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Georgetown Security Studies Review: China in the Middle East !
Georgetown Security Studies Review

Conference Proceedings: China in the Middle East
June 2015
A Publication of the Center for Security Studies at

Georgetown Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
http://gssr.georgetown.edu
Georgetown Security Studies Review: China in the Middle East !I
Georgetown Security Studies Review
Published by the Center for Security Studies

at Georgetown Universitys Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
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Georgetown Security Studies Review: China in the Middle East !II
The Middle East and China ................................................1

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (Usfs, Ret.)
The Dragon Heads West: China-Arab Cooperation in the

New Era ..........................................................................11
Degang Sun
Does China Enhance Stability in the Middle East? .........27

Paul Sullivan
How Syria, Israel, the Palestinians, and Egypt View

Chinas Growing Role in the Middle East ........................47
Sam Chester
Georgetown Security Studies Review: China in the Middle East !1
The Middle East and China

Remarks to a Conference of the United States Institute of Peace and
Georgetown University
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)

Washington, DC 17 February 2015
The Middle East is where Africa, Asia, and Europe come together and
where the trade routes between China, India, and Europe converge. It has
two-thirds of the worlds energy reserves. It is also the epicenter of this
planets increasing religious strife. Relationships between this
strategically crucial region and the rest of the world are now undergoing a
sea change. I have been asked to speak to you about Chinas likely
reactions and role in the region as this occurs.
By the Middle East, China means the mainly Arab and Persian-
inhabited areas of West Asia and North Africa. The collapse of the post-
colonial order there has coincided with Chinas return to wealth and
power. We in the West often include Central Asia in the Middle East.
China does not. The Chinese see the post-Soviet state of affairs in Central
Asia in the mainly Turkic-speaking Muslim nations between China,
Russia, and Europe as developing satisfactorily within the framework
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They are nowhere near
as sanguine about their ability to manage trends and events in the Middle
East.
Before I discuss the dilemmas Beijing confronts there, let me
spend a few minutes talking about how the Middle East got to be the
zone of intolerance and strife much of it is today. Ill then turn to Chinas
current strategy or rather the apparent lack of one. Ill wind up by
briefly assessing the probability of more active Chinese engagement in
the region, including the prospects for Sino-American cooperation or
rivalry there.
Most historians date the modern Middle East to the 1st of July
1798. That was when Napoleon landed in Alexandria, proclaimed Egypt
to have been liberated, and launched the first foreign effort to impose
Western-style government on an Arab people. His well-intentioned but

culturally insensitive actions including the repurposing of some
mosques as cafs soon provoked a revolt by the devoutly Muslim
citizens of Cairo. The French army put down that revolt and defeated the
Ottoman forces arrayed against them. The ease with which French troops
did this provided the worlds Muslims with an impressive demonstration
of the increasing superiority of Western military technology and
organization.
Napoleons year in Egypt and Palestine set off a two-century-long
Western rampage through the Middle East that subjugated its peoples and
systematically subverted their traditional values, imposed unwanted
states and borders on them, developed and extracted enormous profit
from their energy resources, deposed and appointed their governments,
sold avalanches of military hardware to their armed forces, and killed and
displaced millions of them. The Middle East had been a region that
produced a lot of human history. In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, it was a passive and impotent object of contention between
imperial powers and causes largely foreign to it.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran and the Arab uprisings of
2011 mark the end of this epoch of passivity and victimization on the part
of the core nations of the Muslim umma. The Dar al Islams humiliated
peoples are now retaking control of their destiny. They are doing so
amidst a widespread view that incumbent regimes are unjust, lack
legitimacy, and remain in power only because they enjoy the protection
of foreign, mainly Western that is, American patrons.
This simultaneously anti-establishment and barely concealed anti-
Western sentiment could be heard on the streets of Cairo in 2011, when
protesters chanted : the people want the downfall of the regime. The
same mentality is visible today in majorities in parts of the Arab region
who condemn the meticulously provocative atrocities of the so-called
Islamic State or Daesh but take quiet pleasure in the Western outrage
they evoke. Many in the region had earlier seen the assault on New York
and Washington by a small gang of aggrieved fanatics on 9/11 2001 as
not just blowback but payback the beginning of iterative reprisal for
past Western interventions and injuries. Subsequent events have
reinforced rather than reduced the sympathy of many Muslims for what
they view as a justifiable counterattacks and counter-humiliations of the

