PERSONSdigest

Article 2 and 3, NCC Ruling: In a long line of decisions, this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is

Tanada v. Tuvera
necessary in those cases where the legislation
GR No. L-63915, April 24, 1985 itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
then the date of publication is material for
Ponente: Escolin, J
determining its date of effectivity, which is the
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it
Facts: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to
goes into effect.
compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official However, petitioners argument is correct
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
instructions, general orders, proclamations, with the fact of publication. Taking into
executive orders, letter of implementation and consideration other applicable laws, a conclusion
administrative orders. is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the
Respondents however contend that publication in
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the
Section 1. There shall be published in the
presidential issuances in question contain special
Official Gazette all important legislative acts and
provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of
publication in the Official Gazette is not
the Philippines; all executive and administrative
indispensable for their effectivity, citing Article 2
orders and proclamations, except such as have no
of the New Civil Code as basis.
general applicability; decisions or abstracts of
Issue: Is the contention of the respondents decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of
tenable? Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; such
documents or classes of documents as may be
Ateneo de Davao University

Jacinto St., Davao City
required so to be published by law; and such Thus, respondents are ordered to publish in the
documents or classes of documents as the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
President of the Philippines shall determine from issuances which are of general application, and
time to time to have general applicability and legal unless so published, they shall have no binding
effect, or which he may authorize so to be force and effect.
published.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is

to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions
Article 2 and 3, NCC
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the Tanada v. Tuvera
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
Ponente: Cruz, J
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
The publication of all presidential issuances of a

Facts: This petition is for reconsideration/
public nature or of general applicability is
clarification of a decision. Petitioners invoke the
mandated by law as well as a requirement of due
due process of law in demanding the disclosure of
process while other presidential issuances which
a number of presidential decrees which they
apply only to particular persons or class of persons
claimed had not been published as required by
such as administrative and executive orders need
law. The government argued that while
not be published on the assumption that they
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
have been circularized to all concerned. It is a rule
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
of law that before a person may be bound by law,
decrees themselves declared that they were to
he must first be officially and specifically informed
become effective immediately upon their
of its contents.
approval.

Issue/s: 1. W/n the clause unless it is otherwise The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
provided found in Article 2 of NCC means only to those of general application. Thus,
publication of laws or other issuances is not always all statutes, including those of local application
imperative and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
2. What is meant by "law of public nature" or
after publication unless a different effectivity date
"general applicability"?
is fixed by the legislature.
3. Must a distinction be made between laws of

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
general applicability and laws which are not?
executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
4. What is meant by "publication"?
same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
5. Where is the publication to be made? present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be
6. When is the publication to be made? published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
Ruling: The clause unless it is otherwise
delegation.
provided found in Article 2 of NCC refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of Interpretative regulations and those merely
publication itself, which cannot in any event be internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
omitted. personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
publication required of the so-called letters of
legislature may, in its discretion, provide that the
instructions issued by administrative superiors
usual fifteen-day period be shortened or
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
extended. An omission in the publication of laws
by their subordinates in the performance of their
would offend due process insofar as it would deny
duties.
the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Ignorance of the law Even the charter of a city must be published
excuses no one from compliance therewith. notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of

the national territory and directly affects only the requirement not even a substantial compliance to
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees the requirement.
must be published, including even those naming a
public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are Article 2, NCC
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce. G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988
However, no publication is required of the Ponente: Cortes, J

instructions issued by the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned
head of a government agency on the assignments
by the petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
tailoring shop owned by the private-respondents
office uniforms. Municipal ordinances are not
resulting to the death of their daughter, Marissa
covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Bernal. Private respondents have been warned
Code.
regarding the proximity of their shop to the
Thus, all laws as defined above shall be published weakened firewall but the former failed to heed
in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective the warning of the petitioners. On the basis of the
only after fifteen days from their publication, or on foregoing facts, the Regional trial Court rendered
another date specified by the legislature, in judgment finding the petitioners guilty of gross
accordance with Article 2 of NCC. The mere negligence and awarding damages to the
mention of the number of the presidential decree, petitioners and was later affirmed by the Court of
the title of such decree, the supposed date of Appeals. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion

for reconsideration, which was eventually denied Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
by the appellate court in the Resolution of sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion requested. (at p. 212)
for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but
In this case, petitioners motion for extension of
this was denied in the Resolution of October 27,
time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a
1987.
year after the expiration of the grace period on
Hence this petition. June 30, 1986.
Issue/s: W/n the CA committed grave abuse of The argument of the petitioners that the
discretion in denying the motion of the petitioners rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not
be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the
Ruling: No. Applying the rule laid down in
non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No.
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision
70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461], that the
of the Court of Appeals was promulgated must
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a
likewise be rejected. There is no law requiring the
motion for reconsideration cannot be extended,
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
thus, the CA committed no grave abuse of
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as
discretion. In the Resolution denying the motion
a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30, 1986
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
(142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
clarified the rule, to wit:
Supreme Court particularly where issues have
Beginning one month after the been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be published in the advance reports of Supreme
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as
time to file a motion for reconsideration may be the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and
filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial law journals.
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the

The present petition must be denied for lack of
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may
merit.
be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme

On petition of Don Jose the court by
a providencia of May 7 fixed the term of fifteen
days as that within which Doa Francisca should
formulate her demand, which term was
Article 3, NCC
subsequently enlarged seven days on petition of
Jose Zulueta vs. Francisca Zulueta Doa Francisca. June 5 Doa Francisca petitioned
the court, stating that the new Code of Procedure
G.R. No. 428 April 30, 1902 enacted by the Civil Commission was soon to
become operative, and that she deemed it more
Ponente: Ladd, J
advantageous to her rights that the declarative
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion action which she had to bring should be governed
by the new Code rather than that then in force,
Facts: Don Jose Zulueta and his sister, Doa
and asking that proceedings in the action should
Francisca Zulueta, are sole heirs under the will of
be suspended till the new Code went into effect.
their father, Don Clemente Zulueta, who died in
This petition was denied by the court in
Iloilo in 1900. In the course of the voluntary
an auto rendered June 15, declaring, furthermore,
testamentary proceedings instituted in the Court
that the term fixed for the filing of the demand
of First Instance of Iloilo by Don Jose, three
having expired, and thus, Doa Francisca has lost
auditors were appointed to make a division of the
her right to institute the action. On June 22 Doa
estate under article 1053 of the Ley de
Francisca petitioned for the reform of this auto.
Enjuiciamiento Civil, of whom Don Jose and Doa
On the same day this petition was denied in
Francisca each nominated one, the third or auditor
an auto rendered by Don Cirilo Mapa.
umpire being chosen by common accord of the
parties. The two auditors nominated by the parties Hence this recourse.
respectively failed to agree, and each rendered a

Issue/s: W/n Doa Francisca is entitled to relief
separate report. The auditor umpire, whose report
against the consequences of her failure to
was filed March 29, 1901, agreed with and
interpose her appeal against the auto of June 22
accepted in its entirety the report of the auditor
within the period fixed by the law
nominated by Don Jose.

Ruling: The mistake in this instance was her own, view that occurs to us, have been granted. With
but it was a mistake of law, and while we should reference to the declaration in the auto that the
be unwilling to say that special cases might not plaintiff had lost her right to file her demand in the
occur in which relief would be afforded in such a declarative action, it may be said that this
proceeding as this against a mistake of law made declaration followed as a necessary consequence
by a party, we are of opinion that the present is from the providencia of May 7, fixing the time
not such a case. Nothing is shown here except the within which the demand must be formulated, and
bare fact that the party acted under ignorance or the subsequent providencia enlarging the period,
misconception of the provisions of the law in from neither of which providencias had any
regard to the time within which the appeal could appeal or other remedy been attempted by Doa
be taken, and there is no reason why the general Francisca. The petitioner had the benefit of that
principle, a principle "founded not only on period granted by law and was accorded besides
expediency and policy but on necessity," that an extension of seven days, and has consequently
"ignorance of the law does not excuse from had all the rights to which she was strictly entitled
compliance therewith" (Civil Code, art. 2), should under the law and something more. Thus, she has,
be relaxed. The framers of Act No. 75 could not we think no just ground to complain that she has
have intended to totally abrogate this principle been deprived of any substantial right either by
with reference to the class of cases covered by the her own mistake or that of the court below, in any
act. If such were the effect of this legislation the possible view in which the facts of the case may be
court "would be involved and perplexed with regarded.
questions incapable of any just solution and
embarrassed by inquiries almost interminable."
The petition for the suspension of the declarative

action till the new Code went into effect was
Article 3, NCC
totally without merit. No reason was alleged in the
petition itself why the suspension should be Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez
granted other than the mere convenience of the
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, March 8, 2001
party, and none has been suggested on the
argument. The petition could not, in any possible Ponente: Davide, Jr. C.J.

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion Ruling: Yes. In their separate affidavits executed
on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
Facts: Herminia Manzano alleged that she was the
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and
lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San
prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
contract, it was indicated that both were
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that
separated.
marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Respondent Judge knew or ought to know
Luzviminda Payao before respondent that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he
was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract stated that had he known that the late Manzano
clearly stated that both contracting parties were was married he would have discouraged him from
separated. contracting another marriage. And respondent

Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano and
Respondent judge however countered
Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same
that when he officiated the marriage between
was clearly stated in their separate affidavits
Manzano and Payao, he did not know that
which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated
that the two had been living together as husband
gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
and wife for seven years already without the
void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint
ignorance of the law excuses no one has special
affidavit. He then prayed that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
merely to harass him.
embodiment of competence, integrity, and
Issue: W/n respondent judge committed gross independence. It is highly imperative that judges
ignorance of the law in solemnizing the marriage be conversant with the law and basic legal
of Manzano and Payao principles. And when the law transgressed is

simple and elementary, the failure to know it Several years later, he found the Notice to
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Sign the Roll of Attorneys and it was then that he
realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
The finding of the Court Administrator
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC
that the respondent judge be found guilty of gross
was probably just an attendance record. By that
ignorance of law be adopted.
time, he was already working. He stated that he
was mainly doing corporate and taxation work,
and that he was not actively involved in litigation
practice. Thus, he operated under the mistaken
Article 3, NCC belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent,
In Re: Medado
nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer; and the
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
Ponente: Sereno, C.J. forgotten.

On 6 February 2012 or about 7 years later,
Facts: Medado graduated from the University of Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he
the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
Laws in 1971 and passed the same years bar

Issue/s: W/n the petition must be granted
examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7. Ruling: The petition must be denied.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
Oath at the Philippine International Convention
excuse a person from the legal consequences of
Center (PICC) and was scheduled to sign in the Roll
his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a
of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed to do
mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
justification, because everyone is presumed to
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia
Attorneys given by the Bar Office.
facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
Applying these principles to the case at bar, husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
Medado may have at first operated under an decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
he had signed at the PICC entrance before the
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an
oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
However, the moment he realized that what he
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
had signed was merely an attendance record, he
government. Petitioner a Filipina and
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
a valid justification. At that point, Medado should
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
have known that he was not a full-fledged
City. In their application for a marriage license,
member of the Philippine Bar because of his
respondent was declared as "single" and
failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the
"Filipino."
act of signing therein that would have made him
so.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were
still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Article 3, NCC
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Garcia-Recio v. Recio
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001 Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent
Ponente: Panganiban, J. allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage
Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing
as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He decree itself and respondent miserably failed to
contended that his first marriage to an Australian establish these elements.
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce
Hence this petition.
decree obtained in Australian in 1989; thus, he
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
Issue/s: W/n the mere submission of a divorce
1994.
decree itself issued in a foreign country is
sufficient to prove its existence and thus merits
On July 7, 1998, while the suit for the declaration
recognition under our jurisdiction
of nullity was pending, respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Ruling: The petition is partly meritorious.
Sydney, Australia because the "marriage had
irretrievably broken down." Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on
the other hand, a writing or document may be
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the proven as a public or official record of a foreign
Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
stated no cause of action. The RTC declared their copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
marriage dissolved. The decision rendered was custody of the document. If the record is not kept
based on the ground that the divorce decree in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a)
issued in Australia is valid and recognized here in accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
the Philippines and not on Redericks lack of legal diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
capacity to marry. foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of
the seal of his office.
the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng The divorce decree between respondent and
Gee, petitioner argues that the divorce decree, Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
like any other foreign judgment, may be given issued by an Australian family court. However,
recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the

aforemetioned rules on evidence must be Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
demonstrated.
Facts: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in residing, leaving behind real and personal
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to properties here in the Philippines worth
its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not P300,000.00 more or less.
been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification.
grant of letters of administration alleging among
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
others that (a) they are the children of the
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
object properly rendered the divorce decree
knowledge Sy Mat died intestate; (c) they do not
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the
Sydney, Australia.
filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they
The case is thereby remanded to the court a quo nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as
to receive evidence proving respondents legal administratrix of the intestate estate of the
capacity to marry. deceased. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee,
Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen .
After hearing, the probate court held in favor of

the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed
Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix of the intestate
Article 3, NCC
estate of the deceased , finding among others
Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales that:
G.R. No. L-55960, November 24, 1988 (1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee.
Ponente: Cortes, J.

(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chun Yen agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in
are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy Mat her case, her elder brother was the one who
and, contracted or entered into an agreement with the
parents of her husband; that she has five children
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
with Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that she and
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged
her husband, Sy Mat, have been living in FooKien,
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion
China before he went to the Philippines on several
Gillego.
occasions; that the practice during the time of her
marriage was a written document is exchanged
However, the Court of Appeals modified the
just between the parents of the bride and the
decision of the probate court upon appeal
parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter;
declaring among others that:
that in China, the custom is that there is a go-
(1) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu between, a sort of marriage broker who is known
and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged natural to both parties who would talk to the parents of
children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-
wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the be agree to have the groom-to-be their son in-law,
legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao then they agree on a date as an engagement day;
Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to that on engagement day, the parents of the groom
the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China. would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents
of the bride-to-be, and then one month after that,
Issue/s: W/n the legality of Yao Kees marriage a date would be set for the wedding, which in her
with Sy Kiat was sufficiently proved case, the wedding date to Sy Kiat was set on
January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the
Ruling: No. To support their allegations, the
bridegroom brings with him a couch (sic) where
petitioners presented the following evidences:
the bride would ride and on that same day, the
First: Yao Kees testimony that she was married to parents of the bride would give the dowry for her
Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that daughter and then the document would be signed
she does not have a marriage certificate because by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer
the practice during that time was for elders to as is known in the Philippines; that during the

wedding day, the document is signed only by the Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger
parents of the bridegroom as well as by the brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among
parents of the bride; that the parties themselves the many people who attended the wedding of his
do not sign the document; that the bride would sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate
then be placed in a carriage where she would be is issued by the Chinese government, a document
brought to the town of the bridegroom and before signed by the parents or elders of the parties being
departure the bride would be covered with a sort sufficient.
of a veil; x x x that during her wedding, Sy Chick,
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego
the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document
when she testified before the trial court to the
with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of
effect that (a) Sy Mat was married to Yao Kee
that document, she and Sy Mat were married for
according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat's
46 years already and the document was left in
admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom
China and she doubt if that document can still be
he married according to Chinese custom
found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy
Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien
the whereabouts of that document because of the
issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where
lapse of many years and because they left it in a
the following entries are found: "Marital status
certain place and it was already eaten by the
Married"; "If married give name of spousesYao
termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they
Kee"; "Address-China; "Date of marriage1931";
lived immediately together as husband and wife,
and "Place of marriageChina" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat
went to the Philippines sometime in March or Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration
April in the same year they were married; that she issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the
went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came following entries are likewise found: "Civil status
back to China; that again she went back to the Married"; and, 'If married, state name and address
Philippines and lived with Sy Mat as husband and of spouseYao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit
wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat "4".]
during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to
China. And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on
October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's

Republic of China to the effect that "according to The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article
the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the
Yip also Chinese were married on January 19, 1931
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
in Fukien, the People's Republic of China"
the country where they were performed and valid
These evidence may very well prove the fact of there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
the same do not suffice to establish the validity of marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or (Emphasis supplied.) ***
custom.
Construing this provision of law the Court has held
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49
Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 (1922).]
citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided
Law, Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that
in the Rules of Court. With respect to
"a custom must be proved as a fact, according to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45
the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On
states that:
this score the Court had occasion to state that "a
local custom as a source of right can not be
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral
considered by a court of justice unless such
testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
custom is properly established by competent
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a
evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7
foreign country, as are also printed and published
Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the
one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign country, if proved to be commonly
foreign custom.
admitted in such courts.

Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, validity of the marriage in accordance with said
is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus: law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and
Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official
record.An official record or an entry therein, Further, it is a well-established principle that
when admissible for any purpose, may be Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as
a copy attested by the officer having the legal any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs,
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the (1930).]
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
Finally, in the absence of the proof of the Chinese
the custody. If the office in which the record is
law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
the same as ours.
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and authenticated by the
seal of his office.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any Article 3, NCC
competent evidence relative to the law and
Miciano v. Brimo
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of
Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof
G.R. No. L-2259, November 1, 1927
of China's law or custom on marriage not only
because they are Ponente: Romualdez, J.
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there
is no showing that they are competent to testify Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
on the subject matter. For failure to prove the

Facts: The judicial administrator of the estate of
foreign law or custom, and consequently, the
the deceased Joseph Brimo filed a scheme of

partition but Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of Article 4, NCC
the deceased, opposed it. He alleged that the
Juliano-Llave v. Republic
declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent
to this cause is an error on the part of the court.
G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
The opposition is based on the fact that it puts into

Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
effect the provision of Joseph Brimos will which
are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
nationality, which are void for violating Article 10
Facts: At about 11 months before the death of
of the Civil Code.
Sen. Tamano, he married Estrellita twice-first
Issue/s: W/n Andre Brimos contention is tenable under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27,
1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a
Ruling: In the absence of evidence proving the
civil ceremony at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June
existence foreign laws, they are presumed as
2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamanos
those of the Philippines. In this case, Andre failed
civil status was indicated as divorced. Since then,
to prove what the Turkish laws are. He himself
Estrellita has been representing himself as Sen.
recognized it when he sought to be granted the
Tamanos wife.
opportunity to present evidence regarding said
laws. Thus, the refusal of the court to give another On November 23, 1994, Haja Putri Zorayda
opportunity to the oppositor does not constitute Tamano and her son Adib Ahma Tamano, in behalf
an error. There is, therefore, no evidence on of Sen. Tamanos other legitimate children filed a
record that the national law of the testator Joseph complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
Brimo was violated in the testamentary between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
dispositions in question which, not being contrary bigamous.
to our laws in force, must be complied with and

The complainant alleged that Sen.
executed.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites and that this marriage remained
subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.
Furthermore, they averred that the marriage of

Sen. Tamano and Zorayda, having been celebrated Estrellitas motion prompting her to file a
under the New Civil Code, is therefore governed certiorari petition. The Court of Appeals however
by said law. Based on Article 35(4) of the Family resolved the petition adverse to Estrellita .
Code, the subsequent marriage entered into by Subsequent to the CAs decision, the RTC ordered
the deceased with Defendant Llave is void ab initio Estrellita to present her evidence but she again
because he contracted the same while his prior asked for extension.
marriage to Complainant Zorayda was still
Because of the delay, Zorayda and Adib
subsisting, and his status being declared as
moved to submit the case for decision.
"divorced" has no factual or legal basis, because
Subsequently, the RTC declared that the marriage
the deceased never divorced Complainant
of Zorayda and Sen. Tamano still subsists thus Sen.
Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not have
Tamanos marriage to Estrellita is void for being
validly done so because divorce is not allowed
bigamous and was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
under the New Civil Code. Moreover, the
deceased did not and could not have divorced
Issue/s: W/n the CA erred in affirming the decision
Complainant Zorayda by invoking the provision of
of the RTC
P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, because the marriage of the Ruling: The Civil Code governs the marriage of
deceased with Zorayda was never deemed, legally Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
and factually, to have been one contracted under was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos
Muslim law as provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. subsequent marriage to Estrellita is thus, void ab
1083, since they (deceased and Complainant initio.
Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and
thus covered by this law;
Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
After asking for extension of time, under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
Estrellita later filed a Motion to Dismiss where she governing marriage relationships between
alleged that Sen. Tamano and Zoryda are both Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code
Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
as averred in the latters disbarment complaint marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
against Sen. Tamano. The Trial Court denied marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is

not recognized except during the effectivity of otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their
Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of validity or legality or operate to extinguish any
during its effectivity. right acquired or liability incurred thereby.
Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been The foregoing provisions are consistent
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law with the principle that all laws operate
that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is
1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) clearly, plainly and unequivocally expressed or
thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or doubt will be resolved against the retroactive
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the operation of laws. Article 186 aforecited
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to
law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But have its provisions applied prospectively, and
we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-
13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation existing body of law, specifically, the Civil Code
where the parties were married both in civil and in respect of civil acts that took place before the
Muslim rites." Muslim Codes enactment.
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on An instance of retroactive application of the
February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively Muslim Code is Article 186(2) which states:
override the Civil Code which already bestowed
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to
certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and
the effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-
Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
Muslim law shall be considered as one contracted
prospective application of its provisions unless
under Muslim law provided the spouses register
otherwise provided:
their mutual desire to this effect.
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. Acts
Even granting that there was registration of
executed prior to the effectivity of this Code shall
mutual consent for the marriage to be considered
be governed by the laws in force at the time of
as one contracted under the Muslim law, the
their execution, and nothing herein except as
registration of mutual consent between Zorayda

and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The check
are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was
under both civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated
have already settled, the Civil Code governs their reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED
personal status since this was in effect at the time ACCOUNT."
of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen.
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas
Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the
Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage
time Estrellita married him, their subsequent
company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial
marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void ab
Court where Co was convicted of the crime
initio. Petition is denied.
charged, and sentenced to suffer a term of
imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify
the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed his conviction to the CA arguing that
he must be exonerated from the charge citing the
Article 4, NCC
decision of the Supreme Court in Que v. People
Co vs. Court of Appeals (1987)- that a check issued merely to guarantee

the performance of an obligation is nevertheless
G.R. No. 100776; October 28, 1993 covered by B.P. 22 as a basis.
Ponente: Narvasa, C. J. It is because at the time of the issuance of

the check on September 1, 1983, 4 years before
the promulgation of the decision on the case of
Que v. People, the delivery of a rubber or
Facts: In connection with an agreement to
bouncing check as a guarantee for an obligation
salvage and refloat a sunken vessel and in
was not considered as a punishable offense, an
payment of his share of the expenses of the
official pronouncement made in a Circular of a
salvage operations therein stipulated petitioner
Ministry of Justice dated December 15, 1981.
Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on
September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November

