Ble Cases

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), REPRESENTED BY

ITS PRESIDENT, ATTY. VIRGINIA C. RAFAEL, Complainant, v. ATTY. EDNA M.
ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment Hied by the Philippine
Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael
(Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz),
former National Treasurer of PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP).1chanrobleslaw
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in the Judiciary
held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005. As
then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was entrusted with all the money matters of
PACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was
submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national
convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an election of officers was
conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the position of National Treasurer, but she was not
elected; that on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007, the outgoing Board
of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-2007
appropriating the amount of P30,000.00 as term-end bonus for each PACE official
qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for the 12th
convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the association as a matter
of procedure despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz;3 and that
the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president,
Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate
the finances of PACE for the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4chanrobleslaw
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of Liquidation for
the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a week after the said convention; that it
was duly audited by the national auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that
convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE accounts;"5
that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th national convention on May
22, 2007; that the report, together with the cash, checks and original receipts, were
received by Rosita Amisola and witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she denied
running for re-election as PACE national treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had
already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of the First District of Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of the P30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest
with her solely, rather, it was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she
never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty.
Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the disbursement of the said
term-end bonus.8chanrobleslaw
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an
exchange of pleadings, the mandatory conference was held. Afterwards, the protagonists
were directed to submit their respective position papers. Thereafter, the case was re-
assigned to IBP Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).9chanrobleslaw
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommended the dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz
offered documentary evidence to show that she was able to submit the liquidation reports
for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael
herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao
City convention.10 As to the sufficiency and completeness of these reports, this would be
better resolved through an audit rather than in disbarment proceedings. Besides,
Commissioner Fernandez did not consider the position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer
of PACE to have any connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus, according to him, she
should be sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a disbarment
case.11chanrobleslaw
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE elections even
though she was no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore disqualified,
Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best evidence, which was the "certificate of
candidacy," was never offered,12 and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer, knew that her bid
for re-election would be a useless exercise since she would not be able to assume office if
she won.13chanrobleslaw
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diaz's assertion that she never sponsored
the appropriation of the P30,000.00 term-end bonus and that the approval of Resolution
No. 1-2007 was a collegial action among the Board of Directors. Again, Commissioner
Fernandez was of the view that her participation in the passage of the questioned board
resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer.14chanrobleslaw
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a resolution
adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, and
dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.15chanrobleslaw
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16 dated June 21,
2013, granting the complainant's motion for reconsideration. It reversed and set aside its
earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one (1)
year.17chanrobleslaw
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz' liquidation of PACE
funds; (ii) her running for re-election when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii)
her entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer working in the Judiciary,
constituted a "triple - whammy" of questionable actions18 committed by Atty. Diaz in
contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.chanrobleslaw
The Court's Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution.
Everyone should keep in mind that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely
not a right. In order to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and
continues to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their
dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the
opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak
the truth and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and
discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients.19
Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of
good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are
dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.20chanrobleslaw
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to that profession
which society entrusts with the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For
this, he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its
demand for integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. They are always
expected to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in
the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble profession.21chanrobleslaw
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for re-election,
including her non-admission that she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate
of candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the
approval or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including herself
even though she was no longer working in the Judiciary, were definitely not the candor
the Court speaks of. There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1,

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months.
This decision shall be immediately executory.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its distribution to all
courts of the land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into
respondent's personal records as a member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7919, October 08, 2014
DOMADO DISOMIMBA SULTAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CASAN MACABANDING,
Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative complaint1 filed on May 14, 2008 before the Office of the Bar
Confidant by Domado Disomimba Sultan (complainant) against Atty. Casan
Macabanding (respondent) for allegedly having notarized a falsified affidavit.
The Facts
According to the complainant, he ran for the position of Mayor for the Municipality of
Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur in 2007. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
dated March 29, 2007 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for the May 14,
2007 elections.2cralawlawlibrary
Thereafter, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor3

(Affidavit of Withdrawal) dated April 10, 2007 was notarized and submitted by the
respondent to the COMELEC, withdrawing the complainants candidacy without the
latters knowledge or authorization.
When the complainant learned of this, he wrote a letter4 dated April 18, 2007 and
submitted an Affidavit5 to Mamangcoday Colangcag (Colangcag), Acting Election
Officer of the COMELEC in Buadipuso Buntong, Lanao del Sur. The complainant
alleged that he neither executed the Affidavit of Withdrawal nor authorized anybody to
prepare a document to withdraw his COC. He asked that the withdrawal be ignored and
that his name be retained on the list of candidates.
On May 16, 2007, the complainant filed a petition with the COMELEC to count the votes
cast in his favor. The complainant also filed a criminal complaint on May 17, 2007 with
the Prosecutors Office of Marawi City against Abdulmojib Moti Mariano (Mariano) who
was another candidate for the mayoralty position, the respondent, and Colangcag for
Falsification of Public Documents.6 Information7 was thereby filed against the
respondent and Colangcag which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 5842-08 in the
Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Sur, Marawi City.
Meanwhile, the COMELEC Second Division found merit in the complainants petition
and ordered the reinstatement of his name in the list of candidates for the position of
mayor in its Resolution8 dated June 12, 2007. All votes cast in favor of the complainant
were also counted. Thus, Mariano elevated the matter to the COMELEC en banc, which
issued a subpoena requiring the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to study the
signature appearing on the Affidavit of Withdrawal. Subsequently, the NBI transmitted its
Questioned Documents Report No. 428-9079 to the COMELEC en banc, stating that the
signature in the Affidavit of Withdrawal and the specimen signatures of the complainant
were not written by one and the same person.10cralawlawlibrary
On May 14, 2008, the complainant filed the present administrative complaint against the
respondent with prayer for his disbarment. After the respondent filed his comment11 on
the complaint, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and
recommendation.12cralawlawlibrary
The respondent countered that the instant administrative case was filed against him as
political harassment because his family supported the complainants opponent,
Mariano.13 He admitted that he notarized the affidavit after it was signed by the
complainant voluntarily and in the presence of witnesses and thereafter, submitted the
same to the COMELEC. However, the complainant changed his mind when Mariano,
who was the only remaining mayoralty candidate, refused to pay millions of pesos to the
complainant.14 The respondent withheld the identity of the witnesses allegedly to avoid
problems within their family.
On July 1, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and

Recommendation,15recommending that the respondent be suspended from the active
practice of law for six (6) months and two (2) years as notary public.16cralawlawlibrary
On May 15, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIX-2011-29717
adopting the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering respondents irregular notarization and submission of
complainants Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy to the COMELEC
without complainants knowledge and authorization, Atty. Casan Macabanding is
herebySUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months and SUSPENDED from
being commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years.18chanrobleslaw
The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the IBP Board of Governors
denied in its Resolution No. XX-2014-7620 dated March 8, 2014 for being a mere
reiteration of matters already threshed out and taken into
consideration.21cralawlawlibrary
Issue
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY

LIABLE BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT.
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.
The complainant presented the findings of the NBI which are hereunder
reproduced:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
FINDINGS:
Laboratory and scientific comparative examination of the specimens submitted, under
stereoscopic microscope and magnifying lenses, with the aid of photographic
enlargements (Comparison charts), reveal that there exist fundamental, significant
differences in writing characteristics/habits between the questioned signature DOMADO
DISOMIMBA (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample
specimen signatures DOMADO DISOMIMBA (written in Arabic characters/alphabet),
on the other hand, such as in:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
- Structural pattern of characters/elements
- Direction of strokes
- Proportion characteristics
- Other minute identifying details
CONCLUSION:
Based on the above FINDINGS, the questioned signature DOMADO DISOMIMBA
(written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on one hand, and the sample specimen signatures
DOMADO DISOMIMBA (written in Arabic characters/alphabet), on the other hand,
WERE NOT WRITTEN by one and the same person.22 (Underscoring and emphasis in
the original)
The respondent maintained that the NBI officer who examined the complainants
signature is not an expert in Arabic language and thus, could not give an expert opinion
regarding a signature written in Arabic language.23cralawlawlibrary
On this score, the Court refers to Mayor Abdulmojib Moti Mariano v. Commission on
Elections and Domado Disomimba Sultan,24 wherein the Court resolved with finality the
dismissal of Marianos petition before the Court alleging that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the complainants
reinstatement in the list of mayoralty candidates.
Marianos petition challenged the issuances of the COMELEC which were anchored on
its finding that the affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy imputed to the complainant was
forged. It was dismissed by the Court in the Resolution dated August 19, 2008. On
October 9, 2008, the complainant was then proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor of
Buadiposo Buntong, Lanao del Sur, having obtained the highest number of votes (4,078).
Mariano filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the COMELECs failure to avail
of the services of an Arabic expert was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion.25 The
Court denied the motion and addressed the issue raised in this
wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Contrary to petitioners basic stance, a handwriting expert does not have to be a linguist
at the same time. To be credible, a handwriting expert need not be familiar with the
language used in the document subject of his examination. The nature of his examination
involves the study and comparison of strokes, the depth and pressure points of the alleged
forgery, as compared to the specimen or original handwriting or signatures.26 (Emphasis
and underscoring ours)
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance

of evidence. In Rodica v. Lazaro,27 the Court expounded:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., this Court reiterated its oft[-] repeated ruling that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by
preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, this Court declared
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the
same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does
not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
x x x x28 (Citation omitted)
The complainant adduced preponderant evidence that his signature was indeed forged in
an affidavit which the respondent notarized and submitted to the COMELEC.
Consequently, the respondent should be held administratively liable for his action.
Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder
by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.29 It should be noted that a notary publics
function should not be trivialized and a notary public must discharge his powers and
duties which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A notary
public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must inform
themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or
allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.30In fact, the respondent admitted that
the affidavit was notarized in his office without the presence of the
complainant.31cralawlawlibrary
In Carlito Ang v. Atty. James Joseph Gupana,32 the respondent therein was suspended
from the practice of law for one year; his notarial commission was revoked and he was
also disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two years for
notarizing an affidavit of loss without the presence of the party acknowledging the
document.
The same sanctions were imposed against the erring lawyer in Agbulos v. Viray,33 where
the respondent therein admitted that not only did he prepare and notarize the subject
affidavit but he likewise notarized the same without the affiants personal appearance. He
explained that he did so merely upon the assurance of his client Dollente that the
document was executed by complainant.34cralawlawlibrary
In Isenhardt v. Real,35 the respondent therein was subjected to similar penalties when he
notarized a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by the complainant. It
was proven by documentary evidence that the complainant was in Germany at that time
and therefore could not have appeared before the respondent to have the SPA notarized.
The complainant in Linco v. Lacebal36 filed an administrative case against the

respondent notary public for notarizing a deed of donation despite the latters knowledge
that the purported donor had already passed away on an earlier date. For this reason, the
respondents notarial commission was revoked and he was disqualified from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years. Furthermore, he was
suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Thus, based on prevailing jurisprudence, the penalties meted out against a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such are: the
revocation of notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two years, and suspension from the practice of law for one year.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Casan Macabanding is found administratively liable for misconduct

and isSUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Further, his notarial
commission, if any, isREVOKED and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as
Notary Public for a period of two (2) years, with a stern warning that repetition of the
same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED
to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable it to determine
when the revocation of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision
likewise be attached to the personal records of Atty. Casan Macabanding.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED, Complainant, v. NICOLAS C.
TORRES,Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Courts resolution is the Complaint1 dated October 30, 2008 filed by complainant
CF Sharp Crew Management Incorporated (complainant) against respondent Nicolas C.
Torres (respondent), charging him with violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
The Facts
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged
in overseas maritime employment.2 It hired respondent, a medical doctor and a lawyer by
profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to serve as its
legal counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal cases and
medical-related claims instituted by seafarers against complainants various principals.
Among the cases respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims Manager were
the claims of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani (Sampani),
Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and Edmundo M. Chua (Chua).3cralawlawlibrary
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondents request, complainant
issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00, P97,100.00,
and P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua.4 However, complainant later discovered that, save for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the checks to the seafarers and
instead, had them deposited at International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City
Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1.5 With respect to Sampani, complainant also
discovered that he only received the amounts of P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of
P225,239.00 out of the requested amount of P652,013.20, through checks not issued by
complainant.6cralawlawlibrary
On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an Order7
requiring respondent to file an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither did
respondent appear in the mandatory conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did he
file his position paper.8cralawlawlibrary
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation9 dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner found respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR, and
accordingly recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for one (1) year.10cralawlawlibrary
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested and was
issued checks as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani, Delgado, and
Chua on the pretense that the requested amounts represented what was lawfully due
them.11 However, instead of giving the said checks to the named seafarers, he deposited
the same at the International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under
Account No. 003-10-06902-1,12 except for the check in the amount of P145,650.00
issued to Delgado.13cralawlawlibrary
Meanwhile, respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open
Investigation)14on March 24, 2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an
answer because complainant supplied a wrong address to the IBP and filed non-bailable
criminal cases against him which caused his detention in a regular prison cell and, thus,
his inability to comply with the IBPs directives.15cralawlawlibrary
On the merits of the complaint, respondent maintained that the seafarers claims had long
been settled and that the release documents signed by the named seafarers were already in
actual custody and possession of the complainant.16 He further contended that he only
signed the dorsal portions of the checks as a form of guaranty of their genuineness17 and
that he could not have encashed them as they were all payable to a particular payee.18
Lastly, respondent claimed that when he resigned in August 2008, complainant forced
him to sign promissory notes to reimburse certain amounts which had not been accounted
for by the latter in exchange for his clearance documents.19 But before he was able to
settle the promissory notes, he was already arrested in connection with the criminal cases
filed by complainant against him.20cralawlawlibrary
In a Resolution21 dated December 29, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with modification,
increasing the recommended period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2)
years, and ordering respondent to return the full amount of money he received from
complainant which is legally due to the seafarers, with legal interest, within thirty (30)
days from receipt of notice.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 on April 22, 2013 which
was, however, denied in a Resolution23 dated March 8, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings of the IBP in
its report and recommendation, except as to: (a) the recommended penalty to be imposed
upon respondent; and (b) the monetary award in favor of the complainant.
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary
and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith.24 The highly fiduciary
nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client.25 This is the standard laid down by
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyers failure to return upon demand the
funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics.26cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the IBP Investigating Commissioner correctly found that complainant had
duly proven its charges against respondent. In particular, complainant had exposed
respondents modus operandi of repeatedly requesting the issuance of checks purportedly
for the purpose of settling seafarers claims against the complainants various principals,
only to have such checks (except for the check in the amount of P145,650.00 issued to
Delgado) deposited to an unauthorized bank account, particularly International Exchange
Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1. It is well-
settled that when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the
lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent
for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.27 This, respondent failed to do.
Clearly, respondents acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and

confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his clients interests which
he is duty-bound to protect.28 They are contrary to the mandate of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the CPR which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable, disgraceful,
and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him
unfit to practice law.29cralawlawlibrary
Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, the Court deems it proper to modify the
penalty recommended by the IBP. Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers misappropriated their clients money, the Court imposed upon them the ultimate
penalty of disbarment from the practice of law. In Arellano University, Inc. v. Mijares
III,30 the Court disbarred the lawyer for misappropriating his clients money intended for
securing a certificate of title on the latters behalf. Similarly, in Freeman v. Reyes,31 the
same penalty was imposed upon the lawyer who misappropriated the insurance proceeds
of her clients deceased husband.
As already discussed, respondents conduct of misappropriating complainants money has

made him unfit to remain in the legal profession. He has definitely fallen below the moral
bar when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful, and grossly immoral acts.32 As a
member of the Bar, he is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.33 Membership in the legal profession is a privilege, and whenever it is made
to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients
and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of the Court to withdraw
the same,34 as in this case. In view of the foregoing, respondent deserves the ultimate
penalty of disbarment from the practice of law.
Likewise, the Court cannot concur with the IBPs recommendation regarding the return of
the settlement money respondent received from complainant, considering, among others,
that it was not specifically prayed for in the latters administrative complaint and that the
civil liability of respondent therefor may already be the subject of existing cases
involving the same parties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,

Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is herebyDISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondents record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts
in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct1 filed with this
Court on September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case2
he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26,
2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of the case as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents

Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to
wit:
1. Backwages...P146,726.67
2. Separation Pay.24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay.1,538.46
4. Attorneys Fees....17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Ninety One
Pesos & 64/100 (P189,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office,
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision.

During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent
had already collected the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent
received said amount in the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

02/05/2004 7802 P 20,000.00 Attorneys fees
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
Total Amount: P 95,000.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not.
Consequently, complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to
him the amount of P95,000.00, less his attorneys fees of P20,000.00. But respondent did
not budge. Thus, complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong
Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to
attend a conference before the barangay to resolve the issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on
installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that
complainant agreed to pay him additional attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total
monetary award, on top of the attorneys fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal,
and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total
award of P189,491.60, the sum of P17,226.57 representing respondents professional fees
has to be deducted, leaving a balance of P172,275.13.6 Then from said amount,
complainant proposed that he will get P100,000.00 and the balance of P72,275.13 shall
belong to respondent as and for his additional 25% attorneys fees and reimbursement for
all expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the amount of
P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of P20,000.007 attorneys fees,
P17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and P2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left
to respondent was only P56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below
the promised 25% attorneys fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of
P72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater
than what he expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from
spouses Lopez the sum of P93,491.60. Adding the P17,000.00 respondent previously
remitted to complainant, the latter will get a total amount of P110,491.60. This amount,
according to respondent, exceeds the amount of P100,000.00 complainant agreed to and
expected to receive.
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the
Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation9 with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the
penalty of two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution
all the amounts in his possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorneys
fees.10
On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-
139,11 which approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the
modification that respondent should restitute the sum of P85,500.0012 to the
complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for
his failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his
professional engagement and return the same upon demand.
The Courts Ruling

The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good
faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship.13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty
to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule
16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that [a] lawyer shall deliver the funds x x x
of his client when due or upon demand.
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30,
2004 received payments for attorneys fees and partial payments for monetary awards on
behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to
three months he had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the
complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias
Writ of Execution was issued and being implemented when complainant discovered that
spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total amount of P95,000.00 as partial
payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant
said amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand.
Complainant brought the matter before the barangay, but respondent simply ignored the
same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an
accounting and return the money after demand raises the presumption that he converted it
to his own use.14 His unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition
of disciplinary action against him.15cralawred
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive
payment. He implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received
from spouses Lopez to his additional 25% attorneys fees and reimbursement for all
expenses he incurred for the case, in the total amount of P72,275.13. However, after
deducting from the amount of P95,000.00 the amounts of P20,000.00, P17,000.00, and
P2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his dismay was only P56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other
than his self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support
respondents claim that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof
that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorneys fees and reimburse him for
all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did not
present any document, retainers agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be
reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even assuming that respondent was
authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly
informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional
employment. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and
money he has collected for his client. 16 The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his
attorneys fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him
from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.17 Moreover, a lawyer has no right
to unilaterally appropriate his clients money for himself by the mere fact alone that the
client owes him attorneys fees.18cralawred
In sum, [r]espondents failure to immediately account for and return the money when
due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity
and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.19cralawred
The Penalty
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a
lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been
suspension from the practice of law for two years.20 Thus, the IBP Board of Governors
did not err in recommending the imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is
respondents first offense and he is already a nonagenarian,21 the Court, in the exercise of
its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty of one year suspension is
sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross
misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year
upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this
Resolution, the net amount of P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
finality of this Resolution until the full amount is returned. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in
Atty. Sanicas record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014
ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct1 filed with this
Court on September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case2
he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26,
2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of the case as
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents

Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to
wit:
1. Backwages...P146,726.67
2. Separation Pay.24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay.1,538.46
4. Attorneys Fees....17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Ninety One
Pesos & 64/100 (P189,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office,
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision.

During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent
had already collected the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent
received said amount in the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

02/05/2004 7802 P 20,000.00 Attorneys fees
Total Amount: P 95,000.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not.
Consequently, complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to
him the amount of P95,000.00, less his attorneys fees of P20,000.00. But respondent did
not budge. Thus, complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong
Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to
attend a conference before the barangay to resolve the issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on
installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that
complainant agreed to pay him additional attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total
monetary award, on top of the attorneys fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal,
and to refund all expenses respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total
award of P189,491.60, the sum of P17,226.57 representing respondents professional fees
has to be deducted, leaving a balance of P172,275.13.6 Then from said amount,
complainant proposed that he will get P100,000.00 and the balance of P72,275.13 shall
belong to respondent as and for his additional 25% attorneys fees and reimbursement for
all expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the amount of
P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of P20,000.007 attorneys fees,
P17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and P2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left
to respondent was only P56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below
the promised 25% attorneys fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of
P72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater
than what he expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from
spouses Lopez the sum of P93,491.60. Adding the P17,000.00 respondent previously
remitted to complainant, the latter will get a total amount of P110,491.60. This amount,
according to respondent, exceeds the amount of P100,000.00 complainant agreed to and
expected to receive.
IBPs Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the
Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation9 with the following
recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the
penalty of two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution
all the amounts in his possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorneys
fees.10
On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-
139,11 which approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the
modification that respondent should restitute the sum of P85,500.0012 to the
complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for
his failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his
professional engagement and return the same upon demand.
The Courts Ruling

