CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F.

DE LEON, Petitioners,
vs.
BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG, JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY
ARINTO, CARLITO PRESENTACION, and ROBERTO DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 168406 January 14, 2015

I.

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in

declaring CLUEFAs strike illegal

Petitioners Argument

CLUFEA failed to file a Notice of Strike and to conduct a strike vote, in

violation of the legal requirements for staging a strike.

Labor Arbiters Decision

CLUFEAs Notice of Strike did not contain written proposals and Club Filipino,
Inc.s counterproposals, in violation of the Rule XXII, Section 4 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.16The rule provided:

In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable,

further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be
accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of
the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences.
In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state
the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicably.

Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the
foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party
concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board.

The Labor Arbiter declared CLUFEAs strike "procedurally infirm"18 for

CLUFEAs failure to comply with the procedural requirements for staging a
strike. The Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and considered "all the
officers of the union terminated from service."19 Because of the
retrenchment program Club Filipino, Inc. allegedly launched before the Labor
Arbiter issued his Decision, the dismissed union officers were ordered to
receive separation pay "similar in terms with those offered to the employees
affected by the retrenchment program of the club."

Courts Ruling

The Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in declaring CLUFEAs strike
illegal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the requirements under Rule XXII,
Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code "do not
appear to be absolute."34 Rule XXII, Section 4 only requires that the
proposals and counterproposals be attached to the Notice of Strike "as far as
practicable."35 Since CLUFEA had already filed a Notice of Strike when Club
Filipino, Inc. submitted its counterproposals, it was not practicable for
CLUFEA to attach Club Filipino, Inc.s counterproposals to the Notice of
Strike.

The court ruled that CLUFEA could not have attached Club Filipino, Inc.s
counterproposals in the Notice of Strike since petitioner submitted it only
after the union filed the Notice of Strike. It was, thus, not practicable for
CLUFEA to attach Club Filipino, Inc.s counterproposal to the Notice of Strike.
CLUFEA did not violate Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code.

II.

Whether or not CLUFEAS appeal was filed by persons having no

legal standing

The NLRC ruled that CLUFEAs Appeal was filed by persons having no legal
standing to question the Labor Arbiters decision."22 Bautista had allegedly
resigned from Club Filipino, Inc. receiving separation benefits pursuant to
Club Filipino, Inc.s Employees Retirement Plan.

Bautista, Sualog, Calida, Arinto, de Guzman, and Fegalquin filed a Petition

for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals.31 However, Caluag no longer joined,
instead, Presentacion, a CLUFEA member, joined in the filing of the Petition
for Certiorari

For their part, Caluag, Sualog, and Calida allegedly misrepresented

themselves as CLUFEAs officers when they appealed to the NLRC. According
to the NLRC, CLUFEA had already elected a new set of officers. Caluag,
Sualog, and Calida were no longer CLUFEAs officers when they filed the
Appeal.
Courts Ruling

The court ruled that "a worker ordered dismissed under a tribunals
decision has every right to question his or her dismissal especially if
he had not been properly impleaded in the case and in the decision
that decreed his or her dismissal."

With respect to Arinto, de Guzman, and Fegalquin, the court ruled that they
were not granted "the full hearing that the due process requirements of the
Philippine Constitution impose. They merely participated only during the
Motion for Reconsideration stage with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiters Decision
did not bind Arinto, de Guzman, and Fegalquin.

The Court of Appeals found that Bautista and Fegalquin had already resigned
during the pendency of the case and had received separation benefits from
Club Filipino, Inc. Bautista and Fegalquin, therefore, "no longer had any legal
interest in filing the petition for certiorari.

As for Presentacion, the Court of Appeals found that he was not an officer of
CLUFEA and was not dismissed by virtue of the Labor Arbiters Decision. He,
therefore, had no personality to join Bautista, Sualog, Calida, Arinto, de
Guzman, and Fegalquin in filing the Petition for Certiorari. As for Sualog,
Calida, Arinto, and de Guzman, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor
Arbiters Decision was void.

III.

Whether or not the Union Officers was illegally dismissed for

participating in an illegal strike

Petitioners Argument

CLUFEAs members allegedly committed illegal acts while on strike,

preventing their co-workers from entering and leaving Club Filipino, Inc.s
premises and even cutting off Club Filipino, Inc.s electricity and water
supply on the first day of the strike.

Courts Ruling

Union officers may be dismissed for participating in an illegal strike only if

they knowingly participated in it.
The law requires knowledge of the illegality of the strike as a condition sine
qua non before a union officer can be dismissed for participating in an illegal
strike. However, it was not ruled how the respondents participated in the
illegal strike.