The said Administrative Circular was cases as well as to administrative rulings and
subsequently reversed by another issued on circulars. The principle of prospectivity has also
August 8, 1984 almost 1 year after Co had been applied to judicial decisions which, although
delivered the bouncing check to the complainant in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence
on September 1, 1983. of what the laws mean....the reason underlying
Article 8 of the NCC.
The CA affirmed his conviction by citing Senarillos
v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court The ratio of this principle is found in the case of
opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to Chicot County Dainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank
the passage of new law but was merely a (1940). The Chicot doctrine advocates the
construction or interpretation of a pre-existing imperative necessity to take account of the actual
one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3, 1979. existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as
an operative fact negating acceptance of a
Hence this petition. principle of absolute retroactive invalidity.
Issue/s: W/n the decision of the Court in the case The weight of authority tilts in the proposition that
of Que v. People be given retroactive application the Courts decision in Que v People should no be
given retroactive effect to the prejudice of the
Ruling: Article 8 of the NCC, states that Judicial
petitioner and other persons situated, who relied
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system
that such a check did not fall within the scope of
of the Philippines," while Article 4 of the Code
B.P. Blg. 22.
declares that "Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided," which is Everything considered, the Court sees no
echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
"Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar prohibita should override the principle of
as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is prospectivity.
not a habitual criminal . . .
The criminal prosecution against the petitioner is
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, dismissed.
original or amendatory, has been applied in many

banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of
the Second Division.
Article 4, NCC
Frivaldo won the election but on June 9, 1995, Lee
Frivaldo v. COMELEC
filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental)
petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-
G.R. No. 120295; June 28, 1996
elected Governor of Sorsogon which was
Ponente: Panganiban, J. subsequently granted and he was duly proclaimed
on June 30, 1995. With that, Frivaldo sought the
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion annulment of Lees proclamation alleging that on
June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
Facts: On March 20, 1995, private respondent
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines
Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy
after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May
which he filed with the Special Committee on
8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner
Naturalization in September 1994 had been
Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a
granted". As such, when "the said order (dated
petition with the Comelec docketed as SPA No.
June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released
95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from
and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30
seeking or holding any public office or position by
o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
reason of not yet being a citizen of the
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy
governor . . .".
be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division
of the Comelec promulgated a On December 19, 1995, the COMELEC First
Resolution granting the petition. Division rendered its decision stating that Lee,
"not having garnered the highest number of
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo
votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed
remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he
"having garnered the highest number of votes,
was voted for during the elections held on said
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship
date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en
by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the

provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) "healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the
qualified to hold the office of governor of means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and)
Sorsogon". are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are
Issue/s: W/n the repatriation of Frivaldo can be retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to
given retroactive effect correct errors or irregularities and to render valid
and effective attempted acts which would be
Ruling: The Court also held that the repatriation of
otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties
Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his
intended."
application on August 17, 1994.
On the other hand, remedial or procedural

It is true that under the Civil Code of the
laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive
modes of procedure, which do not create new or
effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there
take away vested rights, but only operate in
are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in
rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the
According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those general rule against the retrospective operation of
which are undertaken to cure errors and statutes.
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
creates a new right, and also provides for a new
or private deeds and contracts which otherwise
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws.
would not produce their intended consequences by
On the other hand, said statute also provided
reason of some statutory disability or failure to
a new remedy and a new right in favor of other
comply with some technical requirement. They
"natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
operate on conditions already existing, and are
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire
necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on
Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
the other hand, says that curative statutes are
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos

would have had to undergo the tedious and date of his application therefore, August 17, 1994.
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with In outset, the intent of the legislative authority
the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire must be given full effect and expression and with
their Philippine citizenship under the simplified respect to the law in question, there is more
procedure of repatriation. reason to have this law be made applicable in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations,
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the
events and transactions subsequent to the
wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the
passage of such law.There is nothing in the law
legislative intent was precisely to give the statute
that would bar this or would show a contrary
retroactive operation. "(A) retroactive operation is
intention on the part of the legislative authority;
given to a statute or amendment where the intent
and there is no showing that damage or prejudice
that it should so operate clearly appears from a
to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the
result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation.
terms thereof." It is obvious to the Court that the
Neither has Lee shown that there will result the
statute was meant to "reach back" to those
impairment of any contractual obligation,
persons, events and transactions not otherwise
disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And
constitutional guaranty.
inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a
political and civil right equally as important as the Thus, by reason of the remedial or curative nature
freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right of the law granting him a new right to resume his
against unreasonable searches and seizures and political status and the legislative intent behind it,
other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, as well as his unique situation of having been
therefore the legislative intent to give forced to give up his citizenship and political
retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he
the fullest effect possible. abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive effect as of the date of his application
Furthermore, the Court held that it is not only the
therefor, during the pendency of which he was
law that must be given effect but also Frivaldos
stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality.
repatriation granted to him by said law on June 30,
Petition dismissed.
1995. It must be deemed to have retroacted to the

semester of school year 1993-1994 pursuant to
the Retirement Plan. On February 3, 1994, private
respondent Juat received a third letter from Dean
Leticia L. Lava of petitioner University School of
Article 4, NCC
Arts and Science informing her of the approval by
MLQU v. NLRC the Board of Regents considering her as
compulsorily retired. On November 17, 1992, a
G.R. No. 141673; October 17, 2001 letter was sent by private respondent to petitioner
inquiring the amount of retirement benefits due
Ponente: Pardo, J.
to her and in response petitioner provided her
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion with a computation of the retirement benefits

through a letter dated July 29, 1994. On the same
Facts: Noemi B. Juat, now 68 years of age, worked day private respondent Juat received, under
for almost twenty nine (29) years and started as a protest, the two installments of her retirement
part-time instructor of the petitioner, Manuel L. pay in the total amount of P71,674.91, as
Quezon University (MLQU), from June 16, 1965 evidenced by the general voucher, when the
until her compulsory retirement on March 31, alleged correct amount should be P149, 401.62.
1994.
Believing that she was entitled to a higher amount
On January 14, 1993, then MLQU President Amado of retirement benefits, private respondent
Dizon informed in writing private respondent Juat through counsel sent a letter of demand to MLQU
that she was eligible for retirement under Article President August Sunico, demanding the payment
III, Section I of the MLQU Retirement Plan as cited of the deficiency plus interest at the rate of 12% a
in the Revised Faculty Manual of June 13, year from the date of retirement. On October 3,
1990. The retirement of private respondent was 1996, petitioner replied, alleging that private
deferred because she was still given teaching load respondent was not entitled to receive retirement
for school year 1993-1994. On February 1, 1994 benefits as she was only a part-time employee of
she received another letter from President Dizon MLQU, much less to the payment of deficiency. In
informing her that she was considered the same letter it expressed its willingness to
compulsorily retired effective at the end of second settle the matter amicably but to no avail as no

amicable settlement was reached. On March 25, complaint against petitioner asking for the
1997, private respondent filed a complaint before payment of deficiency of retirement benefits and
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) attorneys fee. Upon motion for reconsideration by
to recover the balance of her retirement benefits herein petitioners, the complaint was
under Republic Act No. 7641. consolidated with private respondent Juats
complaint filed with the Honorable Labor Arbiter
On the other hand, Edilberto D. Azurin is a
Manuel R. Caday.
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) and was hired as
a teacher/instructor, on a full-time basis, of the Issue/s: W/n respondents are entitled to the
petitioner (MLQU) for twenty-five (25) years, from retirement benefits provided for under Republic
September 1969 until June 7, 1994. He received Act No. 7641, even if the petitioner has an existing
monthly compensation, the last and highest of valid retirement plan
which was P11,100.50, payable every thirtieth day

Ruling: The law, Republic Act No. 7641,
of every month.
intends to give the minimum retirement benefits
to employees not entitled thereto under collective
On June 7, 1994, a letter was received by private
bargaining and other agreements. Its coverage
respondent Azurin, informing him that he was
applies to establishments with existing collective
being retired under Article III, Section (a) of the
bargaining or other agreements or voluntary
MLQU Retirement Plan. As stated in said letter, he
retirement plans whose benefits are less than
will receive the amount of P34,282.02 which
those prescribed under the proviso in question.
amount he received under protest, as evidenced
formally requested for reconsideration and
Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social
recomputation of his retirement gratuity, stating
legislation. By their nature, curative statutes may
that under R.A. 7641, he should have received the
be given retroactive effect, unless it will impair
total amount of P150,215.75 based on the last
vested rights. Republic Act No. 7641 has
salary and benefits received by him. Despite
retroactive effect to include in its coverage the
receipt of said demand letter, petitioner failed,
employees services to an employer rendered prior
refused, and continuously refused to heed
to its effectivity. It applies to employees in the
complainants demand for the payment of his valid
employ of employers at the time the law took
claim, prompting private respondent to institute a

effect and those who are eligible to the benefits Complainant claims that respondent is married to
under that statute. one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn
statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on
January 13, 1992; after he had a heated argument
Article 4, NCC with De Castro inside the latter's office.
Atienza v. Brilliantes Petitioner then filed a complaint for Gross

Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706; March 29, 1995 the respondent judge. Respondent however
denied all the allegations and claimed that when
Ponente: Quiason, J.
he married De Castro in civil rites at Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed in
good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,
Facts: Complainant alleges that he has two that he was single because his marriage was
children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living solemnized without a license. Furthermore, he
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air argues that the provision of Article 40 of the
Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said Family Code does not apply to him considering
house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was
is in Manila. governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines;
while the second marriage took place in 1991 and
In December 1991, he found respondent sleeping
governed by the Family Code.
on his (complainant's) bed and he later learned
from the houseboy that respondent had been Issue/s: W/n the Article 40 of the Family Code be
cohabiting with De Castro. Thereafter, respondent given prospective application
prevented him from visiting his children and even
Rulings: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages
alienated the affection of his children for him.
entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of

the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive
Facts: Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
in the manufacture, the distribution and sale of
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
beer; while Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and
Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true
an operator of an outlet selling the formers beer
with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
products. A Dealership Agreement governed their
Respondent has not shown any vested right that
contractual relations.
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case. On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo, a Complaint
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow against respondent for Breach of Contract,
affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their Specific Performance and Damages based on the
retroactive application to pending actions. The alleged violation of the Dealership Agreement.
retroactive application of procedural laws is not
On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo
violative of any right of a person who may feel that
case, respondent filed with the Makati Regional
he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of
Trial Court, Complaint was for the collection of a
Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that
sum of money in the amount of P463,107.75
as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
representing the value of beer products, which
nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court
respondent had delivered to petitioner. The Ilo-Ilo
of Industrial Relations,1965).
and Makati case was consolidated on February 13,
1997 and respondents Motion for
Reconsideration was denied on May 19, 1997.
Petitioner, however contends that the Makati
Article 4, NCC RTCs February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 Orders
consolidating the two cases could no longer be
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery
assailed. Allegedly, respondents Petition for
G.R. No. 138137; March 8, 2001 Certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the
reglementary sixty-day period prescribed in the
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, which took

effect on July 1, 1997. Hence, the CA should have meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the
dismissed it outright. general rule against the retrospective operation of
statutes. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists that its Petition was filed
on time because the reglementary period before
Thus, procedural laws may operate
the effectivity of the 1997 rules was 90 days thus
retroactively as to pending proceedings even
he 60 day period under the 1997 rules does not
without express provision to that
apply.
effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply
Hence this petition. to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In
fact, statutes regulating the procedure of the
Issue/s: W/n respondents contention is tenable
courts will be applied on actions undetermined at
Ruling: As a general rule, laws have no retroactive the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are
effect. But there are certain recognized retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
exceptions, such as when they are remedial or
Clearly, the designation of a specific period of
procedural in nature. This Court explained this
sixty days for the filing of an original action for
exception in the following language:
certiorari under Rule 65 is purely remedial or
It is true that under the Civil Code of the procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify
Philippines, (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, any substantive right of respondent, particularly
unless the contrary is provided. But there are with respect to the filing of petitions for
settled exceptions to this general rule, such as certiorari. Although the period for filing the same
when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in may have been effectively shortened, respondent
nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. had not been unduly prejudiced thereby
considering that he was not at all deprived of that
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, right.
i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of
of procedure, which do not create new or take
procedure may be modified at any time to become
away vested rights, but only operate in
effective at once, so long as the change does not
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such
affect vested rights. Moreover, it is equally
rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal

axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules G.R. No. 136368; January 16, 2002
of procedure.
Ponente: Puno, J
It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit
established by jurisprudence cannot be deemed a
vested right. It is merely a discretionary
Facts: A 34, 829 square meters lot located in
prerogative of the courts that may be exercised
Bunawan, Davao City was registered in the Jaime
depending on the peculiar circumstances of each
C. Tan married to Praxedes V. Tan. On January 22,
case. Hence, respondent was not entitled, as a
1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00,
matter of right, to the 90-day period for filing a
executed a deed of absolute sale over the property
petition for certiorari; neither can it imperiously
in question in favor of
demand that the same period be extended to it.
spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the
Rules of Civil Procedure on July 1, 1997, same contracting parties entered into another
respondents lawyers still had 21 days or until July agreement whereunder Tan was given one (1)
22, 1997 to file a petition for certiorari and to year within which to redeem or repurchase the
comply with the sixty-day reglementary property.
period. Had they been more prudent and
Albeit given several opportunities and/or
circumspect in regard to the implications of these
extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to
procedural changes, respondents right of action
redeem the property until his death on January 4,
would not have been foreclosed. After all, the
1988.
1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were well-
publicized prior to their date of effectivity.
On May 2, 1988, Tans heirs filed before the
The orders of Makati RTC are hereby reinstated. Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against
the Magdangals for reformation of instrument
alleging that, while Tan and
the Magdangals denominated their agreement as
Article 4, NCC deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to

conclude an equitable mortgage.
Tan v. CA

Barely hours after the complaint was stamped court a quo in this case cannot be considered final
received, the Magdangals were able to have Tans and executory.
title over the lot in question canceled and to
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTION
secure in their names TCT No. T-134470. This
FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESSION
development prompted the heirs of Tan, who
of the Magdangals, MANIFESTATION AND
were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr.
MOTION of Tan, Jr., the court a quo presided by
(Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental
the respondent judge, rendered the challenged
complaint. On June 4, 1991, Branch 11 of the
order of June 10, 1996 which directed the Register
Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered
of Deeds of Davao City to cancel TCT No. T-134470
judgment finding for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff therein.
in the name of
The said judgment was affirmed by the Court and Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal and,
such judgment was received by the parties thereafter, to reinstate TCT No. 72067 in the name
involved on October 5, 1995. of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Valles Tan and to
submit her compliance thereto within ten (10)
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the
days from receipt of this Order.
lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND
WRIT OF POSSESSION, therein alleging that, Explaining her action, the respondent judge
among others, the appealed judgment of the wrote in the same order:
Court of Appeals has become final
Following the ruling of the Supreme Court
and executory 15 days from October 5, 1995 or up
in Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120
to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days
days period for plaintiff to pay the amount
redemption period commences. And noting that
of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be
the redemption period had expired without Tan,
reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment
Jr. exercising his option.
x x x which was March 13, 1996. The
On the other hand, Tan, Jr. alleged, among other plaintiff made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well
things, that until an entry of judgment has been within the 120-day period mandated by the
issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof decision of this Court.
furnished the parties, the appealed decision of the

Issue/s: What rule should govern the finality of certified true copy of the entry of judgment or final
judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by resolution and addressed to any appropriate
the petitioner? officer for its enforcement.
Ruling: From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the In appealed cases, where the motion for
case at bar, the rule that governs finality of execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of
judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Appeals at a time that it is in possession of the
Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide: original record or the record on appeal, the
resolution granting such motion shall be
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If transmitted to the lower court from which the
no appeal or motion for new trial or case originated, together with a certified true copy
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in of the judgment or final order to be executed, with
these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall a directive for such court of origin to issue the
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of proper writ for its enforcement.
entries of judgments. The date when the
judgment or final resolution Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the
becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a
its entry. The record shall contain solution to the aforestated problems, the Court
the dispositive part of the judgment or final Resolved to approve and promulgate the following
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a section thereof on execution of judgments,
certificate that such judgment or final resolution amending Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
has become final and executory. (2a, R36)

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. Except where the orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right,
judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion on motion, upon a judgment or order that
thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the motion for its execution may only be filed in expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
the proper court after its entry. appeal has been duly perfected.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally
writ of execution shall be accompanied by a resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied

for in the lower court from which the action judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, true copies of the judgment or judgments or final
submitting therewith certified true copies of the order or orders sought to be enforced and of the
judgment or judgments or the final order or orders entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof,
The appellate court may, on motion in the same
with notice to the adverse party.
case, when the interest of justice so requires,
The appellate court may, on motion in the same direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
case, when the interest of justice so requires, execution.
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on
execution.
finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the
This resolution shall be published in two (2) subject property within the 120-day period of
newspapers of general circulation and shall take redemption reckoned from the appellate courts
effect on June 1, 1994. entry of judgment. The appellate court, however,
did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new
however, amended the rule on finality of
rule retroactively and we hold that given the facts
judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as
of the case at bar, this is an error.
follows:
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final given retroactive effect. This general rule,
orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, however, has well-delineated exceptions.
on motion, upon a judgment or order that
Generally, procedural laws are adjective laws
disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no
enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their
appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied administer justice. They include rules of pleadings,
for in the court of origin, on motion of the practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law,

they provide or regulate the steps by which one Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts
who commits a crime is to be punished. will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their
The general rule that statutes are prospective
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to
sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural
procedural laws. It has been held that a
statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights
retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes
may not preclude their retroactive application to
away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws,
pending actions. The retroactive application of
or creates a new obligation and imposes a new
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
person who may feel that he is adversely
transactions or considerations already
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating
procedural statutes constitutionally
to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not
objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule,
create new or take away vested rights, but only
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
operate in furtherance of the remedy or
procedural laws. It has been held that a person has
confirmation of rights already existing, do not
no vested right in any particular remedy, and a
come within the legal conception of a retroactive
litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial
law, or the general rule against the retroactive
of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other
operation of statutes. The general rule against
than the existing rules of procedure.
giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect
is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section
vested rights does not prevent the application of 39 thereof prescribing that no record on appeal
statutes to proceedings pending at the time of shall be required to take an appeal is procedural in
their enactment where they neither create new nature and should therefore be applied
nor take away vested rights. A new statute which retroactively to pending actions. Hence, the
deals with procedure only is presumptively question as to whether an appeal from an adverse
applicable to all actions those which have accrued judgment should be dismissed for failure of
or are pending. appellant to file a record on appeal within thirty
days as required under the old rules, which
question is pending resolution at the time

Batas Bilang 129 took effect, became academic not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may
upon the effectivity of said law because the law no procedural laws be applied retroactively to
longer requires the filing of a record on appeal and pending actions if to do so would involve intricate
its retroactive application removed the legal problems of due process or impair the
obstacle to giving due course to the appeal. A independence of the courts.
statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try
We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997
certain cases from a court to a quasi-judicial
Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in
claims that accrued before its enactment but
great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
formulated and filed after it took effect, for it does
petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot
not create new nor take away vested rights. The
and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner
court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the time
followed the procedural rule then existing as well
it accrued cannot validly try the claim where, at
as the decisions of this Court governing the
the time the claim is formulated and filed, the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when
jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to
he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
a quasi-judicial tribunal, for even actions pending
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997
in one court may be validly taken away and
Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
transferred to another and no litigant can acquire
retroactively would result in his losing the right to
a vested right to be heard by one particular court.
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile
However, the rule that procedural laws are the retroactive application of this procedural rule
applicable to pending actions or proceedings with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be
admits certain exceptions. The rule does not apply penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he
where the statute itself expressly or by necessary faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the
implication provides that pending actions are period of redemption when he made the
exempted from its operation, or where to apply it redemption.
to pending proceedings would impair vested
The manner of exercising the right cannot be
rights. Under appropriate circumstances, courts
changed and the change applied retroactively if to
may deny the retroactive application of
procedural laws in the event that to do so would

do so will defeat the right of redemption of the Ruling: The ruling is affirmed but with
petitioner which is already vested. modification to the penalty imposed.
The assailed decision is reversed and set aside.

Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No.
6425, the penalty for illegal transportation of
methamphetamine hydrochloride was
imprisonment ranging from six years and one day
to twelve years and a fine ranging from six
Article 4, NCC
thousand to twelve thousand pesos. Pursuant to
People v. Morilla Presidential Decree No. 1683, the penalty was

amended to life imprisonment to death and a fine
G.R. No. 189833; February 5, 2014 ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos. The
penalty was further amended in Republic Act No.
Ponente: Perez, J.
7659, where the penalty was changed to reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos.
Facts: On October 13, 2001, the accused, Morilla,
Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao, and Ruel Dequilla From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed
y Regodan, allegedly belongs to an organized/ penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to be paid by each
syndicate crime group, helped each other to of the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion
transport shabu approximately weighing 503.68 perpetua following the provisions of Republic Act
kilos, by means of 2 vehicles. No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive

application of lighter penalty. Reclusion perpetua
The RTC then convicted Morilla and Mayor Mitra
entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years
of the crime charged but absolved Dequilla and
after which the convict becomes eligible for
Yang for insufficiency of evidence and was
pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties,
subsequently affirmed by the CA.
namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life
Issue/s: W/n CA erred in affirming the decision of imprisonment, on the other hand, does not appear
the RTC to have any definite extent or duration and carries
no accessory penalties.

