Analysis
July 30, 2010
Summary: In recent years Turkey
has made foreign policy choices
that have been at odds with the
preferences of some of its major
partners, such as the United
States, the EU, and Israel, and
it has begun to pursue a more
activist and proactive foreign
policy atypical from earlier times.
Overall examination of policies
shows that economic consider-
ations, as well as living at peace
with neighbors, are more power-
ful determinants of the change
than Islam. The question — as the
country has redefined its role as
a regional power and an impor-
tant world actor and it has begun
to question the current world
governance — is whether such
policies will redefine Turkey’s role
within the Western community or
whether it will result in a gradual
breaking away.
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Turkish Foreign Policy:
Challenges to Turkey’s Western Calling
by İlter Turan
The number of articles that have
appeared recently in a variety of
publications, including those in this
GMF series, on whether Turkish
foreign policy is changing — how
it is changing and, if so, where it is
going — illustrate the interest that this
topic has stimulated. Two critical and
interrelated questions are often asked.
First, is Turkey breaking away from its
traditional role as a reliable ally in the
western defense system and a modern
country in search of membership
in the European Union as part of its
broader policy of constituting an inte-
gral part of the “West”? Second, is the
Turkish government leading the coun-
try’s foreign policy onto an Islamic
path? This second question is more
confusing than it may at first appear
since there is no existing and clearly
identifiable Islamic path to which
foreign policy could turn. It is never-
theless valid to ask such a question if
it is thought that a significant number
of Turkey’s foreign policy actions
can best be explained by its govern-
ment’s subscription to an ideology
that conceptualizes Islam as a proper
basis around which an international
political grouping of countries may be
organized. It also puts close relations
with countries whose populations are
mainly Muslim to the forefront, giving
priority to their concerns and adopting
positions that are detrimental to
Turkey’s relations with other countries
while favoring the preferences of the
former.
The above questions have arisen
mainly because in recent years Turkey
has made foreign policy choices that
have been at odds with the preferences
of some of its major partners such as
the United States, the EU, and Israel,
and it has begun to pursue a more
activist and proactive foreign policy
atypical from earlier times. Indeed,
one might rightfully ask “What is
happening to Turkish foreign policy?”
The Determinants of Foreign Policy
A country changes its foreign policy
in response to shifts in either the
international or the domestic envi-
ronment, or both. As I had already
pointed out in “Less Military May
Not Mean More Democracy” earlier
in this series, the removal of controls
on foreign exchange in January 1980
initiated a major transformation of
the Turkish economy from an import
substitution orientation to one of
export-led growth. The change not
only opened the way to unequalled
economic growth, but it also brought
economic concerns to a central posi-
tion in the making of domestic and
The Balkan Trust for Democracy
Analysis
foreign policy. In the domain of domestic policy, the change
meant that governments now had to pay closer attention to
the concerns of the newly confident business community,
now backed by its enhanced resources that could be tapped
to serve their diverse interests. The average voter also began
to judge the success of governments increasingly by their
economic performance. In the domain of foreign policy, on
the other hand, Turkey began to look for new markets and
strengthen its position in existing ones. A natural outcome
of this increased reliance on exports for economic pros-
perity was the growing sensitivity to economic consider-
ations in the making and implementation of foreign policy.
Turkish foreign policy began to
change in response to shifts in the
domestic and the international
context starting from the mid-
1990s.
Growing democratization and the strengthening of civil
society have also influenced the domestic context in which
foreign policy is made. In contrast to earlier times when
external affairs were deemed to be only the concern of the
government and the state, today public opinion, organized
interests, the media, and even studies produced by think
tanks significantly constrain governments. Foreign policy
questions are taken up both in the legislature and outside,
and are debated among politicians and the public with
greater frequency and at greater length than ever before.
In contrast to earlier times when security considerations
rendered policymaking rather simple, foreign policy has
now become a more complex process where many more
considerations enter the picture and decision-making
requires a more elaborate balancing act between competing
interests.
Turning to the international context, it need not be pointed
out that the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet
Union, and the emergence of new states presented all with
2
a new set of policy-making circumstances. During the time
of the Cold War, there was a tradeoff in which members
of the Atlantic Alliance yielded, if not always enthusiasti-
cally, to American leadership in formulating the broad lines
of foreign policy within which all other members formed
and implemented their own. The end of the Cold War not
only necessitated a redefinition of security needs but also
expanded the range within which individual members of
the alliance could formulate their foreign policies.
Changing Foreign Policy
Propelled by economic and political developments, Turkish
foreign policy began to change in response to shifts in
the domestic and the international context starting from
the mid-1990s. The initial effort to develop close rela-
tions with the newly independent countries of the former
Soviet Union and to improve relations with the countries
of the Middle East has later been developed into a more
identifiable role as a multi-regional power with aspirations
to a stronger voice in the international system. The new
foreign policy role Turkey has chosen has been explained
in the by now well-known book Strategic Depth written
by the current foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu kin his
days as a scholar. Arguing that Turkey is simultaneously
a Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Central Asian, Balkan, and
Mediterranean country, which gives it “strategic depth,”
Mr. Davutoğlu defends the adoption of a proactive, global
strategic role, relying particularly on Turkey’s soft power
potential. This position is a subtle rejection of roles other
countries may have desired for Turkey to play in their
own plans and policies. It has become more explicit in
the speeches of the minister recently, who has said that
anything that hinges on Turkey’s interest is Turkey’s
concern. Nobody tells Turkey what its interests are.
What Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine means has been
unfolding slowly as the country became more confident in
acting in the new international environment. The Turkish
parliament’s refusal, early on, to send forces to Iraq, for
example, was an accident caused by undisciplined deputies.
