G. B. Kerferd - Gorgias On Nature or That Which Is Not

Gorgias on Nature or That Which Is Not
Author(s): G. B. Kerferd
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 1955), pp. 3-25
Published by: BRILL
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181593 .
Accessed: 08/08/2013 10:51
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Gorgiason natureor that whichis not
G. B. KERFERD
T remains of Gorgias' treatise 7rtc? 'rou [0 6v?oc m1) 7rrpL CA)q

HE
have not received very much attention from scholars during the last
fifty years. This is probably due mainly to two reasons - the highly
technical and indeed to many readers repulsive nature of its content, and
the widely held view that it is not meant seriously but is simply a parody
or joke against philosophers, or at best a purely rhetorical exercise. 1 The
first of these views seems so obviously wrong that it is hardly necessary
to devote much time to discussing it. The short answer must be that there
is nothing humourous about the treatise and no indication that it was
ever intended to be so. In this respect it is in exactly the same position
as the second part of Plato's dialogue Parmenides.Its general thesis might
conceivably amuse those to whom all attempts at philosophy are in-
herently absurd, but such persons could hardly be expected to work
through the difficult arguments which make up the contents of the work.
The view that it was purely a rhetorical exercise is no more plausible.
But it is not intended to argue this question at length here. The final
answer to both views must consist in showing just what is the content of
the treatise and the serious purposes to which it is directed. There have
indeed been those who have treated the work seriously. But its inter-
pretation undoubtedly presents quite extraordinary difficulties, and
those who have treated it seriously have arrived at very different views
as to what Gorgias is saying.2 What follows is in part new, and as a
consequence little space is devoted to previous interpretations, and
where they are mentioned it is usually in disagreement. It is nonetheless
the work of scholars in the past who have laid a foundation both in
establishing the text and in interpreting it upon which all future studies
must rest.
Our information about the contents of the treatise comes from two
separate accounts, the summnaryin Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii.
65-87, and the third section of the work De Melisso XenophaneGorgia
I Cf. H. Gomperz, Sophistikund Rhetorik,Leipzig 191 2, I 8 2 ff., H. Maier, Sokrates,
Tlubingen1913, 2x9ff. For reflections of these views see e.g. K. Freeman, Companion
to the Pre-SocraticPhilosophers,3 6 1- 2, and E. Brihier, Histoire de la Philosophie, 1.i. 8 S.
2 Notably G. Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, Roma 1932. M. Untersteiner, I Sofisti,
Torino 1949 (English Translation, The Sophists, Oxford: Blackwell 19S4). 0. Gigon
in Hermes, lxxi (1936) I86-213. E. Dupreel, Les Sophistes, Neuchatel 1948 [actualy
19491. 1 have not seen D. Viale (= Adolfo Levi), Studi su Gorgia in Logos xxiv (1941).

(MXG) attributed to Aristotle. The date of this second work cannot be
determined. While it is certainly not by Aristotle, it may contain
Aristotelian or Peripatetic material and have some relation to Aristotle's
7rp6k M'&MeX(aaou C, tpk a' Evop&vouc, aC, and tp6qTM, ropyLou a,
mentioned in the catalogue of Aristotle's works preserved in Diogenes
Laertius v. 2g. Diels first" assigned it to a Peripatetic of the third century
B.C. but later supposed that it came from the first century A.D. Gigon8
preferred the view that it was based on a series of Peripatetic studies in
the Presocratics and in default of further evidence this is probably the
most likely. It is usually supposed that the contents of both versions
represent a summary of a more extended work by Gorgias himself,
though it is not possible to assess the degree to which the original may
have been compressed and curtailed. Recently it has been asserted 3 that
the text shows 'a very high level of logical skill' unthinkable at the time
of Gorgias. But the author does not offer any detailed analysis of the text.
As against this view the discussion, e.g. of change, seems wholly pre-
Platonic in character. Above all the treatment of the verb 'to be',
if the interpretation which is about to be offered is even partially right,
would hardly be possible after the work of Plato and Aristotle. All that
can be said with reasonable certainty is that Gorgias seems clearly to
have committed himself to the central conclusion of the surviving
summaries, since this is twice attributed to him by Isocrates.4 This
would naturally refer to one of his writings and in fact it is clear that in
later years there was a treatise circulating under the name of Gorgias 5,
with the title sept yuaccor or 7tepL toi5 ,lu 6Vxo4 n ept Ypu'ae&g.It has
never I think been seriously suggested that Sextus took his information
from the author of MXG. The reverse possibility, that MXG drew upon
Sextus is quite out of the question. Whether both or either used inter-
mediary sources between themselves and the treatise circulating under
the name of Gorgias cannot be known. But there seems to be no need
for such a hypothesis in order to explain anything in the surviving
versions and accordingly it is probably better left aside. Whether
Gorgias was himself responsible for the contents of the treatise which
certainly later circulated under his name is another question which once
raised can never be conclusively answered. But an attempt will be made
1 Doxogaphi Gracci, (1879), io8f. Later view in Abh. Berlin Ak. igoo, p. 12.
2 Hermes lxxi (1936) 2 1 2.
3 by X.M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdami95i, 17.
4 IX.3 and XV.26 - Diels-Kranz682 B X.
5 Diels-Kranz682 A io and B 2.

to show that there is nothing in the treatise which might not have been
expressedby Gorgiasin the fifth century and there the matteris perhaps
best left.
On the usual view there are fundamentaldifferencesin the arguments
as presented in the two versions and much discussionhas been devoted
to the question which of the two versions should be preferred where
they differ. Againon the usualview in the first part of both versions the
arguments turn round the question whether Being or Not-Being can be
said to exist or not. But it is fairlyclear that in the two later sections the
interest centres round not the existence or otherwise of Being and
Not-Being, but the status of objects of perception. A real advancein the
study of the treatise came with the suggestion1 that the first section of
the treatise also is concerned with the status of objects of perception,
and that the question at issue was not the existence or otherwise of
Being and Not-Being, but a different one, namely whether the verb
'to be' can be predicated of phenomena without leading to contra-
dictions. It is the aim of what follows to present a fresh reconstruction
of the argumentsof Gorgiasalong these lines, and in particularto show
that the supposeddifferencesbetween the versions of MXG and Sextus
in the first section of the treatise are more apparentthan real.
First the general arrangementof the argumentsin the two versions.
Both MXG (g7ga 12-13) and Sextus (vii. 65) state the major divisions
of the treatise in what are admitted to be identical terms: - Nothing is;
If it is, it is unknowable; If it is and is knowable, it cannot be communi-
cated to others. Sextus states the arguments for the first step, that
Nothing is, according to a straightforward pattern which he summarises
in ch. 66 and follows exactly in the succeeding chapters. He first takes
the supposition ei T p. gv =t and gives two arguments against this.
He then takes the supposition C'Ltz U 9=L and argues in the first place
that if so it must be either eternal or generated or both eternal and
generated, and in the second place it must be either one or many, and
none of these concequences is tenable. He then discusses et r6 av g'rL
xac T4 [L-1 6v and gives reasons against this, and so finally reaches the
required conclusion o068v aT. MXG begins with a general statement
dividing the arguments which are to follow into two groups (979 a I 3-24).
Of these two groups the second in Gorgias' arrangement is described
first in the general statement by the author of MXG. This is made clear
by the words in 979 a 23- 24. >?Tr -? 7pnv tlOV cVO' a68LtL &V
h ?yeL 6trL oux am T oV OUt? -voa o65T gl elva. This sentence is
Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, 1932.

