SandiganBayans Jurisdiction over Estafa case.
SUPREME COURT RULING
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutionsof the
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the
information and her motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending
on December 31, 2000. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and
relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation,
Inc. (OSRFI).One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall Annex. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall
Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property
with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to
the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over
her person, in her capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners motion for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied with finality.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa
case?
(2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
HELD
(1) NO.
DOCTRINE: Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan reads: Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed
with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
RATIONALE:(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd
conclusion. Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded
by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the
legislature. Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials
in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
office.
(2) NO.
DOCTRINE: While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
RATIONALE: Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if
she does not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed thereby express provision of
law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan
with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a
board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over forfeiture case.
G.R. No. 170122-171381 October 12, 2009

CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus
FACTS
The Office of the Ombudsman filed for a petition for the forfeiture of the
properties amounting to PhP143,052,015.29 allegedly amassed by then Maj. Gen.
Carlos Garcia, his wife Clarita and two children, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193
(Forfeiture Case 1). Another forfeiture case was subsequently filed to recover
funds amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55 docketed as Civil Case No. 0196
(Forfeiture Case 2), raffled to the 4th Division.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the
OMB charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder)
which placed the value of the property and funds plundered at PhP
303,272,005.99, docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, raffled to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As per the Sheriffs return, the corresponding summons involving Forfeiture 1
were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. The SB
subsequently issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic. The Garcias
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of SBs lack of jurisdiction over separate
civil actions for forfeiture. The SB denied the Motion to Dismiss and declared the
Garcias in default. Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the
transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were
respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such
consolidation is mandatory under RA 8249. This motion was denied by the SB.
The Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter
alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th
Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the consolidation is
imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements. The SB
merely noted the motion.
As regards Forfeiture 2, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his
return, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian
of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The
general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those pertaining to the other
respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the same, but with the
following qualifying note: Im receiving the copies of Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan
Paolo & Timothy but these copies will not guarantee it being served to the
above-named(sic).
ISSUEs of the CASE
1. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner despite improper service of
summons.
2. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over the forfeiture case despite the filing of the
plunder case.
HELD
1. NO. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to
be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode
authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over a person. It is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II
were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the
PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his
signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both
Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen.
Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of
summons were invalid for being irregular and defective. The requirements for a
valid substituted service of summons are:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service
(2) Specific details in the return
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion
residing at defendants house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of
defendants office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of
summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through
Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned
above for a valid substituted service of summons.
Also, petitioners special appearance to question the courts jurisdiction is not
voluntary appearance. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, together with other grounds raised
therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court.
2. YES, Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by
the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the
civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption
being that the forfeiture cases are the corresponding civil action for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20,
2005 resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the
commission of a criminal offense as such liability is based on a statute that
safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties.
Secondly, a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate
and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of
plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a
prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the
criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. On the other
hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under
RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondents properties to his legitimate income,
it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis--vis of the RTC
G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J.
ARNEL ESCOBAL
vs.
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan,
xxx, Hon. David C. Naval, RTC Judge
Nature of the case: petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
FACTS:
Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the
Philippine Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine
National Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance
operations on drug trafficking at a caf bar and restaurant in Naga City when he
somehow got involved with a shooting incident that resulted to the death of
Rodney Nueca.
Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information
alleging that the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving PNP members and officers. RTC denied the motion.
Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented his
evidence. On July 20, 1994, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case.
Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he
committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed the motion but ordered
the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime
charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of
the PNP.
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner
committed the crime charged while not in the performance of his official function.
The trial court added that nonetheless, upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the
issue had become moot and academic since the amendatory law transferred the
jurisdiction over the offense charged from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The
petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section
4(a)(1), (3) thereof.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information
pursuant to the ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975, and to include
therein an allegation that the offense charged was not committed by the petitioner
in the performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony
and those of his witnesses, the offense charged was committed by him in relation
to his official functions. He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on
March 30, 1995, could not be applied retroactively.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to
allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably
to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that
the latter has jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC
HELD:
The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 .
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over
crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that
the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of the offender and the
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. It is not enough to
merely allege in the Information that the crime charged was committed by the
offender in relation to his office because that would be a conclusion of law. The
amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not contain
any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge
of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on
November 24, 1995, it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include
therein an allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in relation to office.
The trial court erred when it ordered the elevation of the records to the
Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606
was already in effect.
Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in
relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below
"27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may
be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a
Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide
punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively
has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural
law, which may be applied retroactively.
 various contracts awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (SB) Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy
I. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
b. Who committed the offense/crime Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a
b-1. Private individuals committing the offense/crime with public officers complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for
alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who
PEOPLE vs. GO was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
vs.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict,
HENRY T. GO, Respondent
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While
GR No. 168539 there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding
March 25, 2014 probable cause.
Ponente: Peralta The Sandiganbayan issued an Order giving the prosecution 10 days to show cause
why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused considering the accused is a private person and the public official
(Enrile), his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in the
case.
NATURE OF CASE
The prosecution complied with the order contending that SB has already acquired
Petition for Review on Certiorari jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance and posting for bail. They also argued that SB has exclusive
jurisdiction even if he is a private person because he was alleged to have
conspired with a public officer.
BRIEF
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash contending that, independently of the
This is an appeal from the Resolution of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan
deceased Secretary Enrile, the respondent, who is not a public officer nor was
(SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein
capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
prosecuted for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019).
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The SB though a Resolution granted the Motion to Quash. Hence, the petition.
FACTS
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the
Whether or not herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for
conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with
whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case
involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government.
More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain
public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers.

Sandiganbayan: A Resolution was issued granting the Respondents Motion To
Quash the Information, thereby dismissing the case.
Supreme Court: The Resolution of the SB was reversed and set aside.
COURT RATIONALE
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated June 2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting
in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable
for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the
avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous
cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public
officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does
not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer
be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death
did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to
have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require
that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer.
If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be charged in court,
as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person
may be indicted alone.
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (SB) During petitioners term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of
AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in
Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction General Santos City for development as housing projects.
Offenses Committed in Relation to the Office
AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-
fact of the 12 individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over
the subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner
RAMISCAL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors.
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAl, JR., Petitioner
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same
vs. property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00
per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents meter.
GR No. 172476-99 Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral
September 15, 2010 deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
Ponente: Carpio
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of
South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a
complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1)
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
NATURE OF CASE Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds or property through
falsification of public documents.
Special Civic Action for Certiorari
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsmanfound petitioner probably guilty
BRIEF of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to annul the 5 April 2006
Resolution of the SB (4th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed The Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of
Resolution denied petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment on 26 February Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations for falsification of public documents
2006 pending resolution of his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans against petitioner and several other co-accused.
finding of probable cause against him.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be
FACTS excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-
OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various
Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General. when he served as agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property.
President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to
the Office of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). The OMB-Military
adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of
petitioners name from the information. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio
approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the
recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioners first motion for
reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. It found that
petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell,
bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the
purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of
prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign ignorance of the execution of
the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase price of P3,000.00
per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed
for petitioners continued prosecution.
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the
panel of prosecutors.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioners second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him was a
prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or
evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of the case.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
Sandiganbayan: This court denied the petitioners motion to set aside his
arraignment
Supreme Court: This Court affirmed the assailed Resolution of the the
Sandiganbayan
COURT RATIONALE
The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy
termination of the case.36There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on
its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate
dispatch.
This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsmans finding of
probable cause. The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal
complaints.
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case
has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the
Ombudsman, which has full control of the case.
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion
when power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount
to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it.
The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy
termination of the case. There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on
its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate
dispatch.
We remind respondent to abide by this Courts ruling in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, where we stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not by itself merit a suspension of the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the Sandiganbayan. Section
7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied
petitioners motion to set aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately
executory. Costs against petitioner.
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (SB)
Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction
Offenses Committed in Relation to the Office
Exception: Libel / Written Defamation Cases

PEOPLE vs. BENIPAYO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING

CORPORATION, Petitioners
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent

GR No. 154473
April 24, 2009
Ponente: Nachura

NATURE OF CASE
Two Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari

BRIEF
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed
under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the
June 18, 2002 and the June 23, 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No.
155573 challenging the June 25, 2002 and the September 18, 2002 Orders of the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.
FACTS
Alfredo Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission of elections, was charged
with libel before the Office of the City Prosecutor by Photokina Marketing
Corporation, which felt alluded to in a speech made by Alfredo before the Bahay
Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, and in an television interview before
Point Blank, a show hosted by Ces Orena-Drilon at ANC.
The Office of the City Prosecutor, in both instances, filed Informations for libel
before the Regional Trial Court. In both instances, Alfredo moved for the
dismissal of the case, considering that at the time he made the alleged utterances,
he was an impeachable officer and the same was made in relation to his duties,
therefore, even assuming that he can be charged with libel, the same should be
lodged with the Sandiganbayan. In both instances, the RTC ruled in his favor, thus
Photokina elevated the case to the Supreme Court on question of law on whether
the utterances were made in relation to his office; and that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
Whether or not RTC has the jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all
other courts
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
Regional Trial Court: In both cases, this court dismissed the informations for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
Supreme Court: The consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are granted.
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are reinstated and remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
COURT RATIONALE
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and
decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the
action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article
360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is
explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the
court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx.
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is
echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao, where the Court further declared that jurisdiction
remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed "by similar
means," and despite the fact that the phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in
the latter portion of Article 360 of the RPC. In these cases, and in those that
followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded
jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases.
Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera, we explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which
categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the
Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law
is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the
provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws vesting
jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should
prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the
Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like RA 7691
does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled
principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a
special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment.
Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over
that granted by a general law on the MTC.
The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation
to public office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not
divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation
cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office.
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without
qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the
crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial
court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his
office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case,
is, following the above disquisition, gross error.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407
are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for further proceedings.
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-
intervenors.
FACTS:
In May 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved
in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent Canson of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 delos Reyes, a member of the (CIC) Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995
was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG. A panel of investigators was created
and headed by Deputy Ombudsman Blancaflor which absolved from any criminal
liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995
incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the panels
findings and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
Thus, on November 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson who headed the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) was among those
charged as principal in eleven (11) information for murder before the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same informations as accessories
after-in-the-fact.

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations
in March 1996 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One
of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations,
the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend that the
said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more
of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General)
or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has
the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by
Justice Demetriou, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and
ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher
Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the
cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and
some of the accused.
While these motion for considerations were pending resolution, House Bill No.
2299 10 and No. 1094 11 as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 were introduced in
Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically,
the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal
accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. These bills were
consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of
the Philippines on February 5, 1997
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14
denying the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it
"stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996." But on same day SB issued an
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 resolution considering the pertinent provisions
of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as
they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249,
including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval
hereof." And argue that the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake
such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975);
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate
pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the
law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention
be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong
Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers
which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
SC RULING:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten
wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986
(sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items
(a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in
relation to the office.
Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender; In
enacting Republic Act 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions DECISION:
of Presidential Decree 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of
the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby
Sandiganbayan.Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to other City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A.
8249] in relation to their office. The phrase other offenses or felonies is too
broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to
the accuseds official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the
same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the
accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or
accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the
public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase
committed in relation to public office does not appear in the information, which
only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to
qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable
FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO
R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON,
RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P.
LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities as members of
the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FACTS:
Mayor Antionio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, was among others, charged in
connection of the rape-slay of Mary Elieen Sarmena and the killing of Allan
Gomez of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide which was requested to be acted
upon by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the
petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in
Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993,
and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio
Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions
implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of
Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the
Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon arrival, and
after hearing a warrant of arrest was served. Mayor Sanhez was forthwith taken to
the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined. The
respondent prosecutors filed with RTC of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations
charging Mayor Sancehz among others, with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen
Sarmaneta. Aftrer several days, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the
accused, including Mayor Sanchez, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that
the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the
tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the
relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the accused. This Court
thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro
Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the
killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. On that same date, the
petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds
now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the
respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be
quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the
investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not
acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides
arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory
because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a
public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is direct relation between the commission of rape
with homicide and the petitioners office as municipal mayor
2. Whether or not the information is correct, wherein seven counts of
homicide was charged which arose from the death of only two persons.

SC RULING:
1. No.
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public
officials or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the
cases against them should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and
not of the regular courts. This contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall
discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned. Section 4,
paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, provides: Sec. 4.
Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: a) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2)
Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation
to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged
obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption
cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense
committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. In Montilla v. Hilario, this
Court described the offense committed in relation to the office as follows: [T]he
relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in
our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution,
the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without
the office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in
Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. Public office is not
of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide
whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his
office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased. But the use
or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance; its materiality arises, not from the allegations but on
the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the
manner of the commission of the crime.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with
homicide and the petitioners office as municipal mayor because public office is
not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand indepen
dently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the
commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance
of the petitioners official functions to make it fall under the exception laid down
in People v. Montejo.
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the
death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police
substation. The appearance of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the
prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from
representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation
to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not an
essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection
between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it
within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element
of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein,
according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they
had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed
it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy
S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor
of Basilan City.
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that
the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the
discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate
connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime,
being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the
Sandiganbayan.
 In the crime of Rape with Homicide, the Homicide partakes the element of force
2. Yes. and intimidation in rape. Hence, the crime of Rape and Homicide are not distinct
from each other. By virtue of this, it does not run afoul the rule on duplicity of
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: Sec. 13. Duplicity of suits, although there were only two counts of death in this case, each one who
offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in participated in the crime shall be charged with one count of Rape with Homicide
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses.Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and DECISION:
R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.The petitioner and his six co-
accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED
the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143,
Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch.
words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times,
with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of
the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and
thus silence Sarmenta.Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately
for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the
petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against
each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the
subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by
her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.It is of course absurd to suggest
that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the
informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is
thus hoist by his own petard.

This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:Thus,
where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed
on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many
crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.In effect, the presence
of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest
degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its
character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions
like a qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to
constitute a constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide
with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e. death.
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on
December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term and
discussed with the latter the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI)
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall.
President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation which the source of the funds was the Office of the
President.
However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The
succeeding student regent system-wide alliance of student councils, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of
the Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa.
Petitioner posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As
a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her
peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio
capacity. She addeed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary
as a student regent. Moreover she argued that in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or
funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since
it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to
receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official
functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case
of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.
The Ombudsman opposed the motion and the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners
motion for lack of merit
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged or over
her person, in her capacity as UP student regent
2. Whether the offense charged was committed in relation to public office
SC RULING:
1.Yes.
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in
fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not
only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No.
1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A)
covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
she is placed there by express provision of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed
out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-
stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.Moreover, it is well established that
compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.
2. Yes
The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Information. ON JURISDICTION (RTC / SPECIAL CYBERCRIME COURTS)
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner,
being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
DISINI JR VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D.
SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014
feloniously defraud the government x x x." Clearly, there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P.
based on this ground. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL AND ERNESTO SONIDO, JR.,
PETITIONERS, VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY
DECISION:
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE,
THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THE
DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
RESPONDENTS.

Brief

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act

(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The Facts and the Case

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using
his laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links
him to other computers and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he
needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the
general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and
read postings from them;
 Data;Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
Data;Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;Section 19 on
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;Section 20 on
banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, Obstruction of Justice;Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and
hospitals, and schools; and Coordinating Center (CICC); andSection 26(a) on CICCs Powers and
Functions.Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address
Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
or telephone.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating The Rulings of the Court
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order
into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the 1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
system.
Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of
The Issues Presented
unsolicited commercial communications; Section 12 that authorizes the
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time; and Section 19 of the
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block
cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their
access to suspected Computer Data.
commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down
and penalize violators. These provisions are:
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;Section 4(a)(3) on Data Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without
Interference;Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;Section 4(b)(3) on right;Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including
Identity Theft;Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;Section 4(c)(2) on Child transmission of viruses;Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or
Pornography;Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of
Communications;Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;Section 5 on Aiding or others;Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of
Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;Section 6 on identifying information belonging to another;Section 4(c)(1) that
the Penalty of One Degree Higher;Section 7 on the Prosecution under penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;Section 8 on activity for favor or consideration;Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the
Penalties;Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;Section 13 production of child pornography;Section 6 that imposes penalties one
on Preservation of Computer Data;Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer degree higher when crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are
 committed with the use of information and communications The suspects arrest would then lead to a trial that, depending on the suspects
conviction or acquittal, could then go through the judiciary appellate process.
technologies;Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for
During trial, pieces of evidence would be presented and testimonies heard, and
cybercrimes;Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to trial courts would then exercise their constitutional duty to adjudicate the cases
require service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber brought before them.
information as well as specified content data for six months;Section 14
Judicial involvement in all these processes requires the handling members of the
that authorizes the disclosure of computer data under a court-issued Judiciary to be computer literate, at the very least. Due to the highly-technical
warrant;Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination nature of investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes, as well as the apparent need
of computer data under a court-issued warrant;Section 17 that authorizes to expedite our criminal procedure to make it more responsive to cybercrime law
the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration enforcement, SC propose that special cybercrime courts be designated to
specifically handle cases involving cybercrime. In addition, these cybercrime
of the prescribed holding periods;Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of
courts should have their own rules of procedure tailor-fitted to respond to the
justice in relation to cybercrime investigations; Section 24 that technical requirements of cybercrime prosecution and adjudication.
establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
The designation of special cybercrime courts of course is not outside SCs power
Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs Powers and Functions; and Articles
to undertake: Section 21of the Cybercrime Law grants the Regional Trial Courts
353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel. jurisdiction over any violation of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special
cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges should be designated.
Further, the Court DECLARES: Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, empowers this
Court to promulgate rules on the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.
Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL Section 21 of the Cybercrime Law provides:
with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the post and Section 21. Jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court shall have
jurisdiction over any violation of the provisions of this Act. including
react to it.
any violation committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of
commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed
The role of the courts in cybercrime prevention and prosecution within the Philippines or committed with the use of any computer system
Internet has significantly changed the way crimes are committed, and has paved wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any
the way for the emergence of new crimes committed in a totally different plane: damage is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the
from the previous real, physical world, to the abstract, borderless plane of offense was committed, was in the Philippines.
interconnected computers linked through the Internet.
There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially
The judicial steps in cybercrime prosecution start as early as the investigation of trained judges to handle cybercrime cases.
cybercrimes, through the issuance of warrants. After these, courts also determine
the probable cause for the arrest of suspects accused of committing cybercrimes.
Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the 1987 Constitution CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
provides: PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
1. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS (SEC. 1)
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: WHO IS QUALIFIED TO INSTITUTE

5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of JIMENEZ VS. SORONGON
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance
G.R. No. 178607, December 05, 2012
to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
REPRESENTATIVE OF UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (IN HIS
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 214 OF THE
Supreme Court.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG CITY), SOCRATES
ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELI GAZA AND MARKOS
AVGOUSTIS, RESPONDENTS.

The Factual Antecedents

The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a

local manning agency, while Carmen Alamil and the other respondents are some
of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another
local manning agency.

On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated
and large scale illegal recruitment.

On October 9, 2003, the respondents filed their counter-affidavit denying the

complaint-affidavits allegations.

The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding
criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City.

The RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial
determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the
warrants of arrest.
In a September 30, 2005 order,the RTC denied respondent Alamils motion for
being moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against
the respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the
September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the
inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.
In a January 4, 2006 order,Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from
the case and did not resolve respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration and
the petitioners motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214,
presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,the RTC granted respondent Alamils motion for
reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamils motion for judicial determination
as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on
record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a
license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent
Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction through the filing of
pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set
aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,the RTC denied the petitioners notice of appeal
since the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is
mandated to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed
to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65
petition for certiorari.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,the CA dismissed outright the petitioners
Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the
People of the Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that
the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a
victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their
recruitment business. The CA deniedthe motion for reconsiderationthat followed.
Issue
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the
petitioners Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the
petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
Ruling
It is well-settled that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest[,] who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Procedural law basically mandates that [a]ll criminal actions commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of
a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as
Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), represented by the OSG.
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section
explicitly provides: WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers
and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings;(emphasis supplied)

The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court.
This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several casesand continues to be the
controlling doctrine.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to
pursue the criminal action on his own behalf(as when there is a denial of due
process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.

In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal
aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not
appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime,
but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This

PEOPLE VS. VALDEZ
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
-------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 175602
February 13, 2013
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J..:
Nature of Case:
Final Appeal of Judgement
Brief:
The two accused came to the Court on final appeal of the RTCs judgment
convicting them of the crime of Murder. Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw
appeal, which the Supreme Court granted on October 10, 2007. The Supreme
Court modified the judgement by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of Homicide. Subsequently, Edwin Valdez
requested the Court for the application to him of the same judgement despite his
withdrawal of the appeal.
Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the
RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises
Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson. The accused were tried for and convicted of three
counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City.
They were penalized with reclusion perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay to
the heirs actual damages civil indemnity, and moral damages. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC with some modifications as to the civil
indemnity. The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007
Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted,
thereby deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated. Hence, the Court hereby
resolves only the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez. In his appeal, PO2 Valdez
contends among others that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self-
explanatory letter dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to
him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the
judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.
Issue/s:
Whether or not PO2 Valdez may be convicted of murder considering that the
attendance of treachery was not sufficiently allege in the information.
Action/s of the Court:
RTC- Convicted them with three counts of murder
Court of Appeals- Affirmed RTCs decision subject to modification on the
amounts of damages
Courts Rationale on the Above Facts:
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor
the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor,
but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement
of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of
the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the information to the effect that the two accused with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
did xxx assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the victims by then
and there shooting them with a gun, hitting [them] on various parts of their
bodies which were the direct and immediate cause of their deaths did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery
attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring
the killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show
how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to
the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the
gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was
nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular
acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the information.
Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by finding PO2
Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE.
Supreme Court Ruling:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the
application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02
EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty of three counts of homicide, and sentencing him to
suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the
respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the
late Joselito Sayson the amounts ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.
MIGUEL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.
-------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 172035
July 4, 2012
Ponente: BRION, J..:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Brief:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 651 filed by Fernando Q.
Miguel (petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioners
suspension from public office and (ii) denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the suspension order.
Facts:
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local
officials3 of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman) charging the petitioner,
among others, with violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with
the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and
the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City
public market (project).
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman, after finding probable cause filed the
corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.
On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution of
the Office of Special Prosecutor (OSP) declaring that petitioner had waived his
right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001) resolution after failing to
file his counter-affidavit.
After the denial of the petitioners motion to quash, the petitioner was arraigned;
he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases.
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente
Lite. June 27, 2005, the petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the
"obvious and fatal defect of the [i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving
of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension
order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of
his suspension order.
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
ordering his suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the
giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through
"manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges
that the phrases "evident bad faith" and "manifest partiality" actually refers not to
him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information fatally defective.
Issue/s:
Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, is valid.
Courts Rationale on the Above Facts:
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and the cause of the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules)32 requires, inter alia, that the information
shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged.
The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the
accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an
information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts
alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of
the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison detre of the requirement in
the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go
beyond the standard of a "person of common understanding" in appreciating the
import of the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A
reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of
the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-
accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the
information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have the Supreme Court believe that
this elemental phrase was actually omitted in the information when, in his reaction
to the OSPs comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity
of the phrases position, in relation with the other averments in the information.
Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase "acting
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality," the remedy of the petitioner, if at
all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an
information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.
Supreme Court Ruling:
The Court hereby dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
PEOPLE VS SORIA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN SORIA y GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant.
-------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 179031
February 24, 2014
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO J.:
Nature of Case:
Dismissal of the Case
Brief:
The Supreme Court set aside its decision which was promulgated after the
accused-appellants death.
Facts:
On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision1 in this case finding
accused-appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape.
The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on December 20, 2012.
Subsequently, however, the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections
informing us of the death of accused-appellant on August 16, 2012. In compliance
with our directive, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections submitted on
November 11, 2013, a certified true copy of the death certificate of accused-
appellant.
Clearly, accused-appellants demise on August 16, 2012 transpired before the
promulgation of this Courts Decision on November 14, 2012 or before its finality
on December 20, 2012. Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his appeal before
this Court was still pending resolution.
Issue/s:
Whether the decision should be set aside on account of accused-appellant's
demise.
Courts Rationale on the Above Facts:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
In People v. Amistoso, this Court encountered a similar situation wherein the
accused-appellant died before his appeal could be resolved. The Court explained
the implications of the accused-appellants demise as follows:
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his
civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the
civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape had become
irrelevant and ineffectual by reason of his death on August 16, 2012.
Consequently, the same must be set aside and the case against accused-appellant
must consequently be dismissed.
Supreme Court Ruling:
Accordingly, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is set aside and
Criminal Case No. Q-01-98692 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 94, is dismissed on account of accused-appellant's demise.
Rule 110- Place where action is to be instituted
Unionbank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas vs. People
GR No. 192565, February 28, 2012
Brion, J
Brief:
This is a review under rule 45 for the decision of RTC Branch 65 of Makati. The
Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the RTCs Decision dismissing the
petition for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank and Desi Tomas. The RTC found
the MTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas
Facts:
Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
replevin against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998.
The second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC,
Branch 47, Pasay City. In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the
Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the
Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not
commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another
tribunal or agency". The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was
submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and
Tomas was filed in Makati. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that
the venue was improperly laid and that the facts do not constitute an offense. On
the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City Court where the
Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case
against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has
jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there and the
allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied. When the case was elevated
to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the MeTC-
Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.
They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that
"venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was
presented. The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent
jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court
ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential
ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court
to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy.
Issue:
Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where
the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification
was presented to the trial court?
crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false
testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at
the place where the testimony under oath is given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either
be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was
taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of
the crime committed. In all cases, the determination of venue shall be based on
the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

Courts Ruling:

MTC:
Denied the motion to quash
RTC:
Dismissed the petition for certiorari
SC: Dismissed petition

Ratio:

The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the
proper venue for the criminal action. The criminal act charged was for the
execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the RPC is the
applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue
should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes
an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of
the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.'

