Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160786 June 17, 2013

SIMPLICIA O. ABRIGO and DEMETRIO ABRIGO, Petitioners,

vs.
JIMMY F. FLORES, EDNA F. FLORES, DANILO FLORES, BELINDA
FLORES, HECTOR. FLORES, MARITES FLORES, HEIRS OF MARIA F.
FLORES, JACINTO FAYLONA, ELISA FAYLONA MAGPANTAY,
MARIETTA FAYLONA CARTACIANO, and HEIRS of TOMASA
BANZUELA VDA. DE FAYLONA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its

finality, its execution should follow as a matter of course. A supervening
event, to be sufficient to stay or stop the execution, must alter or modify the
situation of the parties under the decision as to render the execution
inequitable, impossible, or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest on
unproved or uncertain facts.

In this appeal, petitioners seek to reverse the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.

48033 promulgated on September 25, 2002,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) directed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, in San Pablo City (RTC)
to issue a special order of demolition to implement the immutable and
unalterable judgment of the RTC rendered on November 20, 1989.

This case emanated from the judicial partition involving a parcel of

residential land with an area of 402 square meters situated in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Laguna (property in litis) that siblings Francisco
Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona had inherited from their parents. Under
the immutable and unalterable judgment rendered on November 20, 1989,
the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona, respondents
herein, would have the western portion of the property in litis, while the
heirs and successors-in-interest of Gaudencia Faylona its eastern half.
For an understanding of the case, we adopt the following rendition by the
CA in its assailed decision of the factual and procedural antecedents, viz:

Involved in the suit is a lot with an area of 402 square meters situated in the
Municipality of Alaminos, Laguna and inherited by both Francisco (Faylona)
and Gaudencia (Faylona) from their deceased parents. The lot is declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 7378 which Gaudencia
managed to secure in her name alone to the exclusion of Francisco and the
latters widow and children. It appears that after Franciscos death, his
widow and Gaudencia entered into an extrajudicial partition whereby the
western half of the same lot was assigned to Franciscos heirs while the
eastern half thereof to Gaudencia. There was, however, no actual ground
partition of the lot up to and after Gaudencias death. It thus result that both
the heirs of Francisco and Gaudencia owned in common the land in
dispute, which co-ownership was recognized by Gaudencia herself during
her lifetime, whose heirs, being in actual possession of the entire area,
encroached and built improvements on portions of the western half. In the
case of the petitioners, a small portion of their residence, their garage and
poultry pens extended to the western half.

Such was the state of things when, on July 22 1988, in the Regional Trial
Court at San Pablo City, the heirs and successors-in-interest of Francisco
Faylona, among whom are the private respondents, desiring to terminate
their co-ownership with the heirs of Gaudencia, filed their complaint for
judicial partition in this case, which complaint was docketed a quo as Civil
Case No. SP-3048.

In a decision dated November 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment
for the private respondents by ordering the partition of the land in dispute in
such a way that the western half thereof shall pertain to the heirs of
Francisco while the eastern half, to the heirs of Gaudencia whose heirs
were further required to pay rentals to the plaintiffs for their use and
occupancy of portions on the western half. More specifically, the decision
dispositively reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment

in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants ordering:

1. The partition of the parcel of land described in paragraph 5 of the

complaint the western half portion belonging to the plaintiffs and the other
half eastern portion thereof to the defendants, the expenses for such
partition, subdivision and in securing the approval of the Bureau of Lands
shall be equally shouldered by them;

2. To pay plaintiffs the sum of 500.00 per month as rental from July 22,
1988 until the entire Western half portion of the land is in the complete
possession of plaintiffs;

3. Defendants to pay the costs of these proceedings.

SO ORDERED."

From the aforementioned decision, the heirs of Gaudencia, petitioners

included, went on appeal to this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 25347. And, in a
decision promulgated on December 28, 1995, this Court, thru its former
Third Division, affirmed the appealed judgment of the respondent court,
minus the award for rentals, thus:

"WHEREFORE, appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, except the

amount of rental awarded which is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED."

With no further appellate proceedings having been taken by the petitioners

and their other co-heirs, an Entry of Judgment was issued by this Court on
June 3, 1996.