West that prove that Islam is no longer impotent.
The states established by European invaders were originally
configured and their borders drawn to facilitate colonial policies of divide
and rule. Colonial regimes were succeeded by autocracies that continued
to govern on this basis. The recent overthrow of these autocracies has
created a state of nature in which religious and ethnic communities,
families, and individuals have been able to feel secure only when they are
armed and have the drop on each other. Where foreign-supported regime
change has occurred, violent politics, partition, and ethno-religious
cleansing have almost everywhere succeeded unjust but tranquil order.
The anarchy brought to the Levant by the American removal of
the Sunni-dominated secular regime in Baghdad in 2003 and the
attempted removal of a similarly Shià-managed secular government in
Damascus since 2011 have kindled an ever-widening religious
conflagration in the Islamic heartlands. Borders established in the
colonial era no longer confine sectarian conflict. The regions rage has
begun to spill far beyond it. Allegiances formed in the Cold War between
states in the region and foreign patrons are meanwhile attenuating.
What happens in the Middle East is now decided in the Middle
East. External forces can no longer intervene with impunity there.
Developments in the Middle East no longer stay there. They affect
nations and regions far beyond the region. China is no exception.
Chinas relations with the Middle East are ancient but more
distant and less obsessively linked to religion than those of the West. In
138 B.C., Chinas Han dynasty dispatched emissaries to establish
economic and political relations with it. This Chinese initiative
inaugurated the so-called Silk Road, which for more than a millennium
linked China by land to Persia, even as a parallel maritime route
connected it to the Arabs.
Islam had already reached China by 651 A.D., when the newly
established Tang Dynasty () received the ambassador of Caliph
Ùthman ibn Àffan (%% % % % %% % % % %% % % %). Today there are at least 3,500
Koranic schools, nine Islamic universities, and about 45,000
mosques in China. Official statistics count about 25 million active
Muslims in China but much evidence suggests that the number of
Chinese who consider themselves Muslim is well over 100 million. Most
are not members of ethnic minorities, though ten of Chinas 55 officially

recognized ethnic groups are predominantly Muslim.
In the early fifteenth century, the Ming Dynasty Admiral Zheng He (
) reaffirmed Chinas ties to the Middle East as well as his own.
(Admiral Zheng was a nominal Muslim and the great-great-great-
grandson of the Persian governor of Yunnan under the multinational Yuan
Dynasty () established by the Mongols.) But China soon abandoned
this outreach, and the arrival of seaborne European imperialists then
severed communication between it and West Asia. This communication
and links between Chinese and Arab Muslims are now being restored.
Chinas recent proposals for a new Silk Road backed by a $40
billion infrastructure investment fund evoke memories of its ancient trade
and cultural connections to the Middle East and regions farther west.
After the European Union (EU), China is the regions biggest trading
partner. There is no question about the centrality of the Middle East to
Chinas energy-related geopolitical calculations. The region already
supplies half of Chinas oil imports, or about 30% of its domestic oil
consumption. China is the largest foreign investor in Iraqs oil
production. Qatar is Chinas biggest source of imported gas.
(Turkmenistan is second.) Iran is a large potential source of gas as well as
oil. Chinas energy imports from the region could well double over the
coming decade and a half.
All three Chinese oil majors gained significant access to oil in
Iraq after the American WMD snipe hunt and failed hit-and-run
democratization attempt there. Still, China remains cautious about the
Middle East even as an energy source. West Asia and North Africa have
received much less Chinese investment than their energy resources would
justify. The relatively low level of Chinese commitment is, in part, a
reflection of the fact that national oil companies like Saudi Aramco (from
which China buys a fifth of all the oil it imports) have no need of foreign
partners and offer them no significant openings to invest except in
refineries dedicated to importing their oil. Africa and South America have
proven both more hospitable and easier for Chinese companies to
understand. But Chinas attention deficit when it comes to the Middle
East also reflects misgivings about the region.
Chinese society has traditionally inclined toward religious
skepticism, that is agnosticism tempered by the cheerful tolerance of
popular superstition. There is something inherently alarming to Chinese