2006, was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and
it took effect on May 20, 2006. The law establishes
a comprehensive system to manage children in
conflict with the law (CICL) and children at risk
Article 4, NCC
with child-appropriate procedures and
Ortega v. People comprehensive programs and services such as
prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation,
G.R. No. 151085 ; August 20, 2008
re-integration and after-care programs geared
Ponente: Nachura, J. towards their development. The law also provides
for, among others, the immediate dismissal of
cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67
Facts: Petitioner, then 14 years old, was charged and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.
with the crime of Rape in 2 two separate Hence this petition.
informations both dated April 20, 1998, for Issue/s: W/n the pertinent provisions of R.A. No.
allegedly raping AAA, then about eight (8) years of 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at
age. the time he committed the alleged rape, he was
merely 13 years old and RA 9344 was not yet
Both the accused and the defendant presented
passed
their own version of facts. On May 13, 1999 the
RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial Ruling: In its Comment dated April 24, 2008,
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer
petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A.
and BBB, who testified with honesty and No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was
credibility and upon appeal, the CA affirmed the convicted by the RTC and the conviction was
decision in toto. affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was
passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
now approximately 25 years old, he no longer
for the decision of the Court but it was denied.
qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344.
During the pendency of the petitioners case, RA
Moreover, the OSG claimed that the
9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344

is applicable only if the child-accused is still below In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of
18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to
68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner 15 years old.
may avail himself of the provisions of Section Given this precise statutory declaration, it is
38 of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic imperative that this Court accord retroactive
suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A.
Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched
recognized principle that laws favorable to the principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt
accused may be given retroactive application, amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which
such principle does not apply if the law itself are favorable to the accused are given retroactive
provides for conditions for its application. effect.This principle is embodied in Article 22 of
The Court was however not persuaded. the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal
provides that the minimum age of criminal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
responsibility is 15 years old and offenders under favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
15 years old at the time of the commission of the habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5
offense is deemed exempt from criminal liability. of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of
He shall merely be subjected to intervention the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
programs. Likewise, Section 64 of the law been pronounced and the convict is serving the
categorically provides that cases of children 15 same.
years old and below, at the time of the There also have extant jurisprudence that the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be principle has been given expanded application in
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the certain instances involving special laws.
appropriate local social welfare and development It bears stressing that the petitioner was
officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, only 13 years old at the time of the commission of
with respect to the exemption from criminal the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own
of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's testimony, and by the testimony of his
age at the time of the commission of the offense. mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was never

assailed in any of the proceedings before demanding for the refund and reinstatement to
the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the his former position. He filed a complaint against
time of the commission of the crime, was below respondent company before NLRC Regional
15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is Arbitration for illegal dismissal, unpaid
exempted from criminal liability. commission and receivable and/or claims due,
non-payment of vacation leaves, holiday pays,
13th month pay, COLA and other company
benefits and damages. Labor Arbiter rendered in
Article 6, NCC
favor of petitioner. Aggrieved by the decision,
Callanta v. NLRC respondent company appealed the same to the

Fifth division of NLRC. Respondent company was
GR No. 105083, August 20, 1993
ordered to post a cash or surety bond. In addition,
Ponente: Bidin, J pursuant to RA 6715, immediate reinstatement of

petitioner to his former position was ordered. The
Contributor: Annalyn Fernandez
bond was posted; however, petitioner was not
reinstated. Hence this petition.
Facts: Petitioner Virgilio Callanta was appointed as
sub-agent by respondent company (Distelleria Issue/s: W/N the resignation by the petitioner
Limtuaco, Co., Inc.) with specific assignment at was valid and effective.
Iligan and Lanao Province from June 18, 1986 to
December 31, 1986. In October of 1986, before Ruling: We agree with public respondent NLRC
the expiration of his appointment, he was that petitioner "failed to adduce evidence that
promoted as national promoter salesman. may prove that and resignation was obtained by
However, on April 28, 1987, he was found to have means of coercion and intimidation." The letter
a shortage of PhP49,005.59 during a spot audit depicting the coercion allegedly imposed upon
conducted. Thereafter, petitioner rendered his him as well as the reason therefore, was nothing
resignation effective immediately. but a self-serving assertion which has so little or

no value at all as evidence for the petitioner.
After seven (7) months, petitioner wrote another
letter complaining his false resignation and

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle that for was rattled and confused into signing a resignation
intimidation to vitiate consent, petitioner must letter on account of a mere "spot audit" report. It
have been compelled by a reasonable and well- is highly unlikely and incredible for man of
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon petitioner's position and educational attainment
his person or property, or upon the person or to so easily succumb to private respondent
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants company's alleged pressures without even
(Article 1335, par. 2 New Civil Code). In present defending himself or demanding a final audit
case, what allegedly constituted the report before signing any resignation letter.
"intimidation" was the threat by private Assuming that pressure was indeed exerted
respondent company to file a case for estafa against him, there was no urgency for petitioner
against petitioner unless the latter resigns. to sign the resignation letter. He knew the nature
of the letter that he was signing, for as argued by
In asserting that the above-described
respondent company, petitioner being "a man of
circumstance constituted intimidation, petitioner
high educational attainment and qualification, . . .
missed altogether the essential ingredient that
he is expected to know the import of everything
would qualify the act complained of as
that he executes, whether written or oral: (Rollo,
intimidation, i.e. that the threat must be of
p. 124). In view of foregoing factual setting,
an unjust act. In the present case, the threat to
petitioner cannot now be allowed to withdraw the
prosecute for estafa not being an unjust act (P.P.
resignation which, in the absence of any evidence
Agustinos vs. Del Rey, 56 Phil. 512 [1932]), but
to the contrary; the Court believes was tendered
rather a valid and legal act to enforce a claim,
voluntarily by him.
cannot at all be considered as intimidation. A
threat to enforce one's claim through competent
authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not
vitiate consent. (Article 1335, par. 4 New Civil
Code).
Furthermore, and on top of the absence of

evidence adduced by petitioner to the contrary,
the Court also finds it unbelievable that petitioner

Article 6, NCC was signed by Remedios, it had not been
established that she was the duly constituted
Guy v. CA
guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no
G.R. No. 163707; September 15, 2006 renunciation of right occurred.
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J Issue/s: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim

precludes private respondents from claiming their
Contributor: Annalyn Fernandez
successional rights
Facts: Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes

Ruling: SC finds that there was no waiver of
Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their
hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
mother Remedios Oanes filed a petition for letters
does not state with clarity the purpose of its
of administration before RTC of Makati. They
execution. It merely states that Remedios received
alleged that they are the duly acknowledged
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her
illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died
minor daughters "by way of financial assistance
intestate leaving an estate valued at PhP10
and in full settlement of any and all claims of
million. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the
petition. In a Manifestation/Motion as
estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim." Considering
Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,
that the document did not specifically mention
petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private
private respondents' hereditary share in the
respondents' claim had been paid, waived,
estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason
waiver of successional rights.
of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of
Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and Parents and guardians may not therefore
educational assistance received from petitioner, repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
Remedios and her minor children discharge the judicial approval. This is because repudiation
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. amounts to an alienation of property which must
pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the
RTC and CA denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as
interest of the ward. Not having been judicially
well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. It
authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the
ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim

instant case is void and will not bar private (20) of the Civil Service Law. Petitioners wife and
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of their three sons were impleaded in the complaint
the deceased. for violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted
as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is
petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and
the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
disposing of his ill-gotten wealth.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no
basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance On 27 October 2004, the Office of the
of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver Ombudsman sought the forfeiture of unlawfully
cannot be established by a consent given under a acquired properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379,
mistake or misapprehension of fact. as amended before the Sandiganbayan. It was
alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman has
determined that a prima facie case exists against
petitioner and the other respondents therein who
hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of,
Article 7, NCC petitioner, since during his incumbency as a
soldier and public officer he acquired huge
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan
amounts of money and properties manifestly out
G.R. No. 165835; June 22, 2005 of proportion to his salary as such public officer
and his other lawful income, if any. Sandiganbayan
Ponente: Tinga, J issued a Resolution granting the relief prayed for.
Contributor: Annalyn Fernandez Petitioner then filed a Motion to Dismiss in Civil

Case No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
Facts: Petitioner was the Deputy of Staff for the
of the Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings
Comptrollership, J6, of the AFP. On September 27,
under R.A. No. 1379. On even date, petitioner filed
2004, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
the present Petition, raising the same issue of lack
complaint against petitioner for violation of Sec. 8,
jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713, violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal
Code, and violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and

Issue/s: W/n the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction imposable penalty. Since this change resulted in
over petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 the proliferation of the filing of cases before the
Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is
Ruling: Originally, it was the Solicitor General who
punishable by a penalty not higher than prision
was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings
correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not
before the then Court of First Instance of the city
being of a serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again
or province where the public officer or employee
amended by P.D. No. 1860 and eventually by P.D.
resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A.
No. 1861.
No. 1379. Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to P.D. No. 1486, original and exclusive As held in the case Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
jurisdiction over such violations was vested in the Supreme Court deduced that jurisdiction over
said court. P.D. No. 1606 was later issued expressly violations of R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with
repealing P.D. No. 1486, as well as modifying the the Sandiganbayan. It could not have taken into
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by removing its consideration R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249
jurisdiction over civil actions brought in since both statutes which also amended the
connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan were not yet
jurisdiction of said court. Such civil actions enacted at the time. The subsequent enactments
removed from the jurisdiction of the only serve to buttress the conclusion that the
Sandigabayan include those for restitution or Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over
reparation of damages, recovery of instruments violations of R.A. No. 1379.
and effects of the crime, civil actions under Articles
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the
32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and forfeiture
present state of statutory law on the jurisdiction
proceedings provided for under R.A. No. 1379.
of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners argument
Subsequently, BP Blg. 129 abolished the that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the petition for forfeiture it being "civil" in nature
the regular courts and expanded the exclusive and the Sandiganbayan allegedly having no
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the jurisdiction over civil actionscollapses
offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to completely.
embrace all such offenses irrespective of the

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Office of the prosecution of said cases. The power to conduct
Ombudsman, the same has been resolved in the the necessary investigation and to file and
case of Republic v. Sandiganbayan. The rule is that prosecute the corresponding criminal and
when a law which expressly repeals a prior law is administrative cases before the Sandiganbayan or
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be the proper court or administrative agency against
thereby revived unless expressly so provided. any public personnel who has acted in a manner
From this, it may fairly be inferred that the old rule warranting criminal and disciplinary action or
continues in force where a law which repeals a proceedings was also transferred from the Chief
prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.
repealed; and that in such cases the repeal of the
Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D.
repealing law revives the prior law, unless the
Nos. 1860 and 1861 which granted the
language of the repealing statute provides
Tanodbayan the same authority. The present
otherwise. Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by
Constitution was subsequently ratified and then
P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of
the Tanodbayan became known as the Office of
the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture
the Special Prosecutor which continued to
under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the
exercise its powers except those conferred on the
Courts of First Instance over the case nor the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the
authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now
Constitution. The Office of the Ombudsman was
Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary
officially created under R.A. No. 6770.
investigation therefore, since said powers at that
time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file
Special Prosecutor.
the petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379.
However, the Ombudsmans exercise of the
The Tanodbayans authority (PD No. 1486) was
correlative powers to investigate and initiate the
further expanded by P.D. No. 1630 issued on 18
proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or
July 1990. Among other things, the Tanodbayan
unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for
was given the exclusive authority to conduct
the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable
wealth amassed after 25 February 1986. As
by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations
regards such wealth accumulated on or before
therefore and to direct and control the

said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
commence before the Sandiganbayan such advance for mailing. However, the then Acting
forfeiture actionsince the authority to file Postmaster General declined to grant the
forfeiture proceedings on or before 25 February requested clearance.
1986 belongs to the Solicitor Generalalthough
Caltex filed a petition for declaratory relief against
he has the authority to investigate such cases for
Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, praying "that
forfeiture even before 25 February 1986, pursuant
judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex
to the Ombudsmans general investigatory power
Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the
under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770.
Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest
to the attention of the public."
Issue/s: W/n the scheme proposed by the

Article 8, NCC appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law
Caltex v. Palomar
Ruling: Article 8 of the Civil Code provides that;

G.R. No. L-19650; September 29, 1966
"Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law
Ponente: Castro, J shall form a part of the legal system." In effect,

judicial decisions assume the same authority as
Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano the statute itself and, until authoritatively
abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
Facts: Caltex (Philippines) Inc. conceived and laid
that they are applicable, the criteria which must
the groundwork for a promotional scheme
control the actuations not only of those called
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil
upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty
products. For the privilege to participate, no fee or
bound to enforce obedience thereto.
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase
of Caltex products required to be made. We note that in the Postal Law, the term in
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails, question is used in association with the word
representations were made by Caltex with the "lottery". With the meaning of lottery settled, and

consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis it is only logical
that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is
Article 8, NCC
consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it GSIS v. Cadiz
involves a consideration, so also must the term

G.R. No. 154093. July 8, 2003
"gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly,
there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
intent to eliminate that element of consideration

Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano
from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
Facts: Leo L. Cadiz was appointed as a
Since in gambling it is inherent that something of Provincial Guard of Negros He entered the police
value be hazarded for a chance to gain a larger service and applied for early retirement due to "an
amount, it follows ineluctably that where no ailment causing paralysis of the left hand and
consideration is paid by the contestant to slurred speech rendering him unfit to discharge
participate, the reason behind the law can hardly further his duties and responsibilities as a police
be said to obtain. officer." The Medical and Dental Service, PNP,
declared him "UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE".
We find no obstacle in saying the same respecting
Respondent filed a disability claim with the GSIS.
a gift enterprise. In the end, we are persuaded to
Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical Officer of GSIS
hold that, under the prohibitive provisions of the
approved the claim and granted respondent
Postal Law which we have heretofore examined,
permanent total disability benefits starting March
gift enterprises and similar schemes therein
19, 1999 and temporary total disability benefits
contemplated are condemnable only if, like
from October 12, 1996 to November 22, 1996. Dr.
lotteries, they involve the element of
Estrada modified her recommendation by
consideration. Recapitulating, we hold that the
retaining respondents temporary total disability
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the
benefits but downgrading the permanent total
rules submitted by the appellee does not
disability benefits to compensation equivalent to
transgress the provisions of the Postal Law.
8 months permanent partial disability benefits.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the related ailment, as in the case at bar, proves that
evaluation but the same was denied. he was really disabled totally to further perform
his assigned task, and to deny permanent total
On appeal by respondent, the Employees
disability benefits when he was forced to retire
Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed the
would render inutile and meaningless the social
findings of the GSIS. Hence, respondent filed a
justice precept guaranteed by the Constitution.
petition with the Court of Appeals which, on June
21, 2002, rendered a decision setting aside the As to the decisions of the Court of Appeals cited by
decision of the ECC and granting respondents petitioner as authorities, it must be stressed that
claim for permanent total disability. judicial decisions which form part of our legal
system are only the decisions of the Supreme
Issue/s: Whether or not the respondent entitled
Court. While rulings of the Court of Appeals may
to permanent total disability benefits?
serve as precedents for lower courts, they only
apply to points of law not covered by any Supreme
Ruling: Yes. Respondents entitlement to
Court decision. This is not, however, the case here,
permanent total disability was established by his
considering that the legal issue presented is
medical records and by the investigation of the
already laid to rest by settled jurisprudence.
very agency he worked for, the PNP, which found
him UNFIT FOR POLICE SERVICE. Even the initial
findings of Dr. Gervillana B. Estrada, Medical
Officer of the GSIS, Dumaguete City evinced that
respondent is really qualified for permanent total Article 8, NCC
disability benefits. Most of all, the decision of the
PNP to retire him at the age of 55 for being unfit CYMCA v. Remmington Steel
for police service is a clear indication that his heart G.R. No. 154093. July 8, 2003
ailment rendered him incapable of effectively and
competently performing his job as a Police Chief Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
Superintendent without serious discomfort or Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano

pain and without material injury or danger to his
life. In a number of cases, it was ruled that the Facts: Remington Steel Corporation leased ground
early retirement of an employee due to a work- floor units 964 and 966 and second floor unit 963

of a building owned by the Manila Downtown premises. RTC-Branch 30, acting as an appellate
YMCA (YMCA) in Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. court, rendered a Decision in Civil granting
Remington used the combined areas of ground Remington a longer extension period of five years
floor units 964 and 966 as hardware store, offices, for second floor unit 963 and ordering YMCA to
and display shops for its steel products, as well as provide a two-meter passageway between units
a passageway to second floor unit 963 which was 964 and 966. YMCA filed an appeal with the CA,
used as staff room for its Manila sales force. YMCA the CA ordered Remington to vacate the premises,
formally terminated the lease over second floor as the continuation of the lease was no longer
unit 963 and gave Remington until March 31, 1997 tenable after the lapse of six years, since the
to vacate the premises. Remington filed with the parties' formal contract had expired. It also noted
MeTC, a case for the Fixing of Lease Period over that since Remington had already transferred to
unit 963 while YMCA filed in the same court an its own building, there was no more reason to
action for Unlawful Detainer involving the same continue the lease.
unit 963 against Remington. During the pendency
On July 29, 2003, the CA issued a
of Civil Case, Remington filed a Petition for
Resolution denying YMCA's motion for
Consignation of Rentals on the ground that YMCA
reconsideration.
refused to receive rentals for ground floor units
Hence, the present petition involving only
964 and 966 and assigned to MeTC-Branch 24.
unit 964.
Remington filed a Formal Surrender of the Leased
Premises, opting to surrender possession of units Issue/s: W/n the questions in the present case
964 and 966 and tendering two checks to cover all relate to the same event have been put forward by
past rentals due on the two units. YMCA filed a No the parties in the case involving unit 966
Objection to the Turn Over of the Leased Premises

Ruling: Yes. The final Resolution in G.R. No.
in Binondo. MeTC- Branch 24 issued an Order
171858 is binding and applicable to the present
declaring the consignation case closed.
case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis
Remington, however, continued to use et non quieta movere which means "to adhere to
ground floor units 964 and 966 as passageway to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are
second floor unit 963. It kept the premises established." The doctrine of stare decisis is one
padlocked and failed to give YMCA the keys to the of policy grounded on the necessity for securing

certainty and stability of judicial decisions. Where On July 22, 1998, the Fact-Finding and
the same questions relating to the same event Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the
have been put forward by the parties similarly Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided charging herein petitioners with Illegal Use of
by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a Public Funds as defined and penalized under
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. It Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and
bears stressing that the facts of the present case violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of
and those of G.R. No. 171858 are substantially the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
same. The only difference is the unit involved; G.R.
The complaint alleged that there were
No. 171858 involves unit 966 while the present
irregularities in the use by then Congressman
case involves unit 964. The opposing parties are
Carmello F. Lazatin of his Countrywide
likewise the same. Once a case has been decided
Development Fund (CDF) for the calendar year
one way, any other case involving exactly the same
1996, i.e., he was both proponent and
point at issue, as in the present case, should be
implementer of the projects funded from his CDF;
decided in the same manner.
he signed vouchers and supporting papers
pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing
Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen
(18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus,
petitioner Lazatin, with the help of petitioners
Article 8, NCC
Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and
Lazatin v. Desierto Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his
CDF into cash. On October 27, 2000, the
G.R. No. 147097; June 5, 2009 Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum,
thereby disapproving the OSP Resolution dated
Ponente: Peralta, J
September 18, 2000 and ordering the aggressive
Contributor: Apple Bernardo-Soriano prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were
then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
Facts:
continuation of criminal proceedings.

Hence this petition. to follow the rule established in a decision of the
Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a
Issue/s: W/n Ombudsman acted with grave abuse
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent
of discretion
cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
Ruling: Petitioners' attack against the decisis is based on the principle that once a
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale. It has question of law has been examined and decided,
long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. it should be deemed settled and closed to further
6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman argument. The doctrine has assumed such value
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that
said office have no constitutional infirmity. The "[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on
issue of whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the
violated the Constitution had been fully dissected becoming virtue of predictability which is
as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of the expected from this Court would be immeasurably
Ombudsman as well as the constitutionality of affected and the public's confidence in the
Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the stability of the solemn pronouncements
OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman. diminished." Verily, only upon showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case
Petitioners now assert that the Court's ruling
override the great benefits derived by our judicial
on the constitutionality of the provisions of
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the
R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the
courts be justified in setting aside the same.
principle ofstare decisis set aside. Again, this
contention deserves scant consideration. In this case, petitioners have not shown any
strong, compelling reason to convince the Court
that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere
applied to this case. They have not successfully
(to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse
things which are established) is embodied in
of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
validly conferred by law with the power of control
doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to
and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or
judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country
overturn any resolution issued by the latter.

rights," and sentenced him to pay a fine of
P200.00.
Respondent Judge, in his comment dated January

Article 9, NCC
18, 1990, concedes that Pagasian was not an
Pagasian v. Azura accused in the case, but insists that his search of
the house of Vicente Dumo, Sr., his seizure of the
A.M. No. RTJ-89-425; April 17, 1990
latter's cart and deposit thereof in the municipal
Ponente: Narvasa, J building, "without being armed with any warrant

issued by any judge," was a "violation of Sec. 2 of
Art. III of the Constitution." He asserts that while
there was no "law in implementation of any
Facts: Judge Cesar P. Azura is charged with having
violation of the provisions of the constitution," he
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment against
felt it to be "his solemn duty to defend and protect
Oscar Palma Pagasian. The latter's sworn
the Constitution," and not to "decline to render
complaint draws attention to a decision rendered
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
on September 21, 1989 by His Honor in a criminal
insufficiency of the laws" (Art. 9, Civil Code), and
prosecution for theft of a large cattle (Crim. Case
adopt "any suitable process or mode of
No. 922-M [87]) entitled "People v. Vicente Dumo
proceeding . . which appears most conformable to
Sr. and Vicente Dumo Jr.," in which the
the spirit" of the Rules of Court (Sec. 6, Rule 135,
complainant, the barangay captain in the locality,
Rules of Court).
was one of the witnesses for the prosecution. The
complaint alleges that although the complainant,
Issue/s: W/n Judge Azura may be held liable for
Pagasian, was "not in any manner, shape or form
the decision he has rendered
an accused in said . . case," respondent Judge in
his decision acquitting both accused "for utter lack Ruling: Yes. Respondent Judge appears to have
of evidence" nevertheless declared him guilty regrettably lost sight of an even more
of "clear violations of the provisions of the fundamental and familiar constitutional precept:
fundamental law of the land and against human "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law" (Sec. 1, Art.