The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good
faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship.13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty
to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule
16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that [a] lawyer shall deliver the funds x x x
of his client when due or upon demand.
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30,
2004 received payments for attorneys fees and partial payments for monetary awards on
behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to
three months he had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the
complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias
Writ of Execution was issued and being implemented when complainant discovered that
spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total amount of P95,000.00 as partial
payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant
said amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand.
Complainant brought the matter before the barangay, but respondent simply ignored the
same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an
accounting and return the money after demand raises the presumption that he converted it
to his own use.14 His unjustified withholding of the funds also warrants the imposition
of disciplinary action against him.15cralawred
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive
payment. He implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received
from spouses Lopez to his additional 25% attorneys fees and reimbursement for all
expenses he incurred for the case, in the total amount of P72,275.13. However, after
deducting from the amount of P95,000.00 the amounts of P20,000.00, P17,000.00, and
P2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his dismay was only P56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other
than his self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support
respondents claim that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof
that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorneys fees and reimburse him for
all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the case. Respondent did not
present any document, retainers agreement, or itemized breakdown of the amount to be
reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even assuming that respondent was
authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly
informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his professional
employment. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and
money he has collected for his client. 16 The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his
attorneys fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him
from the obligation to make a prompt accounting.17 Moreover, a lawyer has no right
to unilaterally appropriate his clients money for himself by the mere fact alone that the
client owes him attorneys fees.18cralawred
In sum, [r]espondents failure to immediately account for and return the money when
due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity
and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.19cralawred
The Penalty
The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a
lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been
suspension from the practice of law for two years.20 Thus, the IBP Board of Governors
did not err in recommending the imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is
respondents first offense and he is already a nonagenarian,21 the Court, in the exercise of
its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a penalty of one year suspension is
sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross
misconduct and accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year
upon the finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act or offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this
Resolution, the net amount of P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
finality of this Resolution until the full amount is returned. Failure to comply with the
foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in
Atty. Sanicas record as a member of the Bar.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9115, September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROBERTO L.
UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for
unprofessional and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private
complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-
in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim
(Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Pacita by virtue of an
Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in
SPEC. PROC. No. 95-75201 (SP 95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a
stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring, developing, and
leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty
Corporation, Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty,
Inc.3cralawlawlibrary
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella,
averred that respondent, her alleged illegitimate half-cousin,6 continuously failed and
refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-
interest to all of Pacitas properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and
delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming from Pacitas
stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged
a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject
property) in favor of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of P54,000,000.00,8
despite an existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust
Agreement) wherein respondent, in his capacity as President of URCI, already recognized
her to be the true and beneficial owner of the same.10 Accordingly, she demanded that
respondent return the said property by executing the corresponding deed of conveyance
in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the proceeds therefrom, but
to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or
after she had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and
URCI agreed to transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a compromise
agreement.12cralawlawlibrary
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas

allegations and raised the affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He
pointed out that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue on the correct
interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also contended that the parties
transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint
having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering
the same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed
for the payment of moral damages and attorneys fees by way of
counterclaim.15cralawlawlibrary
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case

No. 05-1484 for the reason that the facts surrounding the same arose out of a
misunderstanding and misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their
dispute.17cralawlawlibrary
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File
Motion for Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the charges against
respondent continue in order to weed out erring members of the legal
profession.19cralawlawlibrary
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating

Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of
serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of
six (6) months.21cralawlawlibrary
On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion

to withdraw did not serve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation of the
administrative case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court which provides that [n]o investigation shall be interrupted or terminated
by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. Separately, the
Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary
cases are sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22cralawlawlibrary
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent
lacked the good moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed
to comply with the demands of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention
his unworthy and deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property without the formers
consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty was
recommended.23cralawlawlibrary
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation.
The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable.
The Courts Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal profession,
engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty

depends on the factual circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative
case largely constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the
parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebeccas motion to withdraw filed in this case as
well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which involves
the subject propertys alleged disposition in violation of the subject trust agreement. As
the Court sees it, his failure to comply with the demands of Rebecca which she takes as
an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement as well as respondents
acts of mortgaging the subject property without the formers consent, sprung from his
own assertion of the rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of
said courses of action eludes the Courts determination, for that matter had never been
resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in
her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a
misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute and even adds that
respondent had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x
to her entire satisfaction, leading her to state that she is now fully convinced that [her]
complaint has no basis in fact and in law.25 Accordingly, with the admitted
misstatement of facts, the observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by
the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of serious misconduct which
would warrant its recommended penalty.
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of
misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the
apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent
should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should not have
exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any
action which would endanger the Bars reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant
measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also
that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as
compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well
as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00
would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a
FINE of P15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondents record in this Court as attorney.
Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawred
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.,

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7766, August 05, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, v. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Courts resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated February
1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S.
Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) and the lawyers oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for
failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late

Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of
property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After
accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-
11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25,
2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence.5 While respondent was
notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the same
only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the formers office.7 On such occasion,
respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees
and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time,
respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as payment
of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.8 On September
12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a
notice of appeal9 before the RTC.10cralawred
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainants appeal for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent,
however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order12 dated
November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing
the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan,
within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the technical requirements for such
kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension of the
deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007
Order was spurious, as certified by the RTCs Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found
out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment
against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was

complainants failure to timely produce the amount of P1,400.00 to pay for the appeal
fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed
complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in
pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant not for money or
malice but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the courts unfavorable
decision.16cralawred
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable,
and accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year
be meted out against him.18cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner found complainants imputations against respondent to

be well-founded, observing that instead of meeting complainants allegations squarely,
particularly, the issue of the non-disclosure of the dismissal of the partition case,
respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at
hand.19cralawred
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondents

accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant,
ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up
his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainants appeal and make it appear
that there is still an available relief left for Tan.20cralawred
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted
and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.21cralawred
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyers duty to keep his client
constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the
latters confidence, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to clients request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
important information he may have acquired affecting his clients case. He should notify
his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an
appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case
will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The
lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the clients
interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions,
omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is
expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client
who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional
learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause.23cralawred
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of
the dismissal of complainants partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never
bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on
August 24, 2007 when he visited the formers office. To add insult to injury, respondent
was inexcusably negligent in filing complainants appeal only on September 12, 2007, or
way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal.
Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal
profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment.24cralawred
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainants appeal by

fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to
make it appear that complainants appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the
same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part
of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR,
which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which
whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice
of law.26 A lawyers inexcusable neglect to serve his clients interests with utmost
diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus,
administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondents conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful

scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his cases true status through the use
of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should not
just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they
reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.28 In this regard, the
Courts pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is
instructive,viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship
with others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The
nature of the office of an attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to the admission to the practice
of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or
private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients
of the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6)
months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for
his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In
the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who
consistently failed to update his client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several
follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct
by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred
them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special
power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his clients property. Also, in Embido v.
Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an
inexistent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent

to his client,i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in
reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing
undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondents acts are so reprehensible, and his
violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to
discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the
public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his
violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves
the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross

Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of
attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamantes record in this
Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them
to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,** (Acting Chief Justice), Velasco, Jr., De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., on Leave.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10196, September 09, 2014
MELODY R. NERY, Complainant, v. ATTY. GLICERIO A. SAMPANA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A.
Sampana (Sampana) for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal
fees and for making Nery believe that the petition was already filed.
The Facts
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010,1 Nery alleged that in June 2008, she
engaged the services of Sampana for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption
by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually granted, and Nery paid
P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt,
whom they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a
blurred copy of a marriage contract, which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter,
Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00 on 10 September 2008;
(b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no
longer asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed
the petition for adoption and it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery
that they needed to rehearse before the hearing. Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the
hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When Nery asked
why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was
no longer necessary because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that
the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status
of the petition for adoption and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the
court.2 Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met Sampana and sought the
reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would
deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be
deducted, since the petition for adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly
demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from Sampana, but the demands
were left unheeded.
In an Order dated 25 February 2011,3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Atty. Eldrid C. Antiquiera
(Commissioner Antiquiera), stated that Sampana failed to file his answer to the complaint
and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were directed to
submit their position papers.
In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.
On the other hand, in his position paper dated 25 March 2011,5 Sampana argued that
Nerys allegations were self-serving and unsubstantiated. However, Sampana admitted
receiving one package fee from Nery for both cases of annulment of marriage and
adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because
of the old age, civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being
adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that if the [alien] adopter would be married to a close
relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be possible. Sampana, then,
required Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy
(certification). Nery furnished the blurred marriage contract, but not the certification.
Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file it because he
was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana
claimed that Nery could have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the
petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could have overshadowed the adoption
case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after
deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of

malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Commissioner Antiquiera
recommended a penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-217 passed on 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquieras report and recommendation, as

