Section 20. Duties of attorneys.
It is the duty of an attorney:
Lawyer's Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution
and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on
what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him,
such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of
fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required
by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an
action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive
or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of
the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable
means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to
present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may
be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.
In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
IN MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO
DOCTRINES:
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special education qualifications,
duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so
far as the general public and proper administration of justice is
concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into
in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those
who would seek admission to the bar must be a necessity more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of
the general public.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral
duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good
moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must
be demonstrated at the time of the application for permission to
take the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's
oath of office.
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with
the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan.
The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical
injuries upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university
fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused were
consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application
for probation with the lower court. The application was granted on June 18
1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise
him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He
was allowed and he passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the
attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law. He averred that his
probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation
period did not last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney
and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should
show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the
profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names of the parents or brothers and sisters of
Camaligan from notice.
SPOUSES FRANKLIN AND LOURDES OLBES VS. ATTY VICTOR V DECIEMBRE DE GUZMAN VS. DE DIOS 350 SCRA 320 [2001]

FACTS:
FACTS:
Complainants were government employees. Through respondent, Lourdes
renewed a loan application from Rodela Loans Inc., in the amount of Diana De Guzman filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. De Dios for
P10,000.00. She issued and delivered 5 PNB blank checks, which served as representing conflicting interests. Complainant averred that she engaged
collateral for the approved loan as well as for the future loans. Lourdes the services of respondent in 1995 as counsel in order to form a hotel and
paid respondent P14,874.37 intended to the loan plus surcharges, restaurant corporation. With the assistance of respondent, said
penalties, and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt. corporation was registered with the SEC. Respondent also represented
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up the complainant in one case involving a property of the corporation.
blank checks entrusted to him by writing on those checks amounts that Respondent however averred that since the action involved a property of
had not been agreed upon at all and deposited the same checks which the corporation, she represented complainant to protect the interests of
were dishonored upon presentment because the account is already closed. the corporation, she being its legal counsel. Complainant also averred that
Thereafter, he filed a criminal case against complainants for estafa and for while respondent rose to become president of the corporation, she lost all
violation of B.P. 22. Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for the her investments when her delinquent shares were sold by the corporation
disbarment of Atty. Deciembre and charged the respondent with willful in a public auction upon the advise of respondent. The IBP dismissed the
and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a complaint on the ground that there was no attorney client relationship.
member of the Bar.
ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross misconduct and
violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Whether there was attorney client relationship which may justify holding
respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests.
HELD: YES. Respondent lawyer violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for he seriously transgressed by his malevolent
HELD:
act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts that had not been
agreed upon at all and despite full knowledge that the loan supposed to be
Yes. It was complainant who retained respondent to form a corporation.
secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of
She appeared as counsel in behalf of the complainant. There was also
falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
evidence of collusion between the board of directors and respondent.
Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and professional
Indeed, the board of directors now included respondent as the president.
misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral depravity not