III, Constitution). This safeguard, the first listed in sophistical reasoning on the part of the
the Bill of Rights, includes what is known as respondent Judge, sentenced to a penalty without
procedural due process that guarantees a justification whatever, in infringement of basic
procedure which, according to Daniel Webster, principles of which all judges are charged with
"hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon knowledge.
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It is
made more particular in a subsequent section:
"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law" (Sec. 14 [a]).
In said Criminal Case No. 922-M (87), the Article 15, NCC
complaining witness had absolutely no Idea that
Van Dorn v. Romillo
he himself was on trial, like the very persons he
was accusing, for the commission of some offense G.R. No. L-68470; October 8, 1985
(or perhaps for constructive contempt); he
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J
consequently had no opportunity whatsoever to
present any evidence in his behalf to exculpate Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
him from the offense which was known to nobody
except the Judge. What is worse, the complainant Facts: Alicia Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines
was punished for acts not declared by any law to while Upton is a citizen of the United States; they
constitute a penal offense and prescribing a were married in Hong Kong in 1972; that, after the
specific penalty therefor, in violation of another marriage, they established their residence in the
equally familiar precept, which also appears to Philippines; that they begot two children born on
have escaped respondent Judge's attention, that April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively;
no act may be deemed to be, and punished as, a that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
crime unless so declared by law. Under the States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
circumstances, the Court must hold that the also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
complainant was clearly denied due process by

On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit
respondent Judge. He was subjected to no small
against petitioner stating that petitioner's
injustice. He was, by a process of specious,
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop), is

their conjugal property, and he is thus asking that marriage from the standards of American law,
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
that business, and that private respondent be
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
declared with right to manage the conjugal
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
property. Petitioner countered that private
He would have no standing to sue in the case
respondents cause of action is barred by previous
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
community property" as of June 11, 1982.
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the his own representation before said Court from
ground that the property involved is located in the asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no property.
bearing in the case.
Issue/s: W/n the divorce decree obtained by

Upton is recognized here in the Philippines
Ruling: It is true that owing to the nationality Article 15, NCC
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being G.R. No. 80116; June 30, 1989
considered contrary to our concept of public

Ponente: Regalado, J
police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
Philippines, provided they are valid according to

Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda
their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
Nevada released private respondent from the
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, were married before the Registrar of

Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in representation to do so at the time of the filing of
the Federal Republic of Germany.After the the criminal action.
marriage, the couple lived together for some time
The status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused
in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella
must be determined as of the time the complaint
Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
After about three and a half years of marriage, adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by
private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding this is meant that he is still married to the accused
against petitioner in Germany before the spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He
In the present case, the fact that private
claimed that there was failure of their marriage
respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
and that they had been living apart since April,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
1982.
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
the issuance of the divorce decree, private concerned in view of the nationality principle in
respondent filed two complaints for adultery our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
Taking into consideration the rule laid down in the
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, private respondent,
affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua
legal standing to commence the adultery case
sometime in 1983"..
under the imposture that he was the offended
Issue/s: W/n Geiling has the legal capacity to spouse at the time he filed suit. Complaint
initiate the complaint of adultery against Imelda dismissed.
even after the issuance of a divorce decree
Ruling: The power to institute action to prosecute

adultery is exclusively granted to the offended
spouse, it then necessarily follows that such
Article 15, NCC
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal

Garcia-Recio v. Recio On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a
G.R. No. 138322; October 2, 2001
quo, on the ground of bigamy respondent
Ponente: Panganiban, J allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage
Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,

Respondent contended that his first marriage to
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a
a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
petitioner in 1994.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an

On July 7, 1998 while the suit for the declaration
Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
of nullity was pending respondent was able to
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian
secure a divorce decree from a family court in
government. Petitioner a Filipina and
Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d]
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
irretrievably broken down."
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City. In their application for a marriage license, The RTC declared their marriage dissolved. The
respondent was declared as "single" and decision rendered was based on the ground that
"Filipino." the divorce decree issued in Australia is valid and
recognized here in the Philippines and not on
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and
Redericks lack of legal capacity to marry.
respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were Hence this petition.
still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Issue/s: W/n the respondent has the legal capacity
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. to remarry at the time he married the petitioner

Ruling: Respondent contends that the Australian facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry,
divorce decree, which was validly admitted in has no basis.
evidence, adequately established his legal
The legal capacity to contract marriage is
capacity to marry under Australian law.
determined by the national law of the party
Such contention is untenable. In its strict legal concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21
sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated
are (1) absolute divorce ora vinculo and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, applicant for a marriage license. In this case, there
while the second suspends it and leaves the bond is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's
in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar legal capacity to marry petitioner.
which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an

interlocutory decree a conditional or provisional
Article 15, NCC
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an Quita v. CA
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the

G.R. No. 124862; December 22, 1998
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is
effected. Ponente: Bellosillo, J

The decree itself shows that the decree obtained
by the respondent may have been restricted. The Facts: Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both
ruling of the trial court, which erroneously Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso May 1941 but Fe eventually sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She

submitted in the divorce proceedings a private The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escano,
writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their which held that "a foreign divorce between
agreement to live separately from each other and Filipino citizens sought and
a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to
divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a recognition as valid in this
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their jurisdiction," disregarded the divorce between
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain the view that their marriage subsisted until the
Wernimont. death of Arturo in 1972.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died without will. On On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the
31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent
with the Regional Trial Court for issuance of letters and the distribution of his estate.
of administration concerning the estate of Arturo
Issue/s: W/n the divorce decree obtained by
in favor of the Philippine Trust
Quita is recognized here in the Philippines
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming
to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Ruling: Tenchavez v. Escano held that a foreign
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and divorce between Filipino citizens sought and
Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, Code was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
opposed the petition and prayed for the jurisdiction while Van Dorn v. Romillo held that
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
the oppositors submitted certified photocopies of according to their national laws.
the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
We deduce that the finding on their
judgment of divorce between petitioner and
citizenship pertained solely to the time
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the
of their marriage as the trial court was not
sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
intervened.

citizenship at the time of Loma, Quezon City. The marriage produced four
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether children.
she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce Several years later, they decided to
was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked obtain a divorce from the Dominican
the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed
their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable to the Judge of the First Civil Court of
and petitioner could very well lose her right to San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
inherit from Arturo. attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under
its laws. Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private
The case is remanded to the lower court.
respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in
the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by
Article 15, NCC mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently,
on June 23, 1984, the Regional
Perez v. CA
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered
G.R. No. 162580; January 27, 2006 the complete separation of properties between
Tristan and Lily.
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in
the United States and both lived as husband and
Facts: Private respondent Tristan
wife until October 2001.
A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig for the
second time on May 16, 1968. The first marriage It was only later during their marriage that Elmar
ceremony was celebrated at the Central learned of the marriage of Tristan to Lily and the
Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, status of their marriage.
Manila, while the second took place at the
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
Lourdes Catholic Church in La
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with

the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Elmar becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce
then filed her Motion to Intervene alleging that decree, the Philippines will not recognize such
her status and as a companion to Tristan for 17 absolute divorce.
years vest her with the requisite legal interest When Tristan and Lily married on May 18,
required of a would intervenor under the Rules of 1968, their marriage was governed by the
Court. provisions of the Civil Code which took effect
on August 30, 1950. In the case
Issue/s: W/n Elmar has the legal interest in the
of Tenchavez v. Escano we held:
annulment of marriage of Lily ad Tristan
(1) That a foreign divorce between
Ruling: Petitioners claim lacks merit. Under the Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after
law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan; the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act
hence her claim of legal interest has no basis. No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in
When petitioner and Tristan married this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married contracted with another party by the divorced
to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of
obtained from the Dominican Republic never divorce, entitled to validity in the
dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is country. (Emphasis added)
basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated
persons are binding upon citizens of abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never
the Philippines, even though living abroad. acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which
Regardless of where a citizen of her motion for intervention is based Petition is
the Philippines might be, he or she will be dismissed.
governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or
her family rights and duties, or to his or her status,
condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino
Article 15, NCC
regardless of whether he or she was married here
or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an San Luis v. San Luis
absolute divorce from spouse and eventually
G.R. No. 133743; February 6, 2007

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago , J On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court alleged that she is the
Facts: Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), widow of Felicisimo. She then prayed that the
former governor of the Province of Laguna, conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His letters of administration be issued to
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
Felicisimo. action. Rodolfo claimed that the respondent has
no legal personality to file the petition because she
Five years later, on May 1, 1968,
was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter,
Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom
at the time of his death, was still legally married to
he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
Merry Lee. Rodolfo San Luis was later joined by
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Linda, his sister. The trial Court denied both
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of
petitions to dismiss.
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Felicidad presented the decree of
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
on December 14, 1973. First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the
marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo
respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for On September 12, 1995, the trial court
18 years from the time of their marriage up to his dismissed the petition for letters of
death on December 18, 1992. administration. It held that the respondent was

without legal capacity to file the petition for letters records show that there is insufficient evidence to
of administration because her marriage with prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
found that the decree of absolute divorce and Felicisimo under the laws of the
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
not valid in the Philippines and did not bind specific guidelines for pleading and proving
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is
The Court of Appeals however reversed
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
and set aside the decision of the RTC rationating
due execution must be presented. Under Sections
that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. It found
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
custody of the document. If the record is not kept
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result, under
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated
Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in
to contract a subsequent marriage with
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
respondent.
the seal of his office.
Issue/s: W/n a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
With regard to respondents marriage to
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Felicisimo allegedly solemnized
Code
in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
Ruling: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the show that their marriage was done in accordance
legal personality to file the present petition as with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however,
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the

the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a
laws as they must be alleged and proved. petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against
Therefore, this case should be remanded
Orlando and Merope.
to the trial court for further reception of evidence
on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment
the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. declaring the subsequent marriage of Merope
Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan null and void ab
initio, however, said decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeals.
Article 15, NCC Issue/s: W/n petitioner has the legal capacity to
Amor-Catalan v. CA seek the annulment of marriage between Orlando

and Merope
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007
Ruling: Divorce means the legal dissolution of a
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago , J
lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
Facts: Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
United States of America and allegedly became in full force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April such decree is valid according to the national law
1988. of the foreigner. However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988,
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao,
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which
Pangasinan. Contending that said marriage was
bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting

must be proved considering that our courts cannot On the other hand, whether under the New Civil
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Code which is the law in force at the time the
respondents were married, nor in the Family
Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage;
whether petitioner has the personality to file the
however, only a party who can demonstrate
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
"proper interest" can file the same. A petition to
After all, she may have the personality to file the
declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign
name of the real party in interest and must be
law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce
based on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v.
decree becomes absolute. In such case, the RTC
Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the
would be correct to declare the marriage of the
personality to file the petition to declare the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to
already in evidence two existing marriage
their stepmother as it affects their successional
certificates, which were both obtained in the
rights.
Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated
December 21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on
respondent Merope, and the other, in Calasiao, Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
Pangasinan dated June 16, 1988 between the and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took
respondents. effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically
provides:
However, if there was indeed a divorce decree
obtained and which, following the national law of SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of nullity of void marriages.
Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
the nullity of marriage.
solely by the husband or the wife. x x x x

In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie
to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on
remand of the case to the trial court for reception March 5, 1951 and contains the following
of additional evidence is necessary to determine provisions:
whether respondent Orlando was granted a
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child,
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
Article 16 & 17, NCC 4. I further declare that I now have no living
ascendants and no descendants except my
Aznar v. Garcia
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
G.R. No. L-16749; January 31, 1963 CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
Ponente:Labrador, J
xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA
Facts: The Court of First Instance of Davao in a HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo
Special Proceeding No. 622 dated September 14, Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
1949, directed the executor to reimburse Maria notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor
to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and has she been at any time adopted by me, and
declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the who, from all information I have now resides in
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one- THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be

deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Ruling: Edward Christensen was born in New York,
Christensen with the Davao Branch of the migrated to California and resided there for nine
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913
rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine he returned to California very rarely and only for
Currency per month until the principal thereof short visits, and considering that he appears never
as well as any interest which may have accrued to have owned or acquired a home or properties
thereon, is exhausted.. in that state, which would indicate that he would
ultimately abandon the Philippines and make
It is in accordance with the above-quoted
home in the State of California.
provisions that the executor in his final account
and project of partition ratified the payment of As to his citizenship, however, We find that the
only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and citizenship that he acquired in California when he
proposed that the residue of the estate be resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
Christensen. for the latter was a territory of the United States
until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
However, it is opposed Helen Christensen Garcia,
considered himself as a citizen of California by the
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as
fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he
an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
he appears never to have intended to abandon his
acknowledged natural child of the deceased
California citizenship by acquiring another.
Edward E. Christensen.
The law that governs the validity of his

Issue/s: W/n the lower court erred in failing to
testamentary dispositions is defined in Article
recognize that under international law,
16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
particularly under the renvoi doctrine,the intrinsic
application of this article in the case at bar
validity of the testamentary disposition of the
requires the determination of the meaning of
distribution of the estate of the deceased Edward
the term "national law" is used therein.
Christensen should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines

There is no single American law governing the actual question which the rules of the other
validity of testamentary provisions in the United jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the
States, each state of the Union having its own forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally
private law applicable to its citizens only and in been repudiated by the American authorities. (2
force only within the state. The "national law" Am. Jur. 296)
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been
quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply
defined and the reasons for its application in a
to any general American law. So it can refer to no
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in
other than the private law of the State of
the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-
California.
531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted
Indeed, the decision of the court below, sustains herein below:
the contention of the executor-appellee that
The recognition of the renvoi theory
under the California Probate Code, a testator may
implies that the rules of the conflict of
dispose of his property by will in the form and
laws are to be understood as
manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
incorporating not only the ordinary or
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But
internal law of the foreign state or
appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws
the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
as well. According to this theory 'the law
If there is no law to the contrary, in the of a country' means the whole of its law.
place where personal property is situated, it is
xxx xxx xxx
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is
governed by the law of his domicile.
Von Bar presented his views at the
meeting of the Institute of International
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of
court of the forum, in determining the question
the following theses:
before it, must take into account the whole law of
the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to
conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its make the distribution in accordance with
country as regards the application of the law of nationality that is the English
foreign laws. law he must accept this reference back
to his own law.
(2) Provided that no express provision to
the contrary exists, the court shall respect: We note that Article 946 of the California Civil
Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims
applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If
the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards
the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules
their personal statute, and desires that said
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its
personal statute shall be determined by the law of
own intended and appropriate sphere, the
the domicile, or even by the law of the place where
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
the act in question occurred.
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of
California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid
law, provided it be certain that one of them is
down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing
determination of matters with foreign element
the determination of a question to the same
involved is in accord with the general principle of
system of law.
American law that the domiciliary law should
xxx xxx xxx govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person of the owner.
If, for example, the English law directs its
judge to distribute the personal estate of When a man dies leaving personal
an Englishman who has died domiciled in property in one or more states, and leaves a will
Belgium in accordance with the law of his directing the manner of distribution of the
domicile, he must first inquire whether property, the law of the state where he was
the law of Belgium would distribute domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to
personal property upon death in in deciding legal questions about the will, almost
accordance with the law of domicile, and as completely as the law of situs is consulted in
if he finds that the Belgian law would questions about the devise of land. It is logical

that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution should enforce the California internal law
of the personal estate in case of intestate prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and
succession, the same rules should determine the enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens
validity of an attempted testamentary disposition domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
of the property. Here, also, it is not that the California as in comity we are bound to go, as so
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are must enforce the law of California in accordance
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws with the express mandate thereof and as above
rules at the situs property, and the reason for the explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those
is the general convenience of the doctrine. The domiciled abroad.
New York court has said on the point: 'The general
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if
principle that a disposition of a personal property,
there is no law to the contrary in the place where
valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It
California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil
had its origin in that international comity which
Code of the Philippines and that the law to the
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this
contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said
age, when business intercourse and the process of
Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
accumulating property take but little notice of
should govern. This contention can not be
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of
sustained. As explained in the various authorities
the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich,
cited above the national law mentioned in Article
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as authorizes the reference or return of the question
the national law is the internal law of California. to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict
But as above explained the laws of California have of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is
residents therein and another for those domiciled not domiciled in California, to the law of his
in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The

court of the domicile can not and should not refer Tenchavez v. Escano
the case back to California; such action would
G.R. No. L-19671; November 29, 1965
leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J
back and forth between the two states, between
the country of which the decedent was a citizen
and the country of his domicile. The Philippine Facts: On 24 February 1948, Vicenta Escao, 27
court must apply its own law as directed in the years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and
the question has to be decided, especially as the a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows
application of the internal law of California with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
provides no legitime for children while the engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
the Philippines, makes natural children legally before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The
recognizing them. marriage was duly registered with the local civil
register.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the
deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Vicenta and Pastor actually planned to elope after
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will their marriage but it did not materialize because
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the Vicenta was caught by her mother. The Escano
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine spouses sought priestly advice the next morning
Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil and the priest suggested the recelebration of
Code of California, not by the internal law of Vicenta and Pastors marriage but it also did not
California. take place because on February 26, 1948,

Mamerto Escano was informed of the alleged
amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez
and Pacita Noel, thus resulting to Vicentas refusal
to the recelebration of their marriage.
Article 16 & 17, NCC

Afterwhich, the newly wed became estranged to On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an
each other. Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada and she
Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did
First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May
not sign the petition. The case was dismissed
1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents,
without prejudice because of her non-appearance
Mamerto and Mena Escao.
at the hearing.
The Court of First Instance decreed that Pastor is

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband,
now freed from supporting his wife and to acquire
she applied for a passport, indicating in her
property in the exclusion of his wife.
application that she was single, that her purpose
was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City,
Hence this appeal.
and that she intended to return after two years.
The application was approved, and she left for the Issue/s: W/n the Philippine court recognizes a
United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a divorce decree obtained abroad by Filipino
verified complaint for divorce against the herein spouses
plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, Ruling: It is clear from the record that the valid
on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of Escao remained subsisting and undissolved
divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree
court by the said tribunal. of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of
with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely
daughter's marriage to Pastor while on 10 mental in character." At the time the divorce
September 1954, Vicenta sought papal decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her
dispensation of her marriage. husband, was still a Filipino citizen She was then

subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already acts or property, and those which have for
in force at the time, expressly provided: their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by
Laws relating to family rights and duties
laws or judgments promulgated, or by
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
determinations or conventions agreed upon
persons are binding upon the citizens of the
in a foreign country.
Philippines, even though living abroad.
It is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in
should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad
court. Primarily because the policy of our law
vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use
cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil
that term, to further emphasize its restrictive
Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because
policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
the mere appearance of a non-resident consort
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on
cannot confer jurisdiction where the court
grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of
originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal From the preceding facts and considerations,
separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, there flows as a necessary consequence that in
even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the this jurisdiction Vicenta Escao's divorce and
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
subpar. 1). valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez
must be declared to be existent and undissolved.
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give
recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens could
be a patent violation of the declared public policy
of the state, especially in view of the third Article 19, NCC
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. V. CA
prescribes the following:

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989 and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the
Ponente: Cortes, J
anomalies. On December 6, 1972, the Manila
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion police investigators submitted a laboratory crime
report clearing private respondent of participation
Facts: Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was
in the anomalies.
employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and
Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual Notwithstanding the two police reports
capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the
assistant to the engineering operations manager. fact that the report of the private investigator,
He discovered the anomalies within the company was, by its own terms, not yet complete,
and then reported them on November 10, 1972 to petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a
his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to complaint for estafa through falsification of
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry, the Executive Vice- commercial documents, later amended to just
President and General Manager of GLOBE estafa.
MACKAY.
On January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice
However, petitioner Hendry confronted him the from petitioners that his employment has been
next day by stating that he was the number one terminated effective December 13, 1972.
suspect, and ordered him to take a one week Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the
forced leave, not to communicate with the office, Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO).
to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked
office keys. by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating
that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent
to dishonesty.
Tobias returned to work after the forced leave,
petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on
"crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed abusive acts of petitioners.
to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature,