Thereafter, the heirs of Francisco filed with the court a quo a motion for
execution to enforce and implement its decision of November 20, 1989, as
modified by this Court in its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 25347, supra.
Pending action thereon and pursuant to the parties agreement to engage
the services of a geodetic engineer to survey and subdivide the land in
question, the respondent court issued an order appointing Engr. Domingo
Donato "to cause the survey and subdivision of the land in question and to
make his report thereon within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof."

In an order dated November 19, 1997, the respondent court took note of
the report submitted by Engr. Donato. In the same order, however, the court
likewise directed the defendants, more specifically the herein petitioners, to
remove, within the period specified therein, all their improvements which
encroached on the western half, viz
"As prayed for by the defendants, they are given 2 months from today or up
to January 19, 1998 within which to remove their garage, a small portion of
their residence which was extended to a portion of the property of the
plaintiffs as well as the chicken pens thereon and to show proof of
compliance herewith."

To forestall compliance with the above, petitioners, as defendants below,

again prayed the respondent court for a final extension of sixty (60) days
from January 19, 1998 within which to comply with the order. To make their
motion palatable, petitioners alleged that they "are about to conclude an
arrangement with the plaintiffs and just need ample time to finalize the
same." To the motion, private respondents interposed an opposition,
therein stating that the alleged arrangement alluded to by the petitioners
did not yield any positive result.

Eventually, in an order dated January 28, 1998, the respondent court

denied petitioners motion for extension of time to remove their
improvements. Thereafter, or on February 6, 1998, the same court issued a
writ of execution.

On February 12, 1998, Sheriff Baliwag served the writ on the petitioners,
giving the latter a period twenty (20) days from notice or until March 4,
1998 within which to remove their structures which occupied portions of
private respondents property. On March 6, 1998, the implementing sheriff
returned the writ "PARTIALLY SATISFIED", with the information that
petitioners failed to remove that portion of their residence as well as their
garage and poultry fence on the western half of the property.

On account of the sheriffs return, private respondents then filed with the
court a quo on March 11, 1998 a Motion for Issuance of Special Order of
Demolition.

On March 19, 1998, or even before the respondent court could act on
private respondents aforementioned motion for demolition, petitioners filed
a Motion to Defer Resolution on Motion for Demolition, this time alleging
that they have become one of the co-owners of the western half to the
extent of 53.75 square meters thereof, purportedly because one of the
successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona Jimmy Flores who was co-
plaintiff of the private respondents in the case, sold to them his share in the
western half. We quote the pertinent portions of petitioners motion to defer:
"That after the finality of the decision and on this stage of execution thereof,
there was an event and circumstance which took place between the
defendants and one of the groups of plaintiffs (Floreses) which would
render the enforcement of the execution unjust.

On March 4, 1998, the Floreses, one of the plaintiffs as co-owners of the

property-in-question in the Western portion, sold their one-fourth (1/4)
undivided portion in the co-ownership of the plaintiffs to defendant Simplicia
O. Abrigo, as can be seen in a xerox copy of the deed x x x.

xxxx

Defendant Simplicia O. Abrigo is now one of the four co-owners of a

portion, pro-indiviso of the property of the plaintiffs. Thus, until and unless a
partition of this property is made, the enforcement of the execution and/or
demolition of the improvement would be unjust x x x. This sale took place
after the finality".

In the herein first assailed order dated May 13, 1998, the respondent court
denied petitioners motion to defer resolution of private respondents motion
for a special order of demolition and directed the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, thus:

"WHEREFORE, let an alias writ of execution issue for the satisfaction of

the Courts judgment. Defendants Motion to Defer Resolution of the Motion
for a Writ of Demolition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED."

xxxx

On May 20, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, thereunder

insisting that being now one of the co-owners of the western half, there is
need to defer action of the motion for demolition until the parties in the co-
ownership of said half shall have decided in a formal partition which portion
thereof belongs to each of them.

A timely opposition to the motion for reconsideration was filed by the private
respondents, thereunder arguing that the alleged Deed of Sale dated
March 4, 1998 and supposedly executed by Jimmy Flores was merely
falsified by the latter because one of the Floreses, Marites Flores, did not
actually participate in the execution thereof, adding that the same
document which seeks to bind them (private respondents) as
nonparticipating third parties, cannot be used as evidence against them for
the reason that the deed is not registered.