APPROVED, with modification, [t]he Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A, and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of malpractice by his
failure to file a petition for adoption and made complainant believe that he filed the
petition in Court, Atty. Glicerio Sampana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months and ORDERED to RETURN to complainant the amount of One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within thirty days from
receipt of notice.7
The Ruling of the Court
The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the

penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives

rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause.8 Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves
full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of importance.9 A lawyer also
owes it to the court, their clients, and other lawyers to be candid and fair.10 Thus, the
Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received one package fee for both cases
of annulment and adoption. Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the
petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due diligence and candor to his client.
Sampanas proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition for
adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. In his position paper, he suggested to Nery that if
the alien adopter would be married to her close relative, the intended adoption could be
possible. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the
alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of his/her Filipino spouse, and the certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt is waived.11cralawred
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery
of the status of the petition. He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the
petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the legal matter entrusted to him. He
even kept the money given him, in violation of the Codes mandate to deliver the clients
funds upon demand. A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client and of the public confidence in the legal
profession.12cralawred
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana,13
we already found Sampana guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of
land. We imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year and warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In Rollon v. Naraval,14 we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of

suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal
service after receiving the filing and partial service fee. Considering the serious
consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to
increase the penalty for Sampanas malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility to suspension from the practice of law for three (3) years.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana from the practice of law for
THREE (3) YEARS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely. We also ORDER Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana to RETURN to
complainant Melody R. Nery the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), with 12% interest per annum from the time of his receipt of the full
amount of money on 17 November 2008 until 30 June 2013, then 6% interest per annum
from 1 July 2013 until fully paid.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records
of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters;
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. P-13-3102 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2562-P], September 08, 2014
JOSE S. VILLANUEVA, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAULINO I. SAGUYOD, CLERK OF

COURT VI, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 6, PANIQUI, TARLAC,
Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Complaint1 dated March 23, 2007 filed by Jose S. Villanueva against
Atty. Paulino I. Saguyod, Clerk of Court VI, Branch 67, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Paniqui, Tarlac charging the latter with violations of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and of Section 4 (e), Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, otherwise known as the
Code of Ethics for Public Officials and Employees.
The facts, as found by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), follow.
Complainant alleged as follows:
x x x on February 20, 2007, he received a text message from Atty. Lavezares Leomo, his
employer, instructing him to get a certified photocopy of a Petition relative to Land Case
No. 051-06 entitled Petition for the Issuance of a Second Owners Duplicate Copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of Arnel D. Morales. On or about 8:45 in the morning
of that same day, Ms. Rosalie D. Sarsagat, the assigned stenographer of the same court,
advised him to return after thirty minutes because the custodian of the records is not yet
around. Immediately following the lapse of that period, complainant was informed that
the records being requested were in the custody of respondent but must talk to his wife,
Mrs. Judith Saguyod, in order to secure the requested pleading. Complainant found out
that respondents wife likewise holds office in the room of respondent although she is not
an employee of the said court.
Complainant alleges that when he respectfully asked for a photocopy of the pleading,
respondent inquired whether he has a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to get
such photocopy. Complainant showed him the text message he received from Atty.
Leomo. However, respondents wife interrupted them and called a certain person at the
Register of Deeds of Tarlac whom she asked whether complainant is allowed to be given
a copy of the Petition being requested. At the end of their conversation, the wife said,
Huwag ka raw naming bibigyan ng kopya ng Petition ni Arnel D. Morales.
In the course of their dialogue, respondent told complainant: Pinalusot ko na nga yung
pinitisyon mong apat (4) na loss (sic) title, ganiyan ka pa makipag-usap sa amin.
Complainant answered back and said, Anong kinalaman, Sir, noong pinitisyon kong loss
(sic) title, eh iniutos sa akin ng boss ko na ikuha ko siya ng kopya ng certified photocopy,
at wala naman po akong ilegal na transaction na ginawa. Upon hearing this reply,
respondent stood up in his chair and challenged complainant to a fistfight while shouting
this (sic) words: Punyeta ka! Mayabang ka. Ano lalaban ka. Complainant calmly said,
Di ako lalaban, Attorney, kung ayaw mong magbigay ng kopya. Yon na lang sasabihin
ko kay Atty. Leomo. Respondent angrily told complainant, Tarantado ka. Mayabang ka.
Di mo ako kilala kung sino ako dito. Complainant politely replied, Alam ko po na ikaw
ang Clerk of Court dito.
In order to avoid further arguments, complainant went out of the room and proceeded to
the parking area. Respondent blocked his way and shouted, Taga Paniqui ka, taga
Victoria ako. Suntukan na lang tayo. Complainant replied, Hindi ako lalaban sayo,
Attorney. Respondent retorted, Sino ang pinagmamalaki mo, si Atty. Leomo, shit sino
ba siya dito? Complainant answered him, Wala akong ipinagmamalaki, Attorney. Siya
lang ang nag-utos sa akin para kumuha ng kopya ng petition ni Mr. Arnel Morales.
Complainant realized that this boorish attitude displayed by respondent was an act of
vengeance because he failed to give the balance of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P1,500.00) as payment for the Certificate of Finality he issued relative to Land Case
Nos. 021-P06 and 020-P06. Apparently, the four (4) lost titles which respondent is
referring when he said, pinalusot lang niya ito pertains to the land case he initiated by
virtue of the Special Power of Attorney given to him by Mrs. Charlotte Antaran. The said
Petition had not been acted upon for nine months from the time it was filed on May 26,
2006 even though there is a Presiding Judge who will sign the Order commanding the
Register of Deeds of Tarlac to issue the owners duplicate certificate of title. When
complainant followed up the issuance of such Order with Mrs. Rosalie Sarsagat, the latter
answered, Hindi pipirmahan ni Atty. Saguyod ang Certificate of Finality kapag hindi ka
nagbayad ng tatlong libong piso (P3,000.00). To prevent further delay of the release of
the Order, complainant gave an advance payment One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos and
promised to pay the remaining balance later. Respondent Clerk of Court replied angrily,
Marami na akong narinig na pangakong ganyan pero di na bumabalik para magbayad.
Complainant answered him Please, lang Attorney, give me a chance. Respondent Clerk
of Court stood up and said, Siguruhin mo lang. Sige, gagawin ko na. Antayin mo na
lang. After thirty minutes, Ms. Rosalie D. Sarsagat handed the Certificate of Finality and
Order dated January 5, 2007, duly signed by Judge Arsenio P. Adriano. Automatically,
complainant paid One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos to Mrs. Rosalie D. Sarsagat and
demanded for a receipt but the latter replied that a receipt is not being issued in this kind
of transaction. She further retorted, Gusto mo bang bawiin pa ni Atty. Saguyod ang mga
dokumentong yan?
Such acts of respondent contravened Section 4(e) of R.A. 6713 and Section 2, Canon IV
of the New Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Complainant also claims that
respondent violated Section 4, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel when
he allowed his wife to use the Office of the Clerk of Court as the office of her real estate
transaction. Complainant posits that in this scenario a conflict might arise between
respondents official duty and his wifes business dealings.
[In his Comment dated April 27, 2007, respondent denied the charges against him and
claimed that:]
x x x he did not give a copy of the Petition being requested because complainant did not
present a Special Power of Attorney showing his purpose and authority to get such
photocopy. He could not rely on the text message received by complainant because he
doesnt know the phone number of Atty. Leomo. In fact, it is the policy of the court to
require a written authority whenever a similar request is made. To his dismay, however,
complainant answered back, E, di sasabihin ko kay Atty. Leomo na ayaw mo. Eto nga
yung text niya. Upon seeing respondents wife who happened to drop by his office to
remind him to pick up their daughter from school, complainant rudely said, Porke ba
hawak ng asawa mo yan kaya ayaw mong magbigay. Seeing that his wife was offended,
he patted and pushed complainant and emphatically said, Pati babae pinapatulan mo.
According to the guard on duty, complainant continued to hurl threatening words against
him even when he was already outside the building. The guard reported the matter to him,
hence, he went outside to confront [the] complainant. At that moment, complainant said
to him, Dayo ka lang dito sa Paniqui to which respondent Clerk of Court replied, E
ano ngayon kung taga-Paniqui ka at taga-Victoria ako? Nonetheless, to avoid any
untoward incident, he returned to his office.
Respondent denies that his wife holds office in the Office of the Clerk of Court. He points
out that complainant has no evidence to prove such charge. He explains that on that day,
his wife had just passed by his office to tell him to fetch their seven-year old daughter
from school. Although he admits that once in a while, his wife would drop by his office to
see and talk to him an act that is not prohibited by any law, rules or regulations.
Respondent also clarifies that his wife is not a real estate agent but only a person who
facilitates the processing and transfer of certificates of title of subdivision lots. Hence, his
wife has nothing to do with his refusal to give complainant a copy of the petition.
Respondent explains that Land Case No. 021-06 and 022-06 were approved only after
nine months from the time they were filed because then Judge Cesar M. Sotero retired on
(sic) February 2006, while Judge Arsenio P. Adriano who succeeded him assumed his
office as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63, Tarlac City only on
(sic) September 2006. Moreover, complainant was also required by the court to present
other supporting documents like the original copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale in his
Petition.
Respondent admits that he instructed Rosalie Sarsagat to tell complainant that he has to
pay the proper fees for reception of evidence as required under Section 21(e), Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court and the Department of Justice (DOJ). He did not personally ask
complainant to pay those fees because the latter might misconstrue it and use it against
him.2
In a Resolution3 dated October 1, 2007, the Court referred the instant administrative
complaint to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac for investigation, report
and recommendation. Forthwith, the records of the case were transmitted to Executive
Judge Liberty O. Castaeda in a letter4 dated November 9, 2007.
In her Reports and Findings5 dated March 26, 2011, Judge Castaeda recommended that
the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit.
However, in a Resolution6 dated September 12, 2011, the Court nullified Judge
Castaedas Reports and Findings, considering that she made the same while she was
under preventive suspension from office. Thus, the Court referred the administrative
complaint to Acting Presiding Judge Alipio C. Yumul, Branch 67, Paniqui, Tarlac for
investigation, report and recommendation.7
In his Report8 dated February 7, 2012, Judge Yumul recommended that the case be
dismissed.
In a Resolution 9dated June 18, 2012, the Court referred said Report to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum10 dated October 5, 2012, the OCA recommended as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended to the Honorable Court