Issue/s: W/n Globe Mackay and Hendy is liable for Hendry said that, "Tobby, you are the crook and
damages swindler in this company.", the scornful remark
regarding the Flipinos, the letter sent to the
Ruling: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
RETELCO and the filing of malicious criminal
of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
complaints are all in transgression to the standard
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
provided under the principle of abuse of right
observe honesty and good faith.
considering that these imputations of guilt
without basis. Under the circumstances of the
This article, known to contain what is commonly
instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to
certain standards which must be observed not
dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
performance of one's duties. When a right is
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule
Article 19, NCC
of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, it does Far East Bank v Pacilan Jr.
not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally,
G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005
an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper. Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J
In the instant case, the Court found out that Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
Facts: Respondent Pacilan opened a current
invoke causing damage to private respondent and
account with petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on
which the latter must be indemnified.
May 23, 1980.The respondent had since then
The high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by issued several postdated checks to different
petitioners was certainly uncalled for. Also, when payees drawn against the said account. Sometime

in March 1988, the respondent issued Check No. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is
2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and the same manifested by the acts of the individual
was presented for payment to petitioner bank on concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
April 4, 1988. from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply
Upon its presentment on the said date, connote bad judgment or simple negligence,
Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
bank. Subsequently, when the respondent verified conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known
with petitioner bank about the dishonor of Check duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that
No. 2434866, he discovered that his current partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes
account was closed on the ground that it was ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty.
improperly handled. On April 18, 1988, the It implies an intention to do ulterior and
respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
that the closure of his account was unjustified. motive.
When he did not receive a reply from petitioner
bank, the respondent filed a complaint for Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to
damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado. close the account of the respondent based on the
provisions of its Rules and Regulations Governing
the Establishment and Operation of Regular
Issue/s: W/n FEBTC is liable for damages
Demand Deposits.
Ruling: The elements of abuse of rights are the
The facts of this case do not establish that,
following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
in the exercise of this right, petitioner bank
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the
committed an abuse thereof. Specifically, the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
second and third elements for abuse of rights are
Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said
not attendant in the present case. The evidence
provision. The law always presumes good faith and
presented by petitioner bank negates the
any person who seeks to be awarded damages due
existence of bad faith or malice on its part in
to acts of another has the burden of proving that
closing the respondents account on April 4, 1988
the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.
because on the said date the same was already

overdrawn. The respondent issued four checks, all Facts: In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco
due on April 4, 1988, amounting to P7,410.00 was approached by Juan Davalan, Josefino
when the balance of his current account deposit Gabutero and Raul Generoso to amicably settle
was only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery by
overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a
dishonor of his Check No. 2434886. Further, red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of
petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current its certificate of registration. Respondent asked for
account of the respondent was overdrawn 156 the original certificate of registration but the three
times due to his issuance of checks against accused never came to see him again. Meanwhile,
insufficient funds. In 1987, the said account was the motorcycle was parked in an open space inside
overdrawn 117 times for the same reason, and respondents business establishment, Avesco-
again in 1988, 26 times. There were also several AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and
instances when the respondent issued checks by accessible to the public.
deliberately using a signature different from his
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle
specimen signature on file with petitioner bank.
had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
All these circumstances taken together justified
petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-
the petitioner banks closure of the respondents
owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty.
account on April 4, 1988 for improper handling.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its payment,
the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner
corporation. Davalan later assumed he obligation
Article 19, NCC to pay but he stopped paying the remaining
installments on September 1982 and told
Uypitching v. Quiamco
petitioner corporations collector that the
G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006 motorcycle was allegedly taken by the
respondents men
Ponente: Corona, J.
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner
Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the

motorcycle. The leader of the police team, P/Lt. Law. Petitioners acts were found to be contrary to
Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in charge and Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.Hence, the trial
asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and court held petitioners liable. Upon appeal, the CA
the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced affirmed the trial courts decision.
back and forth inside the establishment uttering
Issue/s: W/n the filing of a complaint for qualified
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." When the
theft and/o Officer is in violation of the Anti-
police were unable to find respondent in his
Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor
residence, the policemen went back to Avesco-
warranted the award of damages in favor of the
AVNE Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings
respondent
instruction and over the clerks objection, took the
motorcycle. Ruling: Article 19, also known as the "principle of
abuse of right," prescribes that a person should
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed
not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty
a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or
and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to
violation of the Anti-Fencing La against
liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
respondent in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means
Dumaguete City.He sought to hold the petitioners
to unjust ends.
liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the
motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
(that respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise
filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. These of a right must be in accordance with the purpose
acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent for which it was established and must not be
and injured his reputation and integrity. excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a
damages to the injured party will attach.
decision finding that petitioner Uypitching was
motivated with malice and ill will when he called In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle
respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an was taken at petitioners instance was not only
abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for attended by bad faith but also contrary to the
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing procedure laid down by law. Considered in

conjunction with the defamatory statement, and non-stock private membership club, having its
petitioners exercise of the right to recover the principal place of business in Banilad, Cebu City.
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and Petitioners herein are members of its Board of
injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the Directors. In 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint special company proprietary member of CCCI,
could not in any way be considered to be in designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its
accordance with the purpose for which the right to Senior Vice President and Operations Manager for
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-
totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated proprietary member. The designation was
design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of
ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an Directors.
excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application
respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully
for proprietary membership. As the price of a
caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should
proprietary share was around the P5 million
indemnify him.
range, Benito Unchuan, then president of CCCI,
offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5
million. Respondent, however, purchased the
share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3 million.
Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued
Article 19, NCC
Proprietary Ownership Certificate No. 1446 to
Cebu Country Club v. Elizague respondent.
G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008 During the other 2 meetings, action on
respondents application for proprietary
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
membership was deferred. In another Board
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents
application was voted upon. On August 1, 1997,
Facts: Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is
respondent received a letter informing him that
a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit
the Board disapproved his application for

proprietary membership. Elizague then sent 3 to Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the same
letters to CCCI to inquire regarding the reason of Code.
his applications disapproval. These inquiries
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section
remained unheeded.
3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws requiring the
On December 23, 1998, respondent filed a unanimous vote of the directors present at a
complaint for damages against petitioners special or regular meeting was not printed on the
application form respondent filled and submitted
Issue/s: W/n petitioners are liable for damages to
to CCCI. What was printed thereon was the
the respondent in disapproving the latters
original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent
application for propriety membership with CCCI
on the required number of votes needed for
admission of an applicant as a proprietary
Ruling: Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors,
member. It is thus clear that respondent was left
under its Articles of Incorporation, has the right to
groping in the dark wondering why his application
approve or disapprove an application for
was disapproved. He was not even informed that
proprietary membership. But such right should
a unanimous vote of the Board members was
not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of
required. When he sent a letter for
the Civil Code on the Chapter on Human Relations
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was
provide restrictions.
an objection to his application, petitioners
In rejecting respondents application for apparently ignored him.
proprietary membership, the Court found that
In the exercise of a right, though legal by itself, it
petitioners violated the rules governing human
must nonetheless be in accordance with the
relations, the basic principles to be observed for
proper norm. When the right is exercised
the rightful relationship between human beings
arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and results in
and for the stability of social order. The trial court
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
and the Court of Appeals aptly held that
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
petitioners committed fraud and evident bad faith
in disapproving respondents applications. This is
contrary to morals, good custom or public policy.
Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant

1991 and another P5,400.00 on 9 December 1991.
Then he ceased paying the dues. Ten (10) months
Article 19, NCC
later, Calatagan attempted to collect Clementes
Calatagan Golf Club v. Clemente back accounts by sending a demand letter

dated 21 September 1992 and 22 October 1992 to
G.R. No. 165443 April 16, 2009
his mailing address as indicated in his membership
Ponente: Tinga, J. application but were sent back to sender with the
postal note that the address had been closed.
Facts: Clemente applied to purchase one Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for
share of stock of Calatagan, indicating in his having failed to pay his monthly dues and included
application for membership his mailing address at Clementes name in the list of delinquent
Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box 240, MCC, members posted on the clubs bulletin
complete residential address, office and residence board. On 1 December 1992, Calatagans board of
telephone numbers, as well as the company directors adopted a resolution authorizing the
(Phimco) with which he was connected, Calatagan foreclosure of shares of delinquent members,
issued to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 including Clementes; and the public auction of
May 1990 after paying P120,000.00 for the share. these shares.
On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a

Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members
third and final letter to Clemente which contains a
to meet expenses for general operations, as well
warning that unless Clemente settles his
as costs for upkeep and improvement of the
outstanding dues, his share would be included
grounds and facilities. The provision on monthly
among the delinquent shares to be sold at public
dues is incorporated in Calatagans Articles of
auction on 15 January 1993 to the same mailing
Incorporation and By-Laws. It is also reproduced at
address that had already been closed. The auction
the back of each certificate of stock.
sale took place as scheduled on 15 January 1993,
When Clemente became a member the and Clementes share was sold.
monthly charge stood at P400.00. He Clemente learned of the sale of his share
paid P3,000.00 for his monthly dues on 21 March only in November of 1997. He filed a claim with

the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) spirit and letter of its own by-laws. The by-law
seeking the restoration of his shareholding in provisions was clearly conceived to afford due
Calatagan with damages. On 15 November 2000, notice to the delinquent member of the
the SEC rendered a decision dismissing Clementes impending sale, and not just to provide an
complaint but on 1 June 2004, the Court of intricate facade that would facilitate Calatagans
Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the SEC. sale of the share. But then, the bad faith on
Hence this appeal. Calatagans part is palpable. As found by the Court
Issue/s: W/n Calatagan Golf Club acted in bad faith of Appeals, Calatagan very well knew that
when it sold Clementes share Clementes postal box to which it sent its previous
letters had already been closed, yet it persisted in
Ruling: Calatagan argues that it exercised due
sending that final letter to the same postal box. It
diligence before the foreclosure sale and sent
is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership
several notices to Clementes specified mailing
application had provided his residential address
address.The Court do not agree; Calatagans act of
along with his residence and office telephone
sending the December 7, 1992 letter to
numbers. Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagans By-
Clementes mailing address knowing fully well that
Laws requires that the final notice prior to the sale
the P.O. Box had been closed cannot be labeled as
be made solely through the members mailing
due diligence. Due diligence or good faith imposes
address.
upon the Corporate Secretary the chief repository
of all corporate records the obligation to check Calatagans bad faith and failure to observe its
Clementes other address which, under the By- own By-Laws had resulted not merely in the loss
Laws, have to be kept on file and are in fact on of Clementes privilege to play golf at its golf
file. One obvious purpose of giving the Corporate course and avail of its amenities, but also in
Secretary the duty to keep the addresses of significant pecuniary damage to him. The utter
members on file is specifically for matters of this bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into
kind, when the member cannot be reached operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
through his or her mailing address. Code, under the Chapter on Human Relations.
These provisions, which the Court of Appeals did
Ultimately, the petition must fail because
apply, enunciate a general obligation under law
Calatagan had failed to duly observe both the
for every person to act fairly and in good faith

towards one another. A non-stock corporation like Memorandum of Agreement includes a stipulation
Calatagan is not exempt from that obligation in its that the water and power bill of the subject
treatment of its members. The obligation of a property shall be for the account of Ma. Theresa
corporation to treat every person honestly and in Pastorfide, effective June 1, 1994, vis-a-vis Ma.
good faith extends even to its shareholders or Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the payment
members, even if the latter find themselves of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente
contractually bound to perform certain from the National Home Mortgage.
obligations to the corporation. A certificate of
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water
stock cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was
never questioned nor perturbed until on March
12, 1999. Without notice, the water connection of
Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the office
Article 19, NCC of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to
complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa
Ardiente v Javier
that she was delinquent for three (3) months
G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013 corresponding to the months of December 1998,
January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa
Ponente: Peralta, J.
argued that the due date of her payment was
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion March 18, 1999 yet Mrs. Madjos later told her that
it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the
Facts: Petitioner Joyce V. Ardiente and her
water line was cut off.
husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the
Oro City. On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered delinquent bills and at the same time, she wrote a
into a Memorandum of Agreement selling, letter to the COWD through her lawyer to explain
transferring and conveying in favor of who authorized the cutting of the water line. On
[respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their March 18, 1999, COWD, in its answer to the letter,
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce
Homes in consideration of P70,000.00. The Ardiente that the water line was cut off.

On April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide and her it is their failure to give prior notice of the
husband filed a complaint for damages against impending disconnection and their subsequent
petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water
Gonzalez. The RTC awarded damages to the supply despite the latter's settlement of their
complainant which was later affirmed with delinquent account.
modification by the Court of Appeals. Hence this
petition.
Issue/s: W/n COWD and Gonzales together with

Ardiente may be held to pay for damages Article 19, NCC
Ruling: Yes. It is true that it is within petitioner's University of the East v. Jader
right to ask and even require the Spouses
G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's
account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
to their Memorandum of Agreement. However,
the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause
the disconnection of the respondent spouses' Facts: Plaintiff was enrolled in the University of the
water supply. Based on the principle of abuse of East College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the
rights which provides that the exercise of a right first semester of his last year (School year 1987-
must be in accordance with the purpose for which 1988), he failed to take the regular final
it was established and must not be excessive or examination in Practice Court I for which he was
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for the
another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the second semester as fourth year law student and
injured party will attach. In the present case, on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the
intention to harm was evident on the part of removal of the incomplete grade given him by
petitioner when she requested for the Professor Carlos Ortega (which was approved by
disconnection of respondent spouses water Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the
supply without warning or informing the latter of required fee. He took the examination on March
such request. On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos

Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five Bulletin and as approved of the Department of
(5).s Education, Culture and Sports.
When the Dean and the Faculty Members of the The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies
College of Law met to deliberate on who among at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus,
the fourth year students should be allowed to during the program of which he went up the stage
graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the when his name was called, escorted by her (sic)
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the mother and his eldest brother who assisted in
Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from
Semester (1987-1988) with the following left to right, and he was thereafter handed by
annotation: Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper
symbolical of the Law Diploma.
JADER ROMEO A.
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice
examination. He took a leave of absence without
Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit
pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September
transcript with S.O.
30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review class
in Far Eastern University. Having learned of the
The 35th Investitures & Commencement
deficiency he dropped his review class and was not
Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws
able to take the bar examination. Consequently,
was scheduled on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00
respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging
o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation for
that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish,
that occasion the name of the plaintiff appeared
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
as one of the candidates. At the foot of the list of
feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able
the names of the candidates there appeared
to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the
however the following annotation:
latter's negligence.
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred
The RTC then rendered judgment awarding
upon these candidates who satisfactorily
damages to Jader which was later affirmed by the
complete requirements as stated in the University
CA. Hence this petition.

Issue/s: W/n the University of the East may be absence of all information or belief of facts, would
held liable for damages for its failure to notify render the transaction unconscientious. It is the
Jader of the deficiency in his grades school that has access to that information and it is
only the school that can compel its professors to
Ruling: The petition lacks merit.
act and comply with its rules, regulations and
policies with respect to the computation and the
Although commencement exercises are but a
prompt submission of grades. It is the school that
formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary
exercises general supervision and exclusive
occasion, since such ceremony is the educational
control over the professors with respect to the
institution's way of announcing to the whole world
submission of reports involving the students'
that the students included in the list of those who
standing. Exclusive control means that no other
will be conferred a degree during the
person or entity had any control over the
baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the
instrumentality which caused the damage or
requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent
injury.
to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to
promptly inform the student of any problem
Educational institutions are duty-bound to
involving the latter's grades and performance and
inform the students of their academic status and
also most importantly, of the procedures for
not wait for the latter to inquire from the
remedying the same. Petitioner, in belatedly
former. Want of care to the conscious disregard of
informing respondent of the result of the removal
civil obligations coupled with a conscious
examination, particularly at a time when he had
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to
already commenced preparing for the bar exams,
produce them would make the erring party
cannot be said to have acted in good faith.
liable. Petitioner ought to have known that time
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
was of the essence in the performance of its
established for a successful prosecution by the
obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under
cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is
honest intention to abstain from taking undue
precisely the immediate concern after graduation
advantage of another, even though the forms and
of an LL.B. Graduate. Petitioner's liability arose
technicalities of the law, together with the
from its failure to promptly inform respondent of

the result of an examination and in misleading the Nonetheless, respondents still failed to pay the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all quarterly installments on the promissory notes.
requirements for the course. Thus, petitioner demanded the payment of the
total value of their loans from
respondents. Respondents, however, ignored
petitioner and adamantly refused to pay their
loans.
Article 19, NCC

Consequently, petitioner filed an application for
Development Bank of the Philippines v, Spouses extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages
Doyon in the Regional Trial Court in 1995. To forestall the
foreclosure proceedings, respondents
G.R. No. 167238, March 25, 2009
immediately filed an action for their nullification
Ponente: Corona, J. in the RTC claiming that they had already paid the
principal amount of their loans (or P10 million) to
petitioner.
Facts: In the early 1990s, respondent spouses

In 1998, petitioner withdrew the application for
Jesus and Anacorita Doyon obtained several loans
extrajudicial foreclosure and thereafter moved for
amounting to P10 million from petitioner
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3314-O. The RTC
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As
granted the motion in an order dated March 2,
security for the loans, respondents mortgaged
1998. By agreement therefore between the
their real estate properties as well as the motor
parties, this case is considered DISMISSED with
vehicles of JD Bus Lines. Due to their inability to
prejudice.
fully pay their obligations upon
maturity, respondents requested petitioner to Weeks later, petitioner demanded from
restructure their past due loans. Petitioner respondents the payment of their outstanding
agreed. Hence, respondents signed three obligations which had by then ballooned to more
promissory notes on June 29, 1994. than P20 million. Again, respondents ignored
petitioner. Petitioner filed an application for

extrajudicial foreclosure of respondents real and affirmed by the Court of Appeals upon appeal.
chattel mortgages with the DBP special sheriff in Hence this petition.
Makati and subsequently took constructive
Issue/s: W/n DBP is liable for damages
possession of the foreclosed properties. It posted
guards at the perimeter of respondents property
Ruling: What is due to a person is determined by
in Barangay Cabulihan, Ormoc City (Cabulihan
the circumstances of each particular case. For an
property) where the foreclosed motor vehicles of
action for damages under Article 19 to prosper,
JD Bus Lines were parked. Subsequently, the DBP
the complainant must prove that:
special sheriff issued notices of sale at public
auction of the foreclosed properties. (a) defendant has a legal right or duty;
Respondents filed a complaint for damages (b) he exercised his right or performed his duty
against petitioner and the DBP special sheriff in with bad faith and
the RTC of Ormoc City alleging that by withdrawing
the application for extrajudicial foreclosure and (c) complainant was prejudiced or injured as a
moving for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3314-O, result of the said exercise or performance by
petitioner led them to believe that it would no defendant.
longer seek the satisfaction of its claims. Petitioner

On the first requisite, we find that petitioner had
therefore acted contrary to Article 19 of the Civil
the legal right to foreclose on the real and chattel
Code when it foreclosed on the real and chattel
mortgages.The June 29, 1994 promissory notes
mortgages anew.
uniformly stated that failure to pay an installment
The RTC ruled that, by withdrawing its application (or interest) on the due date was an event of
for extrajudicial foreclosure and moving for the default. Respondents were therefore in default
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3314-O, petitioner led when they failed to pay the quarterly
respondents to believe that their loans had been amortizations on the designated due dates. When
extinguished. Thus, petitioner acted in bad faith the principal obligation becomes due and the
when it foreclosed on the real and chattel debtor fails to perform his obligation, the creditor
mortgages anew. The decision was subsequently may foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of

alienating the (mortgaged) property to satisfy his Lastly, inasmuch as petitioner demanded payment
credit. from them right after the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 3314-O, respondents could not have
Regarding the second requisite, bad faith imports
reasonably presumed that the bank had waived its
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity or
claims against them. Furthermore, the fact that a
conscious doing of a wrong that partakes of the
demand for payment was made negated bad faith
nature of fraud. We note that the RTC of Ormoc
on the part of petitioner. Despite giving
City (Judge Fortunito L. Madrona) "sat" on Civil
respondents the opportunity to pay their long
Case No. 3314-O for three long years. This
overdue obligations and avoid foreclosure,
inordinate delay prejudiced petitioner. Inasmuch
respondents still refused to pay. Since
as petitioner was in the business of lending out
respondents did not have a cause of action against
money it borrowed from the public, sound
petitioner, the RTC and CA erred in granting
banking practice called for the exercise of a more
damages to them.
efficient legal remedy against a defaulting debtor
like respondent. Thus, petitioner could not be
faulted for resorting to foreclosure through a
special sheriff. Such procedure was, after all, the
more efficient method of enforcing petitioners
Article 21, NCC
rights as mortgagee under its charter.
Bunag v CA
Moreover, the March 2, 1998 order of the RTC
merely stated that the withdrawal of the G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992
application for extrajudicial foreclosure in the RTC

Ponente: Regalado, J.
rendered Civil Case No. 3314-O moot and
academic. Nothing in the said order stated, or Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
even hinted, that respondents obligation to

Facts: On September 8, 1973, Conrado Bunag
petitioner had in fact been extinguished. Thus,
brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel where he
there was nothing on the part of petitioner even
allegedly deflowered her against her will and
remotely showing that it led respondents to
consent.
believe that it had waived its claims.

