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1. Sema v. Comelec (G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008)

DECISION
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J.:

- versus -
The Case
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
Respondents. These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10
x------------------------x May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City
as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628
Petitioner, The Facts
Present:

PUNO, C.J., The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative
QUISUMBING, districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists
YNARES-SANTIAGO, of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the
CARPIO, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054
CORONA, (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
CARPIO MORALES, Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region
- versus - AZCUNA, XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in
TINGA, November 1989.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
NACHURA, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
REYES, 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
BRION, JJ. municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a
Respondent. July 16, 2008 distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
x--------------------------------------------------x
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xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the
appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority
of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao
shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will
choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position
in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall
have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for
the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office
until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local
elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they
are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment
of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be
no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district,
which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine
municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of
municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the
municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite
held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato
City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-
0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part
of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the
COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February
2007,[7] provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending
the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District
of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC
promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that
Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City
because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district
in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections
for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the
nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from
canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended
that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902
which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district
despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating
Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first
legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No.
7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that
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(1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise
of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ
of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of
respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as
representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of
candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking
election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City.
Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely
renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further
claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first
legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power
to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention
that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative
district within a city.[13]
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in
respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted
ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R.
No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the
ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled
to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties
submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a)
the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither
by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment;
(b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment
of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly
created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its
earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902
and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following
grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account
the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article
IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact
measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the
apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of
Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the
ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate
representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional
Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section
461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than
250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral
arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province
created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in
G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the
oral arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19,
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Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following
positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a)
as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create
provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the
autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over other
matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA
7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
prescribe standards lower than those mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of
provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.[18] Thus,
Sema proposed that Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the
Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with
the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces
was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards
lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of
provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent
Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted
in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended
that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it
contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b)
the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new
province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the
positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September
2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this
issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral
arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February
2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597.
The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC
acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of
Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its
Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG,
maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary
measure pending the enactment by Congress of the appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to
test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No.
177597.
(B) On the merits
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of
a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
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II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of
Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21]
On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution
No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23] Nor is
there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from
canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify the
outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also
prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized
this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and
regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation
as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City mooted this petition. This case does not concern
respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity
of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act
201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this
petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato
City for representative of the district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with
Cotabato City will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this
incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution
of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not
only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding
elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
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approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation
of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision
of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no
conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to
create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite
requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the
Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces,
cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not
one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional
legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the
delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the
Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays,
provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the
House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it
will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with
a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of
250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power
to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches
250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must
also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.
The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power
to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and
to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
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and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises
these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law
that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of
the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts
of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.
In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is
traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and
thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and
any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law.
Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or
local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a
superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive
authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and
the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions
shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous
regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for
Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM
Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power
x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since
the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating
to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative
is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a
legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next national
elections from the effectivity of the law.[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a
national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives,
is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body
like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its
legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district
representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant
is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
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legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only
create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national
office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow
its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This
violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the
coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan,
recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district,
which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis
supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district
because the Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least one
representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without
a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants
and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article
VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province
out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose
population has so increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment
shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
(Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan,
created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the
House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for
her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into
existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise
nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695
(RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and
Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and
new provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts
without the apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in
the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one
hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several
provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective
inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress
shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every
enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been
made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members
as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the
qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative
district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a)
indirectly, through the creation of a province for each province shall have at
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least one member in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of
several representative districts within a province. The requirements
concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory
thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts,
and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first
method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision
above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded
to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province
is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into
existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise
nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other
conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the
consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative
districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation
under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or
subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional
representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned
requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly
created legislative districts indirectly through a special law enacted by
Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will
not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided
under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case
because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted
by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional
law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress
does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative
districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be
created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a
legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the
Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one representative
in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional
principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to
Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress,
from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province
such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In
short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district
by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create,
or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to
Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato
City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census
taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City
alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that [E]ach city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least
one representative.
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence
of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054,
the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the
ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160,
namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous
territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34] The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior
legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of
250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on
one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated
because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement
in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a
population of at least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the
House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous
creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
PUBCORP 2
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No.
177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and
pack Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]
Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x
provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new
representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing
to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new
provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000)
[population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to
Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one
thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a
national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in
Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054,
envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would
wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the
power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by
Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional
Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative
districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the
Constitution which states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member,
refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The
reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of
the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide.
Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district
representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of
Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total
membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available
in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This
leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219
incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to
increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before
Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that
the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws,
x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the
ARMM Government is established within the framework of the Constitution.
This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the
ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the
PUBCORP 2

national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that
necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not
pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays
that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160,
as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation
of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of
legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate
case.
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and
cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants 2. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec (GR No. 176951, 18
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is November 2008; 21 December 2009; 24 August 2010; and 15
void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of February 2011)
the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
G.R. No. 176951 November 18, 2008
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the
creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the
National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal
district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a
vs.
law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE
Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU;
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
appended to the Constitution.
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
PUBCORP 2
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP
National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal
capacity as taxpayer, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE
OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and
MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP
National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal
capacity as taxpayer, petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR,
PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF
BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF
PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
The Facts
During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24
other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009
(RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into
PUBCORP 2
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th
Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President's signature.11
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion
of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well
as for violation of the equal protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament that
the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.13
The Issues
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution;
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and
are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present
case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took
effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria
for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code,
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear,
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never
written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
PUBCORP 2
Preliminary Matters
Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws
administered by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws.
Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because
Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the "primary
purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city
government administration and securing, through proper and legal means,
solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities,
have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced
if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has
legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has
sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the
release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law
allows.
Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This
law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which
now provides:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of
the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement.
Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood
bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the
enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the
11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in
RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during
the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th
Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the
unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December
of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood
bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the
income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
PUBCORP 2
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into
law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.
Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of
RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th
Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills
which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke
the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application
because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied
retroactively but prospectively.
Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow
the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires
Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary
for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city.
Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the
creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern
such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation
of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the
income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city.
This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local
Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city
must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption
from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity
of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased
income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government
Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national
taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis
supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal,
should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual
income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and
income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be
strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in
determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since
the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the
PUBCORP 2
Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,
Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the
language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the
intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four
corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts
simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of
the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20
Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were
then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption
whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any
municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income
requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.
The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code
True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities
from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the
11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into
law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but
Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities
because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to
Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the
criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption
from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress
cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law.
In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply
with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.
Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general
law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or
controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization,
or regulation" of private corporations in a general law applicable to all without
discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a
special law or charter.
Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable
Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed
during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment
of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the
11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot
be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent
Congresses.
The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills
filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that
Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next
Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006
during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going
through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing
to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on
Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one
(1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented
for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
PUBCORP 2
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on
Unfinished Business, states:
Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of
the following:
a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the
time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is
disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed
at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment has taken
place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are
deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood
bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the
unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have
no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws
passed by subsequent Congresses.
Applicability of Equal Protection Clause
If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009,
contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the
criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the
equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the
Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid
classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is
contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such
exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption
would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009
The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed
under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted
municipalities from those that are not exempted.
Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100
million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the
equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that
the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA
9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and
those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.
To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial
distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the
purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to
all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose
of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th
Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.
Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even
have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending
cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a
cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of
the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting
into cities.
PUBCORP 2

their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all other
Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.
a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for
exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly,
income is less than P100 million. as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were
written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009.
That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL
that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393,
requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date
to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. SO ORDERED.
In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
3. Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. 180050, 10 February 2010 and Resolution
We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may dated 12 April 2011; Min. Res., GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Executive
be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently Secretary Ermita, September 11, 2012
engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and
licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the
RENE O. MEDINA,
profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in
Petitioners,
practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding
slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments.
- versus -
The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a
regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the President
the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in
of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry
PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE
after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any
SPEAKER; GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the
relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will
mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO
discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in
VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands,
the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to
Respondents,
conjure up possible situations which might justify the discrimination. The
classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T. MATUGAS,
protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M.
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16
LONGOS, and HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL,
municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of
PUBCORP 2

Intervenors.
To provide a clear perspective of the instant motion, we present hereunder a
brief background of the relevant antecedents

On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic
G.R. No. 180050 Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).[2] On
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the
Present: mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under
CORONA, C.J., the Local Government Code (LGC).[3] The plebiscite yielded 69,943
CARPIO, affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.[4] With the approval of the people
CARPIO MORALES, from both the mother province of Surigao del
VELASCO, JR., Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed
NACHURA, the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the
BRION, Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office
PERALTA, on July 1, 2007.[5]
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and
ABAD, Rene O. Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this
VILLARAMA, JR., Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the
PEREZ, constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.[6] The Court dismissed the petition on
MENDOZA, and technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.[7]
SERENO, JJ.
Undaunted, petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao
Promulgated: del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari[8] seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355
for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new
April 12, 2011 province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of the
provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from
the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land
RESOLUTION area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing
to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of
NACHURA, J.: the LGC, on both counts, viz.

Constitution, Article X Local Government

For consideration of the Court is the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment
dated October 20, 2010 filed by Movant-Intervenors[1] dated and filed on Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
October 29, 2010, praying that the Court (a) recall the entry of judgment, and divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
(b) resolve their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution. accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
PUBCORP 2
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has
an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not
less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its Decision[9] granting the
petition.[10] The Decision declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure
to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of
a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of
Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise
declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, [t]he land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC,
inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.[11]
The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat
filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its
Resolution[12] dated May 12, 2010,[13] the Court denied the said motions.[14]
Unperturbed, the Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for
leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration, accompanied
by their second motions for reconsideration. These motions were eventually
noted without action by this Court in its June 29, 2010 Resolution.[15]
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave
to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8790, relevant to this case, which provides
RESOLUTION NO. 8790
WHEREAS, Dinagat Islands, consisting of seven (7) municipalities, were
previously components of the First Legislative District of the Province of
Surigao del Norte. In December 2006 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9355, the
Province of Dinagat Island[s] was created and its creation was ratified on 02
December 2006 in the Plebiscite for this purpose;
WHEREAS, as a province, Dinagat Islands was, for purposes of the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections, allocated one (1) seat for Governor, one
(1) seat for Vice Governor, one (1) for congressional seat, and ten (10)
Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats pursuant to Resolution No. 8670 dated 16
September 2009;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 180050 entitled Rodolfo Navarro,
et al., vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, as representative of the
President of the Philippines, et al. rendered a Decision, dated 10 February
2010, declaring Republic Act No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply
with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the
Local Government Code in relation to Sec. 10, Art. X, of the 1987 Constitution;
PUBCORP 2
WHEREAS, respondents intend to file Motion[s] for Reconsideration on the
above decision of the Supreme Court;
WHEREAS, the electoral data relative to the: (1) position for Member, House
of Representatives representing the lone congressional district of Dinagat
Islands, (2) names of the candidates for the aforementioned position, (3)
position for Governor, Dinagat Islands, (4) names of the candidates for the said
position, (5) position of the Vice Governor, (6) the names of the candidates for
the said position, (7) positions for the ten (10) Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Members and, [8] all the names of the candidates for Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members, have already been configured into the system and
can no longer be revised within the remaining period before the elections on
May 10, 2010.
NOW, THEREFORE, with the current system configuration, and depending on
whether the Decision of the Supreme Court in Navarro vs. Ermita is
reconsidered or not, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
to declare that:
a. If the Decision is reversed, there will be no problem since the current
system configuration is in line with the reconsidered Decision, meaning that
the Province of Dinagat Islands and the Province of Surigao del Norte remain
as two (2) separate provinces;
b. If the Decision becomes final and executory before the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District, Surigao del Norte.
But because of the current system configuration, the ballots for the Province
of Dinagat Islands will, for the positions of Member, House of Representatives,
Governor, Vice Governor and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, bear
only the names of the candidates for the said positions.
Conversely, the ballots for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte,
will, for the position of Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of
Representatives, First District of Surigao del Norte and Members,
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, show only candidates for the said position.
Likewise, the whole Province of Surigao del Norte, will, for the position of
Governor and Vice Governor, bear only the names of the candidates for the
said position[s].
Consequently, the voters of the Province of Dinagat Islands will not be able to
vote for the candidates of Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and Member,
House [of] Representatives, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and
candidates for Governor and Vice Governor for Surigao del Norte. Meanwhile,
voters of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, will not be able to
vote for Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Member, House of
Representatives, Dinagat Islands. Also, the voters of the whole Province of
Surigao del Norte, will not be able to vote for the Governor and Vice Governor,
Dinagat Islands. Given this situation, the Commission will postpone the
elections for Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives,
First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First Legislative District, Surigao del Norte, because the election
will result in [a] failure to elect, since, in actuality, there are no candidates for
Governor, Vice Governor, Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First
Legislative District, and Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative
District (with Dinagat Islands) of Surigao del Norte.
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to
be nullified for the same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for
Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have
to be conducted.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
They further alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao
del Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election
results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have
a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the
declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors
PUBCORP 2
election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat
Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District
of Surigao del Norte and a special election will have to be conducted for
governor, vice governor, and House of Representatives member and
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District of Surigao
del Norte. Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants
representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and strong
interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of Dinagat as
part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will affect the latter
province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of the province will have
to be restructured; (2) the services of many employees will have to be
terminated; (3) contracts will have to be invalidated; and (4) projects and other
developments will have to be discontinued. In addition, they claim that their
rights cannot be adequately pursued and protected in any other proceeding
since their rights would be foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would
attain finality.
In their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, movants-
intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act
of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from
territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more
islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the
instant case.
In the Resolution dated July 20, 2010,[16] the Court denied the Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was
before and not after the resolution of this case.
On September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution, citing several rulings[17] of
the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of
judgment. They alleged that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal
interest in this case was not yet existent. They averred that prior to the May
10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case. Even
for the sake of argument that they had notice of the pendency of the case, they
pointed out that prior to the said elections, Sol T. Matugas was a simple
resident of Surigao del Norte, Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr. was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Second District of Surigao del Norte, and
Mamerto D. Galanida was the Municipal Mayor of Socorro, Surigao del Norte,
and that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it was only after they
were elected as Governor of Surigao del Norte, Vice Governor of Surigao del
Norte and Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member of the First District of Surigao
del Norte, respectively, that they became possessed with legal interest in this
controversy.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating
that the decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
Hence, the above motion.
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the
instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not
on the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties, and neither
on Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion, which our
esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagats third
motion for reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for leave to admit their
respective motions for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the
aforesaid motions for reconsideration were already noted without action by the
Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagats Urgent Omnibus Motion differently.
In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-
intervenors could not be considered as a second motion for reconsideration to
warrant the application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court.[18] It should be noted that this motion prays for the recall of
the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration
of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. The denial of their
motion for leave to intervene and to admit motion for reconsideration of the
May 12, 2010 Resolution did not rule on the merits of the motion for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution, but only on the timeliness of
the intended intervention. Their motion for reconsideration of this denial
elaborated on movants-intervenors interest in this case which existed only
after judgment had been rendered. As such, their motion for intervention and
PUBCORP 2
their motion for reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution merely stand
as an initial reconsideration of the said resolution.