It was also upon her advice that the delinquent shares of complainant
expected from, and highly unbecoming a member of the bar. His
were sold at public auction. The present situation shows a clear case of
propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible.
conflict of interests of the respondent.
His misuse of the filled-up checks that led to the detention of one
petitioner is loathsome. Respondent is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED
from the practice of law.
October 2, 1933
FELIX MELEGRITO, complainant, vs. EUSEBIO C. BARBA, respondent.
VICKERS, J.:
These charges of malpractice filed by Felix Melegrito on behalf of himself
and 230 other persons against Attorney Eusebio C. Barba were referred in
due course to the Solicitor- General for investigation and report. As the
complainants were residents of the Province of Tarlac, the Solicitor-General
entrusted the investigation to the fiscal of that province. At the instance of
the respondent the investigation, after being transferred several times, was
set for April 4, 1933, but the respondent did not appear on that date. The
complainants, accompanied by an attorney, appeared and presented their
evidence, consisting of the testimony of Felix Melegrito and various exhibits.
The provincial fiscal found the respondent attorney guilty of serious
malpractice committed by defrauding the complainants of P8,226, and
recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law and
ordered to return said amount to the complainants. The Solicitor-General in
submitting his report to this court said:
After a careful consideration of the evidence, oral as well as
documentary, presented by the complainant in the case, the
undersigned has found that the conclusions of the provincial fiscal
are supported by the evidence of record, and, accordingly, concurs
in his recommendation.
It appears from an examination of the record that Francisco Gonzales, the
owner of the greater part of the "Hacienda Esperanza", transferred certain
portions of it to his daughters Ramona, Guadalupe, Cristina, and Aurea
Gonzales, and that in 1914 his daughters filed separate applications in the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for the registration of their respective
portions of the hacienda. The registration was opposed by Felix Melegrito
and more than 230 other persons. In due course the opposition was
overruled and the registration of the lands in the name of the applicants was
ordered. The cases were appealed to this court, which remanded them to
the lower court for a new trial and for amendment of the plans. The four
cases were then consolidated with cadastral case No. 22 of the Province of
Nueva Ecija, which had been instituted in the meantime. After additional
evidence had been presented, the lower court again decided in favor of the
applicants. From that decision four groups of opponents appealed to this
court, which affirmed the decision of the lower court on March 30, 1929
(G.R. Nos. 28875-79). 1
In February, 1930, the complainants engaged the respondent attorney to
appeal their cases to the Supreme Court of the United States, and agreed to
pay him P6,500. The respondent sailed for the United States in October,
1930, and returned in March, 1931. While in the United States he went to
Washington and secured a letter of introduction from the Vice-President of
the United States to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands in the
hope of being appointed a member of the Governor-General's staff. It does
not appear that the respondent made any attempt, either in Manila or in
Washington, to take the cases of the complainants to the Supreme Court of
the United States, because, as the respondent states, the decision of this
court had become final and unappealable, and the records had been
returned to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. The only thing which
the respondent did, after examining the record, before leaving for the United
states, was to go to Tarlac and have the complainants sign affidavits
respecting their claims to the land, for which he collected P2.50 from each of
the complainants; seven months after his return from the United States,
when the complainants had already demanded the return of the money
which they had paid him, the respondent petitioned the Governor-General to
order a survey of the boundary line between Nueva Ecija and Tarlac
Provinces. The object of this petition, the respondent asserts, was to show
that the lands claimed by Felix Melegrito et al., were not situated in Nueva
Ecija Province, but in Tarlac. The complainants informed the Governor-
General that they were not interested in having the boundary line between
the two provinces surveyed, but in recovering the money which they had
paid the respondent.lawphi1.net
Felix Melegrito testified at the investigation that he and the other
complainants had paid the respondent or his agents a total sum of P8,226.
Four thousand two hundred and twenty-eight pesos (P4,228) of this amount
is supported by receipts signed by the respondent or his authorized agents.
The respondent denies having received the sum of P8,226 or any such sum,
but in his answer of December 29, 1932 he admitted that he had received
P2,185.
The respondent alleges that after examining the records of the land
registration cases, which had already been returned to the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, he told the complainants that the decision of this
court had already become final and could not be appealed, and that the
amount involved in the different cases was not sufficient to entitle the
claimants to a review in the Supreme Court of the United States, and that in
case of an appeal it would be necessary for the appellants to file a
supersedeas bond, which they said they were unable to do. Although the
decision of this court appears to have been final and unappealable when the
complainants consulted the respondent, we are satisfied that he never so