After that outrage on her virginity, Bunag brought Issue/s: W/n Cirilo is liable for damages
her to the house of Juana de Leon, Bunag, Jr.'s
Ruling: It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere
grandmother in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro
to the time-honored rule that an action for breach
Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the
of promise to marry has no standing in the civil
evening. At about ten (10) o'clock that same
law, apart from the right to recover money or
evening, defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., father of
property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith
Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the
of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of
following day which was a Monday, she and
promise to marry per se is not actionable, except
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a
where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses
marriage license, which they did. They filed their
for the wedding and the necessary incidents
applications for marriage license and after that
thereof.
plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the
house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband
However, the award of moral damages is allowed
and wife from September 8, 1973 to September
in cases specified in or analogous to those
29, 1973. On September 29, 1973 defendant
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating
Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in
plaintiff and compelled her to go back to her
relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any
parents on October 3, 1973.
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
A complaint for damages for alleged breach of
good customs or public policy shall compensate
promise to marry was filed by herein private
the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was
respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner
adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the
Conrado Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag,
statutes which leave so many victims of moral
Sr. On August 20, 1983, on a finding, inter alia, that
wrongs helpless even though they have actually
petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private
suffered material and moral injury, and is intended
respondent, the trial court rendered judgment
to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
ordering Bunag to indemnify Zenaida and
untold number of moral wrongs which is
absolved Conrado Bunag, Sr. from any and all
impossible for human foresight to specifically
liability. This decision was laer affirmed in toto by
provide for in the statutes.
the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting bride-to-be:
private respondent and having carnal knowledge
Dear Bet
with her against her will, and thereafter promising
to marry her in order to escape criminal liability,
Will have to postpone wedding My mother
only to thereafter renege on such promise after
opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days,
irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and Please do not ask too many people about the
good customs. These are grossly insensate and reason why That would only create a scandal.
reprehensible transgressions which indisputably
warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral Paquing
and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and
following telegram:
Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING

VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE.
PAKING
Article 21, NCC

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard
Wassmer v. Velez from again.
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964 Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer
and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
Ponente: Bengzon, J.
evidence before the clerk of court as
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment
was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer,
damages. The defendant now appeals to this
following their mutual promise of love, decided to
court.
get married and set September 4, 1954. On

be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for
the important occasion were purchased. Dresses
Issue/s: W/n Wassmer may be held liable for
for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
damages
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
Ruling: Defendant asserts that the judgment is was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts
contrary to law considering that "there is no received. And then, with but two days before the
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,:
for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, the ruling simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... "
Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately soon." But he never returned and was never heard
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the from again.
provisions that would have it so.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise
However, the extent to which acts not contrary to to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that set a wedding and go through all the above-
"any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to described preparation and publicity, only to walk
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, out of it when the matrimony is about to be
good customs or public policy shall compensate solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
the latter for the damage." unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to
contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued. Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to
relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to- Article 21, NCC

Tanjanco v CA Issue/s: W/n Tanjanco is liable for damages
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966 Ruling: No. In holding that the complaint stated a
cause of action for damages, under Article 21
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion upon and quoted from the memorandum
submitted by the Code Commission to the
Facts: From December, 1957, the defendant
Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of
(appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the
the Civil Code where the Commission provided for
plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age;
the following example:
that "defendant expressed and professed his
undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
consideration of defendant's promise of marriage either has not been made, or cannot be
plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under
pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until the present laws, there is no crime, as the
December 1959, as a result of which she conceived girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither
a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to can any civil action for breach of promise
avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, of marriage be filed. Therefore, though
plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM the grievous moral wrong has been
Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 committed, and though the girl and her
a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to family have suffered incalculable moral
support herself and her baby; that due to damage, she and her parents cannot bring
defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, any action for damages. But under the
the latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched proposed article, she and her parents
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and would have such a right of action.
social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree
compelling the defendant to recognize the unborn The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked
child that plaintiff was bearing and to pay her that the example set forth in the Code
damages. Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon

a minor who has been seduced. The essential Lastly, a mere breach of a promise to marry is not
feature is seduction, which in law is more than an actionable wrong under our jurisdiction.
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
Article 21, NCC
woman has yielded
Buenaventura v. CA
With the material allegations of this case, the facts
stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
Ponente: Azcuna, J.
maintained intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
conduct is incompatible with the idea of
Facts: A petition for the declaration of nullity
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
of marriage was filed by petitioner Noel
mutual passion; for had the appellant been
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife,
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles
Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent.
of the defendant, she would not have again
After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with
yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
leave of court, amended his petition by stating
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
that both he and his wife were psychologically
promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all
incapacitated to comply with the essential
sexual relations upon finding that defendant did
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent
not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we
filed an amended answer denying the allegation
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of
that she was psychologically incapacitated.
the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court
First Instance in dismissing the complaint. promulgated a Decision which declares the
marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh

Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab Issue/s: W/n damages may be awarded by reason
initio and orders the plaintiff to pay defendant of the performance or non-performance of marital
damages, among others. obligations
The lower court found that plaintiff-appellant Ruling: The Court of Appeals and the trial court
deceived the defendant-appellee into marrying considered the acts of the petitioner after the
him by professing true love instead of revealing to marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity,
her that he was under heavy parental pressure to and therefore a product of his incapacity or
marry and that because of pride he married inability to comply with the essential obligations of
defendant-appellee; that he was not ready to marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered
enter into marriage as in fact his career was and these acts as willful and hence as grounds for
always would be his first priority; that he was granting moral damages. It is contradictory to
unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as characterize acts as a product of psychological
a husband but also to his son, Javy, as a father; that incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the
he had no inclination to make the marriage work party because of an innate inability, while at the
such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest same time considering the same set of acts as
way out, that of leaving defendant appellee and willful. By declaring the petitioner as
their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant- psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of
appellee and their son as proved by his reluctance awarding moral damages on the same set of facts
and later, refusal to reconcile after their was negated. The award of moral damages should
separation; that the aforementioned caused be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into
defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was
anxiety, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights done deliberately and with malice by a party who
not only in those years the parties were together had knowledge of his or her disability and yet
but also after and throughout their separation. willfully concealed the same. No such evidence
appears to have been adduced in this case.
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court
For the same reason, since psychological
promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners
incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of
appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the
the basic marital covenants that one must assume
trial courts decision. Hence this appeal.

and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it of fiberglass and started using instead recycled
removes the basis for the contention that the broken glass or flint cullets to save on
petitioner purposely deceived the private manufacturing costs.
respondent. If the private respondent was
Petitioner contracted with respondent Editha C.
deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part
Coquia for the purchase of one (1) lot of flint
of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral
cullets, consisting of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons, at
damages was without basis in law and in fact.
a price of P4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order No.
Since the grant of moral damages was not
106211 dated 6 October 1994. Several deliveries
proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary
made by respondent were accepted and paid for
damages cannot stand since the Civil Code
by petitioner at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo as
provides that exemplary damages are imposed in
indicated in Purchase Order No. 106211.
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. However, on 28 October 1994, petitioner
demanded the reduction of the purchase price
from P4.20 per kilo to P3.65 per kilo to which
respondent acceded, albeit allegedly under
Article 21, NCC duress. Petitioner accordingly issued Purchase

Order No. 106373 explicitly superseding Purchase
ACI Philippines v. Coquia
Order No. 106211. Deliveries were again made by
G.R. No. 174466, July 14, 2008 respondent on 5, 8 and 12 November 1994 under
Delivery Receipt Nos. 901, 719 and
Ponente: Tinga, J.
735, respectively. Petitioner accepted the
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion deliveries but refused to pay for them even at the
reduced price of P3.65 per kilo, demanding
Facts: Petitioner ACI Philippines, Inc. is engaged in instead that the unit price be further reduced
the business of manufacturing fiberglass, which is to P3.10 per kilo.
used in both commercial and industrial equipment
for thermal and acoustic insulation. In 1993, it Respondent then filed a Complaint for specific
ceased from using silica sand in the manufacture performance and damages.

The RTC ordered petitioner to accept deliveries of but must depend on competent proof and on the
the flint cullets contracted for under Purchase best evidence obtainable regarding the actual
Order No. 106211 and to pay for the said deliveries amount of loss.
within ten (10) days from each delivery at the unit
Finally, the appellate courts citation of Article 21
price of P4.20 per kilo ad to pay damages. The CA
of the Civil Code misplaced not only because of the
affirmed the trial courts decision.
pre-existing contractual relation between the
Issue/s: W/n ACI is liable for damages parties which bars the application of this
provision, but more importantly because we do
Ruling: The Court finds the award of damages to
not deem petitioner to have acted fraudulently or
respondent to be without factual basis.
in bad faith.
Respondent sought to prove the actual damages
she incurred merely through her own testimony,
without adducing any documentary evidence to
substantiate her alleged losses. While she claims
that she obtained a bank loan at an interest rate Article 21, NCC
of 21%, respondent did not present any document
Gashem Baksh v. CA
to prove the said loan or the use thereof to
purchase flint cullets for delivery to petitioner. G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Neither did respondent present documents to
Ponente: Davide, Jr., J.
prove her alleged stock of 1,000 metric tons of flint
cullets for which she allegedly Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
invested P2,500,000.00.
Facts: On 27 October 1987, private respondent,
The claim for actual damages in this case should without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
be admitted with extreme caution since it is based trial court a complaint for damages against the
only on bare assertions without support from petitioner for the alleged violation of their
independent evidence. In determining actual agreement to get married. She alleges in said
damages, the Court cannot rely on mere complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old,
assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her

community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student October 1989 a decision favoring the private
taking a medical course at the Lyceum respondent. On 18 February 1991, respondent
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 Court promulgated the challenged
August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to decision affirming in toto the trial court's ruling.
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition Hence this petition.
that they would get married; they therefore
Issue/s: W/n Baksh is liable for damages
agreed to get married after the end of the school
semester, which was in October of that year; Ruling: The existing rule is that a breach of
petitioner then visited the private respondent's promise to marry per se is not an actionable
parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated from the
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with would have made it so. The reason therefor is set
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin forth in the report of the Senate Committees on
before she began living with him; a week before the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and The elimination of this chapter is
threatened to kill her; as a result of such proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a actionable has been definitely decided in the case
confrontation with a representative of the of De Jesus vs. Syquia. The history of breach of
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing promise suits in the United States and in England
of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their has shown that no other action lends itself more
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with readily to abuse by designing women and
him anymore and; the petitioner is already unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has
married to someone living in Bacolod City. led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-
Petitioner admitted his personal circumstances as called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
alleged but he denied all other allegations. states. . . .

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand womanhood to him and to live with him on the
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
the untold number of moral wrongs which is deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
impossible for human foresight to specifically parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
enumerate and punish in the statute books. preparatory to their supposed marriage."
The Court so holds, that where a man's promise to

marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter Article 22, NCC
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
Filinvest Land v. Ngilay
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and G.R. No. 174715 October 11, 2012
that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
Ponente: Peralta, J.
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
could justify the award of damages pursuant to
Facts: Respondents were grantees of agricultural
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
public lands located in Tambler, General Santos
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and
City through Homestead and Fee Patents
the willful injury to her honor and reputation
sometime in 1986 and 1991. In 1995, negotiations
which followed thereafter. It is essential however
were made by the petitioner, through its
that such injury should have been committed in a
representative, with the patriarch of the Ngilays,
manner contrary to morals, good customs or
Hadji Ngulam Ngilay. Eventually, the Deed of
public policy.
Conditional Sale of the properties was executed.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it Upon its execution, respondents were asked to
was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive deliver to petitioner the original owners duplicate
protestations of love for and promise to marry copy of the certificates of title of their respective

properties and they received the down payment condition in which they were found before the
on October 28, 1995. execution thereof. Petitioner is correct in its
argument that allowing respondents to keep the
A few days later, they learned that the sale of their
amount received from petitioner will amount to
properties was null and void because it was done
unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment exists
within the period that they were not allowed to do
when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the
so and that the sale did not have the approval of
loss of another, or when a person retains a money
the Secretary of the DENR prompting them to file
or property of another against the fundamental
a case for declaration of the nullity of the deeds of
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
absolute and conditional sale of the questioned
There is unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the
properties.
Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited,
The RTC ruled in favor of Filinvest and upheld the and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or
sale of all the properties in litigation. Respondents with damages to another. Thus, the sale which
elevated the case to the CA in which the latter created the obligation of petitioner to pay the
modified the judgment of the lower court. It agreed amount having been declared void,
upheld the validity of the sale of the properties the respondents have the duty to return the
patents of which were awarded in 1986, including downpayment as they no longer have the right to
the corresponding the right of way. Hence this keep it. The principle of unjust enrichment
petition. essentially contemplates payment when there is
no duty to pay and the person who receives the
Petitioner argues, among others, that the down
payment has no right to receive it.
payment received by the Ngilays must be
returned.
Issue/s: W/n the Ngilays may be compelled as a

matter of law to return to petitioner what they
Article 22, NCC
have received as a downpayment
Republic v. Lacap
Ruling: The rule is settled that the declaration of
the nullity of contract which is void ab initio G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007
operates to restore things to the state and

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J. had expired at the time of the execution of the
contract.
In a First Indorsement dated July 20, 1994, Cesar

Facts: The District Engineer of Pampanga issued
D. Mejia, Director III of the Legal Department,
and duly published an "Invitation to Bid" dated
recommended that payment should be made to
January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business
Carwin Construction, reiterating his earlier legal
under the name and style Carwin Construction and
opinion. Despite such recommendation for
Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was
payment, no payment was made to respondent.
pre-qualified together with two other contractors.
Thus, on July 3, 1995, respondent filed the
Since respondent submitted the lowest bid, he
complaint for Specific Performance and Damages
was awarded the contract for the concreting
against petitioner before the RTC.
of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. On November 4, 1992, a
Contract Agreement was executed by respondent On February 19, 1997 in its Decision, RTC held that
and petitioner. On September 25, 1992, District petitioner must be required to pay the contract
Engineer Rafael S. Ponio issued a Notice to price since it has accepted the completed project
Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold
Accordingly, respondent undertook the works, otherwise would be to overrun the long standing
made advances for the purchase of the materials and consistent pronouncement against enriching
and payment for labor costs. oneself at the expense of another.
Thereafter, respondent sought to collect payment Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the
for the completed project. The DPWH prepared CA. On April 28, 2003, the CA rendered its Decision
the Disbursement Voucher in favor of sustaining the Decision of the RTC. Hence this
petitioner. However, the DPWH withheld decision
payment from respondent after the District
Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) Issue/s: W/n respondent must be paid for the
disapproved the final release of funds on the completed projects
ground that the contractors license of respondent

Ruling: Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies
the maxim Nemo ex alterius incommode debet

lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of Ponente: Mendoza, J.
anothers injury). This article is part of the chapter
of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the
provisions of which were formulated as "basic Facts: Respondent Leandro Legaspi (respondent)
principles to be observed for the rightful was employed as Utility Pastry on board the vessel
relationship between human beings and for the "Azamara Journey" under the employment of
stability of the social order, x x x designed to petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
indicate certain norms that spring from the (petitioner). Respondents employment was
fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement
conduct [that] should run as golden threads (CBA) wherein it was agreed that the company
through society to the end that law may approach shall pay a maximum disability compensation of
its supreme ideal which is the sway and up to US$60,000.00 only.
dominance of justice." The rules thereon apply
equally well to the Government. Since respondent While on board the vessel, respondent suffered
had rendered services to the full satisfaction and "Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD Insertion." He was checked
acceptance by petitioner, then the former should by the ships doctor and was prescribed
be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to medications. On November 14, 2008, respondent
acquire the finished project at no cost would was repatriated to receive further medical
undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the treatment and examination. On May 23, 2009, the
petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such company designated physician assessed his
unjust enrichment is not allowed by law. condition to be Disability Grade 2.
Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full

and permanent disability compensation against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter (LA). In its
January 25, 2010 Decision, the LA ruled in favor of
Article 22, NCC
respondent which was later affirmed by the NLRC.
Philippine Transmarine v. Legaspi On October 22, 2010, during the hearing on the
motion for execution before the NLRC, petitioner
G.R. No. 202791, June 10, 2013
agreed to pay respondent US$81,320.00. The

terms and conditions of said payment were Petitioner now seeks to recover the excess
embodied in the Receipt of Judgment Award with amount they paid to the respondent during the
Undertaking, wherein respondent acknowledged pre-execution conference. Hence this petition.
receipt of the said amount and undertook to
Issue/s:W/n the CA committed reversible error of
return it to petitioner in the event the latters
law in ruling that the petitioner is estopped in
petition for certiorari would be granted, without
collecting the excess payment it made to the
prejudice to respondents right to appeal. It was
respondent notwithstanding the receipt of
also agreed upon that the remaining balance
judgment award signed by the respondent
would be given on the next scheduled conference.
Ruling: As the agreement was voluntarily entered

In the meantime, on March 2, 2011, the LA issued
into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is
a writ of execution which noted petitioners
binding on the parties and may not later be
payment of the amount of US$81,320.00. On
disowned simply because of a change of
March 16, 2011, in compliance with the said writ,
mind. Respondent agreed to the stipulation that
petitioner tendered to the NLRC Cashier the
he would return the amount paid to him in the
additional amounts of US$8,132.00 as attorneys
event that the petition for certiorari would be
fees and P3,042.95 as execution fee. In its Order,
granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by
dated March 31, 2011, the LA ordered the release
the CA, albeit partially, respondent must comply
of the aforementioned amounts to respondent.
with the condition to return the excess amount.
Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of
The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment
judgment of the NLRC, b) the October 22, 2010
Award with Undertaking was a fair and binding
payment of US$81,320.00, and c) the writ of
agreement. It was executed by the parties subject
execution issued by the LA, the CA rendered its
to outcome of the petition. To allow now
Decision, dated June 29, 2011. The CA partially
respondent to retain the excess money judgment
granted the petition for certiorari and modified
would amount to his unjust enrichment to the
the assailed resolutions of the NLRC, awarding
prejudice of petitioner.
only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between
Celebrity Cruise Lines and Federazione Italianaa
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result
Transporti CISL.
or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for

property or benefits received under circumstances G.R. No. 134241. August 11, 2003
that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
Ponente: Carpio, J.
account for them. To be entitled to remuneration,
one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not
Facts: On 23 March 1995, petitioner David
itself a theory of reconveyance. Rather, it is a
Reyes (Reyes) filed before the trial court a
prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine
complaint for annulment of contract and damages
of restitution. There is unjust enrichment when:
against respondents Jose Lim (Lim), Chuy Cheng
1. A person is unjustly benefited; and Keng (Keng) and Harrison Lumber, Inc. (Harrison
Lumber) alleging that on 7 November 1994, Reyes
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense as seller and Lim as buyer entered into a contract
of or with damages to another. to sell (Contract to Sell) a parcel of land (Property)
located along F.B. Harrison Street, Pasay City.
In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent
Harrison Lumber occupied the Property as lessee
US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference
with a monthly rental of P35,000. The total
plus attorneys fees of US$8,132.00 pursuant to
consideration for the purchase of the
the writ of execution. The June 29, 2011 CA
aforedescribed parcel of land together with the
Decision, however, modified the final resolution of
perimeter walls found therein is TWENTY EIGHT
the NLRC and awarded only US$60,000.00 to
MILLION (P28,000,000.00) PESOS.
respondent. If allowed not to return the excess,
the respondent would have been unjustly The complaint claimed that Reyes had
benefited to the prejudice and expense of informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property
petitioner. before the end of January 1995. Reyes also

informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they
failed to vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold
them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a month as
provided in the Contract to Sell. The complaint
further alleged that Lim connived with Harrison
Article 22, NCC
Lumber not to vacate the Property until the
Reyes v. Lim P400,000 monthly penalty would have

accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase already prescribes the specific provisional
price of P18,000,000. remedies which do not include deposit. Reyes
invokes the principle that equity is applied only in
However, Lim learned that Reyes had already
the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation
x x x judicial rules of procedure. Reyes adds the
(Line One) on 1 March 1995 for P16,782,840. After
fact that the provisional remedies do not include
the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
deposit is a matter of dura lex sed lex.
Register of Deeds issued to Line One TCT No.
134767 covering the Property. Issue/s: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
holding the trial court could issue the questioned
On 6 March 1997, Lim requested in open
Orders dated March 6, 1997, July 3, 1997 and
court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10
October 3, 1997, requiring petitioner David Reyes
million downpayment with the cashier of the
to deposit the amount of Ten Million Pesos
Regional Trial Court of Paranaque. The trial court
(P10,000,000.00) during the pendency of the
granted this motion.
action, when deposit is not among the provisional
The trial court denied Reyes Motion for
remedies enumerated in Rule 57 to 61 of the 1997
Reconsideration in its Order dated 3 October
Rules on Civil Procedure
1997. In the same order, the trial court directed
Reyes to deposit the P10 million downpayment Ruling: No. To subscribe to Reyes contention
with the Clerk of Court on or before 30 October will unjustly enrich Reyes at the expense of Lim.
1997. Reyes sold to Line One the Property even before

the balance of P18 million under the Contract to
On 8 December 1997, Reyes filed a Petition
Sell with Lim became due on 8 March 1995. On 1
for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was
March 1995, Reyes signed a Deed of Absolute
dismissed for lack of merit on 12 May 1998.
Sale in favor of Line One. On 3 March 1995, the
Hence this appeal. Register of Deeds issued TCT No. 134767 in the
name of Line One. Reyes cannot claim ownership
Reyes points out that deposit is not among
of the P10 million downpayment because Reyes
the provisional remedies enumerated in the 1997
had already sold to another buyer the Property for
Rules of Civil Procedure. Reyes argues that a court
which Lim made the down payment. In fact, in his
cannot apply equity and require deposit if the law

Comment dated 20 March 1996, Reyes reiterated when a person retains money or property of
his offer to return to Lim the P10 million another against the fundamental principles of
downpayment. justice, equity and good conscience. In this case, it
was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to
On balance, it is unreasonable and unjust for
order the deposit of the P10 million downpayment
Reyes to object to the deposit of the P10 million
to prevent unjust enrichment by Reyes at the
downpayment. The application of equity always
expense of Lim.
involves a balancing of the equities in a particular
case, a matter addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. Here, we find the equities weigh
heavily in favor of Lim, who paid the P10 million
down payment in good faith only to discover later Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC
that Reyes had subsequently sold the Property to

People v. Bayotas
another buyer.
G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994
The principle that no person may unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another is Ponente: Romero, J.
embodied in Article 22 of the Civil Code. This
principle applies not only to substantive rights but
also to procedural remedies. One condition for Facts: Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged
invoking this principle is that the aggrieved party with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on
has no other action based on contract, quasi- June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction,
contract, crime, quasi-delict or any other provision Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
of law. Courts can extend this condition to the the National Bilibid Hospital. Consequently, the
hiatus in the Rules of Court where the aggrieved Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
party, during the pendency of the case, has no dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal but it
other recourse based on the provisional remedies required the Solicitor General to file its comment
of the Rules of Court. with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from
There is unjust enrichment when a person his commission of the offense charged.
unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or

Issue/s: W/n the death of the accused pending Where the civil liability survives, as explained in
appeal of his conviction extinguish civil liability Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a
Ruling: Death of the accused pending appeal of his
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined
amended. This separate civil action may be
by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
enforced either against the
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his
executor/administrator or the estate of the
criminal liability and only the civil
accused, depending on the source of obligation
liability directly arising from and based solely on
upon which the same is based as explained above.
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore." The Court thus holds that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
civil liability based solely on the act complained
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
of, i.e., rape.
may also be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission: Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC
a) Law Padilla v. People
b) Contracts G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.