The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC.
The Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false
affidavit under Art. 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes
and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the
Rule 111: Civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted
Dr. Fenando Solidum vs. People of the Philippines
GR No. 192123
March 10 2014
Bersamin, J
Brief:
This appeal was taken by a physician- anesthesiologist who has been pronounced
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries the RTC and
CA. He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-
through operation conducted in a three-year old patient born with an imperforate
anus.
Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate
anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure
to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling
him to excrete through colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May
17, 1995, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation.
The Petitioner was the anesthesiologist. During the operation, Gerald experienced
bradycardia, and went into coma. He regained consciousness only after a month.
He could no longer see, hear or move. Agitated by her sons helpless and
unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (mother) lodged a complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office
of Manila against Solidum. Upon finding of probable cause, the prosecutors
office filed an information against Dr. Solidum. The case was initially filed in the
MTC but was later transferred to RTC pursuant to Section 5 of RA 8369 (the
Family Courts Act of 1997).
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence? No.
Courts Ruling:
MTC and CA:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. Affirmed by the CA.
SC:
Reversed decision of RTC and CA
Ratio:
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for failing to monitor and regulate properly
the levels of anesthesia administered to Gerald and using 100% halothane and
other anesthetic medications. However, foregoing circumstances, taken together
did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly
imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos
findings did not preclude the probability of other factors related to Geralds
operation which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration
of anesthesia, has caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealing concluded in his report, instead, that although
the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures,
still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur.
The existence of probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has
engendered in the mind of the court a reasonable doubt as to Solidums guilt, and
moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. A reasonable doubt is a doubt growing reasonable out of
evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered
merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to
accept the responsibility of convicting a fellowman. If, having weighed the
evidence on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to
that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most
important and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to mathematical demonstration. It is not
proof beyond the possibility of mistake. We have to clarify that the acquittal of
Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we
cannot now find him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been
establish here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His
acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and
competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the
manner of administration of anesthesia by Solidum was not necessarily the cause
of the hypoxia that cause bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to
adjudge Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital.
We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an
on competent evidence. employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied
due to his being insolvent.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila (ONM).
SC Decision:
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have
to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
holding ONM civilly liable jointly and severally with Solidum. The decree was REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010;
flawed in logic and in law. ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that
is deemed instituted with the criminal actions refers only from the offense
charged. It is puzzling therefore, how the RTC and CA could have adjudged
ONM jointly and severally liable with Solidum for the damages despite the
obvious fact that ONM, being artificial entity, had not been charged along with
Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which
rendered their judgment against ONM void as the product of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the flawed decree
raises other material concerns that the CA and RTC overlooked. We deem it
important, then, to express the following observations for the instruction of the
Bench and Bar. For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the
proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the
outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect.
Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila
could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly
enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary
liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to
Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation
"engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or
branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and
capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public
hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable
and humanitarian work.50Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was
engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of
Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on
THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE ON ITS
CORRESPONDING CIVIL LIABILITY
GR. No. 191240, July 30, 2014
CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR,
Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Brief:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision1 dated
February 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151 with
respect only to the civil aspect of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had
been acquitted of the crime of estafa.
Facts:
The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals acquitted him of the same but the civil aspect of the case
remained. Respondent Salvador then filed a petition for review on Certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in real estate business,
educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by
Salvador and his brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance
business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she
trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to her children when her
annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She
agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business
would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of
promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while Ramon would take charge of the
operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of
US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had
the money, she handed the same to respondent Salvador which was witnessed by
her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never
operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked
respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money
was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that
he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00
was not returned at all.
Issue:
Must the award of damaged be retained despite the acquittal of the accused in the
criminal case? NO
Action of the Courts:
RTC:
WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisyon (sic) correctional
(sic) maximum as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
maximum as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or its equivalent in
Philippine currency.
With respect to accused RAMON SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.
CA:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of Branch 202 of the
RTC of Las Pias City, dated April 21, 2006, is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE and accused appellant PHILLIP R. SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the
crime of Estafa
Supreme Court:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated February
11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is
hereby AFFIRMED
 Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
Ratio: probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission evidence.
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has In discrediting petitioners allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to
be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions
delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible
contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioners
based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was
guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the (4) petitioners behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was
situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been swindled.
damages is "for the same act or omission.
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because The petition for the award of damages is denied.
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general
presumption, "that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor.
The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are present in this
case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For
in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly
and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince
us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in
venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining
circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt
from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In
Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of
preponderance of evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
B. Suspension of Civil Action (Sec. 2)
- when suspended; consolidated
- what is the Bar Rule in Amparo and Habeas Data
LIM VS KOU CO PING
LILY LIM, petitioner, vs. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, respondent.
G.R. No. 175256
August 23, 2012
Ponente: DELCASTILLO, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Second and Seventeenth
Divisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) on the issue on forum shopping for a
private complaint for specific performance and damages, while appealing the
judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for estafa.
FACTS
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement
manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of
cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal
authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can
withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it
is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC
Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja
(Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for
the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold
these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the price of P64.00 per bag or a
total of P3.2 million. Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement
bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of
cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags,
to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining
37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with
Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and
would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to
receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the
withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim
sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the
plant or for the return of her money had failed.
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed
against Co before Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City.
The private complainant, Lily Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to
prove her damages. She prayed for Co to return her money amounting to
P2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. However, the RTC acquitted Co
via Demurer to Evidence which was granted by the court. The civil aspect of the
case also rendered Co not civilly liable to Lim. This was brought on appeal by
Lim in the CA and was dismissed because the parties, causes of action, and reliefs
prayed for in Lims appeal and in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions
seek the same relief, which is the payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of
cement. Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed Lims appeal for forum
shopping.
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The Manila RTC held that there was no
forum shopping because the causes of action invoked in the two cases are
different. It observed that the civil complaint before it is based on an obligation
arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil liability involved in the
appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the
appellate court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTCs Order in Civil
Case No. 05-112396 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The
CA Seventeenth Division denied Cos petition and remanded the civil complaint
to the trial court for further proceedings. The CA Seventeenth Division agreed
with Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not
met in the two proceedings because they do not share the same cause of action.
The CA denied35 Cos motion for reconsideration.
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific
performance and damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of
the criminal case for estafa?
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC (PASIG): Co was acquitted for the criminal aspect of estafa and not
liable for the civil aspect of the crime.
CA (2nd Div.): Dismissed Lims appeals for having committed Forum-
shopping in the filing of appeal and the complaint for specific performance
and damages.
RTC (MANILA): No Form-shopping was committed by Lim because
the causes of action invoked in the two cases are different, one for civil
liability in a criminal case and the other for contracts and quasi-delicts.
CA (17th Div.): CA Seventeenth Division agreed with Manila RTC that the
elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two
proceedings because they do not share the same cause of action.
SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender.(1) civil liability ex
delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability
that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings. The independent
civil liability may be based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as
for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that
may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (in cases of
defamation, fraud and physical injuries).
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or
omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex
delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal action, its
proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the criminal action. The civil
liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action
declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal
action and may be pursued independently as provided in Article 31 and 33 of the
Civil Code.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil
liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum
shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the
instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an
independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any
criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted
in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the
culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil
action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa
contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa
cases against [the offender] did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of
forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended party] arose from the same
act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on different causes of
action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil
action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no and independent from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final
forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. the Civil Code.
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of
obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the SUPREME COURT RULING:
resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve
different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of Premises considered, Lily Lims Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED. The
each other. The answer is in the affirmative. assailed October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lims
The first action (RTC PASIG) is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is ordered REINSTATED and the Court of
instituted together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
(RTC MANILA), judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil
action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of
rights). In her civil complaint, Lim basically alleges that she entered into a sale
contract with Co under the following terms: that she bought 37,200 bags of
cement at the rate of P64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full payment, Co
delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to these
bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six
months from the dates written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants
breached their contractual obligations to her under the sale contract and under the
withdrawal authorities; that Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay more for
each bag of cement, contrary to their agreement to fix the price at P64.00 per bag
and to the wording of the withdrawal authorities; that FRCC did not honor the
terms of the withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not comply with his
obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim.
From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the
defendants contractual obligations, given that she has already performed her
obligations. She prays that the defendants either honor their part of the contract or
pay for the damages that their breach has caused her.

Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in
such manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs
and public policy. These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct
(abuse of rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).

Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 (RTC MANILA) involves only the obligations
arising from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves
only the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense charged. They present
different causes of action, which, under the law, are considered separate, distinct,
C. Independent Civil Action (Sec. 3)
- Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO
LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145391
August 26, 2002
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution1 dated
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2
dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-
C (99). Casupanan vs. Laroya, 388 SCRA 28, G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
FACTS
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for
brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for
brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity),
figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case
No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss
the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the
criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and
dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil
case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7,
1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before
the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,
assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the
proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a
special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the
Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing
the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of
discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case
has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim
in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-
delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence,
and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising
from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the
independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-
operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not
state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo
forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of
the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not
a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal
question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one actionthe
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-
delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Dismissed the civil case of Casupunan and Capitulo against Laroya
due to the pendency of the criminal case against Casupunan.
CA: Dismissed Casupunan and Capitulos civil case against Laroya
because the MCTC decision was already final as to the institution of this
independent civil case pursued by the petitioners.
SC: The decision of the RTC is annulled and reinstated the independent civil
case filed by the petitioners.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.
However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the
rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the
civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these
two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of
action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for
brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the
right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action
before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising
from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the
recovery of damages for quasidelict, and the recovery of damages for violation of
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasidelict under the 1985
Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring
such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the
criminal action. Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed
instituted with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability
arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be
filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on
these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the
criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code
are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the
criminal action.
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the D. Effect of death on the Civil Action (Sec. 4)
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was - compare with Secs. 17, 18 and 20 of Rule 3
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered
in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to PEOPLE VS ROMERO
recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions
based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN L. ROMERO
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
and ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ, accused-appellants.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
G.R. No. 112985
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
April 21, 1999
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim
Ponente: PARDO, J.
of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for
two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in
the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party.
If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive Nature of Case:
period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi- APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Br. 2.
delict is filed.
BRIEF
The case before the Court is an appeal of accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
C. Rodriguez from the Joint Judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a Butuan City, convicting each of them of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 1689, for widescale
swindling, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and
and to jointly and severally pay Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount of one hundred fifty
equal protection of the law.
thousand pesos (P150,000.00), with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 per annum, starting September 14, 1989, until fully paid, and to pay ten thousand
on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous. pesos (P10,000.00), as moral damages

We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in
the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent
civil action.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99)
are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
FACTS
On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, an Information against the two (2) accused for
estafa, as follows:
That on or about September 14, 1989, at Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the General
Manager and Operation Manager which solicit funds from the general public for
investment, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another,
by means of deceit and false pretense, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously deliberately defraud one Ernesto A. Ruiz by convincing the latter to
invest his money in the amount of P150,000.00 with a promise return of 800%
profit within 21 days and in the process caused the issuance of Butuan City Rural
Rural [sic] Bank Check No. 158181 postdated to October 5, 1989 in the amount of
One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) Philippine Currency,
that upon presentation of said check to the drawee bank for payment the same was
dishonored and that notwithstanding repeated demands made on said accused to
pay and/or change the check to cash, they consistently failed and refused and still
fail and refuse to pay or redeem the check, to the damage and prejudice of the
complainant in the aforestated amount of P1,200,000.00.
On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same court another information
against the two (2) accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, arising
from the issuance of the same check.4
On January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 5,5 Butuan City, where they pleaded not guilty to both
informations.
The prosecution presented its evidence on January 10, 1991, with complainant,
Ernesto A. Ruiz, and Daphne Parrocho, the usher/collector of the corporation
being managed by accused, testifying for the prosecution.
On August 12, 1991, the defense presented its only witness, accused Martin L.
Romero.
On November 13, 1992, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts, signed
only by their respective counsels. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
On March 30, 1993, the trial court promulgated a Joint Judgment dated March 25,
1993. The trial court acquitted the accused in Criminal Case No. 38066 based on
reasonable doubt, but convicted them in Criminal Case No. 38087 and
accordingly sentenced each of them, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment, finding or
declaring
(a) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez innocent on reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. 3806, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22;
(b) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 3808 for estafa under P.D. 1689 for wide
scale [sic] swindling and accordingly sentences them to suffer life imprisonment
(Section 1, P.D. 1689) and ordered jointly and severally to return to Ernesto A.
Ruiz the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) with
interest thereon at the rate of Twelve percent (12%) per annum starting from
September 14, 1989 until fully paid and to pay the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as moral damages.
On March 31, 1993, accused filed their notice of appeal, which the trial court gave
due course on April 5, 1993. On March l6, 1994, this Court ordered the accused to
file their appellants brief.
Accused-appellants filed their brief on October 30, 1995, while the Solicitor
General filed the appellees brief on March 8, 1996. During the pendency of the
appeal, on November 12, 1997, accused Ernesto Rodriguez died. As a
consequence of his death before final judgment, his criminal and civil liability ex
delicto, were extinguished.
In this appeal, both accused did not deny that complainant made an investment
with SAIDECOR in the amount of P150,000.00. However, they denied that deceit
was employed in the transaction. They assigned as errors: (1) their conviction
under P.D. 1689 due to the prosecutions failure to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial courts failure to consider the joint stipulation
of facts in their favor but the CA found no merit on the appeal by the accused.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the deceased accused may still be civilly liable in this case?
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Convicted the accused.
CA: Affirmed the conviction of the trial court.
SC: Affirms conviction with modification.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS Rule 112 Preliminary Examination
A. Definition/Description
The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto Rodriguez, died -when a matter of right
pending appeal. Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the - Distinguish from Preliminary Examination
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished
ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H.
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners,
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil vs.
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., Respondent.
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
G.R. No. 172829
Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining accused-appellant, July 18, 2012
Martin L. Romero. The trial court considered the swindling involved in this case Ponente: J. Peralta
as having been committed by a syndicate and sentenced the accused to life
imprisonment based on the provisions of Presidential Decree 1689, which NATURE OF CASE:
increased the penalty for certain forms of swindling or estafa. Petition for review on Certiorari
SUPREME COURT RULING:
BRIEF
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the The present petition arose from a criminal complaint for falsification of public
appealed judgment. The Court hereby sentences accused-appellant Martin Romero documents filed by herein respondent against herein petitioners with the Office of
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision the City Prosecutor of Manila.
mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in the amount of one hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at six (6%) per centum per FACTS:
annum from September 14, 1989, until fully paid, to pay twenty thousand pesos On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was
(P20,000.00) as moral damages and fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), as filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City
exemplary damages, and the costs.
Prosecutor of Manila (representing Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito,
Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriquez. On April 23, 2004, Fenequito, et
al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The
MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal and with the express
conformity by the public prosecutor, the RTC set aside the MeTCs order and
directed the latter to trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal before the CA, which
subsequent ruled that the RTCs assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and
was therefore not appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE:
1. Whether RTCs decision was interlocutory and can be appealed.
2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable
cause.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. RTCs decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be
appealed.
One of the grounds for the CAs outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.s
petition for review was because of the latters failure to submit copies of
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition filed, as
required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a
purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The rationale for this strict attitude
is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities the orderly
disposition of appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court
still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. This
is because Fenequito et al. erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is
final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order is interlocutory
if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be
done upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that which dispose of the
whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC
and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to
present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory
as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be
done on its merits.
2. There is sufficient evidence.
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause
does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that,
more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure
a conviction.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29648, are
AFFIRMED.
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ of the
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 181021
December 10, 2012
Ponente: J. Peralta
NATURE OF CASES:
Petition for review
BRIEF:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari, dated
February 13, 2008, of petitioner Burgundy Realty Corporation, seeking to annul
and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
September 14, 2007 and December 20, 2007, respectively.
FACTS:
Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes is the real estate agent of the petitioner in buying parcels of
land in Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She
informed petitioner that more or less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were
willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner
released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her favor to be used in buying those
parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land, converted and
misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her personal use and benefit.
Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount of
P23,423,327.50, to no avail despite her receipt of the said demand. As such,
petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of Estafa against Reyes before the
Assistant City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City.
Reyes, while admitting that she acted as a real estate agent for petitioner, denied
having converted or misappropriated the involved amount of money and avers that
it is his sub-agent who misappropriated the funds. Reyes filed a complaint for the
crime of estafa against Mateo Elejorde his sub-broker.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the Assistant
Prosecutor of Makati City and recommended the indictment of that Reyes be
indicted of the crime of estafa. Thereafter, an Information for the crime of Estafa
under was filed against Reyes.
Reyes filed a petition for review with DOJ but was dismissed, aggrieved, she then
filed a motion for reconsideration and said motion was granted. DOJ Sec. in a
resolution directed to cause the withdrawal of the information against Reyes.
ISSUE:
Whether the DOJ erred in not finding a probable cause to charge Reyes with the
crime of estafa.
COURT RATIONALE IN THE ABOVE FACTS:
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public
prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call
for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits.15 The complainant need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full
and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to
allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective
claims.
A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct
in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not
dispute that she received in trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as
proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land.
Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not
heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted
money, despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of
misappropriation. The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using
or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon.19 To misappropriate for one's
own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.20 In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale
or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.
Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to
conclude that a probable cause exists for the indictment of Reyes for Estafa. As to
whether the presumption can be rebutted by Reyes is already a matter of defense
that can be best presented or offered during a full-blown trial.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of
presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in
the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED
and, accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated
September 14, 2007 and December 20, 2007, respectively, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
149, Makati City, where the Information was filed against private respondent
Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with her arraignment.
RULE 112 Preliminary Investigation
B. Who may Conduct P.I
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 7, Bacolod City, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804
July 30, 2012
Ponente: Leonardo De Castro
NATURE OF CASE:
Administrative Matter
BRIEF
The case now before this Court sprang from Criminal Case No. 09-03-164 7 4,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr.1 On March 24, 2009,
complainant City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado filed the Information2 in the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, which was eventually raffled to
Branch 7 thereof presided by respondent Judge Abraham A. Bayona.
FACTS:
The case sprang from a criminal case entitled People of the Philippines vs.
Cresencio Palo, Sr. It was initially handled by Investigating Prosecutor Dennis
Jarder who found no probable cause against Palo. However, complainant, upon
review, found that there was a probable cause against Palo. Thus, complainant
disapproved Jarders Resolution and filed the Information in court.
In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused Palo,
respondent Judge Bayona issued an order directing complainant Abanado to
present (1) a copy of the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation, (2)
Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder, (3) Memorandum of the
transfer of case assignment from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City
Prosecutor, and (4) Exhibit to the Court, to enable his court to evaluate and
determine the existence of probable cause.
With respect to item 3, complainant explained in a letter that there was no
memorandum of transfer of the case from Investigating Prosecutor Jarder to him.
Respondent was dissatisfied with the explanation of the Office of the City
Prosecutor. In an Order, respondent stated that the Jarders Resolution dismissing
the complaint was part and parcel of the official records of the case and, for this
reason, must form part of the records of the preliminary investigation. He further
stated that because there was a conflict between Jarders and complainants
resolutions, those documents were necessary in the evaluation and appreciation of
the evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Palo. He, thus, ordered complainant to complete the records of the case by
producing Jarders Resolution. The Office of the City Prosecutor again sent a
letter explaining the impossibility of submitting it to the court. The letter stated
that the Resolution was no longer part of the records of the case as it was
disapproved by complainant.
Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City
Prosecutor. In an order, he required complainant to explain why he should not be
cited for contempt. Complainant requested for a ten-day extension to comply with
it but respondent denied the request. He likewise ordered the Clerk of Court to
issue a subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify
on the existence of his resolution dismissing the case against Palo and to Office of
the City Prosecutors Records Officer Myrna Vaegas to bring the entire record of
the preliminary investigation of the Palo case.
Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for inhibition against
respondent and a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain respondent from proceeding with
the hearing of the contempt proceedings. Complainants prayer for a TRO was
granted by Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Bacolod City.
Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that when a city or
provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating assisting city or provincial
prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of
the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result
would be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the
records of the case. It is no longer required that the complaint or entire records of
the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and be examined by
the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to
unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete records of
the cases all the time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the sole
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused. What is required,
rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or
transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor
as to the existence of probable cause.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint and the same was received by
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). He alleged that respondent was
guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure and gross misconduct. He
essentially asserted that respondent unduly burdened himself by obsessing over
the production of the records of the preliminary investigation, especially Jarders
Resolution. Respondent, in his Comment with Counter-Complaint for Disbarment
of Prosecutor Abanado, reiterated the importance of the Jarders Resolution in
deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
The OCA submitted its report and recommendation. It noted Judge Gelladas
Order which held that the resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding
probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. In
such case, the resolution recommending the dismissal is superseded, and no longer
forms an integral part of the records of the case and it need not be annexed to the
information filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether an investigating prosecutors resolution of dismissal that had been
reversed by the city prosecutor should still form part of the records to be
submitted to the judge.
COURT RATIONALE IN THE ABOVE FACTS:
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function.
Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice
in conducting preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public
prosecutor is put in question. The Department of Justic-National Prosecution
Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against Judge Abraham A. Bayona of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, Branch 7 is DISMISSED.
The counter-complaint against City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado is likewise
DISMISSED.
Quantum of Evidence: Probable Cause vs Prima Facie
PCGG v Navarro-Gutierrez
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner,
v.
MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ (AS THEN OMBUDSMAN),
DON M. FERRY, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C.
ZALAMEA, OFELIA I. CASTELL, AND RAFAEL A. SISON, Public
Respondents,
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, MANUEL I. TINIO, AND ANTONIO R. ROQUE,
Private Respondents.
G.R. No. 194159
October 21, 2015
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari
Brief:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the Resolution2 dated May
30, 2007 and the Order3 dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-03-0500-I, which dismissed the affidavit-
complaint4 of petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
charging individual respondents Don M. Ferry (Ferry), Jose R. Tengco, Jr.
(Tengco), Rolando M. Zosa (Zosa), Cesar C. Zalamea (Zalamea), Ofelia I. Castell
(Castell), Rafael A. Sison (Sison), Rodolfo M. Cuenca (Cuenca), Manuel I. Tinio
(Tinio), and Antonio R. Roque (Roque) for allegedly violating Sections 3 (e) and
(g) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,5 for lack of probable cause.
Facts:
An Affidavit-Complaint6 dated July 15, 2003 filed by the PCGG - through Rene
B. Gorospe, the Legal Consultant in-charge of reviewing behest loan cases -
against former officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), as well as former officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping
Corporation (Galleon),7 charging them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA
3019. In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG alleged that on October 8, 1992, then
President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued Administrative Order No.
13,8 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify various anomalous behest loans entered
into by the Philippine Government in the past. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee,
with the assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG), examined and studied
documents relative to loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations
during the regime of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) -
one of which is the loan account granted by the DBP to Galleon. 10
After examining the aforesaid loan account, the TWG found, that on September
19, 1979, DBP, pursuant to its Board Resolution No. 3002,11 approved guarantees
in favor of Galleon in the aggregate amount of US$90,280,000.00 for the purpose
of securing foreign currency borrowings from financial institutions related to
Galleon's acquisition of five (5) brand new and two (2) secondhand vessels;12 (b)
Board Resolution No. 3002 specifically stated that such accommodation "shall be
undertaken at the behest of the Philippine Government;" 13 (c) as a condition for
the grant of the guarantees, Board Resolution No. 3002 required Galleon to raise
its paid up capital to P98.963 Million by 1981, 14 but Galleon was only able to
raise its capital to P46,740.755.00;15 (d) despite Galleon's failure to comply with
such condition, DBP still granted the guarantees; (e) as of June 30, 1981,
Galleon's arrearages had already amounted to P40,684,059.37, while the aggregate
DBP obligations of Galleon already totaled P691,058,027.92; 16 (f) despite the
outstanding debts, DBP still issued Board Resolution Nos. 4008 17 and
3001,18 approving further accommodations in Galleon's favor in the form of one-
year foreign currency loans to refinance the latter's arrearages, which amounted to
P58,101,718.89 as of September 30, 1982; 19(g) despite Galleon's arrearages
amounting to P128,182,654.38 and obligations accumulating to P904,277,536.96,
DBP still approved the release of Galleon's two (2) secondhand vessels as
collaterals resulting in collateral deficiency;20 and (h) as of March 31, 1984,
Galleon's total obligations to DBP amounted to P2,039,284,390.85, while the
value of its collaterals was only P539,000,000.00. 21 These findings were then
collated in an Executive Summary22 which was submitted to the Ad
Hoc Committee.
Based on the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the
loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive
characteristics of behest loans, considering that: (a) Galleon was undercapitalized;
(b) the loan itself was undercollateralized; (c) the major stockholders of Galleon
were known to be cronies of President Marcos; and (d) certain documents
pertaining to the loan account were found to bear "marginal notes" of President
Marcos himself.23 Resultantly, the PCGG filed the instant criminal complaint
against individual respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0500-I.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable
cause to indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Court Action/s:
1. Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and,
accordingly, dismissed the criminal complaint against them.
2. SC Overturns Ombudsmans decision
Held:
The Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
the criminal complaint against individual respondents for lack of probable cause,
as will be explained hereunder.
The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the accommodations extended by DBP to
Galleon were in the nature of behest loans, which then led to the filing of criminal
cases against individual respondents, who were high-ranking officers and/or
directors of either Galleon or DBP, as evidenced by the various documents on
record.
As may be gleaned from the documents on record, it appears that each of these
high-ranking officers and/or directors of DBP had a hand in recommending the
approval and/or the actual approval of the series of accommodations that DBP
granted in favor of Galleon, which constituted the behest loans received by the
latter during the regime of the late President Marcos.
In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant of behest loans,
Roque, Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell merely denied liability by maintaining that
they had no participation in such grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of
defense that are better ventilated during the trial proper. On the other hand, Ferry,
Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison miserably failed to debunk the charges against
them by not filing their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice.
Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that individual
respondents may have indeed committed acts constituting the crimes charged
against them, and as such they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the
merits.
Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG's findings
contained in the Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad
Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value. It is
noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course
of its proceedings.63 In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman,64 the Court
declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and
does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2007 and
the Order dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-03-
0500-I are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Office of the
Ombudsman is DIRECTED to issue the proper resolution indicting individual
respondents Don M. Ferry, Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Rolando ML Zosa, Cesar C.
Zalamea, Ofelia I. Castell, Rafael A. Sison, Rodolfo M. Cuenca, Manuel I. Tinio,
and Antonio R. Roque of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No.
3019, in accordance with this Decision.
Quantum of Evidence: Probable Cause vs Prima Facie
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART
ALLAN A. MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M.
BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E.
GAERLAN, Petitioners,
v.
MARIO JOEL T. REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194488
February 11, 2015
_______________________________________
Nature of Case: Petition for Review (Certiorari)
Brief:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated March 19, 2013
and Resolution2 dated September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which
rendered null and void Department of Justice Order No. 7103 issued by the
Secretary of Justice.4 The Department Order created a second panel of prosecutors
to conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in view of the first panel of
prosecutors' failure to admit the complainant's additional evidence
Facts:
Dr. Ortega, also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several
radio shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot
dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City,
Palawan.5 After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was
arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he
shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis
C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.On February 6, 2011, Edrad
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan
Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing
of Dr. Ortega.7
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order
No. 0918 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct
preliminary investigation. The First Panel was composed of Senior Assistant
Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog, Assistant State Prosecutor Bryan Jacinto S. Cacha,
and Assistant State Prosecutor John Benedict D. Medina.9
On February 14, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega),
Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former
Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her husband's murder. Former Governor
Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario T. Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque Governor
Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial Administrator Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon
Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado, Armando Noel,
Rodolfo O. Edrad, and several John and Jane Does were also implicated. On June
8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the
Resolution11dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary
Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone
communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad.12 On July 7, 2011,
while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a
Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution dated June 8,
2011. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel in the Resolution13 dated
September 2, 2011.14
On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710
creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case. The Second Panel was composed of Assistant State Prosecutor
Stewart Allan M. Mariano, Assistant State Prosecutor Vimar M. Barcellano, and
Assistant State Prosecutor Gerard E. Gaerlan.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the case "in the interest
of service and due process"15 to address the offer of additional evidence denied by
the First Panel in its Resolution dated September 2, 2011. The Department Order
also revoked Department Order No. 091.
Issue/s:
Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function
beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition
Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu proprio another
panel of prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing
of the information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul
Court Action/s:
1. DOJ Panel 1 dismissed complaint
2. De Lima established DOJ Panel 2
Held:
Yes. The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or
executive function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice
may perform functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial
agency.
Yes. Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of
Justice is authorized to issue Department Order No. 710.
Specifically: Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power vested in
the Secretary of Justice includes authority to act directly on any matter involving
national security or a probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the
prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the
city prosecutor and to review, reverse, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or
petition for review as the law or the rules of the Department of Justice (DOJ) may
provide, final judgments and orders of the prosecutor general, regional
prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.
Yes. The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the
respondent's warrant of arrest has already rendered this Petition moot.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot. Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 26839.
Warrantless Arrests:
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station/precinct
Saraum v People
AMADO I. SARAUM,Petitioner,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 205472,
January 25, 2016
_______________________________________
Nature of Case: Petition for Review (Certiorari)
Brief:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
seeks to reverse the Decision2 dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution3 dated
December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR No.
01199, which affirmed the judgment of conviction against petitioner Amado I.
Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial Court (ATC), Branch 57, Cebu
City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737.
Facts:
That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M., in
the City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and without
being authorized by law, did then and there have in his possession One
(1) lighter, One (1) rolled tissue paper, and one (1) aluminum tin foil
which are instruments and/or equipments fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing, any dangerous drug
into the body.
On August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis
regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega,
Cebu City. A buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis,
PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta. Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1
Julius Anion against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was designated as
the poseur-buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the
back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team as the perimeter
security. PO1 Anion coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation. After preparing all the
necessary documents, such as the pre-operation report and submitting the
same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject area.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his
shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a curtain as partition,
the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Espcranza, who were
holding drug paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu"
pot session. They recovered from Saraum's possession a lighter, rolled
tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the
items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and made initial
markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station,
PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered
from Saraum. After the case was filed, the subject items were turned over
to the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.
Issue/s:
Whether Saraum was committing a crime at the time of his arrest and
whether Saraums arrest was valid
Court Action/s:
1. CA denied Saraums appeal
2. SC affirmed CA
Held:
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance
does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.11 In arrest in flagrante delicto,
the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of
the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01 199, which
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an sustained the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737,
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the is AFFIRMED.
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. the Court is
unconvinced with Saraum's statement that he was not committing a crime
at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were
able to apprehend him, who was then holding a disposable lighter in his
right hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand, 13 while
they were in the course of arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of
hot pursuit of "Pate," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where
Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the
illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any satisfactory explanation with
regard to his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his
possession of the seized items that he claims to have "countless, lawful
uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately
explained the respective uses of the items to prove that they were indeed
drug paraphernalia.14 There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory
examination and finding as to the presence or absence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said items
since possession itself is the punishable act.The valid warrantless arrest
gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the
crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their
lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia.
As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in
seizing them. Considering that Saraum's arrest was legal, the search and
seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful. The various drug
paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are,
therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid
search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to
sustain the judgment of conviction.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution dated December 19,
Warrantless Arrests:
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station/precinct
Comerciante v People
ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES, Petitioner,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205926,
July 22, 2015
_______________________________________
Nature of Case: Petition for Review (Certiorari)
Brief:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October
20, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813, which affirmed in toto the Judgment4 dated July
28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in
Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting petitioner Alvin Comerciante y
Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts:
At around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Radan of the
NARCOTICS group and PO3 Calag were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area
while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong
City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as
Comerciante and a certain Dasilla - standing and showing "improper and
unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other.
Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and
approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3
Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla,
and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance
from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which
was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure
to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so
waived and ordered him to present his evidence. Comerciante averred that PO3
Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the
area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney
along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police
officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked
money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand,
they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and
thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Issue/s:
Whether the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165
Whether the warrantless arrest was valid
Court Action/s:
1. RTC convicted petitioner
2. CA affirmed RTC
3. SC overturned CA and RTC
Held:
A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there
could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3 Calag
himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30
kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and
showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic
sachets to the other. the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even
assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of
white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the
former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something
to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if
Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant
movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in
order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.31 That his reasonable suspicion bolstered
by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession
of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still
assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he
purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
October 20, 2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
Warrantless Arrests (Sec. 5)
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station or precinct
LUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rodel Luz, petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines, respondent
GR No. 197788
February 29, 2012
Ponente: Serreno
__________________________________________________________________
Nature of the case: Petition for Review (Appeal)
Brief:
The appellant was convicted of illegal possession of dangerous drugs by the
RTC later on he was acquitted by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
On March 10, 2003, PO2 Alteza was assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga
City Police Station as a traffic enforcer. Then he saw the accused, which was
coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet. This prompted the police
officer to stop Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving the motorcycle. Thereafter the
accused was invited to the police station while in the police station he was issued
a citation ticket by SPO1 Brillante for violation of the said ordinance, he saw the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something on his jacket and the police
officer was alerted and so, he told the accuse to take out the contents of his jacket.
The police officer saw a weapon and a container take out into his jacket, and then
the accused was to open the said container upon the instruction the police officer,
the accused spilled out the content of the container which turned out to be four
plastic sachets; two of which contained suspected shabu while the other two were
empty.
The RTC convicted Luz of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The prosecution
shows that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected
to a valid search, which led to the discovery of two plastic sachets contained
suspected shabu. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The accused,
however, contends that the there was no lawful search and seizure, because there
was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation
of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he
had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
But the RTC held thus: It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down
and apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation
of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by
motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing
penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not
wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police
officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on
the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because
the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of
City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante
delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or
arrested by the apprehending officers.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
1) Whether or not there was a valid arrest of the accused?
ACTIONS of the Court:
RTC: The appellant was guilty for illegal possession dangerous drugs.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
SC: The decision of the CA was reversed the judgment and acquits the appellant.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
No, there was no valid arrest of the accused. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the
offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law
enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the
Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or
any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the
license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued
by the Bureau therefore which shall authorize the driver to operate a
motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the
time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt
shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the
driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension
will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual provides the
following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
checkpoints:
 SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not
apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the
following, when applicable:
If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation
Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in
prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any
of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no
intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or
take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience
that they were waiting there. There was no intention to take petitioner into
custody.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of
conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5 th Judicial
Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless
his continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
rantless Arrests (Sec. 5)
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station or precinct
ANTIQUERA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
George Antiquera y codes, petitioner,
vs.
People of the Philippines, respondent.
GR No. 180661
December 11, 2013
Ponente: Abad
Nature of the case: Petition for Review (Appeal)
Brief:
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted
by the police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged
in pot session.
FACTS:
On January 13, 2004, the Assistant Prosecutor charged George Antiquera and
Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs. On February 11, 2004, police officers PO1 Recio, PO1 Cabutihan, P/Inso.
Ibon, PO1 Rania and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle
were conducting police surveillance on David St, Pasay City, when they saw two
unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a
jeep. Suspecting a crime has been committed, the policemen rush out to the house
where men came out, they saw partially opened door. The two police officers
Recio and Cabutihan saw the accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and
a pink lighter beside him, Cruz was holding an aluminium foil and an improvised
burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police
officers to enter the house and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. Immediately the police
officers inspect the area they saw a wooden jewellery box. It contained an
improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small plastic sachets with traces of white
crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminium
foil, they confiscated all of these and brought back to the police station. The
substance found was tested and declared positive for traces of shabu.
The accused Antiquera contended that he and Cruz were asleep in their house
when he was roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three
armed police officers forced themselves into the house. One of them shoved him
and said Dyan ka lang, pusher ka. Then he was arrested brought him and Cruz
to the police station. The RTC rendered a decision against the accused Antiquera
and Cruz guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S OF THE COURT
1) Whether or not the CA is correct that the accused was guilty of illegal
possession of drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police
officers that they saw Antiquera and Cruz in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia.
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC: Convicted the appellant for illegal possession of drugs.
SC: Reversed the decision of the RTC and acquitted the appellant.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
No. The prosecutions theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a
case of valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera
and Cruz through the door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That
valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right as well to search the living
room for objects relating to the crime and thus seize the paraphernalia they found
there. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a
"peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt
act constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante
delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that
a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to
the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol
car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but
the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for
help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its
partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-
mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia
that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible,
having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no
choice but to acquit the accused.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest
by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless
arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
September 21, 2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937 and ACQUITS the accused George
Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for lack of evidence
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Warrantless Arrests (Sec. 5)
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station or precinct
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
People of the Philippines v. Vasquez
GR No. 200304
January 15, 2014
Ponente: Leonardo De-Castro
Nature of the case: Petition for Review (Appeal)
Brief:
The appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
FACTS:
That on or about April 3, 1998, the accused Donald Vasquez without being
authorize by law to possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession of 4.03 grams of shabu. In the
testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo that an informant went to their office and reported
that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. Vasquez
claimed that he was an employee of the NBI. According to the informant, alias
Don promised him a good commission if he would present a potential buyer of
drugs. Thereafter Fajardo went to her commanding officer to inform him the
illegal drug activity of the accused, and then she was instructed to form a team to
capture Vasquez with the help of the informant. She was able to get a meeting
with Vasquez in Welcome Rotonda. Then around 9 PM, Fajardo and her team
went to the meeting place wherein Vasquez was around and confirming that the
accused was indeed an employee of the NBI.
At the meeting place, Vasquez was waiting for her outside of the establishment
when she arrived. He asked for the money with her and showed the money to the
accused. However, Vasquez wants to go to a more secure place so they went to his
place for the payment of illegal drugs. Fajardos team arrived at the target area,
the informant and Fajardo walked towards the apartment of the accused. The
accused and his male companion came out and demanded to see the money but
Fajardo told him to see the drugs first. Then the accused gave him the envelope he
was carrying and Fajardo opened it and saw a plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance, after she checked the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the
same was indeed shabu. She gave the buy bust money to Vasquez and Fajardo
signaled her team to capture Vasquez and his companion. The accused and his
companion was arrested and brought to the police station. The defense belied the
prosecutions version of events. They contended that Donald Vasquez was a
regular employee of the NBI, working as a laboratory aid II. His duties consists of
a being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from
different police agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. On
April 3, 1998, Anatolia Caredo, Donalds household help, was eating while
Donald was asleep. Then she heard a knocked on the door. Thereafter two police
officers opened the door and entered the house and followed by three police
officers then they proceeded to Donalds room and kicked down the door and
went inside into his room and Donald woke up to see Fajardo pointing her gun at
him. These police officers searched his room, picking up what they could get.
Then one of them opened a cabinet and saw an illegal drug therein. One of the
witnesses, the neighbor of the accused saw the police officers entered Donalds
house and apprehending Donald Vasquez.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting Donald Vasquez for possession of illegal
drugs and ruled the testimonies of the police officers on which the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of
the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. The accused argues that
the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time
he was arrested. Further that the evidence obtained by these police officers was
illegal and cannot be used against him or it is inadmissible in court.

