LTD Assignment November 15, 2016

1. Rural Bank of Anda, Inc. vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen-Dagupan

GR155051 May 29, 2007

FACTS:
The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of Binmaley, Pangasinan.
Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot
739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 is known as Imeldas Park, while on Lot 739 is a
waiting shed for commuters. Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the
south by the national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary
(seminary) which is on Lot 1.
Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of respondent Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT
6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both
respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley
In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence separating Lot 736
from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking because the smell of horse manure was
already bothering the priests living in the seminary. The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has
openings in the east, west, and center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of
the day
In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a sawali fence was
being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998, the Municipal Mayor of
Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to the seminary to discuss the
situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that the construction of the building for the Rural
Bank of Anda should be stopped.
On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the sawali fence and
restore the concrete fence. On20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta informed respondent that the
construction of the building of the Rural Bank of Anda would resume but that he was willing to
discuss with respondent to resolve the problem concerning Lot 736.
On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal Constructions,
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are valid.
HELD:
The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit that they do not
have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey Section of the Land
Management Services in Region I testified that no document of ownership for Lot 736 was ever
presented to their office. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right
over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any
other mode of acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state
RATIO:
This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state owns all lands and
waters of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution: All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the state.
Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government lands without
prior grant from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104
and 105 are void and consequently, the contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and
the Rural Bank of Anda over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

2. Isagani Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources GR135835 December
6, 2000

FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition
was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include natural
resources somehow against the regalian doctrine.

RATIO:
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral domains"
and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a)
and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners. 3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials
over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of the indigenous peoples

3. Republic of the Philippines vs. Celestina Naguiat GR134209 January 24, 2006

FACTS:
Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial confirmation of
her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was alleged that Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration. The MCTC rendered a decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of
Rustico Angeles to appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since the subject land was declared as alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The
alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree that
the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

RULING:
Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already alienable
and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is file
There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject property is alienable
and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession and occupation, and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.

There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or proclamation stating the
intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property, thus, declaring the land
as alienable and disposable. However, if there has been none, it is presumed that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long
would not ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the construction of Section 14 (1) would render
the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would mean that all lands of public domain
which were not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it
precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as
alienable and disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut
trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous
possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

4. Carino vs. Insular Government 212 U. S. 449 February 23, 1909

FACTS:
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as
the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only
presented possessory information and no other documentation. The State opposed the petition
averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The
State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of
immemorial use and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for
some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the
absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of
such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It
was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since
the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a
possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that
proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he
did the State remained the absolute owner. Land was not registered, and therefore
became, if it was not always, public land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
 deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such

proceedings against him or his father ever was made.

Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private

individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the lands will be
deemed private absent contrary proof.

5. Alfredo Ching vs. CA GR L-59731 January 11, 1990

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied Banking
Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a continuing
guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all
its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of
preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of
said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo
Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares
of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of
conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares
of stocks is not the controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks
under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name
of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the
suretyship obligation was not contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husbands profession or
business.44

ISSUE:
WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans guaranteed by
petitioner Alfredo Ching

HELD: No.

RATIO:
The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the
private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-husband was in the exercise of
his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with
his exclusive money.

The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account of
PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone,
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between
the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be
inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or
a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was
burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

6. Castillo vs. Escutin GR171056 March 13, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel
Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner
discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-
owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy.
Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.

Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to secure an Order
dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion
of several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by Perla K. Mortilla, et al. and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and recreational uses. She was
also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification [if stating that Lot
13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and
Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of
Lipa City issued a Certificationattesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana,
and Perla, was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject to the
issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.

Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and the public
auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the
scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and
Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit
Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice
President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove
ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened her that the owners of Summit
Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY
REGISTRATION ACT

RULING:
From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions held by respondents
Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How then could she even assert that a particular
action was within or without their jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true that petitioner should
have at least been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was being cancelled, she was not
able to establish that such would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or Linatoc. Moreover,
petitioner did not present statutory, regulatory, or procedural basis for her insistence that respondents
should have done or not done a particular act. A perfect example was her assertion that respondents
Mistas and Linatoc should have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name
of Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes the annotation
of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any reliable evidence, petitioners charge
that respondents conspired with one another and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing
more than speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Just because the acts of respondents were consistently
favorable to Summit Realty does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause petitioner
prejudice. Respondents actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title of Catigbac over
Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered under the Torrens system, and accordingly
evidenced by certificates of title.

7. Rudolf Lietz Holdings vs. Registry of Deeds of Paraaque GR133240 November 15,
2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name from Rudolf Lietz,
Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a consequence of its
change of name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real
properties owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner
instituted a petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Paraaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the
titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition that the lands covered by the
subject titles are located in Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in
the custody of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City,
and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of
improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and
the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower
court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the res because it appeared from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City;
hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it
could not have acted on the motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue.
HELD:
Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, where this
Court held that it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioners complaint by respondent trial
court on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to
distinguish between jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law. [16] It may
not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be
changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the
failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event, the court may still render a
valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the
parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the appropriate course of
action at this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the venue in a
motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be
held and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly
challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial
court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of
improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper
course.
Amendments as a matter of right

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is
served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.

Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order that every case may
so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the
circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the
amendment proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case
to be speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in
order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of
a lawsuit, especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the trial of
the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

8. Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro vs. CA GR103727 December 1, 1996

FACTS
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of controversy in these
two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been
laying claim to the ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land area of
approximately 173,000 hectares or 214,047 quiniones,[ on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled Titulo
de Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs,
appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and Quezon; and such
Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City, Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus
affecting in general lands extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the
land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and land swindles and
rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in
the Supreme Court, in connection therewith. G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a
complaintfor recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
104, Quezon City in its decision dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portionof which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the defendants
Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the
herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and
to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance with damages
and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as
heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban against Jose G.
De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz,
Gaudencio R. Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain,
Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment
& Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose F. Castro. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro discovered that the
aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to
portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-
951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from
Original Certificate of Title No. 614 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and 264124, both
derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the aforesaid defendants were able to
acquire exclusive ownership and possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their names
through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614
and 333 had been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in
relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest Development and the
Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971,
April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity
and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate
had been resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the defunct
Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 312-B.
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely, Aurelio Ocampo,
MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung
Tiu.
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against Mareco, Inc. for
improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of
action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El
Mavic Investment and Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based on the following
grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land
covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No.
4136, covering the subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban specifically
stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already been legally and validly titled under
the Torrens system by private persons shall be excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No.
4136.

ISSUE: Whether the claim of 173hectares land is valid

HELD: NO. (1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and, therefore, no rights
could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B, should be,
as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of possession or ownership or to
otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of
them are in possession thereof.

RATIO: The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon
City. Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in
the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation, indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private ownership of land must be
proved not only through the genuineness of title but also with a clear identity of the land claimed.
(Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13
Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65
Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the land
must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v.
Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares
as a basis for classifying lands strongly suggests that the land applied for must be measured per
hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadecos Rejoinder to Opposition
dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo de
Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p. 36). In its Opposition of May 13, 1964 in the
same case, it described the land as containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but
accentuates the nebulous identity of Piadecos land. Piadecos ownership thereof then equally suffers
from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title,
acquired his rights over the property by prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of
June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By
this decree, applications for adjustment -- showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied
for -- were to be filed with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered the
classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party or his legal
representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for adjustment at one
year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880,
extended for another year by the Royal Order of July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought
adjustment within the time prescribed, as he should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the
Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000
hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands (See:
Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of
the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500
hectares, with allowable error up to 5%. Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should
be stated again that Piadecos Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.
9. Legarda vs. Saleeby GR8936 October 2, 1915

