the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Davao
. SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131282. January 4, 2002]
GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A.
ERADEL, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the Decision[1] dated September 17, 1997, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 2340- UDK, entitled Bernardo Eradel vs. Hon. Ermelino G.
Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case No. 1075, Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo
Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bernardo Eradel[2] entered
and occupied petitioners land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras,
San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value
of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and
requested the latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him
with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his
refusal to leave the land.
On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Damages and Attorneys Fees against private respondent and two others,
namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner appended to the complaint the
aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to file their
Answer and was given until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the Ruenas executed a
compromise agreement, which became the trial courts basis for a partial judgment rendered on
January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila,
entered into a Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the
agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership
and possession of Duero.[3] Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement,
and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint. [4]
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996,
judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate
and turn over Lot No. 1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000 annual rental from
1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorneys fees and the cost of the
suit.[5] Private respondent received a copy of the decision on May 25, 1996.
On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has
been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he
turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the
latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on
it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No. 1029, an administrative case between petitioner and
applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of
City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.
On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless
there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He
also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio
Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.
On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed Laurente,
grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a Motion for
Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.
On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from
Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore
it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied
the motion for reconsideration.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted on
January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record and a writ of
execution was issued by the RTC on February 27, 1997. On March 12, 1997, private respondent
filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private respondent
is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur,
when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Annulment
of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All proceedings in Gabriel
L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil Case 1075 filed in the Court a quo, including its
Decision, Annex E of the petition, and its Orders and Writ of Execution and the turn over of the
property to the Private Respondent by the Sheriff of the Court a quo, are declared null and void
and hereby SET ASIDE, No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it held that:
I.
THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
CASE.
II
PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT
AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.
III
THE FAILURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED.[7]
 The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before
it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents
failure to file an answer to the complaint was justified.
At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this Court
pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,[8] we find that to
bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction,
petitioner pointed to Annex E [9] of his petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the
Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, Note: Subject
for General Revision Effective 1994. But it appears that Annex E of his petition is not a
Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document
contain a notation, Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994. Petitioner also asked this
Court to refer to Annex F,[10] where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per
sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the complaint was filed before the
RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox
copies. They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.
Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court
acted with grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[11] But here we find that in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction
over the case and that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is grounded as
well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter.[12] Its action was neither whimsical nor
capricious.
Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In this
case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While participation in all
stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for
affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the courts
jurisdiction,[13] we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive
and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable
enforcement.[14] Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the
action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel
may become a tool of injustice.[15]
In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag,
Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint against
private respondent and two other parties before the said court,[16] believing that the RTC had
jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 7691[17] amending BP 129 had become
effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said
amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was
merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito
Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the
summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He
then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted because of
his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had
by then the evidence to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of
his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land.[18]But
his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion for
Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for
reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the
RTCs lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the
issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case was
still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief
from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still
refused to reconsider the denial of private respondents motion for relief from judgment, it went
on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC
and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an
action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by
their express consent.[19] Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action
at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. [20] The appellate court did not err in saying
that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private
respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel
cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be
raised at anytime and at any stage of the action. [21] Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the
jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law.[22] Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer
jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.[23]The Court
of Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:
x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court
that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent
interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain
the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the
correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from
the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.][24]
Indeed, the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction
and its failure to do so, makes its decision a lawless thing.[25]
Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never
become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the
question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
was in order.
In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning the RTCs
jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in
exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find
that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court
without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before
the proper administrative agency concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on
jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could not be expected to know the
nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought
not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted
his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTCs
cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the
RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his
case. Furthermore, if the RTCs order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land
prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No. 1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a
technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till
the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
 Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the appellate court in
ruling that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we
need not tarry to consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the
circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this score by respondent appellate
court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable reason
in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed the suit was properly his
landlords concern.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1075 entitled Gabriel L.
Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to
petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129638. December 8, 2003]
ANTONIO T. DONATO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FILOMENO ARCEPE,
TIMOTEO BARCELONA, IGNACIO BENDOL, THELMA P. BULICANO,
ROSALINDA CAPARAS, ROSITA DE COSTO, FELIZA DE GUZMAN, LETICIA DE
LOS REYES, ROGELIO GADDI, PAULINO GAJARDO, GERONIMO IMPERIAL,
HOMER IMPERIAL, ELVIRA LESLIE, CEFERINO LUGANA, HECTOR PIMENTEL,
NIMFA PIMENTEL, AURELIO G. ROCERO, ILUMINADA TARA, JUANITO
VALLESPIN, AND NARCISO YABUT, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed on July 17, 1997 which should be a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It assails the Resolutions[1]dated March
21, 1997 and June 23, 1997 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394.[2]
The factual background of the case is as follows:
Petitioner Antonio T. Donato is the registered owner of a real property located at Ciriaco
Tuason Street, San Andres, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 131793 issued
by the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila on November 24, 1978. On June 7, 1994,
petitioner filed a complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 26) of Manila (MeTC) for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer against 43 named defendants and all unknown occupants of
the subject property.[3]
Petitioner alleges that: private respondents had oral contracts of lease that expired at the
end of each month but were impliedly renewed under the same terms by mere acquiescence or
tolerance; sometime in 1992, they stopped paying rent; on April 7, 1994, petitioner sent them a
written demand to vacate; the non-compliance with said demand letter constrained him to file the
ejectment case against them.[4]
Of the 43 named defendants, only 20 (private respondents,[5] for brevity) filed a
consolidated Answer dated June 29, 1994 wherein they denied non-payment of rentals.They
contend that they cannot be evicted because the Urban Land Reform Law guarantees security
of tenure and priority right to purchase the subject property; and that there was a negotiation for
the purchase of the lots occupied by them but when the negotiation reached a passive stage,
they decided to continue payment of rentals and tendered payment to petitioners counsel and
thereafter initiated a petition for consignation of the rentals in Civil Case No. 144049 while they
await the outcome of the negotiation to purchase.
Following trial under the Rule on Summary Procedure, the MeTC rendered judgment on
September 19, 1994 against the 23 non-answering defendants, ordering them to vacate the
premises occupied by each of them, and to pay jointly and severally P10,000.00 per month from
the date they last paid their rent until the date they actually vacate, plus interest thereon at the
legal rate allowed by law, as well as P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs of the suit. As
to the 20 private respondents, the MeTC issued a separate judgment[6] on the same day
sustaining their rights under the Land Reform Law, declaring petitioners cause of action as not
duly warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case and dismissing the case without
prejudice.
Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing the complaint as against the private
respondents, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 47) of Manila (RTC). [7]In a
Decision[8] dated July 5, 1996, the RTC sustained the decision of the MeTC.
Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA for brevity),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41394. In a Resolution dated March 21, 1997, the CA dismissed
the petition on two grounds: (a) the certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioners
counsel and not by petitioner himself, in violation of Revised Circular No. 28-91;[9] and, (b) the
only annex to the petition is a certified copy of the questioned decision but copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the
petition are not annexed, contrary to Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA).[10]
On April 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [11] attaching thereto a
photocopy of the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by petitioner himself[12] and the
relevant records of the MeTC and the RTC.[13] Five days later, or on April 22, 1997, petitioner
filed a Supplement[14] to his motion for reconsideration submitting the duly authenticated original
of the certification of non-forum shopping signed by petitioner.[15]
In a Resolution[16] dated June 23, 1997 the CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration and its supplement, ruling that petitioners subsequent compliance did not cure
the defect in the instant petition.[17]
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
BASED ON HYPER-TECHNICAL GROUNDS BECAUSE:
A. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT
CIRCULAR NO. 28-91. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY
SUBMITTED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS A
DULY AUTHENTICATED CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
WHICH HE HIMSELF SIGNED AND EXECUTED IN THE UNITED
STATES.
B. PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH SECTION 3, RULE
6 OF THE REVISED INTERNAL RULES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS. MORE, PETITIONER SUBSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE PROCEEDINGS COPIES OF THE
RELEVANT DOCUMENTS IN THE CASES BELOW.
C. PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS APPEAL, AND HE STANDS TO LOSE
SUBSTANTIAL PROPERTY IF THE APPEAL IS NOT GIVEN DUE
COURSE. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE MUST BE LIBERALLY
CONSTRUED TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
II.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.
III.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE RTC MANILA,
BRANCH 47, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF MTC
MANILA, BRANCH 26, THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THEIR SECURITY OF TENURE EVEN IF THE
TERM OF THE LEASE IS MONTH-TO-MONTH WHICH EXPIRES AT THE END OF EACH
MONTH. IN THIS REGARD,
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT TENANTS UNDER P.D. 1517 MAY BE EVICTED FOR NON-
PAYMENT OF RENT, TERMINATION OF LEASE OR OTHER
GROUNDS FOR EJECTMENT.
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT THE ALLEGED PRIORITY RIGHT TO BUY THE LOT THEY
OCCUPY DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE LANDOWNER DOES NOT
INTEND TO SELL THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, AS IN THE CASE AT
BAR.
C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED WITHIN A ZONAL
IMPROVEMENT AREA OR APD.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
CONDITIONS UNDER THE LAW RESULT IN THE WAIVER OF
PROTECTION AGAINST EVICTION.
E. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ENTITLED TO
PROTECTION UNDER P.D. 2016 SINCE THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO
INTENTION OF ACQUIRING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
F. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT
THERE IS AN ON-GOING NEGOTIATION FOR THE SALE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AND THAT IT RENDERS THE EVICTION OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PREMATURE.
G. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE
RTC MANILA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING
THAT THE ALLEGED CASE FOR CONSIGNATION DOES NOT BAR
THE EVICTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
IV.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER A REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THEIR
USE AND OCCUPANCY OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE AMOUNT OF AT
LEAST P10,000.00 PER MONTH FROM THE DATE THEY LAST PAID RENT UNTIL THE TIME
THEY ACTUALLY VACATE THE SAME, WITH LEGAL INTEREST AT THE MAXIMUM RATE
ALLOWED BY LAW UNTIL PAID.
V.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS SHOULD PAY PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES AND EXPENSES OF
LITIGATION OF AT LEAST P20,000.00, PLUS COSTS.[18]
Petitioner submits that a relaxation of the rigid rules of technical procedure is called for in
view of the attendant circumstances showing that the objectives of the rule on certification of
non-forum shopping and the rule requiring material portions of the record be attached to the
petition have not been glaringly violated and, more importantly, the petition is meritorious.
The proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error, subject of the
recourse, is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a court with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to
the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. As enunciated by
the Court in Fortich vs. Corona:[19]
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it
is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act
complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[20] (Emphasis
supplied).
Inasmuch as the present petition principally assails the dismissal of the petition on ground of
procedural flaws involving the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the petition, it falls within
the ambit of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
At the time the instant petition for certiorari was filed, i.e., on July 17, 1997, the prevailing
rule is the newly promulgated 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, considering that the CA
Resolution being assailed was rendered on March 21, 1997, the applicable rule is the three-
month reglementary period, established by jurisprudence.[21]Petitioner received notice of the
assailed CA Resolution dismissing his petition for review on April 4, 1997. He filed his motion
reconsideration on April 17, 1997, using up only thirteen days of the 90-day period. Petitioner
received the CA Resolution denying his motion on July 3, 1997 and fourteen days later, or on
July 17, 1997, he filed a motion for 30-day extension of time to file a petition for review which
was granted by us; and petitioner duly filed his petition on August 15, 1997, which is well-within
the period of extension granted to him.
We now go to the merits of the case.
We find the instant petition partly meritorious.
The requirement regarding the need for a certification of non-forum shopping in cases filed
before the CA and the corresponding sanction for non-compliance thereto are found in the then
prevailing Revised Circular No. 28-91.[22] It provides that the petitioner himself must make the
certification against forum shopping and a violation thereof shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint. The rationale for the rule of personal execution of
the certification by the petitioner himself is that it is only the petitioner who has actual knowledge
of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in other courts or tribunals; even
counsel of record may be unaware of such fact.[23] The Court has ruled that with respect to the
contents of the certification, the rule on substantial compliance may be availed of. This is so
because the requirement of strict compliance with the rule regarding the certification of non-
forum shopping simply underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded, but it does not thereby
interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances. [24]
The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against forum shopping
but said certification was signed by petitioners counsel. In submitting the certification of non-
forum shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration,[25] petitioner has aptly
drawn the Courts attention to the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the
15-day reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson
Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. were he to personally accomplish and sign the certification.
technicalities.[39] This guideline is especially true when the petitioner has satisfactorily explained
the lapse and fulfilled the requirements in his motion for reconsideration, [40] as in this case.
In addition, petitioner prays that we decide the present petition on the merits without need
of remanding the case to the CA. He insists that all the elements of unlawful detainer are present
in the case. He further argues that the alleged priority right to buy the lot they occupy does not
apply where the landowner does not intend to sell the subject property, as in the case; that
respondents cannot be entitled to protection under P.D. No. 2016 since the government has no
intention of acquiring the subject property, nor is the subject property located within a zonal
improvement area; and, that assuming that there is a negotiation for the sale of the subject
property or a pending case for consignation of rentals, these do not bar the eviction of
respondents.

