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1 . PEOPLE V. MAGNO
G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision*
of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal
to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.
The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have
been clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official
counsel for the public respondent, thus:
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did
not have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another
problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which
to purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner,
representing Ultra Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private
complainant) Vice President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his
needed car repair service equipment of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)
Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no
sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to
LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President,
Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if
LS Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)
The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be
purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount,
he requested Joey Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the
equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon
Teng who advanced the deposit in question, on condition that the same would be paid as a
short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)
The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee
shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A to serve as security for
the faithful performance of its obligations.
This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the entire
period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p. 17)
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement
whereby LS Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the
corresponding rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation was
completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check
and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon
Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through Joey Gomez not to deposit the
check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks.
Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others,
which were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition,
were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered
with sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15,
1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the
amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the amount of
P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the
garage equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon
Teng was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see
Corazon Teng and promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four
(4) checks were deposited they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-
petitioner was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:
. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violations
of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case
Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant the respective amounts
reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this
Court is intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended
by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to
cover the "warranty deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company.
Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the
Leasing Agreement subject of the high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as
lessee of the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from
the very beginning of the transaction.
By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of
the "purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that
the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for
the equipment. It would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of
equipment on or about the termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he
had to pay the additional amount of the warranty deposit which should have formed part of
the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease
with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor
(Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic constraints
or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should not be charged
against the petitioner.
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as
it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an
unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the
while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed,
supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner
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did not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng,
whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke
suspicion that the transaction is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically
requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty deposit".
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she
who "accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds
for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with
mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs.
Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able
to "sell or lease" its goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who
desperately need petty accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many
instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law,
by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey
to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme
designed to skim off business clients.
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal
sanction of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full
harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble
objective of the law is tainted with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the
lease agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere
accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even
attempt to secure the refund of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement
provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of the lease agreement, the
warranty deposit should be refundable in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash
out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch the nicety of the
alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor
nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and
circumvention of the noble purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as

a means of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich"
scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary
function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential
wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually
committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand,
it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential
wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the
unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal
Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded
upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental
(or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded
and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call
punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of
punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan
Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne,
86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the
accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the
"actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four
(4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an
actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not
be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation could be a menace to society,
should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however,
by the open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of
the "warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:
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Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to
complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement by the
terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was refundable to the accused
as lessee and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any liquidation of said amount
nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed that the amount was already
returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even if true, do not change the fact,
admitted by appellant and established by the evidence, that the four checks were originally
issued on account or for value. And as We have already observed, in order that there may be
a conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the
element of said offense that the check should have been made and issued on account or for
value it is sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check
must have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of the
checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would have
resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in Section 1 of BP
Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there was such an extinguishment in the present
case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not adduced any direct evidence to prove
that the amount advanced by the complainant to cover the warranty deposit must already
have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that
the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show
that he was not guilty of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that
the warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of
Mancor which has interest in the transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit
of her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she
would still pursue collecting from the petitioner since she had in her possession the checks
that "bounced".
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the
warranty deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:

And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22,
which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The court relied on
the rule that in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or not the law had been
violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the conviction of the accused, the
acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and the defenses of good faith and absence
of criminal intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as
required under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the
catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn,
all the more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:
a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain facts
are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)
A cross-reference to the following term shows:
Fitness for Particular Purpose:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or
modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the performance
of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking. It may be deemed
to be part payment and to that extent may constitute the purchaser the actual owner of the
estate.
To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a
pledge to intrust to the care of another.
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The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or convenience, to be
withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the
money so deposited, or the credit which the depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to
its commonly accepted and generally understood among bankers and by the public, includes
not only deposits payable on demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or
not, may be issued, payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid.,
pp. 394-395)
Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied
in this case. From the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the
funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated
this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced
by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament was not communicated to all
the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of which was covered
by L.S. Finance Management.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
2. ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense
of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be
allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges
that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is
justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold
fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic,
it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its
collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and
duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the
process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in
threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous
attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is
when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its
severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA
7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He
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therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof,
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances
as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565,
for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in
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the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable
cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which
they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness
and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on
the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the
law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government
filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001
petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001,
the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process;
and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it
is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation
is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony
with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever
a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that
it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts
must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the
law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure
of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain
whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available
grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally
deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and
palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on
sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that
there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be
no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely
put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the
instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section
2 is sufficiently explicit inits description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or
forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
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2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal
or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the NationalGovernment or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated
or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will
be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of
the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec.
1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating
with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to
have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro,
JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with
his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward
Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR
PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-
8
accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR
HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY
REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR
LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously
none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual
assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal
assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him
to prepare for an intelligent defense.
 9

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature HEREOF.Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more
and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are
process. included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain
and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define REP. ISIDRO: Series.
each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result
in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. REP. GARCIA: Yes.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, [7] unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those REP. GARCIA: Two.
words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not
lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, twice of one enumeration.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of
the words "combination" and "series:" REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
characters. REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different
acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and temporal succession. REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which REP. GARCIA: A series.
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or
series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that
is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime
but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two
acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED
by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the
criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned
in this.
10
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular
crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids
on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning
for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for
it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term
is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to
Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose
or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to
achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer
and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by
multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance
on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that
which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. [10] But the doctrine
does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second
whenever directed against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance
as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is
vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
11
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of
law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as
a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go
unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of
overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put
it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been
held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may

challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the
law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically
are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controvers y
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary.The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, .
. . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is generally
disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
12
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with
which the defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the
Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined
than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in
the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the
law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every
other part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who
voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon
by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional
anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate
and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty
unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among
others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law
meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its
vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the Information
charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits
through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith;
and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the
three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The
phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"

merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the
statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not
mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D.
Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978,
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice
and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is
the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions,
in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified,
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use
of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
13
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the"reasonable doubt" standard is
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application
of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also
important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it
gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep.
Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove
only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does
that not work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed,
say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed
is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is
every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is
an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of
pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these
will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say,
instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is
required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder
the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal
acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to
accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required
under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single
act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element
of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For
example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100
million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain
acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions,
proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder(underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion
the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute
the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution
needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
14
Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed
fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion
that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy"
inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the
proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common
sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to
make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission
that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two
pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder
Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the
Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the
Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an
accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive
element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof
beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no
way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate
crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section
4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element
of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution. [32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear
and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a
criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or
establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a
remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without
invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is
to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental
law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the
sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it
may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the
demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than
enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
15
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid
as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is
not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each
other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum
in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must
be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information
alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that
is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish
the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder. [33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4,
Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster
process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting
the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in
the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the
crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal
laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing
laws as saying what they obviously mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to
have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among
the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a
human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
16
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or
subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the
victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape
or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications
of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context
in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects
and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and
drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators
must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se[37]and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be
absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for violations
of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard
to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for

him to resurrect thislong dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein
that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials
in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption
has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law,
especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if
left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and
institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of
the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice
and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues
of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by
petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial
under a virginal statute. This continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long
time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and
prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
3. PEOPLE V. JUDGE DACUYCUY
17
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an euphemistic phrase, of an
alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed by law but without a specification as to
the term or duration thereof.
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar seeks to set
aside the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, dated September
8,1976, 1 penned by herein respondent judge and granting the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by herein private respondents and docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 5428, as well as his resolution of October 19, 1976 2 denying the
motions for reconsideration filed by the parties therein. Subject of said decision were the
issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975, herein private
respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school
officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case
No. 555 thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and
trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the accused
therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional nature
of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The motion to quash was
subsequently reduced to writing on June 13, 1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal court
denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. 4 On September 2, 1975, private respondents
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the same ground of
lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense considering that Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being
unconstitutional. In an undated order received by the counsel for private respondents on
October 20,1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied. 5
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial
Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal
Case No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction
over the offense charged. Subsequently, an amended petition 7 alleged the additional ground

that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section
32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual
punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and
(2) It also constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private respondents was
related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of Presidential Decree No. 442 previously
transferred from Branch VIII to Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said petition to the latter
branch for further proceedings and where it was subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 5428. 8 On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of
the said amended petitions 9 but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April
20, 1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in
answer to the amended petition. 11
On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision
holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its
violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case
to the former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. 12
Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower court's decision
but the same was limited only to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32
of Republic Act No. 4670. 13 Respondent judge denied both motions for reconsideration in a
resolution dated October 19, 1976. 14
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the following questions
of law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have jurisdiction over violations of Republic
Act No. 4670; and (2) Whether Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the
constitutionality of the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for the adjudication
of the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition.
18
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any
teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner
commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished
by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging
from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no prescribed
period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum
amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of
imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the
court.
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress intended to be
the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision
on the specific term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form
of punishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional measure is thereby created.
In every case where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs
this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have
enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality
of a legislative enactment. 15
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground that the
imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein constitutes a cruel and
unusual punishment, in defiance of the express mandate of the Constitution. This contention
is inaccurate and should be rejected.
We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that

The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel
or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous one
unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community. Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1
Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People vs. Estoista 93 Phil.
647; People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our
Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after the last world war is appropriate here:
The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed
at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and apply to punishments which never existed in America, or which public sentiment
has regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic) inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling,
and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus
be within the prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional prohibition looks
only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to the proportion between the penalty and
the crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs. Estoista, 17
where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and was imposed but with a
recommendation for executive clemency, thus:
... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in view of
certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional
cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound
to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty...
19
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis to declare the
law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what
degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to
await appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no
decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive."
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal provision in
question should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of legislative power, the duration
of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the lattter were
the legislative department of the government."
Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the courts to
determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory construction and not an undue
delegation of legislative power. It is contended that the prohibition against undue delegation
of legislative power is concerned only with the delegation of power to make laws and not to
interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the
discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of the alternative
penalties shall be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of
sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of
crime. In such instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to
use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration
of justice and the application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases." 19 What
respondent judge obviously overlooked is his own reference to penalties "between
designated limits."
In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:
.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the principle that
legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers: Why go
to the trouble of separating the three powers of government if they can straightway remerge
on their own motion? The second is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the

transfer of regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency
"Delegata potestas non potest delegari." 20
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of legislative authority
to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred upon said courts. It is clear,
however, that when the courts are said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal
discretion which is exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when
discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. 21
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of separation of
powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the length of sentence or the
amount of fine between designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. 22
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed that since the
penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the legislature, the court is endowed with
the discretion to ascertain the term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this
postulate. It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference
have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is
an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be
encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which
designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright
intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment,
with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority.
The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment,
without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range,
in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused.
Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially
legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on
separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the
preumption of constitutionality has to yield.
20
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should
be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of
imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It
is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the so-called rule or principle
of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment,
does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative
penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be
considered as a separate and independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised
Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of
penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine
into a term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when
imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine
is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other. 24
2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. 25
With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for violations of said law should be
limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as
the basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the
complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable
by a fine of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former
municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against herein private respondents
falls within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
4. LIANG V. PEOPLE

This resolves petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated January 28, 2000,
denying the petition for review.
The Motion is anchored on the following arguments:
1) THE DFAS DETERMINATION OF IMMUNITY IS A POLITICAL QUESTION TO BE MADE BY THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT AND IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE COURTS.
2) THE IMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS ABSOLUTE.
3) THE IMMUNITY EXTENDS TO ALL STAFF OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB).
4) DUE PROCESS WAS FULLY AFFORDED THE COMPLAINANT TO REBUT THE DFA PROTOCOL.
5) THE DECISION OF JANUARY 28, 2000 ERRONEOUSLY MADE A FINDING OF FACT ON THE
MERITS, NAMELY, THE SLANDERING OF A PERSON WHICH PREJUDGED PETITIONERS CASE
BEFORE THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT (MTC)-MANDALUYONG.
6) THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
This case has its origin in two criminal Informations[1] for grave oral defamation filed against
petitioner, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), alleging that on separate occasions on January 28 and January 31, 1994,
petitioner allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical
staff of ADB. On April 13, 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, acting
pursuant to an advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs that petitioner enjoyed
immunity from legal processes, dismissed the criminal Informations against him. On a petition
for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
160, annulled and set aside the order of the Metropolitan Trial Court dismissing the criminal
cases.[2]
Petitioner, thus, brought a petition for review with this Court. On January 28, 2000, we
rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition for review. We ruled, in essence, that the
immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts
21
performed in an official capacity. Furthermore, we held that the immunity cannot cover the
commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.
On October 18, 2000, the oral arguments of the parties were heard. This Court also granted
the Motion for Intervention of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Thereafter, the parties were
directed to submit their respective memorandum.
For the most part, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration deals with the diplomatic immunity
of the ADB, its officials and staff, from legal and judicial processes in the Philippines, as well
as the constitutional and political bases thereof. It should be made clear that nowhere in the
assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even remotely. The issue in this case, rather,
boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made by petitioner were uttered while
in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case to fall squarely under the
provisions of Section 45 (a) of the Agreement Between the Asian Development Bank and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Regarding the Headquarters of the Asian
Development Bank, to wit:
Officers ands staff of the Bank, including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank, shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
(a) Immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.
After a careful deliberation of the arguments raised in petitioners and intervenors Motions
for Reconsideration, we find no cogent reason to disturb our Decision of January 28, 2000. As
we have stated therein, the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as
falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel. Petitioner
argues that the Decision had the effect of prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation
against him. We wish to stress that it did not. What we merely stated therein is that slander,
in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of
whether or not petitioners utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to
determine.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioner
and intervenor Department of Foreign Affairs are DENIED with FINALITY.
5. PEOPLE V. LACSON
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the Resolution[2] dated
May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said
court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with
multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as Manuel
Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who
was 16 years old, Ray Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren
Sorronda, who was 14 years old,[3] Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the
Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri,
former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members
of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed petitioners motion for
reconsideration.[4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express consent of the
respondent as he himself moved for said provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for
judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also
held therein that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the requirements
for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused;
(2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-
year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the filing
of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to the offended parties were given
before the cases of respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there
were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7)
22
whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or
beyond the 2-year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to be first determined
whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or
from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended parties, or from the date of
effectivity of the new rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the
two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with the
said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the State for its
inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in court. However, the State is not
precluded from presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-
year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the essential
requirements for its application were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution
of March 29, 1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted in his pleadings
filed with the Court of Appeals and during the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion
to dismiss said cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of
the victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge
Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express consent to the provisional
dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion
and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph of the new rule.