informed them, but on the contrary led them to believe that the cases could
be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that to prosecute
the appeal to the best advantage it was necessary for him to go to
Washington. The respondent now maintains that he went to the United
States for the purpose of revisiting his alma-mater in Kansas and securing
the capital necessary for the development of a gold mine, and that he went
to the United States at his own expense, but the receipts, Exhibits B, B-1 to
B-6, show that the respondent collected at least P3,530 before he sailed for
the United States; that in September, 1930, the respondent wrote a letter to
Felix Melegrito, Exhibit F, inquiring whether the voyage was to be made or
not, and urging Melegrito to advance P1,000 for the account of the
respondent's compadre in order to make up the agreed amount. The
respondent said that he wished to reach Washington by Christmas. After the
respondent had sailed his wife and his agent, Benito Diaz, collected further
sums from the complainants. Felix Melegrito went to the boat with the
respondent when he sailed for the United States; and respondent's wife and
his agent in their letters to the complainants refer to respondent's voyage
and his arrival in Washington.
The respondent attorney is guilty of malpractice. He collected several
thousand pesos from the complainants for the purpose of taking their cases
to the Supreme Court of The United States, but he never removed said
cases to that court or attempted to do so, because the decision of this court
had already become final and unappealable, and he was guilty of deceit in
concealing that fact from the complainants while collecting fees from them
for the purpose of prosecuting the appeal.
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice of other gross misconduct in such office.
It appears from the testimony of Felix Melegrito that in April, 1931, he made
a demand on the respondent for the return of the money which the
complainants had paid him, and the respondent promised to repay the sum
of P1,500 at once and the remainder at the rate of P50 a month, but that the
respondent has never repaid any sum to the complainants.
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent is suspended from the practice of
law for a period of two years from this date and until he shall have repaid to
the complainants the sum of P4,228, payment thereof to be evidenced by
receipts in due form, which shall be attached to the record of this case.
Chua vs. Mesina; Gross misconduct A.C. No. 4904. August 12, 2004
Facts:
Complainants Ana Alvaran Chua and Marcelina Hsia administratively
charged respondent Atty. Simeon M. Mesina, Jr., for breach of professional
ethics, gross professional misconduct, and culpable malpractice.
Complainants were lessees of the property of respondent's mother.
Respondent's mother defaulted in paying a loan that she obtained in a
bank, thus respondent convinced complainants to help her mother if
paying the said obligation, to which the complainants acceded. It
was agreed among that that in consideration for the act of complainants,
the property which they are leasing will be transferred to their name. The
complainants complied with the terms of the agreement. A deed of sale
concerning such property was executed.
However, to evade liability for paying capital gains tax, respondent
instructed complainants to execute another deed of sale which will be
antedated 1979, wherein the capital gains tax was not yet in effective.
Subsequently, after the execution of the deed of sale, respondents
instructed his clients [complainants] to execute a simulated deed of sale
which will reflect that the property was re-conveyed to his mother.
The cunning acts of respondent did not end there. Respondent went to the
house of complainants and got the owners certificate of title of the said
property which is still under the name of her mother. he promised to the
complainants that he will process the transfer of the property to their
name. Years passed, but respondent never returned the said title to the
complainants.
Meanwhile, another lessee file a criminal case against the complainants
and respondents for falsification. He claims that was also given the
promise that the property will be offered to him before it will be sold to
another, but respondents sold it to complainants without offering to
him. Because of the foregoing circumstances, complainants filed an
administrative case against respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Held:
Yes, said the Court- "This Court finds that indeed, respondent is guilty of
gross misconduct.
First, by advising complainants to execute another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated to 1979 to evade payment of capital gains taxes, he violated his
duty to promote respect for law and legal processes, and not to abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law; That respondent intended to, as he
did defraud not a private party but the government is aggravating.
Second, when respondent convinced complainants to execute another
document, a simulated Deed of Absolute Sale wherein they made it appear
that complainants reconveyed the Melencio property to his mother, he
committed dishonesty.
transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and
discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these
transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or
improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorneys favor.
Respondent having welched on his promise to cause the reconveyance of
the Melencio property to complainants, consideration of whether he
should be ordered to honor such promise should be taken up in the civil
case filed for the purpose, the issue there being one of ownership while
that in the case at bar is moral fitness.
Respondent ATTY. SIMEON M. MESINA, JR. is, for gross misconduct,
hereby DISBARRED.