We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to have been We are not persuaded. We shall refrain from ruling on the foregoing issues in the present
prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to petition for certiorari. The issues involved are factual issues which inevitably require the
the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A., in order to sign the certification weighing of evidence. These are matters that are beyond the province of this Court in a special
before the Philippine Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the civil action for certiorari. These issues are best addressed to the CA in the petition for review
15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to filed before it. As an appellate court, it is empowered to require parties to submit additional
personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule. documents, as it may find necessary, or to receive evidence, to promote the ends of justice,
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 9, B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary
We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to Reorganization Act of 1980, to wit:
promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective [26] which is simply to
prohibit and penalize the evils of forum-shopping.[27] The subsequent filing of the certification The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
compliance, pro hac vice. cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and
conduct new trials or further proceedings.
In like manner, the failure of the petitioner to comply with Section 3, paragraph b, Rule 6 of
the RIRCA, that is, to append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 21,
of the records as would support the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the
1997 and June 23, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41394 are REVERSED and
petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA gives the appellate court a certain leeway to
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in CA-
require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial
G.R. No. 41394, entitled, Antonio T. Donato vs. Hon. Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA,[28] the CA may require the parties
Manila, Branch 47, Filomeno Arcepe, et al.
to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course,
the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under Section SO ORDERED.
3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA.[29] At any rate, petitioner attached copies of the pleadings and
other material portions of the records below with his motion for reconsideration. [30] In Jaro vs.
Court of Appeals,[31] the Court reiterated the doctrine laid down in Cusi-Hernandez vs.
Diaz[32] and Piglas-Kamao vs. National Labor Relations Commission[33] that subsequent
submission of the missing documents with the motion for reconsideration amounts to substantial
compliance which calls for the relaxation of the rules of procedure. We find no cogent reason to
depart from this doctrine.

Truly, in dismissing the petition for review, the CA had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in putting a premium on technicalities at the expense
of a just resolution of the case.

Needless to stress, "a litigation is not a game of technicalities." [34] When technicality
deserts its function of being an aid to justice, the Court is justified in exempting from its
operations a particular case.[35] Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not
frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, granting
substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.[36]

The Courts pronouncement in Republic vs. Court of Appeals[37] is worth echoing: cases
should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served.[38]Thus, what should
guide judicial action is that a party litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his action or defense rather than for him to lose life, honor or property on mere
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144025. December 27, 2002]
SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G. DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36,
Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by
WILSON JESENA, JR., as Manager, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 and its resolution dated June 1,
2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54587.
The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses purchased a parcel of
land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc., situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240
square meters. Said lot was specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 28254 and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as security for
their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of their house, not on Lot No. 19 but
on Lot No. 18, as private respondent mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon
realizing its error, private respondent, through its general manager, informed petitioners of such
mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their premises. Thus, petitioners
continued with the construction of their house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of
their housing loan from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners
certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of SSS. After Lot No. 19
was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18 and 19 and demanded from private
respondent that their contract of sale be reformed and another deed of sale be executed with
respect to Lot No. 18, considering that their house was built therein. However, private
respondent refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for
reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 36,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.
On January 15, 1998, the trial court[2] rendered its decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit and ordering herein petitioners to pay private respondent the amount of P10,000 as
moral damages and another P10,000 as attorneys fees. The pertinent conclusion of the trial
court reads as follows:
Aware of such fact, the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on the
proposal that he would also buy the same. Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise
defaulted in the payment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot 19. Consequently Lot 19 was
foreclosed and sold at public auction. Thereafter TCT No. T-29950 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof TCT No. T-86612 (Exh. 9) was issued in favor of SSS. This being the situation obtaining,
the reformation of instruments, even if allowed, or the swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 as earlier
proposed by the plaintiff, is no longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the owner of
Lot 19, otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore (sic). Upon the
other hand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having in its favor both Lot 19 which was
earlier mortgaged by him and subsequently foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot 18 where his
house is presently standing.
The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the defendant. It is evident
that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which
parcel of land has been properly indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the
plaintiff. The contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the parties,
besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake, hence the same need no
longer be reformed.[3]
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus, on September
17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, alleging that the court a
quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private respondent with the
HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of judgment, premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction
to try and decide Civil Case No. 17115.
In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for
annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in
the case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.[4]
Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this
instant petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition by applying
the principle of estoppel, even if the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no
jurisdiction to decide Civil Case No. 17115.
At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us the annulment of a
trial court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. Because it is not an appeal, the correctness of
the judgment is not in issue here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of the
decision rendered by the trial court.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already abandoned the
doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.[5] We do not agree. In countless decisions, this
Court has consistently held that, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
nullity and may be assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court
which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As we
held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:[6]
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.
xxx
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question
that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party
is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be
tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs. Court of
Appeals;[7] Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals;[8] Salva vs. Court of Appeals;[9] National Steel
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals;[10] Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals;[11] PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court affirmed the rule that a
partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking
the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging
that same courts jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a
quo by instituting an action for reformation of contract against private respondents. It appears
that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from
start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during
the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court rendered its
decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue
of jurisdiction and it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus
effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves
filed.

Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed to profit
from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent. This Court frowns
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not. [13]

Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any double-dealing by parties
who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter
disregard of the elementary principles of justice and good faith. [14] There is no denying that, in
this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in
the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
said court. It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all
along.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124644. February 5, 2004]
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of
the Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, Executive Clerk of Court IV
of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. Nueca, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand by
the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:
The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military Academy, a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of
the Philippine National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance
operations on drug trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurantlocated along Barlin St.,
Naga City. He somehow got involved in a shooting incident, resulting in the death of one Rodney
Rafael N. Nueca. On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was filed with the RTC of Naga
City, Branch 21, docketed as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner and a certain
Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias Jun Bombita with murder. The accusatory portion of the amended
Information reads:
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver, dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney Nueca and accused 2Lt
Arnel Escobal armed with a caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca thereby inflicting
upon him serious, mortal and fatal wounds which caused his death, and as a consequence
thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA, mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine Currency, and moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.[1]
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively suspending the petitioner from
the service under Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847.When apprised of
the said order, the General Headquarters of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order
No. 91, preventively suspending the petitioner from the service until the case was terminated. [2]
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the RTC, while accused
Bombita remained at large. The petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,[3] the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged. Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash[4] the Information alleging that as mandated by Commonwealth Act No. 408, [5] in relation
to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No. 6975, the court martial,
not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June 25, 1993 requested the Chief
of the PNP for his reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his suspension should
last for only 90 days, and, having served the same, he should now be reinstated. On September
23, 1993,[6] the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C. Naval requesting information
on whether he issued an order lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply. Thus,
on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in the RTC for the lifting of the order of
suspension. He alleged that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and pleaded for
compassionate justice. The RTC denied the motion on March 9, 1994. [7] Trial thereafter
proceeded, and the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced the presentation of
his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the case. Citing Republic of the
Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,[9] he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance
of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order[10] denying the motion to dismiss. It,
however, ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime
charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that it was no longer presenting any
evidence in connection with the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already rested its
case, and that its evidence showed that the petitioner did not commit the offense charged in
connection with the performance of his duties as a member of the Philippine Constabulary.
According to the prosecution, they were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was
not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense was committed just after midnight; (c)
the petitioner was drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner was in the company of
civilians; and, (e) the offense was committed in a beerhouse called Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant.[11]
For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m. on March 15, 1990, he was at
the Sa Harong Caf Bar and Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on
alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-04 issued by Police Superintendent
Rufo R. Pulido. The petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of Benjamin Cario and
Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the
aforestated date.[12]
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed
the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that
upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,[13] the issue had become moot and academic. The
amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to
the RTC since the petitioner did not have a salary grade of 27 as provided for in or by Section
4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the
Information pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion[14] and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment
consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by
the petitioner in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration[15] of the said order, reiterating that
based on his testimony and those of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense charged
was committed by him in relation to his official functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to
consider the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted
on March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.[16]
The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the mother of the victim, through
counsel, categorically and unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the Peoples Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an official mission when the crime was committed.
 On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued an Order reversing and
setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order. It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was
on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded that the prosecution failed to
adduce controverting evidence thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas admission in
her complaint before the PLEB that the petitioner was on official mission when the shooting
happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to allege
that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter
transmit the same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic notes, to the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and
it is hereby declared that after preliminary hearing, this Court has found that the offense charged
in the Information herein was committed by the accused in his relation to his function and duty
as member of the then Philippine Constabulary.
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et
al., G.R. No. 180208, March 11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to file a Re-Amended Information
alleging that the offense charged was committed by the Accused
in the performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his
office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended Information, the complete records of
this case, together with the transcripts of the stenographic notes
taken during the entire proceedings herein, are hereby ordered
transmitted immediately to the Honorable Sandiganbayan,
through its Clerk of Court, Manila, for appropriate proceedings.[17]
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive
Clerk of Court IV, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal Case No. 90-
3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City, Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606,
as amended by R.A. No. 7975,[18] the RTC retained jurisdiction over the case, considering that
the petitioner had a salary grade of 23. Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its case
and the petitioner had commenced presenting his evidence in the RTC; following the rule on
continuity of jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case and render judgment
therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial on May 3, 1996, for the
petitioner to continue presenting his evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
remanding the records of the case to the RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner contends that when the amended information was filed with the RTC on
February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606 was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case against him as he was charged with
homicide with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was committed while
in the performance of his duties. He further asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
P.D. No. 1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed by members and officers of
the PNP with a salary grade below 27 committed in relation to office are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be
applied retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because under Section 7 of R.A. No.
7975, only those cases where trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of
the law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the petitioner. In contrast, the Office
of the Special Prosecutor contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan acted in
accordance with law when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A.
No. 7975 should be applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the
crime committed by the petitioner when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by the
time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken
effect. Thus, the law should be given retroactive effect.
The Ruling of the Court
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with law and the rulings of this
Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the
Information or the Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the commencement of the
action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional
requirements must be alleged in the Information.[19] Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the
inception of the case continues until the case is terminated. [20]
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan
had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .[21]
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over
crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing
the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must
be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law.[22] The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995,
it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the petitioner
committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the
records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606
was already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office
but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below 27, the proper Regional Trial
Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade 23. He was
charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.

The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no
legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be
applied retroactively.[23]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as

to costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 155001. January 21, 2004]
DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, JR., JOSEPH B. CATAHAN, JOSE MARI B. REUNILLA,
MANUEL ANTONIO B. BOE, MAMERTO S. CLARA, REUEL E. DIMALANTA,
MORY V. DOMALAON, CONRADO G. DIMAANO, LOLITA R. HIZON, REMEDIOS
P. ADOLFO, BIENVENIDO C. HILARIO, MIASCOR WORKERS UNION-NATIONAL
LABOR UNION (MWU-NLU), and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PALEA), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR
TERMINALS CO., INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and
SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the
Department of Transportation and Communications, respondents,
MIASCOR GROUNDHANDLING CORPORATION, DNATA-WINGS AVIATION SYSTEMS
CORPORATION, MACROASIA-EUREST SERVICES, INC., MACROASIA-MENZIES
AIRPORT SERVICES CORPORATION, MIASCOR CATERING SERVICES
CORPORATION, MIASCOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE CORPORATION, and
MIASCOR LOGISTICS CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
FLORESTE ALCONIS, GINA ALNAS, REY AMPOLOQUIO, ROSEMARIE ANG, EUGENE
ARADA, NENETTE BARREIRO, NOEL BARTOLOME, ALDRIN BASTADOR,
ROLETTE DIVINE BERNARDO, MINETTE BRAVO, KAREN BRECILLA, NIDA
CAILAO, ERWIN CALAR, MARIFEL CONSTANTINO, JANETTE CORDERO,
ARNOLD FELICITAS, MARISSA GAYAGOY, ALEX GENERILLO, ELIZABETH
GRAY, ZOILO HERICO, JACQUELINE IGNACIO, THELMA INFANTE, JOEL
JUMAO-AS, MARIETTA LINCHOCO, ROLLY LORICO, FRANCIS AUGUSTO
MACATOL, MICHAEL MALIGAT, DENNIS MANALO, RAUL MANGALIMAN, JOEL
MANLANGIT, CHARLIE MENDOZA, HAZNAH MENDOZA, NICHOLS MORALES,
ALLEN OLAO, CESAR ORTAL, MICHAEL ORTEGA, WAYNE PLAZA, JOSELITO
REYES, ROLANDO REYES, AILEEN SAPINA, RAMIL TAMAYO, PHILLIPS TAN,
ANDREW UY, WILLIAM VELASCO, EMILIO VELEZ, NOEMI YUPANO, MARY
JANE ONG, RICHARD RAMIREZ, CHERYLE MARIE ALFONSO, LYNDON
BAUTISTA, MANUEL CABOCAN AND NEDY LAZO, Respondents-in-Intervention,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-in-Intervention,
[G.R. No. 155547. January 21, 2003]
SALACNIB F. BATERINA, CLAVEL A. MARTINEZ and CONSTANTINO G.
JARAULA, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.,
INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M. MENDOZA, in his capacity
as Head of the Department of Transportation and Communications, and
SECRETARY SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, in his capacity as Head of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, respondents, JACINTO V. PARAS,
RAFAEL P. NANTES, EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, WILLY BUYSON VILLARAMA,
PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., HARLIN CAST
ABAYON, and BENASING O. MACARANBON, Respondents-Intervenors,
FLORESTE ALCONIS, GINA ALNAS, REY AMPOLOQUIO, ROSEMARIE ANG, EUGENE
ARADA, NENETTE BARREIRO, NOEL BARTOLOME, ALDRIN BASTADOR,
ROLETTE DIVINE BERNARDO, MINETTE BRAVO, KAREN BRECILLA, NIDA
CAILAO, ERWIN CALAR, MARIFEL CONSTANTINO, JANETTE CORDERO,
ARNOLD FELICITAS, MARISSA GAYAGOY, ALEX GENERILLO, ELIZABETH
GRAY, ZOILO HERICO, JACQUELINE IGNACIO, THELMA INFANTE, JOEL
JUMAO-AS, MARIETTA LINCHOCO, ROLLY LORICO, FRANCIS AUGUSTO
MACATOL, MICHAEL MALIGAT, DENNIS MANALO, RAUL MANGALIMAN, JOEL
MANLANGIT, CHARLIE MENDOZA, HAZNAH MENDOZA, NICHOLS MORALES,
ALLEN OLAO, CESAR ORTAL, MICHAEL ORTEGA, WAYNE PLAZA, JOSELITO
REYES, ROLANDO REYES, AILEEN SAPINA, RAMIL TAMAYO, PHILLIPS TAN,
ANDREW UY, WILLIAM VELASCO, EMILIO VELEZ, NOEMI YUPANO, MARY
JANE ONG, RICHARD RAMIREZ, CHERYLE MARIE ALFONSO, LYNDON
BAUTISTA, MANUEL CABOCAN AND NEDY LAZO, Respondents-in-Intervention,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-in-Intervention,
[G.R. No. 155661. January 21, 2003]
CEFERINO C. LOPEZ, RAMON M. SALES, ALFREDO B. VALENCIA, MA. TERESA V.
GAERLAN, LEONARDO DE LA ROSA, DINA C. DE LEON, VIRGIE CATAMIN,
RONALD SCHLOBOM, ANGELITO SANTOS, MA. LUISA M. PALCON and
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA PALIPARAN NG PILIPINAS
(SMPP), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO.,
INC., MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO M.
MENDOZA, in his capacity as Head of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, respondents,
FLORESTE ALCONIS, GINA ALNAS, REY AMPOLOQUIO, ROSEMARIE ANG, EUGENE
ARADA, NENETTE BARREIRO, NOEL BARTOLOME, ALDRIN BASTADOR,
ROLETTE DIVINE BERNARDO, MINETTE BRAVO, KAREN BRECILLA, NIDA
CAILAO, ERWIN CALAR, MARIFEL CONSTANTINO, JANETTE CORDERO,
ARNOLD FELICITAS, MARISSA GAYAGOY, ALEX GENERILLO, ELIZABETH
GRAY, ZOILO HERICO, JACQUELINE IGNACIO, THELMA INFANTE, JOEL
JUMAO-AS, MARIETTA LINCHOCO, ROLLY LORICO, FRANCIS AUGUSTO
MACATOL, MICHAEL MALIGAT, DENNIS MANALO, RAUL MANGALIMAN, JOEL
MANLANGIT, CHARLIE MENDOZA, HAZNAH MENDOZA, NICHOLS MORALES,
ALLEN OLAO, CESAR ORTAL, MICHAEL ORTEGA, WAYNE PLAZA, JOSELITO
REYES, ROLANDO REYES, AILEEN SAPINA, RAMIL TAMAYO, PHILLIPS TAN,
ANDREW UY, WILLIAM VELASCO, EMILIO VELEZ, NOEMI YUPANO, MARY
JANE ONG, RICHARD RAMIREZ, CHERYLE MARIE ALFONSO, LYNDON
BAUTISTA, MANUEL CABOCAN AND NEDY LAZO, Respondents-in-Intervention,
NAGKAISANG MARALITA NG TAONG ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents-in-Intervention.
RESOLUTION
Puno, J.:
Before this Court are the separate Motions for Reconsideration filed by respondent
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), respondents-intervenors Jacinto V.
Paras, Rafael P. Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie Buyson Villarama, Prospero C. Nograles,
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O. Macaranbon, all members of the
House of Representatives (Respondent Congressmen), [1] respondents-intervenors who are
employees of PIATCO and other workers of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) (PIATCO Employees)[2] and respondents-intervenors
Nagkaisang Maralita ng Taong Association, Inc., (NMTAI)[3] of the Decision of this Court dated
May 5, 2003 declaring the contracts for the NAIA IPT III project null and void.
Briefly, the proceedings. On October 5, 1994, Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC)
submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Philippine Government through the Department of
Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) for
the construction and development of the NAIA IPT III under a build-operate-and-transfer
arrangement pursuant to R.A. No. 6957, as amended by R.A. No. 7718 (BOT Law). [4] In
accordance with the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules), the DOTC/MIAA invited the public for submission of competitive and comparative
proposals to the unsolicited proposal of AEDC. On September 20, 1996 a consortium composed
of the Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services,
Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium),
submitted their competitive proposal to the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).
After finding that the Paircargo Consortium submitted a bid superior to the unsolicited
proposal of AEDC and after failure by AEDC to match the said bid, the DOTC issued the notice
of award for the NAIA IPT III project to the Paircargo Consortium, which later organized into
herein respondent PIATCO. Hence, on July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC
Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the
Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). On November 26,
1998, the 1997 Concession Agreement was superseded by the Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA) containing certain revisions and modifications from the original
contract. A series of supplemental agreements was also entered into by the Government and
PIATCO. The First Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999, the Second Supplement on
September 4, 2000, and the Third Supplement on June 22, 2001 (collectively, Supplements) (the
1997 Concession Agreement, ARCA and the Supplements collectively referred to as the
PIATCO Contracts).
On September 17, 2002, various petitions were filed before this Court to annul the 1997
Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements and to prohibit the public
respondents DOTC and MIAA from implementing them.
In a decision dated May 5, 2003, this Court granted the said petitions and declared the
1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements null and void.
Respondent PIATCO, respondent-Congressmen and respondents-intervenors now seek
the reversal of the May 5, 2003 decision and pray that the petitions be dismissed.In the
alternative, PIATCO prays that the Court should not strike down the entire 1997 Concession
Agreement, the ARCA and its supplements in light of their separability clause. Respondent-
Congressmen and NMTAI also pray that in the alternative, the cases at bar should be referred to
arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the ARCA.PIATCO-Employees pray that the petitions be
dismissed and remanded to the trial courts for trial on the merits or in the alternative that the
1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the Supplements be declared valid and binding.
I this Court resolved to take primary jurisdiction over them. This choice of action follows the
Procedural Matters
a. Lack of Jurisdiction
Private respondents and respondents-intervenors reiterate a number of procedural issues
which they insist deprived this Court of jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant cases on its
merits. They continue to claim that the cases at bar raise factual questions which this Court is ill-
equipped to resolve, hence, they must be remanded to the trial court for reception of
evidence. Further, they allege that although designated as petitions for certiorari and prohibition,
the cases at bar are actually actions for nullity of contracts over which the trial courts have
exclusive jurisdiction. Even assuming that the cases at bar are special civil actions for certiorari
and prohibition, they contend that the principle of hierarchy of courts precludes this Court from
taking primary jurisdiction over them.
We are not persuaded.
There is a question of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of the
facts alleged.[5] Even a cursory reading of the cases at bar will show that the Court decided them
by interpreting and applying the Constitution, the BOT Law, its Implementing Rules and other
relevant legal principles on the basis of clearly undisputed facts.All the operative facts were
settled, hence, there is no need for a trial type determination of their truth or falsity by a trial
court.
We reject the unyielding insistence of PIATCO Employees that the following factual issues
are critical and beyond the capability of this Court to resolve, viz: (a) whether the National
Economic Development Authority- Investment Coordinating Committee (NEDA-ICC) approved
the Supplements; (b) whether the First Supplement created ten (10) new financial obligations on
the part of the government; and (c) whether the 1997 Concession Agreement departed from the
draft Concession Agreement contained in the Bid Documents.[6]
The factual issue of whether the NEDA-ICC approved the Supplements is hardly
relevant. It is clear in our Decision that the PIATCO contracts were invalidated on other and
more substantial grounds. It did not rely on the presence or absence of NEDA-ICC approval of
the Supplements. On the other hand, the last two issues do not involve disputed facts. Rather,
they involve contractual provisions which are clear and categorical and need only to be
interpreted. The interpretation of contracts and the determination of whether their provisions
violate our laws or contravene any public policy is a legal issue which this Court may
properly pass upon.
Respondents corollary contention that this Court violated the hierarchy of courts when it
entertained the cases at bar must also fail. The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within
the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts and appellate courts generally applies to cases
involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial
courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the
basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.
It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but legal questions, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary. As the cases at bar merely concern the construction of the Constitution, the
interpretation of the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations on undisputed
contractual provisions and government actions, and as the cases concern public interest,
consistent stance of this Court to settle any controversy with a high public interest component in
a single proceeding and to leave no root or branch that could bear the seeds of future litigation.
The suggested remand of the cases at bar to the trial court will stray away from this policy.[7]
b. Legal Standing
Respondent PIATCO stands pat with its argument that petitioners lack legal personality to
file the cases at bar as they are not real parties in interest who are bound principally or
subsidiarily to the PIATCO Contracts. Further, respondent PIATCO contends that petitioners
failed to show any legally demandable or enforceable right to justify their standing to file the
cases at bar.
These arguments are not difficult to deflect. The determination of whether a person may
institute an action or become a party to a suit brings to fore the concepts of real party in interest,
capacity to sue and standing to sue. To the legally discerning, these three concepts are different
although commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an
action.[8] As defined in the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.[9] Capacity to sue deals with a situation where a person who may have a cause of action is
disqualified from bringing a suit under applicable law or is incompetent to bring a suit or is under
some legal disability that would prevent him from maintaining an action unless represented by a
guardian ad litem.Legal standing is relevant in the realm of public law. In certain instances,
courts have allowed private parties to institute actions challenging the validity of governmental
action for violation of private rights or constitutional principles.[10] In these cases, courts apply the
doctrine of legal standing by determining whether the party has a direct and personal interest
in the controversy and whether such party has sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of, a standard which is distinct from
the concept of real party in interest.[11] Measured by this yardstick, the application of the doctrine
on legal standing necessarily involves a preliminary consideration of the merits of the case and
is not purely a procedural issue.[12]
Considering the nature of the controversy and the issues raised in the cases at bar, this
Court affirms its ruling that the petitioners have the requisite legal standing. The petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 155001 and 155661 are employees of service providers operating at the existing
international airports and employees of MIAA while petitioners-intervenors are service providers
with existing contracts with MIAA and they will all sustain direct injury upon the implementation
of the PIATCO Contracts. The 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA both provide that
upon the commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III, NAIA Passenger Terminals I and II
will cease to be used as international passenger terminals. [13] Further, the ARCA provides:
(d) For the purpose of an orderly transition, MIAA shall not renew any expired concession
agreement relative to any service or operation currently being undertaken at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal I, or extend any concession agreement which may
expire subsequent hereto, except to the extent that the continuation of the existing services and
operations shall lapse on or before the In-Service Date.[14]
Beyond iota of doubt, the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts, which the petitioners
and petitioners-intervenors denounce as unconstitutional and illegal, would deprive them of their
sources of livelihood. Under settled jurisprudence, one's employment, profession, trade, or
calling is a property right and is protected from wrongful interference. [15]It is also self evident that
the petitioning service providers stand in imminent danger of losing legitimate business
investments in the event the PIATCO Contracts are upheld.
Over and above all these, constitutional and other legal issues with far-reaching economic
and social implications are embedded in the cases at bar, hence, this Court liberally granted
legal standing to the petitioning members of the House of Representatives. First, at stake is the
build-operate-andtransfer contract of the countrys premier international airport with a projected
capacity of 10 million passengers a year. Second, the huge amount of investment to complete
the project is estimated to be P13,000,000,000.00. Third, the primary issues posed in the cases
at bar demand a discussion and interpretation of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its
implementing rules which have not been passed upon by this Court in previous cases. They can
chart the future inflow of investment under the BOT Law.
Before writing finis to the issue of legal standing, the Court notes the bid of new parties to
participate in the cases at bar as respondents-intervenors, namely, (1) the PIATCO Employees
and (2) NMTAI (collectively, the New Respondents-Intervenors). After the Courts Decision, the
New Respondents-Intervenors filed separate Motions for Reconsideration-In-Intervention
alleging prejudice and direct injury. PIATCO employees claim that they have a direct and
personal interest [in the controversy]... since they stand to lose their jobs should the
governments contract with PIATCO be declared null and void.[16] NMTAI, on the other hand,
represents itself as a corporation composed of responsible tax-paying Filipino citizens with the
objective of protecting and sustaining the rights of its members to civil liberties, decent livelihood,
opportunities for social advancement, and to a good, conscientious and honest government. [17]
The Rules of Court govern the time of filing a Motion to Intervene. Section 2, Rule 19
provides that a Motion to Intervene should be filed before rendition of judgment.... The New
Respondents-Intervenors filed their separate motions after a decision has been promulgated in
the present cases. They have not offered any worthy explanation to justify their late
intervention. Consequently, their Motions for Reconsideration-In-Intervention are denied for the
rules cannot be relaxed to await litigants who sleep on their rights. In any event, a sideglance at
these late motions will show that they hoist no novel arguments.
c. Failure to Implead an Indispensable Party
PIATCO next contends that petitioners should have impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as an indispensable party. It alleges that petitioners sued the DOTC, MIAA and the
DPWH in their own capacities or as implementors of the PIATCO Contracts and not as a
contract party or as representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It then
leapfrogs to the conclusion that the absence of an indispensable party renders ineffectual all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. [18]
PIATCOs allegations are inaccurate. The petitions clearly bear out that public respondents
DOTC and MIAA were impleaded as parties to the PIATCO Contracts and not merely as their
implementors. The separate petitions filed by the MIAA employees[19] and members of the
House of Representatives[20] alleged that public respondents are impleaded herein because they
either executed the PIATCO Contracts or are undertaking acts which are related to the
PIATCO Contracts. They are interested and indispensable parties to this Petition. [21] Thus, public
respondents DOTC and MIAA were impleaded as parties to the case for having executed the
contracts.
More importantly, it is also too late in the day for PIATCO to raise this issue. If PIATCO
seriously views the non-inclusion of the Republic of the Philippines as an indispensable party as
fatal to the petitions at bar, it should have raised the issue at the onset of the proceedings as a
ground to dismiss. PIATCO cannot litigate issues on a piecemeal basis, otherwise, litigations
shall be like a shore that knows no end. In any event, the Solicitor General, the legal counsel of
the Republic, appeared in the cases at bar in representation of the interest of the government.
II
Pre-qualification of PIATCO
 The Implementing Rules provide for the unyielding standards the PBAC should apply to
determine the financial capability of a bidder for pre-qualification purposes: (i) proof of the ability
of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide a minimum amount of equity to the
project and (ii) a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project proponent
and/or members of the consortium are banking with them, that they are in good financial
standing, and that they have adequate resources.[22] The evident intent of these standards
is to protect the integrity and insure the viability of the project by seeing to it that the proponent
has the financial capability to carry it out. As a further measure to achieve this intent,
it maintains a certain debt-to-equity ratio for the project.
At the pre-qualification stage, it is most important for a bidder to show that it has the
financial capacity to undertake the project by proving that it can fulfill the requirement on
minimum amount of equity. For this purpose, the Bid Documents require in no uncertain terms:
The minimum amount of equity to which the proponents financial capability will be based shall
be thirty percent (30%) of the project cost instead of the twenty percent (20%) specified in
Section 3.6.4 of the Bid Documents. This is to correlate with the required debt-to-equity ratio
of 70:30 in Section 2.01a of the draft concession agreement. The debt portion of the project
financing should not exceed 70% of the actual project cost.[23]
In relation thereto, section 2.01 (a) of the ARCA provides:
Section 2.01 Project Scope.
The scope of the project shall include:
(a) Financing the project at an actual Project cost of not less than Three Hundred Fifty
Million United States Dollars (US$350,000,000.00) while maintaining a debt-to-
equity ratio of 70:30, provided that if the actual Project costs should exceed the
aforesaid amount, Concessionaire shall ensure that the debt-to-equity ratio is
maintained;[24]
Under the debt-to-equity restriction, a bidder may only seek financing of the NAIA IPT III
Project up to 70% of the project cost. Thirty percent (30%) of the cost must come in the form of
equity or investment by the bidder itself. It cannot be overly emphasized that the rules require a
minimum amount of equity to ensure that a bidder is not merely an operator or implementor of
the project but an investor with a substantial interest in its success. The minimum equity
requirement also guarantees the Philippine government and the general public, who are the
ultimate beneficiaries of the project, that a bidder will not be indifferent to the completion of the
project. The discontinuance of the project will irreparably damage public interest more than
private interest.
In the cases at bar, after applying the investment ceilings provided under the General
Banking Act and considering the maximum amounts that each member of the consortium may
validly invest in the project, it is daylight clear that the Paircargo Consortium, at the time of pre-
qualification, had a net worth equivalent to only 6.08% of the total estimated project
cost.[25] By any reckoning, a showing by a bidder that at the time of pre-qualification its
maximum funds available for investment amount to only 6.08% of the project cost is insufficient
to satisfy the requirement prescribed by the Implementing Rules that the project proponent must
have the ability to provide at least 30% of the total estimated project cost. In peso and centavo
terms, at the time of pre-qualification, the Paircargo Consortium had maximum funds available
for investment to the NAIA IPT III Project only in the amount of P558,384,871.55, when it had to
show that it had the ability to provide at least P2,755,095,000.00. The huge disparity cannot be
dismissed as ofde minimis importance considering the high public interest at stake in the project.
PIATCO nimbly tries to sidestep its failure by alleging that it submitted not only audited
financial statements but also testimonial letters from reputable banks attesting to the good
financial standing of the Paircargo Consortium. It contends that in adjudging whether the
Paircargo Consortium is a pre-qualified bidder, the PBAC should have considered not only its