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The said wall and the
strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system under the name of Legarda in 1906.
Six years after the decree of registration is released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for
registration of his lot under the Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter
included the stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been registered under the
name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy. However, it can
be construed that where two certificates purports to include the same registered land, the holder of the
earlier one continues to hold title and will prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to
any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in
the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title
is registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or
sitting in the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the Torrens system.
Ratio: One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to unknown,
unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such persons will be put to additional
cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when any transaction is had with regard to such lands;
while the other ruling tends to eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object
for which the land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a
certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare, definite and specific
occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being challenged in a Court of Land
Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and expense is reduced to the minimum by the
conclusive character of his certificate of title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore,
judgment against the innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case
such as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or overlapping
registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or fraudulently and conclusively,
to permit default judgments to be entered against them adjudicating title to all or a part of their
registered lands in favor of other applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial
proceedings had for that purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of
thir titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to an entry of
appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured, and inviting attention to the fact that
their right, title and ownership in the lands in questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.

10. Talusan vs. Tayag GR133698 April 4, 2001

FACTS:
On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter alia, that:
--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, from its
former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, [herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in his capacity as
City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that
the above described property would be sold at public auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy
the delinquent real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of
P4,039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974. Elias Imperial never authorized
a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for and on his behalf;
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag for P4,400.00
without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and without compliance with the
provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;
--A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag. The assessed
value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair market value of the same is more than
P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these;
--The bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience, thus, the sale for
the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties is null and void ab initio;
--[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from
its former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of
owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has never been in possession of the said property;
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the [respondents] the sum of P4,400 plus all
interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but said offer was rejected without any
just [or] lawful cause.
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo.
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of not less than
P20,000.00; attorneys fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 for every appearance; and
litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00 to prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with [C]ounterclaim (pages
28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the allegations in the complaint and, at the
same time, raised the following affirmative defenses, among others:
--(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium Certificate of Title No.
651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and
executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a buyer in good faith in a regular and
lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.
--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim because the [petitioners] pray for the
annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said
decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on
October 8, 1987;
--The public auction sale complied with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 464 hence, the
same is lawful and valid:
--[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the [petitioners] by
Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Baguio
City.
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at least P50,000.00;
exemplary damages; attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and, expenses of litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he denied the material
averments in the complaint and stated that no irregularity or illegality was committed in the conduct
of the proceedings with respect to the delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of
the defendant herein were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the provisions
of the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real
Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed against him. He also claimed, by way
of affirmative defenses, that:
--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:
--[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus, the case cannot
prosper;
--Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because of] the fact that it
is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including defendant herein.
ISSUE: The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the auction sale of the
subject property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency when there was no compliance with the
mandatory requirement of Section 46 of P.D. 464 that such notice of delinquency of the payment of
the property tax should be published.
HELD: NO. DENIED
RATIO: As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not find application, if
the statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and standards by which the
matters at bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent purchasers
of the subject property, it is a well-settled principle that between two purchasers, the one who has
registered the sale in ones favor has a preferred right over the other whose title has not been
registered, even if the latter is in actual possession of the subject property.
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune upon
themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the
consolidation of ownership of title to the property in their name. Worse, they failed to pay the real
property taxes due. Although they had been in possession of the property since 1981, they did not
take the necessary steps to protect and legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners suit is now barred by laches. The law helps the vigilant, but not those who sleep on
their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against the slothful and the
contemners of their own rights.

11. Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic GR179987 April 29, 2009

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square
meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was
originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess
grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves.
But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited
by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC
approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of
Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should
the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified
as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date
back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