Third, when on May 2, 1990 respondent inveigled his own clients, the Chua
spouses, into turning over to him the owners copy of his mothers title
upon the misrepresentation that he would, in four months, have a deed of
sale executed by his mother in favor of complainants, he likewise
committed dishonesty.

That the signature of Felicisima M. Melencio in the 1985 document and

that in the 1979 document are markedly different is in fact is a badge of
falsification of either the 1979 or the 1985 document or even both.

A propos is this Courts following pronouncement in Nakpil v. Valdez

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the
business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good
faith. The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise
in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in
business dealings where the parties trade at arms length. Business
TOLEDO VS. ABALOS (A.C. NO. 5141 09/29/1999)
FACTS: This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it
back. Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from
Priscila Toledo,payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per
month. Respondent executed a Promissory Note to guarantee the payment of
said obligation. Respondent failed to pay her obligation despite repeated
demands of the complainant. Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar
Discipline. Although, the respondent received an order from the Commission,
she did not do anything about it. The Commission passed a resolution
recommending the suspension from the practice of law of respondent for a
period of six months for her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the Court
and illustrating her despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer.
ISSUE: Whether or not IBP has jurisdiction to suspend Atty. Abalos.
HELD: YES. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or
disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline
him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. The
recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six
months to be grossly disproportionate to the act complained of , i.e., her failure
to appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. IBP does not
ignore the fact that by virtue of ones membership in the IBP, a lawyer thus
submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization. It was,
however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the
Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her
wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of
this Resolution.
Cojuangco vs Palma A.C. No. 2474 June 30, 2005
Facts: On June 22, 1982, respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma, despite his
subsisting marriage, wed Maria Luisa Cojuangco, the daughter of
complainant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. Thus, the latter filed on November
1982, a complaint disbarment against respondent. Palma moved to dismiss
the complaint. On March 2, 1983, the court referred the case to OSG for
investigation and recommendation. The Assistant Solicitor General heard
the testimonies of the complainant and his witness in the presence of
respondents counsel. On March 19, 1984 respondent filed with the OSG an
urgent motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the final actions of
his civil case for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and his
wife Lisa, poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding, but it
was denied. The OSG transferred the disbarment case to the IBP, the latter
found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath as
a lawyer, hence, was suspended from the practice of law for a period of
three years. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent alleged that he
acted under a firm factual and legal conviction in declaring before the Hong
Kong Marriage Registry that he is a bachelor because his first marriage is
void even if there is judicial declaration of nullity.
Issue: Whether or not a subsequent void marriage still needs a judicial
declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage.
Held: Respondents arguments that he was of the firm factual and legal
conviction when he declared before the HIC authorities that he was a
bachelor since his first marriage is void and does not need judicial
declaration of nullity cannot exonerate him. In Terre vs Terre, the same
defense was raised by respondent lawyer whose disbarment was also
sought. We held:
xxx respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known
that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this court
which holds that purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void an initio is essential. Even if we were to assume, arguendo
merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same
result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his
frist marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the
result that his second marriage must be regarded as bigamous and criminal.
CANON 1 - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence.
RULE 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without
delay.
RULE 1.03. - A judge should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the
independence of the judiciary and should forthwith resist any pressure
from whatever source intended to influence the performance of official
functions.
CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY
AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY
IN ALL ACTIVITIES
RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
RULE 2.02 - A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.
RULE 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.
RULE 2.04 - A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or
administrative agency.
LACHICA V. TORMIS

Facts: Issue:

In an affidavit dated Oct 2, 2003, Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judged
Rosabella M Tormis of the Municipal Trial court of Cebu City, Branch IV,
with abuse of authority. On July 2, 2003, accused Domugho was
apprehended by the police at around 8:45pm and was brought to the
police station for booking and custody at 9:30pm.
On July 3, 2003, complainant was surprised to receive a call from the
accused that she was released from confinement on July 2 at 10:00pm.
Complainant inquired from the police station if an order of release was
issued by the court, but she was informed that the accused was released
because of the phone call the respondent judge made telling the desk
officer that the accused already posted a cash bail. Complainant checked
the case records but the expediente contained no copies of the order of
release. She was only shown a copy of such at 1:00pm. Also, it was only on
430pm of july 3, 2003 that the case records was found.
The police blotter showed no entry of the order of release received was by
the police. Only a notation that there was a posting of the cash bail bond
was entered therein.
Complainant states that it was improper for the respondent judge to
receive the cash bail bond as the function belonged exclusively to the
office of the clerk of court. Also, she claimed that said judge committed an
act of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally order the
release of the accused.
WON respondent judge can be held administratively liable for personally
receiving the cash bail bond for the accused.
Held:
Yes. Section 14, of Rule 114 of the revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states that:
The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in
cash with the nearest collector or internal revenue or provincial, city, or
municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case.
Section 14 exclusively enumerates those officials who are tasked to receive
such bail bond. A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the
deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the
judge.
Respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her
judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the
accused and for deliberately misleading the court by making false
representations. She is suspended from office for 6 months w/o salary and
other benefits and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be
dealt more seriously.