financial statements but other factors showing its financial capability.
Anent this argument, the guidelines provided in the Bid Documents are instructive:
3.3.4 FINANCING AND FINANCIAL PREQUALIFICATIONS REQUIREMENTS
Minimum Amount of Equity
Each member of the proponent entity is to provide evidence of networth in cash and assets
representing the proportionate share in the proponent entity. Audited financial statements for
the past five (5) years as a company for each member are to be provided.
Project Loan Financing
Testimonial letters from reputable banks attesting that each of the members of the ownership
entity are banking with them, in good financial standing and having adequate resources are to
be provided.[26]
It is beyond refutation that Paircargo Consortium failed to prove its ability to provide the
amount of at least P2,755,095,000.00, or 30% of the estimated project cost.Its submission of
testimonial letters attesting to its good financial standing will not cure this failure. At best, the
said letters merely establish its credit worthiness or its ability to obtain loans to finance the
project. They do not, however, prove compliance with the aforesaid requirement of minimum
amount of equity in relation to the prescribed debt-to-equity ratio. This equity cannot be satisfied
through possible loans.
In sum, we again hold that given the glaring gap between the net worth of Paircargo and
PAGS combined with the amount of maximum funds that Security Bank may invest by equity in
a non-allied undertaking, Paircargo Consortium, at the time of pre-qualification, failed to show
that it had the ability to provide 30% of the project cost and necessarily, its financial capability for
the project cannot pass muster.
III
1997 Concession Agreement
Again, we brightline the principle that in public bidding, bids are submitted in accord with
the prescribed terms, conditions and parameters laid down by government and pursuant to the
requirements of the project bidded upon. In light of these parameters, bidders formulate
competing proposals which are evaluated to determine the bid most favorable to the
government. Once the contract based on the bid most favorable to the government is awarded,
all that is left to be done by the parties is to execute the necessary agreements and implement
them. There can be no substantial or material change to the parameters of the project, including
the essential terms and conditions of the contract bidded upon, after the contract award. If there
were changes and the contracts end up unfavorable to government, the public bidding becomes
a mockery and the modified contracts must be struck down.
Respondents insist that there were no substantial or material amendments in the 1997
Concession Agreement as to the technical aspects of the project, i.e., engineering design,
technical soundness, operational and maintenance methods and procedures of the project or
the technical proposal of PIATCO. Further, they maintain that there was no modification of the
financial features of the project, i.e., minimum project cost, debt-to-equity ratio, the operations
and maintenance budget, the schedule and amount of annual guaranteed payments, or
the financial proposal of PIATCO. A discussion of some of these changes to determine
whether they altered the terms and conditions upon which the bids were made is again in order.
a. Modification on Fees and
Charges to be collected by PIATCO
PIATCO clings to the contention that the removal of the groundhandling fees, airline office
rentals and porterage fees from the category of fees subject to MIAA regulation in the 1997
Concession Agreement does not constitute a substantial amendment as these fees are not
really public utility fees. In other words, PIATCO justifies the re-classification under the 1997
Concession Agreement on the ground that these fees are non-public utility revenues.
We disagree. The removal of groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and porterage fees
from the category of Public Utility Revenues under the draft Concession Agreement and its re-
classification to Non-Public Utility Revenues under the 1997 Concession Agreement is
significant and has far reaching consequence. The 1997 Concession Agreement provides that
with respect to Non-Public Utility Revenues, which include groundhandling fees, airline office
rentals and porterage fees,[27] [PIATCO] may make any adjustments it deems
appropriate without need for the consent of GRP or any government agency.[28] In contrast,
the draft Concession Agreement specifies these fees as part of Public Utility Revenues and can
be adjusted only once every two years and in accordance with the Parametric Formula and the
adjustments shall be made effective only after the written express approval of the
MIAA.[29] The Bid Documents themselves clearly provide:
4.2.3 Mechanism for Adjustment of Fees and Charges
4.2.3.1 Periodic Adjustment in Fees and Charges
Adjustments in the fees and charges enumerated hereunder, whether or not
falling within the purview of public utility revenues, shall be allowed only
once every two years in accordance with the parametric formula attached
hereto as Annex 4.2f. Provided that the adjustments shall be made effective
only after the written express approval of MIAA. Provided, further, that MIAAs
approval, shall be contingent only on conformity of the adjustments to the said
parametric formula.
The fees and charges to be regulated in the above manner shall consist of
the following:
....
c) groundhandling fees;
d) rentals on airline offices;
....
(f) porterage fees;
. . . .[30]
The plain purpose in re-classifying groundhandling fees, airline office rentals and
porterage fees as non-public utility fees is to remove them from regulation by the MIAA.In
excluding these fees from government regulation, the danger to public interest cannot be
downplayed.
We are not impressed by the effort of PIATCO to depress this prejudice to public interest
by its contention that in the 1997 Concession Agreement governing Non-Public Utility Revenues,
it is provided that [PIATCO] shall at all times be judicious in fixing fees and charges constituting
Non-Public Utility Revenues in order to ensure that End Users are not unreasonably deprived of
services.[31] PIATCO then peddles the proposition that the said provision confers upon MIAA full
regulatory powers to ensure that PIATCO is charging non-public utility revenues
at judicious rates.[32] To the trained eye, the argument will not fly for it is obviously non
sequitur. Fairly read, it is PIATCO that wields the power to determine the judiciousness of the
said fees and charges. In the draft Concession Agreement the power was expressly lodged with
the MIAA and any adjustment can only be done once every two years. The changes are not
insignificant specks as interpreted by PIATCO.
PIATCO further argues that there is no substantial change in the 1997 Concession
Agreement with respect to fees and charges PIATCO is allowed to impose which are not
covered by Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993[33] as the relevant provision of the 1997
Concession Agreement is practically identical with the draft Concession Agreement. [34]
We are not persuaded. Under the draft Concession Agreement, PIATCO
may impose fees and charges other than those fees and charges previously imposed or
collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal I, subject to the written
approval of MIAA.[35] Further, the draft Concession Agreement provides that MIAA reserves the
right to regulate these new fees and charges if in its judgment the users of the airport shall be
deprived of a free option for the services they cover. [36] In contrast, under the 1997 Concession
Agreement, the MIAA merely retained the right to approve any imposition of new fees and
charges which were not previously collected at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal I. The agreement did not contain an equivalent provision allowing MIAA to
reserve the right to regulate the adjustments of these new fees and charges.[37] PIATCO
justifies the amendment by arguing that MIAA can establish terms before approval of new fees
and charges, inclusive of the mode for their adjustment.
PIATCOs stance is again a strained one. There would have been no need for an
amendment if there were no change in the power to regulate on the part of MIAA. The deletion
of MIAAs reservation of its right to regulate the price adjustments of new fees and charges can
have no other purpose but to dilute the extent of MIAAs regulation in the collection of these
fees. Again, the amendment diminished the authority of MIAA to protect the public interest in
case of abuse by PIATCO.
b. Assumption by the
Government of the liabilities
of PIATCO in the event of the latters
default
PIATCO posits the thesis that the new provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement in
case of default by PIATCO on its loans were merely meant to prescribe and limit the rights of
PIATCOs creditors with regard to the NAIA Terminal III. PIATCO alleges that Section 4.04 of the
1997 Concession Agreement simply provides that PIATCOs creditors have no right to foreclose
the NAIA Terminal III.
We cannot concur. The pertinent provisions of the 1997 Concession Agreement state:
Section 4.04 Assignment.
....
(b) In the event Concessionaire should default in the payment of an Attendant Liability, and the
default has resulted in the acceleration of the payment due date of the Attendant Liability prior to
its stated date of maturity, the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire shall immediately inform
GRP in writing of such default. GRP shall, within one hundred eighty (180) Days from receipt of
the joint written notice of the Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire, either (i) take over the
Development Facility and assume the Attendant Liabilities, or (ii) allow the Unpaid Creditors,
if qualified, to be substituted as concessionaire and operator of the Development Facility in
accordance with the terms and conditions hereof, or designate a qualified operator acceptable to
GRP to operate the Development Facility, likewise under the terms and conditions of this
Agreement; Provided that if at the end of the 180-day period GRP shall not have served the
Unpaid Creditors and Concessionaire written notice of its choice, GRP shall be deemed to have
elected to take over the Development Facility with the concomitant assumption of Attendant
Liabilities.
(c) If GRP should, by written notice, allow the Unpaid Creditors to be substituted as
concessionaire, the latter shall form and organize a concession company qualified to take over
the operation of the Development Facility. If the concession company should elect to designate
an operator for the Development Facility, the concession company shall in good faith identify
and designate a qualified operator acceptable to GRP within one hundred eighty (180) days from
receipt of GRPs written notice. If the concession company, acting in good faith and with due
diligence, is unable to designate a qualified operator within the aforesaid period, then GRP shall
at the end of the 180-day period take over the Development Facility and assume Attendant
Liabilities.
A plain reading of the above provision shows that it spells out in limpid language the
obligation of government in case of default by PIATCO on its loans. There can be no blinking
from the fact that in case of PIATCOs default, the government will assume PIATCOs Attendant
Liabilities as defined in the 1997 Concession Agreement.[38] This obligation is not found in the
draft Concession Agreement and the change runs roughshod to the spirit and policy of the BOT
Law which was crafted precisely to prevent government from incurring financial risk.
In any event, PIATCO pleads that the entire agreement should not be struck down as the
1997 Concession Agreement contains a separability clause.
The plea is bereft of merit. The contracts at bar which made a mockery of the bidding
process cannot be upheld and must be annulled in their entirety for violating law and public
policy. As demonstrated, the contracts were substantially amended after their award to the
successful bidder on terms more beneficial to PIATCO and prejudicial to public interest. If this
flawed process would be allowed, public bidding will cease to be competitive and worse,
government would not be favored with the best bid. Bidders will no longer bid on the basis of the
prescribed terms and conditions in the bid documents but will formulate their bid in anticipation
of the execution of a future contract containing new and better terms and conditions that were
not previously available at the time of the bidding. Such a public bidding will not inure to the
public good. The resulting contracts cannot be given half a life but must be struck down as totally
lawless.
IV.
Direct Government Guarantee
The respondents further contend that the PIATCO Contracts do not contain direct
government guarantee provisions. They assert that section 4.04 of the ARCA, which superseded
sections 4.04(b) and (c), Article IV of the 1997 Concession Agreement, is but a clarification and
explanation[39] of the securities allowed in the bid documents. They allege that these provisions
merely provide for compensation to PIATCO[40] in case of a government buy-out or takeover of
NAIA IPT III. The respondents, particularly respondent PIATCO, also maintain that the
guarantee contained in the contracts, if any, is an indirect guarantee allowed under the BOT
Law, as amended.[41]
We do not agree. Section 4.04(c), Article IV[42] of the ARCA should be read in conjunction
with section 1.06, Article I,[43] in the same manner that sections 4.04(b) and (c), Article IV of the
1997 Concession Agreement should be related to Article 1.06 of the same contract. Section
1.06, Article I of the ARCA and its counterpart provision in the 1997 Concession Agreement
define in no uncertain terms the meaning of attendant liabilities. They tell us of the amounts that
the Government has to pay in the event respondent PIATCO defaults in its loan payments to its
Senior Lenders and no qualified transferee or nominee is chosen by the Senior Lenders or is
willing to take over from respondent PIATCO.
A reasonable reading of all these relevant provisions would reveal that the ARCA made
the Government liable to pay all amounts ... from time to time owed or which may become
owing by Concessionaire [PIATCO] to Senior Lenders or any other persons or entities
who have provided, loaned, or advanced funds or provided financial facilities to
Concessionaire [PIATCO] for the Project [NAIA Terminal 3].[44] These amounts include without
limitation, all principal, interest, associated fees, charges, reimbursements, and other
related expenses... whether payable at maturity, by acceleration or otherwise. [45] They further
include amounts owed by respondent PIATCO to its professional consultants and advisers,
suppliers, contractors and sub-contractors as well as fees, charges and expenses of any agents
or trustees of the Senior Lenders or any other persons or entities who have provided loans or
financial facilities to respondent PIATCO in relation to NAIA IPT III.[46] The counterpart provision
in the 1997 Concession Agreement specifying the attendant liabilities that the Government
would be obligated to pay should PIATCO default in its loan obligations is equally onerous to the
Government as those contained in the ARCA. According to the 1997 Concession Agreement, in
the event the Government is forced to prematurely take over NAIA IPT III as a result of
respondent PIATCOs default in the payment of its loan obligations to its Senior Lenders, it would
be liable to pay the following amounts as attendant liabilities:
Section 1.06. Attendant Liabilities
Attendant Liabilities refer to all amounts recorded and from time to time outstanding in the
books of the Concessionaire as owing to Unpaid Creditors who have provided, loaned or
advanced funds actually used for the Project, including all interests, penalties, associated
fees, charges, surcharges, indemnities, reimbursements and other related expenses, and
further including amounts owed by Concessionaire to its suppliers, contractors and sub-
contractors.[47]
These provisions reject respondents contention that what the Government is obligated to
pay, in the event that respondent PIATCO defaults in the payment of its loans, is merely
termination payment or just compensation for its takeover of NAIA IPT III. It is clear from said
section 1.06 that what the Government would pay is the sum total of all the debts,
including all interest, fees and charges, that respondent PIATCO incurred in pursuance of the
NAIA IPT III Project. This reading is consistent with section 4.04 of the ARCA itself which states
that the Government shall make a termination payment to Concessionaire [PIATCO] equal to the
Appraised Value (as hereinafter defined) of the Development Facility [NAIA Terminal III] or the
sum of the Attendant Liabilities, if greater. For sure, respondent PIATCO will not receive
any amount less than sufficient to cover its debts, regardless of whether or not the value
of NAIA IPT III, at the time of its turn over to the Government, may actually be less than
the amount of PIATCOs debts. The scheme is a form of direct government guarantee for it is
undeniable that it leaves the government no option but to pay the attendant liabilities in the event
that the Senior Lenders are unable or unwilling to appoint a qualified nominee or transferee as a
result of PIATCOs default in the payment of its Senior Loans. As we stressed in our Decision,
this Court cannot depart from the legal maxim that those that cannot be done directly cannot be
done indirectly.
This is not to hold, however, that indirect government guarantee is not allowed under the
BOT Law, as amended. The intention to permit indirect government guarantee is evident from
the Senate deliberations on the amendments to the BOT Law. The idea is to allow for
reasonable government undertakings, such as to authorize the project proponent to undertake
related ventures within the project area, in order to encourage private sector participation in
development projects.[48] An example cited by then Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, one of the
sponsors of R.A. No. 7718, is the Mandaluyong public market which was built under the Build-
and-Transfer (BT) scheme wherein instead of the government paying for the transfer, the project
proponent was allowed to operate the upper floors of the structure as a commercial mall in order
to recoup their investments.[49] It was repeatedly stressed in the deliberations that in allowing
indirect government guarantee, the law seeks to encourage both the government and the private
sector to formulate reasonable and innovative government undertakings in pursuance of BOT
projects. In no way, however, can the government be made liable for the debts of the project
proponent as this would be tantamount to a direct government guarantee which is prohibited by
the law. Such liability would defeat the very purpose of the BOT Law which is to encourage the
use of private sector resources in the construction, maintenance and/or operation of
development projects with no, or at least minimal, capital outlay on the part of the government.
The respondents again urge that should this Court affirm its ruling that the PIATCO
Contracts contain direct government guarantee provisions, the whole contract should not be
nullified. They rely on the separability clause in the PIATCO Contracts.
We are not persuaded.
The BOT Law and its implementing rules provide that there are three (3) essential
requisites for an unsolicited proposal to be accepted: (1) the project involves a new concept in
technology and/or is not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct government guarantee,
subsidy or equity is required, and (3) the government agency or local government unit has
invited by publication other interested parties to a public bidding and conducted the same.[50] The
failure to fulfill any of the requisites will result in the denial of the proposal. Indeed, it is further
provided that a direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity provision will necessarily
disqualify a proposal from being treated and accepted as an unsolicited proposal.[51] In fine, the
mere inclusion of a direct government guarantee in an unsolicited proposal is fatal to the
proposal. There is more reason to invalidate a contract if a direct government guarantee
provision is inserted later in the contract via a backdoor amendment. Such an amendment
constitutes a crass circumvention of the BOT Law and renders the entire contract void.
Respondent PIATCO likewise claims that in view of the fact that other BOT contracts such
as the JANCOM contract, the Manila Water contract and the MRT contract had been considered
valid, the PIATCO contracts should be held valid as well.[52] There is no parity in the cited cases.
For instance, a reading of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. JANCOM
Environmental Corporation[53] will show that its issue is different from the issues in the cases
at bar. In the JANCOM case, the main issue is whether there is a perfected contract between
JANCOM and the Government. The resolution of the issue hinged on the following: (1) whether
the conditions precedent to the perfection of the contract were complied with; (2) whether there
is a valid notice of award; and (3) whether the signature of the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources is sufficient to bind the Government. These issue and sub-
issues are clearly distinguishable and different. For one, the issue of direct government
guarantee was not considered by this Court when it held the JANCOM contract valid, yet, it is a
key reason for invalidating the PIATCO Contracts. It is a basic principle in law that cases with
dissimilar facts cannot have similar disposition.
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA
IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their
construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent
PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance
with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO
and its investors.
II.
Temporary takeover of business affected with
public interest in times of national emergency
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national
emergency the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public
interest. This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the
State.
Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."[54] It consists
of two essential elements. First, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property. Second,
the power is exercised for the benefit of the common good. Its definition in elastic terms
underscores its all-encompassing and comprehensive embrace.[55] It is and still is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable[56] of the States powers. It is familiar knowledge that unlike
the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just
compensation for its paramount consideration is public welfare.[57]
It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national emergency is the primary
consideration when the government decides to temporarily take over or direct the operation of a
public utility or a business affected with public interest. The nature and extent of the emergency
is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms thereof. It is the State that
prescribes such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation of the temporary takeover
as dictated by the exigencies of the time. As we ruled in our Decision, this power of the State
can not be negated by any party nor should its exercise be a source of obligation for the State.
Section 5.10(c), Article V of the ARCA provides that respondent PIATCO shall be entitled
to reasonable compensation for the duration of the temporary takeover by GRP, which
compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or
Terminal Complex.[58] It clearly obligates the government in the exercise of its police power to
compensate respondent PIATCO and this obligation is offensive to the Constitution. Police
power can not be diminished, let alone defeated by any contract for its paramount consideration
is public welfare and interest.[59]
Again, respondent PIATCOs reliance on the case of Heirs of Suguitan v. City of
Mandaluyong[60] to justify its claim for reasonable compensation for the Governments temporary
takeover of NAIA IPT III in times of national emergency is erroneous. What was involved
in Heirs of Suguitan is the exercise of the states power of eminent domain and not of police
power, hence, just compensation was awarded. The cases at bar will not involve the exercise of
the power of eminent domain.
III.
Monopoly