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records
to support the claim that this was a ploy of respondents legal tactician to
reopen the case despite an entry of judgment. To be sure, it is actually
COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into motion anew. To
reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the
Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to
be nullified for the same reasons given in Item b above. A special election for
Governor, Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First
Legislative District of Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands) will have
to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned the peculiar circumstance
of proper party interest for movants-intervenors only with the specter of the
decision in the main case becoming final and executory. More importantly, if
the intervention be not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be left with
no other remedy as regards to the impending nullification of their election to
their respective positions. Thus, to the Courts mind, there is an imperative to
grant the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the
petition for certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-
intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. While it may be
argued that their interest in this case should have commenced upon the
issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest in
this case then was more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC
Resolution No. 8790 provides that should the decision in this case attain finality
prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the election of the local government
officials stated therein would only have to be postponed. Given such a
scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse
effect with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte
since they would simply have remained candidates for the respective positions
they have vied for and to which they have been elected.
For a party to have locus standi, one must allege such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Because constitutional
cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other
persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this interest in the
constitutional question raised.[19]
It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the
event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29, 2010
is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit
Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010
is denied with finality. Indeed, they have sufficiently shown that they have a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010
Resolution be not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions
during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified
and be put to naught. Given their unique circumstances, movants-intervenors
should not be left without any remedy before this Court simply because their
interest in this case became manifest only after the case had already been
decided. The consequences of such a decision would definitely work to their
disadvantage, nay, to their utmost prejudice, without even them being parties
to the dispute. Such decision would also violate their right to due process, a
right that cries out for protection. Thus, it is imperative that the movants-
intervenors be heard on the merits of their cause. We are not only a court of
law, but also of justice and equity, such that our position and the dire
repercussions of this controversy should be weighed on the scales of justice,
rather than dismissed on account of mootness.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised
requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.[20] The
second exception attends this case.
PUBCORP 2
This Court had taken a liberal attitude in the case of David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,[21] where technicalities of procedure on locus standi were brushed
aside, because the constitutional issues raised were of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court.
Along parallel lines, the motion for intervention should be given due course
since movants-intervenors have shown their substantial legal interest in the
outcome of this case, even much more than petitioners themselves, and
because of the novelty, gravity, and weight of the issues involved.
Undeniably, the motion for intervention and the motion for reconsideration of
the May 12, 2010 Resolution of movants-intervenors is akin to the right to
appeal the judgment of a case, which, though merely a statutory right that must
comply with the requirements of the rules, is an essential part of our judicial
system, such that courts should proceed with caution not to deprive a party of
the right to question the judgment and its effects, and ensure that every party-
litigant, including those who would be directly affected, would have the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of their cause, freed from the
constraints of technicalities.[22]
Verily, the Court had, on several occasions, sanctioned the recall entries of
judgment in light of attendant extraordinary circumstances.[23] The power to
suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared
final.[24] In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-
intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the
judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to
arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to
the creation of local government units. In this manner, the thrust of the
Constitution with respect to local autonomy and of the LGC with respect to
decentralization and the attainment of national goals, as hereafter elucidated,
will effectively be realized.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look,
the Court finds that the first and second arguments raised by movants-
intervenors deserve affirmative consideration.
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation
of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed
by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to
accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has
debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis
on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the
framers of the LGC. In this connection, the following excerpts from
congressional debates are quoted hereunder
HON. ALFELOR. Income is mandatory. We can even have this doubled
because we thought
CHAIRMAN CUENCO. In other words, the primordial consideration here is the
economic viability of the new local government unit, the new province?
xxxx
HON. LAGUDA. The reason why we are willing to increase the income, double
than the House version, because we also believe that economic viability is
really a minimum. Land area and population are functions really of the viability
of the area, because you have an income level which would be the trigger point
for economic development, population will naturally increase because there
will be an immigration. However, if you disallow the particular area from being
converted into a province because of the population problems in the beginning,
it will never be able to reach the point where it could become a province simply
because it will never have the economic take off for it to trigger off that
economic development.
Now, were saying that maybe Fourteen Million Pesos is a floor area where it
could pay for overhead and provide a minimum of basic services to the
population. Over and above that, the provincial officials should be able to
trigger off economic development which will attract immigration, which will
attract new investments from the private sector. This is now the concern of the
local officials. But if we are going to tie the hands of the proponents, simply by
telling them, Sorry, you are now at 150 thousand or 200 thousand, you will
never be able to become a province because nobody wants to go to your place.
Why? Because you never have any reason for economic viability.
PUBCORP 2
xxxx
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, what about land area?
HON. LUMAUIG. 1,500 square kilometers
HON. ANGARA. Walang problema yon, in fact thats not very critical, yong land
area because
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay, ya, our, the Senate version is 3.5, 3,500
square meters, ah, square kilometers.
HON. LAGUDA. Ne, Ne. A province is constituted for the purpose of
administrative efficiency and delivery of basic services.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Right.
HON. LAGUDA. Actually, when you come down to it, when government was
instituted, there is only one central government and then everybody falls under
that. But it was later on subdivided into provinces for purposes of
administrative efficiency.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Okay.
HON. LAGUDA. Now, what were seeing now is that the administrative
efficiency is no longer there precisely because the land areas that we are
giving to our governors is so wide that no one man can possibly administer all
of the complex machineries that are needed.
Secondly, when you say delivery of basic services, as pointed out by Cong.
Alfelor, there are sections of the province which have never been visited by
public officials, precisely because they dont have the time nor the energy
anymore to do that because its so wide. Now, by compressing the land area
and by reducing the population requirement, we are, in effect, trying to follow
the basic policy of why we are creating provinces, which is to deliver basic
services and to make it more efficient in administration.
CHAIRMAN PIMENTEL. Yeah, thats correct, but on the assumption that the
province is able to do it without being a burden to the national government.
Thats the assumption.
HON. LAGUDA. Thats why were going into the minimum income level. As we
said, if we go on a minimum income level, then we say, this is the trigger point
at which this administration can take place.[25]
Also worthy of note are the requisites in the creation of a barangay, a
municipality, a city, and a province as provided both in the LGC and the LGC-
IRR, viz.
For a Barangay:
LGC: SEC. 386. Requisites for Creation. (a) A barangay may be created out
of a contiguous territory which has a population of at least two thousand
(2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities
and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political
subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a
certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That
the creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the original barangay or
barangays to less than the minimum requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous cultural
communities, barangays may be created in such communities by an Act of
Congress, notwithstanding the above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation plan for
barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this Section, within his territorial
jurisdiction. The plan shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or
sangguniang panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, the barangay consolidation plan can be prepared and
approved by the sangguniang bayan concerned.
PUBCORP 2
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 14. Barangays. (a) Creation of barangays by the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall require prior recommendation of the
sangguniang bayan.
(b) New barangays in the municipalities within MMA shall be created only by
Act of Congress, subject to the limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Article.
(c) Notwithstanding the population requirement, a barangay may be created in
the indigenous cultural communities by Act of Congress upon recommendation
of the LGU or LGUs where the cultural community is located.
(d) A barangay shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(1) Population which shall not be less than two thousand (2,000) inhabitants,
except in municipalities and cities within MMA and other metropolitan political
subdivisions as may be created by law, or in highly-urbanized cities where
such territory shall have a population of at least five thousand (5,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the NSO. The creation of a barangay shall not
reduce the population of the original barangay or barangays to less than the
prescribed minimum/
(2) Land Area which must be contiguous, unless comprised by two (2) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a barangay sought to be created
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries.
Municipality:
LGC: SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality may be created if
it has an average annual income, as certified by the provincial treasurer, or at
least Two million five hundred thousand pesos (P2,500,000.00) for the last two
(2) consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; a population of at
least twenty-five thousand (25,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office; and a contiguous territory of at least fifty (50) square
kilometers as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau: Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the
land area, population or income of the original municipality or municipalities at
the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply
where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more
islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund of the municipality concerned, exclusive of special funds,
transfers and non-recurring income.
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of effectivity of this Code shall continue
to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant
to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective
set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of
this Code shall henceforth be considered regular municipalities.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. (a) Requisites for Creation A
municipality shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
(i) Income An average annual income of not less than Two Million
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately
preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the provincial treasurer. The average annual income shall include
the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special
accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
(ii) Population which shall not be less than twenty five thousand
(25,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and
(iii) Land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty
(50) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land
area shall not apply where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1)
or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
PUBCORP 2
The creation of a new municipality shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less
than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the
creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
City:
LGC: SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisities:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the
creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be
created unless the following requisites on income and either population or land
area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land
area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100)
square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than
the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation
shall be borne by the petitioners.
Provinces:
LGC: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it
has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 prices
and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the
income of the province.
PUBCORP 2
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces. (a) Requisites for creation A province shall
not be created unless the following requisites on income and either population
or land area are present:
(1) Income An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, special accounts, transfers, and non-recurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area
which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than
the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation
shall be borne by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to
the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability.
However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and
provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created
consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement
as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local
government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to
cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created
province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that
the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption
was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was
intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and
to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to
uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic policy
considerations underpinning the principle of local autonomy.
Section 2 of the LGC, of which paragraph (a) is pertinent to this case, provides
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine
and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The
process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the
local government units.
This declaration of policy is echoed in Article 3(a) of the LGC-IRR[26] and in
the Whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 270,[27] which read
WHEREAS, Section 25, Article II of the Constitution mandates that the State
shall ensure the autonomy of local governments;
PUBCORP 2
WHEREAS, pursuant to this declared policy, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, affirms, among others, that the
territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals;
WHEREAS, Section 533 of the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the
President to convene an Oversight Committee for the purpose of formulating
and issuing the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient
and effective implementation of all the provisions of the said Code; and
WHEREAS, the Oversight Committee, after due deliberations and
consultations with all the concerned sectors of society and consideration of the
operative principles of local autonomy as provided in the Local Government
Code of 1991, has completed the formulation of the implementing rules and
regulations; x x x
Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine
and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area
requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally
construed in order to achieve the desired results. The strict interpretation
adopted by the February 10, 2010 Decision could prove to be counter-
productive, if not outright absurd, awkward, and impractical. Picture an
intended province that consists of several municipalities and component cities
which, in themselves, also consist of islands. The component cities and
municipalities which consist of islands are exempt from the minimum land area
requirement, pursuant to Sections 450 and 442, respectively, of the LGC. Yet,
the province would be made to comply with the minimum land area criterion of
2,000 square kilometers, even if it consists of several islands. This would mean
that Congress has opted to assign a distinctive preference to create a province
with contiguous land area over one composed of islands and negate the
greater imperative of development of self-reliant communities, rural progress,
and the delivery of basic services to the constituency. This preferential option
would prove more difficult and burdensome if the 2,000-square-kilometer
territory of a province is scattered because the islands are separated by bodies
of water, as compared to one with a contiguous land mass.
Moreover, such a very restrictive construction could trench on the equal
protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy and
decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area
requirement should be read together with territorial contiguity.
Another look at the transcript of the deliberations of Congress should prove
enlightening:
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Can we give time to Congressman Chiongbian,[28]
with respect to his
CHAIRMAN LINA. Okay.
HON. CHIONGBIAN. At the outset, Chairman Lina, we would like to apprise
the distinguished Senator about the action taken by the House, on House Bill
No. 7166. This was passed about two years ago and has been pending in the
Senate for consideration. This is a bill that I am not the only one involved,
including our distinguished Chairman here. But then we did want to sponsor
the bill, being the Chairman then of the Local Government.
So, I took the cudgels for the rest of the Congressmen, who were more or less
interested in the creation of the new provinces, because of the vastness of the
areas that were involved.
At any rate, this bill was passed by the House unanimously without any
objection. And as I have said a while ago, that this has been pending in the
Senate for the last two years. And Sen. Pimentel himself was just in South
Cotabato and he delivered a speech that he will support this bill, and he says,
that he will incorporate this in the Local Government Code, which I have in
writing from him. I showed you the letter that he wrote, and naturally, we in the
House got hold of the Senate version. It becomes an impossibility for the whole
Philippines to create a new province, and that is quite the concern of the
respective Congressmen.
Now, insofar as the constitutional provision is concerned, there is nothing to
stop the mother province from voting against the bill, if a province is going to
be created.
PUBCORP 2
So, we are talking about devolution of powers here. Why is the province not
willing to create another province, when it can be justified. Even Speaker Mitra
says, what will happen to Palawan? We wont have one million people there,
and if you look at Palawan, there will be about three or four provinces that will
comprise that island. So, the development will be hampered.
Now, I would like to read into the record the letter of Sen. Pimentel, dated
November 2, 1989. This was practically about a year after 7166 was approved
by the House, House Bill 7166.
On November 2, 1989, the Senator wrote me:
Dear Congressman Chiongbian:
We are in receipt of your letter of 17 October. Please be informed that your
House No. 7166 was incorporated in the proposed Local Government Code,
Senate Bill No. 155, which is pending for second reading.
Thank you and warm regards.
Very truly yours,
That is the very context of the letter of the Senator, and we are quite surprised
that the Senate has adopted another position.
So, we would like because this is a unanimously approved bill in the House,
thats the only bill that is involving the present Local Government Code that we
are practically considering; and this will be a slap on the House, if we do not
approve it, as approved by the lower House. This can be [an] irritant in the
approval of the Conference Committee Report. And I just want to manifest that
insofar as the creation of the province, not only in my province, but the other
provinces. That the mother province will participate in the plebiscite, they can
defeat the province, lets say, on the basis of the result, the province cannot be
created if they lose in the plebiscite, and I dont see why, we should put this
stringent conditions to the private people of the devolution that they are
seeking.
So, Mr. Senator, I think we should consider the situation seriously, because,
this is an approved version of the House, and I will not be the one to raise up
and question the Conference Committee Report, but the rest of the House that
are interested in this bill. And they have been approaching the Speaker about
this. So, the Speaker reminded me to make sure that it takes the cudgel of the
House approved version.
So, thats all what I can say, Mr. Senator, and I dont believe that it is not,
because its the wish of the House, but because the mother province will
participate anyhow, you vote them down; and that is provided for in the
Constitution. As a matter of fact, I have seen the amendment with regards to
the creation of the city to be urbanized, subject to the plebiscite. And why
should we not allow that to happen in the provinces! In other words, we dont
want the people who wants to create a new province, as if they are left in the
devolution of powers, when they feel that they are far away from civilization.
Now, I am not talking about other provinces, because I am unaware, not aware
of their situation. But the province of South Cotabato has a very unique
geographical territorial conglomerations. One side is in the other side of the
Bay, of Sarangani Bay. The capital town is in the North; while these other
municipalities are in the East and in the West. And if they have to travel from
the last town in the eastern part of the province, it is about one hundred forty
kilometers to the capital town. And from the West side, it is the same distance.
And from the North side, it is about one hundred kilometers. So that is the
problem there. And besides, they have enough resources and I feel that, not
because I am interested in the province, I am after their welfare in the future.
Who am I to dictate on those people? I have no interest but then I am looking
at the future development of these areas.
As a matter of fact, if I am in politics, its incidental; I do not need to be there,
but I can foresee what the creation of a new province will bring to these people.
It will bring them prosperity; it will bring them more income, and it will
encourage even foreign investors. Like the PAP now, they are concentrating
in South Cotabato, especially in the City of
General Santos and the neighboring municipalities, and they are quite
interested and even the AID people are asking me, What is holding the creation
PUBCORP 2
of a new province when practically you need it? Its not 20 or 30 kilometers from
the capital town; its about 140 kilometers. And imagine those people have to
travel that far and our road is not like Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as
from here to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that are just one
municipality is bigger than the province of La Union. They have the income. Of
course, they dont have the population because thats a part of the land of
promise and people from Luzon are migrating everyday because they feel that
there are more opportunities here.
So, by creating the new provinces, not only in my case, in the other cases, it
will enhance the development of the Philippines, not because I am interested
in my province. Well, as far as I am concerned, you know, I am in the twilight
years of my life to serve and I would like to serve my people well. No personal
or political interest here. I hope the distinguished Chairman of the Committee
will appreciate the House Bill 7166, which the House has already approved
because we dont want them to throw the Conference Committee Report after
we have worked that the house Bill has been, you know, drawn over board and
not even considered by the Senate. And on top of that, we are considering a
bill that has not yet been passed. So I hope the Senator will take that into
account.