The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be remanded to the RTC
to determine whether private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the respondents motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause. The
records allegedly indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy
of the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor
Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the private complainants to
represent them at said hearing. It is their contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the
purported affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations
therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and
Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal
of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent
and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal
cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the public and private
prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it
was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on
the motion for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal
actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants
merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
23
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and before the Court of
Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first
paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a
provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move
for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in
the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express
consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from
subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived,
the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become
permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has
control of the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy
of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive,
direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning.[7]
Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the

case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the
accused to a provisional dismissal of the case.[8] The mere inaction or silence of the accused
to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object to a provisional
dismissal[10] does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On
the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of
the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the
same on the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such revival or refiling is barred by the
statute of limitations.[13]
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the refiling of the
Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same offense or an offense
necessarily included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary investigation.[14]
However, in a case wherein after the provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may
have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a
new preliminary investigation[15] must be conducted before an Information is refiled or a
new Information is filed. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the
original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same
offense or necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original
charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the
accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be
accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called
by the Rules of Court to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but
essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.[16]
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first
paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of prosecution
24
witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this
Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a need for the trial court to
conduct a personal determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for
its examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court shall have
personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued
against the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant should be recalled by
the trial court. He then prayed therein that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be issued
directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing
scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of this incident.
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18]
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere
provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply filed with the Court of Appeals,
respondent emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for
Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-accused in the
said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the case.
On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner are: (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2)
that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the meantime
until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case
was made with the consent of the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto
attached and made integral part hereof as Annex A.[19]
 25

During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the respondent, through counsel, Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
categorically, unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss
the criminal cases nor did he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus: ATTY. FORTUN:

JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset was simply a
judicial determination of probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge Agnir, upon
the presentation by the parties of their witnesses, particularly those who had withdrawn their
affidavits, made one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in probable cause
for purposes of the issuance of an arrest warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except when it is with the express conformity of the accused.
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any order, or any statement, which
would normally be required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, including other
provisional dismissal. My very limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me
that a judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the
accused to come forward, and the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a
provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:

ATTY. FORTUN: You represented the petitioner in this case?

That is correct, Your Honor. ATTY. FORTUN:

JUSTICE SALONGA: That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort which the good Judge Agnir,
who is most knowledgeable in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional dismissal or
And with notice to the offended party. the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal of the case.

ATTY. FORTUN: JUSTICE GUERRERO:

That is correct, Your Honor. Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a judicial determination
of probable cause?
JUSTICE SALONGA:
ATTY. FORTUN:

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is no probable cause what
should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I
have a copy of that particular motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial determination of probable cause
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an
order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of
the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this
incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court, precisely addressed your prayer
for just and equitable relief to dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
26
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did
not agree to the provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any assent to the
provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any motion for reconsideration
of the order of Judge Agnir that the case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that my client had already been
arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the dis missal, Your
Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any further step
in addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further because it probably could
prejudice the interest of my client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the
respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the Sandiganbayan
without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle,
the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that warrants for his arrest not
be issued. He did not move for the dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs
claim.[21]
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in the Court of Appeals
are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating his admissions
absent evidence of palpable mistake in making such admissions.[22]

To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 would be to add to
or make exceptions from the new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included therein.
This the Court cannot and should not do.[23]
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the hearing
thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as
mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes
involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the
heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs
of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor
who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable
them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof
of such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement
of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs
of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion on valid grounds, including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the
accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right
to due process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal
of the case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to
threaten and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine
jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and
other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability
of the accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent
lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and
examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims
were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be
stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing
on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor
was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were
separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by
27
them, including those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of
Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as well no proof
in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the victims of said motion or of
the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as
private prosecutor,[25] he did so only for some but not all the close kins of the victims,
namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita
Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed
their respective affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no appearance for the heirs of Alex
Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the
heirs of the victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing
the said cases. In fine, there never was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public
prosecutor and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the
respondents motion and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the
respondents motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in the appellate
court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when
Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the
second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
State can thus revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new
Informations for multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent expressly
consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and
all the heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion before the hearing
thereon and were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the
eleven cases, the two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply
the time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-accused
would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish
the States substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple murder. They posit that
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file

the criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only had
two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said cases. When the new rule took
effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had one year and three months within which to
revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for
multiple murder under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily
reduced. They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code and the new
rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently relied on the
prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair
warning that it would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a retroactive
application of the new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution
of May 28, 2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no substantive
right of the State that may be impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question
since [t]he States witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the
prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in April 2001 for
them to do so.[29] According to the respondent, penal laws, either procedural or substantive,
may be retroactively applied so long as they favor the accused.[30] He asserts that the two-
year period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more
than reasonable opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.[31] In any event, the State is
given the right under the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the Information in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not broaden the substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the State
because the prohibition against the revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year
periods provided therein is a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of
a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover,
he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify or negate
the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of
Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has already been filed against the
accused, which filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under Article 90.[32]
28
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of limitations.
Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its
right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such statutes are considered
as equivalent to acts of amnesty founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not
be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses
and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed
beyond availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes are jurisdictional and are
essential elements of the offenses covered.[34]
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a special procedural
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of the
given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.[35]
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a
criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the
timeline under the new rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or
waived its right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal becomes ipso
facto permanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the same crime or another crime
necessarily included therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety as well as the
expenses in any new indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-
year or two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the delay.[39] By the
same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the accused because the trial is not
concluded within the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code
are not thereby diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred
by the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the effect is
basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of the state
to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto be deprived of
his libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action which the state had
acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the crime had created in the

offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil
remedies usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and that inferentially
is held to abate the right which such remedy would enforce, and perfect the title which such
remedy would invade; but this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has
against the offenderthe right to punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred,
and declares that this right and this liability are at an end. [41]
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be applied retroactively. As
applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one who has
committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any
particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied retroactively if to do so
would work injustice or would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the
United States Supreme Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the
injustice of hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which a statute is
fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible,
wrongful, and injurious consequences.[45] This Court should not adopt an interpretation of a
statute which produces absurd, unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are
to be construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied.
In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept in mind and the statute
should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose.[47]
29
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed to enhance and
implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied
retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors, such as the history of the new
rule, its purpose and effect, and whether the retrospective application will further its
operation, the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the
administration of justice and of criminal laws in particular.[48] In a per curiam decision in
Stefano v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in
determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court should be given
retrospective or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law
enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two years under the
new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year
or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on
first impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of
the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice
to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and
of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period
for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and
notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is
shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice.[50] The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-
bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules and
approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal justice
system and the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the

deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of
either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof
or with a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times
when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control
of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of
public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to
public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually operates in
his favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is
hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
expire.[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or reduce the
capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown
dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult.[54] The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time
from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case does not
terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time may dis rupt
or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association,
subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a
normal life because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those
penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence.[55] He may also
lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it
may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire
criminal justice system.[56]
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise that plagued
the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the accused;
not for the accused only.
30
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-
year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his
copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the
intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule
took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the
State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to
revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new
rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two
years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases.
This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus
prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and
wrongful results in the administration of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation
of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and
the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that
the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was
negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United
States Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law
and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the State and the accused.
It should not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the
time-bar therein provided merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an
injustice of hardship to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general
and of criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a
case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date
of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the
new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given

a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the
criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case
before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled
to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts,[58] the concept of fairness must not
be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v.
Villon,[59] this Court emphasized that the judges action must not impair the substantial rights
of the accused nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court
further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the
accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged
must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice;
and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the
party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to
both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were
filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well within the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition
of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED
to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
6. GO V. DIMAGIBA
31
Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely
establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (BP 22), the Bouncing Checks Law. When the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone -- instead of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the
Circular requires a review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to
pending or future litigations. It is not a penal law; hence, it does not have retroactive effect.
Neither may it be used to modify final judgments of conviction.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October
10, 2001[2] and the October 11, 2001[3] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5),
Baguio City.[4] The October 10, 2001 Order released Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from
confinement and required him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. The October
11, 2001 Order disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the
instant petition for Habeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail
Warden is hereby ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless
he is being held for some other lawful cause other than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus
dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of Court, MTC 4, Baguio City.
Further, the petitioner is required to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 in lieu of his
imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the Joint Judgment rendered by MTC 4 dated
July 16, 1999.[5]
The Facts
The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner
Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or
payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed.[6] Dimagiba was
subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22[7] under separate Complaints
filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.[8] After a joint trial, the
MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases.
The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of the
prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for
each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the amount of One Million Two
Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum
commencing from 1996 after the checks were dishonored by reason ACCOUNT CLOSED on
December 13, 1995, to pay attorneys fees of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.[9]
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.[10] On May 23,
2000, the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction.[11] There being no further
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of
Finality of the Decision.[12]
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for
the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of
Execution to enforce his civil liability.[13]
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He
prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing
that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on
him.[14] The arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on February 28, 2001.[15]
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and
directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.[16] On September 28, 2001,
he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition[17] for a writ of habeas
corpus. The case was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001.
Copies of the Order were served on respondents counsels and the city warden.[18]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
32
Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the
immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000
in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not
touched upon.[19] A subsequent Order, explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of
the writ of habeas corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001.[20]
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[21] and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,[22] which
allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22
violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this
rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that (1) he was
a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a
result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the
levy of his properties.[24]
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders
dated October 10 and 11, 2001.[25] That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.[26]
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.[27]
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts consideration:
1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive
decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence
Mittimus, dated September 28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4,
Baguio City, and in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from confinement in jail for the service
of his sentence under the said final and conclusive judgment;
2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the
Petition for Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the
beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the
Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x

3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court
Circular No. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million
and two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) up to double the said amount
or (P2,590,000), not just the measly amount of P100,000; and
4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in hearing and deciding [Dimagibas] Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice
and without affording procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the
Office of [the] City Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the Solicitor General.[28]
In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for habeas corpus
was validly granted. Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues as they intertwine with this
main question.[29]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which
individuals are deprived of liberty.[30] It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus
deliver them from unlawful custody.[31] It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is detained.[32]
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by
virtue of a valid judgment.[33] However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed
when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional
circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
33
in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3)
the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.[34]
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in
Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not
imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those
rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From
his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence
in a Motion for Reconsideration[35] of the MTCCs Execution Order and in a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.[36] Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground
that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked
in the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural
infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions,
in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he
effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable
court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that
had already become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum
shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of
instituting a different action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Preference in the
Application of Penalties
for Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less
than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the
amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.[37]

SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,[38] established a rule of preference in
imposing the above penalties.[39] When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may
be considered as the preferred penalty.[40] The determination of the circumstances that
warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only.[41] Should the judge deem
that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.[42]
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The competence
to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.[43]
Inapplicability of
SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-
AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a first time offender.[44] This circumstance is, however,
not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone.
The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.[45] It is the
trial courts discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-
2001 explains thus:
x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application
of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and
the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence,
the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of
a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
x xx xx xx xx
2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of
a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose
34
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged
retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.[46] On this
point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal
protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly situated.[47]
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to
the accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,[48] has been expanded in
certain instances to cover special laws.[49]
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden of
Batangas City,[50] which we quote:
Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to
benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is
misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit
her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its
effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No.
12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the
purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good
faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance
which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.[51]
Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for
the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual

circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the
Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those
convicted by final judgment.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision
against the accused.[52] That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact
or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial
court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires
a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the
judgment has become final and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances
from which respondents conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well
within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of
Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the
jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws[53] does not apply for the same reasons as those on
retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the
penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which
penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this
matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial
argument to support his contention.[54]
Modification of Final
Judgment Not Warranted
The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,[55] in which the final judgment of
conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence of
imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case proceeded from an Urgent
Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event,[56] not from an unmeritorious petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The Court exercised in that case its
authority to suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment when warranted or made
imperative by the higher interest of justice or by supervening events.[57] The supervening
event in that case was the petitioners urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one
35
year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have
been equivalent to a death sentence.[58]
The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondents supposed
unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by
hypertension, cited by the RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order,[59] is totally bereft of
substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did not make any such allegation in his
Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and
Comment submitted to this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis
alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.[60] Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,[61]
he theorizes that answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the settlement
of the debt.
Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that convicting the
accused who, two years prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from
which the checks originated) was contrary to the basic principles of fairness and justice.[62]
Obviously, that situation is not attendant here.
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties
of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated with his conviction.[63]
Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior
to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an indication that he was
in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his
appropriate penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.[64] What is punished in the latter is not
the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or
were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.[65] The Court reiterates the reasons why
the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized:
The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The
effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The

mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a
thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking
system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.[66]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondents
Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio
City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence.
7. LONEY V PEOPLE
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the Resolution
dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001 Decision affirmed the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash
Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez (petitioners). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and
Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations ,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in
mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque.
At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It
appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994,
tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Article 91(B),[4] sub-paragraphs 5
36
and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067),[5]
Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976
(PD 984),[7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA
7942),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property.[11]
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations
were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act;
(2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when
the incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain
allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 (Joint Order), the MTC[12] initially deferred ruling on
petitioners motion for lack of indubitable ground for the quashing of the [I]nformations x x x.
The MTC scheduled petitioners arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners
motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 (Consolidated Order), granting
partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD
1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article
365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to mine tailings which
were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach caused on
the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to
prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and
condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued
on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove the
single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution Law which
are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving
the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the Philippine

Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance
Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same set of evidence is required in
proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after
taking into consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that
as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of
Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for [v]iolation
of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067) should be dismissed/quashed
because the elements constituting the aforesaid violations are absorbed by the same
elements which constitute violation of the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the Water Code;
and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x
are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for
[v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be
maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless
imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law
punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the
[v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence
resulting to [sic] damage to property.[13]
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29 May
1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing to be
arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the charge for
violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it
maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners
manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of not guilty
pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court, Boac,
Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations
37
for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public
respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the
Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public
respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents motion, Branch 38
ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with petitioners petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondents appeal but
denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed
the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated.
Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be no
absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these laws
are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation are not the
same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in
the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the information[s] filed
against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a well-established rule in
this jurisdiction that
A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar
prosecution under the other. x x x.
x xx x
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are
different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not although they stemmed from a single act.[15]

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94
acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD 1067,
PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC proceed from and are based on a single act
or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2)
the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in People v. Relova.[16]
Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in the charges for violation
of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts complained of in the charge for
violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners should
only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.[17]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94s ruling. The
appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the aforementioned
Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
x xx x
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].
x xx x
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened the
doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against multiple
prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with respect to the variances
in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court, however, decided
the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now
under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the
same section. x x x
38
x xx x
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench since
the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and distinct
laws which are national in character.
x xx x
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the laws by which the
petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements of
each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
x xx x
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give rise
to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the
Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally
finds no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its
Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN MAINTAINING THE
CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE
CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION CONTROL LAW
(P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE

REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF
POLLUTING THE BOAC AND MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND MULTIPLE CHARGES
CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986]
THAT AN ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES
WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED
BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT
OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND
IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN
THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE,
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.][19]
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one
offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
39
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense.[21]
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the
filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.[23] Here,
however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information
charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a
ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed from
and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru
dumping of mine tailings and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the
other charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence is common among them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might
offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying
the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit to this rule is
the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense.[25] In People v. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or more) offenses
arising from the same act are not the same
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code)
define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.[28] However,
for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with
one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD
984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which
petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the
dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without
prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence
of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942 (Philippine Mining Act)
and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly prosecuted for violating the Water
Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its
Environmental Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of
actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the
accused must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of
mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions
of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure
the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If
there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that
Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they
will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the
Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and
imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not
required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine
tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much more from
40
violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental Compliance Certificate.
Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those
punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in se.[29]
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the
same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the charges
for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such
as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita
crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a
felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the
special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution
contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts
statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.
This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had
been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving
rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within
the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in
Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:

The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not the same as
theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an attempt
to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information.
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear both from
the express terms of the constitutional provision involved which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act. x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners position is that it
must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973
Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence
of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second
offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV
(22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against
double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be
different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised
Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x x[30]
(Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on a
single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also
because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits
41
multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the
same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November 2001 and
the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
8. GARCIA V. CA
This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court2of Alaminos City,
Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.3
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial
elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de
Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b). The information reads:
That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing period during the May 8,
1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer
Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor
Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and
Francisca de Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial
candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998)
votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159)
precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos. 008417,
008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one thousand nine hundred twenty-

one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423
and Certificate of Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand seventy-
seven (5,077) votes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency
of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
x xx
5. And finally, on the person of Arsenia B. Garcia, the Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing
the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering
that this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however,
accused Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer
disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.
The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the Provincial Warden is ordered
to commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila,
until further orders from the court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months
to one (1) year.
42
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal
assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY,
THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF
COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED,
AND THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER WAS THE
ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.
II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING
THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.
III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED
THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. "7", WHEN THE
DUTY WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.
IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR
INTENTIONAL.7
Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous, based on
speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no
motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.
Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of
an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?
Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the
acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the
other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes
that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable
only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether
the law has been violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for
reasons of public policy.10
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides:
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses
enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following
shall be guilty of an election offense:
x xx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers,
increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of
the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or
deduct such tampered votes.
xxx
Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even errors and
mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of
votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and
miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the
number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice
and intent to injure another.
43
Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the
law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear.13Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.
Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board of Canvassers
of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results
thereof were sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was then recorded in the
Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity as Chairman, reading the figures appearing
in the results from the precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board,
entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the appellant. Six Statements of
Votes were filled up to reflect the votes received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of
the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each precincts were entered by
accused Viray in the Statements of Votes, these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and
de Vera with the use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding machine tapes were
handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes received by each candidate in the
precincts listed in each Statement of Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the
proper column in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators accused Palisoc and de
Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all Statement of Votes.
6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the grand total was
reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same and accused Viray enters the figure
read by appellant in the column for grand total in the Statement of Votes.14

Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of Votes (SOV) for
each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of votes received in the
precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as an issue.
At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of the subtotals to
arrive at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No.
008423.15The grand total of the votes for private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000 votes less than the number of votes private
complainant actually received. This error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC)
No. 436156 signed by petitioner, Viray and Romero.16
During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who announced the
figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused Viray in his capacity as
secretary of the board.17Petitioner likewise admitted that she was the one who prepared the
COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing the COC even if it was
not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.18
Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of Canvassers had no
idea how the SOV (Exhibit "6") and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921
votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners
concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes. Her failure to
exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the
concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the
law.19
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private
complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not
relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing
of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already punishable under the said
provision.20
At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the appellate court.
The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court
of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where
the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter coincide.21
44
Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the
board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would
result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial
candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of
canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.22
In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.23
As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of
6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes.
The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a
decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is
substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error
results from the mere transfer of totals from one document to another.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one
year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
9. PEOPLE V. ALFREDO DE GUZMAN
BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such
intent, the felony may only be serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established
through the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before, during and after the
assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on September 27,
2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide

committed against Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered on September 10, 2003 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-
MD.2
Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten oclock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter
Alexander) was fetching water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St.,
Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter Alfredo), the brother of
his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter Lucila), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed
Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, Pasensya ka
na Mang Alex and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took
a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down
and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a container, Alfredo suddenly
appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his
body and begging for help. Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino
immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and brought him to the
Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately
rendered medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said
hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said
hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to the
Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left
side, and about one (1) cm. long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the
fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about two (2) cm. The
second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which
resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a
thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician
who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal
and could have caused Alexanders death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn, July 8,
1998, p.8).
45
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December
25, 1997 at around midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At
that point, he accidentally hit Alexanders back, causing the latter to throw invective words
against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the
ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latters face.3
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo
De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., JUNIOR, guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code and
in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as
MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM .
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant compensatory damages in the
amount of P14,170.35 representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proven.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt; that intent to kill, the critical element of the crime charged, was not established; that
the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger during
the fistfight between them; that he did not inflict the stab wounds, insisting that another
person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries
on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly found guilty.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioners conviction, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007.6
Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or
mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the
qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code , as
amended, is present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying
circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be present, we immediately proceed to
ascertain the presence of the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between
him and Alexander. He claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally
emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted minor abrasions on
Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be
held liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element
to characterize the crime as homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such
intent to kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries from the
crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently
shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill
the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is
a specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct
or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is
discerned by the courts only through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of
the accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we
considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the
means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by
the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing
46
of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the motive of the
offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.10
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur
with them. Contrary to the petitioners submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were
not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result of a fistfight between them.
The petitioner wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records
indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper
left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioners attack was unprovoked
with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly
proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on
Alexanders chest being sufficient to result into his death were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of
execution that should produce the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical attention accorded to
Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and
appellate courts on the credibility of Alexanders testimony. It is not disputed that the
testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to support the conviction
of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when the lone witness is
the victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always
regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek
justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the
manner in which the latter committed the crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the
petitioners mere denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible
physical evidence corroborating Alexanders statements. Under the circumstances, we can
only affirm the petitioners conviction for frustrated homicide.
The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty of Six
(6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and
One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM 12 fixed by the RTC erroneous despite the CA

concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a
minimum term.13 The maximum term is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the minimum
term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code for the offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code,14
frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower to reclusion temporal,
the penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances present, however, prision mayor in its medium
period from eight years and one day to 10 years is proper. As can be seen, the maximum
of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA was not
within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence
is four years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as the maximum.
The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of P14,170.35 as
compensatory damages representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he
has duly proven.15 We need to revise such civil liability in order to conform to the law, the
Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we emphatically declared
to be imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused,
and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery. We explained
why in the following manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under
Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state:
(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused
and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory
after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages
caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been reserved or waived. Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves
seek the correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
47
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also the duty to correct
at any time a matter of law and justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the
parties are properly entitled to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights and
obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such
rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and
equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of
conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the
Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and
set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.17
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender
committed violence that nearly took away the victims life. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act for omission.18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly
recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries.19 Towards that end,
the Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that P30,000.00 is a reasonable award
of moral damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
P30,000.00.21 Both of these awards did not require allegation and proof.
In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner shall earn interest of 6%
per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment by the accused.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006 finding
petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision
correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum;
ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00; moral

damages of P30,000.00; and compensatory damages of P14,170.35, plus interest of 6% per
annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
10. VILLAREAL V. PEOPLE
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10
February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part to the
brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his
senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a
special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of
the law was to discourage members from making hazing a requirement for joining their
sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to
counteract the exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[5] Within a
year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick
Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe
Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval
Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito
Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental
principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by
law.[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the
populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting
its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to
resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of
the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v. People),
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R.
Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
FACTS
48
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are
as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto
Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa
(neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites . The latter
were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their briefing, they were
brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from
the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The
neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites
included the Indian Run, which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows
of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the
neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched
while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes
were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty of
lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with
fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies
Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on
the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the
Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit
on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper
and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were
subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After
a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
 49