Otherwise, the government at the time, newly in office with
a stand-in prime minister awaiting the election of Tayyip
Erdoğan to the parliament, did not feel strong and secure
enough to depart from American preferences on such an
important policy question. Over time, however, policies
Analysis
have become better planned, more deliberate, and more
confidently applied. One only needs to point to Turkey’s
development of much closer relations with Syria, the critical
stance against Israel as regards its handling of Gaza, and
finally its efforts to affect a modus vivendi between Iran
and the permanent members of the UN Security Council
regarding the termination of Iran’s enrichment of nuclear
fuel suspected to be intended for nuclear weapons produc-
tion.
Is this new policy driven by religious considerations?
Religious rhetoric, particularly by the prime minister when
he departs from prepared texts, may lead an observer to
think that religion is one of the major driving forces of the
new foreign policy. The Islamic rhetoric seems clearly to
appeal to the emotions of some of the constituencies of the
governing Justice and Development Party. Furthermore,
many of the party regulars and leaders have a sympathy
for the Palestinians. Yet an overall examination of policies
shows that economic considerations, as well as living at
peace with neighbors, are more powerful determinants than
Islam. Relations with Russia are close and growing, as are
those with Balkan, Latin American, and African countries
without significant Muslim populations. Relations with
many countries without significant Muslim populations
therefore suggest that religion may be used as a resource in
advancing relations but does not constitute the fundamental
basis on which policy is formed.
Quo Vadis Turchia?
Is the new policy a deliberate attempt to withdraw Turkey
from the West? Probably not. The basic values the Turkish
state strives toward, including democracy, respect for
human rights, and a functioning market economy, do not
differ significantly from those of its Western allies. What is
significantly different from the past is Turkey’s willingness
to pursue autonomous courses of action, initiating poli-
cies on its own rather than submit to the leadership of the
United States, the EU, or a major West European country.
The question is whether such policies will redefine Turkey’s
role within the Western community or whether it will result
in a gradual breaking away. In addition to commonly shared
basic values, however, there are enough checks and balances
within Turkey’s existing framework of relationships to
3
reduce the likelihood of Turkey’s complete departure from
the Western community.
What are these checks and balances? A few examples might
be sufficient to suggest the general direction of the answer.
The security shield provided by NATO for example, enables
Turkey to deal more confidently with Russia as an economic
partner. Turkey continues to rely on the United States as a
major source of arms procurement. The fact that around
half of Turkey’s exports go to EU-member countries and
that Germany is Turkey’s largest trading partner generate
significant interest in retaining a good working relationship
with the European Union. Turkey’s soft power is consid-
erably enhanced in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and
Central Asia by the fact that it has a strong Western connec-
tion. Turkey’s relations with Iran have to be balanced with
those with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States that are allied
with the United States. Turkey’s strong challenge of Israeli
policies in Palestine has reduced the appeal of Iran in the
region, while its vastly improved relationship with Syria has
reduced Iranian influence there as well and has rendered
Turkey more interested in a negotiated solution with Israel.
These developments are all in harmony with the American
and EU policies in the region. Turkey shares an interest
with the United States and the EU in the development and
survival of a united, independent, and stable Iraq. Similarly,
What is significantly different from
the past is Turkey’s willingness
to pursue autonomous courses
of action, initiating policies on
its own rather than submit to the
leadership of the United States,
the EU, or a major West European
country.
Analysis
both Turkey and its Western partners share an interest
containing the spread of radical Islamic movements and
terror under the guise of religion.
Is the existence of common interests and mutual interde-
pendencies enough to insure that Turkey will not break
away from the Western community, albeit slowly? The
sharing of common values constitutes one form of insur-
ance. The strong identification of Turkey’s political elite
with the Western Community is another, and there is broad
consensus among major political actors on this point. Need-
less to say, Turkey’s membership in the EU would consti-
tute unequalled assurance. Progress on thorny questions
such as Cyprus and the Kurds would be facilitated by the
EU’s unqualified and unanimous commitment to Turkey’s
membership and rapid progress in that direction.
As the country has redefined its role as a regional power
and an important world actor, it has begun to question the
current world governance, which is run by mechanisms
and organizations that were shaped by the power realities
immediately following World War II. Turkey has cooperated
with Brazil to stage its first challenge to the global nuclear
non-proliferation system by developing a negotiated solu-
tion to Iran’s efforts to enrich nuclear fuel as an alternative
to an American led embargo to force Iran to suspend its fuel
enrichment activities.
The dimension of Turkish foreign policy that desires to
change world governance carries a considerable element of
risk. Turkey’s questioning of the global and regional orders,
such as that in the Middle East comes at a time when
Turkey is seen on the rise, the United States in decline, and
Europe incoherent, ineffectual, and incompetent. Turkey
can misjudge its ability to bring about change, the United
States may misjudge is ability to maintain its preferred
order in the world, and the EU may fail in contributing to
world politics in a meaningful way. A situation in which all
misjudge their power and abilities, and develop expecta-
tions or make demands of the other that cannot be met,
leading to adoption of unsustainable but unchangeable
positions, points to a risk about which all actors need to be
concerned.
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi
University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His
previous employment included professorships at Koç University (1993-
1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the
chair of the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the
director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East
(1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political
Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Commit-
tee and a vice president of the International Political Science Associa-
tion (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair of the 21st World
Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is
board chair of the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the
board of several foundations and corporations. He is widely published
in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and
foreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and
international politics of water, the Turkish parliament and its members,
and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent commentator on Turkish
politics on TV and newspapers.
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