followed by the statementof three argumentsand it seems clear that all
three are part of the 'special' demonstrationmentioned in the sentence
quoted. This is confirmed by the words which conclude the statement
of the three arguments- oroq tv o p&rog 1 6yoq bxevou(79 a 33)
which seem clearly to refer to the statement in 979 a 23 just quoted. The
three argumentsare then criticised by the author of MXG (979 a 34-
b i9) and he resumes the statement of Gorgias' views with the words
o
jieT& 6ntov 'r6vM6yov (p-nxvx'rX. (979 b 20). There follow the
arguments about generated and ungenerated, one and many, and the
argumentabout motion which has no parallelin Sextus. The arguments
about generated and ungenerated, and one and many are clearly those
described in the general statement by the author of MXG (979a I3-23)
before he describes the 'special' demonstrationof Gorgias.
This arrangementin MXG led Gigon2 to argue that the presentation
of the argumentsdiffers fundamentallyin Sextus and MXG. He holds
that in MXG the 'special' demonstrationcovers the groundof the whole
of the first division in Sextus, namely et r?t 'ov 9=, ?etr6 v laTn and
et 6 &v &crLxcxl 'r6 ,u? 6v. On this view MXG deals with e't r gv I
in quite a differentway from Sextus, without using the argumentsabout
eternal or generated, one or many at all for this purpose. In MXG these
are held to form a supplement, after the special argument which has
covered the whole ground already,while in Sextus they are the essential
and indeed only argumentsdirected to the question e't ' v&T=L. If this
is true we are confronted at the outset with a radical and perhaps
insoluble problem. One of the two versions has completely recast the
original treatiseat this point and there is no clear indicationas to which
preserves the earlier arrangement. Alternatively we would have to
supposethat in some sense there were two originalversionseachdifferent
from the other. :
MXG begins its statement of the 'special' demonstrationof Gorgias
with the words oux XXs o5hr elvoL okhe jiu etvotL. That the text is
sound is shown by the repetition of the phrasein g7gb i 8ti{ r oiv oVx
t=v od?e elvoct ok, FL?) elva; Three differentrenderings might be
offered for the phrase: i. 'neither Being nor Not-Being exists'. This is
the commonest rendering and might be called the traditional inter-
pretation. 2. 'neither Being nor Not-Being can exist'. 3. 'it is not
1 This word is a conjecture by Diels. See x below p. 17.
' Hermes lxxi (1936) 192-3. He is followed in this by Untersteiner, Sofisti, Testimonianze
c Frammenti,Fasc. 2. p. 4o n. and T'heSophists, E.T. i66 n. 26.
8 as Untersteiner, The Sophists, 172 n. 75.

possible (for it) either to be or not to be.' 1 That the third meaning is
the natural one cannot gain much support from the dubious doctrine
that an infinitive without an article cannot be the subject of a verb in
Greek 2, but seems to follow from the regularuse of the infinitive after
la'n in the sense 'it is possible to....'. The obvious parallels to the
present phrase are Parmenidesfr. 2.3 .v &t&o {a'w ' xod (a c oux
{as; ?tVL andfr. 6. 2-3 gartLTYPclv?t, / tv8 8'oX gaLv and it is
in fact likely that Gorgias had these phrases of Parmenidesin mind.
Unfortunatelythis does not absolutelysettle the meaning, as the phrases
in Parmenides have been variously interpreted. We are here only
concerned directly with the meaning of &rnfollowed by the infinitive.
In the first case Kranz3, followed by Gigon 4 take the meaningof c's oiux
I= Celvm to be 'dass Nichtsein niicht ist'. But the vast majority of
scholars would probably agree that the natural meaning is 'it cannot
be'. Certainlythis is suggested by the antithesis two lines later in the
fragmentm (' Ag ou'xlO'TtV -re XtL 4 Xpec'v ea=TL ' cvaL where Xpe'V
&CL li' eIvCL seems to show that the eIvct in the earlier line is a
predicate.5 There is greater difficulty with the second passagefrom
Parmenides,fr. 6.2 =t yap elvax. While possiblya majorityof scholars
would prefer the meaning 'it can be', the meaning 'Being exists' has
received considerable support.6 In fact both in this case and in the
previous case a definite decision would require a full consideration of
Parmenides' philosophy. Even if Parmenides' meaning could be esta-
blished with certainty it would not necessarilyfollow that Gorgiaswas
using the phrase with the same meaning since the extent to which
Gorgias is discussing the position of Parmenidesis itself problematic.
What must be decisive for Gorgiasmust be the argumentsby which he
seeks to establish6'T oV'x =tLv oute elvat o6re * ? V(XLand it will be
argued that these require the meaning 'it canot either be or not be'.
The first argument in MXG is full of difficulties. The accepted text
there reads oix 9aLV oU'T ?tVmL ou'e tJ etvaC (the phrase already
discussed). e'Lpiv yap To6 etvaLea=t [ ?vact, ou8&vav Atov '6 p
1 Lovedayand Forster in the Oxford Translationof Aristotle, Vol. VI.
2asserted e.g. in Burnet, Early GreekPhilosophy
. 173 n. 2, given some support in
Kiihner-Gerth,ii. 3-S, rejected with examples by Verdenius, Parmenides,
somecomments
on his poem, 1942, 3g and Fraenkel ad Aesch. Ag. S84.
3 in Diels-Kranz i5 P. 231, as against Diels in ii3 p. IS2.
4 Ursprungder griechischen Philosophie, 1945, 251.
a cf. Verdenius, op. cit. 32 n.
S.
4 cf. Heidel, Proc. Am. Ac. of Arts and Sciences, xlviii (1913) 72x, Kranzin Diels-
Kranzil p. 232, Verdenius, op. cit. 37, Gigon, Ursprung,257.

8,v ToU 6voq et. t6 re yap tvj 6v 'cn Lx ov X&LT'0 8v 8v (e ov86
FL0V eVoCM1 OCUXCtVxL 'ra 7p0yM. For this the Oxford translation
for example gives 'it is not possible either to be or not to be. For, he
says, if Not-to-Be is Not-to-Be, then Not-Being would be no less than
Being. For Not-Being is Not-Being and Being is Being, so that things no
more are than are not'. Now after the preliminary statement 6'rLoUX
la-Lv o6re evtvcLo5're ' EvavL we would expect to find one or other or
possibly both of these alternatives taken up. We should expect the next
sentence to be et j.iv yap X=>v elvtv or its equivalent, or e? v?v ydp
gL c
?tv or both together. Even if the argument is compressed and
something of this kind is to be understood, we should expect the
conclusion to be something directly relevant to oi'x garv o5'm EttvL
o&' ,L7t etvoxL. Alternatively if the argument began ?1 0&v yap r6
ctvxr. ? v? elvoc we might expect the conclusion to be some sort of
denial of this hypothesis. In fact we have something quite different. But
the really serious objection to the traditional interpretation here is a
further point. As it stands, and as it has been translated, the argument
makes nonsense of itself. Not only does it not produce the required
conclusion, it produces the very opposite of the required conclusion. If
Not-Being is no less than Being, the conclusi'on must be that both
Not-Being and Being exist. It will not then be the case that things no
more exist than not exist. The only conclusion possible would be that
all things exist, both those that are Not-Being and those that are Being.
But we must set a limit to the confusion of mind which we are justified
in attributing even to a sophist. A fallacious argument is one thing and a
fallacious argument leading to the wrong conclusion is quite another and
we cannot allow the argument to rest in this condition until all other
resources have been tried.
The best edition of the text is that of Diels 1, which uses two manu-
scripts, L and R. Of these Diels remarks 'Codices LR satis fideliter ex
libro corruptissimo descripti sunt. In universum accuratius L, sed variat
fortuna legendi. Interdum R oculos magis intendit et imprimis finem
versus L solito neglegentior. archetypi igitur imago clare enitescit,
quem etiam pluribus et difficilioribus compendiis exaratum fuisse
patet'. 2 He adds 'codicis L praestantia non ipsius diligentia ac fide sed
etiam eo niti videtur, quod coniecturis subinde felicibus eius exemplar
1 Aristotelis qui fertur de Melisso Xenophane Gorgia libellus, Abh. der k. Akad. d. Wiss.
zu Berin, 9goo. The text is not in Diels-Kranz,though to be included in future editions.
It is included in Untersteiner, Frammenti,Fasc. ii.
s ib. p. S.