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the
neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport. 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they In Criminal Case No. C-38340
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. 4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans: 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.[11]
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda) On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo) with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi) against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of conspiracy by
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos) the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman) the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away,
16. Antonio General (General) so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez,
De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero,
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual
guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of 30,000 as indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They
were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of
50,000 and to pay the additional amount of 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16] Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17] On 25 October
2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.[19]
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated
10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction
absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.[20]
50
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice
of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13
March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by
petitioner does not survive the death of the accused.
G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21]
Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA
sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was
deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that
served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date
since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial.
According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived because he was
justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of
the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted,
like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were
not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the
official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that
the chairperson of the initiation rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the
initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling.[24] Further, petitioner echoes the
argument of the Solicitor General that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal
could not have resulted in Lennys death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that,
on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be
considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death
of the victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that
Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did
not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss
of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his
utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the psychological initiation. He

then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it
was not true and that he was just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the
neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him
to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of
compassion and concern for the victims well-being.
G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10
January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the
injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally
liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29]
The said article provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal
liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of
the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P.
Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal
Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal
51
Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the
26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For
various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost
12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert
their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the
prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence
were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.
ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial
of due process;
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
liability of each accused according to individual participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
DISCUSSION
Resolution on Preliminary Matters
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People
In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this
Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties
is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term personal
penalties refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term

pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability
predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However,
civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]
Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against
him deemed closed and terminated.
G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for
accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of
October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that it will not entertain any postponement and
that all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at
all times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present
evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his
client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel
would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37]
Because of this development and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should
be ready at all times down the line, the trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on the
next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally assigned dates. The original dates were
supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon
was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel
filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously scheduled
case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally assigned to his
clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated the
Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the
Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present
evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.[41]
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the
trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the
25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned
trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to
present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to
him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates;
52
that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial
court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation
of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel This constitutional right
includes the right to present evidence in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present
and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled
due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and
upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but
Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued
an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation
of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present
evidence because of his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In
ruling against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomos
non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present
for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates
x xx xx xx xx
Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed
as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such
waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to
present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court
is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of
a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply
warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court
must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences

of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to
deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to
explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave penalty
is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is indispensable
so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46]
(Emphasis supplied)
The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused
General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the
succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At
any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it
really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out
of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-
assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process.
Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal
case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso,
we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no
procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as
a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if
the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]
We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at
bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would substantially
prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the
arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant
to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of
the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation
in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were
part of the traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not
53
outside the official activity of the fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not request
for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice
to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case
for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on
the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue.
Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall
proceed to decide it.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not
have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable
period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy
of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court
had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that
the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and
Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the
movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require were not
at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[51]
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious,
capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is
attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining
the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The
conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered
are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the
prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the
right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an
appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of
double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the
case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a
petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness

thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of
jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from attaching.[62]
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy
trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors
contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:
x xx xx xx xx
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the
prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure
certified true copies of the same.
x xx xx xx xx
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the
delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to
speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.
x xx xx xx xx
[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the
case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the
order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is glaring
from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already
issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the
complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with
the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order
dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is
not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August
5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it
was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused
Concepcion x x x.
x xx xx xx xx
54
It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period of
almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for the
pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on
January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17,
1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length
of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
constitution frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)
This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and
De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial
trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after
arraignment.[66]
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity
of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to
an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused
to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition of
cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it
must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for
a decade already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records
that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez,
Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano.
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that
when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or

conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot
again be charged with the same or an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon
the law of reason, justice and conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in
idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of
jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United
States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional
right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of
law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the
following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court;
(c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted,
or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants
express consent.[75]
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine
has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes
as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with
accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
55
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And
finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the
hope of securing a greater penalty.[76] We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.[77]
This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal
of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized
exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of
mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]
The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for
the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as
to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the accused
cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]
The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to
the Petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because
private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the public
respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored
evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The
Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon
and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[87]
In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave
abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated
the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ

of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to
deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.
We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the
four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91] We have
also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon
a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave
as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those
instances of grave abuse of discretion.
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the
CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds
inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result of
the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of the
death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the
incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity
of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this period
must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act
charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said
period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries
[People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this
Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda
and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations
included)
The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of
the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the
incapacity or medical attendance required.[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced.
A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of slight
physical injuries, because the victims injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required
medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even
serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical
injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.
56
On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According
to the court, the four accused were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment
undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI
medico-legal officers findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the
multiple traumatic injuries he suffered from the initiation rites.[100] Considering that the CA
found that the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it was
patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which
is a light felony.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person
is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical
injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the
legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to
discretion.
The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore
tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable
penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction
of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article
365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that
the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death
occurs.[102]
Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof
that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he
suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all
those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries
on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore give
due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.

Resolution on Ultimate Findings
According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles
263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo
found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members
were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical
injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]
The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have
been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to
the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore,
were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused
Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical
injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.
The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously,
or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man
driven by his own desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and
psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in
order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing
Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping
intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely
known as hazing.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The classical theory
posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose
between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable
for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.[107] The basic postulate of the
classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their
actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal
acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage
in committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral
blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful
purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is not enough to
57
do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that
the act be committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with
power to choose between two things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the
ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between
a licit and an illicit act.[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to
do a certain act.[117]
The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind
and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the
latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the
moving power that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a
particular means to produce the result.[121] On the other hand, the term felonious means,
inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With
these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to
malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden
act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or
omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice
aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[125]
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article
8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it is to
be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or malice. The phrase
coming to an agreement connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to
another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal
negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the
result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs
an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act,
which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by
means of culpa.[128]

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent.[132] Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of accident,
natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or
criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified
as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said that,
throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations
ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can
be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European
universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of
hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were
tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the
recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these
values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends historical
legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through
hazing.[141]
Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join
an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular
chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.[143] During the
program, neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the
chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to
maintain a specified grade point average; to participate in the organizations activities; and to
show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and
alumni members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve
hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as
prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte,
58
initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization may refer to such a person is
generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial,
silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147] It encompasses different forms of
conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire
membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or psychological
suffering or injury.[149]
The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago,
our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as
a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by
confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology
was brought home to each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that
initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a
series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They were made to
go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It
would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi
and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero
was made to sign membership papers with the his own blood.[156]
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of
hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on
Lenny Villa.
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat
or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901,
General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the
academy during his second year at West Point.[158]
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured
during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz
membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the mattress-rotating barrel
trick.[160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board
onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to

climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-
paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162]
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto
the neophyte paratroopers chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in
pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the
victims.[164]
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity
members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand
strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks;
blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on
their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity
in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to
the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station circle
of physical abuse.[167]
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168] The hazing
included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with
water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3)
being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and
other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the
fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours;
and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as they
ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170]
He participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and
torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]
In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries
from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other
initiates went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the
buttocks for more than 200 times.[173]
59
In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.[174]
The pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted
in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and
caned on his face and buttocks.[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted
for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last
two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane
strikes during the four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed
out.[179]
The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by fire, through
which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.[180]
Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this
process enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence, reinforces
and ensures the future of the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership
opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and
common cause.[182]
Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.[183]
The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress
prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois
passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an
injury to his [or her] person therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the
Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of
2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187] Most
anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light
consequences for even the most severe situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing
laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death
or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three

years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193] As an
element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls
under the category of serious bodily injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is
imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence
being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless
the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which
case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not
to exceed seven years.[197]
In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of
not more than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in
serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been
convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to
exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise
be deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided
therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death
of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years,
or both.[204]
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was
no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General
Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since
there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not
there is a contextual background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for
intentional felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception
of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus
60
interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this
finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that
the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict
physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he
had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his
fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court
said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to
have had a hand in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they
acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the
death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their
acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of
witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to what
to expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and
their batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a van
and we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the place of
Mariano Almeda, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and
then the driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside
the van, sir.

x xx xx xx xx
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka, Asuncion Patay
ka and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these remarks
uttered upon your arrival?
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices,
sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what
were the voices or utterances that you heard?
Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking
of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?
x xx xx xx xx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was
there any utterances by anybody?
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were encouraging
others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some
of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
61
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether matigas pa yan,
kayang-kaya pa niyan.
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote?
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could
not really pin point who uttered those words, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol
Express?
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you
remember?
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would say
that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that would in turn
sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he would
jump on my thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that this
guy, his father stole the parking space of my father, sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain
on Villa and that went on, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your family
have his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So he
said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he

kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me
harder blows, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas father stole
the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing distance when
that utterance was made?
Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people who
heard from time to time, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny
Villas father was made?
Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when Lenny
Villas turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?
Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up and
he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
x xx xx xx xx
62
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that
accusations made by Dizon you or your family had his brother killed, can you inform this
Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while
inflicting blows upon you in particular?
Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his
family who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that
it was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued
inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident was when a talk was being given, Dizon was
on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was drinking
beer, and he said and I quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw
yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.
Atty. Tadiar What else?
Witness Thats all, sir.
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician came
around as promised to you earlier?
Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that
there was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to what
to expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.
Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during
the initiation?
 63

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be
mocked at, sir. x xx xx xx xx

Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
x xx xx xx xx
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All the
bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms
like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be
slapped, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your
body but that will be covered?
Witness Yes, sir.
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would
create bruises to your body?
Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you,
scare you, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I
repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of his
brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle, Witness Yes, sir.
sir.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you
x xx xx xx xx did not believe him because that is not true, correct?

Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is Witness Yes, sir.
psychological in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)


Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I have
mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the initiation,
this is correct?
Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those things
was because he wanted to inflict injury.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting me.
Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
Witness No, sir.
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would
run on your thighs, right?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not
only on you but also on the other neophytes?
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also
administered by another master on the other neophyte, this is correct?
64
Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and
Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused were just part of the
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is
no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered
by Petitioner and Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
members during their initiation rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial
proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such
inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding
that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the
intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as
reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez;
Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was
Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to, yung
pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs
while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With the testimony
clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based
solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the
testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be
subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be
mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto,
Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo,
patay kayo sa amin, or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes,
Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed
Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the Solicitor
General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all part of the
psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories,
so that he could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity

initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were
untrue and made-up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during
the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke
as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.
x xx xx xx xx
So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit
or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like playing
the Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or
recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organization
or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to
jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that he will be
made to jump towards the inside portion of the building these are the mental or psychological
tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want
to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken
within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was
not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with
each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys
co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not
true and that [Dizon] was just making it up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to
the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused
were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
fraternity initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus
interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part,
65
insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny
Villa.[221]
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable
doubt
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since
all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and
death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As
an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises
from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no
criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of
physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as
to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries
per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony. The
commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.
In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her
students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and
bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability
for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative
responsibility [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent
the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred
or any malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of
law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil. In People
v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group known as the Missionaries of
Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the head of the victim
into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and
stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by

expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group
caused the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial
courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead
ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide under Article 365 thereof.
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain
on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof.
In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct,
and external acts of the accused.[227] What persons do is the best index of their
intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and
the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of
the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background
surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.
Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of
the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime.
On their first night, they were subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian
Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly
directed at the neophytes arms and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and
to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to traditional
initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the
fraternity.
During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those
who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was
their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump
their legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every
physical activity or round; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to
give them whatever they needed.
These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days before the rites, he asked
both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny
66
would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found
as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily
agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to
the initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that
before admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were
made aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other
forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they
wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that
after a week, you can already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part,
admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden
paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs. Indeed,
there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not
present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes
of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby
satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the
additional rounds on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon,
the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites;
and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling,
which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon was
used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and
the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for
the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the
initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join
the fraternity went through the same process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that
Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress that Congress

itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of
the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration.
The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may
also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the
method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised
Penal Code.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would
be murder or homicide.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized
under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.
SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition
of the crime of hazing?
SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,
fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
67
That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
without being held criminally liable.
x xx xx xx xx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking
the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of
certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered
crimes.
The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing,
but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because
these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. x x x
Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or
group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the
intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these
specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one
files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing
is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called hazing. Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts
of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need
to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay
magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay

pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang
intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin
natin sa mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
x xx xx xx xx
SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor.
But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the
intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted
in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of
the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation
where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the
basic elements of any crime.
If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What
are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be
proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in
the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing,
no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the
fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped,
deterred, discouraged.
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill
or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing.
Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility
and say, We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal.
We do not have any intention to kill or maim.
68
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
x xx xx xx xx
SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x
SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?
SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no
need to prove intent to kill.
SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.
SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr.
President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified
thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of
sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished. However,
the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.
To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into
another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by
the phrase without consent for purposes of this section.

SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it
is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of
concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without
consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter,
it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend
initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury,
Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical
hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity
is of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins
a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the
victim can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was
consent on the part of the victim.
x xx xx xx xx
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished
Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new
mores, traditions, and practices.
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals when
they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of couples. They
can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered acceptable by
the mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should prohibit.
But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even
be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with
the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not
punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
69
If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, Well, he allowed it
upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with
the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the
infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.
But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense
of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological
suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical
injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not
going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.
SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.
SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair
hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or
whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is
the point that he wants to go to.
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We
will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not
foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.[238](Emphasis supplied)
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle
of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an
amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle

of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing
unique as against typical crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act
as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys
parents would not have consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation
rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken,
through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered
harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum,
the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites
through physical and/or psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior
to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not
clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the interpretation of
criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the
trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries
or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background
of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof,
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight,
or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[241] In
this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast,
simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an
injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. [244]
The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
70
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the
mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.[246]
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger
involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to
another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of
conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.[248] In
contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.[249] It is thus possible that there
are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, from
a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ
more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple
traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the
heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253]
In the present case, the victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it
was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the
channeling of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system including the heart,
arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing
the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were
wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries
sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows
to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating
blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that
the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as
well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was
redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was concluded that there was nothing in the
heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or
disease.[260]
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his
eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities
performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes
of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different
objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of their thighs

or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264]
Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI
medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is as
follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations
of defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the deceased
Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by themselves would not
cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to you is what is the
cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair
for us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same
manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human
approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part.[267]
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking
during the initiation rites.[268]
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that
organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269]
With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the
cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who
directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained
themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter
in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened
initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the
presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note
that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this
light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-
Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
71
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing
and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to
establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and
to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another
initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because
he felt he did not have a choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining
the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances,
they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which
lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law
been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of
the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there
was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule
according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed
to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny
Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of
his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of
the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability
from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with
respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
The accused liable to pay damages
The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of 50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid
by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of 30,000 as indemnity to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the
victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CAs award of
indemnity in the amount of 50,000.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by

tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is
prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that
actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor
General does not interpose any claim for actual damages.[277]
The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of
the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount
of 1,000,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon
guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in
G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr.,
and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are
ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the
amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on
all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until
satisfaction.[280] Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED.
The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed,
and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to
include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity
members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties.
72
SO ORDERED.
11. RIVERA V. PEOPLE
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
27215 affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite,
Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 6962-99, entitled People of the Philippines. v. Esmeraldo
Rivera, et al.
On April 12, 1999, an Information was filed in the RTC of Imus, Cavite, charging Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera, of attempted murder. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 1998, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and hit with a piece of hollow block, one RUBEN RODIL who thereby sustained
a non-mortal injury on his head and on the different parts of his body, the accused thus
commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, but failed to perform all the
acts of execution which would produce the crime of Murder by reason of some causes other
than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the said Ruben Rodil was able to ran (sic)
away and the timely response of the policemen, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Ruben Rodil testified that he used to work as a taxi driver. He stopped driving in April 1998
after a would-be rapist threatened his life. He was even given a citation as a Bayaning Pilipino
by the television network ABS-CBN for saving the would-be victim. His wife eked out a living
as a manicurist. They and their three children resided in Barangay San Isidro Labrador II,
Dasmarias, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.

At noon of May 2, 1998, Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo mocked him for
being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and hurled
invectives at Edgardo. A heated exchange of words ensued.
At about 7:30 p.m. the next day, a Sunday, Ruben went to the store to buy food and to look
for his wife. His three-year-old daughter was with him. Momentarily, Esmeraldo and his two
brothers, Ismael and Edgardo, emerged from their house and ganged up on Ruben. Esmeraldo
and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows and he fell to the ground. In that helpless position,
Edgardo hit Ruben three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo and Ismael
continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: Awatin sila! Awatin sila!
Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a stone at him, hitting him at the
back. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to
their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. His attending physician, Dr. Lamberto Cagingin, Jr., signed
a medical certificate in which he declared that Ruben sustained lacerated wounds on the
parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion, hematoma on the left upper buttocks,
multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma periorbital left.[4] The doctor declared
that the lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from
one to seven days.[5] The doctor prescribed medicine for Rubens back pain, which he had to
take for one month.[6]
Esmeraldo testified that at around 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, Ruben arrived at his house and
banged the gate. Ruben challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he
went out of the house and talked to Ruben, the latter punched him. They wrestled with each
other. He fell to the ground. Edgardo arrived and pushed Ruben aside. His wife arrived, and
he was pulled away and brought to their house.
For his part, Ismael testified that he tried to pacify Ruben and his brother Esmeraldo, but
Ruben grabbed him by the hair. He managed to free himself from Ruben and the latter fled.
He went home afterwards. He did not see his brother Edgardo at the scene.
Edgardo declared that at about 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1998, he was throwing garbage in front
of their house. Ruben arrived and he went inside the house to avoid a confrontation. Ruben
73
banged the gate and ordered him to get out of their house and even threatened to shoot him.
His brother Esmeraldo went out of their house and asked Ruben what the problem was.
A fist fight ensued. Edgardo rushed out of the house and pushed Ruben aside. Ruben fell to
the ground. When he stood up, he pulled at Edgardos shirt and hair, and, in the process,
Rubens head hit the lamp post.[7]
On August 30, 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all the accused are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt and are sentenced to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years
of prision mayor as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt the culpability of
the accused. Likewise, the accused are to pay, jointly and severally, civil indemnity to the
private complainant in the amount of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The trial court gave no credence to the collective testimonies of the accused and their
witnesses. The accused appealed to the CA, which rendered judgment on June 8, 2004
affirming, with modification, the appealed decision. The dispositive portion of the CA decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90, is MODIFIED
in that the appellants are convicted of ATTEMPTED MURDER and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum. In all other respects, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The accused, now petitioners, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, alleging that
the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision. They insist that the prosecution failed to prove
that they had the intention to kill Ruben when they mauled and hit him with a hollow block.
Petitioners aver that, based on the testimony of Dr. Cagingin, Ruben sustained only a
superficial wound in the parietal area; hence, they should be held criminally liable for physical

injuries only. Even if petitioners had the intent to kill Ruben, the prosecution failed to prove
treachery; hence, they should be held guilty only of attempted homicide.
On the other hand, the CA held that the prosecution was able to prove petitioners intent to
kill Ruben:
On the first assigned error, intent to kill may be deduced from the nature of the wound
inflicted and the kind of weapon used. Intent to kill was established by victim Ruben Rodil in
his testimony as follows:
Q: And while you were being boxed by Esmeraldo and Bong, what happened next?
A: When I was already lying [down] xxx, Dagol Rivera showed up with a piece of hollow block
xxx and hit me thrice on the head, Sir.
Q: And what about the two (2), what were they doing when you were hit with a hollow block
by Dagol?
A: I was already lying on the ground and they kept on boxing me while Dagol was hitting, Sir.
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block
directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers
scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each
other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground; that
one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the
head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[10]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, asserts that the decision of the CA is
correct, thus:
The evidence and testimonies of the prosecution witnesses defeat the presumption of
innocence raised by petitioners. The crime has been clearly established with petitioners as
the perpetrators. Their intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable
doubt.
74
Eyewitnesses to the crime, Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo clearly and categorically
declared that the victim Ruben Rodil was walking along St. Peter Avenue when he was
suddenly boxed by Esmeraldo Baby Rivera. They further narrated that, soon thereafter, his
two brothers Ismael and Edgardo Dagul Rivera, coming from St. Peter
II, ganged up on the victim. Both Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo recounted that they saw
Edgardo Dagul Rivera pick up a hollow block and hit Ruben Rodil with it three (3) times. A
careful review of their testimonies revealed the suddenness and unexpectedness of the
attack of petitioners. In this case, the victim did not even have the slightest warning of the
danger that lay ahead as he was carrying his three-year old daughter. He was caught off-guard
by the assault of Esmeraldo Baby Rivera and the simultaneous attack of the two other
petitioners. It was also established that the victim was hit by Edgardo Dagul Rivera, while he
was lying on the ground and being mauled by the other petitioners. Petitioners could have
killed the victim had he not managed to escape and had the police not promptly intervened.
Petitioners also draw attention to the fact that the injury sustained by the victim was
superficial and, thus, not life threatening. The nature of the injury does not negate the intent
to kill. The Court of Appeals held:
As earlier stated by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block
directly hit his head, and had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers
scampered away. When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the three (3) brothers helped
each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground;
that one of them picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the victim on the
head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that made the
appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.[11]
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
An essential element of murder and homicide, whether in their consummated, frustrated or
attempted stage, is intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the
prosecution must prove by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.

In People v. Delim,[12] the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes
against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of
the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
presumed.
In the present case, the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of evidence to prove
the intent of petitioners to kill Ruben. Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist
blows. Even as Ruben fell to the ground, unable to defend himself against the sudden and
sustained assault of petitioners, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Edgardo
tried to hit Ruben on the head, missed, but still managed to hit the victim only in the parietal
area, resulting in a lacerated wound and cerebral contusions.
That the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have
produced his death does not negate petitioners criminal liability for attempted murder. Even
if Edgardo did not hit the victim squarely on the head, petitioners are still criminally liable for
attempted murder.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a
felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
75
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.[13]
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.[14]
The Court in People v. Lizada[15] elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out
to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense. The raison detre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that,
in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has
never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It
is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may
be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any
fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as
the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused
is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the
consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a
direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made.
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary,
however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.[16]
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed
hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have died.

We reject petitioners contention that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the
commission of the felony. Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected
manner as Ruben was walking with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent
peril to his life. He had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by
the synchronized assault of the three siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on the victim.[17] Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and
unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would
be treachery.[18] Obviously, petitioners assaulted the victim because of the altercation
between him and petitioner Edgardo Rivera a day before. There being conspiracy by and
among petitioners, treachery is considered against all of them.[19]
The appellate court sentenced petitioners to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years
of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision
mayor in its maximum period, as maximum. This is erroneous. Under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since petitioners are guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should
be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code. Under
paragraph 2 of Article 61, in relation to Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, such a penalty
is prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the
felony (other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery), the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has a
range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree,
prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Hence, petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2)
years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four
(4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum
period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium
period, as maximum. No costs.
76
SO ORDERED.
12. ROQUE V PEOPLE
Petitioner Rogelio Roque (petitioner) was charged with the crime of
frustrated homicide in an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 22d day of November, 2001, in the municipality of
Pandi, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and shoot with a
gun complain[ an ]t Reynaldo Marquez, hitting the latter on his right ear and nape,
and kick[ing] him on the face and back, causing serious physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Reynaldo Marquez, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is[,] by the timely and able medical
attendance rendered to said Reynaldo Marquez which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW
When arraigned on March 23, 2003, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial conference, the defense admitted the identity of petitioner; that
he is a Kagawad of Barangay Masagana, Pandi, Bulacan; and that the day of the
incident, November 22, 2001 was the Thanksgiving Day of the said barangay.
Trial thereafter ensued where the parties presented their respective versions of the
incident.
The prosecution averred that on November 22, 2001, while brothers
Reynaldo Marquez (Reynaldo) and Rodolfo Marquez (Rodolfo) were in the house
of Bella Salvador-Santos (Bella) in Pandi, Bulacan, Rodolfo spotted Rogelio dela
Cruz (dela Cruz) and shouted to him to join them. At that instant, petitioner and
his wife were passing-by on board a tricycle. Believing that Rodolfos shout was
directed at him, petitioner stopped the vehicle and cursed the former. Reynaldo
apologized for the misunderstanding but petitioner was unyielding. Before
leaving, he warned the Marquez brothers that something bad would happen to
them if they continue to perturb him.

Bothered, Rodolfo went to the house of Barangay Chairman Pablo Tayao
(Tayao) to ask for assistance in settling the misunderstanding. Because of this,
Reynaldo, who had already gone home, was fetched by dela Cruz and brought to
the house of Tayao. But since Tayao was then no longer around, Reynaldo just
proceeded to petitioners house to follow Tayao and Rodolfo who had already
gone ahead. Upon arriving at petitioners residence, Reynaldo again apologized to
petitioner but the latter did not reply. Instead, petitioner entered the house and
when he came out, he was already holding a gun which he suddenly fired at
Reynaldo who was hit in his right ear. Petitioner then shot Reynaldo who fell to
the ground after being hit in the nape. Unsatisfied, petitioner kicked Reynaldo on
the face and back. Reynaldo pleaded Tayao for help but to no avail since
petitioner warned those around not to get involved. Fortunately, Reynaldos
parents arrived and took him to a local hospital for emergency medical treatment.
He was later transferred to Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital in Manila where he was
operated on and confined for three weeks. Dr. Renato Raymundo attended to him
and issued a medical certificate stating that a bullet entered the base of Reynaldos
skull and exited at the back of his right ear.
Presenting a totally different version, the defense claimed that on
November 22, 2001, petitioner went to the house of Bella on board a tricycle to
fetch his child. While driving, he was cursed by brothers Reynaldo and Rodolfo
who were visibly intoxicated. Petitioner ignored the two and just went home.
Later, however, the brothers appeared in front of his house still shouting invectives
against him. Petitioners brother tried to pacify Rodolfo and Reynaldo who agreed
to leave but not without threatening that they would return to kill him. Petitioner
thus asked someone to call Tayao. Not long after, the brothers came back, entered
petitioners yard, and challenged him to a gun duel. Petitioner requested Tayao to
stop and pacify them but Reynaldo refused to calm down and instead fired his
gun. Hence, as an act of self-defense, petitioner fired back twice.
On March 12, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 84, rendered its Decision2 finding petitioner guilty as charged, viz:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years [of] prision correccional, as
minimum[;] to ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium [period], as
maximum.
77
SO ORDERED.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order4
dated August 16, 2007.
Undaunted, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its
Decision5 dated February 27, 2009, the CA affirmed in full the RTCs Decision,
thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration7 thereto was likewise denied in a
Resolution8 dated July 30, 2010.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari9 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court where petitioner imputes upon the CA the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN
IT RULED THAT THE ELEMENT OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
WAS NOT SATISFACTORILY PROVEN SINCE THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT
HAS NOT SATISFACTORILY SHOWN THAT THE VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WAS INDEED ARMED WITH A GUN.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN
IT RULED THAT GRANTING FOR THE BENEFIT OF ARGUMENT
THAT THERE WAS INDEED UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION,
PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER JUSTIFIED IN FIRING AT THE
VICTIM/PRIVATE COMPLAINANT FOR THE SECOND TIME.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOSULY
APPRECIATED THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHEN
IT RULED THAT INTENT TO KILL ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER WAS PRESENT CONSIDERING: (A) THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED TWO GUNSHOT
WOUNDS, AND (B) THE PETITIONER PREVENTED BARANGAY
OFFICIALS FROM INTERVENING AND HELPING OUT THE
WOUNDED PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.10
Our Ruling
The Petition must be denied.