IV.

Whether Club Filipino, Inc.s filing of the Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration prevented our Resolution dated July 13, 2009 from
becoming final and executory; and

Petitioners Argument

In the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and the subsequent Motions

to Resolve, Club Filipino, Inc. maintains that this court erred in affirming the
Court of Appeals award of backwages and separation pay in the illegal strike
case on top of the separation pay respondents received by virtue of Club
Filipino, Inc.s retrenchment program.

Club Filipino, Inc. alleged that pending its Petition for declaration of illegal
strike with the NLRC, it implemented a retrenchment program to minimize
its "mounting losses."

Courts Ruling

The Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration must be denied with finality.

Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of

the Resolution dated July 13, 2009 is in the nature of a second Motion for
Reconsideration.

As a general rule, the filing of second Motions for Reconsideration of a

judgment or final resolution is prohibited. Rule 52, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.

This prohibition is reiterated in Rule 15, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of

the Supreme Court: Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The
Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and any
exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice
by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when
the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently
unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable
injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can
only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes
final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a

second motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.

For this court to entertain second Motions for Reconsideration, the second
Motions must present "extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon
express leave first obtained."74 Once leave to file is granted, the second
Motion for Reconsideration is no longer prohibited.75

In the instant case, this court granted leave to petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.
to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, therefore, is no longer prohibited.

The grant of leave to file the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,

however, did not prevent this courts Resolution from becoming final and
executory. A decision or resolution of this court is deemed final and
executory after the lapse of 15 days from the parties receipt of a copy of
the decision or resolution.78 The grant of leave to file the second Motion for
Reconsideration does not toll this 15-day period. It only means that the
Entry of Judgment first issued may be lifted should the second Motion for
Reconsideration be granted.79

This case became final and executory on October 26, 2009, after the lapse
of the 15th day from petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.s receipt of the Resolution
denying its first Motion for Reconsideration. Entry of Judgment, therefore,
was in order.

Since this court did not issue any temporary restraining order to enjoin the
execution of the Court of Appeals Decision, the NLRC correctly proceeded in
implementing the Court of Appeals Decision in the illegal strike case.

V.

Whether the NLRCs Decision on the illegal dismissal case was res
judicata on the illegal strike case.
Courts Ruling

The NLRCs Decision on the illegal dismissal case was not res judicata on the
illegal strike case.

The elements of res judicata are:

1. Judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. Decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
3. Disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be as between the first and second action identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action.86

The fourth element of res judicata is not present. The cause of action for
declaration of illegal strike and the cause of action for illegal dismissal are
different.

In an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause of action is premised

on a union or a labor organizations conduct of a strike without compliance
with the statutory requirements.92

On the other hand, in an action for illegal dismissal, the cause of action is
premised on an employers alleged dismissal of an employee without a just
or authorized cause as provided under Articles 282, 283, and 284 of the
Labor Code.93

There is no res judicata in the instant case. Petitioner filed the illegal strike
because members of the union allegedly disrupted petitioners business
when they staged a strike without complying with the requirements of the
law. Respondents, on the other hand, filed the illegal dismissal case to
question the validity of petitioners retrenchment program.

Both the illegal strike and illegal dismissal cases involve the dismissal of
respondents. In respondents action for illegal dismissal, respondents were
found to have been dismissed by virtue of a valid retrenchment program.

In petitioners action for declaration of illegal strike, the Labor Arbiters

finding that respondents conducted an illegal strike resulted in their
dismissal. Respondents were ordered to receive separation pay similar in
terms with those offered to the employees affected by the retrenchment
program of the club.95 The Court of Appeals, however, found that the Labor
Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in declaring the strike illegal. It then
reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision and awarded some of the respondents
full backwages, benefits, and separation pay.

VI.

Whether or not there is double compensation

Courts Ruling

Since the court ordered that any benefit received from illegal dismissal case
be deducted from any benefit under the Court of Appeals Decision, there
was no double compensation. The Court of Appeals ordered that those who
already retired and received their benefits may no longer claim full
backwages, benefits, and separation pay under the decision in the illegal
strike case. This is with respect to respondents Bautista and L Fegalquin who
already executed their quitclaims.

With respect to Presentacion who was not a union officer and could not be
dismissed under the illegal strike case, the court ruled that he cannot receive
benefits.

With respect to Sualog, Calida, de Guzman and Arinto, who were not found
to have executed a quitclaim with respect to the benefits under the
retrenchment program, the Court of Appeals ruled that any benefits
received" as a result of the decisions must be deducted from the separation
pay received under the illegal strike case.