J Bus Ethics (2017) 140:515
DOI 10.1007/s10551-015-2688-z
Intuition, Analysis and Reflection in Business Ethics
Chris Provis1
Received: 4 July 2014 / Accepted: 8 May 2015 / Published online: 16 May 2015
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015
Abstract The paper aim draws together two ideas that
have figured in different strands of discussion in business
ethics: the ideas of intuition and of reflection. They are
considered in company with the third, complementary, idea
of analysis. It is argued that the interplay amongst these is
very important in business ethics. The relationship amongst
the three ideas can be understood by reference to parts of
modern cognitive psychology, including dual-process the-
ory and the Social Intuitionist Model. Intuition can be
misleading when based on fast and frugal heuristics, and
reasoning needs social exchange if it is to support moral
judgment effectively, but in the complex institutional en-
vironment of business, reflection and analysis can underpin
social communication and feedback to develop sound in-
tuition. Reflection and analysis are both more deliberate,
systematic judgment processes than intuition, but are dis-
tinguished by the fact that reflection embraces hypothetical
thinking and imagination, while analysis is careful, step-
by-step reasoning. Examples of business ethics problems
illustrate the need for both of these processes, and also
suggest how they themselves can be enhanced in the same
social exchange process that underpins the development of
good intuition.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference of the
Australian Association of Professional and Applied Ethics, Sydney, in
June 2014. The author is grateful to participants in discussion on that
occasion, and well as to anonymous referees for this journal.
& Chris Provis
chris.provis@unisa.edu.au
1
School of Management, University of South Australia, North
Terrace, Adelaide, South Australia 5000, Australia
Keywords Analysis
Dual-process theory
Ethical
decision-making
Intuition
Moral judgment
Reflection

Social Intuitionist Model
Moral judgment is fundamental to business ethics, and
attention has been given to different types of moral judg-
ment processes. One basic judgment process is step-by-step
thinking, or calculative ratiocination, as we might call it
(Solomon 1992, pp. 174179). Here, we shall refer to it as
analysis. Analysis can be contrasted with other processes
like reflection and intuition, and these have figured sig-
nificantly in different strands of discussion (e.g. Moberg
and Calkins 2001; Harris 2008; Sadler-Smith and Burke
2009; Provis 2010; Sadler-Smith 2012). However, the re-
lation between analysis, reflection and intuition has not
been clearly elaborated. This paper first explores the dis-
tinction amongst the three processes, aiming to develop an
account that clarifies them by drawing on modern cognitive
psychology, which then allows us to see how they can
complement one another to improve moral judgment.
While each of the three ideas has some everyday use, we
can make them more precise and more consistent with
psychological research and theory, and we can then un-
derstand their implications more fully. Intuition, for ex-
ample, is a term with wide common use, but on closer
examination there seem to be differences amongst forms of
intuition: on one hand, intuition can use mental heuristics
that give quick but sometimes inaccurate results (Gilovich
et al. 2002), and intuitive value judgments may disguise
hidden emotional responses (Haidt 2001); on the other
hand, intuition may on occasion be the product of experi-
ence and learning (Plessner et al. 2008). Reflection and
analysis are more effortful, systematic processes than in-
tuition, but they can be distinguished from one another. As
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6 C. Provis
we explore the nature of the three processes and their in-
terrelationship, we can see what makes the processes more
effective or less so: for example, the availability or absence
of appropriate feedback. Feedback processes are especially
important, and to some extent feedback that supports one
of the three processes emerges from another of them. It will
be seen how that may occur in business, and it will be
argued that complex institutional environments like busi-
ness organisations create a distinctive need for intuition,
analysis and reflection to complement one another.
Aspects of Intuition
To begin with, consider a case involving a manager; call
him Max. Maxs organisation has many retail outlets, in-
cluding quite a number in rural areas. He is a member of a
group that deals with equal opportunity in the organisation,
and he noticed that some of the rural outlets had few
indigenous employees: in fact, quite a few had none at all.
He prepared a paper for the group, starting from this fact,
arguing that recruiting in country areas should try to
overcome the apparent rural prejudice against employing
indigenous workers.
Unfortunately for Max (but perhaps fortunately for or-
ganisational policy), Sue, one of the other members, looked
more closely at the employment figures, and came to Max
about them. She pointed out that while rural outlets do
indeed include those with the lowest levels of employing
indigenous workers, other rural outlets also have the
highest rates of indigenous employees. Max was surprised,
but then commented that the explanation must just be that
the anti-indigenous prejudice was localised, perhaps be-
cause of specific historical or cultural factors in those areas.
No, Sue said, its just the fact that our rural outlets are
relatively small. Its sometimes called the Law of Small
Numbers. She went on to give details: small sample sizes
simply give unreliable indications of population data. Max had
to contact other members of the group, explain that he should
have analysed the data more fully, and retract the paper.
Here, Max made an intuitive judgment that was unsound
and needed correction through analytical reasoning. Re-
searchers on heuristics and biases, such as Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman, have highlighted the ways that in-
tuitive responses mislead us in a wide range of areas, sta-
tistical judgment not least of all (Kahneman 2011, see in
particular chap. 10). However, others, like Gary Klein and
his colleagues, have tried to show that there are many
difficult cases where intuitive judgment can provide a
sound basis for decisions, and the positive role of intuition
in management has often been noted: Chester Barnard, for
example, wrote about it in The Functions of the Executive
(Barnard 1938; see Sadler-Smith 2007, pp. 4246).