The errors petitioner imputes upon the CA all pertain to appreciation of
evidence or factual errors which are not within the province of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court had already explained in Batistis v.
People11 that:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122, and Section 9, Rule 45, of the Rules of
Court, the review on appeal of a decision in a criminal case, wherein the CA
imposes a penalty other than death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is
by petition for review on certiorari.
A petition for review on certiorari raises only questions of law. Sec. 1,
Rule 45, Rules of Court, explicitly so provides, viz:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of
Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The
petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion
filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Petitioners assigned errors, requiring as they do a re-appreciation and reexamination
of the evidence, are evidentiary and factual in nature.12 The Petition
must therefore be denied on this basis because one, the petition for review
thereby violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the
Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA,
unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin,13
which was not shown to be the case here.
Besides, findings of facts of the RTC, its calibration of the testimonial
evidence, its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on the said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect
when affirmed by the CA,14 as in this case. After all, the RTC had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the stand and detect if they were telling
the truth.15 To [thus] accord with the established doctrine of finality and
78
bindingness of the trial courts findings of fact, [the Court shall] not disturb [the]
findings of fact of the RTC, particularly after their affirmance by the CA16 as
petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish any extraordinary circumstance
which merits a departure from the said doctrine.17
In any event, the Court observes that the CA correctly affirmed the RTCs
ruling that petitioner is guilty of frustrated homicide and not merely of less serious
physical injuries as the latter insists. As aptly stated by the CA:
In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to
kill the victim. If there is no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable
for physical injuries only. Vice-versa, regardless of whether the victim only
suffered injuries that would have healed in nine to thirty days, if intent to kill is
sufficiently borne out, the crime committed is frustrated homicide (Arts. 263-
266).
Usually, the intent to kill is shown by the kind of weapon used by the
offender and the parts of the victims body at which the weapon was aimed, as
shown by the wounds inflicted. Hence, when a deadly weapon, like a bolo, is
used to stab the victim in the latters abdomen, the intent to kill can be presumed
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, 13TH ED., P. 431).
It is worth highlighting that the victim received two gunshot wounds in
the head. Indeed the location of the wounds plus the nature of the weapon used
are ready indications that the accused-appellants objective is not merely to warn
or incapacitate a supposed aggressor. Verily, had the accused-appellant been
slightly better with his aim, any of the two bullets surely would have killed him
outright. Also, the intent to kill is further exhibited by the fact that the accusedappellant
even prevented barangay officials from intervening and helping x x x
the bleeding victim. Indeed, the fact that Reynaldo Marquez was miraculously
able to live through the ordeal and sustain only modicum injuries does not mean
that the crime ought to be downgraded from frustrated homicide to less serious
physical injuries. After all, as was mentioned above, what should be
determinative of the crime is not the gravity of the resulting injury but the
criminal intent that animated the hand that pulled the trigger.18
The Court, however, notes that while the penalty imposed upon appellant is
also proper, there is a need to modify the assailed CA Decision in that awards of
damages must be made in favor of the victim Reynaldo.
The RTC and the CA correctly held that actual damages cannot be awarded

to Reynaldo due to the absence of receipts to prove the medical expenses he
incurred from the incident. Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual
damages suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate
damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is
convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.19 Since it
was undisputed that Reynaldo was hospitalized due to the gunshot wounds
inflicted by petitioner, albeit as observed by the RTC there was no evidence
offered as to the expenses he incurred by reason thereof, Reynaldo is entitled
to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Aside from this, he is also
entitled to moral damages of P25,000.00. These awards of damages are in
accordance with settled jurisprudence.20 An interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum must also be imposed on the awarded damages to commence from the date
of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.21
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February
27, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31084 affirming in its
entirety the March 12, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 84 in Criminal Case No. 3486-M-2002 convicting petitioner
Rogelio Roque of the crime of frustrated homicide, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the petitioner is ordered to pay the victim Reynaldo
Marquez moral damages and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000,00
each, with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this Resolution until fully paid.
13. IVLER V. SAN PEDRO
DE CI SIO N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause
to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
79
Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No.
82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No.
82366) for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to
quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803).
Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a
prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the
dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner
contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding
its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the
MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed
the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him
to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes
his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding
appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial
relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking
jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366,
having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless
imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting
petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce
calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical
injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the
homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not
to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party
and private respondent is represented by counsel.
The Issues
80
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to
seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at
the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioners
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366
did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection
afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy
of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the
terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in
relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this
Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8
of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-
arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court
granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing
prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted

in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one
considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself from post-
arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendants absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30
days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in
absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not
ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to
attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the
arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal
to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered
petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of
the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for
the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon
a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No.
82367 was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case
turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve
the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
81
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any
act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be
less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,
by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously,
would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without
regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the
first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower
in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to
apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of
a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act
from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this
hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the
penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2);
(2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3)
a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of
"reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-
offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses
which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-
82
offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field
by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless
imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points
of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes);
(2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming
them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty
structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence"
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree
of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their
structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious
mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere
quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of
classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to
reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of
Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed.
Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each
penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent
variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless
imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act
would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range
all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in
relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their
commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case
for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying
charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually incompatible with the
element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and
since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal
pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that "[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x
[but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en
banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939.
Quizon rejected Fallers conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under
Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller
found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion
arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the
complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be
shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian
conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense
alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon which the
second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy
83
as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to
property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same accused for
"reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had
been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the
Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v.
Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27
(promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in
1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the
Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court
en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court
en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the
First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the
Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage
to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the
Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical
conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority.
Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the
pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent prosecution of an accused
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for
multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon
which the second prosecution was based. Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz
chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter
were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction
of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction
for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same
act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona.
We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case
of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs.
Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held
that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of
reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would
be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty,
it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the
injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
x xx x
84
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal)
Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived
from the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in
Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December
12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not s ustaining
petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January
28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property
through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double
jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the
same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely damage
to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result
of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to
extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more
fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz
progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in
two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal
of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accuseds claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with
approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the
case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy
enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were
charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by
them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through
reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved
in the collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim.
Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints
were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge
against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the
complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the
injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the
Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after
trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay.
In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by one
of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and
another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by
the Court of First Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double
jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the
chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries
and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was
charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised
85
Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and reckless manner ... thereby
causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that
court for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney
filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with
damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be
249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the
Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the
Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of
damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One
of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would
prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would
have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an
ingredient of the other. x x x
x xx x
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the
prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence
could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the
prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser
offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the
defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which
arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been
previously cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz)
"for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground
of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight
Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor
General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case
x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the
purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further
elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or
similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On
one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the
applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views
expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30,
1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed,
stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible
substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to
benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of
the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the
mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x
x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was
crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
86
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single
prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of imprudent acts and their
consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-
offense not falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding
to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how
should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex"
the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those
amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution
proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-
crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the
issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple
consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges
were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting
acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly,
this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even
though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to
impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium
period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts
penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave
felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double
jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts
are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply
and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized
as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the
effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or

severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we
interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to
the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount
equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less
than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the
amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be
an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one for the
physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field
demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a
single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for light
felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365,
discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13,
Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution
and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless
of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus
maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power
to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes
and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a
87
necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected
the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that
offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the
complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected
by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first
prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same
alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the
inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace
x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being
prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second
jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges
under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant
occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided, not to mention
that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge
will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and
proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article
365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept
of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2
May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information
in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
14. INTOD V CA
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City,
finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
88
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental
and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter,
Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan.
He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would
also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location
of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at
said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was
then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused
fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified
that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and
especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for
an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod
for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to
the Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than
petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did
not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not
impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person
conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing appropriate means in
order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated
shall have been physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and
the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code,
inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now
penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with
means which prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property.
8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
person or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
89
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11
There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify
the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and
expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the
physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One
example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18
the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer
would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed
to hit him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It
held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he
was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt to kill. It is well
settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt
is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated
upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is
committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill
the victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court
held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by
reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that way; and further, that he
was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application
only where it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case
where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference
or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of
extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even
if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to
wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal
intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires the punishment
to be administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was
supposed to exist was really present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of
crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to
create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out,
the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room
thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part
of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make
this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot
rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the
Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible
crimes.
90
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and
Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard,
commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories:
legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could
have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it
is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to
smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if
done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to
send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed.
However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and
consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed.
It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense
to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed
federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this
contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus,
following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was
not made criminal by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes
the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time as such legislative
changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be
convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are

satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt not
for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing
as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge
that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized
by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which
would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of
the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element
of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby
MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized
in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the
social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties
provided by the law, and to pay the costs.
15. PEOPLE V. THOMASION (?)
91
16. AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA V. PEOPLE
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision[2] dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri, Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. Contested as well is the appellate courts Resolution[3] dated
March 13, 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
On February 10, 2000, petitioner was charged with murder in an Information that alleges as
follows:
The undersigned, Provincial Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the crime of
Murder, defined and penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club and maul one Manuel K. Chy,
inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately 11:00 a.m. on September 26, 1999, petitioner, Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando
Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which was adjacent to the
house of Manuel K. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m., Chy appealed for the group to quiet down as
the noise from the videoke machine was blaring. It was not until Chy requested a second time
that the group acceded. Unknown to Chy, this left petitioner irate and petitioner was heard
to have said in the Ilocano vernacular, Dayta a Manny napangas makaala caniac dayta. (This
Manny is arrogant, I will lay a hand on him.)[6]
On September 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not
far from Chys apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told
off again. This further infuriated petitioner who remarked, Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan
ko a pagbayagen daytoy, meaning, This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long.[7]
Yet again, at around 12:00 p.m. on September 29, 1999, the group convened at the house of
Foz and Garcia. There, petitioner, Foz, Jr. and Fred Rillon mused over the drinking session on
the 26th and 28th of September and the confrontation with Chy. Enraged at the memory,
petitioner blurted out Talaga a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita. (This Manny

is really arrogant, I will finish him off today.)[8] Later that afternoon, the group headed to the
store of Adela dela Cruz where they drank until petitioner proposed that they move to Punta.
On their way to Punta, the group passed by the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chys sister, and
there, decided to have some drinks.
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy who, incidentally, was coming out
of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner who
suddenly punched him in the face. Chy cried out, Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman
[inaano]? (Why did you box me[?] Im not doing anything to you.)[9] But petitioner kept on
assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was himself hit on the nose while Chy
continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and with it, struck the
lower back portion of Chys head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his house and phoned his wife
Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and complained of difficulty in
breathing. Upon reaching Chys house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody
answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the door and found Chy lying unconscious
on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The
autopsy confirmed that Chy died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch 9) found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE
defined and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his favor
the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as minimum, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS, as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS, representing
expenses for the wake and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00) PESOS, as
moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND (P332,000.00] PESOS, as
loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a Decision dated December 20,
2005, thus:
92
WHEREFORE, premises considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No. 08-1185, is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied in a Resolution dated March
13, 2006.
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT
PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF
DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH
CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY WAS DUE TO FRIGHT OR SHOCK
CAUSED BY THE MALTREATMENT.
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[12]
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for the death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,[13] petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the
trial court because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard
the prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly inferred from,
misread and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.[14]
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando
Foz as the author of the victims injuries. Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armandos
brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner disowns
responsibility for Chys demise since the latter was found to have died of myocardial
infarction. In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio[15] that Chys
medical condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most,

he could be held liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted on
Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial courts assessment of the witnesses and
its conclusion that the beating of Chy was the proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the prosecution as well as the
defense in this case, we are unable to consider the petitioners appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, yet, petitioner raises
questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this Court is not the proper forum
from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual issues, save where the factual findings of the
trial court do not find support in the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed
from was based on a misapprehension of facts.[16] Neither exception applies in the instant
case as would justify a departure from the established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized exception to the rule on non-interference with the
determination of the credibility of witnesses. He points out that the judge who penned the
decision is not the judge who received the evidence and heard the witnesses. But while the
situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado
F. Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less than the petitioner himself.
Consequently, petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged adverse consequence his
own doing might have caused. For us to allow petitioner relief based on this argument would
be to sanction a travesty of the Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue, the
ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente
only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow
that the judge who was not present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a
valid and just decision.[17] Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over the case after Judge
Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the
evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas Antonio who was
recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge
Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and Alvin Pascua on
rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case in its entirety to decide it on
the basis of the records on hand.[18] He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and
calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their conformity to common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate
substantive and procedural due process of law.[19]
93
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left
inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms., upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms.,
dorsum of left hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper lip on the right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut sections show a reddish
brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole posterior wall, the lower portion
of the anterior wall and the inferior portion of the septum. Coronary arteries, gritty, with the
caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%) percent. Histopathological
findings show mild fibrosis of the myocardium.
Lungs, pleural surfaces, shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut sections
show a gray periphery with reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with
some reddish frothy materials noted. Histopathological examinations show pulmonary
edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening capsule. Cut sections show congestion. Histopathological
examinations show mild lymphocytic infiltration.
Stomach, one-half (1/2) full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially digested
food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum,
however, he admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited his liability to slight
physical injuries. He argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his
death.[21] Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis of the records would
acquaint us with the causal connection between the death of the victim and the mauling that
preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate cause of Chys myocardial
infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be myocardial infarction that is because there was
an occlusion in the artery that prevented the flowing of blood into the heart?