ISSUE/S of the CASE:
1) Whether or not there is a valid arrest of the accused without obtaining a warrant of
arrest or a search warrant?
2) Whether or not evidence obtained by these police officers was illegal?
permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2)
seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2)
arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.

ACTIONS of the COURT: Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity
of his arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
RTC: rendered a decision against the appellant convicting him for possession of
illegal drugs CA RULING:
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
August 6, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of
SC: Denied the petition for appeal of the appellant and affirmed the decision of Manila in Criminal Cases No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y
the CA. Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15
and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175, appellant is hereby
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS: sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional in its
medium period, as maximum.
1) Yes.

Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-
bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is
deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this
case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the
appellant is likewise valid.

2) Yes.

We held in People v. Cabugatan that:

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not

absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed
Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail
In one of the cases, Judge Floresta faulted Judge Ubiadas for granting, without
Right to Bail giving notice to the prosecution, the petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who
Art. 3, Section 13 1987 Constitution-PH was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Subic,
Zambales which found probable cause against him for violation of Section 5(b),
Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). Finally, he faults Judge Ubiadas
FLORESTA vs UBIADAS
for disqualifying petitioner judge from appearing in a criminal case despite
PROVINVIAL PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant petitioner judges designation to handle the prosecution of the case by the
Ombudsman.
vs.
Respondent Judge Ubiadas contends that petitioner has no personality to initiate
JUDGE ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, respondent
the complaint against him as he is not a party to the cases subject thereof.
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774
Respondent Judge Ubiadas informs that the petition for bail of Mangohig who
May 27, 2004 was then under preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on January 3,
2000 on which same date a copy of said petition was furnished the public
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J
prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig heard on the morning of January 4, 2000
during which there was no appearance from the Prosecutors Office; and that as the
offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable offense,
respondent granted him bail.
Nature of Case:
The Office of the Court Administrator stressed that the Rules of Court requires a
Administrative proceeding movant to serve notice of his motion on all parties concerned at least three days
before the hearing thereof, hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail
BRIEF without hearing the prosecutions side. It accordingly recommended that Ubiadas
be FINED P20,000.00.
Dorentino Z. Floresta administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the
Olongapo City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with gross ignorance of
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
the law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Whether or not Judge Ubiadas acted with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse
FACTS: of authority when he granted the petition for bail without hearing the prosecution
in the case of Mangohig.
Then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z.
Floresta administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Regional Trial ACTIONS of the COURT
Court (RTC) with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and SC: Respondent was guilty of Violation of Sec 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct in hearingand deciding several cases. Court

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Yes on the grant of bail to the accused Judge Ubiadas acted with gross ignorance
of the law. Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge
has yet been filed in court against a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable
notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor, or at least his
recommendation must be sought. So Fortuna v. Penaco-Sitaca instructs:
Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in
accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The
prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by
the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence
that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally
and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of
the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness.
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99
on January 4, 2000 at 8:30 a.m. Given the filing of the petition only the day
before, at close to noontime, it cannot be said that the prosecution was
afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present evidence after it received a
copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears stressing that the
prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the
application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt is strong. While in Section
18 of Rule 114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires
the court to give a reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require
him to submit his recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a
three-day notice for hearing of motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court
for good cause to set the hearing on shorter notice, there is, in the case of
Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his petition for bail on
shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular
case, taking into account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable
penalties, and the evidence of guilt in the hands of the prosecution. In Crim. Case
No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A.
7610, which is punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and
subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified by relationship which is
punishable by death. Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed grant of
bail, the prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure which is a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule
140 of the Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits or suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a
fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon
to balance the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of
innocence until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to
prepare his defense without being subject to punishment prior to conviction,
against the right of the State to protect the people and the peace of the community
from dangerous elements. ,
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, is found GUILTY of
undue delay in resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the law or procedure
in granting an application for bail without affording the prosecution due process.
He is accordingly FINED in the amount of P20,000.00, with WARNING that
repetition of the same similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
 are knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail partiality.

Right to Bail In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal Case for
illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional
Art. 3, Section 13 1987 Constitution-PH Trial Court, against Rey Daquep Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William
Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio
ZUNO vs CABEBE Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their counsel de
parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUNO, complainant
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the
vs. right of the accused to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent
judge motu propio issued an Order granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for
JUDGE ALEJANDRINO C. CABEBE, respondent
each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for accused
AM OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge
issued the Order without the accuseds application or motion for bail.
November 26, 2004
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon,
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with
the case, realizing that what he did was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays
that respondent judge be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits
and be disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued
Nature of Case: the Order granting bail to the accused without any hearing, the same was
premised on the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial. The
Administrative proceeding prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the accused.
BRIEF On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.

Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno of the Department of Justice complains In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez
that Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended
Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte rendered an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of that a fine ofP20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a
the law and partiality. repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

FACTS:
ISSUE/S of the CASE
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaintof Chief State Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by granting bail
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo of the Department of Justice, against Judge without hearing.
Alejandrino C. Cabebe, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court. The charges

ACTIONS OF THE COURT
SC: Respondent is found GUILTY of violation of Supreme Court Rules
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a
matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail
in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not
the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or
not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the
judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact,
even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused
without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of
the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise
the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the courts order granting
or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and
based thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated
in Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus
depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of
bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of a bail hearing
and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
Respondents contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records
of the criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the
case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail
without a hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail
hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules
and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of his office, should
be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must render justice without
resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live
up to these standards.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found
guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail FACTS:

Right to Bail Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three
(3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of
Art. 3, Section 13 1987 Constitution-PH
Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong.
He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized
by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If
GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
REGION vs OLALIA

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of
petitioner Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch
19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day,
vs.
the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
JUDGE FELIX OLALIA and JUAN ANTONIO MUNOZ, respondents
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After
GR NO. 153675 hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding
that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private
April 19, 2007
respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent
judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying
his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
Nature of Case:
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Petition for certiorari
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
BRIEF
to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights granting bail to a potential extraditee.
extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition proceeding.
ACTIONS of the COURT
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown
SC: Petition is dismissed. Case is Remanded back to RTC
Colony of Hongkong signed an Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and
Convicted Persons. It took effect on June 20, 19097.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such
extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective SUPREME COURT RULING:
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct
dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection
of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.

Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential

extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused
or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for
the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping
with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right
to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a
new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower
than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.
Rule 114 Bail
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN.
G.R. No. 158754
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari under rule 65
BRIEF
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to
reverse and set aside the Resolution[1] of herein respondent Sandiganbayan
(Special Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting
bail to private respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for
brevity), as effectively reiterated in its Resolution[2] of May 30, 2003, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings
against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the
Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding
probable cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several
criminal Informations against the former President and the other
respondents therein. One of the Informations were for the crime
of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the
respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor
of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as
Criminal Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to the respondent Third
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for
Jinggoy and his co-accused. On its basis, Jinggoy and his co-accused
were placed in custody of the law.
On April 30, 2001, Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion
alleging that: (1) no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold
him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only allegedly involved in
illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or criminal
acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter
of right. He prayed that he be excluded from the Amended
Information . In the alternative, he also prayed that he be allowed to post
bail ..
On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor
Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged
In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To
Him.
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
[Jinggoys] Motion to Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion. [His] alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after
arraignment of all accused.
The following day, July 10, 2001, [Jinggoy] moved for reconsideration
of the Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded
to arraign [him]. [He] refused to make his plea prompting respondent
court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R. No.
148965, on the following rationale:
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital
offenses hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings.
The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of
guilt
Hence, the present petition on the submission that respondent Special Division of
the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
bail in favor of Jinggoy after conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating
the weight of the prosecutions evidence.
ACTION of the COURT
. recourse. Wrote that court in its assailed resolution of March 6, 2003:
SC: Petition dismissed.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded benefits to respondent Jinggoy
that were inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended,
as the Court did not read into the Amended Information, as couched, something
not there in the first place. Respondent Jinggoys participation, if that be the case,
in the proceedings involving sub-paragraphs b, c and d, did not change the legal
situation set forth in the aforequoted portion of the Courts ruling in G.R. No.
148965. For when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the inculpatory acts
envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the Court
merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the
Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right
guaranteed an accused under the Constitution.[26] In fine, all that the Court
contextually did in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to
be informed of the nature of the accusation in the light of the filing of the
Amended Information as worded. If at all, the Courts holding in G.R. No. 148965
freed individual respondent from the ill effects of a wrong interpretation that
might be given to the Amended Information.
In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division)
did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail
hearings and evaluating the weight of the prosecutions evidence, it determined
that the evidence against individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis of
that determination, resolved to grant him bail.
As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made by the respondent court
which adds an appropriate dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this
Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility
that, in case of conviction, respondent Jinggoys criminal liability would probably
not warrant the death penalty or reclusion perpetua.
Rule 114 - Bail
OKABE v Gutierrez
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON
GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch
119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA
MARUYAMA, respondents.
GR150185
May 27, 2004
Nature of Case:
Petition for review on certiorari
BRIEF
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, that part of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 60732 dismissing her petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, for the nullification of the August 25 and 28,
2000 Orders of the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
FACTS
Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial
determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment,
alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by
the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint
for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of
the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and the
other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. The
petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating
prosecutor were not enough on which the trial court could base a finding of
probable cause for estafa against her.
The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:
Based on its personal examination and consideration of the Information, the
affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor duly approved by the city prosecutor, the court found
probable cause for the petitioners arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a
determination of probable cause was made after the court had already found
probable cause and issued a warrant for the petitioners arrest, and after the
latter filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, such motion was a
mere surplusage;
In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause, she posits that
the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
ACTION of the COURT
SC: Petition is granted.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused
from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a
preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that he raises
them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as early as
practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that
an application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be
considered as a waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest
on the legalities or irregularities thereon The new rule has reverted to the
ruling of this Court in People v. Red The new rule is curative in nature
because precisely, it was designed to supply defects and curb evils in
procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes are
applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in
applicationBesides, procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively,
even without express provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of
their effectivity, in other words to actions yet undetermined at the time of
their effectivity Before the appellate court rendered its decision on January
31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure was already in effect. It
behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in resolving the
petitioners petition for certiorari and her motion for partial reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal
bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the
finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her
by the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the
petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the
existence of probable cause When the only proof of intention rests on what a
party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of,
an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that
no other explanation of his conduct is possible In this case, the records show
that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the arrest
of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner
learned of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to
avert her arrest and secure her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B.
Macapagal of the RTC of Quezon City approved the bond and issued an order
recalling the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a
personal bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert her
incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of her right to assail her
arrest
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the
Information against the respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom
of the Information that from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable
ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. Such certification of the investigating
prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on the trial court. Nor
may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of the
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused
In contrast, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with
the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant such set
of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any
offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense A finding
of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
than not a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less
than evidence which would justify conviction.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The assailed Orders dated August 25 and 28, 2000 and the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749 are
SET ASIDE. The records are REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 119. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.:
Leviste V CA
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Levistewas convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the
lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporalas maximum
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight
on his part.
FACTS
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the
lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an
urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age
and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight
on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution
and only for strong reasons.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present.
Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more
than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the discretionary of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 rules of court.
ACTION of the COURT
SC: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
substantive rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with
grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals
should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
expressly declared to be discretionary. Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M.
Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking: Bail is either a
matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of
discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall
be denied. (emphasis supplied). In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound
judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the
discretion to grant or deny bail. On the other hand, in the second situation, the
appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it
has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Given these
two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion
stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether
or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in
resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion
stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing
the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may
either allow or disallow bail. A finding that none of the said circumstances is
present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply
authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach. However, judicial discretion has been defined as choice. Choice
occurs where, between two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of
options), there is more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker. On the other hand, the establishment of a
clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping
the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding
body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty
imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years,
petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to
6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before
final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as
pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following
policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under
the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information,
the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated
August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as
follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is
subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must
be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the
appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159,
with dispatch.
Rule 114 - Bail the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is
Right to Bail not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this
Sec. 13, Article III 1987 Constitution in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN ISSUE:

1. Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime
Juan Ponce Enrile, Petitioner charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt
vs. is strong.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), and People of the Philippines, Respondents. 2. Whether or not the petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk?

G.R. No. 213847 ACTIONS OF THE COURT:

August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin, J. SANDIGANBAYAN: Motion to Fix Bail Denied
SC: Petition Granted

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

Ratio:
ACTION TAKEN:
Primary objective of bail The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good
Petition for certiorari
measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused
BRIEF:
appears at trial.
A petition for certiorari was filed to assail and annul the resolutions issued by the
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where Enrile
III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of
was charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the
Criminal Procedure to wit: No person charged with a capital offense, or an
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
excess of jurisdiction.
prosecution.
FACTS:
1. Yes, Bail as a matter of right due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.
basis of his purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of the Priority
This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), his request to post a bail was denied and
a warrant of arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so
the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
Enrile argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill
guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender,
this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in
Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.
The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be
granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,
admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted
upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of
the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject
to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by
the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death or life imprisonment, or
reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma,
the court held: Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty. Bail hearing with notice is indispensable
(Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;
2. Yes, Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international
community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from
Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of
the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of
the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of
the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted
whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and orders the
Provisional Release of Juan Ponce Enrile upon posting of a cash bond of
P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and directs his immediate release from
custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
Rule 115 Rights of Accused
a. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
Ruben Del Castillo @ Boy Castillo, Petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines, Respondent
G.R. No. 185128
January 30, 2012
Ponente: Peralta, J.
ACTION TAKEN:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF:
A petition for Review on Certiorati was filed assailing the Decision and
Resolution of Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 12, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425
FACTS:
Pursuant to a confidential information that Del Castillo was engaged in selling
shabu, police officers went to serve a search warrant in search for illegal drugs
from the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid
which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they
were riding and go directly to Del Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men
found nothing incriminating in Del Castillos residence, but one of the barangay
tanods was able to confiscate from the hut several articles including four (4)
plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972).
During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty however RTC found Del
Castillo guilty beyond reasonableof the charge against him in the information. The
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his
Constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. On
thecontrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in
another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be
admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay
tanod who is a private individual.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut?
ACTION OF THE COURT
RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
CA: Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED
SC: Decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC is hereby reversed and
set aside, petition is granted.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Ratio:
The accused, in all criminal prosecutions, is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. In considering a criminal
case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the status of
the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge
laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt., proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty
that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed
to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when
prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to
and occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is in
possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the same is
sufficient to convict.
The present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every
prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements
must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b)
the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the
accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
In People v. Tira the Court explained the concept of possession of regulated
drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential
element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to
possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when
the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be
sufficient showing that the property is under appellants control or possession. The
CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner
as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any
evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it
established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of
electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in
its Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation.
As such, conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the
electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has
control of the things found in said structure.
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also
provide proof as to the ownership of the structure where the seized articles were
found. During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis,
that the same structure was the shop of petitioner. During the direct testimony of
SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was
owned by petitioner.
Rule 115 provides the accused of his right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt
Presumption of Innocence means that the presumption must be overcome by
evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt means
that there is moral certainty as to the guilt of the accused. Conviction should be
based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.
The significance of this is that accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
The exceptions to the constitutional presumption of innocence are as follows:
b. Persons in possession of recently stolen goods are presumed guilty of
the offense in connection with the goods.
c. Self-Defense One who invokes self -defense is presumed
guilty. The burden of p roving the elements of self -defense
(unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent
or repel it; lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the one defending
himself) belongs to the accused.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was
under petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his
guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own
starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he
is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt.

1. Presumptions If there is a reasonable connection between the fact

presumed and the fact ultimately proven from such fact

Examples:
a. W h e n a n a c c o u n t a b l e p u b l i c o f f i c e r f a i l s t o a c c o u n t
for funds or property that should be in his custody,
h e i s presumed to be guilty of malversation.
 proposed Koronadal City publicmarket. In a resolution, the Ombudsman found
probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of
R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public
Rule 115 Rights of the Accused Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It filed the
Constitutional Rights of the Accused (Sec. 14, Art III) corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.
Right to be Heard
Petitioner being the former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and
as such while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense
MIGUEL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and
confederating with the private [individuals] acting with evident bad faith and
Fernando Q. Miguel, Petitioner manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give
vs. unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting them to
The Honorable Sandiganbayan participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed
Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and
G.R. No. 172035 Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the
July 4, 2012 publication of said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby
Ponente: Reyes, JJ. excluding other consultants from participating in said prequalification.

On motions separately filed by two of the petitioners co-accused, the

Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation. Later, the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally
moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The
ACTION TAKEN: Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-
Petition for Certiorari
affidavit with the OSP.
BRIEF: Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the
petitioner and of the other accused private individuals. Several extensions sought
A petition for Certiorari was filed assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the
which ordered the petitioners suspension from public office and denied the his criminal cases against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners motion
motion for reconsideration of the suspension order. because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier
termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioners continuous failure to submit
FACTS: his counter-affidavit. The petitioner did not question the denial of his motion.

Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials of Koronadal City,
South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao charging the petitioner, among others, with violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect,
the engineering design, and the construction supervision and management of the
The petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases. Later,
the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27,
2005, the petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and
fatal defect of the [i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted
benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner
pendente lite. To which the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension
order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his
motion,prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of
his suspension order.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension
order. Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al. he claims that nowhere in
the records of the case can one see any order or resolution requiring the petitioner
to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered
suspended. For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can
only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the
defect in the information.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, is valid
Whether or not the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner?
ACTION OF THE COURT
SB: promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendente lite
SB: denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge
the validity of his suspension order.
SC: Petition was dismiss for lack of merit
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Ratio:
A pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the
proceedings against him, theres no hard and fast rule exist in regulating its
conduct.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the
information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed
with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or
correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a
challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and
adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the
regularity of the proceedings against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes that no
hard and fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-
suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be
determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
Constitutional Rights of the Accused (Sec. 14, Art III) provides for:
1. No Person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence without due
process of law
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have speedy, impartial and public trial, to
meet the witness face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of the witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable
Rule 115 provides for the requirements of procedural due process:
1. There must be an impartial and competent court with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it.
2. The jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the
defendant or over the property subject of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
4. Judgement must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In criminal cases the requirements of a procedural due process are as follows:
1. The accused must have been heard by a court of competent
jurisdiction
 2. He must have been proceeded against under orderly processes of the WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
law
3. He may be punished only after inquiry and investigation RIGHT TO COUNSEL
4. There must be notice to the accused PEOPLE VS. LARA
5. The accused must be given an opportunity to be heard
6. Judgment must be rendered within the authority of a constitutional PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y
law. ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant. VILLARAMA, JR.,
A pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused G.R. No. 199877
public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible August 13, 2012
defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused Ponente: BIENVENIDO L. REYES
would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.
Nature of Case:
It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one
Petition for Review
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural
BRIEF
due process exist. In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous
Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court
receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2
reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a Reply
dated October 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268,
to the OSPs Opposition to his plea for reconsideration. Given this opportunity, we
finding Arturo Lara (Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
find that the petitioners continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-
homicide.
suspension hearing based on the same alleged defect in the information, which we
have found wanting has legally nothing to anchor itself on. The nature of Section
FACTS
13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict construction
On May 31, 2001 at around 9am in the morning, Enrique Sumulong (accounting
against the State, thus suspension required under this provision is not a penalty
staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.), withdrew the amount of Php
and not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the
230,000.00 from the Metro Bank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries
accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
of the employees of San Sebastian. Accompanied by three other individuals,
which he failed to receive during his suspension. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
Joselito M. Bautista (victim), Atie and Mancob, Sumulong rode a pick-up and
reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a
while they were at an intersection the accused, Arturo Lara, armed with a gun,
public trust. In light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of
conspiring and confederating together with one unidentified person, and both of
preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a valid information and
them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain, and by means
the nature of this suspension, the petitioners demand for a trial-type hearing in the
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than promote, the
feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista the cash money and
orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
shot him to death in the process.
SUPREME COURT RULING
Lara was invited for questioning at the police station after Sumulong identified
him as the culprit. There he was placed in a line-up and was positively identified
by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob.
In Laras defense, he stated that he was a plumber and presented his neighbour to
corroborate his alibi that he was working, digging a sewer trench, from 8 in the
morning until 3 in the afternoon.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his
right to counsel was violated when the CA ruled that there was no legal
compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not
part of custodial investigation.
ACTIONS of the COURT
The RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused
ARTURO LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
294 (1) as amended by Republic Act 7659, and is he reby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the
accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum
of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php230,000.00 representing the
money carted by the said accused.
The CA affirmed Laras conviction.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Contrary to Laras claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was
placed in a police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his
conviction. That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel
did not render Sumulongs identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to
counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation
begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a
part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v.
Amestuzo:22
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the
1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a
person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts
when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation;
hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked
at this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more
recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches
only during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not
yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or
the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of
the line-up.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE VS. SANICO
JOSE PEPE SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND JENNIFER SON-TENIO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 198753
March 25, 2015
Ponente:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
This appeal directly assails the resolution promulgated on April 14, 2011 in C.A.-
G.R. CR UDK No. 0019 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose Pepe Sanico,
et al.,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioners petition to
review and undo the dismissal of his appeal by the RTC; and the subsequent
resolution promulgated on September 15, 2011, 2 denying his motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS
The petitioner, Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for
trespassing (Criminal Case No. 3433-CR) and theft of minerals (Criminal Case
No. 3434-CR) in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod,
Cebu (MCTC). On April 2, 2009, Sanico was then found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Violation of Section 103 of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. In addition he was ordered to pay damages.
On April 22, 2009, Sanicos counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC.
Consequently, on January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City ordered
Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply, Hence the RTC
ruled to dismissed the appeal.
On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Caete, another lawyer acting for Sanico,
filed a motion for reconsideration7 vis--vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating
that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset
with problems due to his wifes debilitating illness which eventually claimed her
life, as well as his counsel, Atty. Barings own medical condition which caused
her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as principal counsel
hereof.
On June 1, 2010, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration because of its
lack of verification and affidavit of merit; and because the supposed sickness of
Sanicos wife and the lapses of Atty. Baring were not justifiable reasons.
On June 23, 2010, Sanico, through Atty. Caete, filed a petition for review in the
CA, contesting his conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure
to file the memorandum on appeal.
On April 14, 2011, the CA denied the petition for review on the following
grounds, namely: (a) the docket fees were not paid; (b) there was no proper proof
of service of a copy of the petition for review on the adverse party; (c) the
petitioner did not furnish to the RTC a copy of the petition for review; (d) there
was no affidavit of service; (e) no written explanation for not resorting to
personal filing was filed; (f) the documents appended to the petition were only
plain photocopies of the certified true copies; (g) no copies of pleadings and other
material portions of the record were attached; (h) the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping were defective due to failure to contain a statement that
the allegations therein were based on the petitioners personal knowledge; (i) the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping did not contain competent
evidence of identity of the petitioner; and (j) the serial number of the commission
of the notary public and the office address of the notary public were not properly
indicated
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether the CA erred in holding against him his former counsels gross and
inexcusable negligence, thereby depriving him of his right to have the conviction
reviewed by the RTC.
ACTIONS of the COURT
MCTC rendered its judgment on April 2, 2009, convicting the accused,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered in Criminal Case No. 3434-CR finding the accused Jose Pepe
Sanico and Marsito Batiquin guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
Violation of Section 103 of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and they are hereby both sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment of Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to Two (2) Years Four (4) Months and One
(1) day of Prision Correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
The truck with Plate No.GAX-119, as an instrument of the crime is
hereby ordered confiscated in favour of the government.
In addition, both accused are hereby ordered to solidarily pay private
complainant Jennifer S. Tenio actual damages in the amount of Four
Million Forty Two Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (P4,042,500.00),
Moral damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), Exemplary Damages in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), Attorneys Fees in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and Litigation Expenses in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 3433-CR Trespassing, the Court finds accused Jose
Pepe Sanico and Marsito Batiquin not guilty for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC dismissed the appeal
On April 22, 2009, Sanicos counsel filed a notice of appeal in the
MCTC.4 Consequently, on January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in
Danao City ordered Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico
did not comply; hence, the RTC ruled on March 16, 2010,5 as follows:
The motion of plaintiff is impressed with merit. The failure of the
accused-appellants to file Memorandum on Appeal is a ground for
dismissal of the Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the accused is ordered dismissed with
prejudice. SO ORDERED
The CA denied the accused motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, appellants Motion
for Reconsideration with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary injunction dated 31 May 2011 is hereby DENIED. SO
ORDERED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The appeal is meritorious.
The parties have argued on whether or not the negligence of the petitioners
counsel should be binding on the petitioner. In our view, however, we do not need
to belabor the point with a lengthy discussion. Without doubt, the petitioner could
reasonably expect that his counsel would afford to him competent legal
representation. The mere failure of the counsel to observe a modicum of care and
vigilance in the protection of the interests of the petitioner as the client as
manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings discovered in the petition for
review was gross negligence in any language because the defects were plainly
avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the Rules
of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a
result was so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court,
the litigation ought to be re-opened to give to the client another chance to present
his case. The legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to have his
conviction reviewed by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed
in the altar of technicalities.
The Court, remind all lower courts and their judges to be alert in safeguarding the
right of the parties to appeal. Although the right to appeal is statutory, it must be
respected and observed because it is an essential component of due process. What
happened herein was the uncharacteristic oversight of the RTC in the application
of the proper governing rules. There should have been no difficulty to discern the
applicable rules, given the clear distinction between the civil and the criminal
procedures. The alertness could have avoided the oversight, and prevented the
waste of time by the petitioner who had to come all the way to this Court to
safeguard his right to appeal
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the resolutions promulgated
on April 14, 2011 and September 15, 2011 by the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CR UDK No. 0019 entitled People v. Jose Pepe: Sanico, et
al. respectively dismissing the petitioners petition for review assailing
the dismissal of his appeal by the Regional Trial Court, and denying his
motion for reconsideration; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the orders
issued on March 16, 2010, June 1, 2010, and August 22, 2011 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Danao City respectively dismissing
his appeal, denying his motion for reconsideration, and denying his
omnibus motion to recall the order issued on March 28, 2011 for the
issuance of the entry of judgment and to quash the entry of
judgment; QUASHES and VACATES the entry of judgment dated
March 30, 2011 for lack of legal basis; NULLIFIES all acts taken by
virtue of the entry of judgment; REMANDS the records to the Regional
Trial Court for further proceedings as outlined in this decision;
and ORDERS the private respondent to pay the costs of suit.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
PEOPLE VS. AYSON
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First
Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents. Nelson
Lidua for private respondent.
G.R. No. 85215
July 7, 1989
Ponente: NARVASA
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
Orders of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are assailed in the petition for
certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in
the name of the People of the Philippines
FACTS
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to
light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's
Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed
by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained. On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos
gave to his superiors handwritten notes informing the PAL management that he
is willing to settle irregularities (approx. Php 76,000.00) allegedly charged against
him.
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager
in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio
Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward
Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit
Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down
in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed
made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying
back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that
he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to
pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place,
"Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees
ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
afterwards did). But no compromise agreement was reached much less
consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during
the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987.
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and
trial thereafter ensued.
The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6
which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been
marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission given on February 8,
1986,", which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendants attorney filed a objections/comments to Pals evidence.
Particularly, Exhibit A and K, the objection was that "said document, which
appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer."
The respondent, Judge Ayson, declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence,
ruling that it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and
gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel.
Private prosecutors file a motion for reconsideration but was denied
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded
the People's Exhibits A and K and correctly constructing the constitutional right
against self-incrimination.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The court ruled that the right against self-incrimination is accorded to every
person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena,
in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself".
It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry. It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or
not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one
the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However,
the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The
witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be
sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to
him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense that he may
refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any
sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood,
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in
ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.
It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him
on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed
that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked
during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A,
just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his
superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to
compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-
called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the
violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the PEOPLE VS. VILLAREAL
investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining companies, or
complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether Respondent.
employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral coercion, x-----------------------x
undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the
specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may G.R. No. 154954
not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE
has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO
of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
explain his side. The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III,
by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense, with NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
employee may, of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation that GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS
against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH
administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, x-----------------------x
his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) G.R. No. 155101
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self- FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," Respondent.
etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly x-----------------------x
considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of
his liability. G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA
II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA,
SUPREME COURT RULING: JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the
Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, PONENTE: SERENO, CJ
1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence
Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and Nature of the Case:
thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary
restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now BRIEF
declared of no further force and effect.
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. It was argued that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of
time and that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original
records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the
appellate court.
FACTS
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam"
Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera,
Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa
(neophytes).
The neophytes were subjected to three days initiation rites.
On the first day the neophytes were subjected to the following Aquilan "initiation
rites ; "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol
Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against
the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran
over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of
their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending
assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with
fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
the "Auxies Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the
neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made
to present comic plays and to play rough basketball and were required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles and whenever they would
give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. After a few hours
the initiation for the day officially ended but was reopened upon the demand of
non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal). The neophytes were subjected to "paddling" and to additional
rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was
so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of
physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering
and incoherent mumblings which were initially, dismissed by Villareal and Dizon
on the thought that he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny
was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him, when his
condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital but was pronounced
dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
ACTIONS of the COURT.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to
speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the
trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153 reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and
16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free
from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated
when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no
cause or justifiable motive. In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.The conduct of both the
prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be considered are factors
such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the
prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We
nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated
in this case.