12. Republic vs. Mindanao Medical Center GR L-40912 September 30, 1976

FACTS:
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the
Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio
Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The property applied for was a portion of what
was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed
bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a
certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however,
annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate
in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus
was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of
P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the
dispositive portion of which reads: +.wph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in connection with the Sales
Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby
is herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for the
whole tract.
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his
Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936,
the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A,
1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of
Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231)
of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said
application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back
thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was
Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot
No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the
administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. This payment did not
include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the
Sales Application at the time the payment was made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of
Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales
Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion,
City of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano
Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land
situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64
ares, and 00 centa.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full 12.8081-
hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical center site
purposes.
HELD: YES
RATIO: Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed
between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void, because
Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in
1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already withrew the area from sale or
settlement and reserved it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however, rationalizes
that the subject of the donation was not the land itself but "the possessory and special proprietary
rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation may
consist of a thing or right. But the term "right" must be understood in a "propriety" sense, over which
the processor has the jus disponendi. This is because, in true donations, there results a consequent
impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets. Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be
possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed
12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of
disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of
Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to
assume in gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the
same may not be the subject of donation.

13. Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority GR133250 July 9, 2002

Facts:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay
with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.
1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered
into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed
by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI
entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously
known as the mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing
the JVA. Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an
Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the
(Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands
of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed lands
as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

14. Republic vs. Doldol GR132963 September 10, 1998

FACTS:
Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol, Misamis Oriental.
On 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said area but the Director of Forestry
rejected the same. Sometime in 1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution
reserving a certain lot as a school site. This lot unfortunately included the lot of Doldol. Sometime in
1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on
schools power. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling that Doldol was entitledto
the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32 years (1959-1991).
ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?
HELD: No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable
public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.
When the conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation of law,
acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of title/certificate of tile being
issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable in
accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed land since his
occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied
with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a
right to assert a right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol
National School.

The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no contractual or
vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or
acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government of
title thereof stands eventhough this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Solicitor
General)

In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land in dispute.

15. Republic vs. Alconaba GR155012 April 14, 2004

FACTS:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an application for
registration of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of 5,220 square meters, situated in
Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their application, they stated, among other things, that they are
the sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original owners
of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in possession of the
said property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother and father on 19 February 1967
and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the property among themselves and subdivided it into
five lots, namely, Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. Since then they have been in
actual possession of the property in the concept of owners and in a public and peaceful manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest
possess sufficient title to the property or have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of
title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts, presented by the respondents do not constitute competent
and sufficient evidence of a bona fide right to registration of the land under Section 48(b),
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073; (c) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can
no longer be availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines.
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., and Carmencita M. Alconaba
testified to establish their claim over the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that he and his co-respondents
acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents Lot 2111 of Cad-455, which is an agricultural
land. Their parents had been in possession of the said land since 1949 and had been religiously paying
the taxes due thereon. When their parents died, he and his siblings immediately took possession of
said property in the concept of an owner, paid taxes, and continued to plant rice thereon. On 24 June
1996, he and his co-heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the said lot and
subdivided it into five lots.
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had been in the possession of their parents
since 1940 and that after the death of their parents she and her siblings immediately took possession
of it and religiously paid the taxes thereon. The land is being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant.
She admitted that no improvements have been introduced by their family on the lot. On cross
examination, she admitted that plans to sell the property were at han.
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the respondents have sufficiently
established their familys actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of the subject property
for more than fifty-seven years, commencing from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest in
1940, and that such possession was in an adverse and public manner. Likewise, it found that the land
in question is alienable and disposable and is not within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it
confirmed the title of the respondents over the said lots; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna,
Calamba Branch, to cause the registration of said parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon
payment of fees; and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration once the decision becomes final
and executory.
Upon appeal by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence,
this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in (a) giving weight to the
self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the lots in question in the concept of
an owner for at least thirty years; and (b) holding that respondents tax declaration is sufficient proof
that they and their parents have been in possession of the property for at least thirty years, despite the
fact that the said tax declaration was only for the year 1994 and the property tax receipts presented by
the respondents were all of recent dates, i.e., 1990, 1991,1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Finally, the
OSG states that even granting for the sake of argument that the respondents have been in possession
of the property since 1940, their adverse possession should be reckoned only from 28 September
1981 when the property was declared to be within alienable and disposable zone.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the self-serving
testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the lots in question in the concept of an owner
for at least thirty years
HELD: YES. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and
(b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
RATIO: The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the
conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word
occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.