A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy table but it changes, the hyperemic changes [in]
the heart muscle were the one[s] that made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was
myocardial infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels itself.
(Emphasis supplied.)[22]
By definition, coronary occlusion[23] is the complete obstruction of an artery of the heart,
usually from progressive arteriosclerosis[24] or the thickening and loss of elasticity of the
arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a person with an existing
arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not occur.[25] Dr. Jessica Romero testified on
direct examination relative to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the patient
[does] not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no previous history of myocardial
[ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries, then excitement [cannot]
cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[26]
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild fibrosis of the myocardium[27] caused by
a previous heart attack. Said fibrosis[28] or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered
the middle and thickest layer of the victims heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary
occlusion from sudden emotion. This causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will cause no crisis on the part of the victim, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And [these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or hitting
on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was] caused definitely by emotional crisis, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that there
was less oxygen being pumped by the heart?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir, it could be.[29]
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
94
Q: I will repeat the question Dr. Antonio testified that the deceased died because of the blow
that was inflicted, it triggered the death of the deceased, do you agree with his findings,
Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction sir.
Q: So you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It could be, sir.
Q: You agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes, sir.[30]
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the emotional strain from
the beating aggravated Chys delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable
conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. The essential requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended
albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actors wrongful acts.[31]
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him with a
bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioners liability for his death. Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in
the case of United States v. Brobst[32] that:
x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact
that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does
not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.[33]
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez[34] enunciates that:
x x x although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if,
because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the
result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)[35]
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one
he intended;[36] el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of
the cause is the cause of the evil caused).[37] Thus, the circumstance that petitioner did not
intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability.
Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his

guilt in accordance with Article 13(3)[38] of the Revised Penal Code.[39] Nevertheless, we
must appreciate as mitigating circumstance in favor of petitioner the fact that the physical
injuries he inflicted on the victim, could not have resulted naturally and logically, in the actual
death of the victim, if the latters heart was in good condition.
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without any aggravating circumstance to
offset it, the imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal
in its minimum period,[40]or anywhere from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen
years (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[41] the trial
court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prisin
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of
earning capacity in the amount of P332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victims actual income
at the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into account. For this purpose,
the Court adopts the formula used in People v. Malinao:[42]
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age of x a reasonable portion of the
the victim at the annual net income which time of this death) would have been received
by the heirs for support.[43]
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took judicial notice of the salary which Manuel Chy was
receiving as a sheriff of the court. At the time of his death, Chy was 51 years old and was
earning a gross monthly income of P10,600 or a gross annual income of P127,200. But, in
view of the victims delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life expectancy to 10 years.
It also deducted P7,000 from Chys salary as reasonable living expense. However, the records
are bereft of showing that the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to substantiate actual living
expenses. And in the absence of proof of living expenses, jurisprudence[44] approximates net
income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs of
Manuel Chy should be awarded P1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity, computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-51) x [P127,200 - (P127,200)]
= 2/3 x (29) x P63,600
= 19 1/3 x P63,600
= P1,229,600
We sustain the trial courts grant of funerary expense of P200,000 as stipulated by the
parties[45] and civil indemnity of P50,000.[46] Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory
in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death
95
of the victim.[47] However, in obedience to the controlling case law, the amount of moral
damages should be reduced to P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy P50,000 as civil indemnity; P200,000, representing
expenses for the wake and burial; and P1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
17. PEOPLE V. SALES
A father ought to discipline his children for committing a misdeed. However, he may not
employ sadistic beatings and inflict fatal injuries under the guise of disciplining them.
This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01627 that affirmed the August 3, 2005 Joint Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 of Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782
and RTC03-789, convicting appellant Noel T. Sales (appellant) of the crimes of parricide and
slight physical injuries, respectively. The Information3 for parricide contained the following
allegations:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the
evening at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with evident premeditation
and [in] a fit of anger, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit [several]
times, the different parts of the body of his legitimate eldest son, Noemar Sales, a 9-year old
minor, with a [piece of] wood, measuring more or less one meter in length and one [and] a
half inches in diameter, [thereby] inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds, which cause[d]
the death of the said victim, to the damage and prejudice of the latters heirs in such amount
as may be proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On the other hand, the Information5 in Criminal Case No. RTC03-789 alleges that appellant
inflicted slight physical injuries in the following manner:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 2002, at around or past 8:00 oclock in the
evening, at Brgy. San Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [accused] assault[ed] and hit with a
piece of wood, one Noel Sales, Jr., an 8-year old minor, his second legitimate son, thereby
inflicting upon him physical injuries which have required medical attendance for a period of
five (5) days to the damage and prejudice of the victims heirs in such amount as may be
proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned on April 11, 2003 and July 1, 2003, appellant pleaded not guilty for the
charges of parricide7 and slight physical injuries8 respectively. The cases were then
consolidated upon manifestation of the prosecution which was not objected to by the
defense.9 During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to stipulate that appellant is the
father of the victims, Noemar Sales (Noemar) and Noel Sales, Jr. (Junior); that at the time of
the incident, appellants family was living in the conjugal home located in Barangay San
Vicente, Tinambac, Camarines Sur; and, that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the
police.10
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peafrancia
without the permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their
mother, Maria Litan Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the
nearby Barangay of Magsaysay. Afraid of their fathers rage, Noemar and Junior initially
refused to return home but their mother prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached
home at around 8 oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant
confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that
he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemars and Juniors hands and feet tied to a
96
coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. During the
beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting
Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in
Noemars head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head,
the left cheek, and legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost
consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her
efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to
believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor. He left and returned with one,
who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to
take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a vehicle to take them to a
hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met at the junction
told them that Noemar is already dead, appellant brought his son back to their house.
Noemars wake lasted only for a night and he was immediately buried the following day. His
body was never examined by a doctor.
The Version of the Defense
Prior to the incident, Noemar and Junior had already left their residence on three separate
occasions without the permission of their parents. Each time, appellant merely scolded them
and told them not to repeat the misdeed since something untoward might happen to them.
During those times, Noemar and Junior were never physically harmed by their father.
However, Noemar and Junior again left their home without their parents permission on
September 16, 2002 and failed to return for several days. Worse, appellant received
information that his sons stole a pedicab. As they are broke, appellant had to borrow money
so that his wife could search for Noemar and Junior. When his sons finally arrived home at 8
oclock in the evening of September 20, 2002, appellant scolded and hit them with a piece of
wood as thick as his index finger. He hit Noemar and Junior simultaneously since they were
side by side. After whipping his sons in their buttocks three times, he noticed that Noemar
was chilling and frothing. When Noemar lost consciousness, appellant decided to bring him
to a hospital in Naga City by waiting for a vehicle at the crossroad which was seven kilometers
away from their house.

Appellant held Noemar while on their way to the crossroad and observed his difficulty in
breathing. The pupils of Noemars eyes were also moving up and down. Appellant heard him
say that he wanted to sleep and saw him pointing to his chest in pain. However, they waited
in vain since a vehicle never came. It was then that Noemar died. Appellant thus decided to
just bring Noemar back to their house.
Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child.
He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained
of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a
hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart.
On the other hand, Maria testified that Noemar suffered from epilepsy. Whenever he suffers
from epileptic seizures, Noemar froths and passes out. But he would regain consciousness
after 15 minutes. His seizures normally occur whenever he gets hungry or when scolded.
The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.11 Thereafter,
appellant surrendered voluntarily.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In a Joint Decision,13 the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight
physical injuries in the manner described in the Informations. In the crime of parricide, the
trial court did not consider the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against
appellant since there is no proof that he planned to kill Noemar. But the trial court
appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong. The dispositive portion of said Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of Noel Sales,
beyond reasonable doubt, he is found guilty of parricide in Crim. Case No. RTC03-782 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs
of Noemar Sales, the amount of 50,000.00 as civil indemnity; 50,000.00 as moral damages;
25,000,00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
97
Furthermore, accused Noel Sales is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of slight physical injuries in Crim. Case No. RTC03-789 and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twenty (20) days of Arresto Menor in its medium period.
Accused Noel Sales is likewise meted the accessory penalties as provided under the Revised
Penal Code. Considering that herein accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, he
shall be credited in the service of his sentence with the time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment in accordance with and subject to the conditions provided for in Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.14
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal15 which was given due course in an Order16 dated
September 21, 2005.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
However, the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of its Decision17 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision dated August
3, 2005 in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789 for Parricide and Slight Physical
Injuries, respectively, is AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant may
appeal this case to the Supreme Court via a Notice of Appeal filed before this Court.
SO ORDERED.18
Issues
Hence, appellant is now before this Court with the following two-fold issues:
I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
DEFENSE WITNESSES.19
Our Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
The Charge of Parricide
Appellant admits beating his sons on September 20, 2002 as a disciplinary measure, but
denies battering Noemar to death. He believes that no father could kill his own son. According
to him, Noemar had a weak heart that resulted in attacks consisting of loss of consciousness
and froth in his mouth. He claims that Noemar was conscious as they traveled to the junction
where they would take a vehicle in going to a hospital. However, Noemar had difficulty in
breathing and complained of chest pain. He contends that it was at this moment that Noemar
died, not during his whipping. To substantiate his claim, appellant presented his wife, Maria,
who testified that Noemar indeed suffered seizures, but this was due to epilepsy.
The contentions of appellant fail to persuade. The imposition of parental discipline on
children of tender years must always be with the view of correcting their erroneous behavior.
A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution in administering the proper
punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental duty to discipline their
minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain from being
motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will undoubtedly
result in sadism.
Prior to whipping his sons, appellant was already furious with them because they left the
family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar
incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby
putting him in disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow
98
so that his wife could look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore
clear that appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their
misdeeds but by an evil intent of venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from
the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and legs. It was only when Noemars body slipped
from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost consciousness that appellant stopped
the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, appellant would most likely not have ceased
from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical attention for Noemar as an act
of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the childs life. It bears stressing that a decent
and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment in the guise
of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, the relevant portion of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code states:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.
x xx x
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he
intended to commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong
done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the
perpetrator.20 Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting
upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating
suffered by the child, he expired. Appellants criminal liability for the death of his son,
Noemar, is thus clear.
Appellants claim that it was Noemars heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit.
This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence.
While Dr. Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a
death certificate indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not
sufficient to prove that his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing

that Noemars cadaver was never examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria,
to lend credence to his contention, the latters testimony did not help as same was even in
conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which
resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar was suffering from epilepsy.
Interestingly, Marias testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, as will be discussed below, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present
in this case.
All the Elements of Parricide are present in the case at bench.
We find no error in the ruling of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that
appellant committed the crime of parricide.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused."21
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a
person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the
severe beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared
Noemar dead. Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day
and then buried him the day after. Noemars Death Certificate22 was also presented in
evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed
the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior.
Maria testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were
whipped by appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside
99
the house but this time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant
delivered the lashes indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to
a tree, was beaten by their father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too
much for Noemars frail body to endure, he lost consciousness and died from his injuries
immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While
Noemars birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be
considered.23 As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of
Noemar during the pre-trial conference and likewise made the same declaration while under
oath.24 Maria also testified that Noemar and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband.
These testimonies are sufficient to establish the relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
There is Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender but not Lack of Intention to Commit
so Grave a Wrong
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in
favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day after the
barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to
the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture"25
which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
However, there was error in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong. Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage
battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they
were battered with a stick to inflict as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his
face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. "The mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated
where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did
actually produce the death of the victim."26
The Award of Damages and Penalty for Parricide