Pursuant to the aforequoted order of May 13, 1998, an alias writ of

execution was again issued. As before, Sheriff Baliwag served the alias writ
to the petitioners on June 16, 1998, giving them until June 23, 1998 within
which to remove their structures which encroached on the western half.
Again, petitioners failed and refused to comply, as borne by the sheriffs
amended return.2 (citations omitted)

In order to stave off the impending demolition of their improvements

encroaching the western half of the property in litis pursuant to the special
order to demolish being sought by respondents, petitioners instituted a
special civil action for certiorari in the CA against respondents and the RTC
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 48033), alleging that the RTC had gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order
of May 13, 1998 (denying their motion to defer resolution on the motion for
demolition), and the order dated June 10, 1998 (denying their motion for
reconsideration).

In support of their petition, petitioners contended that the sale to them by

respondent Jimmy Flores, one of the successors-in-interest of Francisco
Faylona, of his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot
(under the deed of sale dated March 4, 1998) had meanwhile made them
co-owners of the western portion, and constituted a supervening event
occurring after the finality of the November 20, 1989 decision that rendered
the execution inequitable as to them.3

On September 25, 2002, however, the CA dismissed the petition for

certiorari upon finding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion,
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and is accordingly

DISMISSED. The respondent court is directed to issue a special order of
demolition to implement its final and executory decision of November 20,
1989, as modified by this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 25347.

SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition,
but the CA denied their motion on October 6, 2003.5

Issues

In this appeal, petitioners submit in their petition for review that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT,

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DENIAL
OF THE RTC OF ITS ENFORCEMENT OF THE DECISION DESPITE THE
OBVIOUS SUPERVENING EVENT THAT WOULD JUSTIFY MATERIAL
CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES AND WHICH MAKES
EXECUTION INEQUITABLE OR UNJUST.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT,

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FOUND THAT THERE
WAS NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE QUESTIONED ORDERS OF
THE RTC.6

The legal issue is whether or not the sale by respondent Jimmy Flores of
his 1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot constituted
a supervening event that rendered the execution of the final judgment
against petitioners inequitable.

Ruling

We deny the petition for review, and rule that the CA correctly dismissed
the petition for certiorari. Indeed, the RTC did not abuse its discretion, least
of all gravely, in issuing its order of May 13, 1998 denying petitioners
motion to defer resolution on the motion for demolition, and its order dated
June 10, 1998 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the November 20, 1989 decision directed the
partition of the 402-square meter parcel of land between the heirs and
successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona and Gaudencia Faylona, with
the former getting the western half and the latter the eastern half; and
ordered the latter to remove their improvements encroaching the western
portion adjudicated to the former. The decision became final after its
affirmance by the CA through its decision promulgated on December 28,
1995 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 25347 modifying the decision only by deleting
the award of rentals. There being no further appellate proceedings after the
affirmance with modification, the CA issued its entry of judgment on June 3,
1996.

Thereafter, the RTC issued several writs of execution to enforce the

judgment. The execution of the November 20, 1989 decision, as modified
by the CA, followed as a matter of course, because the prevailing parties
were entitled to its execution as a matter of right, and a writ of execution
should issue to enforce the dispositions therein.7

The contention of petitioners that the sale by Jimmy Flores to them of his
1/4 share in the western portion of the 402-square meter lot under the deed
of sale dated March 4, 1998 was a supervening event that rendered the
execution inequitable is devoid of merit.

Although it is true that there are recognized exceptions to the execution as

a matter of right of a final and immutable judgment, one of which is a
supervening event, such circumstance did not obtain herein. To accept their
contention would be to reopen the final and immutable judgment in order to
further partition the western portion thereby adjudicated to the heirs and
successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona for the purpose of segregating
the portion supposedly subject of the sale by Jimmy Flores. The
reopening would be legally impermissible, considering that the November
20, 1989 decision, as modified by the CA, could no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification
was meant to correct what was perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or of law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the
land, rendered it.8 This is pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of a final
judgment, which may be relaxed only to serve the ends of substantial
justice in order to consider certain circumstances like: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) the cause not being entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the doctrine; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory; or (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced by
the suspension.9
Verily, petitioners could not import into the action for partition of the
property in litis their demand for the segregration of the 1/4 share of Jimmy
Flores. Instead, their correct course of action was to initiate in the proper
court a proceeding for partition of the western portion based on the
supposed sale to them by Jimmy Flores.

