Legal Profession 1

+IN RE SHOOP MALCOLM; November 29, 1920

Points to consider: 1. Difference between Civil Law and Common Law 2. Distinguish strains of common law: What are the
bases? 3. How did the Court arrive at the conclusion that there is Anglo- American tradition? 4. What system is in place? 5.
References to American jurisprudence 6. Laws superseded or modified 7. Identify what is that important question the Court
needed to resolve and how it helped solve the Shoop case.

FACTS
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of
Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in
the highest court of the State of New York. - The said rule requires that: New York State by comity confers the privilege of
admission without examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. (Aside
from comity, the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have practiced at least 5 years in any (district or circuit or
highest) court of the US or territory of it. But admission is still in the discretion of the court.) - The rule of New York court, on
the other hand, permits admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases: 1. Provided
that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of the
American Union or in the District of Columbia 2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is
based on the principles of the English Common Law (ECL).

ISSUE
WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity is established

HELD
- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't. established by the Congress. - In interpreting and
applying the bulk of the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the
written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of
those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases
where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions. - The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based
upon the ECL in its present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent. - New York permits
conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to practice in the Phils. similar to those privileges accorded by the rule of this court.
- Petition granted.
Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY
rule; doesnt establish a precedent with respect to future
applications.
Reasoning
On TERRITORY: a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US b. We are NOT an organized territory incorporated into the
United States but c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country" either d. Like Puerto Rico, we may not be
incorporated but we are a territory since the US Congress legislates for us and we have been granted a form of territorial
government, so to that extent we are a territory according to the US Atty. Gen. e. It is not believed that the New York court
intended the word "territory" to be limited to the technical meaning of organized territory or it would have used the more
accurate expression.
f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first requirement since the full phraseology indicates a SWEEPING
INTENTION to include ALL of the territory of the US.

On COMMON LAW jurisdiction:

(On what principle/s is the present day jurisprudence based?)
g. In most of the States, including New York, codification and statute law have come to be a very large proportion of the law of
the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case law which has its roots, to a large but not exclusive degree, in
the old English cases. h. In speaking of a jurisprudence "based on the English Common Law" it would seem proper to say that
the jurisprudence of a particular jurisdiction Is based upon the principles of that Common Law if its statute law and its case law
to a very large extent includes the science and application of law as laid down by the old English cases, as perpetuated and

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modified by the American cases. i. Common Law adopted by decision: i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American
codification and remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal metamorphosis has occurred similar to that
which is transpiring in this jurisdiction today. ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English Common Law" in a general
sense iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of the jurisprudence of the courts where practical considerations
and the effect of sovereignty gives round for such a decision. iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in Anglo-
American jurisprudence are used and applied by the courts to the extent that Common Law principles are NOT in conflict with
the LOCAL WRITTEN laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the change of sovereignty and subsequent legislation, and
there is NO OTHER FOREIGN case law system used to any substantial extent, THEN it is proper to say in the sense of the New
York rule that the "jurisprudence" of the Philippines is based on the ECL.

CIOCON-REER V JUDGE LUBAO

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-Hernandez, and Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (complainants) filed an
administrative complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao (Judge Lubao) of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch
22, for gross ignorance of the law, rules or procedures; gross incompetence and inefficiency; violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019; violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code; violations of pertinent provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, The New Code of Judicial Conduct per A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, and Canons of Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty and
grave misconduct.

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7819 (Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, et al. v. Gaspar Mayo, et al.) for Unlawful Detainer,
Damages, Injunction, etc., an appealed case from the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 3. Complainants alleged
that on 12 September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the parties to submit their respective memoranda within 30
days from receipt of the order. Complainants further alleged that on 30 September 2008, a copy of the order was sent by
registered mail to the defendants, which they should have received within one week or on 7 October 2008. Complainants alleged
that the 30-day period within which to submit memoranda expired on 6 November 2008. Since the defendants failed to submit
their memorandum on 6 November 2008, complainants alleged that they should be deemed to have waived their right to adduce
evidence and Judge Lubao should have decided the case. Yet, four months passed from 6 November 2008 and Judge Lubao still
failed to make his decision.

In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda on 12 September
2008. The Order was sent to the parties through registered mail on 30 September 2008. Judge Lubao alleged that the plaintiffs

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submitted their memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court did not receive the registry return card on the notice to the
defendants. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court sent a letter-request to the Post Office of General Santos City asking
for certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants.
However, the court did not receive any reply from the Post Office.

Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the greater interest of substantial justice, the defendants were given
their last chance to submit their memorandum within 30 days from receipt of the order. In the same order, he directed the
plaintiffs to coordinate with the branch sheriff for personal delivery of the order to the defendants. However, the plaintiffs failed
to coordinate with the branch sheriff and the order was sent to the defendants, again by registered mail, only on 17 June 2009.

Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is engaging in the practice of law even though
he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this Court to require Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for
unauthorized practice of law.

Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge Lubaos failure to submit his comment on time to complainants
administrative complaint is a violation of the existing rules and procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of the law. As regards
his alleged unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged that Judge Lubao was merely trying to evade the issues at hand.

The Findings of the OCA

In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) reported that a verification from the Docket
and Clearance Division of its Office revealed that Karaan also filed numerous administrative complaints [1] against judges from
different courts, all of which were dismissed by this Court.

In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that there was no evidence to show that the orders issued by Judge Lubao were
tainted with fraud, dishonesty or bad faith. The OCA stated that the matters raised by complainants could only be questioned
through judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative complaint. The OCA stated that Karaan
could not simply assume that the order of 12 September 2008 had been received by the defendants without the registry return
card which was not returned to the trial court.

The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached to the records, it would appear that Karaan was engaged in the practice
of law. The OCA also noted the numerous frivolous and administrative complaints filed by Karaan against several judges which
tend to mock the judicial system.

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The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao for lack of merit. The OCA further recommended that
Karaan be required to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for violation of Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court dismissed the complaint against Judge Lubao for being judicial in nature
and for lack of merit. This Court likewise directed Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for violating
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Lubao. Karaan denied that he had been
assuming to be an attorney or an officer of the court and acting as such without authority. He alleged that he did not indicate any
PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number in his documents. He further stated that A.M. No. 07-1674 filed against Judge
Lindo was not actually dismissed as reported by the OCA.

Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to the motion for reconsideration and compliance to the show cause order.
Karaan reiterated that he never represented himself to anyone as a lawyer or officer of the court and that his paralegal services,
rendered free of charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he assists organizations which represent the interests of
senior citizens, the indigents, and members of the community with limited means.

In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA found no merit in the motion for reconsideration. The OCA noted Judge
Lubaos explanation that the case was summarily dismissed by the municipal trial court without service of summons on the
defendants. Thus, Judge Lubao deemed it proper to issue the order requiring all parties to submit their memorandum to give all
concerned the opportunity to be heard. The OCA stated that the remedy against Judge Lubaos action was judicial in nature. The
OCA found that the claim of Karaan that he could prove the receipt of the order by one Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it was
not in the records of the case where Judge Karaan based his order.

The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate and slanderous language, continually attributed all sorts of malicious
motives and nefarious schemes to Judge Lubao regarding the conduct of his official function but failed to substantiate his
allegations. The OCA further noted that this case is just one of the many cases Karaan filed against various judges in other courts
where the same pattern of accusations could be observed.

The OCA found Karaans explanation on the show cause order unsatisfactory. The OCA noted Karaans modus operandi of offering
free paralegal advice and then making the parties execute a special power of attorney that would make him an agent of the
litigants and would allow him to file suits, pleadings and motions with himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf of his
clients. The OCA noted that Karaans services, on behalf of the underprivileged he claimed to be helping, fall within the practice
of law. The OCA recommended that Karaan be declared liable for indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of

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imprisonment for 10 days at the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that a repetition of any of the offenses,
or any similar or other offense, against the courts, judges or court employees will merit more serious sanctions.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the OCAs recommendation that the motion for reconsideration of the Courts 24 November 2010 Resolution
dismissing the complaint against Judge Lubao has no merit.

Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. [2] We agree with the OCA that the remedy of the
complainants in this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial of their motion for reconsideration of this Courts 24 November
2010 Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is in order. As the OCA stated, Karaan could not make
assumptions as to when the defendants received the copy of Judge Lubaos order without the registry return receipt. While
Karaan claimed that he knew when one of the parties received a copy of the order, this claim was unsupported by evidence and
was not in the records of the case when Judge Lubao issued his 20 May 2009 Order giving the defendants their last chance to
submit their memorandum. The records would also show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in his actions on the case, as
his branch clerk of court even wrote the Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12
September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence that Judge Lubao
acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity to be
heard considering that the records of the case would show that the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing
summons to the defendants.