Respondent judge denied the charges. She states that she issued the order
of release at 7pm after accused posted the cash bond. She claimed that
such accused was released because of the order of release and not
because of the phone call. The investigating judge submitted a report
recommending that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P20,000
or suspended for 3 months. OCA agreed with the findings and
recommended the suspension of 3 months.
JUDGE CRISPIN B. BRAVO v ATTY. MIGUEL C. MORALES
These consolidated administrative cases which are in the nature of a
charge and countercharge sprang from the same incident. In A.M. No. P-
05-1950, Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila, Branch 16, charges his former branch clerk of court,
Atty. Miguel C. Morales, now detailed with the Office of the Clerk of Court,
MeTC, Manila, with grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public
officer. In A.M. No. MTJ-1612, on the other hand, Atty. Morales charges
Judge Bravo with grave abuse of authority, slander, harassment, grave
ignorance of the law, inefficiency and grave/serious misconduct.
In his complaint in A.M. No. P-05-1950, Judge Bravo alleged, in gist, the
following:
1. That while serving as the Acting Presiding Judge of MeTC, Manila,
Branch 17, he requested the detail of his branch clerk of court, Atty.
Morales, to the OCC, MeTC, Manila. Later, he recommended to the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) the immediate dismissal of Atty. Morales
from the service for corrupt practices;
2. That since he made the recommendation, he observed Atty. Morales to
have acted discourteously and disrespectful toward him. He relates that
whenever he greets court employees with a "good morning ladies and
gentlemen" after every flag raising ceremony, as was his usual practice, he
noticed Atty. Morales mimicking him in a squeaky comical voice, obviously
to make fun of him;
3. That in the morning of March 22, 2004, before the start of the flag
raising rite at the old MWSS Building in Arroceros, Manila he caught Atty.
Morales about to do his mocking imitating act, prompting him to tell the
latter "tumigil ka"; that he then ordered one of the security guards to
arrest Atty. Morales preparatory to charging him with unjust vexation;
4. That so as not to exacerbate an embarrassing situation, he waited for
the flag raising ceremony to end before apologizing to the crowd for the
incident, only to witness Atty. Morales responding with a shout: "sa akin
hindi ka mag-aapology"(sic) 1
5. That he ignored Atty. Morales outburst and instead instructed the
Officer-in-Charge of the security guards to call the Manila City Hall Police
Detachment, which immediately dispatched PO3 Pacifico Wong and PO2
Jose Rancho; that he briefed both police officers regarding the flag-raising
ceremony incident and about the preceding exchange of charges and
counter-charges filed with the OCA
6. That no arrest was effected on that day owing to the intervention of
MeTC Executive Judge Myra G. Fernandez and 2nd Vice Executive Judge
Tingaraan Guiling who instructed the police officers to maintain the status
quo; and
7. That Atty. Morales sympathizers circulated a manifesto 2 on that same
day denouncing his act as a judge and soliciting support for Atty. Morales
from the Union of the Clerks of Court of the MeTC, Manila; that of the
twenty-nine union members, only three supported Atty. Morales, one of
the three, Atty. Eusebio Yarra, even pointing to the provocative act of Atty.
Morales as the root cause of the incident adverted to.
At his end, Atty. Morales avers in his counter-complaint that Judge Bravo
failed to behave with due restraint when the judge ordered his arrest. As
Atty. Morales argued, unjust vexation is covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, adding that unjust vexation is not a continuing offense and,
ergo, a warrantless arrest could not be effected therefor, let alone by the
responding police officers who have no personal knowledge, as it were, of
the alleged crime.
Upon the Office of the Court Administrators (OCAs) recommendation,
both cases were re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.
Pursuant to a Resolution of the Court dated December 6, 2004, both
parties submitted separate manifestations in which they indicated their
willingness to submit their respective charges for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings thus filed. Pursuant too to another Resolution of September
28, 2005, the Court, upon due motion, ordered the consolidation of A.M.
No. MTJ-1612 with A.M. No. P-05-1950.
In its report, the OCA recommended that Judge Bravo be reprimanded for
abuse of authority and Atty. Morales be fined in the amount of P2,000.00
for conduct unbecoming a government officer.
We find the recommendations of the OCA and the premises holding them