Thank you for giving me this time to explain.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Thank you very much, Congressman James. We will look
into the legislative history of the Senate version on this matter of creation of
provinces. I am sure there was an amendment. As I said, Ill look into it. Maybe
the House version was incorporated in toto, but maybe during the discussion,
their amendments were introduced and, therefore, Senator Pimentel could not
hold on to the original version and as a result new criteria were introduced.
But because of the manifestation that you just made, we will definitely, when
we reach a book, Title IV, on the matter of provinces, we will look at it
sympathetically from your end so that the objective that you want [to] achieve
can be realized. So we will look at it with sympathy. We will review our position
on the matter, how we arrived at the Senate version and we will adopt an open
mind definitely when we come into it.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Kanino yan?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Book III.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Title?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Title IV.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. I have been pondering on the case of James,
especially on economic stimulation of a certain area. Like our case, because I
put myself on our province, our province is quite very big. Its composed of four
(4) congressional districts and I feel it should be five now. But during the
Batasan time, four of us talked and conversed proposing to divide the province
into two.
There are areas then, when since time immemorial, very few governors ever
tread on those areas. That is, maybe youre acquainted with the Bondoc
Peninsula of Quezon, fronting that is Ragay Gulf. From Ragay there is a long
stretch of coastal area. From Albay going to Ragay, very few governors ever
tread [there] before, even today. That area now is infested with NPA. That is
the area of Congressman Andaya.
Now, we thought that in order to stimulate growth, maybe provincial aid can be
extended to these areas. With a big or a large area of a province, a certain
administrator or provincial governor definitely will have no sufficient time. For
me, if we really would like to stimulate growth, I believe that an area where
there is physical or geographical impossibilities, where administrators can
penetrate, I think we have to create certain provisions in the law where maybe
we can treat it with special considerations.
Now, we went over the graduate scale of the Philipppine Local Government
Data as far as provinces are concerned. It is very surprising that there are
provinces here which only composed of six municipalities, eight municipalities,
seven municipalities. Like in Cagayan, Tuguegarao, there are six
municipalities. Ah, excuse me, Batanes.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will you look at the case of --- how many municipalities are
there in Batanes province?
PUBCORP 2
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Batanes is only six.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six town. Siquijor?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Siquijor. It is region?
CHAIRMAN LINA. Seven.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR.L Seven. Anim.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Six also.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Six also.
CHAIRMAN LINA. It seems with a minimum number of towns?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. The population of Siquijor is only 70 thousand, not
even one congressional district. But tumaas in 1982. Camiguin, that is Region
9. Wala dito. Nagtataka nga ako ngayon.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Camiguin, Camiguin.
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. That is region? Camiguin has five municipalities, with
a population of 63 thousand. But we do not hold it against the province
because maybe thats one stimulant where growth can grow, can start. The
land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on
requirements of, we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just
leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that in case
we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao.
Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh.
Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To
devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will
stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we
cannot make a generalization.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Will the creation of a province, carved out of the existing
province because of some geographical id[i]osyncracies, as you called it,
stimulate the economic growth in the area or will substantial aid coming from
the national government to a particular area, say, to a municipality, achieve
the same purpose?
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. Ano tayo dito sa budget. All right, here is a province.
Usually, tinitingnan lang yun, provision eh, hindi na yung composition eh. You
are entitled to, say, 20% of the area.
Theres a province of Camarines Sur which have the same share with that of
Camiguin and Siquijor, but Camiguin is composed only of five municipalities;
in Siquijor, its composed of six, but the share of Siquijor is the same share with
that of the province of Camarines Sur, having a bigger area, very much bigger.
That is the budget in process.
CHAIRMAN LINA. Well, as I said, we are going to consider this very seriously
and even with sympathy because of the explanation given and we will study
this very carefully.[29]
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting
clearly show the manifest intention of Congress to promote development in the
previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land areas by allowing them to
directly share in the allocation of funds under the
national budget. It should be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285
of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is
based on land area, population, and local revenue.[30]
Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in
absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of
statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law,[31] or may
consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant
to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated
in the basic law, the LGC.
It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight
Committee consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative
departments, pursuant to Section 533[32] of the LGC. As Section 533
PUBCORP 2
provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate
rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation
of any and all provisions of this Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the
principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution. It was also
mandated by the Constitution that a local government code shall be enacted
by Congress, to wit
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers
and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied.)
These State policies are the very reason for the enactment of the LGC, with
the view to attain decentralization and countryside development. Congress
saw that the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, had to be replaced with a
new law, now the LGC of 1991, which is more dynamic and cognizant of the
needs of the Philippines as an archipelagic country. This accounts for the
exemption from the land area requirement of local government units composed
of one or more islands, as expressly stated under Sections 442 and 450 of the
LGC, with respect to the creation of municipalities and cities, but inadvertently
omitted from Section 461 with respect to the creation of provinces. Hence, the
void or missing detail was filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR.
With three (3) members each from both the Senate and the House of
Representatives, particularly the chairpersons of their respective Committees
on Local Government, it cannot be gainsaid that the inclusion by the Oversight
Committee of the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to
the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands was intended
by Congress, but unfortunately not expressly stated in Section 461 of the LGC,
and this intent was echoed through an express provision in the LGC-IRR. To
be sure, the Oversight Committee did not just arbitrarily and whimsically insert
such an exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Oversight Committee
evidently conducted due deliberation and consultations with all the concerned
sectors of society and considered the operative principles of local autonomy
as provided in the LGC when the IRR was formulated.[33] Undoubtedly, this
amounts not only to an executive construction, entitled to great weight and
respect from this Court,[34] but to legislative construction as well, especially
with the inclusion of representatives from the four leagues of local government
units as members of the Oversight Committee.
With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive and
legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the LGC
had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be impractical
and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct amendments to the LGC.
But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a
full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the
land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of provinces, can
only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant to
its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that
exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it
enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat.
Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and favorably
voted upon in both Chambers of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers of
Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the
LGC that exemption from the land area requirement, with respect to the
creation of a province when it consists of one or more islands, as expressly
provided only in the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was
amended by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355.
What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a
local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum requirement
of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services
to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. Rather than
looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere
fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagats
existence as a province, they must be seen from the perspective that Dinagat
is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
PUBCORP 2
instrumental in stunting such capacity. As we have held in League of Cities of
the Philippines v. Commission on Elections[35]
Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must
be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but
not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that which is
within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret
and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law
and its legislators.
So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of
Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at
once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes. This
presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and the
corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of
the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not
to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions.
Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of
statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain,
the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by
Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.
Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach
of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to:
1. GRANT the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-
intervenors, dated and filed on October 29, 2010;
2. RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the July 20, 2010 Resolution, and GRANT
the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 20, 2010;
3. GRANT the Intervenors Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010. The May 12, 2010 Resolution is RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE. The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands, is declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355
(An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands
and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID; and
4. The petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
4. Miranda v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999)
[G.R. No. 133064. September 16, 1999]
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO
V. BABARAN and ANDRES R. CABUYADAO, petitioners, vs. HON.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON.
EPIMACO VELASCO, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government,
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS HON.
BENJAMIN G. DY, in his capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY. BALTAZAR PICIO,
in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his
capacity as Provincial Treasurer, respondents,
GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of
Santiago, Isabela from an independent component city to a component city.
PUBCORP 2
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On
July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A.
No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city, viz:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
7720 AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines
in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by
deleting the words an independent thereon so that said Section will read as
follows:
SEC. 2. The City of Santiago. The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted
into a component city to be known as the City of Santiago, hereinafter referred
to as the City, which shall comprise of the present territory of the Municipality
of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the
present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the
entire section and in its stead substitute the following:
SEC. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial Position for the Province
of Isabela.- The voters of the City of Santiago shall be qualified to vote in the
elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members and other elective provincial positions of the Province
of Isabela, and any such qualified voter can be a candidate for such provincial
positions and any elective provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause.- All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.- This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528.2 They alleged as
ground the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification
by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Petitioner Miranda was
the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner
Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City.
Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to
file the petition at bar. They also contend that the petition raises a political
question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public
officials. The Solicitor General also contends that petitioners are not real
parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely
reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component
city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a
plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B.
Aggabao,3 a member of the provincial board of Isabela.4 He contended that
both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require
a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to
vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government
Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus
standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the
intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that
would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
PUBCORP 2
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now
an ancient rule that the constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who
will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.5 Petitioner Miranda
was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in his own
right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent
of the city council of Santiago City. It is also indubitable that the change of
status of the city of Santiago from independent component city to a mere
component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown hereafter.
The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is
direct and immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the
people of Santiago City. Similarly, the standing of the other petitioners rests
on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of Santiago.
They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite
to be conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528
gives them proper standing to strike the law as unconstitutional.
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the
petition at bar on the ground that it involves a political question has to be
brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal especially in light of Section
1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has
been made by this Court in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In
Taada v. Cuenco,6 we held:
xxx
The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the
Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino,7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted
and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to
approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a plebiscite before it can be enforced.
It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners have the said right is
a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress
comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court
alone can decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning and nuances of the Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix
explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its
failure to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its
people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a
plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries
of local government units belongs to Congress.8 This power is part of the
larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress.9 The
exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution.
PUBCORP 2
In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from
an independent component city to a mere component city requires the
approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the
issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of
the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units
involve a common denominator - - - material change in the political and
economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the
people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people in the political units directly affected. It is not difficult to
appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987
Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to
the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the
1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable
practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished,
merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare
of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit
directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering
the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people
in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct
democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru peoples
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the
philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government
units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from
an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be
characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a
political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and
ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the
Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now
have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching
changes on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz:10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528
had merely re-classified Santiago City from an independent component city
into a component city, the effect when challenged (sic) the Act were
operational would be, actually, that of conversion. Consequently, there would
be substantial changes in the political culture and administrative
responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago City
from an independent component city will revert to the Province of Isabela,
geographically, politically and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of
Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela.
This will be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela
on account of the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue
allotment (IRA) from the National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or
the Local Government Code of 1991). The IRA is based on land area and
population of local government units, provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City
Government, and which taxes shall accrue solely to the City Government, will
be redefined (Section 151, R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the
province such as taxes on sand, gravel and other quarry resources (Section
138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139, R.A. No. 7160), or
amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial Government
will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic)
diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of
reduced shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section
285 of the R.A. No. 7160. The City Governments share in the proceeds in the
development and utilization of national wealth shall be diluted since certain
portions shall accrue to the Provincial Government (Section 292, R.A.
No.7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as
provincial officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the
Provincial Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every component city
and municipality within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the
scope of its prescribed powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i),
R.A. No. 7160), and to review (Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders
submitted by the former (Section 455 (b) (1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and
(R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local governance and state of
PUBCORP 2
affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160). Elective city officials
will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor (Section
63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political
autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is
the Office of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an
independent component city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE
X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod will be subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
(Sections 56, 468 (a) (1) (i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160).
Likewise, the decisions in administrative cases by the former could be
appealed and acted upon by the latter (Section 67, R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City
from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval
of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme
nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the
people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their
city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law
substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in
accord with the Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite - (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU
or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or
ordinance fixes another date.
x x x.
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so
long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly
affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena
justifies R.A. No. 8528 on the ground that Congress has the power to amend
the charter of Santiago City. This power of amendment, however, is limited by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an amendment of
a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected is mandatory. He also contends that the amendment merely
caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city. Allegedly, it is a transition
because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No.
8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
calls for the people of the local government unit directly affected to vote in a
plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component
city as a mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the
transition will radically change its physical and political configuration as well as
the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the
theory that "only if the classification involves changes in income, population,
and land area of the local government unit is there a need for such changes to
be approved by the people x x x."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of
section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions - - - first, the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local
government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code
on income, population and land area and second, the law must be approved
by the people "by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government
Code fixed the said criteria and they involve requirements on income,
population and land area. These requirements, however, are imposed to help
assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They
PUBCORP 2
were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people.
Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there will be no more
plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and land area have
been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides:
"No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the
votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within
one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or
ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date."11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local
Government Code of 1991, opines that the plebiscite is absolute and
mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution
have different purposes. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on
income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic
purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter
2 of the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be
attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the
Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political
purpose --- to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political
practice of gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess
committed by the political representatives of the people themselves than the
exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by one commentator, as the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are
"xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done
not only by Congress but also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality
concerned. xxx By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the provision
will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize legislative
action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the
autonomy of local government units."13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by
certain segments of its people. In the debates in Congress, it was noted that
at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has been converted to
an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and
the conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators
expressed surprise for the sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago
City as there had been no significant change in its socio-economic-political
status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of
the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged
reason is unconvincing for it is the essence of an independent component city
that its people can no longer participate or be voted for in the election of
officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they gave
up that privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of
Isabela. There was an attempt on the part of the Committee on Local
Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City to its people via a
plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a
recess was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee anounced
the withdrawal of the amendment "after a very enlightening conversation with
the elders of the Body." We quote the debates, viz:14
"BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 - City of Santiago
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we consider House Bill No. 8729
as reported out under Committee Report No. 971.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] there being none, the motion
is approved.
"Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of
the Body, the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to
inserting in the Record the whole text thereof.
"The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO. 7720 ENTITLED
"AN ACT CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN
INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO
_______________________________________________________
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
PUBCORP 2
Insert
_______________________________________________________
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished
Chairman of the Committee on Local Government be recognized.
"The President. Senator Sotto is recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO
"Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729, which was introduced in the House by
Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its principal author, is a simple measure
which merely seeks to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of
the Province of Isabela.
"The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an
integral part of the Province of Isabela. As an independent component city,
however, it is completely detached and separate from the said province as a
local political unit. To use the language of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an island in the provincial milieu.
"The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they
qualified to run for any elective positions in the Province of Isabela.
"The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power
and authority of general supervision over the city and its officials, which power
and authority are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very
far away from Santiago City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of
Santiago is affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the said
province, and is benefited by its progress and development. Hence, the
proposed bill to convert the City of Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
"Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this
august Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local
Government , recommending approval, with our proposed committee
amendment, of House Bill No. 8729.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved (sic) that we close the period of
interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period
of interpellations is closed.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President.
"The President. What is the pleasure of Senator Roco?
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask for a reconsideration of the ruling on
the motion to close the period of interpellations just to be able to ask a few
questions?
"Senator Tatad. May I move for a reconsideration of my motion, Mr. President.
"The President. Is there any objection to the reconsideration of the closing of
the period of interpellations? [Silence] There being none, the motion is
approved.
"Senator Roco is recognized.
"Senator Roco. Will the distinguished gentleman yield for some questions?
"Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, together with the Chairman of the Committee
on Local Government, we were with the sponsors when we approved this bill
to make Santiago a City. That was about two and a half years ago. At that time,
PUBCORP 2
I remember it was the cry of the city that it be independent. Now we are deleting
that word independent.
"Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the
Record, I want some explanation on what happened between then and now
that has made us decide that the City of Santiago should cease to be
independent and should now become a component city.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the officials of the province said during the
public hearing that they are no longer vested with the power and authority of
general supervision over the city. The power and authority is now being
exercised by the Office of the President and it is quite far from the City of
Santiago.
"In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some
sectors that they want to participate in the provincial elections.
"Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not mean to delay this. I did want it on
record, however. I think there was a majority of 14,000 who approved the
charter, and maybe we owe it to those who voted for that charter some degree
of respect. But if there has been a change of political will, there has been a
change of political will, then so be it.