The court ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the
right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. As a consequence,
an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the
principle of double jeopardy. As we have previously discussed, however, where
the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies. The rule on double jeopardy
is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal
instead of the correctness thereof. Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to
lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from
attaching.
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was
violated. Since there is nothing in the records that would show that the
subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon,
and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
SO ORDERED.

The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records
of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to
comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies
of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September
21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution,
through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from
the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in
fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated
December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution.
It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that even
until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial
court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the
motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for
a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a
quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the
latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to
set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case
remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity
whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon.
Rule 116 Arraignment
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA; AN INTEGRAL ASPECT OF THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. - Section 1(a) of Rule 116
requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself
or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the
language or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the
charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the
accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of
said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the
accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate
regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to
hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution.
REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION BE
READ TO THE ACCUSED IN THE LANGUAGE OR DIALECT KNOWN
TO HIM; NOT COMPLIED WITH BY THE TRIAL COURT IN CASE AT
BAR.
THE TRIAL COURT MUST FULLY DISCHARGE ITS DUTY TO
CONDUCT THE REQUISITE SEARCHING INQUIRY IN SUCH A WAY
AS TO INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED HAD MADE NOT
ONLY A CLEAR, DEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL PLEA, BUT HE
DID SO WITH A WELL INFORMED UNDERSTANDING AND FULL
REALIZATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES THEREOF.
NO VALID JUDGMENT CAN BE RENDERED UPON AN INVALID
ARRAIGNMENT.
PEOPLE VS. ESTOMACA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 117485-86
April 22, 1996
Ponente: REGALADO, J
Nature of Case:
Automatic Review by Supreme Court
BRIEF
5 complaints filed against Estomaca for committing rape and sexual assault
against his daughter. Court found that lower court improperly followed the
procedures regarding arraignment.
FACTS
Melchor Estomaca y Garque, was charged by his daughter, Melita Estomaca, of
five counts of rape, committed on different occasions, before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo, Branch 38, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43568,
43569, 43570 and 43571.
During the arraignment on June 15, 1994, accused-appellant entered a plea of
guilty to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to
Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43569 and 43570.
Trial ensued with respect to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571. The lower
court imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual
assault supposedly perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of
death with respect to the rape allegedly committed on March 6, 1994.
The cases were brought to this Court for automatic review.
From a perusal of the records of the case, it appears that the procedural rules to be
observed for the validity of the arraignment of the accused were irregularly
complied with; similar to what happened in the case of Alicando.
 1. The complaints were not read in detail
2. No record that the accused and his counsel were furnished a copy of
each complaint.
3. Accused was not specifically warned of the consequences on his plea of
guilty.
4. Complaints were supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local dialect."
5. Duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the arraignment of accused arraigned validly in pursuant to Rule 116 of
the Rules of Court.
ACTIONS of the COURT Not Applicable
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
No.
Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that:
1. Arraignment should be made in open court by judge or by clerk
of court
2. The accused be furnished a copy of complaint or information
with list of witnesses stated therein
3. Reading of complaint or information in the language or dialect
that is known to him (mandatory requirement)
4. Asking him what his plea is to the charge
1. It appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five
complaints, synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript, thus:
"(Reading the information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local
dialect)." Since what was supposed to have been read was stated in the
singular, but there were five criminal complaints against appellant, this
Court is then left to speculate on whether all five criminal complaints
were actually read, translated or explained to appellant on a level within
his comprehension, considering his limited education.
2. There is no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio
was furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses against
him, in order that the latter may duly prepare and comply with his
responsibilities.
3. Of more troublous concern is the fact that appellant was not specifically
warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event be
given the death penalty under the "New Law," as the trial court calls
Republic Act No. 7659. He was also not categorically advised that his
plea of guilty would not under any circumstance affect or reduce the
death sentence as he may have believed or may have been erroneously
advised.
4. Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the
complaints were supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local dialect."
Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that appellant fully
understood that medium of expression.
The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that
the accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as
the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts.
This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-
important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is,
therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary
defense in rebuttal thereof. 14 It is an integral aspect of the due process
clause under the Constitution.
5. The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict injunction that the trial
court must fully discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching
inquiry in such a way as would indubitably show that appellant had made
not only a clear, definite and unconditional plea, but that he did so with a
well-informed understanding and full realization of the consequences
thereof.
The Court therefore, on judicial conscience cannot accept as valid a plea of Rule 116 Arraignment
guilty to a charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by an accused
with a befuddled state of mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law. Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional
right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
Adverting Alicando, we reiterated therein that pursuant to Binabay vs. People, et against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the
al., 24 no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
in Alicando the arraignment of appellant therein was void, the judgment of imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of
conviction rendered against him was likewise void, hence in fairness to him and in the State is mobilized against him.
justice to the offended party that case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours with the aforementioned cases on
the particular determinant issue, we have perforce to yield to the same doctrine
and disposition.
PEOPLE VS. PANGILINAN
SUPREME COURT RULING: SET ASIDE & REMANDED to trial court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
The decretal portion reads: vs.
ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-Appellant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568
and 43571 convicting accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two G.R. Nos. 171020
crimes of rape is hereby SET ASIDE. Said cases are REMANDED to the trial March 14, 2007
court for further and appropriate proceedings, with instructions that the same be Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO
given appropriate priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with
deliberate dispatch and circumspection.
Nature of Case:
Automatic Review by Supreme Court

BRIEF
2 complaints filed against Alfredo Pangilinan for committing rape against his
daughter.

FACTS

Two information were filed charging Pangilinan with raping AAA, his
daughter.

1. 5 May 1997 P, who was arrested and detained with no bail

recommended, filed a petition for bail.
2. 23 April 1998 RTC, finding that the evidence against P is strong,
denied Ps petition for bail.
3. Defense presented its evidence with P as the sole witness.
4. 9 June 1999 RTC, having discovered that P had not yet been arraigned,
scheduled his arraignment.
5. 17 June 1999, P, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not
guilty to the charges against him.
6. 9 Sep 1999 RTC convicted Pangilinan of two counts of rape.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person on Pangilinan?
2. Whether Pangilinans rights and interests prejudiced by the fact
that he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for
decision?
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC convicted on two counts of rape and imposed two death sentences
CA - affirmed the death penalties imposed by the trial court but modified the
amounts of damages awarded.
SC- affirmed with modification on the penalty.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. Whether RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person on Pangilinan?
Yes. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the
RTC had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule
that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest
or voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the Pangilinan when he was arrested on 19 Mar
1997. His arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the RTC
jurisdiction over his person.
2. Whether Pangilinans rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he
was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision?
No. Ps belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural
defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without
raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.
In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His
counsels active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that
he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel
would have objected and informed the court of this blunder.
Moreover, no protest was made when Pangilinan was subsequently
arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by
the RTC. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to 2 death
sentences, that P cries that his constitutional right has been
violated. It is already too late to raise this procedural defect.
In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was
raised under similar circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of
accused was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured.
SUPREME COURT RULING
The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 16 November 2005 finding appellant Alfredo Pangilinan y Trinidad guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that each penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346. He is also ordered to pay private complainant AAA, for each count of rape,
the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant.
Rule 116 Arraignment / SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted
for three counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the employee. The accused offered withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to the same with a plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be appreciated in their
offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return favor.
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed
instead to substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public
document by a public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser
crime of falsification of a public document by a private individual.
DAAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner, their plea of "not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of
vs. failure of an accountable officer to render accounts. The Sandiganbayan denied
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent. petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the
prosecution, on the main ground that no cogent reason was presented to justify its
G.R. Nos. 163972-77 approval. Hence, this appeal.
March 28, 2008
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ISSUE/S of the CASE

Nature of Case: Whether Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Appeal petitioners plea bargaining offer.

BRIEF
2 complaints filed against Alfredo Pangilinan for committing rape against his ACTIONS of the COURT Not Applicable
daughter.

FACTS COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

Joselito Daan together with co-accused Benedicto Kuizon were charged for three
counts of malversation of public funds which they purportedly tried to conceal by
falsifying the time book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some
laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato,
Leyte and collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact,
they did not.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser
offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. At arraignment, the accused,
with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before
trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings.
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be
considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference,8 viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. In all criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or admissions made or entered
during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the
accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The
agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be
approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after
the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested
its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it
was made only after the prosecution already presented several
witnesses.
Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. With respect to
the falsification cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in
pleading guilty for a lesser offense of falsification by private individual defined
and penalized under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code will strengthen the
cases against the principal accused, the Municipal Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who
appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After all, the movants herein
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as draftsman detailed as
foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has
already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by
the provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002.
In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the
accused. There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in
the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to
our mind, merits consideration.
Petition granted.
SUPREME COURT RULING Suspension of Arraignment

The decretal portion reads: PEOPLE vs. KHADDAFY JANJALANI, et.al

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
2004 and May 31, 2004 are SETASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is vs
hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of KHADDAFY JANJALANI, et.al, accused-appealant
this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision. G.R. No. 188314
January 10, 2011
Ponente: Sereno, J

NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review (Appeal)

BRIEF

Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005.
The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely, Gamal B.
Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat
Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as
required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death
Penalty).

FACTS

This was the case of the Valentines Day bombing in 2005 by members of the
Abu Sayyaf, which according to them was a gift to the then Pres. Arroyo. A bomb
exploded in the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the
MRT terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center. Prior to the
explosion, at around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move
out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the bus conductor noticed two
men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the
conductor obliged and let them in.According to the bus conductor, he became
wary of the two because of its suspicious attitude, sitting apart with each other in
the bus and looked dumb strucked when asked to pay for the fare, the conductor
noticed that both of the accused paid for two fares each. Their eyes were also
reddish and the other man who sat at the back of the bus appeared to be slouching,
with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden
from view as if he was tinkering with something. Despite the suspicion the
conductor never reported to the police. Moreover, the two men frequently asked
the conductor if the bus would stop over Ayala Avenue. Upon reaching the said
destination, the both of the accused insisted to alight from the bus even if it is not
yet the proper unloading zone. Suddenly, the bus exploded causing the death of
the four passengers and more or less 40 persons injured.
The accused indicted in the pre-trial were Trinidad and Baharan and admitted
guilt in some television interviews, later Asali, another accused who turned out to
be a state witness, gave a tv interview , confessing that he had supplied the
explosive devices. On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim.
Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On
the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge
(Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and
Baharan pled not guilty. , the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge
of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier
charge ofmultiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. The
two accused acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for
re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad
pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.Later, accused filed an
appeal, arguing, among others, that the trial court did not conduct a searching
inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty.
ISSUE/s of the CASE
Whether or not a searching inquiry by the trial court in the re-arraignment is
necessary before allowing the changing of pleas of the accused?
ACTION OF THE COURT
SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE
The Court ruled that a searching inquiry must have been conducted by the judge
in the re-arraignment. As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has
ruled that all trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's
plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty
bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable
conviction.Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure
under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Such requirement applies in re-
arraignment. The Court have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a
searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to
satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress;
mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea.This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Nevertheless, the court are not unmindful of the context under which the
re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of
guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad
previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that
prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made
two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive
television interviews), and the other via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation).
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court deem it unnecessary to rule
on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. However, the Court
still upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, in lieu of the sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused
which was proved in the trial court.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Suspension of Arraignment The respondent was a subscriber of Reuter's and CNN live feeds. After it received
the live feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's arrival and homecoming from Reuter's, it
immediately aired the video from that news feed. The respondent alleged that its
ABS-CBN vs GOZON news staff was not aware that there was (a news embargo) agreement between
ABSCBN and Reuters. Respondent alleged that it was not also aware that it aired
ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioner, petitioner's footage.
vs
FELIPE GOZON, et al., Respondents.
On December 3, 2004, Prosecutor Venturanza issued resolution which found
G.R. No. 195956 probable cause to indict Dela Pena-Reyes and Manalastas. The respondents
March 11, 2015 appealed the Prosecutors resolution before the DOJ. DOJ Secretary Raul M.
Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen Gonzalez ruled in favor of GMA in his resolution dated 1 August 2005 and held
that good faith may be raised as a defense in the case.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
Before the court is a petition for Review on Certiorari filed by ABS-CBN
Corporation to assail the November 9, 2010 Decision and the March 3, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals which reinstated the Department of Justice
Resolution dated August 1, 2005 that ordered the withdrawal of the Information
finding probable cause for respondents' violation of Sections 1774 and 2115 of the
Intellectual Property Code. Respondents are officers and employees of GMA
Network, Inc. (GMA-7).
FACTS
On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against
respondent GMA for (alleged) act of copyright infringement under the Intellectual
Property Code because the GMA aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of
OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-
CBN stated that it has an agreement with Reuter's that the petition will contribute
news and content that it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of the latter's
news and video material, and Reuters will ensure that ABS-CBN's materials
cannot be aired in the country.
Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas motioned to suspend proceedings. The trial
court granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Dela Pea-Reyes and
Manalastas on January 19, 2005 saying that Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, once a petition for review is filed with the
Department of Justice, a suspension of the criminal proceedings may be allowed
by the court.
Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued a resolution on which
reversed Sec. Gonzalez's resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela
Pena-Reyes, Manalastas, as well as to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho
for violation of the Intellectual Property Code (due to copyright infringement).
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing and setting aside DOJ Sec.
Agra's resolution.
The appellate court stated that the ABSCBN has copyright of its news coverage,
but GMAs act of airing five (5) seconds of the homecoming footage without
notice of the No Access Philippines restriction of the live Reuter's video feed,
was undeniably attended by good faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal
liability under the Intellectual Property Code.
ISSUE/s Of The CASE:
Whether or not the grant of the trial court on the motion to suspend proceedings
was proper.
ACTIONs Of The COURT
SC: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to continue with the Arraignment & Plea
proceedings in criminal case. BILL OF PARTICULARS

ENRILE vs PEOPLE
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
The trial court granted respondents' Motion to Suspend Proceedings and deferred vs
respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and Manalastas' arraignment for 60 days in view of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG,
the Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice. et al., Respondents.
Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension
G.R. No. 213455
of the accused's arraignment in certain circumstances only:
August 11, 2015
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. -Upon motion by the proper party, the Ponente: Justice Brion
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to NATURE OF THE CASE
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental Petition for Certiorari
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; BRIEF

(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and Before the court is a petition for certiorari with prayers:

(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition
with the reviewing office.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Pea-Reyes and
Manalastas' arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for
Review before the Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on
September 13, 2010 that the temporary restraining order was issued by the Court
of Appeals. The trial court erred when it did not act on the criminal case during
the interim period. It had full control and direction of the case. As Judge Mogul
reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure to proceed with the
arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes the Court's
independence and integrity.
(a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition;
(b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and
(c) to issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents from holding a
pre-trial and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-
02381
filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014
resolutions2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB).
FACTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder
against Enrile, (Napoles and the PDAF scam) before the Sandiganbayan.
Enrile motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause
and ad cautelam motion for bail; and a supplemental opposition to issuance of
warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information.
The SB heard both motions and denied Enriles motions and ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.
Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him that his arraignment will be on
July 11, 2014. Before the date of arraignment, Enrile filed a motion for bill of
particulars before the SB but the latter denied Enriles motion essentially on the
following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are substantial reiterations of the arguments he
raised in his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for
dismissal of information; and (2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and
are best ventilated during trial.
Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and alleges
that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of
plunder had been.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether or not the denial of the motion for bill of particulars because it is just
substantial reiterations was proper.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
SC: SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayans resolutions which denied Enriles
motion for bill of particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
No. The denial was not proper. That every element constituting the offense had
been alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for
more specific details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have
committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause
and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for
purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE VS. LACSON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.AL., petitioners
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent
G.R. No. 149453
April 1, 2003
Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Motion for Reconsideration
BRIEF:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to
the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said court. In the
aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged with
multiple murder for the shooting and killing of 11 male persons. The Court
granted the Motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.
FACTS:
In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, respondent and his co-
accused were charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of 11
male persons. These cases were later provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr.
A new rule states that provisional dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. The Court ruled in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of the cases
were with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for such
when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for
examination of witnesses. The Court also held that although Section 8, Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect,
there is still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are
attendant. In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend
that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-
bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively. The respondent, on the other
hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in
his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional dismissal of the
criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the
respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the
dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them. The respondent further asserts that the
heirs of the victims, through the public and private prosecutors, were duly notified
of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the
public prosecutor was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion
for judicial determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal
actions are always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private
complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
1. Whether Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
is applicable in the cases.- NO
2. Whether the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be
given a retroactive application without reservations, only and solely on
the basis of its being favorable to the accused. - NO
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
SC: Motion for reconsideration is granted. The Resolution dated May 28, 2002, is
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
1. Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable in Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The Court has
reviewed the records and has found the contention of the petitioners
meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and
with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any
amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With
respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six
(6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived.
Having invoked said rule, the respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
a. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the
case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case;
b. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case;
c. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally;
d. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.
The requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the
time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for
the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional
dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting
that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for
the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. The
respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the
first paragraph. The prosecution did not file any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the
respondent merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and for examination of prosecution witnesses.
 2. The time-bar of 2 years under the new rule should not be applied is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-
retroactively against the State. To apply the time-bar retroactively so that 101112 with deliberate dispatch.
the 2-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public
prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the
new rule. Instead of giving the State 2 years to revive provisionally
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than 2 years to do so.
Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the cases on March 29, 1999. The new
rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-
bar retroactively, the State would have only 1 year and 3 months or until
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period
is short of the 2-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand,
if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have 2 years
from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to
revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new
rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevents injustice to the State and
avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in
the administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded
in the computation of the 2-year period because the rule prescribing it
was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to
comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived
its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was
negligent for not reviving them within the 2-year period under the new
rule. The 2-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely
to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship
to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general
and of criminal laws in particular.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28,
2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24,
2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent
with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for
being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81,
Prescription for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
PANAGUITON VS. DOJ
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G.
CAWILI, respondents.
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Ponente: Tinga, J.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for Review
BRIEF:
This is a Petition for Review of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed
Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration. Petition is granted by the Court setting aside CA resolutions and
ordered DOJ to refile the information against Tongson.
FACTS:
In 1992, Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00
from petitioner. Later, Cawili and his business associate Tongson, jointly issued in
favor of petitioner 3 checks in payment. All checks bore the signatures of both
Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored,
either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made
formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili and upon Tongson,
but to no avail. Petitioner consequently filed a complaint against Cawili and
Tongson for violating B.P. Blg. 22. During the preliminary investigation, only
Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been
unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money
to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not
Cawili's business associate; that, he himself had filed several criminal cases
against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the
bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been
falsified.
To counter, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures
which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had
claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution, the City Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili.
Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even while the case against Cawili
was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after
finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he
had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the
preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer
the questioned signatures to the NBI.
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was
denied for lack of merit.
Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her
resolution, ACP held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No.
3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall
prescribe after 4 years. Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ dismissed the
same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time ruled in his favor and declared that the
offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
However, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the
withdrawal of the 3 informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson.
In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the
offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and
not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses
penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing
the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court
of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that
the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical
grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the
questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
Whether the offense has already prescribed?-NO
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
CA: Case dismissed in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification
and certification of non-forum shopping.
SC: Petition is granted. CA Resolutions were set aside. DOJs resolution dated 9
August 2004 is also annulled and set aside. DOJ is ordered to refile the
information against the petitioner.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The Court ruled and held that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing
of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August
1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the
accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses
they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite
finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is
no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under
special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent
provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
(a) x x x; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for
more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy. Act. No. 3326 indeed applies to offenses under
B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than 30 days but not more than 1 year or by a fine, hence, under Act No.
3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in 4) years from the commission of the
offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof.
However, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can
toll the running of the prescriptive period.
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act
No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of
conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the
justices of the peace.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. A clear example
would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August
1995, well within the 4-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his
appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods.
However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of
the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed
resolution, an aggregate period of 9 years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was
beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active
prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks
because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No.
3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and
actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further
simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner.
The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments
of an information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law.
Evidencealiunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE VS. DUMLAO
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO and EMILIO LAO y
GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 168918
March 2, 2009
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Appeal
BRIEF:
On appeal is the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16699
dated 14 July 2005 which granted the Motion to Dismiss/Quash of respondent
Hermenegildo C. Dumlao and dismissed the case against him. The Sandiganbayan
likewise ordered the case against respondent Emilio G. Lao archived. Petition is
granted by the Court and reversed the Sandiganbayans resolution on granting
Dismiss/Quash of respondent Dumlao. Further, it directed the Sandiganbayan to
set the case for the reception of evidence for the prosecution.
FACTS:
On 19 July 1991, an Amended Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan
charging respondents Dumlao, et. al., with violation of Section 3(g) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
That the Dumlao,et.al., being then the members of the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
while in the performance of their official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally enter into contract of lease-purchase with a private
person whereby the GSIS agreed to sell a GSIS acquired property consisting of 3
parcels of land with an area of 821 square meters together with a 5-storey building
situated for the sum of P2,000,000.00 with a down payment of P200,000.00 with
the balance payable in fifteen years at 12% interest per annum compounded
yearly, with a yearly amortization ofP264,278.37 including principal and interest
granting Lao the right to sub-lease the ground floor for his own account during the
period of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the yearly
amortization which contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
When arraigned, respondent Dumlao, with the assistance of counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. As agreed upon by the prosecution and
respondent Dumlao, a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was
submitted to the court.
On 21 February 2005, respondent Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He stated that the
prosecutions main thrust against him was the alleged approval by the GSIS Board
of Trustees -- of which he was a member -- of the Lease-Purchase Agreement
entered into by and among the GSIS, the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) and respondent Lao. He argued that the allegedly approved
Board Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board of Trustees,
contrary to the allegations in the information. Since the signatures of Ver, Cruz,
Canlas and Clave did not appear in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April
1982, he said it was safe to conclude that these people did not participate in the
alleged approval of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. This being the case, he
maintained that there was no quorum of the board to approve the supposed
resolution authorizing the sale of the GSIS property. There being no approval by
the majority of the Board of Trustees, there can be no resolution approving the
Lease-Purchase Agreement. The unapproved resolution, he added, proved his
innocence. He further contended that the person to be charged should be Atty.
Luis Javellana, who sold the subject property to respondent Lao without the
proper authority. He likewise wondered why he alone was charged without
including the other two signatories in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April
1982.
On 14 July 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed resolution. On 2
September 2005, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Ombudsman, thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case against respondent
Dumlao.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
1. Whether the court erred in dismissing case after pre-trial and before
prosecution could formally present its evidence. YES
2. Whether the facts charged in the information actually constitute an
offense. YES
3. Whether insufficiency of evidence is a ground for Motion to Dismiss.
NO
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
Sandiganbayan: Motion to Dismiss/Quash granted
SC: The resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Dismiss/Quash
of respondent Dumlao is reversed and set aside.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
1. The Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case, because there was
evidence, at that time, when it dismissed the case against respondent
Dumlao. The dismissal by the lower court of the case against respondent
Dumlao was indeed premature. It should have given the prosecution the
opportunity to fully present its case and to establish reasonable doubt on
the alleged approval by the GSIS Board of Trustees of the lease-purchase
of the GSIS properties. The Sandiganbayan violated the prosecutions
right to due process. The prosecution was deprived of its opportunity to
prosecute its case and to prove the accused culpability. The dismissal was
made in a capricious and whimsical manner. The trial court dismissed the
case on a ground not invoked by the respondent. The Sandiganbayan
dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence, while the ground
invoked by the respondent was that the facts charged did not constitute
an offense. The dismissal was clearly premature, because any dismissal
based on insufficiency of evidence may only be made after the
prosecution rests its case and not at any time before then.[26] A purely
capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of a fair
 opportunity to prosecute and convict. It denies the prosecution a day in Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its
court. It is void and cannot be the basis of double jeopardy. case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the
2. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to
averments of an information is whether the facts alleged therein, which evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essentials elements of
the crime defined by law. Evidencealiunde, or matters extrinsic of the The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for
Information, are not be considered. The elements of the crime under insufficiency of evidence, even without giving the prosecution the
Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the opportunity to present its evidence.In so doing, it violated the
accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or prosecutions right to due process. It deprived the prosecution of its
transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accuseds culpability.
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, will prove all the SUPREME COURT RULING:
elements of Section 3(g) as against respondent Dumlao. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16699 dated 14 July 2005
3. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. granting the Motion to Dismiss/Quash of respondent Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, is
The grounds, as enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith
of Criminal Procedure, are as follows: DIRECTED to set the case for the reception of evidence for the prosecution.
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of
the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a
singlepunishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after

the prosecution rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:
CEREZO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES The Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the OP-QC and directed to re-
file the information for libel.
JOSEPH CEREZO
vs. With the resolution by the DOJ the RTC granted the petitions motion for
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES reconsideration stating that the order of dismissal it issued did not yet attained
finality as there was a pending Motion for Reconsideration filed in the DOJ.