c) Quasi-contracts
d) Acts or omissions punishable by
law Facts: On February 8, 1964 the accused, Mayor
Roy Padilla and some policemen by means of
e) Quasi-delicts threats, force and violence demolished and
destroyed the stall and furnitures of the Vergaras

and carried away the goods, wares and expressly declares that the liability of the accused
merchandise found therein. A complaint was filed is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman
in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as,
which rendered the petitioners guilty beyond for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion malicious mischief committed by certain relatives
and to pay damages. who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332,
Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability
The petitioners appealed the judgment of
does not arise from or is not based upon the
conviction to the Court of Appeals. They
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
contended that the trial court's finding of grave
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA
coercion was not supported by the evidence
1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium,
because the demolition of the complainants' stall
1983 ed., p. 623)
was a violation of the very directive of the
petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners Furthermore, Article 29 clearly and expressly
seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market provides a remedy for the plaintiff in case the
premises. The CA absolved the accused from defendant has been acquitted in a criminal
criminal liability but they are ordered to still pay prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not
civil indemnity. Hence this petition. been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
Issue/s: W/n CA erred in requiring the petitioners
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act
to pay civil indemnity after acquitting them from
or omission. The Civil Code provision does not
the criminal charge
state that the remedy can be availed of only in a
Ruling: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the separate civil action. A separate civil case may be
liability of the accused for damages only when it filed but there is no statement that such separate
includes a declaration that the facts from which filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of
the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil recovering damages.
liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code
Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of provision in the rendition of a judgment of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the

same criminal action. The two can stand side by check while the two other cases were filed with
side. A judgment of acquittal operates to and subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial
extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, Court of Guagua, Pampanga on the ground of
however, extinguish the civil liability unless there failure to prosecute.
is clear showing that the act from which civil
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed
liability might arise did not exist.
with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, but
after failing to present its second witness, the
Therefore, the respondent Court of Appeals did
prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases
not err in awarding damages despite a judgment
against respondent. The prosecution likewise
of acquittal.
reserved its right to file a separate civil action
arising from the said criminal cases.
On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant

case for collection of sum of money. On March 20,
Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC 1998, the trial court found in favor of respondent
and dismissed the complaint. The court held that
Cancio v. Isip
the dismissal of the criminal cases against
G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002 respondent on the ground of lack of interest or
failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion case for collection. Hence this petition.
Facts: Jose Cancio filed 3 cases of violation of BP Issue/s: W/n the dismissal of the estafa cases
22 and 3 cases of estafa against Emerciana Isip for against respondent bars the institution of a civil
issuing checks with insufficient funds. action for collection of the value of the checks
subject of the estafa cases
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
dismissed 1 of the 3 violation of BP 22 cases on the Ruling: An act or omission causing damage to
ground that the check was deposited with the another may give rise to two separate civil
drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised

Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer
such as those (a) not arising from an act or for relief.
omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa
Under Article 31 of the Civil Code [w]hen the civil
contractual or obligations arising from law under
action is based on an obligation not arising from
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under
the act or omission complained of as a felony,
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under
[e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may
Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the
proceed independently of the criminal
injured party is granted a right to file an action
proceedings and regardless of the result of the
independent and distinct from the criminal action
latter.
[Article 33, Civil Code]. Either of these two
possible liabilities may be enforced against the
offender subject, however, to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission or under both causes.
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce

respondents obligation to make good the value of
the checks in exchange for the cash he delivered
Article 29, 30 & 35, NCC
to respondent. In other words, petitioners cause
of action is the respondents breach of the Santos v Pizarro
contractual obligation. It matters not that

G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005
petitioner claims his cause of action to be one
based on delict. The nature of a cause of action is Ponente: Tinga, J.
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint

as constituting the cause of action. The purpose of
an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be Facts: In an Information dated April 25, 1994,
determined not by the claim of the party filing the Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in

connection with a vehicle collision between a complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan prescription. Petitioners filed a petition for
and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the certiorari with the Court of Appeals which
lives of the vans driver and three (3) of its dismissed the same.
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
caused physical injuries to five (5) of the vans
passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and
Issue/s: W/n the prescription of an action based
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
on quasi-delict bars an action to enforce civil
for two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
liability arising from the crime
to four (4) years and two (2) months. However, as
there was a reservation to file a separate civil Ruling: A reading of the complaint reveals that the
action, no pronouncement of civil liability was allegations therein are consistent with petitioners
made by the municipal circuit trial court in its claim that the action was brought to recover civil
decision promulgated on December 17, 1998. liability arising from crime. Although there are
allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint
and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean
for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
that petitioners were pursuing a cause of action
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the
based on quasi delict, considering that at the time
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to
of the filing of the complaint, the cause of
their reservation to file a separate civil action.
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint.
Besides, in cases of negligence, the offended party
has the choice between an action to enforce civil
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the
liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal
principal ground that the cause of action had
Code and an action for quasi delict under the Civil
already prescribed. According to the trial court,
Code.
actions based on quasi delict, as it construed
petitioners cause of action to be, prescribe four
An act or omission causing damage to another
(4) years from the accrual of the cause of action.
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal

Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as With this, the trial court should not have dismissed
those (a) not arising from an act or omission the complaint on the ground of prescription, but
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
contractual or obligations arising from law under delicto to be prosecuted on the
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under merits, considering petitioners allegations in their
Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under complaint, opposition to the motion to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the dismiss and motion for reconsideration of the
injured party is granted a right to file an action order of dismissal, insisting that the action was to
independent and distinct from the criminal action recover civil liability arising from crime.
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these
This does not offend the policy that the
liabilities may be enforced against the offender
reservation or institution of a separate civil action
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil
waives the other civil actions. The rationale behind
Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages
this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between
twice for the same act or omission of the
the same litigants arising out of the same act or
defendant and the similar proscription against
omission of the offender. However, since the stale
double recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
action for damages based on quasi delict should
At the time of the filing of the complaint for be considered waived, there is no more occasion
damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, respondents as the only recourse available to
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the interpretation is also consistent with the bar
surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so against double recovery.
because the prescription of the action ex quasi
delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved. Article 31-34, NCC
MHP Garments v. CA

G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994 scouts pants, dresses, and suits on display at
respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
Ponente: Puno, J.
commotion and embarrassed private
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion respondents. Receipts were issued for the seized
items. The items were then turned over by Captain
Facts: On February 22, 1983, petitioner MHP
Peafiel to petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and A criminal complaint for unfair competition was
distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, then filed against private respondents. On
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum December 6, 1983, he Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the dismissed the complaint against all the private
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken respondents and on February 6, 1984, he also
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of ordered the return of the seized items. The seized
scout uniforms and other scouting supplies." items were not immediately returned despite
demands. Private respondents had to go
Sometime in October 1983, petitioner corporation
personally to petitioners' place of business to
received information that private respondents
recover their goods. Even then, not all the seized
Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and
items were returned. The other items returned
Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items
were of inferior quality.
and paraphernalia without any authority.
Petitioner de Guzman, an employee of petitioner Private respondents then filed Civil Case No.
corporation, was tasked to undertake the 51144 against the petitioners for sums of money
necessary surveillance and to make a report to the and damages.
Philippine Constabulary (PC). On October 25,
Issue/s: W/n the petitioners are liable for
1983, petitioner de Guzman, Captain Renato M.
damages
Peafiel, and two (2) other constabulary men of
the Reaction Force Battalion, Sikatuna Village,
Ruling: Petitioners would deflect their liability
Diliman, Quezon City went to the stores of
with the argument that it was the Philippine
respondents at the Marikina Public Market.
Constabulary that conducted the raid and their
Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl
participation was only to report the alleged illegal

activity of private respondents. While of a warrant. And thirdly, if petitioners did not
undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a
should have been included in the complaint for third-party complaint against the raiding team for
violation of the private respondents' contribution or any other relief, in respect of
constitutional rights, still, the omission will not respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money
exculpate petitioners. with Damages, of which they did not.
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, the court

ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of
Article 31-34, NCC
constitutional rights and liberties from public
officer or private individual by citing Article 32 of Frias v. San Diego-Sison
the Civil Code as the basis thereof. The very
G.R. No. 155223, April 4, 2007
nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil
or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.
should be malice or bad faith. Furthermore, Article
32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit
of its provisions those directly, as well as Facts: Petitioner is the owner of a house and lot
indirectly, responsible for its violations. located at No. 589 Batangas East, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, which she acquired
Applying the aforecited provision, the respondent
from Island Masters Realty and Development
court correctly granted damages to private
Corporation (IMRDC) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved
dated Nov. 16, 1990.
in transgressing the right of private respondents
against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, On December 7, 1990, petitioner, as the FIRST
they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant PARTY, and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison
in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the (respondent), as the SECOND PARTY, entered into
prosecution in court of all illegal sources of a Memorandum of Agreement over the property.
scouting supplies. Secondly, they failed to report
the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Petitioner received from respondent two million
Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated

check dated February 28, 1990, instead of 1991, On January 31, 1996, the RTC rendered that the
which rendered said check stale. Petitioner then fraudulent scheme employed by petitioner
gave respondent TCT No. 168173 in the name of entitled respondent to damages. The CA affirmed
IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the the trial courts decison on June 18, 2002.
property between petitioner and IMRDC.
Respondent decided not to purchase the property

Issue/s: W/n the respondent is entitled to moral
and notified petitioner through a letter dated
damages
March 20, 1991, which petitioner received only on
June 11, 1991, reminding petitioner of their Ruling: Article 31 of the Civil Code provides that
agreement that the amount of two million pesos when the civil action is based on an obligation not
which petitioner received from respondent should arising from the act or omission complained of as
be considered as a loan payable within six months. a felony, such civil action may proceed
Petitioner subsequently failed to pay respondent independently of the criminal proceedings and
the amount of two million pesos. regardless of the result of the latter.
On April 1, 1993, respondent filed with the While petitioner was acquitted in the false
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, a complaint testimony and perjury cases filed by respondent
for sum of money with preliminary attachment against her, those actions are entirely distinct
against petitioner alleging that petitioner tried to from the collection of sum of money with damages
deprive her of the security for the loan by making filed by respondent against petitioner.
a false report of the loss of her owners copy of
The Court agree with the findings of the trial court
TCT No. 168173 to the Taguig Police Station on
and the CA that petitioners act of trying to deprive
June 3, 1991, executing an affidavit of loss and by
respondent of the security of her loan by
filing a petition for the issuance of a new owners
executing an affidavit of loss of the title and
duplicate copy of said title with the RTC of Makati.
instituting a petition for the issuance of a new
Because of that, the court ordered the provincial
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles
public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of
respondent to moral damages. Moral damages
petitioner for perjury and false testimony.
may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of

contract cases when the defendant acted already contained the title and the Deed of Sale as
fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith does not those documents were in the same brown
simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it envelope which she gave to Atty. Lozada prior to
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral the transaction with respondent. Such statement
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes remained a bare statement. It was not proven at
of the nature of fraud. all since Atty. Lozada had not taken the stand to
corroborate her claim. In fact, even petitioners
The Memorandum of Agreement provides that in
own witness, Benilda Ynfante (Ynfante), was not
the event that respondent opts not to buy the
able to establish petitioner's claim that the title
property, the money given by respondent to
was returned by Atty. Lozada in view of Ynfante's
petitioner shall be treated as a loan and the
testimony that after the brown envelope was
property shall be considered as the security for the
given to petitioner, the latter passed it on to her
mortgage. It was testified to by respondent that
and she placed it in petitioners attach case and
after they executed the agreement on December
did not bother to look at the envelope.
7, 1990, petitioner gave her the owners copy of
the title to the property, the Deed of Sale between It is clear therefrom that petitioners execution of
petitioner and IMRDC, the certificate of the affidavit of loss became the basis of the filing
occupancy, and the certificate of the Secretary of of the petition with the RTC for the issuance of
the IMRDC who signed the Deed of Sale. However, new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173.
notwithstanding that all those documents were in Petitioners actuation would have deprived
respondents possession, petitioner executed an respondent of the security for her loan were it not
affidavit of loss that the owners copy of the title for respondents timely filing of a petition for relief
and the Deed of Sale were lost. whereby the RTC set aside its previous order
granting the issuance of new title. Thus, the award
Although petitioner testified that her execution of
of moral damages is in order.
the affidavit of loss was due to the fact that she
was of the belief that since she had demanded
from Atty. Lozada the return of the title, she
thought that the brown envelope with markings
which Atty. Lozada gave her on May 5, 1991
Article 31-34, NCC

Casupanan v. Laroya petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
66, assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
Ponente: Carpio, J.
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent
Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya") and the other
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24,
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo")
2000.
and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan
("Casupanan"), figured in an accident. As a result, Hence this petition.
two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit
Issue/s: Whether or not an accused in a pending
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal
criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
file, simultaneously and independently, a seperate
resulting in damage to property, while Casupanan
civil action for quasi-delict against the private
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
complainant in the criminal case
quasi-delict.
Ruling: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111,

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was
the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34
then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,
and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
separately by the offended party even without
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal
reservation. The commencement of the criminal
case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order
action does not suspend the prosecution of the
of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
independent civil action under these articles of the
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
civil action which can proceed independently of arising from the crime, if such civil action is
the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a

reserved or filed before the commencement of the accused is prohibited from setting up any
criminal action. counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
Thus, the offended party can file two separate
therefore forced to litigate separately his
suits for the same act or omission. The first a
counterclaim against the offended party. If the
criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
accused does not file a separate civil action
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in
other a civil case for quasi-delict - without
since the period continues to run until the civil
violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two
action for quasi-delict is filed.
cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent,
or prosecution of the criminal action will not has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only in the same way that the offended party can avail
limitation is that the offended party cannot of this remedy which is independent of the
recover damages twice for the same act or criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing
omission of the defendant. In most cases, the a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while
offended party will have no reason to file a second refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
civil action since he cannot recover damages twice criminal case, is to deny him due process of law,
for the same act or omission of the accused. In access to the courts, and equal protection of the
some instances, the accused may be insolvent, law.
necessitating the filing of another case against his
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
employer or guardians.
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case
for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly erroneous.
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused "may be litigated in a separate civil
action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the

Article 36, NCC filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied.
Bobis v. Bobis
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000
Issue/s: W/n the subsequent filing of a civil action

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy
Facts: On October 21, 1985, Isagani Bobis
contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Ruling: A prejudicial question is one which arises
B. Javier. Without said marriage having been in a case the resolution of which is a logical
annulled, nullified or terminated, the same antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a
respondent contracted a second marriage with question based on a fact distinct and separate
petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, from the crime but so intimately connected with it
1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioners accused. It must appear not only that the civil case
complaint-affidavit, information for bigamy was involves facts upon which the criminal action is
filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, at based, but also that the resolution of the issues
the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City. Sometime raised in the civil action would necessarily be
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for determinative of the criminal case. Consequently,
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his the defense must involve an issue similar or
first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated intimately related to the same issue raised in the
without a marriage license. Respondent then filed criminal action and its resolution determinative of
a motion to suspend the proceedings in the whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its
criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil two essential elements are:
case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial
question to the criminal case. The trial judge (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
granted the motion to suspend the criminal case intimately related to the issue raised in the
in an Order dated December 29, 1998. Petitioner criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines remembered that bigamy can successfully be
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of
which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
A prejudicial question does not conclusively
marriage which would have been valid had it not
resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but
been for the existence at the material time of the
simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the
first marriage.
information in order to sustain the further
prosecution of the criminal case. A party who In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to
raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
hypothetically admitted that all the essential marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
elements of a crime have been adequately alleged judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.
in the information, considering that the He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
prosecution has not yet presented a single
Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
evidence on the indictment or may not yet have
the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the
therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated
information on the ground of prejudicial question
above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his
is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action
charge through a non-criminal suit.
against him.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective
at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry.
The clear implication of this is that it is not for the Article 36, NCC
parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or Philippine Agila Satellite v. Lichauco
not the first marriage was void for lack of a license G.R. No. 134887, July 27, 2006
is a matter of defense because there is still no
judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the Ponente: Carpio- Morales , J.
second marriage was contracted. It should be Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Facts: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Michael de Guzman (de Guzman), PASI President
Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), later informed
consortium of private telecommunications Jesli Lapuz (Lapuz), President and CEO of the
carriers and the Department of Transportation Landbank of the Philippines, by letter of
and Communications (DOTC) represented by then December 3, 1996, of the governments
Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. relative to the assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161E and 153E
launching, ownership, operation and and requested the banks confirmation of its
management of a Philippine satellite by a Filipino- participation in a club loan in the amount of US$
owned or controlled private consortium or 11 million, the proceeds of which would be
corporation. applied to PASIs interim satellite.
Pursuant to Article IV of the MOU, the consortium Lichauco subsequently issued, in December 1997,
of private telecommunications carriers formed a a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including
corporation and adopted the corporate name 153E.
Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI), herein PASI, claiming that the offer was without
petitioner. By letter dated June 28, 1996, PASI its knowledge and that it subsequently came to
president Rodrigo A. Silverio (Silverio) requested learn that another company whose identity had
the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won
for official government confirmation of the the award for orbital slot 153E, filed on January 23,
assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 1998 a complaint before the Regional Trial Court
153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites. against Lichauco and the Unknown Awardee for
PASI thereupon undertook preparations for the injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E,
launching, operation and management of its declare its nullity, and for damages.
satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans,
increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint
its business partners, and making an initial before the Office of the Ombudsman against
payment of US$ 3.5 million to Aerospatiale, a Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his
French satellite manufacturer. affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco
with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. The To determine the existence of a prejudicial
Ombudsman adopting Evaluation Report of its question in the case before the Ombudsman, it is
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau necessary to examine the elements of Section 3(e)
(EPIB) found the existence of a prejudicial of R.A. 3019 for which Lichauco was charged and
question after considering that the case filed with the causes of action in the civil case which are
the RTC involves facts intimately related to those following:
upon which the criminal prosecution would be 1. The accused is a public officer discharging
based and that the guilt or the innocence of the administrative or official functions or private
accused would necessarily be determined in the persons charged in conspiracy with them;
resolution of the issues raised in the civil case. 2. The public officer committed the prohibited
A motion to dismiss the civil case against act during the performance of his official duty or
respondent was denied by the trial court and on in relation to his public position;
elevation of the order of denial to the Court of 3. The public officer acted with manifest
Appeals, said court, by Decision dated February partiality, evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable
21, 2000, also ordered the dismissal of the case. negligence; and
Hence this petition. 4. His action caused undue injury to the
Issue/s: W/n the civil case is a prejudicial question Government or any private party, or gave any
to the complaint of violation of Section 3(e) of party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
Republic Act No. 3019 preference to such parties.
Ruling: The rationale for the principle of

The civil case against Lichauco on the
prejudicial question is that although it does not
other hand involves three causes of action. The
conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
first, for injunction, seeks to enjoin the award of
accused, it tests the sufficiency of the allegations
orbital slot 153E, the DOTC having previously
in the complaint or information in order to sustain
assigned the same to PASI; the second, for
the further prosecution of the criminal case.
declaration of nullity of award, seeks to nullify the
Hence, the need for its prior resolution before
award given to the undisclosed bidder for being
further proceedings in the criminal action may be
beyond Lichaucos authority; and the third, for
had.
damages arising from Lichaucos questioned acts.

On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G.
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of
orbital slot 153E is, in the civil case, declared valid private respondent, and on the same day,
for being within Lichaucos scope of authority to respondent was charged with the crime of estafa
thus free her from liability for damages, there under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal
would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
there be basis for undue injury claimed to have
On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a
been suffered by petitioner. The finding by the
motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a
Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial
prejudicial question because of a pending petition
question is thus well-taken.
with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) involving the same parties.
Article 36, NCC It appears that on January 7, 1999, private
Omictin v. CA respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the

declaration of nullity of the respective
G.R. No.148004 , January 22, 2007 appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as
Ponente: Azcuna , J. President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad

Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion dividends, recovery of share in the profits,
involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a
Facts: Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations
receiver, recovery of damages and an application
Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a
for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office
injunction against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng,
of the City Prosecutor of Makati against private
Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner.
respondent George I. Lagos alleging that despite
repeated demands, Lagos refused to return the In the action before the SEC, private respondent
two company vehicles entrusted to him when he averred that Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign
was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc. corporation organized and existing under the laws
of Singapore, and is fully owned by Saag

Corporation (Bhd). On July 1, 1994, he was be acquired by any other person or entity without
appointed as Area Sales Manager in the his prior consent, he has the option either to
Philippines by Thiang Shiang Hiang, Manager of require the other stockholders to purchase his
Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. Pursuant to his appointment, shares or to terminate the JVA and dissolve Saag
respondent was authorized to organize a local Phils., Inc. altogether. Thus, pursuant to this
joint venture corporation to be known as Saag provision, since private respondent did not give his
Philippines, Inc. for the wholesale trade and consent as regards the transfer of shares made by
service of industrial products for oil, gas and Gan and Thiang, he made several requests to
power industries in the Philippines. Nicholas Ng, who replaced Gan as director, and
Janifer Yeo, Executive Director of Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.,
On September 9, 1994, Saag Philippines, Inc. was
to call for a board meeting in order to discuss the
incorporated with Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as the majority
following: a) implementation of the board
stockholder. Private respondent was appointed to
resolution declaring dividends; b) acquisition of
the board of directors, along with Rommel I. Lagos,
private respondents shares by Saag (S) Pte. Ltd.;
Jose E. Geronimo, Gan Ching Lai and Thiang Shiang
c) dissolution of Saag Phils., Inc.; and d) the
Hiang, and was elected president of the domestic
termination of the JVA.
corporation. Later, due to intra-corporate
disputes, Gan and Thiang resigned and divested Ng and Yeo failed to appear, however, in the
their shares in Saag Corporation (Bhd), thereby scheduled board meetings. Instead, on September
resulting in a change in the controlling interest in 30, 1998 they issued a letter appointing Alex Y. Tan
Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. as President Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc. Tan, in
turn, appointed petitioner Omictin as the
On June 23, 1998, private respondent resigned his
companys Operations Manager Ad Interim.
post as president of Saag Phils., Inc. while still
retaining his position as a director of the Citing as a reason the absence of a board
company. According to private respondent, the resolution authorizing the continued operations of
joint venture agreement (JVA) between him or Saag Phils., Inc., private respondent retained his
Saag Phils., Inc. and Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. provided that possession of the office equipment of the
should the controlling interest in the latter company in a fiduciary capacity as director of the
company, or its parent company Saag Corp. (Bhd), corporation pending its dissolution and/or the

resolution of the intra-corporate dispute. He Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in
likewise changed the locks of the offices of the the intra-corporate dispute will determine the
company allegedly to prevent Tan and petitioner guilt or innocence of private respondent in the
from seizing company property. crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner
before the RTC of Makati. As correctly stated by
The trial court, in an order dated September 8,
the CA, one of the elements of the crime of estafa
1999, denied respondents motion to suspend
with abuse of confidence under Article 315, par.
proceedings and motion to recuse. And on June
1(b) of the Revised Penal Code is a demand made
30, 2000, the CA rendered that a prejudicial
by the offended party to the offender:
question exists which calls for the suspension of
the criminal proceedings before the lower court. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence
under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315 are as
follows:
Issue/s: W/n a prejudicial question exist to

1. That money, goods, or other personal
warrant the suspension of the criminal
property be received by the offender in
proceedings pending resolution of the intra-
trust, or on commission, or for
corporate controversy that was originally filed
administration, or under any other
with the SEC
obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;
Ruling: A prejudicial question is defined as that
which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
2. That there be misrepresentation or
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein
conversion of such money or property by
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
the offender, or denial on his part of such
tribunal. Here, the case which was lodged
receipt;
originally before the SEC and which is now pending
before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue of 3. That such misappropriation or
Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
intimately related to those upon which the another; and
criminal prosecution is based.