Section 19, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the State prohibit or regulate
monopolies when public interest so requires. Monopolies are not per seprohibited. Given its
susceptibility to abuse, however, the State has the bounden duty to regulate monopolies to
protect public interest. Such regulation may be called for, especially in sensitive areas such as
the operation of the countrys premier international airport, considering the public interest at
stake.

By virtue of the PIATCO contracts, NAIA IPT III would be the only international passenger
airport operating in the Island of Luzon, with the exception of those already operating in Subic
Bay Freeport Special Economic Zone (SBFSEZ), Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) and in
Laoag City. Undeniably, the contracts would create a monopoly in the operation of an
international commercial passenger airport at the NAIA in favor of PIATCO.

The grant to respondent PIATCO of the exclusive right to operate NAIA IPT III should not
exempt it from regulation by the government. The government has the right, indeed the duty, to
protect the interest of the public. Part of this duty is to assure that respondent PIATCOs exercise
of its right does not violate the legal rights of third parties.We reiterate our ruling that while the
service providers presently operating at NAIA Terminals I and II do not have the right to demand
for the renewal or extension of their contracts to continue their services in NAIA IPT III, those
who have subsisting contracts beyond the In-Service Date of NAIA IPT III can not be arbitrarily
or unreasonably treated.

Finally, the Respondent Congressmen assert that at least two (2) committee reports by
the House of Representatives found the PIATCO contracts valid and contend that this Court, by
taking cognizance of the cases at bar, reviewed an action of a co-equal body.[61] They insist that
the Court must respect the findings of the said committees of the House of
Representatives.[62] With due respect, we cannot subscribe to their submission. There is a
fundamental difference between a case in court and an investigation of a congressional
committee. The purpose of a judicial proceeding is to settle the dispute in controversy by
adjudicating the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the case.On the other hand, a
congressional investigation is conducted in aid of legislation. [63] Its aim is to assist and
recommend to the legislature a possible action that the body may take with regard to a particular
issue, specifically as to whether or not to enact a new law or amend an existing
one. Consequently, this Court cannot treat the findings in a congressional committee report as
binding because the facts elicited in congressional hearings are not subject to the rigors of the
Rules of Court on admissibility of evidence.The Court in assuming jurisdiction over the petitions
at bar simply performed its constitutional duty as the arbiter of legal disputes properly brought
before it, especially in this instance when public interest requires nothing less.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by the respondent PIATCO,