G.R. No. 185230 The motion for reconsideration of the respondents were denied by the RTC thus a
June 1, 2011 Petition for Certiorari was filed arguing that the RTC Orders violated their
Pontante: NACHURA, J constitutional right against double jeopardy.

The Court of Appeals found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in
Nature of the Case: ordering the reinstatement of the case. All of the elements of double jeopardy
Petition for Review of Certiorari exist, namely:
a. Valid information sufficient in form and substance.
BRIEF: b. The information was filed before a court of competent jurisdiction
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking c. Termination of the case was not expressly consented to by
to annul the July 11, 2008 Decision and November 4, 2008 Resolution of the respondents.
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, which reversed and set aside
the October 24, 2006 and the February 26, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the DOJ Secretary has no jurisdiction
Court(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92. over the case as mandated in the DOJ Department Order No. 223 that no appeal
shall be entertained if the accused has already been arraigned or, if the
FACTS: arraignment took place during the pendency of the appeal.

Petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for liber against Juliet Yaneza, Pablo
Abunda, Jr. and Vicente Afulugencia and Oscar Mapalo. The Quezon City ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Prosecutors Office (OP-QC) finding probable cause filed corresponding Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the
Information before the RTC. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration impregnable wall of double jeopardy.
and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence before the OP-QC which
later on issued a resolution reversing its decision and thus a Motion to Dismiss ACTION of the COURT:
and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC. However, respondents were RTC : Dismissed the criminal case following the withdrawal of
already arraigned to which they all entered a not guilty plea. The RTC ordered the Information by the OP- QC
criminal case dismissed stating that the Court finds merit in the motion of the DOJ : Set aside the decision of the City Prosecutor directing to re-file
Public Prosecutor to dismiss the case. Aggrieved, Petitioner moved for the the information
reconsideration of the Order stating that the OP-QC resolution dismissing the case RTC : Reversed its decision following the DOJ Resolution
did not attain finality since a Petition for Review was filed before the Department CA : Annulled the RTC Orders ruling that the elements of double
of Justice. With this information the RTC deferred the action on the said motion jeopardy exist.
waiting for the decision of the DOJ.
SC : Annulled and Set Aside the Orders of the RTC. The case is
REMANDED to the QC RTC for evaluation on whether probable
cause exists to hold respondents for trial
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the
findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts
bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and this
assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
In this case the RTC both relied on the recommendation of the Public
Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice in rending the decision without any
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case, thus the Orders
were stained with grave abuse of discretion and violated the complainants right to
due process. They were void, had no legal standing, and produced no effect
whatsoever.
Double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Since the motion
to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion then respondents were
not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and the assailed
July 11, 2008 Decision and the November 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, and the October 24, 2006 and the February
26, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Quezon
City RTC, Branch 92, for evaluation on whether probable cause exists to hold
respondents for trial.
CO vs. UY
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner
vs
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,
respondent
G.R. No. 183994
June 30, 2014
Ponented: PERALTA, J
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 2008 and August 1,
2008 Resolutions of the Court of Appeal s (CA) in CA-G.R. SP NO. 102975,
which dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
FACTS:
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for violation of BP Bilang
22 was filed against Petitioner William Co by Respondent Prosperity Plastic
Products represented by Elizabeth Uy. The case was later on provisionally
dismissed on June 9, 2003 in an open court. Ms. Uy received the noticed on July
2, 2003 and her counsel the day later. A motion to revive the case was filed on
July 2, 2004 which was granted, and the motion for reconsideration filed by Co
was dismissed. Co moved for recusation to which the presiding Judge handling
the case move to inhibit, thus the case was raffled to MeTC branch in Caloocan.
Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injuction before he RTC
challenging the revival of the criminal case which was later on denied. Co then
filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court which was also
dismissed and made final and executory after no motion for reconsideration was
filed.
Before the MeTC, Co filed a Motion for Permanent Dismissal which was opposed
by respondent Uy raising that the issues were already resolved with finality by the
Supreme Court. However, Judge Gonzaga granted the petition of Co, thus
Respondent Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan which
acted favorably, directing MeTC to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.
Petitioner Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which was denied
thus a petition was filed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner
on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial constitutes final
dismissal of these cases;
2. Whether or not the MeTC acted with jurisdiction in reviving the
criminal cases against petitioner which were dismissed on the
ground of denial of his right to speedy trial; and
3. Assuming por gratia argumenti the cases were only provisionally
dismissed:
a. Whether the one-year time bar of their revival is computed
from issuance of the Order of Provisional Dismissal.
b. Whether the actual number of days in a year is the basis for
computing the one-year time bar;
c. Whether the provisionally dismissed cases against
petitioner are revived ipso facto by the filing of motion to
revive these cases
ACTIONS of the COURT
MeTC : Provisionally dismissed the Case
RTC : Affirmed the MeTC for the revival of the case and dismissed the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner.
SC : Affirmed the Decision of the RTC
MeTC : Granted the Motion for Permanent Dismissal filed by Petitioner
and Denied the Motion for reconsideration of the Respondent
RTC : Granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the Respondent and
Ordered the MeTC to proceed with the trial
CA : Dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Petitioner
SC : Denied the Petition
COURT RATIONALE ON THE FACTS:
The Supreme Court noted that the issues raised in the petition were also the meat
of the controversy in Cos previous petition which was dismissed and the
resolution became final and executory.
a. Denial for a speedy trial
The Supreme Court emphasized that speedy trial is a relative
term and necessarily a flexible concept, and in determining
accuseds right to speedy trial was violated the delay should be
considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The
factors are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason
therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d)
prejudice caused by such delay. Unjustified postponements
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are
what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
b. Requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules,
which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in
the second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express
conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the
motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an
order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4)
the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case. As noted in the case, no notice of any motion for
provisional dismissal or of the hearing was served on the private
complainants at least three days before said hearing as mandated. Such
notice will enable the offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object to the
motion on valid grounds, including (a) the collusion between the
prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal
case thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts
to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the
case with the consequent release of the accused from detention would
enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witness or flee from Philippine Jurisdiction provide
 opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and
other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover
on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of
preliminary attachment against his property.
c. The order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of
the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution. When a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all
kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the letter to his/her
given address.
d. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year
or a leap year. A year is composed of 12 calendar months. The number
of days is irrelevant.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30,
2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-
G.R. SP NO. 102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside
the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Crimila Case
Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of the
suit be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar-Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C. Maglague for his acts that appear to
have violated the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rule on Forum Shopping.
SORIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP),
and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC)
G.R. No. 159517-18
June 30, 2009
Ponente: NACHURA, J
Nature of the Case:
Appeal by Certiorari
BRIEF:
Petitioners Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan (petitioners) appeal by
certiorari the August 5, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649
FACTS:
Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan were the President and General Manager,
respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. Petitioners
indirectly obtained loan from RBSM by falsifying the loan applications and other
bank records.
The State Prosecutor charged Soriano in the RTC with violation of Section 83 of
Republic Act No. 337 or the General Banking Act, as amended by PD No. 1795
or Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI)
Rules in relation to the information that he indirectly borrow or secure a loan with
Rural Bank of San Miguel amounting to P15 million without the consent and
approval of the majority of the directors of the bank, by using the name of one
depositor VIRGILIO J. MALANG who have no knowledge of the said loan.
On the same day, information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document
was filed against Soriano and Ilagan. It was alleged that Petitioners falsify loan
documents by making it appear that VIRGILIO J. MALANG secured a loan for
P15 million.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-
2000 respectively and were raffled to Branch 14.

Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A No. 337, as amended, was
filed against Soriano, covering P 15 million loan obtained in the name of
ROGELIO MAAOL.
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial
document for obtaining the said loan. It was also alleged that Petitioners falsify
loan documents to make it appear that one depositor named ROGELIO MAAOL
secured a loan worth P15 million.
The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively and
were raffled to Branch 77.
Petitioners moved to quash all the information filed in Branch 77 and Branch 14
on the grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense. They argued that Soriano was charged with
violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents
for allegedly securing fictitious loans, and that the facts alleged in the information
do not constitute an offense. The motion to quash was denied, the Court ruled that
accused Hilario P. Soriano was charged in Criminal Case No. 1980-M-2000 for
Violation of Sec. 83 of R.A. NO. 337 as amended by PD 1795 and Criminal Case
No. 19810M-2000 for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents.
Thus, each Information charges only one offense.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the
Orders of Branch 77 and Branch 14 dismissing their motion to quash. The CA
denied the motion to quash thus the petitioners submit for resolution the same
matters to the Supreme Court arguing that the RTC Branch 14 and 77 abused their
discretion in denying their motion to quash information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
motion to quash on the ground that the information filed constitutes more than one
offense in it thus violating Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC : Denied the Motion to Quash
CA : Sustained the denial of Petitoners separate motions to quash
SC : Denied the petition for review and affirmed the decision of the
CA
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The term GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, in its juridical sense, connotes
capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and capricious manner by
reason of passion and hostility.
Duplicity of offense in single information is a ground to quash the information
under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. By
duplicity of charge means a single complaint or information that charges more
than one offense. In the case, more than one information and each charges a
different offense.
Petitioner argues that he can only be charged with one offense since all are based
on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. However jurisprudence teems that a
single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions.
A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural,
reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a
director, officer, stockholder and other related interest in the bank.
The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretense, and damage,
which are essential elements for estafa are not elements of a DOSRI violation.
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the
proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash information. The proper
procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without
prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion
to quash and if after trail on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Thus Petition for review is DENIED.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
RULE 117
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
People vs De Leon, 754 SCRA 147
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG
DE LEON, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 197546
March 23, 2015
Ponente: PEREZ, J.:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
For review is the conviction for the crime of Murder of accused-appellants
BAYANI DE LEON (Bayani), ANTONIO DE LEON (Antonio), DANILO DE
LEON (Danilo), and YOYONG DE LEON (Yoyong) by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),1 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-113990, which Decision2 was affirmed with
modifications by the Court of Appeals. The accused-appellants were charged with
Robbery with Homicide.
FACTS

The accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide under an
Information which reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of violence and/or intimidation
against [sic] person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob
one EMILIO A. PRASMO, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place
aforementioned, while victim/deceased Emilio A. Prasmo was walking along A.
Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia, Novaliches, this City, together with his
wife and daughter in-law, accused pursuant to their conspiracy armed with
sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal. revolver rob EMILIO A. PRASMO and
took and carried away P7,000.00, Philippine currency, and by reason or on the
occasion thereof, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and
treachery, accused with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon EMILIOA. PRASMO by then and there shooting and hacking the
victim with the use of said weapons, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Emilio A. Prasmo.
When arraigned, all the accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty except
accused Antonio. Thus, the RTC ordered a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is
concerned.
The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as
charged in the Information, but found all the accused guilty of the crime of
murder. According to the RTC, contrary to the charge of robbery with homicide,
the accused is guilty of the crime of murder because the prosecution failed to
establish the crime of robbery. The RTC, citing People v. Nimo,23 ratiocinated
that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, robbery must be
proven as conclusively as the killing itself.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of
the RTC and found all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However,
contrary to the findings of the RTC with regard to the crime of robbery, the Court
of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of the
separate crime of robbery.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the accused appellant can be convicted for crime of
murder which is different from the crime filed in the information which
is robbery with Homicide. Yes
2. Whether or not the accused appellant Danilo De Leon was placed in
double jeopardy when the appellate court also found him guilty of
robbery based on the same information filed where he was already found
guilty of murder. Yes
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Accused appelants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER
CA: AFFIRMED in toto with the added MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Danilo de Leon is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED except for the modification which
was aside.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. With regard to the crime charged, accused-appellants are guilty of the
crime of Murder instead of Robbery with Homicide. As borne by the
records, the only intent of the accused-appellants was to kill Emilio. The
"accused-appellants had an axe to grind against Emilio x x x. The means
used by the accused-appellants as well as the nature and number of
wounds - debilitating, fatal and multiple inflicted by appellants on the
deceased manifestly revealed their design to kill him. The robbery
committed by appellant Danilo [was on] the spur of the moment or [was]
a mere afterthought."
As we already held, the nature and location of wounds are considered
important indicators which disprove a plea of self-defense. A perusal of
the evidence would depict the presence of a deliberate onslaught against
Emilio. The means used by accused-appellants as shown by the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by Emilio are so much more
than sufficient to repel or prevent any alleged attack of Emilio against
 accused-appellant Antonio. Evidently, the accused-appellants intent to
kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds
sustained by Emilio. The wounds sustained by Emilio indubitably reveal
that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a homicidal
aggression on the part of accused-appellants.
2. We find that the appellate court erred for violating the constitutional right
of Danilo against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense.1wphi1 If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.24
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a
valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was
acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.25
In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double
jeopardy: (1) a valid Information for robbery with homicide was filed;
(2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted
Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which
amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Indeed the
conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery was not
proven. The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of
murder and not of robbery with homicide on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone.
evidence is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of
double jeopardy.27 A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. In
fact, the Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal of the trial
court28 due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to
afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard
from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.29
The crime of robbery was not proven during the trial. As we discussed,
the acquittal of the accused-appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-Appellants BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE
LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON are hereby declared guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellants are ordered to pay Emilio
Prasmo's heirs the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for Emilio
Prasmo's death, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded

from ruling on the innocence or guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery.
To once again rule on the innocence or guilt of the accused of the same
crime transgresses the Constitutional prohibition not to put any person
"twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."26 As it
stands, the acquittal on the crime of robbery based on lack of sufficient
RULE 119
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness.
Salvanera vs People, 523 SCRA 147
Rimberto T. Salvanera, petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines and Lucita Parane, responedents
G.R. No. 143093
May 21, 2007
Ponente: Puno, C.J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46945. The Court of Appeals discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and
Domingo Tampelix from the Information in Criminal Case No. TM-1730 for
Murder, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, to
become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise cancelled the bail bond of
petitioner Rimberto Salvanera.
FACTS
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera,
together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is
charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with
treachery and evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN
PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his body, resulting to
his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
victim.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay,
the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to
the place of the commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood
money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained, except
Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large.
Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on March 4,
1997, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo
Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when
it denied the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be
state witnesses. -Yes
2. Whether or not the cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner is proper. -
Yes
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Granted petitioners application for bail and denied the prosecutions
motion for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix.
CA: Discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the
Information to become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner
Salvanera.
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the
following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
 (2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its
case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the
very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We
have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow
criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the
conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing proof of
veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some particulars, we
can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other respects." It is
enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other
witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the
records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important
points by each others testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the
testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their
trustworthiness becomes manifest." As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and
Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the conspirators. Where a crime is
contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential because
only they have knowledge of the crime.8 The other prosecution witnesses are not
eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and
proposed state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the
commission of the crime.
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the
prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a
person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation
of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having
committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain
the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude
the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised,
who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions
addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to
prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is
limited. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not
to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every
now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such
errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more than courts should correct the
blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice
at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts
should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually
level.
2. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail bond of
petitioner. The grant of petitioners application for bail is premature. It has to
await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies
must be given their proper weight in determining whether the petitioner is entitled
to bail.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999,
September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto.
RULE 119
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the order of the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused,
or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served
on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against
the accused.
Vda. de Manguerra vs Risos, 563 SCRA 471
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON
C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY.
GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, respondents.
G.R. No. 152643
August 28, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
Nature of Case:
Petition for review on certiorari
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 15, 2001 and its
Resolution2 dated March 12, 2002. The CA decision set aside the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25, 20003 granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda.
de Manguerras (Concepcions) motion to take deposition, and dated November 3,
20004 denying the motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul G. Risos,
Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.
FACTS
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19,
through a criminal information dated October 27, 1999, which was subsequently
amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-
52248,5 arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly
committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner
of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to
the document. Hence, the criminal case.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City,
while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila
for further treatment.
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the
Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial
question. They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for
declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved.8 On May 11,
2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcions motion for
reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000.9
This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before
the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and remains pending before the appellate
court to date.10
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters
deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to
her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents petition
by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This
notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that
the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23
of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to
civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court
where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of
Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the examination of prosecution witnesses in the present case is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. Yes, Rule 119 applies
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: No. RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be
taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
CA: Yes. Set aside decision of RTC and any deposition that may have been taken
on the authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in
the presence of the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in order that
the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face.26 It also
gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they
deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the credibility of
said witnesses.27 Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses
demeanor.28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of
Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a
party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12,29 1330
and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect
on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who,
according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial
court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him,
shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a
waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcions advanced age and health condition exempt
her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the
coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the
coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be
conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial;
or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.
Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too
sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally
examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear
before the court for examination during the trial proper.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose
of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As
correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may
not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this
requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness
deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true
when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve its witness testimony to TRIAL
prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
protection of the accuseds constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the
trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
COBADOR VS. PEOPLE
SUPREME COURT RULING:
ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner,
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision vs.
and Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA- PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. SP No. 62551, are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 186001
SO ORDERED. October 2, 2009
PONENTE: ABAD. J,

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for review on certiorari

BRIEF:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision of August 4, 2008 and Resolution of October 28, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP 100431 that affirmed the August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.

FACTS:
On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador
before the RTC of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-00-93291 of murdering, in
conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio. On February 13, 2006, after
presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC
declared at an end the prosecutions presentation of evidence and required the
prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within
15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of time,
the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not make
the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case,
complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention
in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the
circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had
not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution witnesses did
not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006
the prosecution asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal
offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his
motion to dismiss.
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabadors
August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed
his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right
to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted for
decision insofar as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration
of this Order but the RTC denied it on February 19, 2007. Cabador questioned the
RTCs actions before the CA but on August 4, 2008 the latter denied his petition
and affirmed the lower courts actions. With the CAs denial of his motion for
reconsideration, on October 28, 2008 petitioner came to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court was
in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he
effectively waived his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted the
case for decision insofar as he was concerned
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC - RTC ISSUED an Order treating petitioner Cabadors August 1, 2006
motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence therefore declaring his waiver to
present evidence in his defense
CA - AFFIRMED the August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City and DENIED the petition.
SC - REVERSED and SET ASIDE October 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100431 and NULLIFIED August 31, 2006 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81
COURT RATIONALE OF ABOVE FACTS
Tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, to determine whether the pleading
filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1)
the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it
is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the
accuseds right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable,
vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified
postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.This was the main thrust of
Cabadors motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by
the trial court.
The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because
of the prosecutors absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the
prosecutions repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its
failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his
right to speedy trial. But the RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these
extensive averments and altogether treated Cabadors motion as a demurrer to
evidence because of a few observations he made in paragraphs "11 and 12
regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any
demurrer. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against
him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the
crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony
of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not
because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal offer of
exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss. To say that Cabador filed
a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man, touching the side
of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested
its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss
the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
Therefore, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the TRIAL
ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

PEOPLE vs TAN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DANTE TAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 167526

July 26, 2010
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for review on certiorari

BRIEF:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution and February 24, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433.

FACTS:
On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, in
relation to Sections 32 (a)-1 and 56 of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by
petitioner People of the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153. These two inforamtions stated that
he did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock Exchange a
sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of which he is the beneficial
owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation shares in Criminal Cases
No. 119831 and 75,000,000 Best World Resources. They were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832.

After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty to both charges and the trial
ensued.
On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on
the day after, filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002, respondent
filed an opposition to petitioners formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed
by the RTC, petitioner filed a "Motion to Withdraw Prosecutions Formal Offer of
Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of Evidence." Said motion was granted by
the RTC and petitioner thus continued its presentation of evidence.
On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and
was then ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26, 2003,
petitioner filed a request for marking of certain documents and motion to admit
attached formal offer of evidence. The motion was initially denied by the RTC,
but on motion for reconsideration the same was granted by the RTC. The RTC,
thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally, on
November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.
After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated
January 29, 2004, directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18,
2004, petitioner filed its Opposition to the demurrer.
On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting respondents Demurrer to
Evidence.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
Whether or not the RTC violate petitioners right to due process by grave abuse of
discretion in granting the respondents Demurrer to Evidence?
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC - GRANT of respondents Demurrer to Evidence
CA DISMISSED the case on the ground that a Demurrer to Evidence is one on
the merits and operates as an acquittal
SC - DENIED petition, AFFIRMED CAs Resolutions
COURT RATIONALE OF ABOVE FACTS
This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it
conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondents
demurrer to evidence.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v.
Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not
attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present
its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of
to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
It is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its case. It even
bears to point out that the RTC even allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal
offer of evidence after having initially rested its case and then continue its
presentation by introducing additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be
attributed to the RTC as petitioners right to due process was not violated. Even
Galman finds no application to the case at bar as clearly such trial cannot be
considered a sham based on the abovementioned considerations.
While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of
the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so.
Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part
of the RTC, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of
judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by petitioner.
Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not
defeat a plea of antrefois acquit. We are bound by the dictum that whatever error
may have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now be
corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. Consequently,
petitioners attempt to put in issue the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004
Orders of the RTC which denied admission of certain documentary exhibits in
evidence must fail. As correctly manifested by the CA, the said Orders have
already been overtaken by the March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted
respondents demurrer to evidence. Hence, this Court would be violating the rules
on double jeopardy if the twin orders were to be reviewed after a finding that the
CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to
evidence.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting
the demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that
the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of
the merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, the RTC extensively
discussed its position on the various issues brought to contention by petitioner.
One of the main reasons for the RTCs decision to grant the demurrer was the Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit
absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World Resources Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution
Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred shares as well as Section 9 and 10, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.
IMPERIAL vs JOSON
It is very clear from the evidence formally offered, that the foregoing facts were
not proven or established. These cases were for Violations of RSA Rule 32 (a)-1 NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners,
and Section 56 of Revised Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that the vs.
prosecution never presented in evidence the Article of Incorporation of BW MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL. Respondents.
Resources Corporation. This document is very vital and is the key to everything,
including the conviction of the accused. Without the Article of Incorporation, the SANTOS FRANCISCO Petitioners,
vs.
Court has no way of knowing the capitalization authorized capital stock of the
SPS. GERARD AND MARICEL JOSON Respondents.
BW Resources Corporation, the classes of shares into which its stock is divided
and the exact holdings of Dante Tan in the said corporation. Its not being a NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners,
prosecutions evidence renders impossible the determination of the ten (10%) vs.
percent beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is no focal point to HILARION FELIX, ET AL., Respondents.
base the computation of his holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an owner
of ten (10%) percent G.R. No. 160067
G.R. No. 170410
G.R. No. 171622
November 17, 2010
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Consolidated petitions for review on certiorari

BRIEF:
Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the consolidated
petitions for review on certiorari at bench primarily assail the decisions rendered
in the following cases, viz.: (a) Decision dated 4 September 2003 of the then
Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 74030; (b)
Decision dated 26 October 2005 of said Courts then Special Eighth Division in
CA-G.R. No. 81262; and, (c) Decision dated 17 February 2006 of the same
Courts then Special Sixth Division in CA-G.R. No. 87906.
FACTS:
These cases were the products when an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck collided with a
Fuso six-wheeler truck owned by petitioner Nelson Imperial. The Isuzu ten-
wheeler truck was then being driven by petitioner Santos Francisco, while the
Fuso six-wheeler truck was driven by respondent Santiago Giganto, Jr. who was,
at the time, accompanied by a helper or pahinante, respondent Samuel Cubeta.
After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck
further rammed into a Kia Besta Van which was, in turn, being driven by
respondent Arnel Lazo. The KIA Besta Van was owned by Noel Tagle who was
then on board said vehicle, together with the following passengers, namely,
Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and Lydia, all surnamed Felix; Marvin,
Martin and Jan-Jon, all surnamed Sadiwa; Antonio Landoy; and, respondents
Evelyn Felix, and Jasmin Galvez.
The accident resulted in the death of Noel Tagle, the owner of the KIA Besta Van,
and seven of its passengers, namely, Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and
Lydia, all surnamed Felix; and, Antonio Landoy. As a consequence of the
collisions, a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property was filed
against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial on 16 May 2001 before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon. The Sariaya MTC proceeded to
conduct the mandatory pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 after
petitioner Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment scheduled in
the case. The Sariaya MTC issued an order which, while denying petitioner
Franciscos motion for reconsideration, directed that the pre-trial conference be
set anew in view of the reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Francis Sia and the
appearance of a new private prosecutor in the case.23 Dissatisfied, petitioner
Francisco filed on 1 April 2002 the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-37 before Branch 58 of the Lucena
City RTC.
A complaint for damages was also filed by petitioners Francisco and Imperial
against respondents Giganto and Cubeta before Branch 22 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Naga City. In turn alleging that the mishap was attributable to the
negligence of the driver of the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck, respondent Giganto joined
respondent Maricel Joson and her husband, respondent Gerard Ferdinand Joson,
in filing against petitioners Francisco and Imperial the complaint for damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 8314 before Branch 82 of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Valenzuela City.
Respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson moved for the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 2001-0296 before the Naga RTC, on the ground of litis pendentia. Invoking
the "interest of justice rule", said respondents argued that Civil Case No. 8314
before the Valenzuela MeTC should be maintained despite petitioners earlier
filing of their complaint for damages before the Naga RTC.
The Naga City RTC issued an order dismissing petitioners amended complaint on
the ground that the same was barred by the complaint for damages filed against
them before the Paraaque RTC. Differentiating said pleading from a
supplemental pleading which only serves to bolster or add something to a primary
pleading, the Naga RTC ruled that petitioners amended complaint supplanted and
did not retroact to the time of their original complaint.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
a. G.R. No. 160067 whether the action of the petitioners to file complaint
in Naga RTC is a cause for the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of the case instead of Paraaque RTC calling attention to the lesser case
load
b. G.R. No. 170410 whether he nine postponements of the pre-trial
conference in the case attributable to the prosecution amounted to a
violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial
c. G.R No. 171622 whether Paraaque RTC's issuance of order was both
premature and attended with grave abuse of discretion
ACTIONS of the COURT:
Sariaya MTC- DENIED petitioner Franciscos motion for
reconsideration
Lucena RTC - DISMISSED petitioner Franciscos petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of merit
Valenzuela MeTC - DISMISSAL of the complaint filed against them by
respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson
Naga RTC - DISMISSED petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case
No. 2001-0296 on the ground of litis pendentia
 RTC of Paraaque City - DISMISSED without prejudice in view of their
failure to attend the same pre-trial conference
Court of Appeals
a. NULLIFIED the Valenzuela MeTC's
b. AFFIRMED the 2 August 2002 and 16 September 2002 orders
issued by the Naga RTC which dismissed petitioners' amended
complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-0296 on the ground of litis
pendentia
c. AFFIRMED the Paraaque RTC's 7 October 2002 order denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss
SC DENIED G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410 and GRANTED petition
in G.R. No. 171622
COURT RATIONALE OF ABOVE FACTS
a. G.R. No. 160067
No, the Supreme Court cannot hospitably entertain petitioners insistence that
the abatement of the case before said court in favor of the one they filed before the
Naga RTC would promote the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of the
parties complaints for damages against each other which are indisputably
personal in nature, considering that majority of the parties live closer to the
Paraaque RTC. Under the "interest of justice rule", moreover, the determination
of which court would be "in a better position to serve the interests of justice" also
entails the consideration of the following factors: (a) the nature of the controversy;
(b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties; and, (c) other similar
factors.
Even prescinding from the foregoing considerations, our perusal of the record also
shows that, by filing their answer and third-party complaint against respondents
Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta in Civil Case No. 01-0325, petitioners have
already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Paraaque RTC. In
addition, petitioners have filed before said court the following motions and
incidents, viz.: (a) 17 June 2003 motion for reconsideration of the 2 June 2003
order directing the payment of the filing and other docket fees for said third-party
complaint; (b) 11 June 2003 opposition to set the case for hearing;56 and, (c) 2
September 2004 urgent motion for reconsideration and to set aside order of
default. Having filed their third-party complaint as aforesaid and repeatedly
sought positive relief from the Paraaque RTC, it stands to reason that petitioners'
should no longer be allowed to question said court's jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 01-0325 which, unlike the suit for damages pending before the Naga RTC,
additionally involves all the parties indispensable to the complete resolution of the
case.
b. G.R. No. 170410
No, the constitutional right to a speedy trial of the petitioner was not denied.
Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice, said right is considered violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
Far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the delays entailed
by the postponements of the aforesaid hearings were, to a great extent, attributable
to petitioner Franciscos own pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the
interlocutory orders issued by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at least
three public prosecutors to the case, namely, Prosecutors Rodolfo Zabella, Jr.,
Francis Sia and Joel Baligod.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates
commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial
order71 and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180
days,72Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time
within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to
speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case" and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. Viewed in the context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well
as the further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of
Prosecutor Sias subsequent transfer to another government office, we find that
the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the
postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC
were violative of his right to a speedy trial.
c. G.R No. 171622
 Yes, the order was both premature and attended with grave abuse of Demurrer to Evidence
discretion. Right against Double Jeopardy
The record is, indeed, bereft of any showing that summons were issued requiring
respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta to file their answer to the PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN
aforesaid pleading. If only in the interest of the orderly, expeditious and complete
disposition of the parties' complaints for damages against each other, we find that PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
the Paraaque RTC should have first awaited the full joinder of the issues before vs.
its 8 June 2004 grant of the motion to set the case for hearing filed by respondents HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), MANUEL G. BARCENAS,
Felix, Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy. Time and again, the Court has espoused a respondent.
policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default which are frowned upon, as a G.R. No. 174504
case is best decided when all contending parties are able to ventilate their March 21, 2011
respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
thereof. Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather
than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the
defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)