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Empirical Research and Dual-Process Theory
Both the negative and the positive aspects of intuitive
judgment have been explored in a wide variety of empirical
studies. There has been experimental work, like that by
Kahneman and Tversky on peoples statistical inference
(see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974), and like that by
Haidt and colleagues on peoples rationalisation of intu-
itive, emotion-driven responses (see e.g. Haidt 2001; Haidt
and Bjorklund 2008a), and there have also been field
studies like those of Klein and colleagues (see e.g. Klein
1998, 2009). Research on expert decision-making has also
cast light on intuition: for example, in recent studies by
Schweizer and colleagues of soccer referees intuitive de-
cision-making (Schweizer et al 2009). There have also
been analyses based on computer simulations of human
cognitive processes (e.g. Johnson-Laird 2006; Ohlsson
2011), and other related work has included exploration of
brain activity during different types of mental processes,
using techniques like functional magnetic resonance
imaging (see e.g. Satpute and Lieberman 2006; Salvador
and Folger 2009).
In particular, the nature of intuition has been explored
quite extensively as part of dual-process theory, which
is now a familiar idea in cognitive psychology (see e.g.
Chaiken and Trope 1999). Although there are many
variations and some controversies in accounts of dual-
process theory (Reynolds 2006; Evans 2008), there is
widespread agreement that the functioning of the brain
can be characterized by two different types of cognition
having somewhat different functions and different
strengths and weaknesses (Stanovich 2011, p. 16). The
two types of cognition have been distinguished in
various ways. They are characterised by Kahneman as
follows:
System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with little
or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.
System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental
activities that demand it, including complex computa-
tions. The operations of System 2 are often associated
with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and
concentration (Kahneman 2011, pp. 2021).
The terminology System 1 and System 2 is drawn
from Stanovich and West (2000). Some dual-process the-
orists use the terms X-system and C-system, where
X is drawn from reflexive, and C is drawn from
reflective (Satpute and Lieberman 2006, p. 87; Salvador
and Folger 2009, p. 8): the connotation of reflexive is
speed and automaticity; that of reflective is careful de-
liberation. However, the idea of reflection has a specific
history of its own. It will be suggested below that recent
work in cognitive science could make it worthwhile to
Intuition, Analysis and Reflection in Business Ethics
distinguish reflection from other System 2 processes in a
way that builds on that past background. We shall therefore
just use the terminology System 1 and System 2. Plessner and Czenna 2008; Hodgkinson et al. 2009), and
Work by Kahneman and Tversky was some of the ear-
liest to explore the difference between System 1 and Sys-
tem 2. Thus, for example, experiments have repeatedly
shown that our automatic or semi-automatic judgments
based on statistics tend to embody systematic errors that
can best be explained on the basis that we seek out causal
explanations for matters that are actually just random
variations, as Max did in the example above. Only by more
careful, systematic reasoning can we arrive at sound
judgments of such phenomena. Kahneman (2011, p. 19)
notes that System 1 may embody what we often call in-
tuitive thinking, whereas only the slower System 2 can
construct thoughts in an orderly series of steps (2011,
p. 21), which is the sort of process we may associate with
analytical thinking. The fact that there are the two different
sorts of processes makes good evolutionary sense (Stano-
vich 2004, p. 40, 2011, p. 25). If early homo sapiens en-
countered a predator, we were more likely to survive
through a rapid, automatic response than through a careful,
systematic process of assessment and decision. We might
sometimes flee when there was no real threat, but in the
long run we were still much better off. Equally, it may have
been useful for us to perceive causal links whenever we
could, even if doing so sometimes led us to see links
amongst phenomena that were actually random. In our
modern world, there are often problems with such judg-
ments. When we need an accurate conclusion, as Max did
in the case above, a slower, more systematic System 2
response is preferable. In such cases, intuition can lead us
into error.
Debates About Intuition
As noted above, there is debate about the place of intuitive,
System 1 judgments. This is partly because although some
of our System 1 judgments seem to be hard-wired, a direct
result from evolutionary development of the human brain,
others are acquired through experience (Stanovich 2004,
p. 38, 43; Evans 2008). Intuitive judgment includes not
only responses that are innate, developed through evolu-
tionary selection, but also responses that individuals de-
velop initially through System 2 processes of deliberation
and evaluation. Chess is one well-studied example. A
novice chess player will spend some time carefully think-
ing through the possible outcomes of a particular move,
whereas an expert will evaluate the move quickly and ef-
fortlessly (Lehrer 2009, p. 44). Intuition developed in this
way can sometimes yield good judgment where individuals
are under pressure from time constraints or situational
complexity. Various theorists have discussed the ways in
7
which intuitive judgments can be beneficial (e.g. Klein
1998, 2009; Lehrer 2009, chap. 5; Sadler-Smith 2007;
how intuitive judgments can deliberately be improved (e.g.
Hogarth 2001; Raab and Johnson 2008; Sadler-Smith and
Burke 2009).
