League of Cities v COMELEC:

The Court has received flak on this case for supposed flip-flopping.-Justice
Abad in his concurring opinion
Facts
November 18, 2008 (6-5 vote): The Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck
down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws (to turn municipalities into cities) for violating
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause
March 31, 2009 (7-5 vote): The Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote,
denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration
April 28, 2009 (6-6 vote), the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the
respondents second motion for reconsideration, making the November 18, 2008 Decision
final and executory
December 21, 2009 (6-4 vote): After the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision and
without any exceptional and compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly
reversed the November 18, 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the
Cityhood Laws
August 24, 2010 (7-6 vote) Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for
reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the November 18, 2008
Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional
February 15, 2011: Granted the motion for reconsideration of the respondents against the
August 24, 2010 decision
April 12, 2011: The Ad Cautelam (to be on the safe side) Motion for Reconsideration of
the petitioners is denied
June 28, 2011: Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration shut down due to technicality (2nd
motion for reconsideration not allowed, but not absolute)

Issue: WON the 16 cityhood bills are unconstitutional CONSTITUTIONAL

Points of the versions of the case that affirm the UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

of the cityhood laws:
Principle of retroactivity cannot be invoked:
o Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA
9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress.
The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which
became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the
principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application because
RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively
but prospectively.
Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue
Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
o The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450
of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria,
prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local
government units in national taxes

In violation of Sec. 10, Article X of the 1987 constitution (the creation of a municipality
must be in accordance with the Local Government Code)
 o The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law
In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other
than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the
increased income requirement for the creation of cities under
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009
VIOLATION of the Constitution!!
o The clear intent of the Constitution is to ensure that the creation of cities and
other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory
criteria found solely in the Local Government Code.
o RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to
increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for
the creation of a city.
o Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement (exemptions need to be
clearly and unequivocally stated in the Local Government Code)

On the Operative Fact Doctrine (The law is unconstitutional, but its effects may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play)
o Theory of minority: The Doctrine operates to constitutionalize the
unconstitutional Cityhood Laws.
This cant be since it will create a dangerous precedent to the
enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate
implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional.
o The Doctrine of Operative Fact is the exception, not the rule.
o However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by
the new cities, or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be
recognized as valid and effective as a matter of equity and fair play to
the innocent people who may have relied on these laws.

On the Equal Protection Clause

o The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose
of the income requirement (not a valid class)
o In short, the classification criterion-mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress-is not rationally related to the purpose of the law to
prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
Moreover, this violates the requirement that a valid classification
must not be limited to existing conditions only (that specific
condition-pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th congress-will never
happen again)
o If the 16 cityhood bills were allowed to pass based on this criterion, then the
equal protection clause will demand that all municipalities with the
same or higher income than these municipalities must also qualify as
eligible to be turned into cities under the Local Government Code

On the tie-vote for a motion for reconsideration

o The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads:
IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED
o The Courts prior majority action on the main decision stands affirmed
o Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18
 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or
directive
o The 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of
18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31
March 2009 denying reconsideration
In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009
Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority
of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed. These
can only be overruled by a majority vote.

Points of the versions of the case that affirm the CONSTITUTIONALITY of

the cityhood laws:
Congress intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress
would not be covered by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million
imposed by Republic Act No. 9009
o The exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express
articulation of that intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009.
The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative
power, which power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to
alter and repeal them
Without doubt, the Local Government Code (LGC) is a creation of Congress through
its law- making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it
enacted Republic Act No. 9009, and such power of amendment of laws was again
exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws
o Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a
belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher
calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which
is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these
municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces
o Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself
The imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the creation
of component cities was arbitrarily made.
o There was no evidence or empirical data, such as inflation rates, to support
the choice of this amount
o The imposition of a very high-income requirement of P100 million, increased
from P20 million, was simply to make it extremely difficult for
municipalities to become component cities
On the Equal Protection Clause: The existence of substantial distinction with respect
to respondent municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the
purpose of the law, not by Republic Act No. 9009, but by the very purpose of
the Local Government Code (LGC)
o Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized the capacity and
viability of respondent municipalities to become the States partners in
accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial
regions, which is the very thrust of the LGC
In the enactment of the Cityhood Laws, Congress merely took the 16 municipalities
covered thereby from the disadvantaged position brought about by the abrupt increase
in the income requirement of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, acknowledging the
privilege that they have already given to those 33 newly-converted component cities,
 which prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9009, were undeniably in the same footing
or class as the respondent municipalities
While it is true that litigation must end, even at the expense of errors in judgment, it
is nobler rather for this Court of last resort, as vanguard of truth, to toil in order to
dispel apprehensions and doubt (excuse lang ito na paflip-flop yung decision)