4. That there is a demand made by the Ponente: Reyes, R.T., J.
offended party to the offender.
Logically, under the circumstances, since the

Facts: In 1988, petitioner company and Dr.
alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the
Climaco entered into a Retainer Agreement for
validity of the demand for the delivery of the
one year, with a monthly compensation
subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the
of P3,800.00, where he may charge professional
person making such a demand on the companys
fees for hospital services rendered in line with his
behalf. Private respondent is challenging
specialization. The agreement further provided
petitioners authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in
that either party may terminate the contract upon
the corporate case pending before the RTC of
giving thirty (30)-day written notice to the other.
Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this light, if
In consideration of the retainers fee, Dr. Climaco
the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be
agrees to perform the duties and
defective, it is as if no demand was ever made,
obligations enumerated in the Comprehensive
hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Medical Plan, which was attached and made an
Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing
integral part of the agreement.
received for safekeeping or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation Explicit in the contract, however, is the
involving the duty to deliver or to return the same provision that no employee-employer relationship
or deliver the value thereof to the owner could shall exist between the company and Dr. Climaco
only give rise to a civil action and does not while the contract is in effect. In case of its
constitute the crime of estafa. termination, Dr. Climaco shall be entitled only to
such retainer fee as may be due him at the time of
termination.
Dr. Climaco continuously served as the company

physician, performing all the duties stipulated in
Article 36, NCC
the Retainer Agreement and the Comprehensive
Coca-Cola Bottlers Inc. v. Social Security System Medical Plan. By 1992, his salary was increased
to P7,500.00 per month. Meantime, Dr. Climaco
G.R. No. 159323, July 31, 2008

inquired with the Department of Labor and issue determines whether or not the criminal
Employment and the SSS whether he was an action may proceed. It comes into play generally
employee of the company. Both agencies replied in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
in the affirmative. As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a action both pending and there exists in the former
complaint before the National Labor Relations an issue which must be preemptively resolved
Commission (NLRC), Bacolod City. In his before the criminal action may proceed. This is so
complaint, he sought recognition as a regular because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
employee of the company and demanded action is resolved would be determinative juris et
payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in
allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave the criminal case.
pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits.
Here, no prejudicial question exists because
During the pendency of the complaint, the there is no pending criminal case. The
company terminated its Retainer Agreement with consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as
Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another previously instituted civil action. In Berbari v.
complaint for illegal dismissal against the Concepcion it was held that a prejudicial question
company before the NLRC Bacolod City. He asked is understood in law to be that which must
that he be reinstated to his former position as precede the criminal action, that which requires a
company physician of its BacolodPlant, without decision with which said question is closely
loss of seniority rights, with full payment of related.
backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for
Neither can the doctrine of prejudicial question
payment of damages.
be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed
Issue/s: W/n there exist a prejudicial by Dr. Climaco with the SSC involves the question
question of whether or not he is an employee of Coca-Cola
Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to the compulsory
Ruling: The rule is that there is prejudicial
coverage of the Social Security System. On the
question when (a) the previously instituted civil
contrary, the cases filed by Dr. Climaco before the
action involves an issue similar or intimately
NLRC involved different issues. In his first
related to the issue raised in the subsequent
complaint, Dr. Climaco sought recognition as a
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such

regular employee of the company and demanded Pimentel (petitioner). On 7 February 2005,
payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living petitioner received summons to appear before the
allowance, holiday pay, service incentive leave Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-
pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits. The trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria
second complaint was for illegal dismissal, with Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
prayer for reinstatement to his former position as Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
company physician of the under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground
companys Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority of psychological incapacity.
rights, with full payment of backwages, other On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent
unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages. motion to suspend the proceedings before the
Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of
determinative of whether or not the SSC should a prejudicial question.
proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to Issue/s: W/n the resolution of the action for
be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
the case before the court. that warrants the suspension of the criminal case
for frustrated parricide against petitioner
Ruling: A prejudicial question is defined as:
Article 36, NCC x x x one that arises in a case the resolution

of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
Pimentel v. Pimentel
involved therein, and the cognizance of
G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010 which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and
Ponente: Carpio, J.
separate from the crime but so intimately
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion connected with it that it determines the guilt

or innocence of the accused, and for it to
Facts: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine
suspend the criminal action, it must appear
Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
not only that said case involves facts
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
intimately related to those upon which the

criminal prosecution would be based but a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
also that in the resolution of the issue or produce it by reason of causes independent of
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or petitioners will. At the time of the commission of
innocence of the accused would necessarily the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
be determined. married. The subsequent dissolution of their
The relationship between the offender marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-
and the victim is a key element in the crime of 7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged
parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill crime that was committed at the time of the
his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or marriage between petitioner and respondent is
descendants, or his spouse. The relationship annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally
between the offender and the victim distinguishes liable since at the time of the commission of the
the crime of parricide from murder or alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of
marriage is not similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further,
the relationship between the offender and the
Article 36, NCC
victim is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995

The issue in the civil case for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is Ponente: Kapunan, J.
whether petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
Facts: On 9 February 1989, private respondents
accused killed the victim. In this case, since
Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide,
designated as industrial labor sectoral
the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
representative and agricultural labor sectoral
execution which would have killed respondent as
representative respectively, for the Sangguniang

Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus
then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." charging petitioners of
Local Government. Private respondents Binaohan Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 amended.
February 1989 and 17 February 1989, respectively.
On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the
petition with the Office of the President for review proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the
and recall of said designations. The latter, ground that a prejudicial question exists in Civil
however, in a letter dated 20 March 1989, denied Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial
the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda Court of Dumaguete City.
to recognize private respondents as sectoral
Issue/s: W/n the legality or validity of private
representatives.
respondents' designation as sectoral
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a representatives which is pending resolution in CA-
petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
Special Civil Action No. 9661, for recognition as against petitioners.
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was
Ruling: The rationale behind the principle of
dismissed on 23 July 1991.
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an decisions. It has two essential elements:
action with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
City to declare null and void the designations of
intimately related to the issue raised in the
private respondents as sectoral representatives,
criminal action; and
docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo
Tuanda, et al. versus Secretary of the Department
(b) the resolution of such issue determines
of Local Government, et al."
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
On 21 July 1991, information was filed before the

Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at This refusal, however, was anchored on
bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CA- petitioners' assertion that said designations were
G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial made in violation of the Local Government Code
question to warrant suspension of the (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void.
arraignment and further proceedings in the Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the
criminal case against petitioners. trial court's decision declaring null and void private
respondents' designations as sectoral
All the elements of a prejudicial question are
representatives for failure to comply with the
clearly and unmistakably present in this case.
provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
There is no doubt that the facts and issues
337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against petitioners
involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the
would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand
criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The
on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and
filing of the criminal case was premised on
partiality there being in the first place no
petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith
obligation on their part to pay private
in not paying private respondents' salaries and per
respondents' claims. Private respondents do not
diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil
have any legal right to demand salaries, per
action was instituted precisely to resolve whether
diems and other benefits. In other words, the
or not the designations of private respondents as
Court of Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in
sectoral representatives were made in accordance
the civil action will ultimately determine whether
with law.
or not there is basis to proceed with the criminal
case.
More importantly, the resolution of the civil case
will certainly determine if there will still be any
reason to proceed with the criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the

Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec, Article 36, NCC
3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and
Consing v People
with manifest partiality, to pay private
respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

Ponente: Bersamin, J. On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the
total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19,
1999 that had been paid to and received by de la
Facts: Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la demands.
Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from

On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759
Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on
civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to
a parcel of land (property) registered under the
enjoin Unicapital from proceeding against him for
name of de la Cruz. In accordance with its option
the collection of theP41,377,851.48 on the ground
to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital
that he had acted as a mere agent of his mother.
agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal
total consideration ofP21,221,500.00. Payment
complaint for estafa through falsification of public
was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
document against Consing and de la Cruz in the
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la
Makati City Prosecutors Office.
Cruz and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00
and paying an additional amount On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the
of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the property RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the
was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital. application for a writ of preliminary attachment
(Makati civil case).
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop
the property, they learned that the title to the On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his
property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the
of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng, the parties ground of existence of a prejudicial question due
from whom the property had been allegedly to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati civil
acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held by De cases.
la Cruz appeared to be spurious.

Issue/s: Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case of a criminal case. This was precisely the Courts
prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
cases?
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if
Ruling: A perusal of Unicapitals complaint in the the civil and the criminal action can, according to
Makati civil case reveals that the action was law, proceed independently of each other. Under
predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on
allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to the Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in
effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
"wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent independent civil action may be brought by the
manner in offering as security and later object of offended party. It shall proceed independently of
sale, a property which they do not own, and the criminal action and shall require only a
foisting to the public a spurious title." As such, the preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
action was one that could proceed independently may the offended party recover damages twice for
of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 the same act or omission charged in the criminal
of the Civil Code, which states as follows: action. x x x x
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for
physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely Damages and Attachment on account of the
separate and distinct from the criminal action, alleged fraud committed by respondent and his
may be brought by the injured party. Such civil mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
action shall proceed independently of the criminal independent civil action under Article 33 of the
prosecution, and shall require only a Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
preponderance of evidence. prejudicial question that will justify the suspension
of the criminal case at bar.
It is well settled that a civil action based on
defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be Contrary to Consings stance, it was not improper
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to
the Civil Code, and does not operate as a his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension and Makati civil cases involved different

complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the
the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital had second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in
separately instituted against him were undeniably the instant criminal case.
of similar mold, i.e., they were both based on
Issue/s: W/n the subsequent declaration of nullity
fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the
of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of
Civil Code. Clearly, the Makati criminal case could
the criminal case for bigamy
not be suspended pending the resolution of the
Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
Ruling: Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as
follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor

Article 36, NCC shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before
Capili v People
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013 before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment
Ponente:Peralta, J.
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore,
Facts: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Petitioner thereafter case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging could not yet be presumed dead according to the
that: (1) there is a pending civil case for Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
declaration of nullity of the second marriage subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or
before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. subsequent marriage has all the essential
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is requisites for validity.
declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency

In the present case, it appears that all the The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity
elements of the crime of bigamy were present of the first marriage was immaterial because prior
when the Information was filed on June 28, 2004. to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already
been consummated. Moreover, petitioners
It is undisputed that a second marriage between
assertion would only delay the prosecution of
petitioner and private respondent was contracted
bigamy cases considering that an accused could
on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a
simply file a petition to declare his previous
valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3,
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal
1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
case. We cannot allow that.
declared the bigamous nature of the second
marriage between petitioner and private The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had
declaration of the second marriage for being no bearing upon the determination of petitioners
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that
subsisting at the time the second marriage is
the accused may still be charged with the crime of
contracted.
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the
first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.
Article 36, NCC

In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the
accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the Beltran v People
crime of bigamy is consummated on the
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
celebration of the subsequent marriage without
the previous one having been judicially declared Ponente:Buena, J.
null and void, viz.:

Facts: Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 merit the suspension of the criminal case for
at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in concubinage
Cubao, Quezon City. On February 7, 1997, after
Ruling: The rationale behind the principle of
twenty-four years of marriage and four
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of
decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the
marriage on the ground of psychological
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code
related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity
who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with
of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint
to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as
for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised
to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour.
final determination of the civil case, it must appear
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall not only that the said civil case involves the same
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a facts upon which the criminal prosecution would
Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the be based, but also that in the resolution of the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the the guilt or innocence of the accused would
civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage necessarily be determined.
posed a prejudicial question to the determination
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code,
of the criminal case.
respondent, without first having obtained the
Issue/s: W/n the pendency of the petition for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage,
declaration of nullity of marriage based on can not be said to have validly entered into the
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a

marriage though void still needs a judicial Corporation (Advanced) represented by its
declaration of such fact before any party can Executive Project Director, Ettori Reyes executed a
marry again; otherwise the second marriage will deed of conditional sale involving the purchase by
also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman
declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is Dredging Pump worth 10 million pesos. The
presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay 3
respondent was for all legal intents and purposes million pesos as downpayment and the 7 million
regarded as a married man at the time he balance through 4 post-dated checks. Reyes
contracted his second marriage with complied but in 1998 he asked for the
petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any restructuring of his obligation by replacing the 4
decision in the civil action for nullity would not post dated checks with 9 post dated checks that
erase the fact that respondent entered into a would include the interest at the rate of
second marriage during the subsistence of a first P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not of the obligation from April 30 to October 31,
essential to the determination of the criminal 1998.
charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes request
and returned the 4 checks. In turn, Reyes issued
the 9 post dated checks with the aggregate
amount of P7,125,000.00 drawn against United
Article 36, NCC Coconut Planters Bank.
Reyes v. Rossi Rossi deposited 3 of the post-dated checks on

their maturity in Advanced Foundations bank
G.R. No. 159823; February 18, 2013
account at the PCI Ba k in Makati. 2 of the checs
Ponente:Bersamin, J. were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes

instruction to stop their payment while the 3rd was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Facts: On October 31, 1997, petitioner Reyes and

Advanced Foundation Construction Systems

Rossi likewise deposited 2 more checks but the determinative juris e de jure of the guilt or
checks were returned with the notation Account innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
Closed stamped on them.
It is true that the rescission of a contract results in
On July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for the extinguishment of the obligatory relation as if
rescission of contract and damages in the Quezon it was never created, the extinguishment having
City RTC while on September 8, 1998, Rossi retroactive effect. The rescission is equivalent to
charged Reyes with 5 counts of estafa and 5 counts invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving
of violation of BP Blg. 22. things in their status before the celebration of the
contract. However, until the contract is rescinded
On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City
the juridical tie and the concomitant obligations
Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation
subsist.
recommended the dismissal of the case of estafa
and the suspension of the proceedings relating to On the other hand, violation of BP Blg. 22 requires
the violation of BP Blg. 22 based on prejudicial the concurrence of the following elements,
question. This recommendation was adopted by namely: (1) making, drawing and issuance of a
the City Prosecutor of Manila and subsequently by check to apply for account or for value; (2)
the Secretary of Justice. knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have the sufficient
Issue/s: W/n the civil action for rescission of the
funds in or credit in the drawee bank for the
contract of sale raised a prejudicial question that
payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
required the suspension of the criminal
and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the
prosecution for violation of BP Blg. 22
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
Ruling: A prejudicial question comes into play in a dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
situation where a civil action and a criminal action without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
are both pending and there exist in the former an payment.
issue that must be first determined before the
The issue therefore in criminal actions upon the
latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue
violations of BP Blg. 22 is therefore, whether or
raised in the civil action is resolved would be
not Reyes issued the dishonored checks knowing
them to be without funds upon presentment. On

the other hand, the issue in the civil action for Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl
rescission is whether or not the breach in the Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovita
fulfillment of Advanced Foundations obligation Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
warranted the rescission of the conditional sale.
The first few checks were honored by the bank,
Indeed, under the BP Blg. 22, the mere issuance of but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining
a worthless check was already an offense itself and checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they
under such circumstance, the criminal were dishonored for the reason that the Account
proceedings for the violation of BP Blg. 22 could is Closed. Demands were made by Spouses
proceed despite the pendency of the civil action Mirabueno and Spouses Dimalanta to the
for rescission of the conditional sale. petitioner to make good the checks. Despite this,
however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a
Article 36, NCC civil action for collection of sum of money,

damages and attorney's fee with prayer for the
Yap v. Cabales
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of General Santos City and on December 15,
Ponente:Peralta, J.
1997, Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and
Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion instituted a similar action.
Facts: Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the
Yap are engaged in the real estate business City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several
through their company Primetown Property informations for violation of Batas Pambansa
Group. Sometime in 1996, petitioner purchased Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 against the petitioner with the
several real properties from a certain Evelyn Te Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases, (MTCC), General Santos City.
petitioner issued several Bank of the Philippine

Islands (BPI) postdated checks to

In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate be adjudged free from criminal liability for
motions to suspend proceedings on account of the violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of
existence of a prejudicial question and motion to worthless checks with knowledge of the
exclude the private prosecutor from participating insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in
in the proceedings. Petitioner prayed that the itself an offense. Thus, it is clear that
proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended the determination of the issues involved in Civil
until the civil cases pending before the RTC were Case Nos. 6231 and 6238 for collection of sum of
finally resolved. money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner in the criminal cases
Issue/s: W/n there exists a prejudicial question
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
that necessitates the suspension of the
proceedings in the MTCC
Ruling: The issue in the criminal cases is whether Article 36, NCC
the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22,
Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola
while in the civil case, it is whether the private
respondents are entitled to collect from the G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009
petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that
Ponente:Velasco, Jr., J.
they have rediscounted from Evelyn. The
resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal cases against him, and Facts: On February 2, 2005, petitioner, through its
there is no necessity that the civil case be President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-
determined first before taking up the criminal President for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P.
cases. Amora, filed a Complaint for violation of Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private
respondent Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20,
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband,
petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by
the value of the checks and damages, he cannot filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the

rescission of an alleged construction agreement reason had not the drawer, without any
between the parties, as well as for damages. The valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
case was filed with the RTC, Las Pias City. payment.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid
before the MTC, were issued in consideration of
contract or agreement to support the issuance of
the construction agreement. Thereafter, on July
the check/s or that the checks were issued for
25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to
valuable consideration does not make up the
Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 in
elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in
Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil
a long line of cases that the agreement
case posed a prejudicial question as against the
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
criminal cases.
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22.
Issue/s: W/n there exist a prejudicial question
To determine the reason for which checks are
Ruling: It must be remembered that the elements issued, or the terms and conditions for their
of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public
follows: reposes in the stability and commercial value of

checks as currency substitutes, and bring havoc in
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of trade and in banking communities. The clear
any check to apply for account or for intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the
value; mere act of issuing a worthless check malum
prohibitum.
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer,
or issuer that at the time of issue there are Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case
no sufficient funds in or credit with the declares that the construction agreement
drawee bank for the payment of such between the parties is void for lack of
check in full upon its presentment; and consideration; this would not affect the
prosecution of private respondent in the criminal
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check
case. The fact of the matter is that private
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
respondent indeed issued checks which were
funds or credit, or dishonor for the same

subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It
is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element

required for the existence of a prejudicial
question, that the resolution of the issue in the
civil action would determine whether the criminal
action may proceed, is absent in the instant case.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists.


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Article 2 and 3, NCC Ruling: In a long line of decisions, this Court has

ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is

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The clear object of the above-quoted provision is

The publication of all presidential issuances of a

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3. Must a distinction be made between laws of

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meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the

However, no publication is required of the Ponente: Cortes, J

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filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial law journals.

Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the

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respectively failed to agree, and each rendered a

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The petition for the suspension of the declarative

Ateneo de Davao University

Luzviminda Payao before respondent that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment

separated. contracting another marriage. And respondent

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Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion

Laws in 1971 and passed the same years bar

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys

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Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,

Ateneo de Davao University

Ateneo de Davao University

After hearing, the probate court held in favor of

Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales that:

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Ateneo de Davao University

Ateneo de Davao University

Ateneo de Davao University

on the subject matter. For failure to prove the

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The opposition is based on the fact that it puts into

dispositions in question which, not being contrary bigamous.

to our laws in force, must be complied with and

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1083, since they (deceased and Complainant initio.

Zorayda) did not register their mutual desire to be

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Ateneo de Davao University

Co vs. Court of Appeals (1987)- that a check issued merely to guarantee

Ponente: Narvasa, C. J. It is because at the time of the issuance of

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construction or interpretation of a pre-existing imperative necessity to take account of the actual

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Ateneo de Davao University

On the other hand, remedial or procedural

which are undertaken to cure errors and statutes.

irregularities, thereby validating judicial or

Ateneo de Davao University

Ateneo de Davao University

Contributor: Quenee L. Resurreccion with a computation of the retirement benefits

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monthly compensation, the last and highest of valid retirement plan

which was P11,100.50, payable every thirtieth day

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Article 4, NCC with De Castro inside the latter's office.

Atienza v. Brilliantes Petitioner then filed a complaint for Gross

Ateneo de Davao University