correctum erat' and 'instructusautem erat archetypusvariislectionibus'.
This raises the possibility that L has removed traces of other readingsin
the archetype which R may have preserved through default of 'happy'
conjectures. In the first sentence of the present argumentthe received
text is that of L. But R has et ,uv yxp t6 ,L rVXL i ca'rLt p' e1VocL.
I believe that what lies behind this is eL ,udv yap t' lvoL g
cat<t.v> fi
e OLC [r1 EVXL and this is the right reading here. This will help to make
sense of the argument as I will attempt to show shortly. But there are
further reasons for adopting it which may be discussed first. Sextus
begins his first argumentwith EL yap t6 [iq ov e'TL and his second with
xcxL &),o dL T6 8zV gaT The second argument in MXG begins with
El 8'6L T6 pJ LIVatL9L (979a 28). The second argument in MXG is
clearly the same argument as the second argument in Sextus, and while
discussion of the first argument in Sextus must be postponed for the
present it is clear that it has at least some elements in common with the
first argument in MXG. Accordingly a double symmetry will be
obtainedif in the first argumentin MXG we read eLCuev yocp T6 [0? ?v(XL
<9=Ltv>. Further support may be derived from the opening of the
criticism of the first argument in MXG. Here R has d yap Xxxl 7cO-
8?(X,VUa,V,WM;@ gtOayeXeTML. ELt T6 [L &V galV i 9=L aJXTC& CEtsEvet-
'
xOLalC xL Ca-tV 6V. L has a y&p x&La (lacuna of two
610LOV
'
letters) 7o8CLXVt%UaLV, ou6cTc8XtayEToCL.dt T6 IIOV g'TLV a oq ?lt7tCV
?LI xoK 1TV 6C.tOLQVsU? 6v. Both manuscripts then continue To53to
gi oUtre qaNCvT xLToiTg oure &voyxI and reasons are given for this
remark. For the first sentence of the criticism recent scholars follow
Diels and write & yocpx&ct&<'XXot oC>no8LXVtuuaLv, oVPOLUOg Ty<X>CT0CL.
But the criticisms which follow refer to the 'special' demonstration of
Gorgias which the author of MXG has already clearly distinguished from
the proofs which Gorgias took from others, namely those concerned
with the one and the many, etc. This being the case the introduction of
&XXoLhere makes the author of MXG contradict himself. Moreover
whatever the second sentence means it must be some sort of recapitu-
lation of what Gorgias has said. Only so can the ro&3oin the third
sentence be explained.' Therefore 8Lao?ye'-roLshould be retained with
the manuscripts, and for the first sentence as a whole we should read
something like a yap xcxLoc<&6raX>7ro8exLvuaLv OUSTcq8L0CXeyZT0L.The
second sentence may seem desperate. But it begins e Ior? 'ovgartL and
there is nothing at all in the manuscripts to suggest an original di sZ tLh
1 so Cook-Wilson in Class. Review vi (1892) 4+1-2.

cv I= <qk 6v> or &I 6 ILv <Ll 8v> gcar which Cook-Wilson I saw
would be required to representthe et vIv yap T IL etvoct=l piL ctvvL
of the first sentence of the first argument in MXG. In fact et r6 ,i
*wrr in the criticism is the same as detap r* & Sv I= at the beginning
of the first argument in Sextus. Accordingly it supports the reading
proposed for the first sentence of the first argument in MXG, Et J.v ymp
'r L ?ZevOC <ImTLV>h Im 0 ?tCv(c... Again the beginnig of the
second argument in MXG, dE8' 6?acaq r? 1V lv fart, 'r6elvaL, cp*a,
oux laTL r6 M<V'LxzLvzvOv,is represented in the criticism (979b i I) by
o6x &vck'yx-y&p d1 tLs r6 v ga'li xacx 'r 8v tv? elvaZt. Since in this case
'r ri~8v crrt in the criticism corresponds to et 'r6 [i CtvL dart in the
argument criticised, we may conclude that in the case of the first
argument also et 'r r?h69v I in the criticism implies et ih ClVOL
Iro in the argument critisised. For the second sentence in the criticism
one might suggest cE-r6 tui 8v ot, h &nv, &(7A6)4 tCtCLV &ve6) &TLILV
xocl &anv 6LoLov (or with Diels 6o1CAoq)tuh 6v. This is based on R and
would explain how the manuscript reading appears there as it does.
Moreover as will be seen it makes the whole passage of criticism
intelligible and makes possible a single interpretation underlying the
first argument in Sextus taken in conjunction with the first argument
in MXG.
The interpretation must now be discussed. With the reading proposed
the first argument in MXG will run et ,uiv ydp 'r [L' elvtL <aTtLV>,
gai L 11L ?TVML, oV8 &v fvtrov tr6 '! p v - O5 6G'rogct. '6 re ydp ! &V
ga'n .L, av xt 'T6 v 6v, (O)a'c OV86V [L&XXOVcvaL %oUx ?lvoCL?& 7CpOyCLOCM.
This of course follows immediately after the introductory sentence oux
gatV O5Tc elvOt Oe'4 eltVaL. The whole may be rendered: 'it is not
possible (for anything) either to be or not to be. For if it is possible that
it should not be, inasmuch as it is (possible for it) not to be, it would
be no less that which is not than it would be that which is. For that
which is not is not, and that which is, is, so that things will no more be
than not be. (This is absurd, therefore it is not possible for things not
to be - oix arTt I elva-L or tdZ elvocr oux 9=v). This gives the
needed simple follow on from the initial proposition ou'x aTLv o5Tr
cIvoc o6e t ctvoc. MXG like Sextus takes up the negative alternative
first ou'x CgTI elvct in the one case, t6 tL?v v o'ux gaTnin the other.
In the second part of the first sentence in MXG '6 pL9 ! 6v can easily
be understood as a predicate once the reading f ga'L ji) ectvaCis adopted.
p. 37 in fact proposed to read in the first argumentin
1 ibid. Reinhardt, Parmenides,
Sextus cE y&p 'r6 t? 8v aTt <[L? 6v>.
I0