"Thank you, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very frank about it, that was a very
important point raised by Senator Roco, and I will have to place it on the
Record of the Senate that the reason why we are proposing a committee
amendment is that, originally, there was an objection on the part of the local
officials and those who oppose it by incorporating a plebiscite in this bill. That
was the solution. Because there were some sectors in the City of Santiago
who were opposing the reclassification or reconversion of the city into a
component city.
"Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr. President -- because the two of us had
special pictures (sic) in the city -- is that I thought it should be put on record
that we have supported originally the proposal to make it an independent city.
But now if it is their request, then, on the manifestation of the Chairman, let it
be so.
"Thank you.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield for a few questions, Mr. President?
"Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to the interpellation of our good friend,
the Senator from Bicol, on the matter of the opinion of the citizens of Santiago
City, there is a resolution passed by the Sanggunian on January 30, 1997
opposing the conversion of Santiago from an independent city.
"This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And
that is the reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the
amendments is that a plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.
"The question I would like to raise-- and I would like to recall the statement of
our Minority Leader -- is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a
particular politician.
"In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that
the additional territory be added to the election of the provincial officials of the
province of Isabela.
"Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
"Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of it, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. With the permission of the two gentlemen on the Floor,
Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I
share some information.
PUBCORP 2
"Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial
leadership, it will not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership, because the
provincial leadership will then campaign in a bigger territory.
"As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of
Santiago who will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and
whose children will have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This
is one of the prime reasons why this amendment is being put forward.
"While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those
who signed the resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was
sponsored by the congressman of that district who represents a constituency,
the voice of the district.
"I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice
must be heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law
which has been crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given
account, as we do give account to many of the legislations coming from the
House on local issues.
"Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the reason why I am raising this question is
that, as Senator Roco said, just two-and-a-half years ago we passed a bill
which indeed disenfranchized--if we want to use that phrase-- the citizens of
the City of Santiago in the matter of the provincial election. Two-and-a-half
years after, we are changing the rule.
"In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a
plebiscite in order to approve the conversion of the city into an independent
city. I believe that the only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is
again to subject this issue to another plebiscite as part of the provision of this
proposed bill and as will be proposed by the Committee Chairman as an
amendment.
"Thank you very much, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the Constitution does not require that the
change from an independent to a component city be subjected to a plebiscite.
Sections 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those
enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this
constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key word here is conversion. The word
conversion appears in that provision wherein we must call a plebiscite. During
the public hearing, the representative of Congressman Abaya was insisting
that this is not a conversion; this is merely a reclassification. But it is clear in
the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a
component city. That is how the members of the committee felt. That is why
we have proposed an amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite
in as much as there is no provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we
would like not only to give the other people of Santiago a chance or be
enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province is concerned, but also
we will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To them, this is the best
compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela
deciding for them.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr. President, I think we can move to close the
period of interpellations.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
"Senator Tatad. I move that we now consider the committee amendments, Mr.
President.
PUBCORP 2
"The President. Is there any objection? Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
"Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13, insert a new Section 3, as follows:
"SEC. 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED
BY DELETING THE ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE
THE FOLLOWING:
"SEC. 49. PLEBISCITE. - THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO
INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE
EFFECT UPON THE RATIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR
THE PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS
ACT. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND
SUPERVISE SUCH PLEBISCITE.
"The President. Is there any objection?
"Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Enrile is recognized.
"Senator Enrile. I object to this committee amendment, Mr. President.
"SUSPENSION OF SESSION
"Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-minute suspension of the session.
"The President. The session is suspended for a few minutes if there is no
objection. [There was none]
"It was 7:54 p.m.
"RESUMPTION OF SESSION
"At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
"The President. The session is resumed.
"Senator Sotto is recognized.
"Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a very enlightening conversation with the
elders of the Body, I withdraw my amendment.
"The President. The amendment is withdrawn.
"Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Maceda is recognized.
"Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the sponsor for the withdrawal of the
amendment.
"Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela -- I am no great
fan of the Senator from Isabela -- but it so happens that this is a local bill
affecting not only his province but his own city where he is a resident and
registered voter.
"So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national
importance, senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as possible,
accommodate the request of the Senator from Isabela as we have done on
matters affecting the district of other senators. I need not remind them.
"Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
"The President. Senator Alvarez is recognized.
"Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I express my deepest appreciation for
the statement of the gentleman from Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may
have said, the feeling is not mutual. At least for now, I have suddenly become
his great fan for the evening.
"May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of
Santiago not because I do not want it to be a city but because it had
PUBCORP 2
disenfranchised the young men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of
the province. The town is the gem of the province. How could we extricate the
town from the province?
"But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman
of the Committee.
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President.
"The President. The Majority Leader is recognized.
"Senator Tatad. There being no committee amendments, I move that the
period of committee amendments be closed.
"The President. Shall we amend the title of this bill by removing the word
independent preceding component city?
"Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We are merely citing the title. The main title
of this House Bill No. 8729 is An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic
Act 7720. The title is the title of Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think that we
should amend that anymore.
"The President. What is the pending motion? Will the gentleman kindly state
the motion?
"Senator Tatad. I move that we close the period of committee amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
"Senator Tatad. Unless there are any individual amendments, I move that we
close the period of individual amendments.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the period
of individual amendments is closed.
"APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
"Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move that we vote on Second Reading on
House Bill No. 8729.
"The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, we shall
now vote on Second Reading on House Bill No. 8729.
"As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
"Several Members. Aye
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silence]
"House Bill No. 8729 is approved on Second Reading."
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for
the downgrading of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the
voice of the people of the city via a plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. vs. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning
the province of Negros Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite.
In his concurring opinion striking down the law as unconstitutional, Chief
Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz:
"The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was to have the creation of the
new Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held on February 7,
1986. The transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and
other officials shall by then have been installed in office, ready to function for
purposes of the election for President and Vice-President. Thus, the petitioners
reported after the event: With indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros
del Norte was set up and proclaimed by President Marcos as in existence; a
new set of government officials headed by Governor Armando Gustilo was
appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February 7, 1986, the
political machinery was in place to deliver the solid North to ex-President
Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the
elections - the unashamed use of naked power and resources - contributed in
no small way to arousing peoples power and steel the ordinary citizen to
perform deeds of courage and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino
today.
PUBCORP 2
"The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all
the implementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a
new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are
equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the
proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion
of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros
Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the
Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra,
Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog,
Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and
disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973
Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary
substantially altered without the approval of a majority of the votes in a
plebiscite in the unit or units affected. It is plain that all the cities and
municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the
proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters
of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and
give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole province is affected by
its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the
plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from
the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to
vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority
and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when
allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into component
cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the City of Oroquieta, Misamis
Occidental,16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan17 whose charters were
amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of
officials of the province to which their city belongs without submitting the
amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San
Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities
then were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The
two cities were chartered but were not independent component cities for both
were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered independent
cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under
consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained:18
"x x x Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely
empowers the voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial
officials. There is no intention whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City
of San Carlos and there is no showing whatsoever that the enactment of this
bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and prerogatives already enjoyed by
the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as of now, is a component
city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely, as we said
earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial elections,
without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is
for this reason that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill19 allowing qualified voters
of the city of Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis
Occidental. In his sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being
given to the people of Oroquieta City was consistent with its status as a
component city.20 Indeed, during the debates, former Senator Neptali
Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then
obtaining xxx where voters of one component city can vote in the provincial
election while the voters of another component city cannot vote simply
because their charters so provide.21 Thus, Congress amended other charters
of component cities prohibiting their people from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared
unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
5. Samson v. Aguirre (G.R. No. 133076, 22 September 1999)
[G.R. No. 133076. September 22, 1999]
MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his
capacity as the Executive Secretary, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
PUBCORP 2
On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act
No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City.
Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of
Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8535.
Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the
implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the
creation of the City of Novaliches, and the Department of Budget and
Management from disbursing funds for said plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, through a
motion we duly noted.
Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:
a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local
Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the
requirements of income, population and land area; seat of government; and
no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively, and its
Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and (2), as to furnishing a
copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; and
b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.[1]
Petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area
were not presented to Congress during the deliberations that led to the
passage of R.A. No. 8535. This, he argues, is clear from the minutes of the
public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on
the proposed charter of the City of Novaliches. Petitioner particularly cites its
hearings held on October 3 and 27, 1997. He is silent, however, on the
hearings held by the appropriate Committee in the House of Representatives.
Likewise, petitioner points out that there is no certification attesting to the fact
that the mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely
affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of income,
population, and land area.
In their Comment, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General,
traversed all the allegations of petitioner. They claimed he failed to
substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. In their memorandum,
respondents argued that petitioner had the burden of proof to overcome the
legal presumption that Congress considered all the legal requirements under
the Local Government Code of 1991 in passing R.A. 8535. Further,
respondents stated that the petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document
supporting petitioners claim that R.A. 8535 is unconstitutional. Respondents
pray that the present petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union,[2] we had occasion to stress
that:
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a
statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a
reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it
unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which
supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all
possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the
constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.[3]
Every statute is presumed valid.[4] Every law is presumed to have passed
through regular congressional processes.[5] A person asserting the contrary
has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and unmistakably. Having this
in mind, we now proceed to examine whether or not petitioner was able to
successfully overcome the presumption of validity accorded R.A. No. 8535.
The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7:
SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a
local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be
based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide
for all essential government facilities and services and special functions
commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local
government unit concerned;
PUBCORP 2
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within
the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to
provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the
Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in
Article 11:
ART. 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless
the following requisites on income and either population or land area are
present:
(1) Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or land
area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred (100)
square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province. The land area
requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than
the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation
shall be borne by the petitioners.
Petitioner argues that no certifications attesting compliance with the foregoing
requirements were submitted to Congress, citing in particular public hearings
held by the Senate Committee on Local Government.
However, we note that the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated
in the House of Representatives. Its principal sponsor is Cong. Dante Liban of
Quezon City. Petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no
certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government,
as is the usual practice in this regard. Allegations, without more, cannot
substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by Congress,
based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor.
Moreover, present during the public hearings held by the Senate Committee
on Local Government were resource persons from the different government
offices like National Statistics Office, Bureau of Local Government Finance,
Land Management Bureau, and Department of Budget and Management,
aside from officials of Quezon City itself.
The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated
the combined average annual income of the 13 barangays[6] for the years
1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26.[7] Under the Local Government
Code, a proposed city must have an average annual income of only at least
P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two years. The representative
from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would comprise
the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310.[8] This figure is more
than the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules. There is no need to
consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government
Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income
and population or land area. Other than the income requirement, the proposed
city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance
with either requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice may
also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
Petitioner avers that the oral manifestation made by the representatives of
government offices is not enough certification. But respondents reply that in
the hearings, particularly by the Local Government Committee headed by
PUBCORP 2
Senator Sotto, on October 3 and 27, 1997, the DBM, DILG, and Finance
Officials were present along with other officers armed with official statistics and
reference materials. In their official capacity, they spoke and shed light on
population, land area and income of the proposed city. Their official statements
could serve the same purpose contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their
affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in open session of either the
Senate or the House of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a
certification submitted to either chamber routinely.
Moreover, petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations during
the public hearings, the representatives present did not also submit written
certifications. Note that under the Implementing Rules, written certifications are
required to be attached to the petition for the creation of a city, to be submitted
by interested municipalities or barangays to Congress in the form of a
resolution. Petitioner, however, did not even bother to present a copy of said
petition if only to prove that it was without the written certifications attached as
required by law. We are thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge,
that these requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the assailed
legislative act.
Petitioner then argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of
government of the proposed City of Novaliches as required under Section
11(a) of the Local Government Code:
SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices, and
Facilities. (a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units
shall specify the seat of government from where governmental and corporate
service shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to
geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and
communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and economic
progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into account.
Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not provide
for a seat of government. However, this omission, to our mind, is not as fatal
to the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it to be. We agree with
respondents that under Section 12 of the Local Government Code, which
applies to the proposed City of Novaliches by virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No.
8535,[9] the City of Novaliches can still establish a seat of government after its
creation. For said Code already provides as follows:
SECTION 12. Government Centers. Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall
endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies, or
branches of the National Government, local government units, or government-
owned or controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In
designating such a center, the local government unit concerned shall take into
account the existing facilities of national and local agencies and offices which
may serve as the government center as contemplated under this Section. The
National Government, local government unit or government-owned or
controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the construction
of its buildings and facilities in the government center.
While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can very
well also be the seat of government, from where governmental and corporate
service shall be delivered.[10]
With regard to the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the creation of the
City of Novaliches, petitioner again failed to present any concrete evidence on
this point. Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was present during the
deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local Government, and made no
mention of anything concerning such adverse effects. As chief executive of
Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be the first person to protest any
development that might prove detrimental to Quezon City. The fact that he did
not raise any adverse issue during the public hearings on R.A. No. 8535,
stressing instead his concern on the matter of inclusion of all Quezon City
voters in the plebiscite that would decide the fate of the City of Novaliches, is
indicative of the non-existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in the
plebiscite as contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will obviously
have the opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the
principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches.
That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of
concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches, if true,
will also not render invalid R.A. No. 8535. The evident purpose of this
requirement, found in the Implementing Rules, is to inform the City Council of
the move to create another city and to enable it to formulate its comments and
recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City Council members are
obviously aware of the petition. The matter has been widely publicized in the
mass media. Surely members of the Quezon City Council, including petitioner,
PUBCORP 2
could not now be heard to claim they have not known of the contents of the
barangays petition to create the City of Novaliches.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a
prohibited amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioners contention.
The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of the
House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country.
Nowhere does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only
17 cities and municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of
the ordinance in or appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous
interpretation.
Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear
and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality being
enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to convince the Court with
substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
6. Alvarez v. Guingona (G.R. No. 118303, 31 January 1996)
[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996]
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR.
NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D.
MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. ALIPON, petitioners, vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government,
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as
Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO MANUBAY, HON.
VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO
VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON.
CELSO CALEON and HON. ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. SANTOS, in his
capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his
capacity as Municipal Administrator, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just
recently passed by Congress and signed by the President into law, is
constitutionally infirm.
Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of
Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the
City of Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the
minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a component city.
Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No.
8817 into Republic Act No. 7720:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of
Santiago into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
Santiago, was filed in the House of Representatives with Representative
Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included Representatives
Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill
was referred to the House Committee on Local Government and the House
Committee on Appropriations on May 5, 1993.
On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993,
public hearings on HB No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on
Local Government. The committee submitted to the House a favorable report,
with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of
Representatives on Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on
December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 was transmitted to
the Senate.
PUBCORP 2
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An
Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent] Component
City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the Senate. It was
introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993.
This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public
hearing on HB No. 8817.
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was
transmitted to the Senate, the Senate Committee on Local Government
conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, the said
committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the
recommendation that it be approved without amendment, taking into
consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all fours with SB No. 1243.
Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his
approval thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local
Government.
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on
Second Reading and was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On
March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the
action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by
the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a
plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into
a city.
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following
twin issues: (I) Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to
be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality
for purposes of its conversion into an independent component city, and (II)
Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own
version of HB No. 8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated
in the House of Representatives.
I
The annual income of a local
government unit includes the IRAs
-----------------------------------------------------------
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because
its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having
computed Santiagos average annual income in the following manner:
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94
Minus:
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94
Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992,
after deducting the IRAs, the average annual income arrived at would only be
P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Thus, petitioners claim
that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average
annual income requirement.
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance, which indicates Santiagos average annual income to
be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the Internal Revenue
Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate
that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from
the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease,
depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing.
PUBCORP 2
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because
Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government
Units.
It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must,
among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million
Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices.1
Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.2
Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of
Santiago with the aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and
contextual explication of the meaning of internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-
a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the principles of local
autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and
intensified empowerment of the local government system.