Despite some controversy, there is consensus amongst
leading theorists about some key issues (Kahneman and
Klein 2009). Intuition can sometimes lead us astray, but
sometimes is invaluable. So far as ethics is concerned,
some intuitions are certainly questionable, such as those
about in-group loyalty (Baron 1998, chap. 4; Provis 2012,
pp. 3941). However, it is arguable that good ethical
judgment in many business situations must be based on
intuition, and that such intuition constitutes Aristotles
phronesis, or practical wisdom (Provis 2010; Sadler-Smith
2012, p. 363). Debate over the role of intuition in decision-
making in management, and in ethics, nowadays tends to
focus not on whether good decisions can be made intu-
itively, but on the sorts of occasions when they can be, on
how frequent and important they are, and on how intuitive
judgment may be improved (e.g. Weaver et al. 2014).
To some extent, such points remain contentious because
they cannot be resolved by empirical investigation alone,
as may be illustrated in the three perspectives represented
by Kahneman, Klein and Haidt, respectively. Kahneman is
sceptical of intuitive judgment, focussing on the extent to
which we are systematically misled by cognitive heuristics
when we use our intuitive judgment. Klein, on the other
hand, has emphasised situations where it seems that indi-
viduals have been able to make good judgments only on the
basis of intuition. However, they agree on many funda-
mental points about intuitive expertise: We found that the
sharpest differences between the two of us were emotional
rather than intellectual, they say (Kahneman and Klein
2009, p. 518), and they identify a number of key theoretical
points they agree on as well as a number of key recom-
mendations about when to trust intuitive expertise and how
to develop it. It seems as though part of the difference
between them regards what is important. For Kahneman,
the theoretical implications of heuristic-driven bias loom
large; for Klein the success of intuitive judgment in com-
plex real situations is more prominent. Could we say that
one emphasis is correct, the other not? That may turn on
what kind of setting we have in mind.
A similar issue arises with regard to the Social Intu-
itionist Model propounded by Haidt and his colleagues.
The model has shone light in some dark corners, exploring
the way that many intuitive moral judgments are prompted
by feelings like disgust, only subsequently to be ra-
tionalised in discussion by reference to moral rules or
principles. Haidt and colleagues acknowledge that moral
reasoning sometimes has a causal role to play, but such
123
8 C. Provis
reasoning is hypothesized to be rare (Haidt and Bjorklund
2008a, p. 193), occurring for example when intuitions
conflict or in some public policy issues where one simply
does not know enough to have an opinion (Haidt and
Bjorklund 2008a, p. 195). It is not clear how the claim of
rarity can be empirically tested. Narvaez presents some
evidence to the contrary (2008, p. 235), to which Haidt and
Bjorklund respond (2008b), but at least part of the issue is
not about statistical frequency but about the relative im-
portance of cases where moral reasoning has a central role
to play. That sort of issue does not seem to be a straight-
forwardly empirical one, and I shall argue below that in
business it is both common and important for moral rea-
soning to play a causal role in peoples judgments and
decisions.
Part of the explanation why moral reasoning can play an
important role in business ethics judgments and decisions
is the prominence in business of social exchange and
feedback. That such processes can allow reasoning to fig-
ure in judgments and decisions is a significant part of the
Social Intuitionist Model. However, we can understand
more fully how they may do so if we first consider the ideas
of analysis and reflection.
Reflection and Analysis
Consider Max once again. Later in the week, he had a letter
from a consumer group expressing concern over the sour-
cing of some of the firms clothing products. He was al-
ready familiar with publicity about working conditions in
some of the countries where clothing is produced, high-
lighted by disastrous fires where workers lost their lives in
factories with appalling conditions. Media stories revolved
around the conditions and exploitation of workers.
Max turned the letter over in his mind, reflecting on the
implications. Suppose they took these items out of their
product lines, they would lose some profit, but not too
much. He could picture the lives of workers in ramshackle
wooden factories, and contrast it with his own comfortable
family. Removing the products would not only placate the
consumer group, it would be a good thing to do, and not too
hard to sell to directors and shareholders. He came to a
decision, and sent an e-mail message: they would terminate
the products.
Shortly afterwards, he had a phone call. It was Lucy, one
of the international buyers. She wanted to speak about the
decision on the clothing products. He started to explain the
decision: regardless of the lost profit, it was the moral thing
to do. For a moment, there was silence on the other end of
the phone. Then Lucy slowly and carefully recounted the
work that had been done to check their suppliers. There had
been exhaustive checks, supported by personal visits she
123
had made to the places where the garments are produced.
She had spoken to workers, and even visited some of their
families. While it was true that some of the other factories
in the country were oppressive and exploited workers very
badly, the garments sold by this firm came only from as-
siduously vetted sources. The prices were low not because
the workers were low-paid, but because the owners had
invested in new, superior equipment. Terminating these
products would have exactly the opposite effect to what
Max intended, making life harder for good employers and
their employees.
Max was silent, then promised to check what Lucy said.
He spent the afternoon doing so, and her account was fully
confirmed. He should have done more work to analyse the
issue before he made a decision. He sent another message
retracting the first, and wrote a letter to the consumer
group.