respondent Congressmen and the respondents-in-intervention are DENIED with finality.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 154599. January 21, 2004]
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
HON. JOSE ATIENZA, JR., and THE CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks the nullification of
Manila City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002,[1] and respondent City Mayors Executive Order
No. 011, Series of 2002,[2] dated 15 August 2002 , for being patently contrary to law.
The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay National (Liga for brevity) is the national organization of
all the barangays in the Philippines, which pursuant to Section 492 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991, constitutes the duly elected
presidents of highly-urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the metropolitan Manila Chapter, and
metropolitan political subdivision chapters.
Section 493 of that law provides that [t]he liga at the municipal, city, provincial,
metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president,
and five (5) members of the board of directors. All other matters not provided for in the law
affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local government units shall be governed by
their respective constitution and by-laws, which must always conform to the provisions of the
Constitution and existing laws.[3]
On 16 March 2000, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Constitution and By-laws to
govern its internal organization.[4] Section 1, third paragraph, Article XI of said Constitution and
By-Laws states:
All other election matters not covered in this Article shall be governed by the Liga Election Code
or such other rules as may be promulgated by the National Liga Executive Board in conformity
with the provisions of existing laws.
By virtue of the above-cited provision, the Liga adopted and ratified its own Election
Code.[5] Section 1.2, Article I of the Liga Election Code states:
1.2 Liga ng mga Barangay Provincial, Metropolitan, HUC/ICC Chapters. There shall be
nationwide synchronized elections for the provincial, metropolitan, and HUC/ICC chapters to be
held on the third Monday of the month immediately after the month when the synchronized
elections in paragraph 1.1 above was held. The incumbent Liga chapter president concerned
duly assisted by the proper government agency, office or department, e.g.
Provincial/City/NCR/Regional Director, shall convene all the duly elected Component
City/Municipal Chapter Presidents and all the current elected Punong Barangays (for HUC/ICC)
of the respective chapters in any public place within its area of jurisdiction for the purpose of
reorganizing and electing the officers and directors of the provincial, metropolitan or HUC/ICC
Liga chapters. Said president duly assisted by the government officer aforementioned, shall
notify, in writing, all the above concerned at least fifteen (15) days before the scheduled election
meeting on the exact date, time, place and requirements of the said meeting.
The Liga thereafter came out with its Calendar of Activities and Guidelines in the
Implementation of the Liga Election Code of 2002,[6] setting on 21 October 2002 the
synchronized elections for highly urbanized city chapters, such as the Liga Chapter of Manila,
together with independent component city, provincial, and metropolitan chapters.
On 28 June 2002, respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series
of 2002, providing, among other things, for the election of representatives of the District
Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both chapters thirty days
after the barangay elections. Section 3 (A) and (B) of the assailed ordinance read:
SEC. 3. Representation Chapters. Every Barangay shall be represented in the said Liga
Chapters by the Punong Barangayor, in his absence or incapacity, by the kagawad duly elected
for the purpose among its members.
A. District Chapter
All elected Barangay Chairman in each District shall elect from among themselves the President,
Vice-President and five (5) members of the Board.
B. City Chapter
The District Chapter representatives shall automatically become members of the Board and they
shall elect from among themselves a President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, Auditor
and create other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.
The assailed ordinance was later transmitted to respondent City Mayor Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., for his signature and approval.
On 16 July 2002, upon being informed that the ordinance had been forwarded to the
Office of the City Mayor, still unnumbered and yet to be officially released, the Liga sent
respondent Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed considering
that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of the Liga through legislation, a
function which was clearly beyond the ambit of the powers of the City Council.[7]
Respondent Mayor, however, signed and approved the assailed city ordinance and issued
on 15 August 2002 Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, to implement the ordinance.
Hence, on 27 August 2002, the Liga filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION,
WHEN IT ENACTED CITY ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002 PURPOSELY TO GOVERN THE
ELECTIONS OF THE MANILA CHAPTER OF THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS AND WHICH
PROVIDES A DIFFERENT MANNER OF ELECTING ITS OFFICERS, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT SAID CHAPTERS ELECTIONS, AND THE ELECTIONS OF ALL OTHER CHAPTERS OF
THE LIGA NG MGA BARANGAYS FOR THAT MATTER, ARE BY LAW MANDATED TO BE
GOVERNED BY THE LIGA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS AND THE LIGA ELECTION
CODE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR OF MANILA COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN HE ISSUED EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 011 TO IMPLEMENT THE QUESTIONED CITY
ORDINANCE NO. 8039 S. 2002.
In support of its petition, the Liga argues that City Ordinance No. 8039, Series of 2002,
and Executive Order No. 011, Series of 2002, contradict the Liga Election Code and are
therefore invalid. There exists neither rhyme nor reason, not to mention the absence of legal
basis, for the Manila City Council to encroach upon, or even assume, the functions of the Liga by
prescribing, through legislation, the manner of conducting the Liga elections other than what has
been provided for by the Liga Constitution and By-laws and the Liga Election Code. Accordingly,
the subject ordinance is an ultra vires act of the respondents and, as such, should be declared
null and void.
As for its prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the petitioner cites as
reason therefor the fact that under Section 5 of the assailed city ordinance, the Manila District
Chapter elections would be held thirty days after the regular barangay elections. Hence, it
argued that the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction would be
imperative to prevent the implementation of the ordinance and executive order.
On 12 September 2002, Barangay Chairman Arnel Pea, in his capacity as a member of
the Liga ng mga Barangay in the City Chapter of Manila, filed a Complaint in Intervention with
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction.[8] He supports the position of the Liga and prays for the declaration of the questioned
ordinance and executive order, as well as the elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay pursuant
thereto, to be null and void. The assailed ordinance prescribing for an indirect manner of election
amended, in effect, the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides for the
election of the Liga officers at large. It also violated and curtailed the rights of the petitioner and
intervenor, as well as the other 896 Barangay Chairmen in the City of Manila, to vote and be
voted upon in a direct election.
On 25 October 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in lieu
of Comment.[9] It supports the petition of the Liga, arguing that the assailed city ordinance and
executive order are clearly inconsistent with the express public policy enunciated in R.A. No.
7160. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called
the power of subordinate legislation. Thus, the enactments in question, which are local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of law.
On the issue of non-observance by the petitioners of the hierarchy-of-courts rule, the OSG
posits that technical rules of procedure should be relaxed in the instant petition.While Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, grants original jurisdiction over cases of this nature to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), the exigency of the present petition, however, calls for the relaxation
of this rule. Section 496 (should be Section 491) of the Local Government Code of 1991
primarily intended that the Liga ng mga Barangaydetermine the representation of the Liga in the
sanggunians for the immediate ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues affecting
barangay government administration. Thus, the immediate resolution of this petition is a must.
On the other hand, the respondents defend the validity of the assailed ordinance and
executive order and pray for the dismissal of the present petition on the following grounds:
(1) certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is unavailing; (2) the petition should not be
entertained by this Court in view of the pendency before the Regional Trial Court of Manila of
two actions or petitions questioning the subject ordinance and executive order; (3) the petitioner
is guilty of forum shopping; and (4) the act sought to be enjoined is fait accompli.
The respondents maintain that certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available to one
aggrieved by the decision of a tribunal, officer, or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The City Council and City Mayor of Manila are not the board and officer contemplated
in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court because both do not exercise judicial functions. The enactment
of the subject ordinance and issuance of the questioned executive order are legislative and
executive functions, respectively, and thus, do not fall within the ambit of judicial functions. They
are both within the prerogatives, powers, and authority of the City Council and City Mayor of
Manila, respectively. Furthermore, the petition failed to show with certainty that the respondents
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The respondents also asseverate that the petitioner cannot claim that it has no other
recourse in addressing its grievance other than this petition for certiorari. As a matter of fact,
there are two cases pending before Branches 33 and 51 of the RTC of Manila (one is
for mandamus; the other, for declaratory relief) and three in the Court of Appeals (one is for
prohibition; the two other cases, for quo warranto), which are all akin to the present petition in
the sense that the relief being sought therein is the declaration of the invalidity of the subject
ordinance. Clearly, the petitioner may ask the RTC or the Court of Appeals the relief being
prayed for before this Court. Moreover, the petitioner failed to prove discernible compelling
reasons attending the present petition that would warrant cognizance of the present petition by
this Court.
Besides, according to the respondents, the petitioner has transgressed the proscription
against forum-shopping in filing the instant suit. Although the parties in the other pending cases
and in this petition are different individuals or entities, they represent the same interest.
With regard to petitioner's prayer for temporary restraining order and/ or preliminary
injunction in its petition, the respondents maintain that the same had become moot and
academic in view of the elections of officers of the City Liga ng mga Barangay on 15 September
2002 and their subsequent assumption to their respective offices. [10] Since the acts to be
enjoined are now fait accompli, this petition for certiorari with an application for provisional
remedies must necessarily fail. Thus, where the records show that during the pendency of the
case certain events or circumstances had taken place that render the case moot and academic,
the petition for certiorari must be dismissed.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolve to dismiss this petition
for certiorari.
First, the respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated
unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives. A petition for certiorariunder Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it
must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(2) the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.[11]
 Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[12]
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under
which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought
before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.[13]
The respondents do not fall within the ambit of tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the enactment by the
City Council of Manila of the assailed ordinance and the issuance by respondent Mayor of the
questioned executive order were done in the exercise of legislative and executive functions,
respectively, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. On this score alone, certiorari will not
lie.
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
ordinance and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. [14]Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Italics supplied).
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction
over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. [15]
Third, even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the extraordinary writ
of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts. No special and important
reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the
intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed.
We have held that this Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive, but is
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain cases. As aptly
stated in People v. Cuaresma:[16]
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any
of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor0 will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative
of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.
As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez,[17] the propensity of litigants and lawyers to
disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court
must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, we shall reaffirm the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[18]
Petitioners reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre[19] is misplaced because the non-observance of
the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what was sought to be nullified in
the petition for certiorari and prohibition therein was an act of the President of the Philippines,
which would have greatly affected all local government units. We reiterated therein that when an
act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling
the controversy becomes the duty of this Court.The same is true when what is seriously alleged
to be unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is coequal with
Congress.
We hesitate to rule that the petitioner and the intervenor are guilty of forum-
shopping. Forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the
following requisites must be present: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as are
representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.[20]
In the instant petition, and as admitted by the respondents, the parties in this case and in
the alleged other pending cases are different individuals or entities; thus, forum-shopping cannot
be said to exist. Moreover, even assuming that those five petitions are indeed pending before
the RTC of Manila and the Court of Appeals, we can only guess the causes of action and issues
raised before those courts, considering that the respondents failed to furnish this Court with
copies of the said petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139791. December 12, 2003]
MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. EDDY NG KOK
WEI, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated March 26,
1999 and Resolution[2] dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40504,
entitled Eddy Ng Kok Wei vs. Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation.
The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:
Eddy Ng Kok Wei, respondent, is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing
in the Philippines. On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila
Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a
condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
Subsequently or on December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee
of P50,000.00 for the purchase of a 46-square meter condominium unit (Unit 703) valued
at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989, respondent paid 90% of the purchase price in the sum
of P729,830.00.
Consequently, petitioner, through its President, Mr. Antonio G. Puyat, executed a Contract
to Sell in favor of the respondent. The contract expressly states that the subject condominium
unit shall substantially be completed and delivered to the respondent within fifteen (15) months
from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that (S)hould there be no substantial completion
and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by
respondent) shall be charged against (petitioner).
Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent returned to
the Philippines sometime in April, 1990.
In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner, through its Senior Assistant Vice-President, Mr.
Mario G. Zavalla, informed respondent of the substantial completion of his condominium unit,
however, due to various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon and steel
and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.
Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioners notice of delivery dated May 31,
1990, respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water
and electric facilities.
Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its building
administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990.
On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his
condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was constrained to send petitioner a letter
dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for the damages he sustained. But petitioner
ignored such demand, prompting respondent to file with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
150, Makati City, a complaint against the former for specific performance and damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3440.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the
condominium unit and on April 12, 1991, occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action
has been limited to his claim for damages.
On December 18, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision[3] finding the petitioner liable for
payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its obligation to the respondent. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering
Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation to pay plaintiff Eddy Ng Kok Wei the following:
1. One percent (1%) of the total amount plaintiff paid defendant;
2. P100,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P25,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 26, 1999, affirmed in toto the
trial courts award of damages in favor of the respondent.
Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate
Court in a Resolution dated August 5, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of the condominium unit to
respondent.
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case,
Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority [now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)] [4] shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
xxx
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
x x x.
 Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant
case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot
or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the HLURB.[5]

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We have held
that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings and submitting its
case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.[6]

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the
Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this
case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.

On petitioners claim that it did not incur delay, suffice it to say that this is a factual
issue. Time and again, we have ruled that the factual findings of the trial court are given weight
when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.[7] Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages as a
result thereof, are indeed factual questions.

The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact,
unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the
impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. [8] These exceptions are not present
here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 26, 1999 and
Resolution dated August 5, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMEDIN TOTO.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370. April 25, 2003]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGUSTIN T.
SARDIDO, Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido (Judge
Sardido) formerly presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, for
gross ignorance of the law. Judge Sardido issued an Order dated 20 October 1998 excluding
Judge Braulio Hurtado, Jr. (Judge Hurtado) of the Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North
Cotabato as one of the accused in an Amended Information. [1] Judge Sardido ruled that
Supreme Court Circular No. 3-89 requires that Judge Hurtado be dropped from the Amended
Information and his case be forwarded to the Court.
The Facts
Private complainant Teresita Aguirre Magbanua accused Oscar Pagunsan and Danilo
Ong of the crime of Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Document. [2] The
Amended Information included Judge Hurtado. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14071,
was raffled to Judge Sardido, then presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal,
South Cotabato (MTC-Koronadal).
In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 8 August 1993, private complainant Magbanua and six
other vendors allegedly sold two parcels of land, covered by TCT Nos. 47873 and 33633 and
located at the commercial district of Koronadal, to Davao Realty Development Corporation,
represented by accused Ong, with co-accused Pagunsan, as broker.Judge Hurtado, who at that
time was the Clerk of Court of RTC-Koronadal and ex-officio notary public, notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
However, private complainant Magbanua denies signing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
8 August 1993 which states that the consideration for the sale was only P600,000.00. Private
complainant asserts that what she and the other vendors signed was a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 6 August 1996 for a consideration of P16,000,000.00.Under the terms of the sale, the
vendee agreed to pay for the capital gains tax. The consideration in the 8 August 1993 Deed of
Absolute Sale was apparently undervalued.Subsequently, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
assessed the vendors a deficiency capital gains tax of P1,023,375.00.
Judge Hurtado filed a motion praying that the criminal complaint against him be forwarded
to the Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado claimed that Circular No. 3-89 dated 6 February 1989
requires all cases involving justices and judges of the lower courts, whether or not such
complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, such as
acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc. to be forwarded to the
Supreme Court. Judge Hurtado asserted that since the case against him is one involving a judge
of a lower court, the same should be forwarded to the Supreme Court pursuant to Circular No. 3-
89.
The Provincial Prosecutor opposed Judge Hurtados motion, arguing that the case against
Judge Hurtado is not within the scope of Circular No. 3-89 since it is not an IBP-initiated case.
Moreover, the offense charged was committed in 1993 when Judge Hurtado was still a clerk of
court and ex-officio notary public.
On 20 October 1998, Judge Sardido issued an Order, the pertinent portions of which read:
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is, whether the case of Judge Hurtado, who is
charged for acts committed prior to his appointment as an RTC Judge, falls within the purview of
the afore-said Circular No. 3-89.
It is the humble submission of the Court that the case of Judge Hurtado, an RTC Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Kabacan, North Cotabato, falls within the meaning and intent of the said
circular.
For reasons being, firstly, the said circular provides that all cases involving justices and judges of
lower courts shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for appropriate action, whether or not such
complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, and
regardless of the nature of the crime, without any qualification whether the crime was committed
before or during his tenure of office. Under the law on Legal Hermeneutics, if the law does not
qualify we must not qualify. Secondly, it would sound, to the mind of the Court, awkward for a
first level court to be trying an incumbent judge of a second level court.
For reasons afore-stated, this Court can not and shall not try this case as against Judge
Hurtado, unless the Honorable Supreme Court would order otherwise.
Wherefore, the foregoing premises duly considered, the name of Judge Braulio L. Hurtado, Jr. is
ordered excluded from the amended information and the case against him is ordered forwarded
to the Honorable Supreme Court, pursuant to the afore-said Circular No. 3-89 of the Supreme
Court, dated February 9, 1989.
Accordingly, Maxima S. Borja (Borja), Stenographer I and Acting Clerk of Court II of the
MTC-Koronadal, South Cotabato, wrote a letter dated 21 July 1999 forwarding the criminal case
against Judge Hurtado to the Court Administrator for appropriate action.
Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated 25 October
2000 pointing out that Circular No. 3-89 refers only to administrative complaints filed with the IBP
against justices and judges of lower courts. The Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed
before trial courts against such justices and judges.
Thus, in the Resolution of 6 December 2000, the Court directed that the letter of Acting
Clerk of Court Borja be returned to the MTC-Koronadal together with the records of the criminal
case. The Court directed Judge Sardido to explain in writing why he should not be held liable for
gross ignorance of the law for excluding Judge Hurtado from the Amended Information and for
transmitting the records of Judge Hurtados case to the Court.
In his Explanation dated 26 January 2001, Judge Sardido reasoned out that he excluded
Judge Hurtado because Circular No. 3-89 directs the IBP to forward to the Supreme Court for
appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts x x x. Judge Sardido
claims that the Circular likewise applies to courts in cases involving justices or judges of the
lower courts, especially so in this case where Judge Hurtado was charged with falsification of
public document as a notary public while he was still the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of the 11th Judicial Region in Koronadal, South Cotabato.
In the Resolution of 28 March 2001, the Court referred this case to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. On 10 July 2001, the OCA
submitted a Memorandum recommending that this case be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter.
Judge Sardido filed his Manifestation dated 20 September 2001 stating that he is
submitting the case for decision based on the pleadings and records already filed. Judge
Sardido insisted that he did what he had done in all honesty and good faith.
OCAs Findings and Conclusions
The OCA found that Judge Sardido erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the
accused in the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 14071. The OCA held that Circular
No. 3-89, which is Judge Sardidos basis in issuing the Order of 20 October 1998, refers to
administrative complaints filed with the IBP against justices and judges of lower courts. The
Circular does not apply to criminal cases filed against justices and judges of lower courts. The
OCA recommended that a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed on Judge Sardido for gross ignorance
of the law.
The Courts Ruling
The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 in response to a letter dated 19 December 1988 by
then IBP President Leon M. Garcia, seeking clarification of the Courts En Banc Resolution of 29
November 1998 in RE: Letter of then Acting Presiding Justice Rodolfo A. Nocon[3] and
Associate Justices Reynato Puno[4] and Alfredo Marigomen[5]of the Court of Appeals.
A certain Atty. Eduardo R. Balaoing had filed a complaint against Court of Appeals
Justices Nocon, Puno and Marigomen relating to a petition filed before their division. In its En
Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988, the Court required the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court
for appropriate action the complaint[6] filed by Atty. Balaoing with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline. The Court stated that the power to discipline justices and judges of the lower courts is
within the Courts exclusive power and authority as provided in Section 11, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.[7] The Court Administrator publicized the En Banc Resolution of 29 November 1988
by issuing Circular No. 17 dated 20 December 1988.
The Court issued Circular No. 3-89 on 6 February 1989 clarifying the En Banc Resolution
of 29 November 1988. Circular No. 3-89 provides in part as follows:
(1) The IBP (Board of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall forward to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving justices and judges of lower courts,
whether or not such complaints deal with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their
official functions, such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property, etc. x
x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Circular No. 3-89 clarified the second paragraph, Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court which states that:
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper
charges against erring attorneys including those in the government service. (Emphasis
supplied).
As clarified, the phrase attorneys x x x in the government service in Section 1 of Rule 139-B
does not include justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts who are not subject to
the disciplining authority of the IBP. All administrative cases against justices of appellate courts
and judges of lower courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
However, Rule 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys which is
administrative and not criminal in nature. The cases referred to in Circular No. 3-89 are
administrative cases for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys, including justices of
appellate courts and judges of the lower courts. The Court has vested the IBP with the power to
initiate and prosecute administrative cases against erring lawyers. [8] However, under Circular No.
3-89, the Court has directed the IBP to refer to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all
administrative cases filed with IBP against justices of appellate courts and judges of the lower
courts. As mandated by the Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive power to discipline
administratively justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts.
Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate
courts or judges of lower courts. Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of
offenses committed by justices of appellate courts[9] and judges of lower courts. This is clear
from the Circular directing the IBP, and not the trial courts, to refer all administrative cases filed
against justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts to the Supreme Court. The case
filed against Judge Hurtado is not an administrative case filed with the IBP. It is a criminal case
filed with the trial court under its jurisdiction as prescribed by law.
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the same time both a criminal act
and an administrative offense. Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates to an
act committed before or after he became a judge is of no moment. Neither is it material that an
MTC judge will be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case against an attorney
or judge is distinct and separate from an administrative case against him. The dismissal of the
criminal case does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative case arising from the same set
of facts. The quantum of evidence that is required in the latter is only preponderance of
evidence, and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in criminal cases.[10] As held
in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza:[11]
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant
evidence is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a
finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does not
necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial courts finding of civil
liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative
action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the
administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are
altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the
Courts ruling in In re Almacen, which we quote:
x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in
no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein.[They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x