together to be well-taken.
At bottom is the sad spectacle of two officials of the judiciary wasting the
precious hours of the Court, including theirs, that could have otherwise
been devoted to a more salutary productive judicial pursuit rather than on
petty wrangling that has no place in the judicial system. They ought to be
reminded that the nature and responsibilities of the men and women in
the judiciary, as defined in different canons of conduct, are neither mere
rhetorical words nor idealistic sentiments but working standards and
attainable goals to be matched with actual deeds. 3 The Court has
repeatedly stressed that court employees, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, being public servants charged with dispensing justice, should
always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility, if not
maturity. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum, but must also be in accordance with law and court regulations.
They should avoid any act or conduct that would or tend to diminish public
trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with the
dispensation of justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility. 4
An examination of the records of these consolidated cases reveals an
undeniable pervasive atmosphere of animosity between Judge Bravo and
Atty. Morales as evidenced by a number of administrative cases filed by
one against the other. In fact, there are six additional administrative cases
filed by Atty. Morales against Judge Bravo, 5while there are three more
administrative cases filed by the latter against the former. 6 With the
strained relations between the two, it was not inconceivable for Atty.
Morales to make fun of Judge Bravo in front of court employees by
mimicking the latter, making the greeting in a squeaky comical voice, and
for Judge Bravo to retaliate instantaneously by ordering the arrest of his
erring subordinate even before a criminal suit is instituted.
On the charge that Judge Bravo abused his authority, the Court agrees with
the inculpatory findings of the OCA. Judge Bravo indeed overstepped the
bounds of his authority when he ordered the arrest of Atty. Morales on the
basis of a mere intent to sue the latter later for unjust vexation. Being a
dispenser of justice, it behooves Judge Bravo to observe the same rules of
due process in dealing with his subordinates. He should have confined
himself to filing an administrative complaint or a criminal one and let the
wheels of justice run its course. To be sure, Judge Bravo's actuation was
unbecoming a judge who, needless to stress, is expected to exercise
proper restraint and civility in dealing even with insolent subordinates.
We feel, however, that Judge Bravos actuation in the premises does not
amount to grave abuse of authority, as urged by Atty. Morales. Provoked
as the judge was by Atty. Morales insulting conduct, the judge, like any
other normal person, must have been carried away by his emotion. Even
then, his conduct as a judge is not totally excusable. To paraphrase what
we said earlier, a judge, even in the face of boorish behavior from those he
deals with, ought to conduct himself in a manner befitting a gentleman
and a high officer of the court.
The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the fact that all but three
members of the MeTC Clerk of Court circle refused to rally behind Atty.
Morales in his tiff with Judge Bravo, indicating doubtless that the
cumulative effect of his provocative remarks and actions against the judge
were what triggered the unfortunate March 22, 2004 incident.
The foregoing notwithstanding, some form of sanction should still be
imposed on Judge Bravo, reacting as he did in a manner disproportionate
to what Atty. Morales had done, however wrong they might have been.
There being no showing, however, that Judge Bravo had been previously
charged with and found guilty of the same or similar administrative
offense, a reprimand with a warning appears proper.
We likewise agree with the OCAs finding on Atty. Morales guilt for
conduct unbecoming a government employee. His insulting act of
mimicking the judge, in the presence of other court employees, a gesture
calculated to ridicule, is a behavior unexpected of one in the judicial
service. The ideal is for a court employee to be well-mannered, civil, and
considerate in his actuations, more particularly with respect to his relation
to the presiding judge he is assigned under. Here, Atty. Morales' acts went
against the principles of public service and such unpleasant kind of
behavior must not be tolerated if we are to demand the highest degree of
excellence and professionalism among public employees and to preserve
the integrity and dignity of our courts of justice. He failed to live up to the
norms of conduct demanded of his position.