that:
1 the present administrative case against respondent Atty. Paulino I. Saguyod, Clerk
of Court VI, Branch 67, Regional Trial Court, Paniqui, Tarlac be RE-DOCKETED as
a regular administrative matter: and,
2 respondent be: (a) ADMONISHED for Violation of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and of Section 4(e) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as
the Code of Ethics for Public Officials and Employees, and WARNED that a
repetition of [the] same or similar act will be dealt with severely in the future; and, (b)
SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) month and one (1) day for simple
misconduct for demanding from complainant the amount of P3,000.00 as
commissioners fee and appearance fee in Land Case Nos. 021-P06 and 020-P06.11
The issues for our resolution are:
whether or not respondent indirectly demanded and received from complainant an

amount of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) for the issuance of the Certificate of
Finality;
whether or not respondents receipt of commissioners fee for reception of evidence is

legal and proper;
whether or not respondent extended prompt and courteous service to complainant when
the latter requested for a photocopy of a certain pleading; and
whether or not the wife of respondent holds office in the Office of the Clerk of Court.12
Let us discuss the issues in seriatim.
The first and second issues shall be discussed jointly as they are interrelated.
In his Comment, respondent claimed that he should be exonerated from the charges
against him since the amount he demanded from complainant for the release of the
Certificate of Finality relative to Land Case Nos. 021-P06 and 020-P06 covers the
appearance fee required under pertinent circulars of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the commissioners fee under Section 21(e), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
We do not agree.
To begin with, clerks of court are important officers in the judicial system. Their
administrative functions are vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice. They
cannot be allowed to overstep their powers and responsibilities. Their office is the hub of
adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and judicial concerns. They perform a
very delicate function as custodian of the courts funds, revenues, records, property and
premises. They are specifically imbued with the mandate to safeguard the integrity of the
court as well as the efficiency of its proceedings, and to uphold the confidence of the
public in the administration of justice. As such, this Court cannot countenance any act or
omission of any court personnel that would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.13
Here, it appears that respondent went beyond his responsibilities when he demanded the
payment of P3,000.00 from complainant. Such act violates Chapter VI, Section D, par.
1.2.12 of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court which states that branch clerks of
court who are directed by the judge to receive evidence ex parte shall not demand and/or
receive commissioners fees. In fact, only the amount of P500.00 may be collected
pursuant to Section 21(e), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Time and again, we have held that clerks of court are not authorized to demand and/or
receive commissioners fees for reception of evidence ex parte.14 To be entitled to
reasonable compensation, a commissioner must not be an employee of the court. Section
D (7), Chapter IV of the Manual for Clerks of Court provides that The Court shall allow
the commissioner, other than an employee of the court, such reasonable compensation as
the circumstances of the case warrant to be taxed as costs against the defeated party, or
apportioned, as justice requires.15 Accordingly, respondent, as a court employee, has no
authority to demand or receive any commissioners fee.
Thus, the OCA aptly held that, as such, respondent should be held liable for simple
misconduct which is punishable under Section 52(B), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with a penalty of suspension from
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for a first offense of misconduct.
Considering that this is respondents first infraction, the penalty of three (3) months
would suffice.
Anent the third issue, the OCA properly observed:
Records showed that complainant went to Branch 67, RTC, [Paniqui], Tarlac on February
20, 2007, with only a text message from Atty. Lavezares Leomo, to secure a certified
photocopy of a petition relative to Land Case No. 051-06. Respondent advised
complainant to secure a letter request from Atty. Leomo because it was the policy of the
court to provide court documents only to parties to the case and their counsel or duly
authorized representatives. The text message from Atty. Leomo was not the official
request required by the court and respondents refusal to provide complainant the
requested documents was proper to protect the integrity of court records. Court records
are public documents and access to these documents shall be afforded the citizens, subject
to certain limitations provided by law.
It must be emphasized that Atty. Leomo was provided with the requested documents
when he personally went to the court and explained that he needed a copy of the Petition
in Land Case No. 051-06, including its annexes, particularly the Affidavit of Loss and the
Finality of the Decision because his client, Nelita S. Navarro, intended to file an
opposition to the petition. This only showed that upon formal request, respondent will not
hesitate to provide court documents.
Respondent, however, may be held liable for conduct unbecoming a court employee for
his attitude towards complainant. It appears from a reading of the transcript of
stenographic notes that complainant became rude when respondent turned down his
request to get a photocopy of the petition and other court documents. Ronaldo P. David
and Ruben Giganti, court employees, both testified that complainant shouted and pointed
a finger at respondent when he requested for the documents. To avoid confrontation,
respondent called for them to escort complainant out of the office. Complainant
continued shouting invectives, hence, respondent upon being informed of complainants
behavior, went out and confronted complainant. It was at this moment when Danilo
Dacoma, a friend of complainant, saw a person wearing barong (referring to respondent)
reprimanding complainant and saying I am from Victoria, you youre here in Paniqui, if
you like we just box each other.16
From the foregoing, it is obvious that complainant and respondent had a heated argument
on February 20, 2007. Thus, although complainants actions are reprehensible, it was
equally inappropriate for respondent to have handled the situation that way considering
that he is a court officer.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees (Republic
Act No. 6713) sets out a policy towards promoting a high standard of ethical
responsibility in the public service. It enjoins those in the government service to extend
prompt, courteous and adequate service to the public, and, at all times, to respect the
rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals and good
customs, among other ideals.17 As a public officer, respondent is bound, in the
performance of his official duties, to observe courtesy, civility and self-restraint in his
dealings with the public.18
Regrettably, although respondents reaction was understandable given the circumstances,