That it should be so understood is supported by the criticism where
A 6v after 6FoLovor poLoccoq is clearly a predicate (979a 36). It is only
if the argumentis interpreted in this way that the conclusion ceases to
be nonsense. If Gorgias is arguing that both r6 &tu 6v and or 6v exist,
he cannot possibly conclude that things areno more existent thannon-
existent, he can only conclude that things exist in any case, whether they
are sZ 6v or tZ 6v. But if in the first sentence of the argumentGorgias
maintins that things are both ILh6v and 6v then the conclusion follows
and all is well." Again the occurrence of the expression 'r rcp 'xra in
the conclusion makes it clear that it is not the existence of Being or
Not-Being which is in question, but somethingmuch wider. This seems
confirmed by the occurrence of &ravTM2, in the criticism at 979b 8.
The criticism by the author of MXG must next be considered, more
particularlyas it has not always received proper attention in the past.
With the proposed reading in the first sentence this will run: For what
he himselfgives as a demonstrationhe expressesas follows. If that which
is not is (possible), in so far as it is so it would be possible to say simply
that it is, and yet all the same it is that which is not. But this is not self
evident, nor is it a necessary conclusion. For suppose there are two
things, one of which is (something) and another which is not. Of these
the first is, but in the case of the other it is not true that it is that which
is not.' (Reading &mepel uolv6vroLv,'rou [Av6vtro, 'rO5i 6Oux6vTo4,
'r Xdv fl, 'r 9' oiux "?qOk 6&t*art 'r p.v tr? 6v). The point of this
criticism is this: Gorgiashas supposedthat if you say of anythingthat it
is that which is not something else, e.g. if you say 'X is not Y' then you
are sayingthat it both is and is not. The author of MXG replies that if
you say that something is something, you are sayingthat it is (existential
import), but if you say that something is not something, you are not
saying that it is something that is not, i.e. you are not saying that it is
not (no negative existential import is this case). Accordinglyif you say
'X is not Y' you are not saying 'X is not' and so Gorgias' supposed
contradiction does not result. Here the use of the dual6vtotvshows that
it is things in general which are being discussed, and not simply Being
and Not-Being since the latter would not be included under 6vrotv.
Moreover it is only in this way that the proper force is given to the PZv
which has bothered editors in piv tz1 6v.
1 There is no question here of o686v ~?&Xovhaving a sceptic sense - it involves a
positive assertion that 7pyFawa both are and are not, as in the case of Democritus'
tLhVXXov'r68iV M 'r- "i86 ctvOCL, Diels-Kranz, 68 B i S6.
2 So L. R has '& winv cf. MXG 97fa 30-36 - Diels-Kranz6, 3o A E.
II

In the next sentence the readingis uncertainbut the general sense is
clear. &L&' Tr 0oV O0X 9=LV o5tre ?ZV(XLto6Te .L0 eIVaXL, 'r 8& &Iqxt o5O
1tepov oux 1=v; 1 'Why then is it not possible for anything either to
be or not to be, why are not both or either alternatives possible?' This.
is followed by a further statement of Gorgias' argument introduced by
yap which shows that the preceding rhetorical questions are to be inter-
preted in the light of what follows as well as in the light of what precedes
them. The statement as given in L and completed by Foss reads: oWv
y&dp<~jrov>, qpVJcT(v, a'r
reb) Iv?) Et tva t ?eVXlv, dtnep et-I tL xOxL'r
)ou
Il0 EtVOCL, 6TE OUgE? vT-aLV eVMo T6 IL' EtVOLo06x.t6. The clause 8rL
ou8e(3( op-qaLvetIVLT6 er? tvci o068tuL is difficult. The Greek can hardly
carry the meaning given by Apelt 2, 'no one says that there is no sense in
which Not-Being is'. But the other meaning 'no one says that Not-Being
is in any sense' is not satisfactory either. Firstly it is not true,the atomists
being a well known case to the contrary.3 Secondly, as Cook-Wilson
saw4, what is wanted is not some external objection, but something
which Gorgias has himself said and which is inconsistent with the previous
statement ?tncp Ct7 TL xxl T6 [ CtVML. This is secured if o&v8dis read
in place of oie8e.5 In this case qnlat refers to Gorgias as it does else-
where in the criticism 6 and the meaning will be 'while at the same
time he denies absolutely that Not-to-be involves being.'
With this change the course of the whole criticism down to and
including the present passage will be: Gorgias argues that 'is not'
involves both 'is' and 'is not' and this is a contradiction. So 'is not' is not
possible. To this the criticism replies that 'X is not Y' does not involve
'X is not' in the sense 'X does not exist.' Accordingly we have no
reason to conclude that things cannot either be or not be. They may be
both, or at any rate things can be. For Gorgas is saying that 'not-to-be'
would involve being no less than 'to-be' would involve being, if it is
true that (ererp) 'not-to-be' involves being something. This last is what
Gorgias is saying, while at the same time curiously enough he says that
'not-to-be' absolutely excludes being. Another way of putting the point
might have been this: If 'X is not' involves 'X is and is not' this in turn
involves 'X is and is', as the second 'is not' itself involves 'is and is not'
and so on indefinitely.
1 possibly -r68i &pca A '6 repovo4x Masrtv; cf. Plato, Hipp. Min. 376a 3.
2 Rh. Mus. xliii (i888) 208.
3 cf. Aristotle, Met. A. 98sb 4. Diels-Kranz6,67 A 6.
4 Class. Review vi (1 89 2) 443-4.
5 This suggestion by Cook Wilson is adopted in the Oxford translation. Another
&vin place of o48kv.
possibility would be oUC8'
6 cf. 978 a i 8, 979 b 2. For a corrupt o)8lc( with c7)n7Lvsee 980 a i i .
I 2

The criticism then proceeds to the second line of attack. 'Even if that
which is not something is non-existent, even so it does not follow
that which is not is in the sense in which that which is, is. For that which
is not is not, while that which is, still is'. Suppose we concede to
Gorgias what we refused to concede earlier, that if you say 'X is not Y'
you are saying 'X is not,' i.e. 'X does not exist,' this still does not lead
to the contradiction which Gorgias supposes to follow. The contra-
diction occurred in the conclusion 'X is and is not'. But when we say
4X is not Y' we are not using 'is' of X in the same sense in which we are
using it when we say 'X is Y.' This last case implies that X exists, while
'X is not Y' does not involve the existence of X. Consequently, suppose
'X is not Y' does involve supposing that X does not exist, there is no
resultant contradiction, since 'X is not Y' does not involve supposing
that X exists.
Finally we have the following criticism. 'Suppose it is true to say
simply that which is not exists, strange though it would be to say
so, does the result follow that all things are not rather than are? For
exactly the opposite seems to emerge. For if that which is not exists,
and that which is exists, then all things exist. For both the things which
are exist and the things which are not exist'. If the received text is
sound, the author of MXG misrepresents what Gorgias says, though it
does not affect the point of his criticism. Gorgias did not say <=ae tai&?ov
-
oux EIV(L i aVOxLr(t&Ta Op&yjT but 45X?re ou&v [X&ov ?tVXL oVx ?IVML
-i 7rpotyjOCs,i.e. he did not say that all things are not rather than are,
but that they no more are than are not. But in the criticism R has
lvaL h jL elvXL and L has e ?tLvaLFA elva. In both cases elvaL is placed
before {cA dvocl and it is likely that the right reading is &6repov<oU>
Zcov
tutL &Ptcvv'nx L
vL7 CIVeL; This would bring the criticism into
0tYLRov
accord with Gorgias' words and the whole will run 'Suppose it is true to
say simply that that which is not exists, strange though it would be to say
so, does the result follow that all things no more are than they are not?
For exactly the opposite seems to emerge. For if that which is not exists
and that which is exists, then all things exist. For both the things which
are exist and the things which are not exist'. This criticism might be
expressed in the following way. If 'X is not Y' involves us in supposing
that X exists, strange though this supposition may seem, there is no need
to conclude 'X is and X is not'. The right conclusion would be the
opposite, namely 'X exists' since 'X is not Y' involves 'X exists' and
'X is not Y' involves 'X exists'.
It is time now to turn to the version of Sextus. Here fortunately the
13