Reflection is important. It can help us enormously in
ethical decision-making, allowing us to see new possi-
bilities and different points of view. However, it often
needs to be based on systematic analysis, checking details,
working carefully through all the known possibilities,
considering whether a conclusion stands up to detailed
scrutiny. Max engages in a process that we might reason-
ably call reflection, and fails to engage in a process we
might reasonably call analysis. Nevertheless, ordinary
language is an imperfect tool. Our choice of terms is often
a matter of context or audience, of etiquette or inclination.
Is there any theoretically useful distinction between the
process of reflection and the process of analysis?
The Idea of Reflection
Virtues of analysis might seem to be particularly to do with
drawing accurate conclusions. It seems plausible to suggest
an account of analysis that identifies it as some sort of
systematic, step-by-step approach to drawing or checking
conclusions. But what of reflection? The idea of reflection
has figured in philosophical discussion at least since the
time of John Dewey. In How We Think, he says that re-
flective thought is active, persistent, and careful consid-
eration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the
light of the grounds that support it, and the further con-
clusions to which it tends (Dewey 1910, p. 6). From our
point of view, though, this seems to cross over the dis-
tinction between reflection and analysis. For Dewey, the
essence of reflective thought is that it contains an element
of inference, drawing conclusions from evidence (Dewey
1910, p. 8). This is something Max failed to do effectively
in coming to a decision about the letter from the consumer
group. The question is whether there is any sound theore-
tical way to make a satisfactory distinction between ana-
lysis and reflection.
Intuition, Analysis and Reflection in Business Ethics
After Dewey, the idea of reflection has been prominent in
some modern academic writing, with a focus especially on
the place of reflection in teaching and the professions (e.g.
Schon 1983; Kolb 1984; Moon 1999), including its role in
business ethics education (e.g. Harris 2008; Hoivik 2009).
However, writing in these areas has often been unclear in
defining reflection. Twenty years ago, Hatton and Smith
commented that the term reflection is often ill-defined and
has been used rather loosely to embrace a wide range of
concepts and strategies (1995, p. 33). They surveyed
various uses of the term in modern literature. Eventually,
for their own study, they defined reflection as deliberate
thinking about action with a view to its improvement
(1995, p. 40). Like Deweys, such a definition is very broad,
and does not offer a distinction from analysis.
Part of the difficulty in defining reflection has been the
aim to maintain ordinary connotations of the idea. Jennifer
Moon has said There is no point in defining reflection in a
manner that does not relate to the everyday use of the word
if further confusion is not to be created (Moon 2001, p. 1;
see also Moon 1999, p. 92). That is true. However, ev-
eryday use may be ambiguous and vague, and a
theoretically useful definition may not be able to retain all
everyday connotations. How wide everyday usage is,
shows itself in the comment by van Manen: Reflection is
a fundamental concept in educational theory, and in some
sense it is just another word for thinking (1991, p. 98). kind of thinking we do when we imagine alternatives to
While disavowing any intention to give a definition,
Moon suggested that reflection at least includes a form of
mental processing with a purpose and/or an anticipated
outcome that is applied to relatively complicated or un-
structured ideas for which there is not an obvious solution
(1999, p. 4) and that commonly it is seen as a means of
transcending more usual patterns of thought to enable the
taking of a critical stance or an overview (1999, p. 5). The
latter comment is consistent with the useful suggestion by
Moberg and Calkins that the raw material of reflection is
an experience (cognition) on which a person engages in the
process of cogitating and meditating (metacognition)
(2001, p. 258). Then, they turn to possible objects of re-
flection in business ethics, such as ones moods, expecta-
tions or defining moments, and suggest a way to promote
constructive reflection. Their discussion is important, and it
is possible to refine one of the key ideas: that reflection is a
form of metacognition. We may take Deweys account as a
starting point, but consider that his account applies better to
what we have termed analysis, rather than reflection. His
account refers to considering the support for a proposition
and its implications. Interpreting this as working out what
conclusions follow from specified premises, or checking
whether some putative conclusions do actually follow from
specified premises, we might identify this as analysis, and
specify reflection as imagining what some alternative
9
premises might be, and their implications. To do so, we
shall have to take account of our aims and desires, and
what beliefs or knowledge we have that may be relevant to
the task at hand, that are not taken account of so far in the
premises we have used in our reasoning.
That suggestion clearly needs further development.
However, it seems consistent with common usage. One
connotation of reflection seems to be taking an overview
or sitting back from a situation to review it (Moon 1999,
p. 5): moving back, perhaps, to reconsider the premises that
have hitherto been the basis for our reasoning. Is the idea
consistent with emerging literature in cognitive psy-
chology? Moon (1999, viii) commented that modern psy-
chology literature is relatively unhelpful in regard to
reflection, not offering any clear way to distinguish re-
flection from thinking more generally. Some more recent
work in the area may have changed that. Koriat comments
that there has been a surge of interest in metacognitive
processes in recent years (2007, p. 289), and some recent
literature suggests possible ways to make sense of the idea
of reflection that distinguish it from analysis.