A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. He must be conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled
doctrines. He should strive for excellence and seek the truth with passion.[12] Judge Sardido
failed in this regard. He erred in excluding Judge Hurtado as one of the accused in the Amended
Information and in forwarding the criminal case against Judge Hurtado to the Court.

One last point. This administrative case against Judge Sardido started before the
amendment[13] of Rule 140 classifying gross ignorance of the law a serious offense punishable
by a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. The amendment cannot apply
retroactively to Judge Sardidos case. However, the fine of P5,000.00 recommended by the OCA
is too light a penalty considering that this is not the first offense of Judge Sardido.

In RE: Hold Departure Order Issued by Judge Agustin T. Sardido,[14] the Court
reprimanded Judge Sardido for issuing a hold-departure order contrary to Circular No. 39-
97. In Cabilao v. Judge Sardido,[15] the Court fined Judge Sardido P5,000.00 for gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. The Court gave a stern
warning to Judge Sardido that a commission of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely. In Almeron v. Judge Sardido,[16] the Court imposed on Judge Sardido a stiffer fine
of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. He was again sternly warned that the commission
of the same or similar act in the future would be dealt with more severely including, if warranted,
his dismissal from the service.

In a more recent administrative case, Torcende v. Judge Sardido,[17] the Court found
Judge Sardido again guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of gross misconduct. This time the
Court dismissed Judge Sardido from the service with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits. The dismissal was with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations.

The records of the OCA further disclose that Judge Sardido has other similar
administrative complaints[18] still pending against him. Such an unflattering service record erodes
the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. It is the duty of every member of the bench to
avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.[19] The
Court may still impose a fine on Judge Sardido in the instant case despite his dismissal from the
service.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Agustin T. Sardido is FINED Ten Thousand Pesos