We take this opportunity to remind both Judge Bravo and Atty. Morales
that government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential part of
dispensing justice; civility is never a sign of weakness and courtesy is a
mark of culture and good breeding. Impatience and rudeness have no
place in the government service in which personnel are enjoined to act
with self-restraint and civility at all times. 7

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court resolves to:

(a) REPRIMAND Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan

Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, for abuse of authority;

(b) Impose a FINE on Atty. Miguel C. Morales of the Office of the Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, in the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) for conduct unbecoming a public officer.

Both are hereby STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or

similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
ATTY. CONRADO B. GANDEZA, JR. vs. JUDGE MARIA CLARITA C. TABIN Complainant argued that respondent Judge has no personality to interfere
with the police investigation and only the police investigator has the right
Before us is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainant Atty.
to request for re-examination.
Conrado B. Gandeza, Jr. against Judge Maria Clarita C. Tabin, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Baguio City, for Complainant likewise suspected that respondent Judge may have also
Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge. facilitated the filing of the criminal complaint in court against his driver,
since the complaint was filed in court barely a week after the collision. The
The antecedent facts are as follows:
investigating prosecutor even recommended an exorbitant sum
Complainant alleged that on November 20, 2007, around 9 o'clock in the of P30,000.00 for complainant's driver's liberty. Complainant believed that
evening, a Mitsubishi Galant with plate number UJB 799 driven along the processes have been railroaded to accommodate respondent Judge.
Marcos Highway, Baguio City by Guimba Digermo (Digermo), collided head
Moreover, complainant averred that his wife, a practicing lawyer in Baguio
on with a Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up with plate number XMW 135 driven by
City, at one time saw an employee of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio,
Marion Derez. The Mitsubishi Galant is owned by complainant and his
Branch 2, carrying outside of the court premises, the folder of the criminal
wife, Atty. April B. Gandeza, while the Ssangyong Musso Pick-Up is owned
case filed against their driver. When asked as to why said staff was carrying
by respondent Judge's nephew, Paul N. Casuga.
the case record outside the court's premises, said employee informed her
Complainant recalled that when he arrived at the accident site, he saw that she will bring it to the sala of respondent Judge as the latter requested
respondent Judge conferring with the police investigator. He claimed that for it.
respondent Judge approached him and in a harsh tone accused his driver
In another incident, complainant added that when his wife went to the
to be the one at fault and was under the influence of liquor. Respondent
Philippine Mediation Center (PMC), Baguio City, to move for the
also kept on reminding the police investigator to put in his report the
postponement of the scheduled mediation of the subject criminal case, she
alleged drunken condition of his driver despite complainant's request to
was informed by the clerk that respondent Judge went there and inquired
respondent judge not to prejudge the situation.
about the supposed mediation.
Complainant claimed that at the hospital, while both drivers were being
Complainant insisted that respondent's actions showed her interest in the
subjected to physical examination, respondent Judge, instead of
criminal case without regard to proper decorum. She, in effect, abused her
accompanying her nephew's driver, opted to stand closely beside
judicial position.
complainant's driver and kept on suggesting to the examining doctor that
his driver was under the influence of liquor. He added that when On July 11, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed
respondent Judge came to know the "negative" result of the alcoholic Judge Tabin to submit her comment on the complaint against him.2
breath examination of his driver, she protested and demanded another
In her Comment3 dated September 9, 2008, Judge Tabin denied that she
examination on his driver. Despite his protests and his driver's refusal to
exerted undue influence in the conduct of the investigation. While she
undergo a re-examination, respondent Judge's request prevailed. Later on,
admitted that she did request the police officer that complainant's driver
complainant alleged that a new medical certificate showing his driver was
should be subjected to an alcoholic breath test as done earlier to her
under the influence of liquor was issued upon respondent's insistence.
nephew, she, however, insisted that she did not influence PO3 Jackson U.
Pabillo and the doctor of the Baguio General Hospital into doing the
same.4 Judge Tabin also pointed out that she never made public the fact
that she is a judge, albeit, she admitted that complainant and PO3 Pabillo
knew her as such.5
Respondent Judge also disputed that she used her position in borrowing
the records of the criminal case against Digermo. She explained that at
that time, her sister did not have a lawyer, thus, she asked one of her staff
to borrow the records of the criminal case as there may be developments
in the case that her sister might not be aware of. Respondent added that
she opted to borrow the case records instead, since she did not want to
create the wrong impression that she was exerting her influence on the
conduct of the criminal proceeding. Likewise, she explained her presence
at the PMC by claiming that she merely accompanied her sister there as
the latter did not know PMC's location.
Likewise, Judge Tabin denied that she had a hand in the filing of the case
against Digermo. She disputed that she recommended the amount
of P30,000.00 as bond for his provisional liberty, considering that the
Prosecutor's Office is an independent office.
In a Memorandum6 dated February 5, 2009, due to conflicting statements
of the parties, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint be
referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
for investigation, report and recommendation.
On March 11, 2009, the Court directed the redocketing of the instant
complaint as a regular administrative matter and referred the case to
Executive Judge Edilberto T. Claravall of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, for investigation, report and recommendation.7
During the investigation conducted by the Investigating Judge,
complainant failed to appear.8 Later on, it appeared that the criminal case
against complainant's driver was dismissed after the complainant settled
his differences with respondent Judge.
On November 3, 2009, in his Report,9 Judge Claravall recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Judge Tabin due to insufficient evidence
to prove her guilty of gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a judge.
Judge Claravall pointed out that the charges of Gross Misconduct and