text is sound 1, and there is only one major problem of translation,
namely the meaning to be assigned to the phrases r6 [h 6v and 'r 6v.
We have first a summaryand then the statement of the first argument
(chs. 66-7). On the one view this would be translated.That nothing
exists he argues after the following manner: if anything exists, either
Being exists or Not-Being exists, or both Being and Not-Being exist.
But Being does not exist as he will establish, nor does Not-Being exist
as he will explain, nor do Being and Not-Being exist, as he will make
plain. Therefore nothing exists. Now Not-Being does not exist. For if
Not-Being exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same time. For
in as much as it is thought of as not being, it will not exist, but in as
much as it is not being, it will exist again. But it is absurdthat a thing
should both exist and not exist at the same time. Therefore Not-Being
does not exist'. On the other view we would have 'That nothing is he
arguesafter the following manner: if anythingis, either that which is is,
or that which is not is, or that which is and is not is. But neither that
which is is, as he will establish, nor that which is not is as he will
explain, nor that which is and is not, as he will make plain. Now that
which is not is not. For if that which is not is, it will both be and not
be at the same time. For in as much as it is thoughtof as not being, it will
not be, but in as much as it is not being 2, it will be again. But it is
absurdthat a thing shouldboth be and not be at the sametime. Therefore
that which is not is not).
As far as concerns the Greek of Sextus there seems little reason to
prefer either rendering to the other down to this point.3 There is
clearly a close relation to the first argumentin MXG and an attempt has
been made above to show that the argumentsare in fact identical. It
has been pointed oUt 4 that in the statement of Gorgias' arguments
MXG uses a terminologyattested for the fifth century, at least in related
forms, while Sextus is at least to some extent rewriting Gorgiasin later
philosophic terminology. In the criticism by the author of MXG which
has alreadybeen discussedwe find r6 eIlvotand r6 , elvhatreplaced by
'r66v and 'r L 6v except in the case of direct quotation of Gorgias'
words.5 There is every reason to suppose that the same thing has
1 it is included in Diels-Kranz,but without translation.
2 or possibly 'in as much as it is that which is not,' keeping the i6 of N.
3 On the traditionalview Diels felt the need to insert 'r6into the text after Bekkerat
the end of the summary.This is unneeded on the second view.
4 Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, 1932, IS8 n. 4; for the language,of Dc Melissoand Dc
Xenophanesee Diels' Praefatiop. ioff in his edition of MXG.
5 This helps to confirm the proposed oWv in the criticism, above p. io.
'4

happenedin Sextus. It has been arguedabove that the use of the infinitive
was rather agaist the meaning Being and Not-Being. Buatso far the
questionmust be left open as far as concerns Sextus.
The second proof in the version of Sextus as usuallyunderstood is as
follows: And again, if Not-Being exists, Being will not exist. For these
are opposites one to another, and if existence is applied as a term to
Not-Being, then non-existence will be applicable as a term to Being.
But it is not the case that Being does not exist. On this view of what
Gorgiasis saying, he proves that Not-Being does not exist by showing
that if it does exist, the consequence will be that Bei does not exist.
This he clearly regardsas a reductio ad absurdum- we cannot say that
Being does not exist - o'UXI 86 ye t'o U o'ux =rLv.Therefore we must
deny the statementwhich would producethis absurdity,we must saythat
Not-Being does not exist. Yet it is hard to believe that Gorgias could
have argued in this way. He apparentlyappealsas to a decisive agreed
principle to the fact that we cannot say that Being does not exist. Yet
immediately after the conclusion of this second argument he goes on
with the words 'Nor does Being exist. For if Being exists it is either
eternal or generated or both eternal and generated...' The decisive
agreed principle is thus immediately denied by Gorgiashimself. In fact
it is clearlythe essence of Gorgias'whole position to deny that 'r 8v g&r'
and for him seriously to assert the contrarywould destroy his position
utterly on the usual view of the way in which he is arguing his case.
This difficulty was seen already by Foss in 1828 1, but so far no satis-
factorysolution has been propounded. The phrasedoes not occur in the
correspondingargument in MXG and Gigon 2 argued that it was an
additionby Sextus. The second argumentin MXGis as follows: eL8' 6?cs
t6 pn e,vO(LgaGTL,TO elvoc, '
, o1x gTL T OtLXEt(LeV. eL yap T6
PL] EIVOLL (CL TO etVOL [L?' EaV L IMpO 'xe. faTe o0x &v o05ro, ca(v,
ou v&v s a 28-30) which may be rendered: If all the same that
things should not be, is (possible), that they should be, this being the
opposite, is not (possible). For if that they should not be, is, then it is
proper to say 'is not' of that they should be. So that not even in this
way, he says, would anythingexist.
This is criticised by the author of MXG in the following terms: He
first simply denies that if we say nro,- elvmL eTt it follows that To evxr.
oux gaTL, but does not give reasons, presumablybecause he regardsthe
1 De Gorgia Leontinocommentarium.Halis Saxonum, 1828,
p. 174. Similarly H. Gomperz,
Sophistik und Rhetorik, 23-4, and Gigon. Hermes lxxi (1936) 195.
2 ibid.
Ig

point as obvious. He then goes on to argue that supposing we say t6 ,uh
ov 9=L does involve '6 8v oux aTTLit does not follow that nothing
would exist. For although ta 6vx on this view would not exist, t& >h
6v'Twouldexist, sincewe havesaid'6 IL Uv cart. Thisis clearlya valid
criticismof the argumentof Gorgiasas statedby the authorof MXG,
andit is so obviousthatit is difficultto believethat Gorgiaswouldnot
haveseen it. The answeris that, just as in Sextus,the argumentwhich
Gorgiasis using proceedsby a reductioad absurdum. The difference
betweenthe two versionsis that in Sextusthe penultimatestep in the
argumentis expresslystated o?uxc86 ye T6 8v oux gTn whereas in
'
MXG it must be understood. 1 If we say r6 elvcxt an this leads to
oux 9cL. We cannot say this. Therefore we cannot say x! t
'6 ?tv(XL
dvXL 9. So far as this argument goes we still have nothing of which
we can say 90rTL. Thus the step ouxl 8s ye t6 6v oux ga'L is vital to the
argumentboth in Sextus and MXG, and cannotbe dismissedas an
intrusion. How then is it to be explained? The answer surely is that
Gorgias was not concerned to deny the existence of Being and Not-
Being at all. What he was concerned with was the status of phenomena,
which are quite plainly the subject of discourse in the second and third
divisions of the treatise where he argues that if anything is it cannot be
known, and if it is and can be known it cannot be communicated to other
human beings. What he is saying is that the verb 'to be' cannot be used
of phenomena either positively or negatively without contradiction
resulting. If this is realised it becomes possible to approach the arguments
both in Sextus and MXG from a different point of view. The question
confronting us is this: is it possible to say of something that it is not?
Gorgias has two arguments to show that it is not possible. In the first
argument he claims that it would lead to the contradictory assertion that
it both is and is not. In the second argument he claims that it would lead
to the equally intolerable result that that which is is not. In each case
we should suppose that behind the phrases r6 tv' 6v and '6 6v in Sextus
lie an original r6 ji' eIvat and 6 ?tvcat. The subject of the infinitives
will be an indefinite 'it' which is naturally expanded on occasion into
or so 7rp&iocyroin MXG. If we say that it is possible for things not
6v'rac
to be - fE rtLz e EatL - this leads us to the assertion that that which
is is not, which is a contradiction and so impossible.
The conclusion of the second argument in MXG has a qualification
attached to it - s?L 'T(xu'v la'LV eIvct -rc xaL ?Xti c and this
I The need for this step in the argument in MXG is recognised by Untersteiner, The
Sophists, E.T. p. 146.

qualification is taken up in a separate argument (g7 a 31-33). This states
that if 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same, even so nothing would be.
For that which is not, is not, and that which is, is not. Of this argument
the criticism says: if 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same, even so it
would not follow that nothing is rather than that something is. For just
as he argues that if that which is not and that which is are the same, then
that which is and that which is not alike are not; so, reversing the
position it is equally possible to say that everything is; for that which is
not is and that which is, is, so that everything is. At first sight this
criticism seems correct - indeed it might seem proper to go further and
say not only is it possible to make the reversal but necessary to do so.
The preceding argument began by asking us to suppose that it is possible
that it should not be. We are then told that this involves us in saying that
'to be' is 'not to be' which is a contradiction unless 'to be' and 'not
to be' are the same. If they are the same and we suppose that it is possible
that it should not be, then in whatever way we work out the following
steps, we should surely arrive at only one conclusion, namely that it is.
But closer inspection of what Gorgias is made to say in the third argument
suggests a different chain of reasoning. He takes as his starting point
T6 'r yap ,uh 6v oUx *GL. If ElIVocL and CIvoLare the same then the
inference to be drawn will depend on whether you start from the
proposition tr LJ'ovgato or rL7' 'v o x lart. Gorgias chooses to start
from t6 p3) ov oiux laTL and from this as a starting point his conclusion
follows with sufficient show of reason. But how can he take such a
starting point? He has already posited for the sake of argument that
p3)edVOCLgtCL and has admitted that this is not so far disproved if we
posit the identity of [3) etVlL and Vac.L.How then can he appeal to this
principle 'Z6 &u'v oux 9T as a starting point? The only possible answer
is that for Gorgias there is a distinction in meaning between 'r6 p3 FtvmL
9CM and '6 p) 'ovgorc, the first meaning 'it is possible that it should
not be' and the second meaning 'that which is not is' or something
similar in each case. The first involves the second but is not the same as
it. Gorgias holds it as self-evident, or at any rate as beyond possible
dispute that that which is not is not. The supposition that it is possible
for it not to be involves the further supposition that that which is not is.
This is impossible, and so the original supposition must be rejected.
We thus have the position that in the second argument it was necessary
to appeal to the principle that that which is, is, and in the third argument
in MXG we have an appeal to the principle that that which is not is not.
In each case these are not principles which Gorgias is setting out to
17

prove, but principles which he feels able to use in order to establish
other contentions.
A similar problem arises in the argument which comes at the end of
the first section in Sextus (ch. .5). As usually interpreted this runs
something like this: and that they do not both exist, Being and Not-
Being, is easy to prove. For if Not-Being exists and Being exists, Not-
Being will be the same as Being in respect of existence. And for this
reason neither of them exists. For that Not-Being does not exist is
agreed, and Being has been shown to be the same as Not-Being. There-
fore, it, Being,will not exist. Thleobjection to this argumentwas seen
by Calogero:1 From the identity of Not-Being with Being the con-
clusion should be that both exist, not that neither exists. Once againthe
answerdependsupon the startingpoint which is adopted. Let us suppose
the identity of 'Z 6v and 'r61c 6v. Take next the proposition that r6 &v
I=? and it would follow that therefore both 'c 6v and 'r [u' 6v are.
Alternativelytake as a second proposition that r6 t v o6x M=r;and it
would follow that both are not. Gorgiasin fact takes the second course
with the words 'rLt-&p r6 ,uh5v. Here the source of his adoptedstarting
point is not clear. Becauseof the place in which the argumentunder
discussionoccurs in the account of Sextus it may be that Gorgiason this
occasion regarded &rL '6 tL3 8v oux =tLv as something established
earlier, namely in the first two arguments at the beginning of the
treatise. But the antithesis between o66oyov and WeCxTLa suggests
that this is not so. The second has been shown, the first is something
which does not need to be shown but can be appealedto as something
upon which there is general agreement. If this is the case, then once
againwe have an appealto an agreedprinciple outside the course of the
argumentitself. And againas in the previous case we have a superficial
inconsistency. He begins by saying tLT6 &?tv ?GL and in the course of
refutation says 6X1T6 t Zv o&Vx
0rrLV, o6'6Xoyov.This suggeststhat the
original course of the argument may have been somethinglike this: For
if it is possible that it should not be and also that it shouldbe, that which
is not will be identical with that which is in respect of being. And for
this reason neither of them will be (possible). For that which is not is
not, as is agreed, and it has been shown that that which is is the sameas
that which is not.
1 op. cit. z69-170. The attempted answer of Untersteiner, The Sophists, E.T. p. 146 and
note 33 does not seem to meet the difficulty.The point is tbat once it has been said as
here that -r6Gvexists and sb i?h 8v exists, then their identity in respect of existence must
be an identity in respect of 'positive existence', i.e. they must both exist, and not both
not exist.
i8

This argumentin Sextus has obvious similaritiesto the third argument
in MXGwhich hasalreadybeen discussed(979a 31-33). It hasin fact
been maintained that the two are identical and that we have here a
further example of the different arrangementof the argumentsin the
two versionsof the original. This may be true. But the fiuctions of the
two argumentsare different in each case. In MXG the argumentoccurs
within a frameworkof discussion directed to establishthat 'r6 [t va
o?x &an and it purports to be an answer to a possible objection that
might be taken to the previous two arguments.In Sextus on the other
handits finction is to deal with ihe combined possibilitythat bothr6 6v
and 'r ' 6v may be, and it is rounded off by a further argumentwhich
expressly deals with the same combined possibility (ch. 76). There is
nothing unlikely in supposing that Gorgias may have used the same
argument in different connections and in effect repeated himself, and
this is probablythe easier hypothesisin the present case.
The statementof the third argumentin MXG is followed by the short
sentencewhich in L readsOU6'Wpv o5v O aUT6X6yo &xeEvou while R
has o0roqin place of o&rwq.For this Diels proposed oroa uidvoiuv o
7rp&')oqXyoq exEvouand it would be equally possible to read taoq in
place of 7p&oq. In either case the reference is clearly to the earlier
statement at 979a 23-24 where we have the phrase pt& 'cT-v tpw'rqv
Y.&OV oCUrO5
&not8eLELV EV h ?&EyL 6rt OVX 1=tv 0t) Oa
CtYOLL C I.t'Y elvocL.
Accordingly there can be no doubt that the three argumentsin MXG