A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is
constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.3
Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but
not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government
unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority,
responsibilities and resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in
Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling especially the peripheral local
government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but also
with their oWn resources and assets.6
The practical side to development through a decentralized local government
system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened
powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now
operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more
expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and
accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision
for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively
carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the
vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its
own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national
taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
(3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization
and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial
boundaries.8.
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization
proceeds accrue to the general fund of the local government and are used to
finance its operations subject to specified modes of spending the same as
provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and
regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must
be set aside for local development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the
local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national
wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should
be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues
and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the
local government unit.10
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion
of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically
accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of
the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local
government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the
Department of Finance certified, among others, that the municipality had an
average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of
Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual
income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To reiterate,
IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify
the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition
and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when
the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its
instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.12
PUBCORP 2
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the full
import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be
revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from
regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue
allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the
Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids,
grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar
others (Italics ours).14 Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous
construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be
accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown
to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other
laws.15
II
In the enactment of RA No. 7720,
there was compliance with Section 24,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
-----------------------------------------------------------
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional
prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim
of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243,
was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB
No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243
was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own
admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243
was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not
only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817,
was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of
the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the
instant controversy.
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was
already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on
HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December
17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than
a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate
held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817,
already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill
of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance.17 There, on the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT)
Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless constitutionally required to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained:
x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required by
the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may
undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. x x x as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may
be produced. To insist that a revenue statute-and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law-must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H.
No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what
the Senate did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into consideration in enacting
S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H.
No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following
the enacting clause (which, it would seem petitioners admit is an amendment
by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own
on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same
subject.
PUBCORP 2
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are
expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both
views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. x x x18
III
Every law, including RA No. 7720,
has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality
--------------------------------------------------------------------
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who
petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully
establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition
must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the
immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
7. Mariano v. COMELEC (G.R. Nos. 118577, 07 March 1995)
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No.
7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was
filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina
Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners,
only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo
Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following
grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation
to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;
PUBCORP 2
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three
consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following
the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854
as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed
city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted
into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction
bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay
and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the
appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining
local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions.2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a
local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be
clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government
unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits,
its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of
local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil
sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land
area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be
brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that
covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or
multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any
clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present
territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why
the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A.
No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense
of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose
the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
PUBCORP 2
This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by
its exact metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial
notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes.4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In the
cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed
City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate
resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not
prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain
the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond
cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of
newly created or converted cities should be described by meted and bounds,
with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide a means by which
the area of said cities may be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant merely as tool in the
establishment of local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by
referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in this
case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has
been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain
therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens
titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which
the Local Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code
is to empower local government units and to give them their rightful due. It
seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their
constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no
cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but
defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the
slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the
law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will
not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v.
Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an
active instrument of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means
that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72
SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective
officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City
of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a
new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified
and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate
existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically
absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
PUBCORP 2
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including
Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and
are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They
argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate
existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present
municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously
served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served
for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay
decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can
still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive
term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would
not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay
will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected
in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in
the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to
an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse,
they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of
section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-
urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts
that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts created under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission on
Elections to commence at the next national elections to be held after the
effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes, Dasmarias and
Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which
shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2)
the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill7 and
(3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.8
In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution9
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that
reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with
a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
PUBCORP 2
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole
or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati
is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati
as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the
title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the
policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not
command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be sufficient
compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.
8. Cawaling Jr. v. COMELEC (G.R, No. 146319, October 26, 2001)
[G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001]
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents.
[G.R. No. 146342. October 26, 2001]
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON,
MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF BACON, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 8806 which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of
the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A.
No. 8806, an Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities
Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating
Funds Therefor.[1]
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,[2] the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification.
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC)
proclaimed[3] the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and
approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.[4]
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of
Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present
petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite
on the following grounds:
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-
day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof;
and
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty
(20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.
PUBCORP 2
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted
another petition (G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition, seeking to enjoin
the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 for being unconstitutional,
contending, in essence, that:
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section
450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city; and
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City
of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon,
thereby violating the one subject-one bill rule prescribed by Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution.
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.[5]
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May
14, 2001 elections, the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of
its officials. Since then, the City Government of Sorsogon has been regularly
discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No.
8806.
We shall first delve on petitioners constitutional challenge against R.A. No.
8806 in G.R. No. 146342.
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality.[6] This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming
courtesy for each others acts.[7] The theory is that every law, being the joint
act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure
that it is in accord with the fundamental law.[8] This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has
shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative one.[9] In other words, the grounds for nullity must
be beyond reasonable doubt,[10] for to doubt is to sustain.[11]
Petitioner initially rejects R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected. (Emphasis ours)
The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (the Code), thus:
Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual
income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population,
and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified
by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the
city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
(Emphasis ours)
Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A.
No. 8806 complied with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population
and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of creation. He contends that
under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by
PUBCORP 2
converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging two
municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.
This contention is devoid of merit.
Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The
phrase A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a
component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city
may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and
which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local
government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in
accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the
Code distinctly provides:
Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local
government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed
for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the
income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code:
Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local
government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification
prior to such division. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division
or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the
Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no compelling reason for
merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City
of Sorsogon considering that the Municipality of Sorsogon alone already
qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes into the
wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission,[12] this Court, through Justice Jose P.
Laurel, made it clear that the judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise of judicial power,
we are allowed only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable,[13] and may not annul an act of the
political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.[14]
Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the one subject-
one bill rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (emphasis ours)
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal
subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the
abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act
sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner
claims that no such information has been provided on the abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion, there
is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the
City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject
separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of
the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of
Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the
Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, cannot be said to
exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be
considered to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence.
It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as
to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein.[15] The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,[16]
and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.[17] Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the
rule so as not to cripple or impede legislation.[18]
PUBCORP 2
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and
convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No.
8806.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the
plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of
Sorsogon City.
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be
conducted within 120 days from the approval of said Act per express provision
of its Section 54, viz:
Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence
upon the ratification of its creation by a majority of the votes cast by the
qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the present municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from the approval
of this Act. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E.
Estrada. Thus, petitioner claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was
conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120-day period after the
approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite
being conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and
approved in the plebiscite held on December 16, 2000.
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on
December 16, 2000 based on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65
of the Act states:
Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least
two (2) newspapers of general and local circulation.
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a
newspaper of general circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was
published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province of Sorsogon.
Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which
date, according to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in
determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from
the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been
published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for
the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,[19] it
could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took effect. Thus, the
COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the
120-day period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
The COMELEC is correct.
In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect
unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be
conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date. (Emphasis ours)
Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall
be conducted within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not
from its approval. While the same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix
another date for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from
the date of the effectivity of the law.
Consequently, the word approval in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should
be read together with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only
mean effectivity as used and contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This
construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the
laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled to
avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated
in Taada:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both
on the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the
conclusion, and so hold, that the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers
PUBCORP 2
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. (Emphasis supplied)
To give section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the
Act effective even before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred
in Taada.
Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive
information campaign on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11 (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was
presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we
sustain the presumption[20] that the COMELEC regularly performed or
complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
9. Aquino v. Comelec (G.R. No. 189793, 07 April 2010)
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and
JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent
democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing
a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever
so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the majority,
for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a
challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable,
the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to
the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic
institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second Legislative
District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the following
information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA
STS., PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and
10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; That I will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed to such is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and
that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge.1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo
Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati
City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino2 on the ground that the
latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which,
under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The
petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
PUBCORP 2
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed,
petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated
March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he
had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year
and thirteen (13) days.3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for
the dismissal of the disqualification case.4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC
wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among others, his
Affidavit dated May 2, 1995,5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor
Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April
28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the
COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against
respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the
Office of Representative in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED.9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three
(3) candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner
garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as
against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand
nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they
filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second
Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum
to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's
proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to
complete the canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati,
but to suspend the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he
obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Representative of the
Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration filed
by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the
Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate
implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise
directed to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and
to calendar the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at
10:00 in the morning, PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion
to lift order of suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum
and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of
Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the
issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after
the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the
COMELEC en banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion
thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances
of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but
PUBCORP 2
to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow
the parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before
the Commission has to be studied with more reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution
reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May
6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible
and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the
Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack
of the constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently, the order of
suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he obtain the winning
number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made
permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed
canvass of election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates, who shall be immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15,
1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued
by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the following errors for
consideration, to wit:
A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE
THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL
CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH
DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY
WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID
JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS,
AND THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN
ANOTHER FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT
WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX
"C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS
ERROR IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE MINISTERIAL
NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE FINALITY OF
THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT
TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER
IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE
YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES
IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY
EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND
BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN
MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
PUBCORP 2
F who has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS
TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING
QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION
OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND
PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE
ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED AS
SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.15
I Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate, who has been
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after
the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question
of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of the House of
Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification
is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET). Given the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that
the COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in
directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the
Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed
candidate to the House of Representatives and a member of the same.
Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically
vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications
of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become
members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate
cannot be said to be a member of the House of Representatives subject to
Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate
in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646
allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein.
Thus, petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and
(petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from the
moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to
pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the
elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7)
of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications
of candidates Section 6 states:
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a
candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not oust the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will
not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him
when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of
guilt is strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be
applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions
of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under
Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas
Pambansa 881.
PUBCORP 2
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify
as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the
latter "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of
Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks election
for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. 18 Residence,
for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held
that the term "residence" has always been understood as synonymous with
"domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept of domicile or constructive
residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted
from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile
(emphasis ours) Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July
22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that the provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick
to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22,
1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of
residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers
or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for
electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this
nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through
the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated
by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period
or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It
would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold
question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of
one year in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of
PUBCORP 2
Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the
same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy
for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of
San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same
for 52 years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth
certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents
Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the
COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up
to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995
elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an
alleged lease agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC,
in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract
maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's
original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2)
years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for
only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.
26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to
vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has
other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he
claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his
stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or
domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the
lack of identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected
all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc
emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by
establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease
agreement cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to
Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at
bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.30 These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in
support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of
origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly met by the evidence
adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac
to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose
the one year residency requirement in a newly created political district is
specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of
thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this
case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were
domiciled in the area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be
denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the
creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such
new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking
advantage of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC
did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the
Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around
for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but
he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
PUBCORP 2
residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has
not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order
instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the
candidate receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in
the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first"
among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue
the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and
psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested
by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly
entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive
disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of
a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had
petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would
have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended
the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco.
The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated
by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first
among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not
prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from
one end to the other. In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared
as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate
provided the people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith that
at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive.
The votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who
obtained the next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner.
According to this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a
contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the
one receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-
candidate in view of his unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a
ground for disqualification) cannot be considered in the canvassing of election
returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent votes
because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate
in the eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the
only candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that
the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the
event the candidate who ran for the portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority
or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative
of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their
ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it
is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the elections. (20
Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous
ruling in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified
candidate fall within the category of invalid or non-existent votes because a
disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law," reverting to
our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and
Benito v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected,
and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the
PUBCORP 2
office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v.
Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected
does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be valid to vote the winner
into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the
votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible;
they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v.
COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the
office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for
the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people
of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent
Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v.
Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course
to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal
could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in
the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide
candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that
she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes was
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that
petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for
and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing
the eligibility, requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same
position cannot assume the vacated position. (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no
compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in
the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to
deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the
people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was
allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his
disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus
Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed
the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The
simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes
in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election,
(137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all
disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and
Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad
Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana
and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be
reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435),
which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil.
238) was supported by ten members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
PUBCORP 2
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel.
Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified,
the votes intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be
considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate
in whom, sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of
Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona fide without any intention to
missapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified
to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the
government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and
cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be
installed, under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be
deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner
Ortega is not a larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo
(as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No.
105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We
cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the
runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually
the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly
represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure
American state and English court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the
possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes
so measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be
tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just
one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated
candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances where the votes
received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant,
voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the
result among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the
disqualification of an ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence
of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a
shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any
mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to
have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible"
candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion
declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of Representative
of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's
finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by
the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government
of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by
the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications
necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks
one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by
the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Our Order restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional
elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
10. Tan v. Comelec (G.R. No. 73155, 11 July 1986)
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO,
VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO,
DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE
HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY,
petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER
OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
Gamboa & Hofilea Law Office for petitioners.
PUBCORP 2
ALAMPAY, J.:
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a
New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros
del Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and
municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for
Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections
from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the
aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986. Said law provides:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities
of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona;
and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are
hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros
del Norte.
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the
City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos
on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of
Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square
kilometers more or less.
SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz.
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which
are the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from
the approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of
Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the
President of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province.
SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the
plebiscite herein provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local
funds.
SEC. 6. This Act shall takeeffect upon its approval.(Rollo, pp. 23-24)
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is
not in complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI,
Section 3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that
See. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which
must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and
these requisites are:
SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a
territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population
of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual
income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million
pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the
population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.
The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both
the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and
nonrecurring income. (Rollo, p. 6)
Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays
during which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition,
a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring
therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January
3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant
case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which
should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court.
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros
del N rte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the
municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias,
E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the
voters from the rest of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found
PUBCORP 2
need to change the prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional
issues which they have raised in the action will be ventilated and given final
resolution.'"At the same time, they asked that the effects of the plebiscite which
they sought to stop be suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered
its decision on the very fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners
have brought out.
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events
rendered moot the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled
for January 3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that-
... a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on
Elections to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.
Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province
of Negros Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that
a writ of mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent Commission on
Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified
voters of the entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall
participate, at the same time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held
on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity;
And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent
Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to
answer for expenses incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by
the Court. (Rollo pp. 9-10).
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance
the issuance of any official proclamation of the results of the aforestated
plebiscite.
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as
amicus curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court
on January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said
motion was granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986.
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on
January 7, 1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require
respondents to comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said
resolution, public respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, on January 14, 1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the
challenged statute.-Batas Pambansa 885, should be accorded the
presumption of legality. They submit that the said law is not void on its face
and that the petition does not show a clear, categorical and undeniable
demonstration of the supposed infringement of the Constitution. Respondents
state that the powers of the Batasang-Pambansa to enact the assailed law is
beyond question. They claim that Batas Pambansa Big. 885 does not infringe
the Constitution because the requisites of the Local Government Code have
been complied with. Furthermore, they submit that this case has now become
moot and academic with the proclamation of the new Province of Negros del
Norte.
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province
of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros
del Norte, de not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units
affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this
reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not
violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo
Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al.
(G.R. No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the
pronouncements therein, hereunder quoted:
1. Admittedly,this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the
use of the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as
petitioners do that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent
municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much
more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable
construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be
separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.
2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two
possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the
other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save,
PUBCORP 2
not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic
presumption all these years is one of validity. ...
3. ... Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there
are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to
separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is
more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose.
It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New
responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new
municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of
choice-their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves.
To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will.
They may even frustrate it, That certainly will be so if they vote against it for
selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the
fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the
preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an
accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the
meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the
framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia.
Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with
force in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under
the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of
Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with, Respondents discredit
petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so
prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created
has not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise
the new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square
kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area
prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and
stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province
plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an
area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered
moot and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted
on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of
canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite,
164,734 were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were
against it; and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of
the total votes cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed the new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte".