We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was engaged in unauthorized practice of law.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[3] the Court ruled that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession.[4] Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the
use of legal knowledge or skill.[5] Here, the OCA was able to establish the pattern in Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He
would require the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as
their attorney-in-fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other pleadings acting for and in his own behalf and as
attorney-in-fact, agent or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not indicate in the pleadings that he was a
member of the Bar, or any PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not detract from the fact that, by his actions,
he was actually engaged in the practice of law.

Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a person [a]ssuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court,
and acting as such without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent

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adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be
punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If a respondent
is adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
or imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both.

Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,[6] the OCA recommended that Karaan be cited for indirect
contempt and be sentenced to serve an imprisonment of ten days at the Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a
warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense against the courts, judges or court employees will
merit further and more serious sanctions. The OCA further recommended that a memorandum be issued to all courts of the land
to notify the judges and court employees of Karaans unauthorized practice of law and to report to the OCA any further
appearance to be made by Karaan. However, the records would show that Karaan is already 71 years old. In consideration of his
old age and his state of health, we deem it proper to remove the penalty of imprisonment as recommended by the OCA and
instead increase the recommended fine to P10,000.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of the Courts Resolution dated 24 November 2010 dismissing the
complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao for being judicial in nature. We find REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR. GUILTY of indirect
contempt under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and impose on him a Fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land for their guidance and information. The courts and court
employees are further directed to report to the Office of the Court Administrator any further appearance by Remberto C. Karaan,
Sr. before their sala.

SO ORDERED.

IN RE MUNESES

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
IN RE EPIFANIO MUNESES Keywords:
(Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship) Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses became a lawyer in 1966
B.M. No. 2112 but acquired American citizenship in 1981
Restored citizenship in 2006 by virtue of RA 9225
A Filipino lawyer who re-acquires citizenship remains to be
a member of the Philippine Bar but must apply for a license
or permit to engage in law practice.

On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege
to practice law in the Philippines.

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Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his privilege to practice law when he became a American citizen in 1981.
In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C. He intends to retire
in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing requirement
for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to
engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the
right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession
in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required, and incompliance
thereof, petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were
satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications, the OBC recommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the
Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

IN RE MEDADO Key words: Canon 9, Roll of Attorneys

In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys

B.M. no 2540, September 24, 2013
Ponente: C.J. Sereno

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I. Terms
Canon 9- A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law

II. Reliefs Sought

Atty. Michael Medado filed a petition to be able to sign the roll of attorneys.

III. Facts
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1979, passing the Bar with an
average of 82.7%
May 7, 1980: He took the lawyers oath.
He was scheduled to sign the roll of attorneys on May 13, 1980, but failed to do so, as he had misplaced
the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office, which he had left in his province.
Years later, he found the notice, realizing he had not signed the roll. At that time, he was already working
in the field of corporation and tax, which did not include much litigation.
In 2005, he attended the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education seminar, which required him to provide
his roll number to be credited, but he could not produce it.
Feb 6, 2012: He filed a petition to be allowed to sign the roll.
The Office of the Bar confidant had recommended that the petition be denied for gross negligence,
misconduct, and lack of merit, as he did not have a valid justification for his actions.

IV. Issue/s and Held

1. Whether or not Atty. Medado acted in gross negligence and misconduct.

Held: Yes, but the court granted his petition, with an additional fine of P32,000, and penalty of not
allowing him to sign for 1 year (because he cannot be suspended yet, as he is not a full-fledged lawyer),
wherein he is not allowed to practice.

To not allow Medado to sign the roll of attorneys would be like the penalty of disbarment, which
is reserved for the most serious of ethical transgressions.
The petitioner acted in good faith, as he had filed the petition himself, acknowledging his own
lapses. He had also showed his good moral character in that he had not been a subject of
disqualification, showing that he had continuously adhered to the strict requirements of the legal
profession. He has also proved his competence and ability, as shown through his work in the
Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corp., PNOC, and EDC
The practice of law is a privilege to those who can show mental and moral fitness.
The petitioners failure to sign for 30 years cannot be deemed as a mistaken belief.
Ignorantia facti excusat; Ignorantia legis nemimem excusat
It was an honest mistake when he had thought that he had already signed the roll during his
oath-taking (attendance pala), but after discovering the notice, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice, which is an indirect contempt of court
Canon 9 applies to him, as signing in the roll is a requirement to become a full-fledged lawyer.

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