he should have still conducted himself in a manner befitting an officer of the court. For
this, respondent is admonished and warned to be more courteous in his dealings with the
public.
As to the fourth issue, no evidence was presented to prove that respondents wife holds
office at the Office of the Clerk of Court. Per Judge Yumuls findings, respondents claim
that his wife only dropped by his office to remind him to fetch their daughter from school
was not even repudiated by complainant.
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the OCAs findings and recommendations.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the

service for a period of three (3) months for SIMPLE MISCONDUCT, for demanding
from complainant the amount of P3,000.00 as commissioners fee and appearance fee, in
Land Case Nos. 021-P06 and 020-P06. Respondent, is likewise, ADMONISHED for
Violating the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and of Section 4(e), Republic Act No.
6713, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt
with more severely in the future.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014
IMELDA CATO GADDI, Complainant, v. ATTY. LOPE M. VELASCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
Before us is an administrative complaint filed by Imelda Cato Gaddi (Gaddi) against Atty.
Lope M. Velasco (Velasco) for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
The Facts
According to Gaddi, she was the Operations and Accounting Manager of the Bert Lozada
Swimming School (BLSS) when she broached the idea of opening a branch of BLSS in
Solano, Nueva Vizcaya (BLSS in Solano) to Angelo Lozada (Angelo), the Chief
Operations Officer of BLSS. Believing that Angelo agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in
Solano. However, in April 2010, Angelo informed the management that he did not
authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelos complaint, the police officers apprehended
the swimming instructors of BLSS in Solano, namely: Jonathan Lagamzon Lozare,
Katherine Agatha Gaddi Ancheta, who is Gaddis niece, and Lorenz Ocampo Gaddi, who
is Gaddis grandson.
At past 10:00 a.m. of 22 April 2010, while inside the BLSS main office in Sta. Ana,
Manila, Gaddi was informed of the apprehension of the swimming instructors. Worried,
Gaddi pleaded with Angelos wife, Kristina Marie, and the BLSS Programs Manager
Aleza Garcia for permission to leave the office and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead of
acceding to her plea, they commanded Gaddi to make a handwritten admission1 that the
BLSS in Solano was unauthorized. They warned Gaddi that she cannot leave the office
without the handwritten admission. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing the handwritten
admission and left the office before 1:00 p.m. of the same day. Subsequently, Gaddi
found out that Angelo filed a complaint against her regarding the BLSS in Solano using
her handwritten admission, which was already notarized by Velasco.
Thus, Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for violation of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, specifically Rule IV, Section 2 (b) and Rule VI, Section 3. Gaddi
denied that she personally appeared before Velasco to have her handwritten admission
notarized. She alleged that she did not consent to its notarization nor did she personally
know him, give any competent evidence of identity or sign the notarial register.
In his comment dated 17 September 2010,2 Velasco alleged that he was commissioned
notary public for Makati City from 4 January 2010 to 31 December 2011. He alleged that
Gaddi appeared before him in his notarial office in Makati City on 22 April 2010 and
requested for the notarization of a four-page handwritten document. He ascertained
Gaddis identity, through two identification cards her BLSS ID and Tax Identification
Number (TIN) ID, and that the document was her own. Thereafter, he notarized the
document and recorded it in his notarial register as Doc. No. 130, Page No. 27, Book No.
192, Series of 2010. Velasco insisted that he duly complied with the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice and it was Gaddis complaint, which was notarized by a fake notary
public. Velasco claimed that Gaddi only denied having the document notarized when she
found out that Angelo used the document against her.
In a Resolution dated 18 October 2010,3 the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation dated 23 June 2011,4 Investigating Commissioner

Pablo S. Castillo (Investigating Commissioner) found the complaint impressed with
merit, and recommended a penalty of fine of P5,000.00 on Velasco for violation of Rule
IV, Section 2(b) and Rule VI, Section 3 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
The Investigating Commissioner gave more credence to Gaddis statement that she did
not personally appear before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized. The
Investigating Commissioner found it contradictory to logic and human experience that
Gaddi went first to Makati City to have her self-incriminating handwritten admission
notarized before proceeding to Nueva Vizcaya. The Investigating Commissioner also
believed Gaddis statement that the identification cards presented by Velasco were
computer-generated from the BLSS office, since the portion of the notarial certificate
listing the evidence of identity was left blank. As to Velascos claim that Gaddis
complaint had a fake notary public, the Investigating Commissioner found it
unsubstantiated.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-1275 passed on 13 February 2013, the IBP Board of

Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners report and
recommendation, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A, and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and for violation of Rule IV, Sec. [2(b) and Rule VI, Sec.] 3 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Atty. Lope M. Velascos Notarial Commission is
hereby REVOKED and DISQUALIFIED for being Commissioned as Notary Public for
two (2) years with stern [w]arning to be more circumspect in his dealing and that
repetition of the same act shall be dealt with more severely.
There was no motion for reconsideration filed.
The Ruling of the Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendations with modification.
Time and again, we have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, and routinary act.6 Notarization converts a
private document to a public document, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity.7 A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face; for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties.8cralawred
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the signatory to the document is in the notarys presence personally at
the time of the notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified through competent evidence of identity.9 At the time of notarization, the
signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or mark the notary publics notarial register.10
The purpose of these requirements is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness
of the signature and to ascertain that the document is the signatorys free act and deed.11
If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary public is mandated to
refuse to perform a notarial act.12 A notary public is also prohibited from affixing an
official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.13cralawred
In the present case, contrary to Velascos claim that Gaddi appeared before him and
presented two identification cards as proof of her identity, the notarial certificate, in
rubber stamp, itself indicates: SUBSCRIBE AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS
APR 22, 2010 x x x AT MAKATI CITY. AFFIANT EXHIBITING TO ME HIS/HER
C.T.C. NO.__________ISSUED AT/ON___________.14 The unfilled spaces clearly
establish that Velasco had been remiss in his duty of ascertaining the identity of the
signatory to the document. Velasco did not comply with the most basic function that a
notary public must do, that is, to require the presence of Gaddi; otherwise, he could have
ascertained that the handwritten admission was executed involuntarily and refused to
notarize the document. Furthermore, Velasco affixed his signature in an incomplete
notarial certificate. Velasco did not even present his notarial register to rebut Gaddis
allegations. It is presumed that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced.15cralawred
In Isenhardt v. Real,16 a notary public who failed to discharge his duties was meted out
the penalty of revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years, and suspension from the
practice of law for one year. For notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity
and voluntariness of the signatory to the document, for affixing his signature in an
incomplete notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in his pleadings, Velasco failed to
discharge his duties as notary public and breached Canon 117 and Rule 1.0118 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Considering these findings and our previous
rulings,19 Velasco should not only be disqualified for two years as a notary public, he
must also be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Lope M. Velasco GUILTY of violating
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDShim from the practice of law for one year, REVOKES
his incumbent notarial commission, if any, andPROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two years, effective immediately, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 9925, September 17, 2014
MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL, Complainant, v. ATTY. RONALDO E. RENTA,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Mariano R. Cristobal against Atty.
Ronaldo E. Renta.
The facts are not disputed.
Complainant engaged the services of Renta Pe & Associates Law Office for the filing of a
petition for recognition for the minors Codie Darnell Green and Matthew Darnell
Green before the Bureau of Immigration. Respondent as the managing partner signed
the Special Contract of Legal Services2in behalf of said law office. Respondent also
received from complainant the full and package price of P160,000 for the filing of the
petition for recognition.3 No such petition, however, was filed.4cralawred
Thus, the instant complaint was filed against respondent for the latters failure to file the
petition for recognition and return the amount of P160,000 despite demand.
In his comment,5 respondent explained that the petition for recognition was not filed
because Anneth Tan, the one supposed to file the petition, misplaced it and did not inform
him of such fact. He also claimed that he begged complainant to forgive him and assured
him that he will return the money. However, respondent failed to refund the money on
time for he was hard up in funds. Eventually, he was able to save enough and refunded
the money to complainant. Respondent likewise begs forgiveness from the Court and
promises not to repeat his mistake.
In addition, respondent submitted complainants Affidavit of Desistance.6 In the said