which have alreadybeen discussed together constitute what the author
regarded as the special demonstration of Gorgias. It has been argued
above that all three of these argumentsare concerned only with the
possibility 6tcL 'Z !L' EIVaL IaL. In this case the words oGr e1VML O6Tc
ILI elvoc do not correctly characterisethe three argumentsand this may
be taken as an objection to the interpretation offered above. But the
situation can perhaps be explained if the author of MXG is actually
quoting the words of Gorgias at the beginng of the so called special
demonstration,and if Gorgiaswere there statingor repeatinghis whole
thesis andnot merely that part of it which he proposedto deal with first.
So far we have been concerned with the possibility that that which is
not might be and the consequences which would follow from the
adoption of that supposition. Next comes the consideration of the
possibility that that which is might be. Here the version of Sextus is
relatively full and easy to follow. The version in MXG is briefer and in
places the text is quite uncertain. But it will be arguedthat there is no
differencebetween the two versions in the substanceof what they give,
I9

and both accord with the general interpretation of Gorgias' position
which is here being propounded.Sextus begins: Moreoverthat which is
is not (possible). For if it is, it is either eternal or generated or at the
same time eternaland generated. But it is not eternalnor is it generated,
nor is it both, as we shall show. Thereforethat which is is not (possible).
Correspondingto this in MXG we have simply el 8i tortv ffrOL&y6v7yrov
h yev6tLevov lvtoL. No subject is expressed and the meaningmust be:
if anythingis, it is either ungeneratedor generated.The argumentswhich
follow all have no expressedsubject but an implied indefiniteone. In the
general summaryprovided by the author of MXG at 979a i8 we have
avc xV eap, tiv, TL I=?L FLJTC IV ,M7 7tOXAOC L7T? 'T&IVMZ
?tIVOCL
and the same form is used in the recapitulatorypassage
4rc yev6,zevoc
at 979b 33: c' ONi &VXyx71 Riv Et7rep &aL TL ?JroL&y6v-n'rov X ye9v6tLvov
etvaL. These expressions confirm that the subject of the arguments is
an indefinite 'anything'. There is every reason to suppose that the
phrase 'if anything is' is a shorter and more convenient formulation of
the full formula'if it is possible that it should be' eld8 gaLV elvot, and
both expressions point against the view that the subject of discourse is
the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being.
In support of the contention that that which is is neither eternal nor
generated Sextus gives the following. If that which is, is eternal, it is
infinite, and if it is infinite it is nowhere. For in order for it to be some-
where there must be that in which it is. If that in which it is is other
than that which is it will be larger than it, which is impossible if that
which is is infinite. On the other hand if that in which it is is that which
is, then that which is will be two things, namely space and body, which
is impossible. So if that which is is nowhere it is not. (Therefore that
which is, is not eternal). In the first part of this argument it is clear that
Gorgias is proceeding equivocally from infinite in a temporal sense to
infinite in a spacial sense. Aristotle appears to have charged Melissus
with making the same equivocation 1 and it is probable that the charge
is correct." In MXG the corresponding argument is stated much more
briefly: If it is ungenerated he concludes that it is infinite by the princi-
ples of Melissus. 8 The text then continues: -. &r7CLpOv o'Xxv avvoct;
7iou (for nore of LR) o6'm yap 'v ai6'-r o6r' Lv&dp c1voL. &uoyocp&v
o6Tco; 7rXetco?XvXL r6 -re
&s6v xal 'r v P. The objection that 'it would
be two' will not refer to the first step in Sextus, where the objection was
1 Soph. El. i68b 39 = Diels-Kranz, 3o A io.
2 see Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 471-2.
3 for which see Diels-Kranzs, 3o B 2-3.
20

not this, but that it would not be infinite if in something other than
itself, but to the second step in Sextus' argument,namely if it is located
within itself. This is seen from Sextus' words xact&'o yeAae'rakc r 6v.
In MXG it is usual to read 7rtdp&in place of 7s\eEc of LR. But the
completion of the argument in MXG is referred to Zeno, and Zeno
supposednot only that the place of 'r 6v would be distinct from -r66v
but thatan infinite series of placeswould need to be posited.l Accordingly
there is no reason to reject j 7cel@.
The next step in the argumentis to show that it cannotbegenerated.
This in both versionshas two parts. If it is generatedit mustbe generated
either out of that which is or out of that which is not. But the arguments
used to deny these alternative possibilities are different in the two
versions. In Sextus we have: If it is something which is, it has not come
into being but alreadyis. (Thereforeit hasnot come into being out of that
which is). Secondly it cannot be generated out of that which is not.
For that which is not cannot generate anything since that which is to
generate anything must possess substance. Both these arguments are
attributed by Aristotle to early philosophers in general terms (Phys.
I91 a 23-3 I). This suggests a possibleanswerto the discrepancy between
the two versions - it may be that Gorgiasgave a series of argumentsto
establish each point, and as the theme was a well worn one, only one
argumentis reported in each case. MXG has for the first step el yo&p
-rb
&V Lteromk6aOL, OUX &v 9t' elVocL'r 6v, &o=ep y' ?et xAo'L
T' .L' 6v ykVOLtO,
oux &ai 9L e 6v. The soundness of the opening words seems es-
tablished by the similar statement by Melissus 2 and the meaning must
be: If that which is were to change into something it would no longer
be that which is, just as, if that which is not were to become something,
it would no longer be something which is not. The first half of the
sentence is clearly an argument against generation out of that which is.
The contention is that if anything came into being out of that which is,
then that which is would become that which is not, i.e. that which is
not what it was. This must be rejected - we cannot say that that which
is is not, as this is a contradiction. Once again Gorgias is making an
appeal to a principle regarded as independently established, the principle
o5XL8e ye Sr6ov o6x 9=cv. A difficulty has been found in the second half
of the sentence because it has seemed to be offering a proof that nothing
can come into being out of that which is not, and this is the problem
1 Diels-Kranz6, 29 A 24. For 8vo ^ -trcXc( cf. MXG 975a x2 - Diels-Kranz*,30 A S
and 977a 25 = 21 A 28.
2 Diels-Kranz", 3o B 8, par. 6.
2I

attacked in the following proof in such a way as to imply that it has not
previously been established.' But it is probable that the purpose of the
second half of the sentence is differentfrom this, andthatthe comparison
between the two halvesis simply formal. If that which is were to change
it would not then be that which is, just as if that which is not were to
become somethingit would not then be something which is not, and if
anythingelse were to change it would no longer be that which it had
been before the change took place. In other words we are not here
asked to suppose that there is any absurdityinvolved in sayig 'if that
which is not were to become something which is'. The reasons for
supposingthat this is impossible have yet to be given. These are given
next. If we say that that which is not is not, nothing can come out of it,
since it is nothing. On the other hand if we say that that which is not
is, 2 then nothing will come into being out of it for the same reasonthat
nothing will come into being out of that which is. In other words that
which is not would be the same as that which is and so the argument
about that which is will apply.
The argumentsabout generated and ungeneratedare followed both in
Sextus and MXG by a further group introduced by xal &) in Sextus
and by 9Tnin MXG, which makes it clear that we are to be concemed
with further argumentsto establish that that which is is not (possible).
It may be noted that this time both Sextus and MXG have an indefinite
subject. It is argued that if it is, it is either one or many.In Sextusthe
first alternative is discussed under four headings and it is argued that
whichever of these is adopted the result is that that which is is not one.
The text in MXG does not allow of restorationwith any certainty, but
we seem to have a summarystatementcoveringtwo of the four headings
used by Sextus, namely a6lcx and 6Eye0Oo. For the second alternativewe
have only broken words in MXG which require supplements in order to
make sense but there is no indication that they refer to a different
argument from that which is provided by Sextus.
Finally something must be said about the argument concerning XtnaLc
which appears only in MXG. It is usually treated as an argument to show
that change does not exist. It falls into two parts, the first concerned
with change other than movement in space and the second with loco-
motion. The text is quite unreliable in each case, but the conclusions
and the general nature of the arguments seem clear. In the first case it
is argued that, if anything changed, it would not be the same as it was
1 Cook Wilson, op. cit., 44S-6.
' 6v with the Oxford translators.
2 Reading cE8' I 6 6
22