BRIEF
The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to
an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS
On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of
Presidential Decree No. 14452 before the Sandiganbayan for failing to liquidate
cash advances amounting to P61, 765.00. Private respondent filed a motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence which was subsequently granted by the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of
the offense defined and penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the
private respondent, an accountable officer, received cash advances in the total
amount of P120,000.00, (2) the purpose of the cash advance has been served, (3)
the private respondent settled his cash advances only in March 1996, (4) the city
auditor sent a demand letter to settle the cash advance within 72 hours from
receipt thereof, and the private respondent received said letter on December 22,
1995 but failed to liquidate the same within the aforestated period.
Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent
to an acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. Further, assuming that the Sandiganbayan
erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at most, constitute an error of
judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Thus, certiorari does not lie to correct
the grant of the demurrer to evidence by the Sandiganbayan.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice
resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil.
1133, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

ISSUE/S OF THE CASE

1. Whether the granting of the demurrer to evidence has an effect of acquittal.

ACTIONS of the COURT

SANDIGANBAYAN: Demurrer to evidence was granted.
SC: Appealed decision is affirmed.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the
effect of an acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the
dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in
double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still
reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For
the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any
damage from private respondents non-liquidation of the subject cash advance
because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecutions witness, that private
respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.
Waiver of right to present evidence court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to
consider the case submitted for decision.
BANGAYAN vs. BANGAYAN ISSUE/S of the CASE
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, Whether Sally had waived her right to present evidence.
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
ACTIONS of the COURT
G.R. No. 201061 RTC and CA: Ruled that Sally Bangayan waived her right to present evidence.
July 3, 2013 SC: Decision of the CA is affirmed.
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a
Nature of the case: matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. In this case,
Petition for Review (Appeal) Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case.
BRIEF Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned
matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to
present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
FACTS
Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre in September 1973. In February We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence,
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. On 7 March 1982, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. Sally could not accuse
in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the
Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate
delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994. She then filed criminal
actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against him. Benjamin,
in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence and
subsequently, a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied. The trial
court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial
Demurrer to evidence
PEOPLE vs. JOSE C. GO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 191015
August 6, 2014
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Nature of the case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with
great caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the
offended party and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the
accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in
the resolution of demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and must
engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their experience, the
law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence on hand.
FACTS
The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) conducted an investigation
and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of
Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of managers
checks in the name of Philippine Recyclers and Zeta International, Inc. These
managers checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the
private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically
transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him
earlier.
PDIC filed a complaint for two counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents. On January 17, 2007, the private respondents filed their Demurrer to
Evidence praying for the dismissal of the criminal cases instituted against them
due to the failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding
the private respondents Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the
criminal cases and acquitting all of the accused in these cases.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an original Petition for Certiorari
with the CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court. It claimed that the
Order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; that it was issued with partiality; that the prosecution was deprived of
its day in court; and that the trial court disregarded the evidence presented, which
undoubtedly showed that respondents committed the crime of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents.
Respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the grant
of their demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination of the
facts and evidence by the trial court, leading it to conclude that the prosecution
failed to meet the quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the
part of respondents.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence is proper.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Granted the Demurrer to Evidence; Dismissed the Case.
CA: Affirmed the Ruling of the Trial Court.
SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Court grants the Petition. Demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole
evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict
of guilt. Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether
the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and
cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The
order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." When grave abuse of
discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court when it granted the accuseds demurrer to evidence, we
deem its consequent order of acquittal void.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declares that the CA grossly
erred in affirming the trial courts July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondents
demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse
of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila are declared null and void, and the said cases are ordered
REINSTATED for the continuation of proceedings.
People vs. Pepino
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs
JERRY R. PEPINO and DAISY M. BALAAN, Appellants.
G.R. No. 183479
June 29, 2010
Ponente: Carpio Morales
Brief:
Appellants Jerry R. Pepino (Pepino) and Daisy M. Balaan (Daisy), along with
Alfredo R. Pelenio (Pelenio), were indicted before the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court (RTC) for Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659
FACTS:
Anita Ching (the victim) left her Goldline Tours office in Quezon City on board
her car driven by Alejandro Soriano, together with her are other employees
Policarpio Guinto (Guinto) and Eva Guinto. The victim and company had barely
left the office when they were blocked by a vehicle from which four armed men
poked their firearms at them and forcibly took the victim and boarded her on their
vehicle. Two of the armed men were Pepino and Pelenio as recognized by the
victim and Guinto, who take the victim to a safehouse where she was detained for
19 days.
During the victims captivity, ten persons alternately guarded her. Daisy, one of
two female member of the group, warned her not to escape, otherwise, she would
be hanged. The group initially asked for a P30 million ransom but the amount was
eventually negotiated down to P500,000.00 which was paid to the group. The
victim was released and dropped near a drugstore along Bonifacio
Avenue in Quezon City by Pelenio and Daisy
Pelenio escaped from detention. He was eventually recaptured in Cebu City but
was killed in a shootout with the police. Before his death, Pelenio sent a letter to
the presiding judge of the trial court asking for forgiveness for his escape and
admitting his complicity with Pepino in the crime. Sr./Insp. Vicente Arnado, who
was called as a hostile witness for the defense, identified Pepino as the leader of a
notorious kidnap-for-ransom group.
Without presenting evidence, Pepino merely challenged his warrantless arrest for
kidnapping as illegal, insisting that he was arrested not for said crime but as an
incident of his arrest for illegal possession of firearms. Daisy who claimed to have
been arrested with her uncle Pelenio, denied having met the victim at the
safehouse, alleging that she only met the victim when she was presented at the
Department of Justice.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered its decision founding Pepino
and Daisy guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal and accomplice. The case
against Alfredo Pelinio, who appears to have died during the pendency of this
case, is hereby considered closed.Failure of Daisy to attend the promulgation of
judgement, a warrant for her was issued. Despite her flight, she moved for
reconsideration of the decision which the trial court denied. She thereafter filed a
notice of appeal which was given due course by the trial court
The case was brought to the Court of Appelas for automatic review due to the
death penalty imposed to Pepino for action and disposition. It appears that Pepinos
appeal was consolidated with that of Daisys. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial courts decision and denied the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the motion for reconsideration shall be granted.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered its decision founding
Pepino and Daisy guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal and accomplice.
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC. Denied motion for reconsideration.
SC: Denied the appeal in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
COURT RATIONALE:
No. Since Daisy, without proferring any justifiable cause, failed to attend the
promulgation of judgment and continues to be a fugitive from justice to date, her
appeal must be dismissed. So Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court
instructs:
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.The judgment is promulgated by reading it in
the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.
However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced
in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or
outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of
court.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these
Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and
file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The appeal of appellant DAISY M. BALAAN is DENIED in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
RULE 120 - JUDGEMENT decision finding the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
Nature of Judgement in Criminal Cases
On appeal, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration. Then the petitioners filed a petition for
review, however it was rejected by the Supreme Court for failure to state material
Llamas vs. CA
dates. Since the Supreme Court denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration,
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, Petitioners, judgment of conviction became final and executory. With the consequent issuance
by the trial court of the Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested Carmelita Llamas for
vs. her to serve her 2-month jail term but the police failed to arrest petitioner
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE Francisco Llamas because he was nowhere to be found. Francisco moved for the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. There being no action
taken by the trial court on the motion, petitioners instituted, on the instant
proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions. The
G.R. No. 149588 Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the resolution, but
reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration. After evaluating the
September 29, 2009 petitioners arguments, the court denies the petition.
Ponente: Nachura

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Nature of Case: Whether the petitioners can institute an annulment of the RTC and CA decision
since the courts did not take any action when they raised the issue of jurisdiction
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with Preliminary Injunction
Brief:
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas were convicted of other forms of
swindling. Petitioners assailed the jurisdiction of the court after they have been RTC: Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of "other
convicted, and moved that the proceedings be annulled forms of swindling" penalized by Article 316, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC)
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC
FACTS:
SC: Rejected the petition for review for failure to state material dates
Petitioners, Francisco and Carmelita Lllamas, were charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati with the crime of "other forms of swindling. The petitioners
conspiring and confederating together sold their property in Paraaque to Conrado
COURT RATIONALE:
P. Avila, representing the said property to be free from all liens and encumbrances
while it was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus. The RTC then rendered its
No. xxx
The Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
of in criminal cases. In People v. Bitanga, the Court explained that the remedy of of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases: thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
annulment of judgment. The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos
recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory
application to criminal cases. SUPREME COURT RULING:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional
Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.
Sec. 18. Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Application of
certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. The provisions of Rules 42, 44
to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the
Supreme Court in original and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal
cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Rule.
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter
be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
xxxx
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
RULE 120 JUDGEMENT
People vs. Montesclaros
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs
Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montesclaros, Defendants.
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.
G.R. No. 181084
June 16, 2009
Ponente: Puno
Nature of Case:
It is an appeal on the decision of Court of Appeals Visayas affirming with
modification the decision of Regional Trial Court of Lapu Lapu City in finding
Ida Montesclaros guilty as an accomplice of rape.
Brief:
RTC convicted Tampus of 2 counts of rape, as principal. Ida was found guilty as
an accomplice in one of criminal cases. They appealed the said decision.
FACTS:
Two informations were filed charging Bartolome Tampus of raping ABC, 13
years old, and Ida Montesclaros, mother of ABC, for giving permission to Tampus
to rape ABC. The first information states that, on april 1, 1995 about 4:30pm in
Lapulapu city with the jurisdiction of the RTC Lapu-Lapu, the accused Tampus
was in deep slumber due to drunkenness did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the then 13 yer old victim against her
will in conspiracy with Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Tampus to rape
the minor. On the second information, it stated that on April 3, 1995 at about 1am,
Tampus was armed with a wooden club and by means of threat and intimidation
did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with then 13 year
old against her will.
The offended party is the daughter of Montesclaros. Montesclaros started o rent a
room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. The minor testified that she
was in the house with her mother and Tampus on April 1, 1995, that the two
adults were drinking beer and forced her to drink too. After having 3 bottles then
she got sleepy and was lying on the floor when she overheard Tampus requesting
her mother to be permitted to have sexual intercourse with the minor.
Montesclaros agreed and told Tampus to leave as soon as he is finish with her
daughter. Montesclaros then left for work and left the minor along with Tampus.
The minor fell asleep and have woken up with pain and blood on her genitals. The
minor cried to her mother but was ignored by Montesclaros.
The abused was repeated, that then made her to seek from her aunt Nellie
Montesclaros about the rape and that her mother sold her. Her aunt Nellie was the
one who reported the incident to the police. The head of the medico-legal branch
of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, conducted a physical
examination of the minor and testified that the result of the examination revealed a
deep healed laceration.
The minor filed 2 complaints against Tampus on rape and against Montesclaros
on conspiracy to the rape. Tampus denied the rape with alibis that Ida always
bring her daughter to the beer house with her and his duties to the barangay tanod
post would prevent the incident of the minor having left at home alone with him.
Then the head of Dept. Psychiatry issued a medical certification which showed
that Ida was treated as an outpatient diagnosed with Schizophrenia. Trial court
convicted Tampus of 2 rapes and Ida as accomplice. Ida's illness was then
appreciated which would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving
her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the RPC and in
effect mitigated her penalty.
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, Tampus died and
his appeal was dismissed. Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only
with that of Ida. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with
modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida,
but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of intelligence.
On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending physician,
Idas schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not undetermined at the time of their passage, every Information must state the
deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the
crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case
at bar, the Information did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this
ISSUE OF THE CASE: circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida
may only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is
Whether the aggravating circumstance of relationship may be appreciated punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled
although the same was not alleged in the information. an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which
was signed into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: Convicted Tampus of 2 counts of rape, as principal. Ida was found guilty as SUPREME COURT RULING:
an accomplice in one of criminal cases.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station,
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC with modification. finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice
in the crime of rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten
SC: Affirmed the decision of CA with modification.
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
COURT RATIONALE:
No. The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABCwho was 13 years old at
the time of the incidentcould have been considered as a special qualifying
circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death, under
Article 266-B of the RPC. Both the circumstances of the minority and the
relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victims parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in
the information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying
circumstances under Article 266-B of the RPC.
Although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with
the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information,
and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it
cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to
increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing
Rule 120 Judgment
HIPOS vs BAY
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO
REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL
REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HONORABLE RTC JUDGETEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86,
Respondent.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Mandamus
FACTS:
Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for
the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl
Hipos et al., before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s]
before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable
cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged. The Office of the City
Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the
Informations.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the
Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August
2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding
that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of
even date.
ISSUE:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT
JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS ON THE GROUND THAT BY VIRTUE OF
RESOLUTION THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
OF QUEZON CITY FINDS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO
WITHDRAW INFORMATION?
HELD:
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel
an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will
not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in
which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment
and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be
issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is
never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular
way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw
Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be
compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at
bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he
had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not
available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse
of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition
for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial
judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is
improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving PEOPLE V LORENZO
judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise
of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an People of the Philippines, plaintif-appellee
action already taken in the exercise of either. vs
The Court find that they are in agreement with the trial court, that there is Paterno Lorenzo y Casas, defendant-appellant
indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial.

Brief:
Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184 which affirmed the 05 October 2005
Decision promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in
Criminal Case Nos. 6991-93, finding accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

Facts:
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-bust
operation.
On 12 September 2003, two (2) Informations were filed against accused-
appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) charging him with violating
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The cases were raffled to
Branch 76 of the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal and docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
6992-93.
One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a
different Information, which case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
6991. Estanislao was accused of possessing illegal drugs in violation of the
provisions of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered
NOT GUILTY pleas.
The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1)
Noel P. Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust team.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9
September 2003, upon a series of reports relayed by a confidential informant that
a certain Paterno Lorenzo was peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan area,
the team of PO3 Pineda embarked on a buy-bust operation against said drug
peddler.
 Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1 Pineda was
able to retrieve the marked money and 2 other sachets of shabu from him. Seeing
what had happened to Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later on identified
as a certain Estanislao, attempted to escape the police officers and ran, but he was
soon accosted by PO3 Tougan. A search of his pockets yielded one (1) sachet of
shabu.
After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to the
police station where the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The plastic
sachets containing 2.04 and 0.20 grams of white crystalline substance bought
from Lorenzo was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination.
The results as contained in Chemistry Report no. D-1741-03E showed that the
substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
or shabu.
Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant
Lorenzo and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version
of the facts.
On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo
for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, but acquitting Estanislao
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of
Appeals, questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in the
seizure and custody of the evidence against him.
On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction rendered by the RTC, disposing to wit
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court a quo erred in finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred in not giving weight and
credence to accused-appellants defense or denial
HELD:
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the
strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence,
the defense may logically not even present evidence on its behalf. In which case,
the presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be
acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense
bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.
Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable
doubt. The defense anchors its claim on the failure of the prosecution to adopt the
required procedure under Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, on the
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs.
According to the defense, this alleged failure to follow proper procedure, i.e.
inventory and photographing of the retrieved evidence, raises doubts as to
whether the specimen examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court
were indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The defense also faults the police
operatives for not having coordinated with the PDEA regarding the buy-bust.
Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether the
prosecution discharged its burden of proving Lorenzos guilt beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged. The court rule in negative. The prosecutions case
fails for failure to establish the identity of the prohibited drug with moral
certainty.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the
prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the
buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefore. Material to the prosecution for illegal sale
of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale had actually taken
place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. The
term corpus delicti means the actual commission by someone of the particular
crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements
are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be
a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the
evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond doubt.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction
cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The
identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart
from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance
offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of
certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21
(a), paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, reads:
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying
with the express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the
procedure is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt of or innocence of the accused. Thus, the
proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure,
under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officers.
PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased
the shabu from accused-appellant and that he only retrieved it from said
informant. He further testified that he marked the retrieved sachet
of shabu together with the two other sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized
from the accused, but it was not certain when and where the said marking was
done nor who had specifically received and had custody of the specimens
thereafter.
The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-
buyer who had personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution
witness was at least four meters away from where accused-appellant and the
poseur-buyer were. From this distance, it was impossible for him to hear the
conversation between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer.
The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to whether the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same ones that
were released to CampCrame and submitted for laboratory examination. The court
therefore finds that this failure to establish the evidences chain of custody is
damaging to the prosecutions case.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to
support accused-appellants conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article
II, Republic Act No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.
Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail.
PEOPLE V BARON
G.R. No. 185209
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN, Appellant.
REY VILLATIMA and alias "DEDONG" BARGO, Accused.
Facts:
On July 19, 1995, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental, charging Rene Baron y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey Villatima
(Villatima), and alias Dedong Bargo (Bargo) with the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide committed against Juanito Berallo (Berallo). The Information contained the
following accusatory allegations:
That on or about 9 oclock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at
Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order to rob, steal and
take away things and money which is enumerated in the case and
inflicting upon the person of Juanito Berallo the injuries which is also
enumerated in the case.,
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe hemorrhage due to Multiple Stabbed
wounds, which directly caused the death of the victim Juanito Berallo,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount, to
wit:
P 50, 000.00 - as indemnity for the death of the victim.
P 150, 000.00 - as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity,
or such amount to be fixed by the court.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only the appellant was arrested. Villatima and Bargo remain at-large to date.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the
appellant is as follows:
Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a conversation with
Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julies Bakeshop at Magsaysay
St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The
appellant approached Berallo and asked if he could take him and his companions to
Hacienda Caridad for P30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant called Villatima, then
wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallos tricycle.
Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julies Bakeshop at around the same
time Joquino and Ballesteros were in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a
parked tricycle while the appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread, she
approached Berallo and asked if he was going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could
ride with him. However, Berallo replied that he still had to ferry passengers. She thus
decided to cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While inside the jeep, she saw two
more persons boarding Berallos tricycle.
On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with
homicide incident. Together with other policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana,
Cadiz City, where he saw Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20 meters
away from the highway. They also noticed several traces of footprints near Berallos body
and a tricycle sidecar in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a
fatigue jacket.
Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the
cadaver of Berallo. She found that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe
hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds. Five of them were considered as fatal and caused
the immediate death of Berallo. The wounds also indicated that they could have been
inflicted by more than one person.
The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of
the suspects. After having been apprised of his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-
accused took Berallos tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the sidecar, brought
the motorcycle to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at
the house of Villatimas aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).
 Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew
Villatima, together with the appellant, and another companion, were the ones who brought
the motorcycle to her house in Kabankalan.
Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of
Natividad as the one stolen from her deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of
money and the value of the personal property stolen from her husband. She allegedly spent
the sum of P2,400.00 for the purchase of the burial lot.
The Version of the Defense
one of the accused declared a hold-up and at gun point, tied the hands of the victim and
brought him towards the sugarcane field where he was stabbed to death. The victim was
divested of his wallet containing P1,250.00, a wrist watch and ring. Emerging from the
sugarcane plantation, they boarded the tricycle of the victim, detached the sidecar and
dumped the same in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one of
the accused.They proceeded to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in
the house of Villatimas aunt, Natividad.

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and
1995, at around 7 oclock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family participated in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by
and proceeded to the public transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle with two circumstantial evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
passengers passed by and its driver inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
boarded the tricycle and told the driver that he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver experience.[7] Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more
requested him to accompany them up to Segundo Diez. He agreed out of concern for the than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been
safety of the driver. Upon reaching Bangga Doldol, however, the passengers announced a established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt
hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the driver not to make any wrong beyond reasonable doubt.[8] A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
move, or they would be killed.Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the driver and can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results to a
dragged him towards the sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what happened to the driver fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
since he remained in the tricycle. However, he suspected that the driver was killed by the perpetrator.[9]
two passengers.
Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of
the tricycle. They then took him to a house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to
leave the premises. The following morning, they returned to Cadiz City. The two
passengers even accompanied him to his house and threatened him and his wife at
gunpoint not to report the incident to the police authorities.
On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, policemen came to his
house and asked where the motorcycle was taken. He told them of the location of the
vehicle and insisted that he had nothing to do with the incident. He stressed that the two
passengers whose names he did not know, were responsible for the crime committed.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED

HELD: The trial court did not gravely erred in their Judgment. In this case, the
prosecution successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of
the appellant and his companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and his companions
boarded the tricycle of the victim pretending to be passengers. Midway to their destination,
RULE 120 JUDGEMENT
ABELLANA VS PEOPLE 655 SCRA 683
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 174654. August 17, 2011.
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review
BRIEF:
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006
Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA
Decision set aside the May 21, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. CBU-51385 and acquitted the
petitioner of the crime of falsification of public document by a private individual
because the Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa
through falsification of a public document.4 However, the CA still adjudged him
civilly liable.
FACTS:
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga
and SaapiaAlonto (spouses Alonto),6 secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987,
petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed
of Absolute Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was
notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the
notary public.8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name
and sold the lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999, an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with
Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate
intent, and with intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a public document
consisting of a Deed of Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square
meters executed before Notary Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page
No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987 of the latters Notarial Register showing
that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto sold their parcel of land located at
Pardo, Cebu City, for a consideration of P130,000.00 in favor of accused by
imitating, counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be imitated or counterfeited the
signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto above their typewritten
names in said document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the accused
very well knew that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto did not sell their
aforestateddescri[b]ed property and that the signature[s] appearing in said
document are not their signature[s], thus causing it to appear that spouses Saapia
B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto participated in the execution of said document when
they did not so participate[. Once] said document was falsified, accused did then
and there cause the transfer of the titles of said land to his name using the said
falsified document, to the damage and prejudice of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and
DiagaAlonto in the amount of P130,000.00, the value of the land.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
Whether or not the petitioner committed the crime of estafa through
falsification of public document.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: FelixbertoAbellana GUILTY of the crime of falsification of public
document by private individuals
CA: Resolve to set aside the Decision dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only insofar as it found the
petitioner guilty of a crime that is different from that charged in the Information.
The civil liability determinations are affirmed.
SC: Petition is meritorious
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS: RULE 120 JUDGMENT
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal
shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. PEOPLE VS ASIS 629 SCRA 250
In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the
civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the
failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,
award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action.
In other words, the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the - versus -
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might arise did not
Court of Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO,
exist.
Respondents.
Here, the CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it convicted
petitioner of an offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the G.R. No. 173089
Information. To recall, petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of
public document. However, the RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually August 25, 2010
signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary
public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of Ponente: Mendoza, J.
falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioners
conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however, found no Nature of the Case:
reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court
and thus sustained the same. We do not agree. Based on the records of the case, Petition for Review on Certiorari before the CA
we find that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any BRIEF:
damage to spouses Alonto.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse
SUPREME COURT RULING: and set aside the June 7, 2006 Resolutionof the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed outright its petition for certiorari under Rule
The petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court 65 for being the wrong remedy.
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are
AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime FACTS:
of falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of On October 7, 2002, at 12:30 oclock in the morning, respondent Jaime
civil liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, Abordo (Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by
the payment of P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the property, and the private complainants Kennard Majait (Majait), Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose
payment of nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation Montes (Montes). An altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the
expenses, is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
leg while Calvez was hit in the lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped
unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in
Criminal Case Nos. N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in
Criminal Case No. N-2211 before the Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province,
Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court found no treachery and evident premeditation.
Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,[2] the RTC held Abordo liable only for
Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries
with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic mitigating
circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes,
Abordo was acquitted.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil
aspect. They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez
without the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for
both the civil and the criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought
withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration and its supplement.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majaits motion for
reconsideration while Calvezs motion to withdraw was granted. On said date, the
trial court also dismissed Calvez appeal for not bearing the conformity of the
Provincial Prosecutor. Acting on Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zunos
Indorsement of the October 11, 2005 letter of Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C.
Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the CA.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that private respondent had
no intent to kill, in holding him guilty of only serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries instead of frustrated murder and attempted murder in
criminal case nos. n-2211 and n-2212, respectively, and in acquitting him of the
crime charged in criminal case no. n-2213
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
CA: Dismissed the Petition
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties
were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the
order. We find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to
question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In
our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment
of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without
exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.
Thus, in People v. Louel Uy, the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not
absolute. By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In People v. Laguio, Jr., where the acquittal of the accused was via the
grant of his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a
petition for certiorari. Thus:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may
review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds
demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of
dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the
accused against double jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases
supplied]

In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordos acquittal in Criminal Case
No. N-2213 was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating
Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was
correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
appellate court. It was a serious error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of
its right to avail of that remedy.
SUPREME COURT RULING
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for
certiorari for being the wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for
certiorari, the Court resolves to DENY the same for lack of merit.

As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the

petition for certiorari were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be
a remand to the CA.

A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be
remanded to the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSGs petition
for certiorari, which forms part of the records, would not merit a favorable review
even if it would be given due course simply because it is bereft of merit. For said
reason, We deem that a remand of the case would only prolong the disposition of
the case. It is not without precedent. On many occasions, the Court, in the interest
of public service and for the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further proceedings, as where
the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the case.

The rule is that while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous

acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as
to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.The case of Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, presents an instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. The rationale
behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void.
Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong
remedy. There is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the
petition for certiorari, on its face, cannot be given due course.
RULE 120 JUDGMENT the said [accused] to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 12 years, 1 month and 1
day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 20 years, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and the accessory penalties thereto; to pay and
BASILONIA VS VILLARUZ 765 SCRA 489 [indemnify], jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani Roblete
the sum of P32,100.00 representing funeral expenses, tomb, burial, and expenses
for wake; the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Atty. Isagani
Roblete; the amount of lost income cannot be determined as the net income of the
RODOLFO BASILONIA, LEODEGARIO CATALAN AND JOHN deceased cannot be ascertained; and to pay the costs of suit. [Accused] Vicente
BASILONIA, petioner, Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence. In Criminal Case
No. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, this court finds the accused John Jojo Basilonia
-versus-
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Frustrated
HON. DELANO F. VILLARUZ, acting in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Homicide, as principal, committed against the person of Rene Gonzales on
RTC, Roxas City, Branch 16 and DIXON ROBLETE September 15, 1983, defined under Article 249, in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate
Gr. Nos. 191370-71 sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision [correccional] as minimum, to
6 years, and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum; and to pay the costs. [Accused]
August 10, 2015 Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are
ACQUITTED for lack of evidence. In Criminal Case No. 1774 for Illegal
Possession of Firearm, all [accused] are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
Nature of the Case: evidence.
Petition for Certiorari ISSUE OF THE CASE
BRIEF: Whether or not a trial court have jurisdiction to grant a motion for
execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after the date of entry of
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules judgment.
of Civil Procedure (Rules) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order is the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
Rules in criminal cases.
CA: Dismissed the appeal
FACTS:
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
On June 19, 1987, a Decision was promulgated against petitioners in
Criminal Case Nos. 1773, 1774 and 1775, the dispositive portion of which states: The determination of whether respondent trial court committed grave
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds the abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting a
[accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John Jojo Basilonia, motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as principals in Criminal Case No. a criminal case became final and executory necessarily calls for the resolution of
1773 for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas the twin issues of whether the penalty of imprisonment already prescribed and the
City, Philippines, defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the civil liability arising from the crime already extinguished. In both issues,
Philippines, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and sentences petitioners vehemently assert that respondent trial court has no more jurisdiction
to order the execution of judgment on the basis of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules. concerned. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the trial court for the
We consider the issues separately. immediate issuance of mittimus, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 40-2013, in
relation to OCA Circular No. 4-92-A.
As to Prescription of Penalty, applying existing jurisprudence in this
case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time, they were
never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to
imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not
run in their favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and in
eventually granting the same.
As to the extinction of Civil Liability The treatment of petitioners civil liability
arising from the offense committed is different. Elementary is the rule that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. An action for revival of
judgment is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the case or the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. The purpose is not to re-examine
and re-try issues already decided but to revive the judgment; its cause of action is
the judgment itself and not the merits of the original action. However, being a
mere right of action, the judgment sought to be revived is subject to defenses and
counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and those arising after the finality of the
first judgment or which may have arisen subsequent to the date it became
effective such as prescription, payment, or counterclaims arising out of
transactions not connected with the former controversy. Once a judgment
becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution the issuance of which is the trial court's ministerial duty, compellable by
mandamus. Yet, a writ issued after the expiration of the period is null and void.
The limitation that a judgment be enforced by execution within the stated period,
otherwise it loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of the court. Failure to
object to a writ issued after such period does not validate it, for the reason that
jurisdiction of courts is solely conferred by law and not by express or implied will
of the parties. In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a
motion for execution should be filed in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules and existing jurisprudence.
SUPREME COURT RULING
The instant petition for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Orders dated December 3, 2009 and January 25, 2010 of Presiding Judge Delano
F. Villaruz, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 16, are AFFIRMED IN
PART only insofar as to the execution of the penalty of imprisonment is
Rule 120 Judgment
ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and RICHARD NATIVIDAD,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 198270
December 9, 2015
Ponente: Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated January 18, 2011 and
Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32723 which reversed and set aside the Decision dated February 23, 2009 and
Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case
Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed the Joint Decision dated September 3,
2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
FACTS
Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing
Nanquil, introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City
under the name and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction
materials for their project inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn
Morillo, owner of Amasea General Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The
parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of the purchases shall be paid within
seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining eighty percent (80%) to
be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of which shall be via
postdated checks.
Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting
to a total of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners
were undertaking their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00
in cash and issued two (2) post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga
branch, in the amounts of P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner
attempted to deposit the checks in her savings account at Equitable PCIBank, San
Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the dishonor to respondent and
his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent issued two (2) post-
dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be honored upon
maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCIBank, Makati
Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account
from which they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently,
petitioner made several demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail,
prompting her to file a complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City.
Thus, on August 12, 2004, two (2) Informations were filed against respondent and
Milo Malong.
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution
recommending that respondent and his partners be charged in court with the crime
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as
for Violation of Batas Pambansa No. 22 (BP 22), which was later docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the
prosecution had proven all the elements of violation of BP 22 as against
respondent.
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC
of Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject
checks were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the
action was improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually
transpired in Makati City. Respondent also pointed out that during the retaking of
petitioners testimony on March 14, 2008, the records of the case did not show
that the public prosecutor manifested his presence in court and that he delegated
the prosecution of the case to the private prosecutor. Thus, since there was no
appearance for the public prosecutor, nor was there a proper delegation of
authority, the proceedings should be declared null and void.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision,
reversed the lower courts rulings and dismissed the case without prejudice to its
refiling in the proper venue.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant action.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite a clear
showing that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.
ACTIONS of the COURT
MeTC:
The MeTC found the accused RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
RTC:
The RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling.
CA:
The CA reversed the lower courts rulings and dismissed the case.
. case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for
SC:
The petition is GRANTED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some
occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crimes essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
In the more recent Yalong v. People, wherein the modes of appeal and rules of
procedure were the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalongs
appeal still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC
had properly acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is
well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential
thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crimes essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case;
it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing
or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a
criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places
where any of its elements occurred in particular, the place where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the
court of the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can
be vested with jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the
fact that the check subject of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in
Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant
encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PCIBank. The MeTC of Makati,
therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision
in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright
due to certain procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV
of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. Thus, as a general rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case
must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State.
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party
to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended
party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court, when there is denial
of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on
the case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, when there is
grave error committed by the judge, or when the interest of substantial justice so
requires.
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial
of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved partys prayer is not tantamount
to putting the accused in double jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the
prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in
favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is because a judgment of acquittal
is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing
lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage
hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be
applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the
Court Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision
dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos.
337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

The unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand that the
Court forego a rigid application of the technicalities under the law so as to prevent
petitioner from suffering a grave injustice. In fact, after having sufficiently proven
to the satisfaction of both the MeTC and the RTC her right allegedly violated by
respondent, the CA simply dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing of
the case with the appropriate court, her action for the incorrect ground of wrong
venue. On the mistaken reasoning that the MeTC of Makati City did not have
jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA, without providing any legal or
jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start from the very beginning and re-
file her complaint before the same court which already had jurisdiction in the first
place.

Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters,
the Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest the administration of justice be
derailed by an overly stringent application of the rules. Rules of procedure are
meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict
adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long
as their purpose is sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play
takes place, the rules should be liberally construed. Dismissal of appeals purely on
Rule 121 New Trial or reconsideration
MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA, Petitioners,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 163957-58
x--------------------------------------------x
ERNESTO G. PESCADERA, Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 164009-11
April 7, 2009
Ponente: Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and
June 14, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the consolidated Criminal Case
Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and
Ernesto G. Pescadera. In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and
Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their conviction of violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA) of the
provincial government employees of Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner
Pescadera alone appeals his conviction of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the provincial government employees
amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30. In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for
their acquittal.
FACTS
Estino was elected Vice-Governor of Sulu in the May 1998 elections along with
Gov. Abdusakur Tan. On June 23, 1998, the Court issued a status quo order,
suspending the effects of the proclamation of Gov. Tan and ordering Vice-Gov.
Estino to assume the position of Governor until further orders. Thus, Estino acted
as Governor of Sulu from July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 when the Court lifted
the suspension order against Gov. Tan. Ernesto G. Pescadera, on the other hand,
was Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during Estinos stint as Acting Governor.
Pursuant to Commission on Audit (COA)-ARMM Office Order No. 99-165
dated August 26, 1999, a special audit team was created upon the request of the
Provincial Government of Sulu. An audit of the disbursement vouchers and
payrolls for the period starting July 27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 was then
conducted by COA State Auditor II Mona U. Balabaran and her team. The COA
Special Audit Report stated that there were anomalies in the payment of salary
differentials, allowances, and benefits, among others. The Ombudsman then filed
three informations against petitioners, as follows:
a. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26192
That accused Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera, failed to pay them their
salary differentials, Additional Compensation Allowance (ACA), Personal
Emergency and Representation Allowance (PERA), Representation and Travel
Allowance (RATA), Mid-year Bonus, Cash Gift and Clothing Allowance in the
total amount of P8,435,625.34.
b. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26193
That accused Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera, misappropriated the
GSIS monthly contributions and loan amortizations collected from the provincial
employees in the amount of P4,820,365.30 for their own personal benefit or
advantage to the damage and prejudice of the said employees and the government
as well.
c. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26194
 That accused Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera, withdraw from
Philippine National Bank-Jolo Branch the amount of P21.5 million on 07 May
1999 out of the Internal Revenue Allotment of P28,268,578.00 which was
deposited to the account of Sulu Provincial Government on the same day and
using the said amount to pay various expenses without, however, specifying what
the expenses are in violation of existing government accounting rules.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged in the informations.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and New Trial which were denied in the June 14, 2004
Sandiganbayan Resolution. Thus, they filed these petitions.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not petitioners failed to pay the rata and are thus guilty of
violating Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
2. Whether or not petitioner Pescadera is guilty of malversation of public funds
for failure to remit the GSIS contributions
ACTIONS of the COURT
Sandiganbayan:
1. In Criminal Case No. 26192, the Court finds accused MUNIB S.
ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA, both GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and pursuant to
Section 9 thereof.
2. In Criminal Case No. 26193, this Court finds accused ERNESTO G.
PESCADERA, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
malversation of public funds and accused PESCADERA is likewise ordered
to restitute the amount of FOUR MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE PESOS AND THIRTY
CENTAVOS (Php4,820,365.30) to the Provincial Government of Sulu. With
respect to MUNIB S. ESTINO, for failure of the Prosecution to prove his
[guilt] beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ordered ACQUITTED of the
crime of malversation of public funds.
3. In Criminal Case No. 26194, for failure of the Prosecution to prove the guilt
of accused MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA beyond
reasonable doubt, both accused are hereby ordered ACQUITTED.
.
SC:
1. SET ASIDE the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26192
and REMANDED the case to the Sandiganbayan for new trial on the alleged
nonpayment of RATA.
2. REVERSED and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 26193 and ACQUITTED Ernesto G. Pescadera of the charge
against him.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Case Should be remanded to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose,
they submitted documents which allegedly show that they paid the RATA under
the 1998 reenacted budget. They also claim that the COA Report did not
sufficiently prove that they did not pay the RATA because the alleged
disbursement vouchers, which were supposed to be annexed to the COA Report as
proof of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report.
The Court resolved to grant petitioners a chance to prove their innocence by
remanding the case to the Sandiganbayan for a new trial of Criminal Case No.
26192. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a
judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are
strictly not newly discovered, it appears to that petitioners were mistaken in their
belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In their Supplemental
Motion and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented
the evidence of payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of
the charge was the nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without
mention of the RATA nor the 1998 reenacted budget. It seems that they were
misled during trial. They were precluded from presenting pieces of evidence
that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget
because the prosecutions evidence was confined to alleged nonpayment of RATA
under the 1999 budget.
The Court were inclined to give a more lenient interpretation of Rule 121, Sec. 2
on new trial in view of the special circumstances sufficient to cast doubt as to the
truth of the charges against petitioners. The situation of the petitioners is peculiar,
since they were precluded from presenting exculpatory evidence during trial upon
the honest belief that they were being tried for nonpayment of RATA under the
1999 budget. This belief was based on no less than the testimony of the
prosecutions lone witness, COA Auditor Mona Balabaran. Even Associate Justice
Palattao of the Sandiganbayan had to clarify from Balabaran which budget she
was referring to Balaraban, however, made it very clear that the unpaid benefits
were those provided under the 1999 budget.
In granting petitioners motion for new trial, the Court reiterated the
pronouncement in Cano v. People:
It is x x x equally settled that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense and are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be
defeated. They should beliberally construed so that litigants can have ample
opportunity to prove their claims and thus prevent a denial of justice due to
technicalities.
More importantly, the Court have settled that procedural rules can be suspended if
matters of life, liberty, honor, and property are at stake, thus:
In Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, it specifically laid down the range of reasons
which may provide justifications for a court to resist a strict adherence to
procedure and suspend the enforcement of procedural rules. Among such reasons
x x x are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) counsels negligence
without any participatory negligence on the part of the client; (3) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the case; (5) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; and (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory.
The Court also held that:
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the
exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. In
proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of
substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and
formalistic adherence to such rules. x x x
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Court agreed with Pescadera that this is not the demand contemplated by
law. The demand to account for public funds must be addressed to the accountable
officer. Nowhere in the pleadings did the Special Prosecutor refute the lack of a
formal demand upon Pescadera to account for the GSIS premiums. Pescadera
even denies being informed of the conduct of the audit, an assertion which was
not refuted by the prosecution. It can be concluded then that Pescadera was not
given an opportunity to explain why the GSIS premiums were not
remitted. Without a formal demand, the prima facie presumption of conversion
under Art. 217 cannot be applied.
There is no proof that Pescadera used the GSIS contributions for his personal
benefit. The prosecution merely relied on the presumption of malversation which
we have already disproved due to lack of notice. Hence, the prosecution should
have proven actual misappropriation by the accused.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 16, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 26192 is SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for new trial on the alleged nonpayment of RATA. The Decision
dated April 16, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26193 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Ernesto G. Pescadera
is ACQUITTED of the charge against him. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 121 New Trial or reconsideration
ROMMEL C. BRIONES, Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156009
June 5, 2009
Ponente: Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
This is a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated July 17,
2002 and the resolution dated November 13, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 24127 finding petitioner Rommel C. Briones (Briones) guilty of
the crime of robbery.
FACTS
S/G Dabbin Molina is a security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services
owned by Johnny Fuentes; in the course of his employment with the security
agency, S/G Molina was issued a .38 caliber revolver (firearm).
On January 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., S/G Molina and S/G George Gual were
manning the northwest gate of BF Homes Northwest, Paranaque. Somewhere on
Jakarta Street, they noticed Romulo Bersamina, a homeowner, being mauled by
four (4) individuals, two (2) of whom were later identified as Briones and his
brother, Vicente Briones (Vicente), who were both residents of BF Homes. S/G
Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop the mauling; it was at this
point that S/G Molina lost his firearm to Briones. How he lost it whether there
was accompanying violence or intimidation is the submitted issue in this case. S/G
Molina subsequently reported the incident to his supervisor, Arthur Alonzo, and to
SPO1 Manuel Plete. The police arrested Briones after conducting an investigation.
Briones denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm grabbing, and
claimed that he was in his house when the incident happened.
The RTC ruled that Briones can only be held liable for simple theft, as the
elements of violence and intimidation the attendant circumstances that must be
present in the crime of robbery were not duly proven. The RTC found that the
principal prosecution witness, S/G Gual, merely testified that he (Briones)
grabbed the firearm of S/G Molina.
On appeal to the CA, Briones argued that: (1) his conviction was based solely on
the testimony of S/G Gual who was not present at the scene and did not really see
what happened; and (2) he cannot be convicted of simple theft under a criminal
charge of robbery.
The CA turned down these arguments and ruled that S/G Guals testimony is a
credible eyewitness account of the incident. S/G Gual was also categorical in his
testimony; the defense did not even try to impugn his credibility as a witness since
it opted not to cross-examine him.
Briones thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New
Trial and Motion to Dismiss, and Supplemental Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and Motion to
Dismiss (collectively, Omnibus Motion) with the CA where he confessed his
physical presence and participation on the alleged robbery of the firearm, but
claimed that he was merely protecting his brother, Vicente, when he took the
firearm. The CA denied the Omnibus Motion; hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
(1) Whether there are factual and legal bases to support his conviction of the
crime of robbery; and
(2) Whether a new trial is justified under the circumstances.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC:
The RTC found Briones guilty of simple theft under paragraph 3, Article 309 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code).
CA:
The CA found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293, in relation to
paragraph 5 of Article 294, of the Code, and not of theft; the CA ruled that force
and intimidation attended the taking of S/G Molinas firearm, as Briones
approached S/G Molina with the intent of taking his firearm away.
. again at the expense of Briones former counsel; based on allegedly newly
SC:
The SC partly granted the petition and sustained Briones conviction for the crime
of theft, not robbery.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Court observed that the petition raises factual issues that call for a re-
weighing of the evidence on record. As a rule, this is not allowed under Rule 45,
as only questions of law are covered in a petition for review on certiorari. In this
case, the Court is not a trier of facts, and thus, it is not tasked to make its own
assessment and give its independent evaluation of the probative value of the
evidence adduced by the parties in the proceedings. However, the above rule
admits of exceptions; one of them is when there is a conflict in the factual findings
of the lower courts. When this happens, no reason exists for the lower courts
factual findings to be conclusive and the Court carries the burden of reviewing the
evidence on hand.
The Court noted in this regard that the conflict in the factual findings of the RTC
and CA does not relate to Briones criminal culpability both courts found his
conviction under the criminal information to be supported by sufficient evidence.
The conflict rather centers on the factual question of how the taking took place
which must necessarily affect the characterization of the crime committed.
In this regard, we give special significance to the RTCs unique position in
assessing the credibility of witnesses, as the RTC has the unrestricted opportunity
to observe firsthand the conduct and demeanor of witnesses at the trial. Unless the
trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts whose substance and value may affect
the result of the case, we respect his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.
From our own reading of the records, we find that S/G Gual gave clear and
precise answers; no inconsistencies existed materially affecting their veracity.
Neither was it shown that S/G Gual was driven by any improper motive to falsely
testify against Briones.
As against this credible and positive testimony of S/G Gual, Briones could only
set up denial and alibi as his defenses. We have previously ruled that for these
defenses to deserve merit, they must be substantiated by clear and convincing
proof. Under the present facts, these defenses were without corroboration. On the
contrary, Briones and his new counsel desperately now move to try the case
discovered evidence. They blame the former counsels allegedly erroneous legal
strategy when he raised denial and alibi as Briones defenses, instead of invoking
self-defense or defense of a relative. They also now foist on this Court an
Affidavit of Desistance dated July 29, 2002 executed by Fuentes, as well as an
Affidavit dated July 22, 2002 executed by one Oskar Salud. These documents
allegedly prove that Briones had no intent to gain and, in fact, threw away the
firearm after grabbing it from S/G Molina.
A change of Briones' defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or defense of a
relative is effectively a change of theory of the case brought only during appeal.
Law and fairness to the adverse party demand that when a party adopts a
particular theory and the case is tried and decided on the basis of that theory in the
court below, neither party can change his or her theory on appeal. While this rule
is not absolute, no exceptional reasons in this case exist to justify a deviation.
Additionally, an error or mistake committed by a counsel in the course of judicial
proceedings is not a ground for new trial. In People v. Mercado, we declared:
It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of
his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result might have been different if he proceeded differently. A client
is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be
admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a
suit so long as new counsel could be employed who would allege and
show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced
or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness,
the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper
defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce certain
evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not proper
grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great
that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his
case. [Emphasis supplied]
 RULE 121
From the facts, it does not appear that Briones was denied competent legal
representation in the proceedings before the RTC. Republic of the Philippines

Lastly, for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, Supreme Court
the concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must
have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered Baguio City
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the THIRD DIVISION

evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA
admitted.[26] In this case, although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other
conditions were not established. and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO ,
SUPREME COURT RULING
Petitioners,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated July 17, 2002 and Resolution dated November 13, 2002 of the - versus -
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24127 are hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner
Rommel Briones is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
of THEFT under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is
sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months 4TH DIVISION
of arresto mayor.

SO ORDERED. and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Facts:

Quintin Saludaga and Fiel Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the
construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and
Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar without conducting a competitive public
bidding, thus depriving the government the chance to obtain the best, if not, the
most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said contracts to Olimpio Legua, a
non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation of Sec. 356 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular No. 91-
368. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing
undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove
the actual damage, therefore a new information was filed, for violation of Sec. 3
(e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS
moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that
there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the first information. vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

Issue:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the CESAR FORTUNA
information that would warrant a new preliminary investigation.
vs.
Held:
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
would warrant a new preliminary investigation
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
vs.
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: CESAR FORTUNA, ET AL.

xxxx FACTS:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Considering such, there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense:
either by causing undue injury or by giving private person unwarranted benefit.
With that, the accused may be charged either through the two modes. Hence, a
new preliminary investigation is unnecessary.
Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna and De Jesus were convicted for the crime of murder
for the death of Col. Rolando Abadilla. With that, Lumanog and Santos separately
filed their motions for reconsideration seeking the reversal of their conviction.
They contested the credence accorded to the identification of the accused by the
lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo.
Fortuna submitted an Affidavit executed by a certain Orencio Jurado, Jr. who
claimed to be one of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case.
Fortuna contended that said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the
procedures undertaken by the police authorities.
ISSUE:

Whether or not introduction of additional evidence after the trial is valid to justify
new trial

HELD:

No. Introduction of additional evidence after the trial is not valid to justify new
trial.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151911 : July 25, 2011]
EDGAR PAYUMO, REYNALDO RUANTO, CRISANTO RUANTO,
APOLINARIO RUANTO, AND EXEQUIEL BONDE, PETITIONERS, VS.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, DOMICIANO CABIGAO, NESTOR DOMACENA,
ROLANDO DOBLADO, ERNESTO PAMPUAN, EDGARDO PRADO,
ROMEO DOMINICO, RAMON GARCIA, AND CARLOS PACHECO,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 154535]
NESTOR DOMACENA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND EDGAR
PAYUMO, REYNALDO RUANTO, CRISANTO RUANTO, APOLINARIO
RUANTO, AND EXEQUIEL BONDE, RESPONDENTS.
Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the
defense argument that there was no positive identification of Abadillas killers. To
justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of
such evidence, it must be shown that the evidence was newly discovered
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could
not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the
court below.
Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure
testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the
investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in
this case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as
newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating
the judgment. In any case, the Supreme Court ruled that whatever flaw that may
have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused, the same was
cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the
prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
FACTS:
A shooting incident occurred on February 26, 1980 in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta.
Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and
Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians
instantly killing one and wounding several others. The accused were accused for
Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the
Sandiganbayan.After four years of trial, the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, convicting the accused as co- principals in
the crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder. On
January'11, 1985, the accused filed their Motion for New Trial, which was denied.
The accused elevated the case to the Supreme Court, which set aside the October
5, 1984 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and remanding the case for a new trial.
Thus, Criminal Case No. 4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was
raffled to the First Division. he The First Division received anew all the evidence
of the parties, both testimonial and documentary. Later, with the creation of the
Fourth and Fifth divisions, Criminal Case No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth
Division. On February 23, 1999, the Fifth Division promulgated judgment,
convicting the accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder.
The accused filed their Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New
Trial. Since the Fifth Division could not reach unanimity in resolving the
aforesaid omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was constituted pursuant to
Section 1 (b) of Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. On
September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-2, issued the subject
Resolution promulgated on October 24, 2001, setting aside the November 27,
1998 Decision and granting a second new trial of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
granted a new trial for the said Criminal Case.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division
acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it nullified the November 27, 1998
Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219.
On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new
trial in Criminal Case No. 4219, the Court finds the same to be devoid of any
legal and factual basis. Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that: new and material evidence has been discovered which
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at
the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial. In this case, the records of
the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the criteria
for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial
based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if
admitted, would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering
party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or
during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however, such records
could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented
during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO
records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There is excess of
jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
APPEALS
RULE 122-125
Rules of Court
MACAPAGAL v PEOPLE
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R No 193217
February 26, 2014
Ponente: J. Peralta
_____________________________________________________________
BRIEF:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated November 25, 2008
convicting petitioner Corazon Macapagal of the crime of Estafa; the Order
denying her Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial; and the Order4 dated
June 29, 2010 denying her Notice of Appeal, in Criminal Case No. 98-166722
FACTS:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of
the crime of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount
of P800, 000.00, which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of
jewelry. Petitioner received the decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely
moved for reconsideration, but was likewise denied in an Order dated May 20,
2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31, 2009. She supposedly
filed a Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied on June 29,
2010 for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
WON the RTC of Manila, Branch 9, gravely erred in denying the Notice of
Appeal filed by the herein Petitioner-Appellant.
WON the RTC of Manila, Branch 9, gravely erred in convicting the herein
Petitioner-Appellant of the crime of Estafa.
WON the RTC of Manila, Branch 9, gravely erred in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or new trial filed by the herein Petitioner-Appellant.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
Supreme Court: Petition is DENIED for Lack of Merit.
COURT RATIONALE:
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities
which this court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioners cause. It appears that
petitioner assails not only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but
likewise seeks the reversal of her conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be
discussed below, the petition is bound to fail, because of petitioners complete
disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial courts denial of
her notice of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure lay down the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided
by law, in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. An appeal must be taken within fifteen days
from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed
from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance
of the appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a
mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme
Court. However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a
decision or final order from which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court
specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a
special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of appeal
in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the
petition merits an outright dismissal.
The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the
task of determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned
lawyers to follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any
error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to the clients cause.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still
dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari,
this should not be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom
of choice of the court to which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this
Court is allowed only if there are special, important and compelling reasons
clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition, which are not present in this
case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an
appeal of the trial courts decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so
for yet another fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated
earlier, petitioner elevated to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of
appeal but also the Decision convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her
motion for reconsideration. In utter disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner
attached to the petition only the June 29, 2010 RTC Order denying her notice of
appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa and the order denying her
motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original of the
assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such
requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and
evaluation of the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders,
resolutions, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence
that are material and relevant to the issues presented in the petition without relying
on the case records of the lower court.
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioners repeated disregard of
the Rules and the Courts lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution dated September
15, 2010, the Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit
of service on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper
verification in accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7
of the Rules, and a valid certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 7, with properly accomplished jurat showing that the affiant
exhibited before the notary public at least one current identification document
issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the affiant as
required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
as amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC; and (c) her counsels contact details pursuant to the En Banc
Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days
from notice. x x x
Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to
require her counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for
non-compliance. Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply
to respondents Comment to the petition.
On August 2, 2011, petitioners counsel submitted his explanation for non-
compliance and asked for more time within which to comply with the Courts
resolution, because of heavy workload and his failure to contact petitioner who
apparently transferred residence. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2011, the
Court, while granting the motion for extension requested, admonished petitioners
counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again, petitioner failed to file the
required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the counsels explanation
why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioners counsel claimed that he
could not prepare the required reply because the documents needed had been
destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He, likewise, pointed out that he exerted earnest
efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that point. After the Court
required him again to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for
not complying with the Courts resolutions, and since his efforts to communicate
with his client proved futile, he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his duties
and responsibilities as counsel on record. In a Resolution dated December 10,
2012, we required petitioner herself to comment thereon, but no such compliance
was made to date.
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or
some procedural imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice. It is the
duty of the counsel to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign,
to determine which court has appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for
appeal. Any error in compliance may be fatal to the client's cause. It should be
stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process.
It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its exercise. The
requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court
dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules
with greater fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.
APPEALS
RULE 122-125
Rules of Court
People v Morales
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.
G.R No 172873
March 19, 2010
Ponente: J. Del Castillo
_____________________________________________________________
BRIEF:
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 24,
2006 affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 103 finding appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa guilty of the
crimes of possession and sale of dangerous drugs.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged in two separate Information before the RTC with
possession and sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Upon
arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges
read in Filipino, a language known and understood by him. On motion of the City
Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for joint trial. Trial on the merits ensued
thereafter.
The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera (PO3
Rivera) were presented by the prosecution were they made a pre-operation report
on a buy-bust operation to be conducted on the herein appellant. A poseur-buyer
was instructed to carry out the operation. Shortly, after the pre-arranged signal,
Morales was arrested. Upon conducting the body search, he found another sachet
which he suspected to be "shabu" and two aluminum foils. Appellant was brought
to the Police Station for detention, while the items seized from him were brought
to the Crime Laboratory for examination. The two sachets tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while the aluminum foil sheets tested
negative of the aforementioned substance.
Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3, 2003
during their respective testimonies, which they acknowledged to have executed
subsequent to the buy-bust operation.
The defense presented the testimonies of their witnesses. The appellant denied the
charges against him, testified that he was in Manila at that time to bring money for
his parents who live at Cruz na Ligas, and that he did not receive the mark money.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
Whether the appellant should not be convicted of the offenses charged against him
since his guilt has not been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: The trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The
trial court held that the prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as
the person who possessed and sold to the poseur-buyer the "shabu" subject of this
case, during the buy-bust operation conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003.
Court of Appeals: The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found
that contrary to the allegations of the appellant, there was no instigation that took
place. Rather, a buy-bust operation was employed by the police officers to
apprehend the appellant while in the act of unlawfully selling drugs. The appellate
court further held that what is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
Supreme Court: The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00037 affirming the judgment of conviction of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa
is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt, and is ordered to be
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other
lawful cause.
COURT RATIONALE:
Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged since his
guilt has not been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In support
of his contention, appellant alleges that the arresting officers did not even place
the proper markings on the alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time and place
of the alleged buy-bust operation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct
testimony of the two arresting officers sufficiently established the elements of
illegal sale and possession of shabu.
At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a
criminal case: the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the
duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the
appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of
such review, we find the present appeal meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial courts findings of fact,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of
exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with
direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After due consideration of the
records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence,
we hold that this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements
must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2)
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. On the
other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to
be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law,
and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of
the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and
disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA
9165, were not observed. The records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team
complied with these procedures despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the
use of "shall" in the directives of the law. The procedural lapse is plainly evident
from the testimonies of the two police officers presented by the prosecution,
namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.
PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the
appellant. Moreover, he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items
seized. The patent lack of adherence to the procedural mandate of RA 9165 is
manifest in his testimony.
The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items
collectively raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact
same items that were confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with
Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor,
for and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the siezed items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team, these conditions were not met in the
case at bar. No explanation was offered by the testifying police officers for their
failure to observe the rule. In this respect, we cannot fault the apprehending
policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a PDEA operative and the
other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the procedure
involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP. In fine, there is
serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered
from the appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1
Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the
identity of the person who had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its
examination and pending presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise
failed to establish the chain of custody which is fatal to its cause.1avvphi1
In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond APPEALS
reasonable doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which RULE 122-125
proves fatal to the prosecutions case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to Rules of Court
establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required
for successful prosecution of both possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we Quidet v People
resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y Midarasa. ROSIE QUIDET, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.G.R No

GR No. 170289
April 8, 2010
Ponente: J. Del Castillo

_____________________________________________________________

BRIEF:

Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the

offense itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and
kept within the penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the
balance tips in favor of the milder form of criminal liability as what is at stake is
the accuseds liberty. We apply these principles in this case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) July 22, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 which affirmed
with modifications the March 11, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. 92-079 and 92-
080.

FACTS:

On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr.
(Taban), and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with homicide in Criminal Case
No. 92-079 for the death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy) were charged with frustrated
homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmys
cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew), arising from the same incident. Upon
arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 92-
080 (frustrated homicide). Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 92-079 (homicide),
Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo maintained their
innocence.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
Whether the favorable appeal of Quidet will extend to the other two accused who
did not appeal.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and
Tubo guilty of homicide and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty
of frustrated homicide. The period of preventive imprisonment during which the
accused were detained pending the trial of these cases shall be credited in full in
favor of all the accused. The trial court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and
Andrew was previously planned by the accused. The active participation of all
three accused proved conspiracy in the commission of the crimes. Furthermore,
the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses cannot be
offset by the defense of plain denial.
From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.
Court of Appeals: The CA dismissed the instant appeal for lack of merit. The
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (a)
That in Criminal Case No. 92-080 the crime is only Attempted Homicide; and (b)
the civil indemnity in the amount of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos which was
awarded to the heirs of Andrew Tagarda be deleted as the same has not been fully
substantiated. In upholding the conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA
held that conspiracy was duly established as shown by the concerted acts of the
accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy. Hence, all of the accused are
guilty of homicide for the death of Jimmy.
The CA, however, disagreed with the trial courts finding that the accused are
liable for frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew.
According to the CA, the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew
because the latter successfully deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor
injuries which could have healed within five to seven days even without medical
treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is merely attempted homicide.
The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew because
the same was not fully substantiated.
Supreme Court: the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 22, 2005
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351
is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days
of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda P5,0000.00 as
moral damages. Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are ordered to solidarily
pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda P50,0000 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080, Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide and are meted the sentence
of four (4) months of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to four (4)
years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum. They are ordered
to solidarily pay Andrew Tagarda P30,000.00 as moral damages. Rosie Quidet is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the
sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He is ordered to pay Andrew
Tagrda P5,000.00 as moral damages
3) The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio Tubo
and Rosie Quidet shall be credited in their favor in accordance with Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code.
4) The bail bond of Rosie Quidet is cancelled.
COURT RATIONALE:
The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
petitioner is criminally liable only for his individual acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is
the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the
crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of all.
To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the
inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner before, during and after
the stabbing incident. From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance
which militate against the finding that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.
First, there is no evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or
enmity against Jimmy or Andrew. The prosecution eyewitnesses (Andrew and
Balani) as well as the three accused were one in testifying that there was no
misunderstanding between the two groups prior to the stabbing incident.
Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080,
the CA correctly modified the same. The crime committed was attempted
homicide and not frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew
sustained were not life-threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal
their conviction, this part of the appellate courts judgment is favorable to
them, thus, they are entitled to a reduction of their prison terms. The rule is
that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those
who did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is
favorable and applicable to the latter.

Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a purely accidental
encounter between Tabans and Andrews groups with both having had a drinking
session.

Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the incident, thus,
negating his intent to kill the victims. By the prosecution witnesses account,
petitioners participation was limited to boxing Andrew and Jimmy after Taban
and Tubo had stabbed the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor
indispensable to the commission of the crimes as they were done after the
stabbing. Thus, petitioners act of boxing the victims can be interpreted as a mere
show of sympathy to or camaraderie with his two co-accused.

Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral
certainty in order to establish that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo to
commit the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide.

For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt,

petitioners liability is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly
established that petitioner boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of the
extent of the injuries sustained by the latter from these acts, petitioner should only
be made liable for two counts of slight physical injuries. In addition, he should
pay P5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as
moral damages to Andrew. Actual damages arising from said acts cannot,
however, be awarded for failure to prove the same.
IRENORIO B. BALABA, petitioner,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009
FACTS
On Oct. 18-19, 1993, the State Auditors Arlene Mandin and Loila Laga
discovered a total cash shortage of P 114,186.34 upon conducting an
examination of cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the
Municipality of Guindalman, Bohol.
3 demands letters were sent to Balaba asking him to explain the
discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with Balbalas explanation,
Graft Investigation Officer I Miguel P. Ricamora recommended that an
information for Malversation of Public Funds as defined and penalized
under Art. 217 of the RPC, be filed against Balaba with the
Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an Information with the
Sandiganbayan on April 26, 1995 but was subsequently transferred to the
trial court on June 30, 1995 upon the effectivity of RA 7975.
On Dec. 9, 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty and sentenced him to
indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. He shall suffer
the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed.
On Jan.14, 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated
that he would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals. On Aug. 6,
2003 Balaba filed his Appellants Brief.
The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellees Brief,
filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the dismissal of the appeal
for being improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction
over the appeal.
On Dec. 15, 2004, Court of Appeals dismissed Balabas appeal and
declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the
Sandiganbayan exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.
On Jan. 27, 2005, Babala filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked
that he be allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the
Sandiganbayan. Court of Appeals denied Balbalas motion in its
resolution on Aug. 24, 2004.
On Oct. 7, 2005, Balbala filed a Motion this present petition before this
court.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal instead of
certifying the case to the proper court.
HELD
The Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment
Balaba seeks to appeal. Upon Balabas conviction by the trial court, his
remedy should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3,
Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which further defined
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads: The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions
or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own
original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the
filing of Balabas appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the
Sandiganbayan.
The Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed
Balabas appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.In Melencion v.
Sandiganbayan it was ruled: An error in designating the appellate court
is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the
proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to
appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct
appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. In this case, Balaba
sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the
expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its
Decision on December 9, 2002. Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal on 14
January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its
lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the
error only on January 27, 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to
appeal from the decision of the trial court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
VS.
CHARMEN OLIVO ALONG, NELSON DANDA Y SAMBUTO AND JOEY
ZAFRA Y. REYES
G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009
FACTS
On November 21, 2000, Maricel Permejo was tending the store of the
victim, Mariano Constantino in Bagong Silangan, Quezon City.
Suddenly, 3armed men entered the store and demanded money. When
Maricel did not accede to the demand, Nelson Danda kicked her in the
leg while his Joey Zafra got money from the cash register. When the
store owner, Mariano Constantino, went inside the store and shouted, the
Charmen Olivo poked a gun at him. Mariano ran towards the back of the
house but appellant Olivo nevertheless chased him. Thereafter, Maricel
heard successive shots and saw appellants Danda and Zafra going out of
the store while the bloodied body of Mariano was lying at the stairway of
the house. The victim was taken to the hospital where he died upon
arrival. RTC rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of the
crime of robbery with homicide.
Accused-appellants Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court of Appeals.
They argue that in criminal prosecutions, the State has the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has to prove
the identity of the accused as the malefactor, as well as the fact of the
commission of the crime for which he is allegedly responsible. They
argue that it can be gleaned from the records of the case that the
prosecution relied mainly on the testimony of the alleged eyewitness
Maricel Permejo, but her testimony leaves much to be desired. They
argue that Maricel Permejo did not point to them as the malefactors and
she only did so upon the instruction given in Camp Karingal. They point
out that they were invited allegedly for violation of the anti-drugs law
and were appalled to learn that they were charged with a different crime
and the alleged witness was coached to identify them. Evidently, they
stress, their guilt has not been proved with the required quantum of
evidence. The appellants further argue that while the alleged eyewitness
claimed she saw the accused-appellant Joey Zafra take the money from
the cash register, she did not see how and who killed Mariano
Constantino. She merely claimed that she saw the accused-appellants
armed and chased the deceased outside the store. They conclude that
whether or not the accused-appellants indeed committed homicide on the
occasion of the robbery is a matter that has not been proven with the
required moral certainty of guilt.
On the other hand, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argues that findings of fact of the trial court are generally
upheld on appeal and the accused-appellants are assailing the correctness
of the findings of fact of the trial court by impugning the credibility of
the prosecution witness Maricel Permejo. The prosecution claims that
contrary to the accused-appellants claim that the police officers taught
the witness Maricel Permejo to point to them as the perpetrators, her
testimony is straightforward and direct.
ISSUE
Whether the lower court has committed grave abuse of discretion in
convicting the accused.
Whether the co-accused Joey Zafra who did not appeal is entitled also to
acquittal.
HELD
It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a
witness or his credibility, this Court accords the highest respect and even
finality to the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it
committed palpable mistake, misappreciation of facts or grave abuse of
discretion. It is the trial court which has the unique advantage of
observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of voice
of a witness while testifying. The well-entrenched rule is that findings of
the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high respect,
if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing
evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and
circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will
warrant the modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. Factual
findings of trial courts, when substantiated by the evidence on record,
command great weight and respect on appeal, save only when certain
material facts and circumstances were overlooked and which, if duly
considered, may vary the outcome of the case.
 The present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment
of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. One
final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically
circumstanced as the other appellants and who was likewise convicted on
the same evidence, does not appear to have perfected an appeal from the
trial courts judgment. The record does not show the reason therefor. Be
that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar
as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are
definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not
therefore be treated as the odd man out and should benefit from the
acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under similar conditions and on the
same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court has
justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who
failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we
subsequently reversed.

MERCEDITA T. GUASCH, petitioner
VS.
ARNALDO DELA CRUZ, respondent
G.R. No. 176015, June16, 2009
FACTS
On Nov. 10, 2000 Arnaldo dela Cruz file a Complaint-Affidavit against
Mercedita T. Guash with the City Prosecutor of Manila. He alleged that
petitioner went to his residence requesting him to exchange her check
with cash of P3,300,000.00. Initially, he refused. However, petitioner
returned the next day and was able to convince him to give her
P3,300,000.00 in cash in exchange for her Insular Savings Bank Check
No. 0032082 dated January 31, 2000 upon her assurance that she will
have the funds and bank deposit to cover the said check by January 2000.
On the date of maturity and upon presentment, however, the check was
dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn
was already closed.
On February 7, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information
for estafa against petitioner. After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty
and after the prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion with
Leave to Admit Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer to
Evidence on April 1, 2005.
The trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer
to evidence and dismissing the case. The trial court found that
respondents assertion of misrepresentation by petitioner that her check
will be fully funded on the maturity date was not supported by the
evidence on record. Accordingly, her guilt not having been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner was acquitted.
On June 28, 2005, respondent received a copy of the said order. On July
14, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation with attached Motion to
Amend Order dated June 16, 2005 to include a finding of civil liability of
petitioner. In the Manifestation, respondents counsel justified his failure
to file the motion within the reglementary period of 15 days because all
postal offices in Metro Manila were allegedly ordered closed in the
afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.
Meantime, on Aug. 30, 2005, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals praying that the trial courts Order dated June
16, 2005 granting the demurrer to evidence be set aside.
The trial court denied respondents Motion to Amend in its Order dated
Sept. 20, 2005 finding that counsel for respondent was inexcusably
negligent; hence, the Order dated June 16, 2005 has become final and
executory. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same
was denied by the trial court in its Order dated Nov. 7, 2005.
On Dec.7, 2005, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal informing the trial
court that he was appealing the Order dated Sept. 20, 2005 and the Order
dated Nov. 7, 2005. The trial court likewise denied the notice of appeal in
an Order dated Dec 13, 2005.
Consequently, on February 13, 2006, respondent filed a Supplemental
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the Order
dated Sept. 20, 2005, the Order dated Nov. 7, 2005, and the Order dated
Dece13, 2005. On August 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied respondents Motion
to Amend.
HELD
Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, the statutory requirement
that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary
period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course
must be strictly enforced; Purposes for such Statutory Requirement.As
a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for
reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision
attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly
enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The
purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay
in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly
the discharge of judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and
 obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite Appeal
period of time. Rule 124, Section 8 and Rule 125, Section 1
In exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant People vs. Taruc
the giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of
statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1) the vs.
existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the FRANCISCO TARUC, accused-appellant.
case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of any showing that G.R. No. 185202
the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party February 18, 2009
will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO

Nature of Case:
Petition for Review

BRIEF
A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 February 2008
in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 01638 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Francisco
Taruc @ Taruc, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated 29 June
2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Case
No. 8010 for murder.

FACTS

The accused-appellant was convicted before the RTC of Bataan, Branch 3, on 29

June 2005 with the crime of murder with the attending aggravating circumstance
of treachery in connection with the death of Emelito Sualog, and sentenced to
suffer death and pay amounts of P49,225.00 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in
civil indemnity and P30,000.00 in moral damages.

The case was brought for automatic review in the Court of Appeals pursuant to
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for

Extension of Time to File Appellants Brief. However, it was returned, and the
court ordered the counsel for the accused-appellant to furnish it with the present
and complete address of his client within five days from notice.
The PAO lawyer informed the court that the accused-appellant escaped from
prison on 23 August 2002, which was later confirmed by the warden of the Bataan
Provincial Jail.
The motion was later granted by the court, even in the absence of the accused-
appellant. Following lapse of the period and a subsequent valid explanation
supplemented by the PAO lawyer for the delay of the filing of the brief, the Court
of appeals affirmed the decision and modifying the iposed penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua, in pursuance to R.A. No. 9346.
On 13 March 2008, the accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal for the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the accused-appellant lost his right to appeal his
conviction by escaping prison.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Accused-appellant was convicted of murder with the attendance of
treachery
CA: The decision of the RTC was affirmed with modifications
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Yes, the accused-appellant has lost his right to appeal his conviction by escaping
prison and evading arrest.
An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of
the judgment in a criminal case.If the accused fails to appear before the trial court,
promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6,
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused
to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the
remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and
the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender
and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies.
He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a
justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies
within fifteen (15) days from notice
Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows
the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, to
dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of
the courts over his person.
This rule was extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Failure to attend the promulgation by the RTC of its decision and failure
to surrender and file the required motion within the prescribed period, the
accused-appellant impliedly waived any remedy against said judgment of
conviction available under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
including the right to appeal the same.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal
processes of the land, accused-appellant revealed his contempt of the law
and placed himself in a position to speculate, at his pleasure on his
chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of
justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. Such
conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus.
Appeal Tiu filed a petition for certiorari with RTC of Pasay City that declared the decision
Rule 122, Section 1 by the MeTC void.
Tiu vs. CA
Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari following denial
DAVID TIU, petitioner of his motion for reconsiderayion in the RTC.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated: Motions and petitions filed by both parties were granted, the MeTC issued an
EDGARDO POSTANES, respondents Order granting Postanes motion to suspend the proceeding while presiding Judge
Estrellita M. Paas inhibited herself from further hearing the case.
G.R. No. 162370 A motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping was also file by the
April 21, 2009 petitioner in the Cort of Appeals.
Ponente: Carpio
The Court of Appeals, on 29 October 2003, reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the dismissal of the said case.

Nature of Case: On 24 February 2004, the Court of Appeals denied Tius motion for
Petition for Review reconsideration.

BRIEF ISSUE/S of the CASE

This is a petition for review assailing the 29 October 2003 Decision and 24
February 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals that annulled the 6 November
2000 Decisionof the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 115, Pasay City on the
ground of violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. The RTC
declared void the acquittal by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44,
Pasay City, of respondent Edgardo Postanes for the crime of grave threats.
FACTS
The issue stemmed from the consolidated charges filed by Edgardo Postanes
against Remigio Pasion and David Tiu, petitioner, against Edgardo Postanes, for
crimes of slight physical injuries and grave threats, respectively.
The case was dismissed by the MeTC on 26 January 1999 due to insufficiency of
evidence.
A motion for was filed by the petitioner and was subsequently denied by the
MeTC.
Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: The decision of the MeTC that dismissed the criminal case against
Postanes was declared void
CA: The decision of the RTC was reversed
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Yes, there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning
the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC.
All the elements of double jeopardy are present in the case: (1) the Information
filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and
(4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Also, Doctrine: Eligibility for Probation Even After Appealing From an Erroneous
there is no showing that the court lost or lacked jurisdiction that would have Judgment
allowed the an appeal.
COLINARES VS. PEOPLE
The Supreme Court also stated that the present petition by Tiu is defective since
the filing was not made by the Solicitor General. Arnel Colinares, Petitioner

vs.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
People of the Philippines, Respondent

G.R. No. 182748,

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29
October 2003 Decision and 24 February 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals December 13, 2011
in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. Costs against petitioner.
NATURE OF THE CASE:

Appeal

BRIEF

This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it
takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c)
when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case
to the trial court.

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated

homicide for hitting the head of the private complainant with a piece of stone. He
alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was
only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,

alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. His conviction was
affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.
THE ISSUES
Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser]
offense [of attempted homicide] and a reduced probationable penalty, may he may
still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court?
THE RULING
The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal,
MODIFIED the CA decision and found Arnel GUILTY of ATTEMPTED (not
frustrated) HOMICIDE and SENTENCED him to and indeterminate but
PROBATIONABLE penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum and 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional as maximum. The Court also voted 8-7
to allow Arnel to APPLY FOR PROBATION within 15 days from notice that
the record of the case has been remanded for execution to trial court.
YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court.
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it
will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment
against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty
that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to
the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse,
Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with
the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation
Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him
to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
probation. He was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to
apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied
him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the
first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right
from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed
on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that
Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is
the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for
probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE
Artemio Villareal, Petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines, Respondent
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
BRIEF
The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its
Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due
process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. While the
Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner
Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of
the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the
accused.
THE FACTS
Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
have been initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The
initiation rites started when the neophytes were met by some members of the
mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They were
consequently brought to a house and briefed on what will be happening during the
days when they will be initiated. They were informed that there will be physical
beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were brought to
another house to commence their initiation.
The neophytes were insulted and threatened even before they got off the van.
Members of the fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as they alighted from
the van. Several initiation rites were experienced by the neophytes like the Indian
run, Bicol express and rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles
of the fraternity and were hit everytime they made a mistake.
Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head of the initiation
rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity members subjected neophytes
to paddling and additional hours of physical pain. After the last session of
beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that night, he was feeling cold and his
condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on
arrival.
Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized
with reclusion perpetua.
On January 10 2002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. 19 of the the accused were acquitted, 4 of
the appellants were found guilty of slight physical injuries, and 2 of the accused-
appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide.
Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori under Rue 45 on the grounds
that the CA made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of due process and second,
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, petitioner
Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10
August 2011.
THE ISSUE
Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is
extinguished by death
THE RULING
Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death. The Court took
note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death when it has been received while
the petition was pending resolution. Personal penalties refer to the service of
personal or imprisonment penalties, while pecuniary penalties refer to fines, costs, Rules 126 Search and Seizure
civil liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code states that the criminal
liability of a convict for personal penalties is totally extinguished by death of the Abraham Miclat Jr. y Cerbo, Petitioner
convict. His pecuniary penalty has been extinguished since the death of the Vs.
accused happened before his final judgment. Therefore, the death of the petitioner
for both personal and pecuniary penalties including his civil liability has ended. People of the Philippines, Respondent
His petition has also been dismissed and the criminal case against him has been
G. R. No. 176077
closed and terminated.
August 31, 2011

PERALTA, J;

Nature of the Case:

Petition for Review on Certiorari

Facts:

Police operatives including PDEA conducted a surveillance of drug trafficking in

Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. The informant of the police
directed them to the residence of a certain ABE PO3 Antonio then positioned
himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group
deployed themselves nearby. Through a small opening in the curtain-covered
window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1 meters, he saw
Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be
containing shabu. At the same instance they arrested the petitioner. However, the
version of the petitioner is that, together with her father and sister while watching
television the police operatives barrage themselves into their house and that the
shabu was later planted to the petitioner while travelling to the police station.

The trial court rendered the decision finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA subsequently affirmed the trial
court decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

1.WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED

WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR
A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED (SIC) OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND
NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST AND CONTINUED DETENTION.
WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following
elements must be established:

Ruling: (1) The accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a

Supreme Court ruled that at the time of petitioners arraignment, there was no
objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the
validity of the conviction of the accused.
While it is true that Sec. 2 of the bill of rights preserves the rights of individuals of
illegal search and seizure. However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by
the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a
crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless
arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
prohibited or regulated drug;
(2) Such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) The accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the
drug.
Supreme Court ruled there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact
of the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the
narration of the prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to
the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error
was committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that
petitioner committed the crime charged against him.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

For the exception in Section 5

(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present:
Rules 126 Search and Seizure
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
Vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant
G..R. No. 188611
June 16 2010
Nachura, J;
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review
Facts:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana
had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion.
The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but
no one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack
from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and
3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they
were under arrest, but one the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. at the police station,
the investigators contacted Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the
bag . When the mayor arrived 15 minutes later, the bags were open and the 3
bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in news paper, were recoverd.
There after the investigatir marked invetored and forwarded the confiscated
marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in bags all tested positive for marijuana a dangerous
drug.
RTC: Found Guity
Issue:
Whether or not the apellants constitutional right against unreasonable searches
was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer;
Ruling:
CA Affirmed
The search of moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search of seizure shall be made except by the
virtue of warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause.
The constitutional proscrition against warrantless searches and seizure admits
certain exceptions. Aside from search incident to a lawful arrest , a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle , and the seizure of evidence
in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicle, this had been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicle makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched
to move out to the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search and seizure in
this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was
about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would
be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conduction the search
under the circumstance. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching
officer had no time to obtain warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board
the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
DOCTRINES
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited
drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of
the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack
ofcriminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime
charge is malum prohibitum
DOCTRINE: Sec. 4 Requisites for issuing a Warrant -
Warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.
______________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 176066
August 11, 2010
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
BRIEF: For review is the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated April 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal
Case No. 17619-R, of illegal possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential
Decree No. 1866, otherwise known as the Illegal Possession of Firearms, as
amended.
FACTS:
At around nine oclock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male
informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived
at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2
Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain
Estela Tuan had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City. Present at that time were Police Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional
Officer of the 14th Regional CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy
Regional Officer; and other police officers.
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around
one oclock in the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-
ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to the
accused-appellants house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellants house,
while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong
and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellants house and showed SPO2 Fernandez
the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office,
SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from
accused-appellant. When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for
marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for
accused-appellants house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a
Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one
oclock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three
oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-
ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of
probable cause.
Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte
Marquez and PO2 Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-
appellants house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when
the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested
one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellants neighbor, to come along.
The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellants house. Even though
accused-appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the
house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellants father, after he was shown
a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector
Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house, while SPO1 Carrera and
PO2 Chavez searched inside.
SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the
presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their search on the second
floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellants room, below which they
found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six oclock that evening,
accused-appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-
appellant to open a built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of
marijuana. PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confiscated from accused-
appellant and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and recovered
from the house and in accused-appellants presence.
The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for examination.
On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against
accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
firearm.
Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her
counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY to both charges. Pre-trial and trial proper
then ensued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Search Warrant was invalid for not describing with
particularity the place to be searched
ACTIONS OF THE COURTS:
RTC: The trial court found the accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda
GUILTY of illegal possession of marijuana and Illegal Possession of Firearms
CA: The appellate court PARTLY GRANTED the instant appeal. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of
marijuana. However, it MODIFIED the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting
accused-appellant of the charge for illegal possession of firearm.
SC: AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
No. Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant
did not describe with particularity the place to be searched.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of
the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There
was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-
appellants residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed
of several rooms.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant
for accused-appellants house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized
as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence
against the accused-appellant.
Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal
possession of 750 grams or more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in her possession a total
of 19,050 grams of marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the
RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still within
the range of fines imposable on any person who possessed prohibited drugs
without any authority, under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
DOCTRINE: When searches and seizures allowed without warrants
STOP-AND-FRISK RULE
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband
concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
______________________________________________________________
SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, PETITIONER,
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 182010
August 25, 2010
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.:
BRIEF: Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y
Romines (petitioner) challenges the November 27, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July 28, 2003 Decision of
Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No.
02-2297 convicting Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section
11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002) - possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
FACTS:
On the basis of an informant's tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas
(PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan
St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged
notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as Ryan.
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas
to the target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three
meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a
small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While
PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious
when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then
introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic
sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however,
petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1
Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the
plastic sachet on which he marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item,
petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where
P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a
memorandum dated December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist
of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the substance
contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the
conduct of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas
soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension recounting the details of their
intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioner's arrest.
Results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Dangerous
Drugs Report No. DD-02-613, viz:
xxxx
F I N D I N G S:
Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen
gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE,
 a dangerous drug. x x x ACTIONS OF THE COURTS:

xxxx RTC: By Decision of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner GUILTY of
illegal possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the
results thereof in Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-4128 reading: CA: The appellate court AFFIRMED the trial court's decision.

xxxx SC: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12)
F I N D I N G S: years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all
other respects, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297
Volume of urine = 60 mL. is AFFIRMED.
pH of urine = 5.0
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
HELD:
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen
gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE Yes. The Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a
HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metaboliteAMPHETAMINE. x x x valid "stop-and-frisk" operation.
xxx
Appellant's conviction stands.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was "planted,"
stemming from an all too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest - before her
from her and her family.
arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such
ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest - as well as the
Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioner's daughter Josan Lee and family
inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof- for the first time
friend Ma. Stella Tolentino, corroborated petitioner's account. They went on to
only on appeal before the appellate court. By such omissions, she is deemed to
relate that the police officers never informed them of the reason why they were
have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.
taking custody of petitioner.
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed
In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate court's application of the
engender the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police
"stop-and-frisk" principle in light of PO1 Cruzin's failure to justify his suspicion
officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts.
that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing
When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white
something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To
crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts
training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to
constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion.
curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he
introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the
plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the accused was valid under the
stop-and-frisk principle.
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid
search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of
vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4)
searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among other things,
the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.
xxx
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the
suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's possession - later voluntarily
exhibited to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on
what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself
to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was
exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer
had identified himself.
It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever
available defenses she would raise. While such admissions do not necessarily
control in determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they
nevertheless provide a reasonable gauge by which petitioner's credibility as a
witness can be measured, or her defense tested.
It has not escaped the Court's attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by
adopting two completely inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one
hand, she argues that the "stop-and-frisk" search upon her person and personal
effects was unjustified as it constituted a warrantless search in violation of the
Constitution. In the same breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast
to her version that she was at home resting on the date in question and had been
forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives and brought to the
police station, for no apparent reason than to try and extort money from her. That
her two witnesses - a daughter and a friend - who were allegedly present at the
time of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim that they were
not informed why she was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their
testimony.
Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of
petitioner's, that they are victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like
alibi, has been held as a shop-worn defense of the accused in drug-related cases,
the allegation being easily concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the
defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption
of regularity of official acts of government officials. This it failed to do.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings
of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of
petitioner
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision of the RTC
in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is AFFIRMED.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
MARIMLA vs People
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC
Judge, Branch 57, Angeles City, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158467
October 16, 2009
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
Nature of Case: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
1
Brief: It seeks to annul the Order dated September 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, denying petitioner spouses Joel and
Marietta Marimlas Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence
Illegally Seized, and the Order2 dated April 21, 2003 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
FACTS:
Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime
Division led two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila
seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners house located on RD Reyes St.,
Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St.,
Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications
uniformly alleged that SI Lagascas request for the issuance of the search warrants
was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D.
Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a
test buy made at petitioners house. The purpose of the application for search
warrants was to seize Shabu, Marijuana weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters,
burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia. Juadge Guarina found probable cause to
issue the search warrant. The ocers conducted a search and found separate dried
owering tops in dierent containers. The petitioners led a Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant for it was allegedly led outside the territorial jurisdiction and
judicial region of the court where the crime is committed
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to issue the warrant
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC: Denied petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Supress
Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of Merit
CA: Denied Motion for Consideration
SC: The decision of the RTC is affirmed
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Public Prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by
Judge Mario Guaria III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court,
is in order. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes executive judges of the
RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in places
outside territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and among others
by the NBI.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted
by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions led directly
before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it
involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of
its rule-making power under the Constitution. Rule 126 of the Criminal
Procedures on Search and Seizure states that:
Sec. 2.Court where application for search warrant shall be led. An
application for search warrant shall be led with the following: (a) Any court
within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, (b) For compelling Rule 126 Search and Seizure
reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the Sec. 2. Court where application of Search warrant shall be filled
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses
However, if the criminal action has already been led, the application shall only
be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Nothing in A.M. No. PEOPLE VS. PUNZALAN
99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF
from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff - appellee
warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the vs.
Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every JERRY PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN, accused - appellants
The Solicitor General for plaintiff appellee
bureau may perform such duties as may be specied by their superior or head, as
Atty. not indicated for accused appellants
long as it is not inconsistent with law. We cannot nd any irregularity or abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners Motion to G.R. No. 199087
Quash Search Warrant. November 11, 2015
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Nature of Case:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Order Petition for Review (Appeal)
s dated
September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge O BRIEF
mar Viola of the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED. This is an appeal for the reversion of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City, Branch 116 convicting accused-appellants of violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act 9162, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS
On November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the morning, the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Team headed by Intelligence Agent I Liwanag
Sandaan and other agents implemented a search warrant issued on October 28,
2009 by then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to (i) make an immediate
search of the premises/house of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan,
Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who
are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay
City; and (ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of assorted
dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the
court.
Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be
occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch6 of the compound describing the
house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant.
Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to
coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and
Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a media
representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation. From the
barangay hall, they walked toward the target place using as a guide the sketch they
prepared.
When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, which is
a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on the door. A woman, later
identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When
they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they
have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not
successful since the PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to
enter the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when
found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant infront
of accused-appellants.
Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the
table. 101 Pagaragan was able to seize nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets, two (2)
square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a small round plastic container.
All three (3) plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of
white crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There were also other
paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2
Esteban and IO2 Alvarado effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and
Patricia Punzalan after informing them of their constitutional rights. 101
Pagaragan immediately marked the seized items by placing the marking "ADP".
After searching and marking the evidence found on the first floor, the team,
together with the barangay officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and
conducted the search on the second and third floors but found nothing. They went
downstairs where they conducted the inventory of recovered items. 101 Pagaragan
prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly
Search which were later signed by the barangay officials.
After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were brought to
the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1 Pagaragan presented the
seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report, Request for Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination. They
likewise caused the preparation of their respective affidavits. Photographs were
also taken during the actual search and inventory. Laboratory examination of the
seized pieces of drug evidence gave positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of 40.78 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
The accused-appellants denied the charged whereby they presented witnesses and
questioned the validity of the search conducted in their premises.
The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of
different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that only one
search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also,
the address of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and
adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be
searched was attached to the records and such description of the place was
unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to
successfully conduct their operation in the premises described in the search
warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant
sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA, thus, the appeal of the
accused-appellants alleging errors committed by the CA.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the search warrant issued by RTC of Manila, Branch 17, to
search the premises in Pasay is valid.
2. Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the two witnesses rule in this case.
ACTION of the COURT
RTC: Appellants were convicted for violation of Section 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 or R.A. No. 9165.
CA: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
On the first issue
In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim that the
PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the
requirements for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of
the PDEA Director General. Accused-appellants also contended that the court
which issued the search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority
to issue the search warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be
conducted is outside its territorial jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its Resolution of January 27,
2004, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional
Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. - The Executive Judges and, whenever
they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station,
the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have
authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force
(ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended,
and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their
respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in
the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned
shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts.
xxxx
In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation, accused-appellants failed to
show that the application for search war
rant of the subject premises was not approved by the PDEA Regional Director or
his authorized representative. On the contrary, the search warrant issued by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with the requirements for the
issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court, thus:
Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 2 to 5, Rule
126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, modified by Section 12 of Supreme
Court En Bane Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC dated January 27, 2004, and
Certification dated October 28, 2009, it appearing to the satisfaction of the
undersigned after personally examining under oath Agent Liwanag B. Sandaan
and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Metro
Manila Regional Office, that there is probable cause, there are good and sufficient
reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs,
particularly shabu, including the proceeds or fruits and those used or intended to
be used by the respondents as a means of committing the offense, you are hereby
commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the
premises above described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs including the proceeds 01
fruits and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.19cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, we find no merit in accused-appellants' claim that the RTC of Manila,
Branch 17, had no authority to issue the assailed search warrant since the place to
be searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction. As aforecited, Section 12, Chapter
V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants
to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases
such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the parameters under the said
section have been complied with. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated October 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
On the second issue 04557 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense With costs against the accused-appellants.
has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in
the place to be searched. There is no exact test for the determination of probable SO ORDERED.
cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the
finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. When a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.

xxx

On the third issue

Notably, Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses. - No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.

As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present
during the initial search, the search was witnessed by accused-appellants
themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies
only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member
of his family.

xxx

In fine, we find no error on the part of the CA in affirming the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellants of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellants
Jerry Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan of the crime charged. We likewise find
proper the modification by the trial court of the penalty imposed to life
imprisonment and a fine of P400,000.00