Reflection as a Cognitive Process
In particular, an aspect of cognitive processing that has
been extensively studied is hypothetical thinking: the
things that have already happened, or things that are in
prospect. Often it might be reasonable to refer to such
thinking as reflection, as we envisage a person considering
past or future possibilities, or mulling over what course of
action to choose. This is what Max did when he received
the letter from the consumer group. He imagined what
would happen if the firm did something different in the
future, he imagined the possibility that he himself was a
worker in the sort of clothing factory the letter referred to,
he imagined himself a few days later explaining to stake-
holders why the products had been removed from sale. It
should come as no surprise that hypothetical thinking has
received a lot of attention in research on cognitive pro-
cesses. Hypothetical thinking requires us to undertake the
computationally demanding process of reasoning about a
situation, while maintaining our awareness that it is an
imaginary or hypothetical situation (Stanovich 2011,
4850), a process that has sometimes been called cogni-
tive decoupling. This process makes great demands on
working memory, and a wide variety of experimental
studies have explored its detail (Byrne 2005; Evans 2007).
From the point of view of dual-process theory, it seems
clear that hypothetical thinking is a System 2 activity
(Evans 2006, p. 379; Stanovich 2011, p. 47). Although not
all System 2 processes involve hypothetical thinking, it
seems to be a key part of System 2 processes to support
123
10
hypothetical thinking. However, it may be that there are
two aspects to such support: the process of initiating hy-
pothetical thinking on one hand, and on the other hand the
process of maintaining it once started. There is a case to be
made for referring to the first process as reflection, and to
the second as analysis: reflection consists of imagining
different possibilities, while thinking through their details
is a process of analysis. Stanovich argues for such a dis-
tinction amongst System 2 processes: those processes that
initiate hypothetical thinking and simulation, on one hand,
and on the other hand those that sustain it by preventing
confusion between real and imagined situations (Stanovich
2011, pp. 4752). The first sort of System 2 processing
Stanovich labels the reflective mind, the second sort he occur in hypothetical thinking because our cognitive system
terms the algorithmic mind. The reflective mind inter- tends to mitigate the demands on it by concentrating on just
rupts System 1 or other processing to initiate focussed al-
gorithmic processing; the algorithmic mind maintains such
processing in the face of potentially distracting stimuli and
ensures that attention to the previously determined cogni-
tive goal is maintained (Stanovich 2011, p. 59). Processes
of the algorithmic mind are the sorts of processes tradi-
tionally measured by standard intelligence tests. On the
other hand, the reflective mind determines the cognitive
goal for the algorithmic mind. Stanovich argues that the
difference between the reflective mind and the algorithmic
mind is captured operationally in the distinction that psy-
chologists make between tests of intelligence and tests of
critical thinking (2011, p. 39).
We are well aware of failures of algorithmic thinking.
When we make a mistake in our mental arithmetic, when
we fail to work through the implications of a changed
meeting schedule, when Max failed to undertake a step-by-
step examination of the firms clothing supply chain, the
explanation is often that our cognitive resources have let us
down. In business, it is easy to make mistakes because of
shortcomings in algorithmic processing. We can omit to
order resources, forgetting that others will have been used.
We can make commitments that require us to be in two
places at once. We can fail to allow for seasonal variations.
And so on. There are failures because our working memory
cannot cope with the demands on it, or because the de-
mands are so effortful (Kahneman 2011, chaps. 2, 3). Ex-
perience helps us guard against such lapses: for example,
accounting arrangements can focus attention on areas
where mistakes might be made, or we can develop
checklists to ensure that actions are conducted only in the
correct order, or to ensure the people speak to one another
before decisions are made where they could lead to a
problem (Gawande 2009, pp. 6567). Such a checklist
could have helped Max, as he neglected the effortful task
of examining supply chain details. It can often be important
in ethical issues, as we ensure that people are treated fairly
in a recruitment process, for example.
123
C. Provis
On the other hand, however, it is also possible for us to
become too much caught up with step-by-step analysis in
algorithmic thinking, as we focus too exclusively on a
single issue. We might concentrate too much on the process
of recruiting someone to do a particular job, without paus-
ing to reflect that the job may be unnecessary in the near
future. Or we may put all our mental efforts into techni-
calities of a new computer system, without paying attention
to the situation of the people who will be using it. We may
implement a flawless recruitment process for an unneces-
sary position, or establish a computer arrangement that
works perfectly given the correct input, but which many
individuals are unable to use. Such problems are likely to
one possibility: in hypothetical thinking, we consider one
hypothesis at a time and maintain it until we find a good
reason to give it up (Evans 2006, p. 380). Stanovich refers
to this error as focal bias; it can be seen in a number of
well-attested experimental results, such as framing and
anchoring effects (2011, p. 105; cf. Berlyne 1960, p. 266).
Once I have started to think about finding someone to do the
job, I remain focussed on the process of recruitment and
selection, failing to think about other possibilities, such as
temporarily reallocating work to others.
Stanovichs account of the reflective mind is consistent
with the idea of stepping back to look again at the premises
that one has been using previously. Other recent work also
seems consistent with the same general idea. One example
is Ohlssons work on mental creativity: how we solve
problems that initially baffle us. Ohlsson gives an account
of creative imagination that focusses partly on the occur-
rence of insight, the experience we may have when we
solve a problem that has resisted ordinary analysis (Ohls-
son 2011, p. 87). There are some parallels between insight
and intuition (Sadler-Smith 2007, chap. 3), and ordinary
language does not always distinguish the ideas clearly, but
here insight refers just to the solution of problems that have
confronted individuals with some cognitive impasse, some
sort of puzzle they have previously been unable to solve.