before, and that which is would become that which is not 1, and that
which is not would have come into existence. In the second case, if
anything moved, it would cease to be because movement involves
division, and this, in some way not at all clear from the argument as
stated, involves the non-existence of that which moves. Now as Gorgias
maintainsit as true that nothing is, the conclusion thatx[viaLqleads to
not being or non-existence can hardlybe for him a groundfor rejecting
the existence of motion or change. And in fact the argumentsoffered
are quite intelligible on a different supposition, namely if his contention
was 'if anythingis, it would not be liable to change or movement. But
things are liable to change and movement, therefore they are not'. This
suggested interpretation gains support from the way the argument
opens - ou8'&vxtLw 7vo (GLV oiov. Here the &vimplies a preceding
'if' clause either expressed or understood. The &vshould be retained
and not changedto av3 with Apelt. The preceding 'if' clause is obviously
the 'L {CL which is also the hypothesis preceding the argumentsabout
generated and ungenerated and about one and many. With this as a
starting point we can read and understandthe whole argumentin the
following way. 'Nor, he says, if anything is, would it move. For if it
moved, it would no longer be in the same state as before, but that which
is would not be, and that which is not would have come to be. And
further if it moves and changes position, being no longer continuous,
that which is is divided, etc.
So much for the detailed argumentsin the first division of Gorgias'
treatise. Much must necessarily remain uncertain, more especially in
view of the state of the text for the version in MXG. But it is hoped that
enough may have been said to suggest that there is no reason to think
that the argumentswere differently arrangedin the two versions nor
that their contents are at variance.Moreover it had been arguedthat the
main question with which Gorgias is concerned in the first division of
the treatise is not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being
but the question how far the verb 'to be' can be used of phenomena
without contradictions resulting. A complete investigation would
require an examinationof the Eleatic tradition in order to determine
Gorgias' relation to it, since obviously if the interpretation here offered
is sound, this also will need to be stated differently from the way in
which it has been commonly stated. This cannot be attempted here.
The interpretationis put forwardas one which arisesout of a readingof
1 or possibly'that which is would cease to be', tr6aLv oiux&ivcb instead of TO' p.iv
<&v>
4&v>oDx&vcEl2.
23

the text of the two versionsof the treatiseof Gorgiasand which explains
the difficulties in them better than the usual way of readingthem. But
two generalpoints maybe mentioned in conclusion.
The interpretation here propounded accords well with the way in
which Sextus introduces his summaryof Gorgias' views. Sextus treats
Gorgias immediately after Protagoras. He begins with the statement
'Gorgiasof Leontini belonged to the same group as those who abolished
the criterion, although he did not adopt the same line of attack as
Protagorasand his followers'. He concludes his account with the words
'the criterion of truth is thus abolishedas far as concerns the difficulties
raisedby Gorgias.For there would be no criterion of that which neither
is nor can be known nor is of such a natureas to be communicatedto
another'. Now Sextus makes it clear that, on his view at least 1,
Protagoraswas concerned with phenomenaand the truth of statements
made about them. In the example used by Plato in the Theaetetus, which
is not Sextus' example, but is none the less a convenientone, Protagoras
would say that the same wind is both hot and not hot, so that in any one
case we could alwayssay with equal truth 'it is' and'it is not.' Since all
appearancesare both true and false we are left with no criterion for
distinguishingtrue from false, and consequently for Sextus the theory
of Protagorascomes close to scepticism, though he will not accord him
that title since on certain matters he dogmatizes. Gorgias, on the view
arguedfor in the present paper, held that we cannot say of phenomenal
objects either that they are or that they are not because in either case
absurdresults would follow. This in the eyes of Sextus amounts to the
abolition of phenomenaand consequently he concludes that there can
be no criterion of truth for Gorgias, since there can be no criterion of
that which has no being. If Gorgiashad been merely concerned with the
status of Being and Not-Being it is not so clear how his views could have
been linked with those of Protagoras.But this is perfectly naturalif both
Gorgias and Protagoraswere regarded as developing their distinctive
doctrines with primaryreference to phenomenalobjects. Anotherpiece
of evidence concerning Gorgias points in the same direction. When
Isocratesbrieflyand quite incidentallyhas occasion to refer to the views
of Gorgias, a man whose work he knew and admired, he twice 8
expresses the paradox of Gorgias in the fonn ou'&vrc-ov6vrcwv lCr'v.
Here the plural o'r6v'rxis natural enough if Gorgias was concerned with
1 Cf. his Pyrr. Hyp. 1. 2I6-219. For discussion I may refer to Durham University
Journal, Dec. 1949, 20-26.
2 = Diels-Kranzg, 82 B i.
IX.3 and XV.26,
24

phenomena,but much less naturalif his main contention was that neither
Being nor Not-Being exists.
Secondly there is an interesting piece of evidence to be found in
Aristotle's PhysicsA. 2. i85b 2g (Diels-Kranz6, 83. 2). According to
this passage the sophist Lycophron wished to remove the I=L from
sentences in order to avoid makingthe one many, while others adjusted
the form of the expression, saying of a man not Xeux6 ea-t but
Xe bx&zL. According to Themistius1 Lycophron would say simply
Xxxpa'nq Xeux6q in place of Icoxpa&q ?eux6qELV, and would confine
the use of the verb 'to be' to existential uses. The attempt to abolish
FaTLas a copula was not confined to Lycophton as Aristotle shows and
Aristotle discusses the matter in a rather Eleatic context. But he tells
us that the matter was one of considerableconcern to oL 6=epot ?i-V
oppoXcxv among whom he apparently includes Lycophron. As to the
identity of the others speculation has suggested Antisthenes, the
Megariansand the Eretrians.1The question must have continued to
interest philosophers long afterwardsas we find in Cicero, Tusc.Disp.
i. I 3 that because Crassusis dead we are asked to prefer the formula
MiserM. Crassusto Miserest M. Crassusbecause the latter expression
would imply that Crassusis alive while at the same time he is dead. The
origin and extent of the movement to abolish the copula cannot now be
determined. But it seems clear that Lycophronwas in effect a disciple of
Gorgias in other matters 3 and the abolition of the copula would have
been an extremely appropriatestep for him to take if he also subscribed
to Gorgias'doctrine that its retention is bound to lead to contradictions.
Manchester.
I In Ar. Phys.Paraphrasis 6.28 (Schenkl), not in Diels-Kranz.
2 cf. Ross ad Ar. Phys.,loc. cit.
3 cf. Zeller-Nestle, Ph. d. Gr. i6, 1323 n. 3.
25


G. B. Kerferd - Gorgias On Nature or That Which Is Not

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

G. B. Kerferd - Gorgias On Nature or That Which Is Not

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Gorgias on Nature or That Which Is Not

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

T remains of Gorgias' treatise 7rtc? 'rou [0 6v?oc m1) 7rrpL CA)q

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

1 so Cook-Wilson in Class. Review vi (1892) 4+1-2.

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

Accordingly there can be no doubt that the three argumentsin MXG

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

This content downloaded from 129.173.72.87 on Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:51:38 AM

Você também pode gostar