We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an

exception to the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable
judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already litigated and
settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein
as to render the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.10 A
supervening event consists of facts that transpire after the judgment
became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the
judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware
of prior to or during the trial because such matters were not yet in existence
at that time.11 In that event, the interested party may properly seek the stay
of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution,12 or he may move the
court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice
and the supervening event.13 The party who alleges a supervening event to
stay the execution should necessarily establish the facts by competent
evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the
conclusive effects of a final and immutable judgment.

Here, however, the sale by Jimmy Flores of his supposed 1/4 share in the
western portion of the property in litis, assuming it to be true, did not modify
or alter the judgment regarding the partition of the property in litis. It was
also regarded with suspicion by the CA because petitioners had not
adduced evidence of the transaction in the face of respondents, including
Jimmy Flores, having denied the genuineness and due execution of the
deed of sale itself.

The issuance of the special order of demolition would also not constitute an
abuse of discretion, least of all grave. Such issuance would certainly be the
necessary and logical consequence of the execution of the final and
immutable decision. According to Section 10( d) of Rule 39, Rules of Court,
when the property subject of the execution contains improvements
constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall
not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special
order of the court issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due
hearing and after the judgment obligor or his agent has failed to remove the
improvements within a reasonable time fixed by the court. With the special
order being designed to carry out the final judgment of the RTC for the
delivery of the western portion of the property in litis to their respective
owners, the CA's dismissal of the petition for certiorari could only be
upheld.1wphi1

It irritates the Court to know that petitioners have delayed for nearly 17
years now the full implementation of the final and immutable decision of
November 20, 1989, as modified by the CA. It is high time, then, that the
Court puts a firm stop to the long delay in order to finally enable the heirs
and successors-in-interest of Francisco Faylona as the winning parties to
deservedly enjoy the fruits of the judgment in their favor.14

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on September 25, 2002 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 48033;
DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, in San Pablo City to issue
forthwith the special order of demolition to implement its final and executory
decision of November 20, 1989, as modified by the Court of

Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 25347; DECLARES this decision to be

immediately executory; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
 MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ROLANDO D. MANANSALA
AND/OR MEL MANANSALA, DOING BUSINESS AS DATAMAN TRADING
COMPANY AND/OR COMIC ALLEY, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

This appeal seeks to overturn the decision promulgated on February 27,

2004, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner to annul the orders of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) dated March 20, 2000,2 May 15, 2001,3 and January 27,
20034 dismissing the criminal charge of violation of Section 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 49 (Decree on Intellectual Property) it had instituted against the
respondents; and the resolution promulgated on December 6, 2004 denying
its motion for reconsideration.5

Antecedents

The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents thusly:

Petitioner (Microsoft Corporation) is the copyright and trademark owner of all
rights relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software (computer
programs) such as, but not limited to, MS-DOS (disk operating system),
Microsoft Encarta, Microsoft Windows, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel,
Microsoft Access, Microsoft Works, Microsoft Powerpoint, Microsoft Office,
Microsoft Flight Simulator and Microsoft FoxPro, among others, and their
user's guide/manuals.

Private Respondent-Rolando Manansala is doing business under the name of

DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY and/or COMIC ALLEY with business address at
3rdFloor, University Mall Building, Tail Avc, Manila.

Private Respondent Manansala, without authority from petitioner, was

engaged in distributing and selling Microsoft computer software programs.

On November 3, 1997, Mr. John Benedict A. Sacriz, a private investigator

accompanied by an agent from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
was able to purchase six (6) CD-ROMs containing various computer
programs belonging to petitioner.
As a result of the test-purchase, the agent from the NBI applied for a search
warrant to search the premises of the private respondent.

On November 17, 1997, a Search Warrant was issued against the premises
of the private respondent.

On November 19, 1997, the search warrant was served on the private
respondent's premises and yielded several illegal copies of Microsoft
programs.

Subsequently, petitioner, through Atty. Teodoro Kalaw IV tiled an Affidavit-

Complaint in the DOJ based on the results of the search and seizure
operation conducted on private respondent's premises.

However, in a Resolution dated March 20, 2000, public respondent State

Prosecutor dismissed the charge against private respondent for violation of
Section 29 P.D. 49 in this wise, to quote:
'The evidence is extant in the records to show that respondent is selling
Microsoft computer software programs bearing the copyrights and
trademarks owned by Microsoft Corporation. There is, however, no proof that
respondent was the one who really printed or copied the products of
complainant for sale in his store.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby, recommended that respondent be charged for

violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge for violation of
Section 29 of PD No. 49 is recommended dismissed for lack of evidence.'
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing that printing or
copying is not essential in the crime of copyright infringement under Section
29 of PD No. 49.