(P10,000.00) for gross ignorance of the law. The fine may be deducted from his accrued leave
credits.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151149. September 7, 2004]
GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR., LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS
GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear
from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the
Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds. Verily, the
dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
December 8, 2000 Decision[2] and the November 20, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-GR SP No. 57496. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right in applying for the
patent over the land in question, it appears that his action is already barred by laches because
he slept on his alleged right for almost 23 years from the time the original certificate of title has
been issued to respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was
certified as agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment of patents or titles
acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the petitioners action is deemed misplaced as he really
does not have any right to assert or protect. What he had during the time he requested for the
re-classification of the land was the privilege of applying for the patent over the same upon the
lands conversion from forest to agricultural.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost.[4]
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioner. It affirmed the RTCs dismissal of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the
grounds relied upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
The Antecedent Facts
The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:
On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with the District Office of
the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the re-classification of a piece of real
property known as Sombrero Island, located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of
approximately 18 hectares. Said property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C of
Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582.
Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, ordered the
inspection, investigation and survey of the land subject of the petitioners request for eventual
conversion or re-classification from forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for George Katon to
apply for a homestead patent.
Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator) undertook the investigation,
inspection and survey of the area in the presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon
(deceased) and his cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no
actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted
by petitioner and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to
the island from time to time to undertake development work, like planting of additional coconut
trees.
The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably endorsed by the
Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its main office in Manila for appropriate action. The
names of Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were
included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.
In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry R.J.L. Utleg informed the
Director of Lands, Manila, that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest purposes,
the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act.
Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had been classified from
forest land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his request and at his
instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then [l]and investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca Jr. and
Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On November 22, a second
endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer Diomedes De Guzman with specific
instruction to survey vacant portions of Sombrero Island for the respondents consisting of five (5)
hectares each. On December 10, 1965, Survey Authority No. R III-342-65 was issued
authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten (10) hectares
of Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23, 1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin
filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of
4.3 hectares.
Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo filed a homestead patent
application for a portion of the island comprising 8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that
[R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent
Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March
3, 1977[5] with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original certificates of title covering
certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in favor of respondents on the ground that the same
were obtained through fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his
favor.
On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he himself requested for the
reclassification of the island in dispute and that on or about the time of such request,
[R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and Gapilango already occupied their respective areas and
introduced numerous improvements. In addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any
homestead application for the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the
inspection and survey of the island.
According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the respondents insist that they already
had their respective occupancy and improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a
mere overseer of the petitioner because he said he was acting for himself in developing his own
area and not as anybodys caretaker.
Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions
and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have been faithfully paying
taxes thereon for twenty years.
Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as the island is
concerned because an action for reconveyance can only be brought by the owner and not a
mere homestead applicant and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to
assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and original certificates of
title issued in favor of the respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well
as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the
exclusive right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was he
who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural land. [6]
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and
Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to amend his Complaint so he could
thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango. The Motion
to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was denied by the trial
court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his
Petition for Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for Reconsideration
of the aforesaid Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the
merits. It held that while petitioner had caused the reclassification of SombreroIsland from forest
to agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence,
he never acquired title to that land.
The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the
reversion of the property to the State were matters between the latter and the homestead
grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the grant, the homesteaders right
thereto stands.
Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the
land in question, he was already barred by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23
years from the time Respondent Palancas title had been issued.
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the
merits of the case. It agreed with petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in
perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous
ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of
the CA Special Division of five members with two justices dissenting pursuant to its residual
prerogative under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined that petitioner clearly
had no standing to seek reconveyance of the disputed land, because he neither held title to it
nor even applied for a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State could sue for
cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for reversion of the land to the
public domain.
Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for reconveyance. First,
petitioners action was brought 24 years after the issuance of Palancas homestead patent. Under
the Public Land Act, such action should have been taken within ten years from the issuance of
the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from the submission (Annex F of the
Complaint) of petitioner himself that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six
hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal steps to assert his right to the
property. His action was filed beyond the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and
1137 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an issue not
raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition?
2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1,
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the
Petition?[8]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CAs ruling
on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its
December 8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 Resolution,
as follows:
Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed have lost its way and
been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming importance of the interests and issues
involved in the case below, the apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case,
and the volume of the conflicting, often confusing, submissions bearing on incidental matters.
We stand corrected.[9]
That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The CAs Resolution on this
point has rendered petitioners issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it
to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case
when the only issue that could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse
of discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction
of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, [10] more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
Second Issue:
Dismissal for Prescription
and Lack of Jurisdiction
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives under
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of
jurisdiction and prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the
trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection
of an appeal. It follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases
appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are
evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the court
shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin[11] we explained thus:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the court
clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during
trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with
the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio dismissal
would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and
expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the
amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new
rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of
action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is barred by a
prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.[12] (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court, as follows:
SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. A partys appeal by notice of appeal is deemed
perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court
may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow
withdrawal of the appeal. (Italics supplied)
The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the
records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal.[13] In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue
protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution
pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not have been based,
therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not
one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the
case on appeal. What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual
powers of the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1[14] of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it dismissed the
Complaint motu proprio on more fundamental grounds directly bearing on the lower courts lack
of jurisdiction[15] and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.[16]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.[17] In his Complaint for
Nullification of Applications for Homestead and Original Certificate of Title No. G-7089 and for
Reconveyance of Title,[18] petitioner averred:
2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner, Respondent] Manuel
Palanca Jr., [petitioners] cousin, in connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x
xfraudulently and in bad faith:
2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a pre-requisite to the filing of an application
for homestead patent in his name and that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully
aware that [Petitioner] KATON had previously applied or requested for re-classification and
certification of the same land from forest land to agricultural land which request was favorably
acted upon and approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and
misrepresentation;
xxxxxxxxx
2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was applying for the VACANT
PORTION of Sombrero Island where there was none, the same constituted another clear case
of fraud and misrepresentation;
3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of
[Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names
of [respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo[,] having been done
fraudulently and in bad faith, are ipso facto null and void and of no effect whatsoever.[19]
xxxxxxxxx
x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects with natural necessity arise
knowing from such act or omission, [Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation, first
degree cousins, trust, interdependence and intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x.[20]
Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1) nullifying the homestead
patent applications of Respondents Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well
as Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of Respondent Palanca;
and (2) ordering the director of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey
the Sombrero Island to petitioner.[21]
The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for declaration of nullity of
the free patent and certificate of title or, alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely
for reversion?
The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the trial
court could have exercised jurisdiction.
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must
contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned by the
plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2)
that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a
document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. [ 22] In these cases,
the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of the
Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the
issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.[23]
In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also respected as
incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title thereto is sought to be nullified on the
ground that it was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendants name. [24] As with an
annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to
recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the
defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.[25] Therefore, the defendant who
acquired the property through mistake or fraud is bound to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the
property or the title thereto.[26]
In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner allege that he had previously
held title to the land in question. On the contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was
public land,[27] that it had never been privately titled in his name, and that he had not applied for
a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land Act.[28]This Court has held that a complaint
by a private party who alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means, and
who consequently prays for its annulment, does not state a cause of action; hence, such
complaint must be dismissed. [29]
Neither can petitioners case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the Public Land Act
categorically declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such
an action.[30] A private person may not bring an action for reversion or any other action that
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with the result that the
land thereby covered would again form part of the public domain.[31]
Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed land will revert to the
public domain even if the title is canceled or amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper
party who may bring action is the government, to which the property will revert. [32] A mere
homestead applicant, not being the real party in interest, has no cause of action in a suit for
reconveyance.[33] As it is, vested rights over the land applied for under a homestead may be
validly claimed only by the applicant, after approval by the director of the Land Management
Bureau of the formers final proof of homestead patent. [34]
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only because of lack of
jurisdiction, but also because of the utter absence of a cause of action, [35] a defense raised by
respondents in their Answer.[36] Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court[37] ordains that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to
protect has no cause of action by which to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the
court.[38]
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title
or its reconveyance, the case should still be dismissed for being time-barred.[39] It is not disputed
that a homestead patent and an Original Certificate of Title was issued to Palanca on February
21, 1977,[40] while the Complaint was filed only on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought
way past ten years from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive period for
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.[41]
It must likewise be stressed that Palancas title -- which attained the status of indefeasibility
one year from the issuance of the patent and the Certificate of Title in February 1977 -- is no
longer open to review on the ground of actual fraud. Ybanez v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[42] ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent, is as indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding one
year from its issuance; provided, however, that the land covered by it is disposable public land,
as in this case.
In Aldovino v. Alunan,[43] the Court has held that when the plaintiffs own complaint shows
clearly that the action has prescribed, such action may be dismissed even if the defense of
prescription has not been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato,[44] we also explained
thus:
"x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-
barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v.
Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28,
1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1,f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground
as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on
the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the
defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings
(Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua
Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v.
Perez, 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse
of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record;
either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the
evidence."[45] (Italics supplied)
Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After all, if and when they
are able to do so, courts must endeavor to settle entire controversies before them to prevent
future litigations.[46]
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231
is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and
prescription. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES,[1] G.R. No. 147406
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
Respondent.
July 14, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? This
is the paramount issue raised in this petition for review of the February 28, 2001 Decision[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22697.
Pertinent are the following antecedent facts and proceedings:
On July 8, 1994, an information[3] for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against
the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 18.[4] The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.[5] Trial on the merits ensued and on August 19,
1998, the trial court convicted the petitioner as charged.[6] In his appeal before the CA, the
petitioner questioned, among others, for the first time, the trial courts jurisdiction. [7]
The appellate court, however, in the challenged decision, considered the petitioner to
have actively participated in the trial and to have belatedly attacked the jurisdiction of the RTC;
thus, he was already estopped by laches from asserting the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction. Finding no other ground to reverse the trial courts decision, the CA affirmed the
petitioners conviction but modified the penalty imposed and the damages awarded. [8]
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the
following issues for our resolution:
a. Does the fact that the petitioner failed to raise the issue of
jurisdiction during the trial of this case, which was initiated and filed by the
public prosecutor before the wrong court, constitute laches in relation to the
doctrine laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, notwithstanding the fact that
said issue was immediately raised in petitioners appeal to the Honorable
Court of Appeals? Conversely, does the active participation of the petitioner
in the trial of his case, which is initiated and filed not by him but by the public
prosecutor, amount to estoppel?
b. Does the admission of the petitioner that it is difficult
to immediately stop a bus while it is running at 40 kilometers per hour for
the purpose of avoiding a person who unexpectedly crossed the road,
constitute enough incriminating evidence to warrant his conviction for the
crime charged?
c. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in considering the
place of accident as falling within Item 4 of Section 35 (b) of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, and subsequently ruling that the speed
limit thereto is only 20 kilometers per hour, when no evidence whatsoever to
that effect was ever presented by the prosecution during the trial of this
case?
d. Is the Honorable Court of Appeals justified in convicting the
petitioner for homicide through reckless imprudence (the legally correct
designation is reckless imprudence resulting to homicide) with violation of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when the prosecution did not
prove this during the trial and, more importantly, the information filed against
the petitioner does not contain an allegation to that effect?
e. Does the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witness
Leonardo Hernal that the victim unexpectedly crossed the road resulting in
him getting hit by the bus driven by the petitioner not enough evidence to
acquit him of the crime charged?[9]
Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide
a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such
statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[10] In this case, at the time the criminal
information for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile Law
(now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129[11] had already been amended by Republic Act No. 7691.[12] The said
provision thus reads:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases.Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided,
however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
[13]
years, jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 2235-M-94.
 While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they
nevertheless are of the position that the principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded
the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTCthe trial went on for 4 years with the
petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional
infirmity. The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the
subject matter may be raised at any time even for the first time on appeal. As undue delay is
further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable.
To settle once and for all this problem of jurisdiction vis--vis estoppel by laches, which
continuously confounds the bench and the bar, we shall analyze the various Court decisions on
the matter.
As early as 1901, this Court has declared that unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some
legislative act, no court or tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.[14] We went on to state
in U.S. v. De La Santa[15] that:
It has been frequently held that a lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter
is fatal, and subject to objection at any stage of the proceedings, either in
the court below or on appeal (Ency. of Pl. & Pr., vol. 12, p. 189, and large
array of cases there cited), and indeed, where the subject-matter is not
within the jurisdiction, the court may dismiss the proceeding ex mero
motu. (4 Ill., 133; 190 Ind., 79; Chipman vs. Waterbury, 59 Conn., 496.)
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; it is given
only by law and in the manner prescribed by law and an objection based on
the lack of such jurisdiction can not be waived by the parties. x x x[16]
Later, in People v. Casiano,[17] the Court explained:
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question
of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court
actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case
was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the
parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for
the same must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by
consent of the parties or by estoppel (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if
the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon
a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the
party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal,
to assume an inconsistent positionthat the lower court had jurisdiction.
Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties,
has no bearing thereon. Thus, Corpus Juris Secundum says:
Where accused has secured a decision that
the indictment is void, or has been granted an
instruction based on its defective character directing the
jury to acquit, he is estopped, when subsequently
indicted, to assert that the former indictment was
valid. In such case, there may be a new prosecution
whether the indictment in the former prosecution was
good or bad. Similarly, where, after the jury was
impaneled and sworn, the court on accused's motion
quashed the information on the erroneous assumption
that the court had no jurisdiction, accused cannot
successfully plead former jeopardy to a new
information. x x x (22 C.J.S., sec. 252, pp. 388-389;
italics ours.)
Where accused procured a prior conviction to
be set aside on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction, he is estopped subsequently to
assert, in support of a defense of previous jeopardy,
that such court had jurisdiction. (22 C.J.S. p. 378.)[18]
But in Pindagan Agricultural Co., Inc. v. Dans,[19] the Court, in not sustaining the plea of lack of
jurisdiction by the plaintiff-appellee therein, made the following observations:
It is surprising why it is only now, after the decision has been
rendered, that the plaintiff-appellee presents the question of this Courts
jurisdiction over the case. Republic Act No. 2613 was enacted on August 1,
1959. This case was argued on January 29, 1960. Notwithstanding this
fact, the jurisdiction of this Court was never impugned until the adverse
decision of this Court was handed down. The conduct of counsel leads us
to believe that they must have always been of the belief that
notwithstanding said enactment of Republic Act 2613 this Court has
jurisdiction of the case, such conduct being born out of a conviction that the
actual real value of the properties in question actually exceeds the
jurisdictional amount of this Court (over P200,000). Our minute resolution
in G.R. No. L-10096, Hyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaa de Seguros, et
al., of March 23, 1956, a parallel case, is applicable to the conduct of
plaintiff-appellee in this case, thus:
x x x that an appellant who files his brief and submits
his case to the Court of Appeals for decision, without
questioning the latters jurisdiction until decision is
rendered therein, should be considered as having
voluntarily waived so much of his claim as would
exceed the jurisdiction of said Appellate Court; for the
reason that a contrary rule would encourage the
undesirable practice of appellants submitting their
cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in
expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of
attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be
unfavorable: x x x[20]
Then came our ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy[21] that a party may be barred by laches from
invoking lack of jurisdiction at a late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in the
case with the active participation of said party invoking the plea. We expounded, thus:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel
by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not
 a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
cannot be toleratedobviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-
Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S.Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs.
McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess,
16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in
the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra)to the effect
that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case
for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverseas well as in Pindagan etc.
vs. Dans et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano et al. vs.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union
etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26,
1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948,
it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo, as well
as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not
only patent but revolting.[22]
For quite a time since we made this pronouncement in Sibonghanoy, courts and tribunals, in
resolving issues that involve the belated invocation of lack of jurisdiction, have applied the
principle of estoppel by laches. Thus, in Calimlim v. Ramirez,[23] we pointed out
that Sibonghanoy was developing into a general rule rather than the exception:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court
over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of
a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.
This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is
to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from
the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been
ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that
rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but
rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored
principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court
that rendered the questioned ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by
laches. It was ruled that the lack of jurisdiction having been raised for the
first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years after the
questioned ruling had been rendered, such a plea may no longer be raised
for being barred by laches. As defined in said case, laches is failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.[24]
In Calimlim, despite the fact that the one who benefited from the plea of lack of jurisdiction was
the one who invoked the courts jurisdiction, and who later obtained an adverse judgment therein,
we refused to apply the ruling in Sibonghanoy. The Court accorded supremacy to the time-
honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Yet, in subsequent cases decided after Calimlim, which by sheer volume are too plentiful to
mention, the Sibonghanoy doctrine, as foretold in Calimlim, became the rule rather than the
exception. As such, in Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc.,[25] the Court ruled:
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, this rule
presupposes that estoppel has not supervened. In the instant case,
respondent actively participated in all stages of the proceedings before the
trial court and invoked its authority by asking for an affirmative
relief. Clearly, respondent is estopped from challenging the trial courts
jurisdiction, especially when an adverse judgment has been
rendered. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, we held:
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question at all
the jurisdiction of the lower court x x x in its answers to
both the amended complaint and the second amended
complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the lower court after it had received
an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco
North Express, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.
105180, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 477,
491), participation in all stages of the case before the
trial court, that included invoking its authority in asking
for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by
estoppel from challenging the courts jurisdiction.
Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second
amended complaint on April 16, 1985, petitioner did not
question the lower courts jurisdiction. It was only
on December 29, 1989 when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the lower courts decision that
petitioner raised the question of the lower courts lack of
 jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise
the issue of jurisdiction by its own inaction. (italics ours)
Similarly, in the subsequent case of Sta. Lucia Realty and Development,
Inc. vs. Cabrigas, we ruled:
In the case at bar, it was found by the trial
court in its 30 September 1996 decision in LCR Case
No. Q-60161(93) that private respondents (who filed the
petition for reconstitution of titles) failed to comply with
both sections 12 and 13 of RA 26 and therefore, it had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case.However, private respondents never questioned
the trial courts jurisdiction over its petition for
reconstitution throughout the duration of LCR Case No.
Q-60161(93). On the contrary, private respondents
actively participated in the reconstitution proceedings
by filing pleadings and presenting its evidence. They
invoked the trial courts jurisdiction in order to obtain
affirmative relief the reconstitution of their titles. Private
respondents have thus foreclosed their right to raise the
issue of jurisdiction by their own actions.
The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine
that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a
litigants participation in all stages of the case before the
trial court, including the invocation of its authority in
asking for affirmative relief, bars such party from
challenging the courts jurisdiction (PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA
402 [1998]). A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent
and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Asset
Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 579
[1998]; Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299
SCRA 442 [1998]). The Court frowns upon the
undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting his case for decision and
then accepting judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse (Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. NLRC,
298 SCRA 517 [1998], citing Ilocos Sur Electric
Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA 36 [1995]).
(italics ours)[26]
Noteworthy, however, is that, in the 2005 case of Metromedia Times Corporation v.
Pastorin,[27] where the issue of lack of jurisdiction was raised only in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) on appeal, we stated, after examining the doctrines of jurisdiction vis--
vis estoppel, that the ruling in Sibonghanoystands as an exception, rather than the general
rule. Metromedia, thus, was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
before the NLRC on appeal.[28]
Later, in Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip,[29] the Court clarified that:
Petitioner argues that the CAs affirmation of the trial courts dismissal of its
case was erroneous, considering that a full-blown trial had already been
conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer be
used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.
The above argument is anchored on estoppel by laches, which
has been used quite successfully in a number of cases to thwart dismissals
based on lack of jurisdiction. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, in which this doctrine
was espoused, held that a party may be barred from questioning a courts
jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its
opponent. In fine, laches prevents the issue of lack of jurisdiction from
being raised for the first time on appeal by a litigant whose purpose is to
annul everything done in a trial in which it has actively participated.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The ruling in Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the
exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar
the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is
analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should
be clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so
belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
had abandoned or declined to assert it. That Sibonghanoy applies only to
exceptional circumstances is clarified in Calimlim v. Ramirez, which we
quote:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The
lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualified by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case
of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been applied to situations
which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved
in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the
supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception,
but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a courts lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.
Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not
by the defenses contained in the answer.[30]
Also, in Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral,[31] even if the pleader of lack of jurisdiction actively took
part in the trial proceedings by presenting a witness to seek exoneration, the Court, reiterating
the doctrine in Calimlim, said:
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be
waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however,
is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar
circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party
invoking lack of jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage
when the proceedings had already been elevated to the
CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of
laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined
to assert it.[32]
And in the more recent Regalado v. Go,[33] the Court again emphasized
that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to be applicable, thus:
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark
doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction
by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be
invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the
factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such
controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for
the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after
the questioned ruling had been rendered. At several stages of the
proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the
Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only when
the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally
woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not
present in the case at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the
Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of contempt, promptly filed a
Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said courts jurisdiction based on
procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate
courts directive to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt
and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could not be considered as
an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case
within the milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the
mandate of the court that could lead to dire consequences that impelled her
to comply.[34]
The Court, thus, wavered on when to apply the exceptional circumstance
in Sibonghanoy and on when to apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La
Santa and expounded at length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has
always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from
asserting the courts absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar
to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke
unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction
over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of
the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any
harm.[35]
Applying the said doctrine to the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal
before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to
attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of estoppel by
laches unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce
them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that
he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence,
change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.[36] In applying the principle of estoppel
by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the Court therein considered the patent and
revolting inequity and unfairness of having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more
after more or less 15 years.[37] The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
We note at this point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is
to be applied rarelyonly from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine
must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.[38] When misapplied,
the doctrine of estoppel may be a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of
injustice.[39] Moreover, a judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is
void.[40] Hence, the Revised Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments
rendered by courts or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will
even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.[41] As we have stated
in Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,[42]
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-
judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of
a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and
the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature
and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law,
and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise
would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the
action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of
the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over the cause of action. x x x
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by
the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his
answer or motion to dismiss. Jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the
nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. x x x
x The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its
decision, are null and void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral
attacks.[43]
With the above considerations, we find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised in the
petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review

on certiorari is GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice.

SO ORDERED.