We find proper the trial courts award to the heirs of Noemar of the sums of 50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and 50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of exemplary
damages of 25,000.00 should be increased to 30,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.27 "In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all
the monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from the date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid."28
As regards the penalty, parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua when it considered the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
However, even if we earlier ruled that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, we maintain the penalty imposed.
This is because the exclusion of said mitigating circumstance does not result to a different
penalty since the presence of only one mitigating circumstance, which is, voluntary surrender,
with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the
proper prison term. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides in part as follows:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
x xx x
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
x xx x
The crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to
death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, and no aggravating
circumstance, the imposition of the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty
of death on appellant was thus proper.29
100
The Charge of Slight Physical Injuries
The victim himself, Junior testified that he, together with his brother Noemar, were beaten
by their father, herein appellant, while they were tied to a coconut tree. He recalled to have
been hit on his right eye and right leg and to have been examined by a physician thereafter.30
Maria corroborated her sons testimony.31
Juniors testimony was likewise supported by Dr. Ursolino Primavera, Jr. (Dr. Primavera) of
Tinambac Community Hospital who examined him for physical injuries. He issued a Medical
Certificate for his findings and testified on the same. His findings were (1) muscular
contusions with hematoma on the right side of Juniors face just below the eye and on both
legs, which could have been caused by hitting said area with a hard object such as a wooden
stick and, (2) abrasions of brownish color circling both wrist with crust formation which could
have been sustained by the patient due to struggling while his hands were tied. When asked
how long does he think the injuries would heal, Dr. Primavera answered one to two weeks.32
But if applied with medication, the injuries would heal in a week.33
We give full faith and credence to the categorical and positive testimony of Junior that he was
beaten by his father and that by reason thereof he sustained injuries. His testimony deserves
credence especially since the same is corroborated by the testimony of his mother, Maria,
and supported by medical examination. We thus find that the RTC correctly held appellant
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries.1awphil
Penalty for Slight Physical Injuries
We likewise affirm the penalty imposed by the RTC. Dr. Primavera testified that the injuries
sustained by Junior should heal in one week upon medication. Hence, the trial court correctly
meted upon appellant the penalty under paragraph 1, Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:
ART. 266. Slight Physical Injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight physical injuries shall
be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate
the offended party for labor from one to nine days or shall require medical attendance during
the same period.
x xx x
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present in the commission of the
crime, the penalty shall be in its medium period. The RTC was thus correct in imposing upon
appellant the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor in its medium period.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01627 that affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of
Calabanga, Camarines Sur in Criminal Case Nos. RTC03-782 and RTC03-789, convicting Noel
T. Sales of the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS that the award of exemplary damages is increased to 30,000.00. In
addition, an interest of 6% is imposed on all monetary awards from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
18. URBANO V. IAC
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which
affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner
Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went
to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters
from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay
flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano
went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo
Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of
the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and
101
demanded that Javier pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked
Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack.
Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a
swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter
embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house
about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio
councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went
to the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio,
Javier was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health
physician of San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to
Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal
certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of age, married,
residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and found the
following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar
prominence, right.
As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound was presented
to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p.
88, Original Records)

Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on
October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to
formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter
(Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties appeared before
this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably, for
they are neighbors and close relatives to each other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted
forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment,
and promising to him and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to
harbour any grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital
in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound
in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings
of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi-
102
#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessa-
tion of respiration and HR after muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo bag resuscita-
tion and cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought home by rela-
tives. (p. 100, Original Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty
as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12)
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined
at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the
nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but
raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against
the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial
was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:

That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to
the present having been re-elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May 17,
1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that swept
Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam which irrigates
the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water and its flow
to the canals and ditches were regulated and reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the canals and
ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches became
shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my secretary
Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo Javier
catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said Marcelo Javier
died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision
"an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA
631).
103
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a
result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November
14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a
very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from
tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound,
but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused
his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered
lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by
which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78,
Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which
got infected with tetanus. And the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable
for all the consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G.
5072; People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own
negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that
he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he
found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the
deceased would be reckless enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and
that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and

tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like
tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was
infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms
that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the
fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was
infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of
proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from
the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability
for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus-
104
The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of
unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are
encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness
in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way
to rigidity, and patients often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in
the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name
of lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained
contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of muscle involvement is
quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms develop in the
region of the injury. In the vast majority, however, most muscles are involved to some degree,
and the signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval referred to
as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated
with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising
in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction
of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer lasting spasms
with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic contraction
of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to
irreversible central nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of
more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized spasms
are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a somewhat shorter incubation period and
onset time; trismus is marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation
remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal
Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried
the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980.
After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw
and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day
after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore,
the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day
from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have
been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we
are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead
us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we
ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
105
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act
or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the
very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions
of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA
16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited
to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the
petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not
criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon
y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
(Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal
of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been
explained by the Code Commission as follows:

The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two
liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other
is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so
different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the public action
for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should
be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnity the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under
discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source
of injustice-a cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not
thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the
victim are so minded.
106
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
19. JACINTO V PEOPLE
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking
the reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated
December 16, 2003, affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its
Resolution[2] dated March 5, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
131, with the crime of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM
INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free
access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed
upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in their own
account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of P10,000.00,
representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible,
reveals the events that transpired to be as follows.

In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed
petitioner Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the
amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam
Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was
deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle;
the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk
of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call
sometime in the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer
wanted to know if she could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of
issuing the checks payable to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by
Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that
time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela
Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was to inform Capitle
that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam,
asking the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding
the bounced check. Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through
Valencia, because the Capitles did not have a phone; but they could be reached through
Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed
Ricablanca to ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca
of a plan to take the cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner
Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle. Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant,
reported the matter to the owner of Mega Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter
indeed handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for
her purchases from Mega Foam.[4] Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997,
petitioner also called her on the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.[5] Verification
from company records showed that petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega
Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in
August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.[6]
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check
in his bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some
107
unknown woman arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check
rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to
inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was informed by the bank
that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didnt know where to find the woman
who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
worked out an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided
by Dyhengco were marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the
bills were given to Ricablanca, who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with
Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was
then holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally
intended to proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the
plan did not push through. However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioners house, where she met petitioner
and Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita
Valencia; Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go
shopping. It was only petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded
petitioner's jeep and went on to Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the
jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she was getting cash from
Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises was the
P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the
money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the
whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found
fluorescent powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that
petitioner and Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified
theft against the two and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the
wife of Generoso Capitle.
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the
following scenario.

Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997, but claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some
time before her resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the
arrest, Ricablanca came to her mothers house, where she was staying at that time, and asked
that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for
a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with
the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She
allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their jeep, which they parked
outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca placed the money
on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on
June 30, 1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to
her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she
(Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims
that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not
know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the
house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to
Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested
them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise,
Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, What is this? Then, the NBI agents
arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered
its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y
Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of FIVE (5) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to
SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
108
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto mayor
medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner
Gemma Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[8]
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements
of the crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the
Revised Penal Code: (1) the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner,
as collector for Mega Foam, did not remit the customer's check payment to her employer
and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said property belonged to another the check
belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for purchases she made; (3) the taking was
done with intent to gain this is presumed from the act of unlawful taking and further shown
by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of petitioner's brother-in-law;
(4) it was done without the owners consent petitioner hid the fact that she had received the
check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the company; (5)
it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force

upon things the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was
known to be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence
petitioner is admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code,
the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the
accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the
law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the
thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the
same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question
arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals[9] is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod,
the accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since
the intended victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the
CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged
guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in
relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual impossibility of
producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
x xx x
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against pers ons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of
the employment of inadequate to ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means
employed or the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an
offense has already performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the
crime was not produced by reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of
impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by such person are essentially
inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the social danger
109
and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of
arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that
its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate
or ineffectual. The aspect of the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime
under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was further explained by the Court in Intod[10]
in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment.
There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime.
x xx x
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to
the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x [11]
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual
impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to
steal the latter's wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in
Intod. In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified
theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere
act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be
unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received

the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the
extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the
time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner
turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and
Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which
she thought was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court
held in Valenzuela v. People[12] that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revis ed
Penal Code, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the
taking of personal property of another. Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the tak[ing
of] personal property of another without the latters consent.
x xx x
x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the
position that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its
taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product
of the felony that the offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is
able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner
alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x
x xx x
x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete
from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity
to dispose of the same. x x x
x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which
produces the felony in its consummated stage. x x x [13]
110
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate
the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The
circumstance of petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the
dishonored check was no longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified
theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check
was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime
of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cas h replacement should
not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught
receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her
intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced
with cash by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since
said scheme was not included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court
cannot pronounce judgment on the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process
clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could have been another possible
source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner
Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in
Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED
20. PEOPLE V PUGAY
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-
82 of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information
which reads as follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario, Province of
Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and assisting one another, with

treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of their superior strength, and with
the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a combustible liquid to the body of Bayani
Miranda and with the use of fire did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn
the whole body of said Bayani Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and the means
employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong, that is the burning of the body of
Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the
trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but
crediting in favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y Magdalena are
pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct participation of the crime
of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and appreciating the aforestated mitigating
circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and Samson to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the
law for both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim
in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and exemplary damages of
P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
111
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the
following errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY THE
PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF
EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE
(Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48, Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19,
1982, a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different
kinds of ride and one was a ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel
and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and
noisy. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They
made the deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took
a can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the
body of the former. Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process
of pouring the gasoline. Then, the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch
out of him.

The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the
deceased. Some people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped
the same with rags to extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other
police officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring
as to who were responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed
to Pugay and Samson as the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the
police officers brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario
municipal building for interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written
statements of Gabion and the two accused, after which Gabion was released. The two
accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-
appellants for the reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their
written statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that
he poured a can of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water
and then the accused Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other
hand, alleged in his statement that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see
the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note is the fact that both statements did not
impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements
alleging that they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into
admitting authorship of the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame
on Gabion for the commission of the offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned
and discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the
sole basis for the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated
that "even without Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and
112
convincing testimony which remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and
unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other
eyewitnesses to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons
investigated by the police, only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the
case. They argue that the deliberate non- presentation of these persons raises the
presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the
crime. In fact there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one
Abelardo Reyes and one Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the
respective acts of pouring of gasoline and setting the deceased on fire to the accused-
appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were listed as prosecution witnesses
in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be merely corroborative,
their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the
suppression of merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<re||an1w>
Besides, the matter as to whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only
was the latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in
exchange for his absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading
a comic book during an unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to
testify and state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified
that she never talked to Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant
case was tried. Besides, the accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both
Pugay and the other accused Samson testified that they had no previous misunderstanding
with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour
gasoline on the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-
appellants quote Gabion's testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to
 113

pour gasoline on the deceased, he (Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass you tried according to you
when the victim's body was on fire that he noticed a commotion. to ask him not to and then later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell you
he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that you were reading comics
when you saw Pugay poured gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How could Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he was going to pour gasoline
you possibly see that incident while you were reading comics? that is why you prevent him?

A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what they were doing. A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I thought it was water but it was
gasoline.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with gasoline and lighted and burned
later you had a talk with Pugay, is that correct? Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a stick on his ass, he later got hold
of a can of gasoline, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was trying to prevent him from
doing so. A. Yes, sir.

Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had a talk with Pugay and as a Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the time you told him not to pour
matter of fact, you told him not to pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if gasoline when he merely pick up the can of gasoline.
that is true?
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline he was already in the process
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass, do you mean to say you come of pouring gasoline on the body of Bayani?
to know that Pugay will pour gasoline unto him?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour gasoline before he did that Gabion stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that
actually? Gabion saw Pugay get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it
was while Pugay was in the process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir. Gabion warned him not to do so; and that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.

However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity
of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before

the commission of the crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused
Pugay or Samson. Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear
that the accused Pugay and his group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence,
the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against the deceased is individual and not collective, and each of them is liable only for the
act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13, Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil.
1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having
taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its
contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline.
The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even before
pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who
at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the Solicitor General that the
accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this Court ruled
as follows:
A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be
cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.
He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would
have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and
property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and
injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from
four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his
brief contends that "his conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the
deceased on fire knowing that gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by
treachery as the victim was left completely helpless to defend and protect himself against
such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
114
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to
kill the deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing
that his act was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of
treachery to exist, the attack must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods,
or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the
body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have
committed the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of
doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the
deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility.
Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries
on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver
offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article
4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the
accused Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary
mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as
there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion
testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased
burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<re||an1w>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging
from eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by
Miranda's parents for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is
P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to
P43,940.00.
 115

Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00
as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against
the accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.