Thus, respondents stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del
Norte province, the appointments of the officials of said province created were
announced. On these considerations, respondents urge that this case should
be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of
the new province is now a "fait accompli."
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which
appear to be agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province
of Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any
public funds in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so
disclosed in the Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial
Treasurer of Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37).
Thus, the prayer of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed
by this Court to desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account
of such plebiscite should not longer deserve further consideration.
Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte,
it expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the
following:
SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the
City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos
on the South and the natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island
of Negros on the West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares
more or less. (Emphasis supplied).
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del
Norte were defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:
SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities
of Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona;
and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are
PUBCORP 2
hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into
a new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the
City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos
on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of
Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square
kilometers more or less.
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued
by Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros
Occidental, dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros
Occidental have the land area as indicated hereunder based on the Special
Report No. 3, Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970,
1975 and 1980 by the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila.
Land Area
(Sq. Km.)
1. Silay City ...................................................................214.8
2. E.B. Magalona............................................................113.3
3. Victorias.....................................................................133.9
4. Manapla......................................................................112.9
5. Cadiz City ..................................................................516.5
6. Sagay .........................................................................389.6
7. Escalante ....................................................................124.0
8. Toboso.......................................................................123.4
9. Calatrava.....................................................................504.5
10. San Carlos City...........................................................451.3
11. Don Salvador Benedicto.................................... (not available)
This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever
purpose it may serve him.
(SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
Provincial Treasurer (Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively
new municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an
uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one
of the component units of the new province, was derived from the City of San
Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added
thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia,
Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of
petitioners that the total land area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros
Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth
of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived from
the land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental) would constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This area
of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers,
representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz
and the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay,
Escalante, Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only
2,765.4 square kilometers using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980,
Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National
Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations
of petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary
Bill No. 3644, reads:
PUBCORP 2
SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of
one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification
of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes
cast in such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the new
province.
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a
significant change in the above provision. The statute, as modified, provides
that the requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province
which are the areas affected."
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities
and towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the
petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit
that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in
the unit or units affected by the creation of the new province as a result of the
consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
existing province. In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the
province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the
questioned plebiscite.
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been
held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before
Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the
existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess
to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so
that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error
should not provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this
Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli
then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation
is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as
respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents'
submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now
to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be,
this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to
recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the
boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that
this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they
manage to bring about a fait accompli.
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending
to the unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after
a swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and
discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our
fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our government. This Court
gives notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter
inclined to ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement
the same with indecent haste, even if such acts would violate the Constitution
and the prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be
blind and deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is done. To
such untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court,
nevertheless, still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong
brought to its attention.
On the merits of the case.
Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new
province of Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the
present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case
at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for
convenience, We again quote:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is
thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of
Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that
two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
PUBCORP 2
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The
other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from
the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to
said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of
these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can
justify exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged
intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to
carry out what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy
of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and
overrule the cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to
be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and
complied with. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed
fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local
government units but at the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what
the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would
be no different from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the
Idol therein.
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should
be dismissed because the motive and wisdom in enacting the law may not be
challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not
the wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the
Constitution which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry.
Petitioners' discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P.
Blg. 885 to say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual
issues the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners
of the unexplained changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill
No. 3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and
surreptitious manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt
scheduling of the plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the
questionable conduct of the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve
as interesting reading but are not the decisive matters which should be
reckoned in the resolution of this case.
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little
support to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and
pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes
versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No.
55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held
to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court
upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the
people of the barangay that would constitute the new municipality.
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents.
What is, however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating
that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of
ambiguity in the use of the expression unit or units affected." The ruling
rendered in said case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then
to exercise its discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how
the pertinent provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive
Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as
petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent
municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected."
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes
vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly
expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a
distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which
We hereunder quote:
2. ... when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of
the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the
case at bar or an of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision.
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of
the ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar, In the
analogous case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on
Elections, L-56022, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 633, this dissent was reiterated
by Justice Abad Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a
constitutional infirmity a referendum which did not include all the people of
PUBCORP 2
Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum was intended to ascertain if the
people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to
Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting opinion served as a useful guideline in the
instant case.
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now
afforded the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by
respondents herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views
then taken that local autonomy would be better promoted However, even this
consideration no longer retains persuasive value.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject
matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant
multifarious complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was
a division of a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local
Government Code. Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In
the case at bar, creation of a new province relates to the largest political unit
contemplated in Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province
of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be
subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in
the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of
an existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially
altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects cf the division
of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate
areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
The economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be
inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case,
either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore,
the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular
provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the
people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill
No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte
recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas
affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of
this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas," what was contemplated
evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those
to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the
proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This
assumption will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the
Constitution.
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when
Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so
that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be
conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We
are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected
referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the
Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province,
thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily
affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They
must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the
areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In
anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite
there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving
phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional
statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and
far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area
affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province,
not to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently
argue the points raised by the petitioners.
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros
del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long
established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality
of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion
that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about
285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which
contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners,
"to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision
known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What
was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that
in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and
PUBCORP 2
consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a
substantial alteration of boundary.
As contended by petitioners,
Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', 'abolished' as used in the
constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the
mutually exclusive to each other. A Province maybe created where an existing
province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will
involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being
substantially altered.
It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is
divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only
some and not all the voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or
substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true.
It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits
of this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise,
nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive
pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive
Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here express, We now state
that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the
voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the new political unit
will be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose
of determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby
abandoned.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by
petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent
Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at
which all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as
now existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that
the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent
nullity.
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986
as null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the
Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a
new plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional
infirmity attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Big. 885 and also because
the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with
the criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal
basis for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of
another plebiscite does not exist.
Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by
the new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the
officials thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal
fiction should be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly
as possible, if only to settle the complications currently attending to its creation.
As has been manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been
impleaded as the defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del
Norte, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil
Case No. 169-C, for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds
by the parent province to the new province, in an amount claimed to be at least
P10,000,000.00.
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the
province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province
does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the
Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits
submitted by the petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the
new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This
assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area
of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its
land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers, taking into
account government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and
municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when
Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the
province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square
kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land
and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even
PUBCORP 2
the submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within
the three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the
territory of the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and
fallacious.
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As
so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or
more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the
Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects
that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and
excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous
means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c)
near, text, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307).
"Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is
only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid
masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be
ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the
statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R. p. 110). Therefore,
in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the
"territory" the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the
legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term
"territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely
concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant
to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a
statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p.
636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction
(In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is
an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the
words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and
made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result.
The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in
construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning
of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored
(Helvering vs. Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land
area but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union
province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province
(such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province
first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was
marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill
No. 3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and
simple gerrymandering; "that recent happenings more than amply
demonstrate that far from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has
become the fiefdom of a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; emphasis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the
merits of this case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real
motives and wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge
on those grounds can also be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither
may this Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of
legislative powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools
of a political machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the
electorate and the power of a vigilant people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of
the Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is
the patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to
preserve the continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired
undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution which they wish
to be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which
petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a
worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our
people there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the
appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
PUBCORP 2
11. Dela Cruz v. Paras (G.R. Nos. L-42571-72, 25 July 1983)
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III, LEONCIO
CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH
VELASCO, NANETTE VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA,
RUBEN DE CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO
ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO GREGORIO, TEODORO
REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO, NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO
GUMATAY, ANDRES SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO
BERNARDEZ, and PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the
Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents.
Federico N. Alday for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether or not a
municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, 1 can,
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the
pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is contended
that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality
being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling,
petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them
was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1. Title of
Ordinance. This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as the
[Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2.
Definitions of Terms (a) 'Night Club' shall include any place or establishment
selling to the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to dance. (b)
'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place or establishment where
dancing is permitted to the public and where professional hostesses or
hospitality girls and professional dancers are employed. (c) 'Professional
hostesses' or 'hospitality girls' shall include any woman employed by any of
the establishments herein defined to entertain guests and customers at their
table or to dance with them. (d) 'Professional dancer' shall include any woman
who dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee or
remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the operator or by the persons she
dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the owner, manager, administrator or
any person who operates and is responsible for the operation of any night club,
cabaret or dance hall. Section 3. Prohibition in the Issuance and Renewal
of Licenses, Permits. Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality
and because of their other adverse effects on this community as explained
above, no operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be
issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and
no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls
and professional dancer for employment in any of the aforementioned
establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said
persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the
renewal thereof. Section 4. Revocation of Permits and Licenses. The
licenses and permits issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls
which are now in operation including permits issued to professional hostesses,
hospitality girls and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the
expiration of the thirty-day period given them as provided in Section 8 hereof
and thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within the jurisdiction
of the municipality shall be illegal. Section 5. Penalty in case of violation.
Violation of any of the provisions of this Ordinance shall be punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding three (3) months or a fine not exceeding P200.00
or both at the discretion of the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical
entity, the person charged with the management and/or operation thereof shall
be liable for the penalty provided herein. Section 6. Separability Clause.
If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Ordinance is held
unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or provision hereof shall be
affected thereby. Section 7. Repealing Clause. All ordinance, resolutions,
circulars, memoranda or parts thereof that are inconsistent with the provisions
of this Ordinance are hereby repealed. Section 8. Effectivity. This
Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its approval; provided, however,
that operators of night clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in operation
including professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are
PUBCORP 2
given a period of thirty days from the approval hereof within which to wind up
their businesses and comply with the provisions of this Ordinance." 4
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction
were filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. 5 The grounds alleged
follow:
1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to
prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the
equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was
in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree
No. 189, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license
and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been
transferred to the Department of Tourism." 6 The cases were assigned to
respondent Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, who issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975. The answers were
thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: " 1. That the Municipal Council is
authorized by law not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs invoking Section 2243 of the RAC,
CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is
not violative of petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the
law, since property rights are subordinate to public interests. 3. That
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils
of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs." 7 There was the
admission of the following facts as having been established: "l. That petitioners
Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued
licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue-petitioner Jose Torres III, since
1958; petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960; petitioner Renato Alipio, since
1961 and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That petitioners had
invested large sums of money in their businesses; 3. That the night clubs are
well-lighted and have no partitions, the tables being near each other; 4. That
the petitioners owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls
therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out with customers; 5. That these
hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not
one of them is suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to
submit to a medical check-up or those who are found to be infected with
venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That the crime rate there is better
than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then came on
January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari
by way of appeal.
In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court dismissed the
petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the opening paragraph thus: "Those who
lust cannot last. This in essence is why the Municipality of Bocaue, Province
of Bulacan, stigmatized as it has been by innuendos of sexual titillation and
fearful of what the awesome future holds for it, had no alternative except to
order thru its legislative machinery, and even at the risk of partial economic
dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets. This in essence is
also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good government, and
cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal and social
revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police power the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council
of Bocaue, Bulacan. The restraining orders heretofore issued in these two
cases are therefore hereby rifted, effective the first day of February, 1976, the
purpose of the grace period being to enable the petitioners herein to apply to
the proper appellate tribunals for any contemplated redress."9 This Court is,
however, unable to agree with such a conclusion and for reasons herein set
forth, holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify the
enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as
follows: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.
- The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience
of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein." 10 It is practically a reproduction of the former Section 39 of
Municipal Code.11 An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof, according to
Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States
v. Abendan 12 "is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against
public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given
PUBCORP 2
subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not
prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable
exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced invalid." 13 In another leading
case, United States v. Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice
Malcolm, where the present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was
stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has two branches: One
branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to
such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.
With this class we are not here directly concerned. The second branch of the
clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council which
are enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary
and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.' It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with
the general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with
the laws or policy of the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then regulated
and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the
State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power
by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that
does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 16 It is clear that in the
guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of
personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous
of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made
and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended.
17 It was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN ACT
GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER
TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its first section insofar as pertinent
reads: "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have
the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars,
saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement
within its territorial jurisdiction: ... " 19 Then on May 21, 1954, the first section
was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise
"Prohibit ... " 20 The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as
Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the
above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far
as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed
decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all, however. The title was
not in any way altered. It was not changed one whit. The exact wording was
followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There
is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic
Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would
give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "
21 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not
prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is
a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, 22 in the
language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the
great public needs, 23 to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling,
occupation, or enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of
which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such
grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save
rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
We have done so before We do so again. 24
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific
provision of the recently-enacted Local Government Code. 25 The general
welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code provision, is set forth
in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the
PUBCORP 2
sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein; ..." 26 There are in addition provisions that may
have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniang
bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels,
inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist
guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns
of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and
regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority
without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss)
Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or
massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard
pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment; ..."
27 It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night
clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under
review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once
more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because
no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction.
That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued
existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile,
to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an
affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their
business. During such time, their employees would undergo a period of
deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it
should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays
less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken
appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a
deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element
of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full
deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and
reasonableness.
4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as a retreat
from its resolute stand sustaining police power legislation to promote public
morals. The commitment to such an Ideal forbids such a backward step.
Legislation of that character is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the
judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to lend the weight of
its support to measures that can be characterized as falling within that aspect
of the police power. Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 There is a
misapprehension as to what was decided by this Court. That was a regulatory
measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal
protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely regulated the mode in
which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices
which could encourage vice and immorality. This is an entirely different case.
What was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was pointed
out in the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc.
decision that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity, it was likewise
made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a requirement if a statute were
void on its face. That it certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at
the most dubious and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower
court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and nullied. Ordinance No.
84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and
unconstitutional. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby made permanent. No costs.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves his right to file a dissent.
De Castro, Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.
12. Binay v. Domingo (G.R. No. 92389, 11 September 1991)
G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
PUBCORP 2
Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner.
Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-
enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved
Resolution No. 60 which reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF
EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF
UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A" p. 39)
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved
families of Makati whose gross family income does not exceed two thousand
pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of other
requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash
relief from the Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the
municipal secretary certified a disbursement fired of four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program.
(Rollo, Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for
its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent
COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement
of finds for the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44)
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48,
respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by
respondent in its Decision No. 1159, in the following manner:
Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to wit:
1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati
and the intended disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power
and parens patriae and
2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification,
dated June 5, 1989, has already appropriated the amount of P400,000.00 to
implement the Id resolution, and the only function of COA on the matter is to
allow the financial assistance in question.
The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:
a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational relation to the
public safety, health, morals, or general welfare to be sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the police power. The mere assertion by the legislature that a
statute relates to the public health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the
statute within the police power of a state for there must always be an obvious
and real connection between the actual provisions of a police regulations and
its avowed purpose, and the regulation adopted must be reasonably adapted
to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16 Am. Jur 2d, pp. 542-543;
emphasis supplied).
Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective
sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged
public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati.
Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still
subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a
public purpose, i.e., that the disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial
assistance to a bereaved family of the Municipality of Makati, or a total of
P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be for the benefit of
the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for
the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case. On this point
PUBCORP 2
government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes.
(Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. 50-51, Rollo)
Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati,
through its Council, passed Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60
(Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52).
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision
No. 1159. Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil
action of certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159 be set aside as null
and void.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on
the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est
suprema lex Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort
and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit
v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation
may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by
the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A
valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be
inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as
a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the
fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give
effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on
public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. (62
C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such corporations are
as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the
inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the
municipal corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully
accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers.
(Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations,
as governmental agencies, must have such measures of the power as are
necessary to enable them to perform their governmental functions. The power
is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not
only does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police
power but the municipality does also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause:
pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and
issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP 337). And
under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and
safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in
the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense
it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC,
176 SCRA 719). On it depends the security of social order, the life and health
of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community,
the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and
it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests.