They are problems that need creative imagination, the sorts
of problems which in ethical matters demand moral
imagination (Johnson 1993; Werhane 1999). Ohlsson
contrasts analytical thinking with the sort of process that
leads to insight (Ohlsson 2011, pp. 6061). Like other
forms of hypothetical thinking, the cognitive process that
results in creative insight explores implications of a single
set of premisses, but after continued impasse moves to
consider alternative possibilities (Ohlsson 2011,
pp. 102107). The way forward for someone who has ar-
rived at an impasse in efforts to solve a problem is to reach
back to find a different starting point, rather than just
continuing to apply the same analytical processes.
Intuition, Analysis and Reflection in Business Ethics
Accounts like these by Stanovich and by Ohlsson seem
consistent with distinguishing analysis from more reflective
thinking: they at least suggest a distinction between two
sorts of processes that are importantly different, and in
particular may be importantly different for ethical judg-
ment and decision. It seems clear that there is developing
work that can help to make sense of a distinction between
analytical reasoning and reflective thought, broadly along
the lines that analysis consists of focussed, step-by-step
reasoning about a single possibility, whereas reflection
considers new, alternative possibilities to be examined.
Such work can be linked to dual-process accounts of
mental functioning that can also allow intuitive judgment
to be distinguished from analysis and from reflection.
The Relevance to Business Ethics
Intuition, analysis and reflection are all relevant to busi-
ness, and each can have a place in business ethics judgment
and decision-making. But are they any more relevant here
than elsewhere? In fact, there are some characteristics of
the business environment that can make it especially im-
portant to see how the three forms of cognitive processing
can complement one another.
Earlier, we made particular note of the different ap-
proaches to intuition represented by Kahneman, by Klein and
by Haidt. The first concentrates on the experimental work
that demonstrates hard-wired System 1 tendencies to use
cognitive heuristics; the second is developed from natural-
istic studies that show how individuals can develop good
intuitive judgment from appropriate experience and feed-
back; while the third emphasises the extent to which intuitive
moral judgments emerge from basic emotional responses
like shame and disgust. However, Haidt and colleagues
Social Intuitionist Model also incorporates the point that
System 2 reasoning is important as a part of social interaction
that can modify and improve ethical judgments (Haidt and
Bjorklund 2008a, p. 181). Now, we have seen also that
System 2 style reasoning can be reflective or analytical. A
number of those various points play complementary roles in
understanding and managing business ethics judgment and
decision-making. Intuitive judgments can be as misleading
in business ethics as they can be elsewhere. The initial case
where Max erred in seeing evidence of discrimination is one
sort of example. On the other hand, with experience man-
agers can develop intuitive ethical expertise. But develop-
ment of sound intuitive judgment through experience
requires appropriate feedback. Often, that needs to be ob-
tained through social interaction based on sound analysis and
reflection. The interplay amongst all these processes emer-
ges from the sorts of organisational and institutional settings
in which business is conducted.
11
Examples of Business Ethics Problems
The characteristic of business that allows social exchange
and feedback to build good intuitive judgment is its com-
plex institutional environment. Individuals have specific
roles to play, in a social context governed by a mixture of
formal rules, informal conventions and personal relation-
ships. Some moral demands are quite general, and the same
as elsewhere, but others are more specific to the environ-
ment. Consider these examples:
a firm faces the prospect of bankruptcy, and directors
have to decide whether it is ethical to rearrange
company affairs in a way that will disadvantage some
creditors but maintain the company as a going concern;
the director of a company is invited to serve on a
government committee, and has to decide whether
membership of the committee would involve her in a
conflict of interest;
a middle-level manager finds evidence that suggests to
him that a product sold by his firm may pose a risk to
consumer safety, and when other managers have an
opposed view to his, has to decide whether to disclose
the matter publicly.
Examples like these suggest limitations of the Social In-
tuitionist Models claim that most moral judgments are im-
pelled by intuitive emotional responses like disgust and
shame. It is easy to accept that our judgments about incest or
eating a pet dog are prompted by emotional reactions and
subsequently rationalised, but situations like those mentioned
above are distinguished by their complex organisational and
institutional environments. Someone unfamiliar with the
context and institutional structures of the cases may barely
understand the issues that arise, let alone have judgment dri-
ven by an intuitive emotional response. A good deal of our
moral judgment about such cases revolves around interpreting
the situations in the first place. To understand them, we have to
know about details of the institutional framework, about
peoples roles and the specific conventions and rules that
shape others expectations, on which people base their deci-
sions and actions. These factors distinguish such situations
from many others that call for moral judgment.
In particular, the complexity of such environments em-
phasises the need for complementary intuition, analysis and
reflection. Even in a small organisation in a stable envi-
ronment, unaided analytical thinking would be thwarted by
the number of possibilities it would have to deal with, as
each individual would need to take account of other indi-
viduals possible perceptions, expectations, and reactions:
a combinatorial explosion (Ohlsson 2011, p. 64). Choice
of possibilities to consider has to emerge from knowledge
and experience of such contexts: the choice constitutes
the memory systems best guess as to what knowledge is
123
12
relevant for the problem at hand (Ohlsson 2011, p. 99).