On May 15, 2001, the public respondent issued a Resolution denying the
Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ, which denied
the petition for review.6
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Dissatisfied with the outcome of its appeal, the petitioner filed its petition
for certiorari in the CA to annul the DOJ's dismissal of its petition for review
on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ.

On February 27, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the
dismissal by the DOJ,7 disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
Consequently, the Orders dated March 20, 2000, May 15, 2001 and January
27, 2003 respectively are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.8 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Issue

The petitioner insists that printing or copying was not essential in the
commission of the crime of copyright infringement under Section 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 49; hence, contrary to the holding of the DOJ, as
upheld by the CA, the mere selling of pirated computer software constituted
copyright infringement.9

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Although the general rule is that the determination of the existence of

probable cause by the public prosecutor is not to be judicially scrutinized
because it is an executive function, an exception exists when the
determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.10 Bearing this in
mind, we hold that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in
sustaining the public prosecutor's dismissal of the charge of copyright
infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 on the ground
of lack of evidence because the public prosecutor thereby flagrantly
disregarded the existence of acts sufficient to engender the well-founded
belief that the crime of copyright infringement had been committed, and that
the respondent was probably guilty thereof.11

Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49 specifically defined copyright as an

exclusive right in the following manner:
Section 5. Copyright shall consist in the exclusive right;

(A) To print, reprint, publish, copy, distribute, multiply, sell, and make
photographs, photo-engravings, and pictorial illustrations of the works;

(B) To make any translation or other version or extracts or arrangements or

adaptations thereof; to dramatize it if it be a non-dramatic work; to convert
it into a non-dramatic work if it be a drama; to complete or execute if it be a
model or design;

(C) To exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce, the work in any

manner or by any method whatever for profit or otherwise; it not
reproduced in copies for sale, to sell any manuscript or any record
whatsoever thereof;

(D) To make any other use or disposition of the work consistent with the
laws of the land.
Accordingly, the commission of any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 49 without the copyright owner's consent constituted
actionable copyright infringement. In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,12 the Court has emphatically declared:
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and
occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law,
and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this
connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the
owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by
statute on the owner of the copyright.
The "gravamen of copyright infringement," according to NBI-Microsoft
Corporation v. Hwang:13
is not merely the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works but rather
the unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5.
Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without
obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself civilly and
criminally liable for copyright infringement.14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA stated in the assailed decision as follows:

A reading of Section 5 (a) of the Copyright Law shows that the acts
enumerated therein are punctuated by commas and the last phrase is
conjoined by the words 'and'. Clearly, the same should be interpreted to
mean as 'relating to one another' because it is basic in legal hermeneutics
that the word 'and' is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used
to denote a 'joinder' or 'union'.

In the book of Noli C. Diaz entitled as STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, the word

'and' was defined as a 'conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing
the idea that the latter is to be added to or taken along with the first'. Stated
differently, the word 'and' is a conjunction pertinently defined as meaning
'together with', 'joined with', 'along or together with', 'added to or linked to'
used to conjoin 'word with word', 'phrase with phrase', 'clause with clause'.
The word 'and' does not mean 'or', it is a conjunction used to denote a
joinder or union, 'binding together', relating the one to the other.

Hence the key to interpret and understand Section 5 (a) of P.D. 49 is the
word 'and'. From the foregoing definitions of the word 'and' it is
unmistakable that to hold a person liable under the said provision of law, all
the acts enumerated therein must be present and proven. As such, it is not
correct to construe the acts enumerated therein as being separate or
independent from one another.