(16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it is not confined within narrow circumstances of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible
connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under
Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general
welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing
its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
PUBCORP 2
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not
capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms
to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet
the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be
commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs
of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently
as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a
broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially
occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and
general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to
deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to
everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the
corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to
frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60
is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be
for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority,
of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few
individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to
provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the
promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10,
Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid."
(Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for
the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion
of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as
subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups
may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down
to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been
passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-
farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards
social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though
not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it
is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This
decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal
for municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate
dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition
is hereby GRANTED and the Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is
hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
13. Tano v. Socrates (G.R. No. 110249. 21 August 1997)
[G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997]
ALFREDO TANO, BALDOMERO TANO, DANILO TANO, ROMUALDO
TANO, TEOCENES MIDELLO, ANGEL DE MESA, EULOGIO TREMOCHA,
FELIPE ONGONION, JR., ANDRES LINIJAN, ROBERT LIM, VIRGINIA LIM,
FELIMON DE MESA, GENEROSO ARAGON, TEODORICO ANDRE,
ROMULO DEL ROSARIO, CHOLITO ANDRE, ERICK MONTANO, ANDRES
OLIVA, VITTORIO SALVADOR, LEOPOLDO ARAGON, RAFAEL RIBA,
ALEJANDRO LEONILA, JOSE DAMACINTO, RAMIRO MANAEG, RUBEN
MARGATE, ROBERTO REYES, DANILO PANGARUTAN, NOE
GOLPAN,ESTANISLAO ROMERO, NICANOR DOMINGO, ROLDAN
TABANG, PANGANIBAN, ADRIANO TABANG, FREDDIE SACAMAY,
PUBCORP 2
MIGUEL TRIMOCHA, PACENCIO LABABIT, PABLO H. OMPAD,
CELESTINO A. ABANO, ALLAN ALMODAL, BILLY D. BARTOLAY, ALBINO
D. LIQUE, MELCHOR J. LAYSON, MELANI AMANTE, CLARO E. YATOC,
MERGELDO B. BALDEO, EDGAR M. ALMASET A., JOSELITO MANAEG,
LIBERATO ANDRADA, JR., ROBERTO BERRY, RONALD VILLANUEVA,
EDUARDO VALMORIA, WILDREDO MENDOZA, NAPOLEON BABANGA,
ROBERTO TADEPA, RUBEN ASINGUA, SILVERIO GABO, JERRY
ROMERO, DAVID PANGAGARUTAN, DANIEL PANGGARUTAN, ROMEO
AGAWIN, FERNANDO EQUIZ, DITO LEQUIZ, RONILO ODERABLE,
BENEDICTO TORRES, ROSITO A. VALDEZ, CRESENCIO A. SAYANG,
NICOMEDES S. ACOSTA, ERENEO A. SEGARINO, JR., WILDREDO A.
RAUTO, DIOSDADO A. ACOSTA, BONIFACIO G. SISMO, TACIO ALUBA,
DANIEL B. BATERZAL, ELISEO YBAEZ, DIOSDADO E. HANCHIC, EDDIE
ESCALICAS, ELEAZAR B. BATERZAL, DOMINADOR HALICHIC,
ROOSEVELT RISMO-AN, ROBERT C. MERCADER, TIRSO ARESGADO,
DANIEL CHAVEZ, DANILO CHAVEZ, VICTOR VILLAROEL, ERNESTO C.
YABANEZ, ARMANDO T. SANTILLAN, RUDY S. SANTILLAN, JODJEN
ILUSTRISIMO, NESTOR SALANGRON, ALBERTO SALANGRON, ROGER
L. ROXAS, FRANCISCO T. ANTICANO, PASTOR SALANGRON,
BIENVENIDO SANTILLAN, GILBUENA LADDY, FIDEL BENJAMIN
JOVELITO BELGANO, HONEY PARIOL, ANTONIO SALANGRON, NICASIO
SALANGRON, & AIRLINE SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION OF PALAWAN,
petitioners, vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, MEMBERS OF
SANGGUNIAN PANLALAWIGAN OF PALAWAN, namely, VICE-GOVERNOR
JOEL T. REYES, JOSE D. ZABALA, ROSALINO R. ACOSTA, JOSELITO A.
CADLAON, ANDRES R. BAACO, NELSON P. PENEYRA, CIPRIANO C.
BARROMA, CLARO E. ORDINARIO, ERNESTO A. LLACUN, RODOLFO C.
FLORDELIZA, GILBERT S. BAACO, WINSTON G. ARZAGA, NAPOLEON F.
ORDONEZ and GIL P. ACOSTA, CITY MAYOR EDWARD HAGEDORN,
MEMBERS OF SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG PUERTO PRINCESA,
ALL MEMBERS OF BANTAY DAGAT, MEMBERS OF PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE OF PALAWAN, PROVINCIAL AND CITY
PROSECUTORS OF PALAWAN and PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, and ALL
JUDGES OF PALAWAN, REGIONAL, MUNICIPAL AND METROPOLITAN,
respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-
92, dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto
Princesa; (b) Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993,
issued by Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c)
Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993,
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement
thereof; and (3) restrain respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City and Judges of Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts[1] and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from
assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases concerning the violation of the
Ordinances and of the Office Order.
More appropriately, the petition is, and shall be treated as, a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition.
The following is petitioners summary of the factual antecedents giving rise to
the petition:
1. On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa
City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993
entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH
AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1,
1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF, the full text of which reads as
follows:
Section 1. Title of the Ordinance. - This Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE
BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998
AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES THEREOF.
Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea
Waters from Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all
persons and/or entities operating within and outside the City of Puerto
Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the business or shipment of
live fish and lobster outside the City.
PUBCORP 2
Section 3. Definition of terms. - For purpose of this Ordinance the following are
hereby defined:
A. SEA BASS - A kind of fish under the family of Centropomidae, better known
as APAHAP;
B. CATFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Plotosidae, better known as
HITO-HITO;
C. MUDFISH - A kind of fish under the family of Orphicaphalisae better known
as DALAG
D. ALL LIVE FISH - All alive, breathing not necessarily moving of all specie[s]
use for food and for aquarium purposes.
E. LIVE LOBSTER - Several relatively, large marine crustaceans of the genus
Homarus that are alive and breathing not necessarily moving.
Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or
company to ship out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either
via aircraft or seacraft of any live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH,
MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.
Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating this
Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or
imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) months, cancellation of their permit
to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of the herein stated
penalties, upon the discretion of the court.
Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating the
provisions of this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty
prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon its president and/or
General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager, as the case maybe
[sic].
Section 7. Any existing ordinance or any provision of any ordinance
inconsistent to [sic] this ordinance is deemed repealed.
Section 8. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1993.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
2. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero
issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which
reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-
14-74, otherwise known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON
ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE,
OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS
POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS
REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City
Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL
LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM
JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and
directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live
fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto
Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of
destinations [sic] either via aircraft or seacraft.
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed
the required Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered
by invoice or clearance issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources and as to compliance with all other existing rules and
regulations on the matter.
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as
stated herein must be held for proper disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the
PAL Manager, the PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices
concerned for the needed support and cooperation. Further, that the usual
courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in the conduct of the
inspection.
PUBCORP 2
Please be guided accordingly.
xxx
3. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION
PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING,
SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS
FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR
SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA
GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL,
OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON
(TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS
(LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL
AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING
FROM PALAWAN WATERS, the full text of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that
only five (5) percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent
condition as [a] habitat of marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms;
WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and devastation of the
corals of our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like
dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances
and other related activities;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve
the existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones
to reinvigorate and regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five
(5) years;
WHEREAS, Sec. 468, Par. 1, Sub-Par. VI of the [sic] R.A. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
[upon] acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing, among others.
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Kagawad Nelson P. Peneyra and upon
unanimous decision of all the members present;
Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved, to approve Resolution No. 33, Series of
1993 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and to enact Ordinance No. 2 for the
purpose, to wit:
ORDINANCE NO. 2
Series of 1993
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN IN SESSION
ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. TITLE - This Ordinance shall be known as an Ordinance Prohibiting
the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng),
2. Epinephelus Fasciatus (Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or
Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4. Tridacna Gigas
(Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and
other species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7.
Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae
(Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and coming from
Palawan Waters.
Section II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Sec. 2-A (Rep. Act 7160). It is hereby declared, the policy of the state that
the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development
as self reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for [a]
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be
given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources.
2. Sec. 5-A (R.A. 7160). Any provision on a power of [a] local Government Unit
shall be liberaly interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
PUBCORP 2
government units. Any fair and reasonable doubts as to the existence of the
power shall be interpreted in favor of the Local Government Unit concerned.
3. Sec. 5-C (R.A. 7160). The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be
liberally interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the
people in the community.
4. Sec. 16 (R.A. 7160). General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom,
as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance; and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare.
Section III. DECLARATION OF POLICY. - It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the Province of Palawan to protect and conserve the marine resources of
Palawan not only for the greatest good of the majority of the present generation
but with [the] proper perspective and consideration of [sic] their prosperity, and
to attain this end, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan henceforth declares that is
[sic] shall be unlawful for any person or any business entity to engage in
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms as enumerated in Section 1 hereof in and
coming out of Palawan Waters for a period of five (5) years;
Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating
this Ordinance shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months
to twelve (12) months and confiscation and forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic]
and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion of the Court;
Section V. SEPARABILITY CLAUSE. - If for any reason, a Section or provision
of this Ordinance shall be held as unconditional [sic] or invalid, it shall not affect
the other provisions hereof.
Section VI. REPEALING CLAUSE. - Any existing Ordinance or a provision of
any ordinance inconsistent herewith is deemed modified, amended or
repealed.
Section VII. EFFECTIVITY. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days
after its publication.
SO ORDAINED.
xxx
4. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, Annexes A and C
hereof thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan
and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the
petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine
merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade;
5. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de
Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were even charged
criminally under criminal case no. 93-05-C in the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay, an original carbon copy of the criminal
complaint dated April 12, 1993 is hereto attached as Annex D; while xerox
copies are attached as Annex D to the copies of the petition;
6. Petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, on the other hand, were charged
by the respondent PNP with the respondent City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa
City, a xerox copy of the complaint is hereto attached as Annex E;
Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units,
prosecutors office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original
jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend
that:
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which
the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had
the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the
catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine
PUBCORP 2
coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or
gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of
petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were
unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts
which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business
endeavors to a successful conclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void,
the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have
to be dismissed.
In the Resolution of 15 June 1993 we required respondents to comment on the
petition, and furnished the Office of the Solicitor General with a copy thereof.
In their comment filed on 13 August 1993, public respondents Governor
Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
defended the validity of Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of
the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause (Section
16 of the Local Government Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific
power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and
Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such
powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that
the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain
healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted,
covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were
enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic
organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five
(5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged
to regenerate.
Aforementioned respondents likewise maintained that there was no violation
of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the
former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance
which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means;
while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who
catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches
live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium
cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all
those belonging to one class.
On 25 October 1993 petitioners filed an Urgent Plea for the Immediate
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order claiming that despite the pendency
of this case, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan was bent on
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 11223 against petitioners Danilo Tano,
Alfredo Tano, Eulogio Tremocha, Romualdo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Andres
Lemihan and Angel de Mesa for violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan. Acting on said plea, we issued on 11
November 1993 a temporary restraining order directing Judge Angel Miclat of
said court to cease and desist from proceeding with the arraignment and pre-
trial of Criminal Case No. 11223.
On 12 July 1994, we excused the Office of the Solicitor General from filing a
comment, considering that as claimed by said office in its Manifestation of 28
June 1994, respondents were already represented by counsel.
The rest of the respondents did not file any comment on the petition.
In the resolution of 15 September 1994, we resolved to consider the comment
on the petition as the Answer, gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.[2]
On 22 April 1997 we ordered impleaded as party respondents the Department
of Agriculture and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and required
the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on their behalf. But in light of
the latters motion of 9 July 1997 for an extension of time to file the comment
which would only result in further delay, we dispensed with said comment.
After due deliberation on the pleadings filed, we resolved to dismiss this
petition for want of merit, on 22 July 1997, and assigned it to the ponente for
the writing of the opinion of the Court.
I
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The first is composed of
Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Danilo Tano, Romualdo Tano, Teocenes
PUBCORP 2
Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Andres
Linijan, and Felimon de Mesa, who were criminally charged with violating
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 33 and Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1993, of the Province of Palawan, in Criminal Case No. 93-05-C of the 1st
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Palawan;[3] and Robert Lim and
Virginia Lim who were charged with violating City Ordinance No. 15-92 of
Puerto Princesa City and Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province of
Palawan before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa.[4] All of
them, with the exception of Teocenes Midello, Felipe Ongonion, Jr., Felimon
de Mesa, Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, are likewise the accused in Criminal
Case No. 11223 for the violation of Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan, pending before Branch 50 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan.[5]
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners
numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of several marine
merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.
The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the
prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the
constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have
been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being
fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the
ordinances.
As to the first set of petitioners, this special civil for certiorari must fail on the
ground of prematurity amounting to a lack of cause of action. There is no
showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the criminal cases, have
filed motions to quash the informations therein and that the same were denied.
The ground available for such motions is that the facts charged therein do not
constitute an offense because the ordinances in question are
unconstitutional.[6] It cannot then be said that the lower courts acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to justify recourse
to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition. It must further be
stressed that even if the petitioners did file motions to quash, the denial thereof
would not forthwith give rise to a cause of action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule is that where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy
therefrom is not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and
if, after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom
in the manner authorized by law.[7] And , even where in an exceptional
circumstance such denial may be the subject of a special civil action for
certiorari, a motion for reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court
concerned an opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be
dispensed with because of existing exceptional circumstances.[8] Finally, even
if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied, the remedy under
Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the grounds provided for in
Section 1 thereof.[9] For obvious reasons, the petition at bar does not, and
could not have , alleged any of such grounds.
As to the second set of petitioners, the instant petition is obviously one for
DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a declaration that the Ordinances in
question are a nullity ... for being unconstitutional.[10] As such, their petition
must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed of original jurisdiction over
petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved,[11] it
being settled that the Court merely exercises appellate jurisdiction over such
petitions.[12]
II
Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action
ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the
hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional or
compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should
be allowed. While we have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts
and with the Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
gives petitioners no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, so we held
in People v. Cuaresma:[13]
This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all hierarchy
of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
PUBCORP 2
first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are
better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent
further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on
the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land.
In Santiago v. Vasquez,[14] this Court forcefully expressed that the propensity
of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts must be put to a
halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court,
but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise,
in the adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to
the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We
reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.
III
Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of
petitioners, we opt to resolve this case on its merits considering that the lifetime
of the challenged Ordinances is about to end. Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City
of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1 January 1998, while Ordinance No.
2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19 February 1993, is effective for
only five (5) years. Besides, these Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in
the exercise of powers under the new LGC relative to the protection and
preservation of the environment and are thus novel and of paramount
importance. No further delay then may be allowed in the resolution of the
issues raised.
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local
government units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.[15] To overthrow
this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the
conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.[16]
Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.[17]
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the
Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners
contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Petitioners specifically point to Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7,
Article XIII of the Constitution as having been transgressed by the Ordinances.