affidavit, complainant said that respondent cried for forgiveness and that he has forgiven
him. Complainant confirmed that respondent had already refunded the amount he paid.
We required Cristobal to file his reply to Atty. Rentas comment. In his Reply,7
complainant confirmed the contents of his affidavit of desistance, the refund made by
respondent and his act of forgiving the respondent for the latters misdeeds.
Since the facts are not contested, we deem it more prudent to resolve the case now rather
than refer it to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
On complainants affidavit of desistance, we hold that its execution cannot have the effect
of abating the instant proceedings against respondent in view of the public service
character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public
interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant
relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. A
disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as
an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.8cralawred
Under the established facts, we find that respondent violated Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
We have held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyers duty to serve
the client with competence and diligence.9cralawred
Here, it is beyond doubt that respondent breached his duty to serve complainant with
diligence and neglected a legal matter entrusted to him. He himself admits that the
petition for recognition was not filed, seeks forgiveness from the Court and promises not
to repeat his mistake.10 Complainant also submitted official letters11 from the Bureau of
Immigration that indeed no such petition was filed. That Anneth Tan supposedly lost the
petition for recognition and failed to inform respondent cannot absolve him of liability for
it was his duty not to neglect complainants case and handle it with diligence.
We note that while respondent failed to refund immediately the amount paid by
complainant, he nevertheless exerted earnest efforts that he eventually was able to fully
repay complainant and begged complainants forgiveness.
In Voluntad-Ramirez v. Bautista,12 we found Bautista negligent in handling Voluntad-

Ramirezs case and ruled that he is guilty of violating Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. We admonished Bautista to exercise greater care
and diligence in the performance of his duty to his clients and ordered him to restitute to
Voluntad-Ramirez P14,000 out of the P15,000 acceptance fee. In said case, we cited
Cario v. Atty. De Los Reyes13 where the respondent lawyer who failed to file the
complaint-affidavit before the prosecutors office restituted the P10,000 acceptance fee
paid to him. The respondent lawyer in Cario was reprimanded by the Court with a
warning that he should be more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta LIABLE for violation of Canon 18 and
Rule 18.03 of theCode of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby REPRIMANDED
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7184, September 17, 2014
FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe
(respondent) for malpractice as a notary public, among others.
The Facts
In a Complaint1 dated April 27, 2006, complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant)
charged respondent, previously of the Public Attorneys Office,2 for malpractice and
gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer, alleging
that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of
Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva3 dated 25th day of
1999 (subject document), stating that he is a notary public for and in the City of
Marikina.4 Said document was one of the attachments to the Amended Complaint5
dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil Case No. 03-849-MK entitled Esperanza Nieva
Dela Cruz [(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada [(as represented by
complainant)]. To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification6 dated May 26,
2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City, certifying that per the courts record, respondent is not a commissioned
notary public for the City of Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance.
In a Resolution7 dated July 5, 2006, the Court required respondent to file his Comment8
which he eventually submitted on February 13, 2007 after proper service. In said
pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of the
subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at that
time.9 To prove his defense, he attached a Certification10 dated August 23, 2006 issued
by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City, certifying the fact of his
appointment as notary public for the City of Pasig and in the Municipalities of Taguig,
Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999 under Appointment No.
98.11 Further, respondent, thru the comment, incorporated his own administrative
complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a fellow lawyer in view
of the filing of the instant administrative case against him.12cralawred
In response, complainant filed a Reply13 dated April 26, 2007 asserting that he has the
legitimate right to file the administrative complaint against respondent for his unlawful
act of notarization, which is not an act of harassment as respondent claims. He also draws
attention to the fact that the subject document was incompletely dated and yet notarized
by respondent.14cralawred
In a Resolution15 dated July 11, 2007, the Court, inter alia, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Eventually, both parties appeared during the mandatory conference held on April 30,
2008.16cralawred
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 22, 2008, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner found respondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyers
oath, reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of the subject document in
Marikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. To this end, the
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that in the acknowledgment of the subject
document, it was categorically stated that respondent is a notary public for and in the City
of Marikina, Province of Rizal, of which he was not, hence, violating the Notarial Law.
Moreover, respondent likewise violated the lawyers oath, specifically its mandate for
lawyers, to obey the laws and do no falsehood.18cralawred
In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he
was still commissioned as a notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not
recommend that he be disqualified as such.19cralawred
In a Resolution20 dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1) year, with immediate
revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.
On reconsideration,21 the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution22 dated March 8,

2014, modified the penalty stated in its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty
of reprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for the decreased period of one (1) year.
administratively liable.
The Courts Ruling
The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.
As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted

that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the
Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999,
could not notarize the subject documents acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as
said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of
Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary publics jurisdiction is crystal clear from
Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice:23cralawred
Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term A person commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for
a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned
under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V,
Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,24 of which Section
240, Article II states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall
be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of
Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)
For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in
the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not,
respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the
lawyers oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray,26 the Court
instructively expounded on infractions similar to that of
respondent:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondents act of notarizing

documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial
commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While perhaps not on all
fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation involved, what the Court said in
Nunga v. Viray is very much apropos:
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a
violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then,
too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary

act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements
for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely
more than casual.27 (Emphases supplied)
With respondents liability herein established, and considering further the attendant
circumstances of this case, take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he
had already acknowledged his wrongdoings,28 the Court finds that suspension for a
period of six (6) months29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In
addition, he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
one (1) year and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby
revoked.30cralawred
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of

malpractice as a notary public, and violating the lawyers oath as well as Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this
Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of one (1) year and his notarial commission, if currently
existing, is hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

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Ble Cases

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SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE), REPRESENTED BY

The Court's Ruling

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1,

This decision shall be immediately executory.

Thereafter, an Affidavit of Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy for Municipal Mayor3

On July 1, 2009, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY

Ruling of the Court

In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance

The complainant in Linco v. Lacebal36 filed an administrative case against the

WHEREFORE, Atty. Casan Macabanding is found administratively liable for misconduct

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated August 1, 2009, the IBP Investigating

The Issue Before the Court

The Courts Ruling

Clearly, respondents acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of trust and

As already discussed, respondents conduct of misappropriating complainants money has

WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents

All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.

Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision.

Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Courts Ruling

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents

All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.

Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision.

Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Courts Ruling

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebeccas

On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebeccas motion

The Issue Before the Court

The Courts Ruling

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

The gravity of the misconduct determinative as it is of the errant lawyers penalty

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.,

On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Investigating Commissioner found complainants imputations against respondent to

Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondents

The Issue Before the Court

The Courts Ruling

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainants appeal by

In view of the foregoing, respondents conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross

In her position paper,4 Nery reiterated her allegations in the complaint.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation,6 Commissioner Antiquiera found Sampana guilty of

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

The Ruling of the Court

The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the