Sometimes we may call on memories of scripts that tell
us what to expect of people in specific situations, and
which set out peoples role requirements (Witteman and
van Geenen 2009, p. 47; Provis 2012, chap. 3). However,
undue focus on role prescriptions can be the kind of ana-
lytical thought Stanovich argues to be defective in the
absence of reflection (Stanovich 2011, p. 65). It is a type of
compartmentalization that shows cognitive and moral
shortcomings (Sadler-Smith 2012, p. 364).
In their complexity, these situations resemble the cases
studied by Klein and his colleagues. As in development of
many sorts of expertise, development of good intuitive
judgment in situations of this type requires substantial ex-
perience, but experience alone is not enough: if subsequent
judgments are to become better, the experience needs to in-
clude feedback. This feedback needs to be accurate, diag-
nostic, and reasonably timely (Phillips et al. 2004, p. 306).
But what form can such feedback take in business ethics?
In complex institutional settings, appropriate feedback
does not emerge from success or failure so straightfor-
wardly as in many other contexts. The novice chess player
who gobbles up an offered pawn soon experiences the ig-
nominy of rapid checkmate, and learns accordingly. Man-
agers who make poor ethical judgments sometimes get
quick, vivid feedback, but more often outcomes of actions
are slow to develop, and frequently are contestable in their
interpretation. Very often, it is easier to maintain a view
that an action was ethical than that it was profitable. If
others disagree, we can tell ourselves that in such matters
our judgment is simply better than theirs. In ethics, more
than in many other areas, we can maintain belief in our
own superior judgment. We are subject to confirmation
bias, in its various forms: our tendency to seek or interpret
evidence in ways that are consistent with our pre-existing
beliefs or ideas (Nickerson 1998).
Here, the Social Intuitionist Model shows one of its
strengths and offers assistance. As individuals, we tend to
maintain belief in the soundness of our judgments and
decisions, but in social contexts we have to give accounts
to others and expose ourselves to their views: when you
put flawed reasoners together into a social group good
reasoning can emerge, because each persons confirmation
bias is challenged by others (Haidt 2013, p. 288). In
general, individuals are very much aware of group norms,
and very attentive to others judgments, evaluations and
actions (Haidt 2001, p. 819, 2007, p. 9991000; Sadler-
Smith 2012, p. 361). This does not only happen in business,
of course, but in business such social interaction is a key
source of feedback. Often, it uses language, and that
enormously increases its scope. When we can define and
use terms like conflict of interest can we develop the
sorts of norms and judgments that are important in modern
123
C. Provis
business, and then can we exchange feedback that is ac-
curate, diagnostic, and reasonably timely.
Intuition, Reflection and Analysis
Language does not only function to allow interpersonal
communication about such complex institutional environ-
ments. It is also crucial for intrapersonal processes of ana-
lysis and reflection. It may be that social use of language is
evolutionarily primary, and that human cognition then be-
came able to use it for individual analysis and reflection
(Stanovich 2011, pp. 9192), but in any event it seems clear
that language can facilitate such thinking (Stanovich 2011,
p. 50). Intrapersonal thought is then able to rehearse the
language that might be used for interpersonal persuasion or
accounting. Once intrapersonal processes of analysis and
reflection are established, we can then see how they may
affect and be affected by interpersonal processes of social
exchange. We analyse issues and reflect on them, and then
expose our judgments to social feedback, either through
discussion or when we implement our decisions. Then the
three processes of intuition, analysis and reflection can build
on and develop one another.
Thus, for example, in the cases envisaged above about a
prospect of bankruptcy or a possible conflict of interest,
analytical reasoning may be very important. Only by
carefully thinking through the effects of a possible rear-
rangement would it be possible to come to any ethical
conclusion. A failure of analysis might cause great harm or
unfairness. The analysis will have to be based on extensive,
sophisticated understanding of business processes and
structures, but the details will also need to be worked
through carefully. In considering a putative conflict of in-
terest, the director will not only have to understand the idea
of a conflict of interest and how it might possibly apply in
this case; she will also have to carefully analyse the details
of her role as a director and the functions of the committee.
Some reflection may be necessary to consider different
possibilities, but analytical thinking will be dominant.
On the other hand, in the third case, reflection may be
paramount. The manager needs to step back and consider
the implications of various alternatives. In doing so, he
may use his imagination to consider a hypothetical future
where he acts in one way, and contrast it with an alternative
where he acts in a different way. Some analysis may be
necessary to see the likely effects of the different alterna-
tives, but reflective thinking will be dominant.
When the individuals make their decisions, they will be
confronted with the outcomes. Those outcomes may in-
clude social feedback, which will confirm or disconfirm
their judgment. Over time, from such decisions and feed-
back, they will be able to develop better intuitive judgment.
But that development may not be fostered solely by social
Intuition, Analysis and Reflection in Business Ethics
feedback. It may also be important for them to analyse or
reflect on what transpired. Part of the process of developing
intuitive expertise identified by Klein is individuals en-
riching their experiences by reviewing prior experiences to
derive new insights and lessons from mistakes (Phillips
et al. 2004, p. 306). Retrospective analysis and reflection
can lead to neural restructuring, just as social feedback can
(Reynolds 2006). As Reynolds comments, anyone who
has lain awake at night contemplating the experiences of
the previous day knows that retrospection is a key com-
ponent of the ethical experience (Reynolds 2006, p. 742).
Typically, such retrospection will involve both reflection
and analysis. In reflecting, our hypothetical thinking ima-
gines different possibilities, what might have happened or
how we might have felt if we had acted differently. In
analysing, we not only have to work out the likely effects
of different courses of action, but also the explanations for
what we actually did and what actually happened.
Both individual analysis and reflection, on one hand, and
social discussion and feedback, on the other hand, are im-
portant for developing intuitive ethical expertise in business.
By seeing the ways that intuition, analysis and reflection
may interact, we can also see what conditions may inhibit or
enhance the development of good ethical judgment. They
will be like processes of developing intuitive expertise in
general, but in an environment where social feedback is
especially important. Social feedback can be added to our
memory store, to be called on again in future (Baddeley
et al. 2009, p. 11). Social feedback is important partly be-
cause it leads us to imagine possible feedback as we reflect
on possible courses of action: hence, such techniques as
encouraging ourselves to imagine how we would feel if an
action was described to one of our parents, or reported on
the front page of the newspaper (e.g. Trevino and Nelson
2007, p. 108). That is just one amongst a number of tech-
niques that experimental research has identified as effective
in managing ones cognitive processes and overcoming
ones first impulse, and with experience we can develop
others as well (Patterson et al. 2012, p. 2).
Social feedback is important in developing reflective
awareness. On the other hand, the converse may also be
true: reflective awareness may be important to sustain the
social interactions that provide feedback. Comparing au-
tomatic, unconscious, System 1 sorts of processes in social
cognition with more explicit processes, Frith and Frith say
We suggest a particular role for explicit processes in
fostering social interactions, which may be unique to
humans. These processes are characterized not sim-
ply by awareness but also by reflective awareness.
(2012, p. 301).
Just as hypothetical thinking involves cognitive decoupling,
they suggest that reflective discussion involves mental
13
decoupling, focussing on our mental representations them-
selves rather than simply using them as a basis for further
thought, and that then reflective discussions enable us to
compare our views of the world and to create improved
shared views of the world (2012, p. 304). Such improved
views can be about the physical world, but in the present
context what is most important is that they may be
improvements in our understanding of others desires,
beliefs and intentions. In complex institutional settings, this
is a key to developed understanding of roles and relation-
ships, and the improved understanding becomes part of our
knowledge base for future judgments and decisions. Ulti-
mately, over time, individuals will develop intuitive judg-
ment about many situations that earlier would have required
System 2 processing of deliberate analysis and reflection.
The process is not inevitable. Phillips and colleagues
emphasise that individuals motivation is important for
their development of intuitive expertise (2004, p. 306), and
Ohlsson emphasises that effort is important for the sort of
reflective thinking that solves insight problems: deciding
to search is a major determinant of the probability of
finding (2011, p. 386). Individuals characteristics will
include their abilities and dispositions to engage in analysis
and reflection. At the same time, social environments will
sometimes be more likely and sometimes be less likely to
foster worthwhile feedback. In organisations, there are
enormous pressures for conformity and compliance, and on
many occasions organisational culture may inhibit open
exchange or ethical reflection. But knowing more about the
processes involved can help us to promote and manage
good ethical judgment and decision. Behnam and Rasche
(2009) point out similarities between ethical reflection and
business strategising. Perhaps the clearest and most fun-
damental similarity is that each is a process that may be
neglected, but can be deliberately embarked upon. In dis-
tinguishing amongst ethical reflection, analysis and intu-
ition and seeing how they interact, we are better equipped
to manage the processes involved. Such processes are not
always under deliberate control, but sometimes they are,
and the clearer we are about their nature, the better we are
able to exercise whatever control is possible.
Conclusion
Overall, an improved account of the distinction and rela-
tionships amongst intuition, analysis and reflection assists
moral development and ethical judgment, and does so
especially in business and in other similar contexts where
there is a complex institutional environment. To begin
with, it is important that there are differences between
different sorts of intuition. In many cases, intuitive ethical
judgments are more or less innate, based on fast and frugal
123
14
heuristics or on emotive responses, but in complex insti-
tutional environments, they can show expertise developed
through experience, both individual personal experience
and experience of social interaction and feedback from
others. However, these experience-based intuitive judg-
ments emerge partly from earlier analysis and reflection.
The analysis will include both working out implications of
possible actions in the complex environment, and ethical
evaluation of the outcomes. The reflection will involve
critical thinking about the starting points of analysis, and a
willingness to consider other possible starting points.
There are some implications for teaching business ethics.
Some established practices using case studies and other
techniques may be refined if we have a clearer idea of the
different processes by which we arrive at moral judgments,
and how those processes are related. In addition, however,
there are implications for ways of developing ethical be-
haviour within organisations. If we have a clearer idea of the
different sorts of processes that can bring us to ethical
judgments, we can better prepare ourselves as individuals,
and we can better work with others to develop our collective
ethical expertise.
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