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to allege and adduce evidence showing
that the private respondent is the one who copied, replicated or reproduced
the software programs of the petitioner. In other words, 'sale' alone of
pirated copies of Microsoft software programs does not constitute copyright
infringement punishable under P.D. 49.15 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA erred in its reading and interpretation of Section 5 of Presidential

Decree No. 49. Under the rules on syntax, the conjunctive word "and"
denotes a "joinder or union" of words, phrases, or clause;16 it is different
from the disjunctive word "or" that signals disassociation or independence.
17
However, a more important rule of statutory construction dictates that
laws should be construed in a manner that avoids absurdity or
unreasonableness.18 As the Court pointed out in Automotive Parts &
Equipment Company, Inc. v. Lingad:19
Nothing is better settled then that courts are not to give words a meaning
which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequence. That is a principle
that goes back to In re Allen decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held
that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results. That is a strong argument against its adoption. The words of
Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: 'The fact that the construction
placed upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an absurdity is
another argument for rejecting it x x x.'

It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a

deplorable result. That has long been a judicial function. A literal reading of a
legislative act which could be thus characterized is to be avoided if the
language thereof can be given a reasonable application consistent with the
legislative purpose. In the apt language of Frankfurter: A decent respect for
the policy of Congress must save us from imputing to it a self-defeating, if
not disingenuous purpose. Certainly, we must reject a construction that at
best amounts to a manifestation of verbal ingenuity but hardly satisfies the
test of rationality on which law must be based.20 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The conjunctive "and" should not be taken in its ordinary acceptation, but
should be construed like the disjunctive "or" if the literal interpretation of the
law would pervert or obscure the legislative intent.21 To accept the CA's
reading and interpretation is to accept absurd results because the violations
listed in Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 49 - "To print, reprint,
publish, copy, distribute, multiply, sell, and make photographs, photo-
engravings, and pictorial illustrations of the works" cannot be carried out
on all of the classes of works enumerated in Section 2 of Presidential Decree
No. 49, viz.:
Section 2. - The Rights granted by this Decree shall, from the moment of
creation, subsist with respect to any of the following classes of works: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(A) Books, including composite and encyclopedic works, manuscripts,

directories, and gazetteers;

(B) Periodicals, including pamphlets and newspapers;

(C) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery;

(D) Letters;

(E) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works and

entertainments in dumb shows, the acting form of which is fixed in writing or
otherwise;

(F) Musical compositions, with or without words;

(G) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving,

lithography, and other works of art; models or designs for works of art;

(H) Reproductions of a work of art;

(I) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture,

whether or not patentable, and other works of applied art;

(J) Maps, plans, sketches, and charts;

(K) Drawings, or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;

(L) Photographic works and works produced by a process analogous to

photography; lantern slides;

(M) Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to

cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;

(N) Computer programs;

(O) Prints, pictorial, illustration, advertising copies, labels, tags, and box
wraps;

(P) Dramatization, translations, adaptations, abridgements, arrangements

and other alterations of literary, musical or artistic works or of works of the
Philippine Government as herein defined, which shall be protected as
provided in Section 8 of this Decree.

(Q) Collection of literary, scholarly, or artistic works or of works referred to in

Section 9 of this Decree which by reason of the selection and arrangement of
their contents constitute intellectual creations, the same to be protected as
such in accordance with Section 8 of this Decree.

(R) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.

Presidential Decree No. 49 thereby already acknowledged the existence of
computer programs as works or creations protected by copyright.22 To hold,
as the CA incorrectly did, that the legislative intent was to require that the
computer programs be first photographed, photo-engraved, or pictorially
illustrated as a condition for the commission of copyright infringement
invites ridicule. Such interpretation of Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No.
49 defied logic and common sense because it focused on terms like "copy,"
"multiply," and "sell," but blatantly ignored terms like "photographs," "photo-
engravings," and "pictorial illustrations." Had the CA taken the latter words
into proper account, it would have quickly seen the absurdity of its
interpretation.

The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by
itself to show the existence of probable cause for copyright infringement.
There was no need for the petitioner to still prove who copied, replicated or
reproduced the software programs. Indeed, the public prosecutor and the
DOJ gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the petitioner's charge for
copyright infringement against the respondents for lack of evidence. There
was grave abuse of discretion because the public prosecutor and the DOJ
acted whimsically or arbitrarily in disregarding the settled jurisprudential
rules on finding the existence of probable cause to charge the offender in
court. Accordingly, the CA erred in upholding the dismissal by the DOJ of the
petitioner's petition for review. We reverse.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review

on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
February 27, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 76402; DIRECTSthe Department of
Justice to render the proper resolution to charge respondent ROLANDO D.
MANANSALA and/or MEL MANANSALA, doing business as DATAMAN
TRADING COMPANY and/or COMIC ALLEY in accordance with this
decision; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary