FIRST DIVISION

Spouses JOSEPHINE G.R. No. 160762

MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Chairperson,
Ynares-Santiago,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
Promulgated:
LEONARDO YAMANE,
Respondent. May 3, 2006
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

roperty purchased by spouses during the existence of

P their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. This

presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence that the property is paraphernal. Conjugal
property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted
by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have
accrued to the conjugal partnership.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court, challenging the November 22, 2002

Decision[2] and the September 17, 2003 Resolution[3] of the Court

of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 60939. The assailed Decision

disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sheriffs Certificate
of Sale dated August 12, 1981 and the Final Sheriffs Certificate of
Sale dated August 26, 1982 are declared NULL and VOID.[4]

The CA denied reconsideration in its September 17,

2003 Resolution.

The Facts

The undisputed factual findings of the CA are as follows:

 Involved in the suit is a 750 square meters (sic) parcel of lot
located at Res. Sec. K, Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel
Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane, [respondent] herein,
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12491.

As a result of a motion for execution of a charging lien filed by Atty.

Guillermo F. De Guzman in Civil Case No. 1841, entitled Florence
Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel Pucay Yamane v.
Cypress Corporation, which said counsel handled for the plaintiffs
therein, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Pucay sisters, the
subject property was levied to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees in the
amount of P10,000. The said property was scheduled to be sold at
public auction on August 11, 1981.

Four days prior to the auction sale, [respondent] filed a Third-Party

Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff to stop the public auction
on the ground that the subject property is conjugal property and,
therefore, should not be held answerable for the personal obligation
of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction
sale despite [respondents] protest. The subject property was sold to
spouses Josephine [and] Henry Go (or [petitioners]) as highest
bidder. No redemption having been made during the one-year period,
a Final Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was eventually issued on August
26, 1982 conveying and transferring the said property to [petitioners].

On September 4, 1984, [respondent] filed a Complaint with

the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, docketed as Civil Case No.
417-R, against [petitioners] and Sheriff Melgar for annulment and
cancellation of auction sale upon the same ground stated in the
abovementioned third-party claim. Citing the Order of
theRegional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch V in LRC Case No.
2288, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. 12491 and directed
the Register of Deeds to issue new title in the name of Josephine Go
x x x, [petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. In the Order dated November 28, 1984, the motion was
denied by the trial court.

In their Answer filed on December 10, 1984, [petitioners] denied

the material allegations of the complaint and interposed the following
special affirmative defenses: that the cause of action was barred by
prior judgment; that [respondent] has not pursued any lawful remedy
to annul the execution proceeding; that there is no flaw or irregularity
in the auction sale; and that since the execution sale was made in
 accordance with Section 21, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, it
is deemed final and any irregularity committed in the course thereof
will not vitiate its validity.

On December 28, 1984, Muriel likewise lodged a Complaint for

Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 505-R, against [petitioners] and
Atty. Guillermo De Guzman alleging, in gist, fraud, misrepresentation,
manipulation and unlawful acts of the defendants in causing the levy
of the subject property with an estimated commercial value
of P200,000 as against a charging lien in the amount of P10,000.

In its May 27, 1985 Order, the trial court ordered the joint
hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 417-R and 505-R. On August 30, 1985,
Muriel was declared non-suited for failure to appear in the hearing
despite due notice. As a consequence, Civil Case No. 505-R was
dismissed on October 15, 1985.[5]

In its Decision[6] dated March 25, 1998, the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 4, held that the subject parcel
of land was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay
Yamane -- spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal
property. The appearance of his name on the Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) was deemed to be merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner, his late wife. Hence, finding that he
had no legal standing to question the auction sale or to pray for its
annulment or cancellation, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of
merit.

Upon receipt of the RTC Decision on April 8, 1998,

respondent filed a Motion,[7] in which he prayed that he be allowed
to file his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision, on or
before May 30, 1998. The trial court granted[8] his Motion; received
the Motion for Reconsideration,[9] which was filed on May 28, 1998;
and eventually denied it in its Order dated June 5, 1998.[10] He then
elevated the matter to the CA on June 15, 1998.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA reversed the RTCs Decision. The Sheriffs Certificate

of Sale dated August 12, 1981, and the Final Sheriffs Certificate of

Sale dated August 26, 1982, were declared null and void.

According to the appellate court, property acquired during

marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the exclusive funds of

one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose. That the

land was acquired during the spouses coverture was sufficiently

established by the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale, both

indicating that Muriel Pucay Yamane was married to Leonardo

Yamane; and by the undisputed testimony of the previous owner,

Eugene Pucay. Because of petitioners failure to establish that the

land in question had been acquired by Muriel using her exclusive
funds, the CA concluded that the contested land was conjugal

property.

The appellate court further held thus:

x x x [T]he disputed property being a conjugal property of [respondent]
and his wife, and absent any showing of some advantage or benefit
that accrued to their conjugal partnership from the transaction
between the Pucay sisters and Atty. De Guzman, the public auction
sale of the subject property in favor of [petitioners] is null and void.[11]

Hence, this Petition.[12]

Issues

Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:

I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the
appeal and in not dismissing the same, despite the fact that the
respondent failed to perfect his appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period set by the Rules of Court.

II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring the subject property
as conjugal property, despite the existence of clear evidence
showing that the subject property is the exclusive paraphernal
property of Muriel who, even during her lifetime, always claimed
the said property as her own exclusive paraphernal property
and not as property co-owned with her husband, the
respondent herein.
 III. The Court of Appeals, assuming, ex grati argumenti, that the
subject property is conjugal property between respondent and
Muriel, gravely erred in ruling that the same cannot answer for
the charging lien of Atty. Guillermo de Guzman in Civil Case
No. 1841.[13]

In the main, they posit two issues. They raise, first, the
procedural question of whether the CA erred in giving due course
to respondents lapsed appeal; and,second, the substantive issue
of whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Procedural Issue:
Whether Respondents Appeal
Should Be Given Due Course

Petitioners contend that the CA erred in giving due course to the

appeal filed by respondent beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
 Concededly, he received a copy of the RTC Decision on April
8, 1998. He had, therefore, until April 23, 1998, within which to file
an appeal. Prior to the latter date, however, he moved that his new
counsel be allowed to file a motion for reconsideration on May 30,
1998. It was eventually filed on May 28, 1998, but was
denied. Respondent subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal on June
15, 1998. By this time, the original period to appeal had expired. It
should be clear that the Rules prohibit an extension to file a motion
for reconsideration.[14]

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period

prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure is not only mandatory,
but also jurisdictional; and the lapse of the appeal period of fifteen
days deprives a court of the jurisdiction to alter a final judgment.[15]

There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court

dispensed with technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy
appeals. In some of those instances,the presence of any justifying
circumstance recognized by law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence -- properly vested the judge with discretion
to approve or admit an appeal filed out of time.[16] In other
instances, lapsed appeals were allowed in order to serve
substantial justice, upon consideration of a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; c) the merits of the case; d) causes not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence
of the party that would be favored by the suspension of the rules;
e) the failure to show that the review being sought was merely
frivolous and dilatory; and f) the fact that the other party would not
be unjustly prejudiced.[17]

Indeed, in some exceptional cases, the Court has allowed the

relaxation of the rules regulating the reglementary periods of
appeal. These exceptions were cited inManila Memorial Park
Cemetery v. CA,[18] from which we quote:

In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four days
in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision
of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time
when her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could
only file the appeal four days after the prescribed reglementary period
was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the
perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days
to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to
lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had
since then been devoted for public purposes. In Olacao vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been
judicially settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of
the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered
twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.[19]
 We believe that a suspension of the Rules is similarly
warranted in the present controversy. We have carefully studied
the merits of the case and noted that the review being sought has
not been shown to be merely frivolous and dilatory. The Court has
come to the conclusion that the Decision of the RTC, Branch 4 (in
Civil Case No. 417-R), must be set aside. It would be far better and
more prudent to attain the ends of justice, rather than to dispose of
the case on technicality and cause grave injustice in the
process. Thus, we would rather excuse a technical lapse and afford
respondent a review of the case on appeal.

Substantive Issue:
Paraphernal or Conjugal?

The purchase of the property had been concluded in 1967,

before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988.[20] Accordingly, the transaction was aptly covered by the then
governing provisions of the New Civil Code. On the latter basis,
therefore, we shall resolve the issue of the nature of the
contested property.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.[21] As a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article
in favor of the conjugal partnership,[22] the party who invokes the
presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage.[23]

In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does

not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to
be conjugal was acquired.[24] Moreover, the presumption may be
rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing
evidence.[25] There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership
of one of the spouses,[26] and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.[27]

The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land

belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and
Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from Eugene Pucay
on February 27, 1967,[28] or specifically during the marriage.[29] We
then follow the rule that proof of the acquisition of the subject
property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative. It is clear enough that the presently
disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership.

Petitioners concede that the property was acquired during the

subsistence of the marriage of Muriel to
respondent.[30] Nonetheless, they insist that it belonged exclusively
to her for the following reasons:

First. Respondent never denied nor opposed her claim in Civil

Case No. 505-R, which she had filed during her lifetime; or in AG-
GR Sp. No. 01616 (entitledMuriel Pucay Yamane v. Josephine
Go), that the disputed parcel of land was her exclusive paraphernal
property. They allege that his failure to file a denial or opposition in
those cases is tantamount to a judicial admission that militates
against his belated claim.

Second. The Deed of Absolute Sale of the property is in the sole

name of Muriel. Petitioners posit that, had the spouses jointly
purchased this piece of land, the document should have indicated
this fact or carried the name of respondent as buyer.
Third. The failure of respondent to redeem the parcel of land within
the redemption period after the auction sale indicated that he was
not its co-owner.

We will discuss the three arguments seriatim.

Unilateral Declaration

Respondents interest cannot be prejudiced by the claim of Muriel

in her Complaint in Civil Case No. 505-R that the subject parcel of
land was her paraphernal property. Significantly, the nature of a
property -- whether conjugal or paraphernal -- is determined by law
and not by the will of one of the spouses.[31] Thus, no unilateral
declaration by one spouse can change the character of a conjugal
property.[32]

Besides, the issue presented in Civil Case No. 505-R was not the
nature of the subject piece of land being levied upon,
but whether Atty. Guillermo de Guzman was entitled to a charging
lien. In that case, Muriel claimed that she had not officially retained
him as counsel, and that no lawyer-client relationship had been
established between them.[33]

Deed and Title in the

Name of One Spouse

Further, the mere registration of a property in the name of one

spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.[34] Hence, it cannot be
contended in the present case that, simply because the title and
the Deed of Sale covering the parcel of land were in the name of
Muriel alone, it was therefore her personal and exclusive
property. In
concluding that it was paraphernal, the trial courts reliance
on Stuart v. Yatco[35] was clearly erroneous.

As stated earlier, to rebut the presumption of the conjugal nature of

the property, petitioners must present clear and convincing
evidence. We affirm and quote below, for easy reference, the
relevant dispositions of the CA:
x x x. We are unable to go along with [petitioners] contention that the
subject property was acquired by Muriel with her exclusive
funds. Mere registration of the contested property in the name of the
wife is not sufficient to establish the paraphernal nature of the
property. This reminds Us of the teaching in the recent case of Diancin
 v. Court of Appeals, that all the property acquired by the spouses,
regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains,
unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife. To quote:

As a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses,

regardless of in whose name the same is registered, during
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In the case at bar,
the fishpond lease right is not paraphernal having been
acquired during the coverture of the marriage between
Matilde and Tiburcio, which was on April 9, 1940. The fact that
the grant was solely in the name of Matilde did not make the
property paraphernal property. What was material was the
time the fishpond lease right was acquired by the grantee, and
that was during the lawful existence of Matildes marriage to
Tiburcio.
x x x [T]his presumption is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proving that the
property belongs exclusively to the wife rests upon the party
asserting
it. Mere assertion of the propertys paraphernal nature is not
sufficient.

The record as well as the foregoing established jurisprudence lead us

to conclude that the contested property was indeed acquired during
the marriage of herein [respondent] and Muriel. To prove that it is
nonetheless paraphernal property, it is incumbent upon [petitioners]
to adduce strong, clear and convincing evidence that Muriel bought
the same with her exclusive funds. [Petitioners] failed to discharge the
burden. Nowhere in the evidence presented by them do We find any
indication that the land in question was acquired by Muriel with her
exclusive funds. The presumption not having been overthrown, the
conclusion is that the contested land is conjugal property.[36]

Non-Redemption
After the Auction Sale
The non-redemption of the property by respondent within the
period prescribed by law did not, in any way, indicate the absence
of his right or title to it.Contrary to petitioners allegation, the fact is
that he filed a Third-Party Claim[37] with the sheriff, upon learning of
the levy and impending auction sale. This fact was specifically
admitted by petitioners.[38] Respondent claimed that the parcel of
land was conjugal, and that he could not answer for the separate
obligation of his wife and her sisters.[39] Notwithstanding his claim,
the disputed piece of land was sold at a public auction on August
11, 1981. Consequently issued were a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale
dated August 12, 1981, and a Final Sheriffs Certificate of Sale
dated August 26, 1982.[40]

Likewise, in his Opposition (Answer) to the Petition in LRC File

Adm. Case No. 2288,[41] respondent raised the issue of the
conjugal nature of the property and reserved his right to file an
independent action to annul the auction sale. In its March 30, 1983
Order,[42] however, Branch 5 of the RTC of Baguio City did not rule
on either the actual ownership or the nature of the parcel of
land. Rather, it granted the Petition to issue a new certificate of title
in favor of Petitioner Josephine Mendoza Go. It found that, under
Section 75 of Presidential Decree 1529, respondent had no legal
standing to question the auction sale, because he was not the
registered owner of the property. Instead, his right to prove his
claim in a separate and independent action was upheld.[43] Thus,
he instituted the present case for annulment and cancellation of the
auction sale.
The foregoing points clearly explain the failure of respondent to
redeem the property. Misplaced is petitioners emphasis on his
failure to do so within the period required by law, because
redemption in this case would have been inconsistent with his claim
that the sale was invalid.[44] Redemption would have served as an
implied admission of the regularity of the sale and estopped him
from later impugning its validity on that ground.[45]

Since petitioners have failed to present convincing evidence that

the property is paraphernal, the presumption that it is conjugal
therefore stands. The next question before us is, whether the
charging lien of Atty. de Guzman may be properly enforced against
the piece of land in question.
Charging Lien Not Chargeable
Against Conjugal Property

It is indisputable that the services of Atty. de Guzman were

acquired during the marriage of respondent and Muriel. The
lawyers legal services were engaged to recover from Cypress
Corporation (in Civil Case No. 1841) the balance of the purchase
price of the sale of the exclusive property of Muriel and her
sisters.[46]The recovery was done during the marriage.[47]

The CA elucidated on this matter as follows:

x x x. The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the

Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for the exclusive interest
of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for her exclusive interest when
she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to
handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were
incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters private and
exclusive interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly
cannot be charged against the contested conjugal property.

Even on the remote assumption that the conjugal property could be

held liable, levy on execution of the same property should still be
denied in accordance with the ruling in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De
Garcia that before a conjugal property could be held liable for the
obligation contracted by a spouse, there must be a showing of some
advantage or benefit that accrued to the conjugal
partnership. Concededly, the burden is on the [petitioners] to prove
that the services rendered by Atty. De Guzman in handling Civil Case
No. 1841 for the Pucay sisters had, somehow, redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of herein [respondent] and
Muriel. This onus, [petitioners], however, failed to discharge.[48]
We find no reason to deviate from the CAs findings, which are
amply supported by evidence. The expenses incurred by Muriel for
the recovery of the balance of the purchase price of her
paraphernal property are her exclusive responsibility.[49] This piece
of land may not be used to pay for her indebtedness, because her
obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership.[50] Moreover, her rights to the property are
merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Under the New Civil Code, a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the
support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose
upon her husbands failure to deliver the needed sum;[51] when
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife
by the courts[52] or by the husband;[53] or when the wife gives
moderate donations for charity.[54] Failure to establish any of these
circumstances in the present case means that the conjugal asset
may not be bound to answer for Muriels personal obligation.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone.[55] In this case, therefore, the property -- being conjugal in
nature -- cannot be levied upon.[56]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision

and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.