The pertinent portion of Section 2 of Article XII reads:
SEC. 2. x x x
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources
by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII provide:
Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
xxx
SEC. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially
of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and
fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
PUBCORP 2
fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also
protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of
marine and fishing resources.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. In their petition, petitioner Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan is described as a private association composed of
Marine Merchants; petitioners Robert Lim and Virginia Lim, as merchants;
while the rest of the petitioners claim to be fishermen, without any qualification,
however, as to their status.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms
subsistence or marginal fishermen,[18] they should be construed in their
general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in
fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by
existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of
gathering the fish,[19] while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields
but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood.[20] Section 131(p) of the LGC
(R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual
engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale,
barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and
his immediate family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a
finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to
subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the
nations marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State
may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. Our survey of
the statute books reveals that the only provision of law which speaks of the
preferential right of marginal fishermen is Section 149 of the LGC of 1991
which pertinently provides:
SEC. 149. Fishery Rentals, Fees and Charges. -- x x x
(b) The sangguniang bayan may:
(1) Grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other
aquatic beds or bangus fry areas, within a definite zone of the municipal
waters, as determined by it: Provided, however, That duly registered
organizations and cooperatives of marginal fishermen shall have preferential
right to such fishery privileges ....
In a Joint Administrative Order No. 3, dated 25 April 1996, the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
Local Government prescribed the guidelines on the preferential treatment of
small fisherfolk relative to the fishery right mentioned in Section 149. This case,
however, does not involve such fishery right.
Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal
marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development, and
conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant
precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their
enjoyment by the people may be guaranteed not only for the present
generation, but also for the generations to come.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use
of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian
Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration,
development and utilization ... shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State. Moreover, their mandated protection, development, and
conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution,
imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor
of anyone. Thus, as to the curtailment of the preferential treatment of marginal
fisherman, the following exchange between Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo
and Commissioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., took place at the plenary session
of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. RODRIGO:
Let us discuss the implementation of this because I would not raise the hopes
of our people, and afterwards fail in the implementation. How will this be
implemented? Will there be a licensing or giving of permits so that government
officials will know that one is really a marginal fisherman? Or if policeman say
PUBCORP 2
that a person is not a marginal fisherman, he can show his permit, to prove
that indeed he is one.
MR. BENGZON:
Certainly, there will be some mode of licensing insofar as this is concerned
and this particular question could be tackled when we discuss the Article on
Local Governments -- whether we will leave to the local governments or to
Congress on how these things will be implemented. But certainly, I think our
Congressmen and our local officials will not be bereft of ideas on how to
implement this mandate.
xxx
MR. RODRIGO:
So, once one is licensed as a marginal fisherman, he can go anywhere in the
Philippines and fish in any fishing grounds.
MR. BENGZON:
Subject to whatever rules and regulations and local laws that may be passed,
may be existing or will be passed.[21] (underscoring supplied for emphasis).
What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the
Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.[22] On this score, in Oposa v. Factoran,[23] this Court
declared:
While the right to balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles the State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation - aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners - the advancement
of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution
for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-
founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second
, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come - generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment ...
The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh
and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In
fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right:
SEC. 16. General Welfare.-- Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (underscoring supplied).
Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare
provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the
local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people of the community.
The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize,
by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing;
and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.[24]
PUBCORP 2
Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the
sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia,
ordinances that [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other
forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance.[25]
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization[26] as
expressly mandated by the Constitution.[27] Indispensable thereto is
devolution and the LGC expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of
a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers
and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to
the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government
unit concerned,[28] Devolution refers to the act by which the National
Government confers power and authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.[29]
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the
conservation of mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters.
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal
waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and
not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest
reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two
lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the
boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third
line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it.[31] Under
P.D. No. 704, the marine waters included in municipal waters is limited to three
nautical miles from the general coastline using the above perpendicular lines
and a third parallel line.
These fishery laws which local government units may enforce under Section
17(b), (2), (i) in municipal waters include: (1) P.D. No. 704; (2) P.D. No. 1015
which, inter alia, authorizes the establishment of a closed season in any
Philippine water if necessary for conservation or ecological purposes; (3) P.D.
No. 1219 which provides for the exploration, exploitation, utilization, and
conservation of coral resources; (4) R.A. No. 5474, as amended by B.P. Blg.
58, which makes it unlawful for any person, association, or corporation to catch
or cause to be caught, sell, offer to sell, purchase, or have in possession any
of the fish specie called gobiidae or ipon during closed season; and (5) R.A.
No. 6451 which prohibits and punishes electrofishing, as well as various
issuances of the BFAR.
To those specifically devolved insofar as the control and regulation of fishing
in municipal waters and the protection of its marine environment are
concerned, must be added the following:
1. Issuance of permits to construct fish cages within municipal waters;
2. Issuance of permits to gather aquarium fishes within municipal waters;
3. Issuance of permits to gather kapis shells within municipal waters;
4. Issuance of permits to gather/culture shelled mollusks within municipal
waters;
5. Issuance of licenses to establish seaweed farms within municipal waters;
6. Issuance of licenses to establish culture pearls within municipal waters;
7. Issuance of auxiliary invoice to transport fish and fishery products; and
8. Establishment of closed season in municipal waters.
These functions are covered in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994
between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in
the LGC and the powers granted to local government units under Section 16
(the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447 (a) (1) (vi), 458 (a)
(1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under
R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP)
for Palawan Act, approved on 19 July 1992. This statute adopts a
comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan
compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and
PUBCORP 2
endangered environment of the province, which shall serve to guide the local
government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the
formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said
province.[32]
At this time then, it would be appropriate to determine the relation between the
assailed Ordinances and the aforesaid powers of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the Province of Palawan to protect the environment. To begin, we ascertain
the purpose of the Ordinances as set forth in the statement of purposes or
declaration of policies quoted earlier.
It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or
purposes: (1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic
animals covered therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals
of the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of
Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to
enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows
the establishment of closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been
expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994
between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and
Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare
clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces
to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment.[33]
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable,
ecological imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support
systems.[34] They collect, retain, and recycle nutrients for adjacent nearshore
areas such as mangroves, seagrass beds, and reef flats; provide food for
marine plants and animals; and serve as a protective shelter for aquatic
organisms.[35] It is said that [e]cologically, the reefs are to the oceans what
forests are to continents: they are shelter and breeding grounds for fish and
plant species that will disappear without them.[36]
The prohibition against catching live fish stems, in part, from the modern
phenomenon of live-fish trade which entails the catching of so-called exotic
tropical species of fish not only for aquarium use in the West, but also for the
market for live banquet fish [which] is virtually insatiable in ever more affluent
Asia.[37] These exotic species are coral-dwellers, and fishermen catch them
by diving in shallow water with corraline habitats and squirting sodium cyanide
poison at passing fish directly or onto coral crevices; once affected the fish are
immobilized [merely stunned] and then scooped by hand.[38] The diver then
surfaces and dumps his catch into a submerged net attached to the skiff .
Twenty minutes later, the fish can swim normally. Back on shore, they are
placed in holding pens, and within a few weeks, they expel the cyanide from
their system and are ready to be hauled. Then they are placed in saltwater
tanks or packaged in plastic bags filled with seawater for shipment by air freight
to major markets for live food fish.[39] While the fish are meant to survive, the
opposite holds true for their former home as [a]fter the fisherman squirts the
cyanide, the first thing to perish is the reef algae, on which fish feed. Days
later, the living coral starts to expire. Soon the reef loses its function as habitat
for the fish, which eat both the algae and invertebrates that cling to the coral.
The reef becomes an underwater graveyard, its skeletal remains brittle,
bleached of all color and vulnerable to erosion from the pounding of the
waves.[40] It has been found that cyanide fishing kills most hard and soft corals
within three months of repeated application.[41]
The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 of the
City of Puerto Princesa and the prohibited acts provided in Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993 of the Province of Palawan, on one hand, and the use of sodium
cyanide, on the other, is painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and
reasonableness of the Ordinances may not then be controverted.
As to Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, issued by Acting City Mayor Amado
L. Lucero of the City of Puerto Princesa, we find nothing therein violative of
any constitutional or statutory provision. The Order refers to the
implementation of the challenged ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo relies upon the lack
of authority on the part of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa to
enact Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1992, on the theory that the subject thereof
is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under P.D. No. 704, otherwise known as the
PUBCORP 2
Fisheries Decree of 1975; and that, in any event, the Ordinance is
unenforceable for lack of approval by the Secretary of the Department of
Natural Resources (DNR), likewise in accordance with P.D. No. 704.
The majority is unable to accommodate this view. The jurisdiction and
responsibility of the BFAR under P. D. no. 704, over the management,
conservation, development, protection, utilization and disposition of all fishery
and aquatic resources of the country is not all-encompassing. First, Section 4
thereof excludes from such jurisdiction and responsibility municipal waters,
which shall be under the municipal or city government concerned, except
insofar as fishpens and seaweed culture in municipal in municipal centers are
concerned. This section provides, however, that all municipal or city
ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries and any disposition
thereunder shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Department of Natural
Resources for appropriate action and shall have full force and effect only upon
his approval.[42]
Second, it must at once be pointed out that the BFAR is no longer under the
Department of Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and
Natural Resources). Executive Order No. 967 of 30 June 1984 transferred the
BFAR from the control and supervision of the Minister (formerly Secretary) of
Natural Resources to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food (MAF) and
converted it into a mere staff agency thereof, integrating its functions with the
regional offices of the MAF.
In Executive Order No. 116 of 30 January 1987, which reorganized the MAF,
the BFAR was retained as an attached agency of the MAF. And under the
Administrative Code of 1987,[43] the BFAR is placed under the Title
concerning the Department of Agriculture.[44]
Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of
Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by
the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would
be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of
municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has
been dispensed with in view of the following reasons:
(1) Section 534 (Repealing Clause) of the LGC expressly repeals or amends
Section 16 and 29 of P.D. No. 704[45] insofar that they are inconsistent with
the provisions of the LGC.
(2) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local
government units have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters,
and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate
ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances,
electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to
prosecute other methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the
provisions of applicable fishing laws.[46] Finally, it imposes upon the
sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang
panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and
lakes or of ecological imbalance.[47]
In closing, we commend the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Puerto
Princesa and Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Palawan for
exercising the requisite political will to enact urgently needed legislation to
protect and enhance the marine environment, thereby sharing in the herculean
task of arresting the tide of ecological destruction. We hope that other local
government units shall now be roused from their lethargy and adopt a more
vigilant stand in the battle against the decimation of our legacy to future
generations. At this time, the repercussions of any further delay in their
response may prove disastrous, if not, irreversible.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PUBCORP 2
14. White Light Corp. v. City of Manila (G.R. No. 122846, 20 January
2009)
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA.
MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,
Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist
district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash
between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the
archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city
ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other
establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a
similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments
from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for
such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against
our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of
law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which
seeks the reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court
of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled,
"An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses,
Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law
the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City
Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality
of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting
short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic],
wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in
hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and
charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the
renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be
concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the
same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any
provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine
of Five Thousand (5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not
exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the
manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable:
Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense,
the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not
consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby
deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
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Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November
10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation
(MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant,
herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC
prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC
claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it
was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on
a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of
only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium
Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC)
filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on
the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The three companies are
components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC
also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw
as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The
RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist
from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22,
1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on
March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the
Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the
case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance
null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of
Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference
was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises
and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate
economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships
the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by
simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance
annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate
purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be
effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and
carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20
The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated
January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and
referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government
units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses
and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
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The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City
under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation
and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and
its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties
for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos fine
or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single
offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it
violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive
interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not
violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes
the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time
stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained
by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate.
Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of
its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators
Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.25
In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions
they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed
Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners standing. Petitioners
allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their
business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However,
petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also
being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these
establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their
patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court
sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support
that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing
is built on the principle of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does
unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions
rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived
directly from the Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing
doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of
precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal
interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a
petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such
as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially
in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an
exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32
the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an injury-in-fact, thus
giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue
in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there
must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation
of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil
PUBCORP 2
Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for
customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest
were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or
equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state
action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held
that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that
would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or
adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those
who have this kind of confidential relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein
the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has
standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a
statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and
to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that
the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their
patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine
comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action
are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to
statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies
when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.39
In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping
intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional
rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time
frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only
the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40
Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a
prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender,
nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a
motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar
to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on
motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However,
the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the
Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar
goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective
ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public
morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments.
This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban
on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have
been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to
which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban
is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local
government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as
the general welfare clause.
A.
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Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of
the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people.43 Police
power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45
gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our
nations legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of
the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with
the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to
the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of
Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his
cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of
due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by
a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their
political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or legislative
actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by
the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political
decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary
is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and
good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral
arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through
the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which
the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional
questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as
guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades
a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.
The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation
or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty
insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two
related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality
of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise
absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities
are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by
the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient
justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law,
has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as
it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it
can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been
predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal
result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the
prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired
potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process
grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid
down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4
of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to
the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular"
PUBCORP 2
minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing
with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational
basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on
gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v.
Reed.56 While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection
analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due
process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of
equal protection challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest.58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.59
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its
earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such
as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the
injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the
application of the most deferential standard the rational basis test. Yet as
earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of
availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers
were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly,
these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel
the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter
gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms which
the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of
their constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty
enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental
right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of
what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom
where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they
interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately
understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty
which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that
most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man
to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65] In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties
in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the
concept of liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to
clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . .
guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not
PUBCORP 2
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the
subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution,
adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the
ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."68 Whether or not this depiction
of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate
sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of
Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy
and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing
the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His
separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental
that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot
abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that
his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to
himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is
set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe
that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe,
the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe
accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would
proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting
the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose
pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their
homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have
a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any
person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span
of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons
of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71
It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will
not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck
down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the
exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away
from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising
space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The
Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons
engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it
prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even
unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
PUBCORP 2
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit
patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-
Malate area, its longtime home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to
depict our capital city the Pearl of the Orient as a modern-day Sodom or
Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams
of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving
big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as
Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis
wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus
attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to
Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited
and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive
measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on
the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities.
Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from
their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms
and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent
that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well--intentioned the Ordinance
may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains
the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly
equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with
immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens
deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do
not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the
promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle.78
The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-
legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively
little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate
accommodation of different interests.79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot
legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as
explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning
that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public
attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on
age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions
between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the
acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental
liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration
on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the
individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by
the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral
duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason
of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and
because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable
complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in
the face of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often
be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the
constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to
promote morality.
PUBCORP 2
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
15. Social Justice Society v. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052. February 13,
2008; see also Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers v. Lim/Atienza
(G.R. No. 187836, 25 November 2014)
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and
BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,
Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society
(SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to
compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on
November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its
publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to
local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order,
safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from
Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring
health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and
Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land
bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata
St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in
the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the
southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from
Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation
of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a
period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within
which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are hereby
in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy
(DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil
companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the
oil companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES
shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the
Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
PUBCORP 2
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with
the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer
and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the
OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management, including
the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with
international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic
considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL
COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and
integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and
operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into
by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer
zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL
COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole
responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the
following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its
appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and
intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the
joint operations and the scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES
compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect
the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future
occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the
same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for
a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30,
2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue
special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also
called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4,
2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend
or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under
Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the
oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.
Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by
the MOU and the resolutions.14 However, he also confusingly argues that the
ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter
has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and
in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from
enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be
considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus
may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that
is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty
that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy
PUBCORP 2
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have
a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and
it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required
to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a
duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The
principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not
to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ
to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established.
Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the
enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party
registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It
claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a
mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are
regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in
the enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned the
right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21
He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil
companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have
made the respondents duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear
or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners,
that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of
the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were
inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and
made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only
until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders
respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest
of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the
Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should
be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.