Conduct Unbecoming a Judge are penal in nature; thus, the same must be
proven by convincing proof. The Investigating Judge observed that the act
of Judge Tabin in borrowing the records of the criminal case was an
exercise of her right to information. He is convinced that the actions of
Judge Tabin were just normal reactions of any person who comes in
defense and aide of a relative.
On March 26, 2010, the OCA, however, found Judge Tabin guilty of
violation of Canon 4, Section 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The
OCA reasoned that there was sufficient evidence showing that respondent
Judge is liable for impropriety. Records show that Judge Tabin did not
merely look after the safety of her nephew after the vehicular accident,
but she likewise ascertained that the conduct of the investigation was in
her nephew's favor.10
RULING
While we agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge that
respondent Judge cannot be held liable for gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a judge due to lack of evidence of malice on the part of
respondent Judge, we, however, agree with the findings of the OCA that
Judge Tabin is guilty of impropriety.
As found by the OCA, it was inappropriate for respondent judge to direct
that a second test be conducted on complainant's driver when the first test
resulted in a "negative." Respondent judge cannot interfere in the conduct
of the investigation. Inevitably, as a result of her interference, complainant
suspected that she was influencing the outcome of the investigation as
evidenced by complainant's alleged statement: "Itong ospital na ito, pwede
palang impluwensyahan ng huwes."
Even assuming that respondent Judge did not make public her position as a
judge to the examining doctor or the investigating policeman, the fact that
she knew that said police officer and the complainant had knowledge of
her being a judge should have refrained her from further interfering in the
investigation. She cannot act oblivious as to how and what the public will
view her actions. She should have kept herself free from any appearance
of impropriety and endeavored to distance herself from any act liable to
create an impression of indecorum.
Likewise, respondents act of borrowing court records and accompanying
her sister at the PMC under the guise of extending assistance to her sister
manifested not only lack of maturity as a judge, but also a lack of
understanding of her vital role as an impartial dispenser of justice. She may
have the best intention devoid of any malicious motive but sadly her
actions, however, spawned the impression that she was using her office to
unduly influence or pressure the concerned people to conduct the medical
examination as well as the investigation in their favor.
Indeed, while respondent Judge's concern over the safety of her nephew
and the outcome of his criminal case is understandable, she should not
have disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the expense of the
integrity of the court. Although concern for family members is deeply
ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in
mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving
the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere
appearance of impropriety in all activities.11
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in
a magistrates activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like
Caesars wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondents act
discloses a deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the
Judiciary must exercise in the performance of his official functions and of
his activities as a private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent
to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind
that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under constant
observation.121avvphi1
In a number of cases,13 following the case of Rosauro v. Kallos,14 we ruled
that impropriety constitutes a light charge. Section 11 (C), Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court provides the following sanctions if the respondent is found
guilty of a light charge:
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or;
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to be
irreproachable in conduct and to be free from any appearance of
impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their
official duties, but also in their daily life. For no position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary. The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone
in the Judiciary is to maintain its good name and standing as a temple of
justice. The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct,
act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice which would violate the norm of public accountability or tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary, as in the case at bar.15
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Clarita C. Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City,GUILTY of IMPROPRIETY and is hereby
REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
Maceda v. Vasquez Held:

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993. In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by
the Supreme Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
Facts:
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts and its
the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the review of the following personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated September
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the
18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
by petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
petitioners motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
Ombudsman, respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorneys them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government
Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have separation of powers.
been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioners
been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998, when in
certificates of service to the Supreme Court for determination of whether
truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in
said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the
five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for
Supreme Court has the necessary records to make such a determination.
decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly
The Ombudsman cannot compel the Supreme Court, as one of the three
falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May,
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to
June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to
testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
affidavit-complaint.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by the
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court
Supreme Court an extension of ninety (90) days to decide the
employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must
aforementioned cases.
defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Supreme Court
Issue: for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal
complaint for the alleged falsification of a judges certification submitted
to the Supreme Court, and assuming that it can, whether a referral should
be made first to the Supreme Court