about a region where politics center on contests of religion and degrees of
religiosity. Then, too, todays Middle East is not just politically volatile, it
is a zone of frequent war. Israel periodically bombs and strafes its
neighbors. The United States conducts vast, politically inconclusive
interventions. Arabs and Persians engage in rivalry that mixes religious
zealotry with geopolitics. Bearded men with guns kidnap and murder
each other for perplexing reasons. Some people want the downfall of
some regimes. Like the Balkans in the run-up to World War I, the states
of the region manipulate and seek to enlist the support of outside powers
against each other.
There is, of course, much more to the Middle East than this
caricature, but what most Chinese know about it is more off-putting than
enticing. They view the region with the same blurry myopia that
Americans apply to Latin America imagining it as an undifferentiated
mass rather than the tapestry of distinctive societies it is. Unlike many
Western expatriates there, Chinese are for the most part new and still
personally uncommitted to careers in the Middle East. And China seems
for the most part to be following generic rather than region-specific
policies there.
The Chinese cabinet the State Council has issued White
Papers on many foreign policy issues and regions. It has offered no such
guidance on relations with the Middle East. Beijing has belatedly begun a
strategic dialogue and is discussing a free trade agreement with the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) but it has not established a strategic
partnership with any country or grouping of countries in the Middle
East, as it has in every other region of the globe. Aside from access to
energy and the sale of goods and engineering services, China has yet to
define its strategic interests or intentions in the Middle East. There are,
no doubt, many reasons for this.
Shortly after the establishment of the Peoples Republic, China
proclaimed its adherence to five principles of peaceful coexistence that
it crafted with India. The new doctrine stipulated that relations between
states should be conducted on the basis of mutual respect for each
others territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression,
mutual non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and
cooperation for mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. The five
principles were an effective repudiation of the hegemonic tributary

system by which China had traditionally conducted its foreign relations
and a detailed affirmation and embrace of the Westphalian order that is
the foundation of the United Nations Charter.
The Peoples Republic has since become one of the worlds most
committed advocates of the sovereign equality of states, their immunity
from foreign dictation or intervention in their domestic affairs, and their
right to their own ideology, regardless of what foreigners may think of it.
China is now often criticized by Western bureaucrats and politicians for
its insistence that business is business, and politics is politics, and the two
should not be mixed. By marked contrast, those doing business with
China seem to find its apolitical approach to trade and investment both
reassuring and refreshingly undomineering.
In the Middle East, it has suited both the Chinese temperament
and Chinas national interests to stand on isolationist principles rather
than develop a strategy. This has enabled China to avoid involvement in
the regions uniquely turbulent and toxic politics. China has also avoided
challenges to established powers like the United States that make
periodic efforts to influence politico-military interactions there. For
China, no rivalry means no spillover of differences about trends and
events in the Middle East to relations with America or other great powers.
Chinas wary neutrality in the regions complex nationalist, religious, and
geopolitical quarrels has frustrated the participants in these struggles.
Beijing is happy to sell regional actors weapons or, in the case of Israel,
buy military and internal security technology from them, but it has been
completely unresponsive to efforts to enlist it as any partys patron. In
recent years, the United States has developed an agenda in the Middle
East independent of its traditional security partners there. Without
exception, these partners now seek to dilute what they have come to
regard as overdependence and overreliance on America. But China has
not been willing to extend even implicit security guarantees to them, to
offset their military dependence on the United States, Russia, or other
great powers, or otherwise to compete for their allegiance.
Beijing has carefully dissociated itself from Americas
misadventures in Iraq, Libya, and Syria but has not exercised its veto to
block Washington in the UN Security Council or otherwise tried to
prevent what it has seen as U.S. miscalculations and misdeeds. Chinas
aloof stance endears it to no one in the Middle East, still less Washington,
but its caution has so far enabled it to avoid Islamist reprisal for offensive
conduct abroad. It has yet to suffer externally directed terrorist acts of the
sort that now ever more frequently disturb domestic tranquility in the
West.
In both Africa and Central Asia, by contrast, China has policies of
active engagement, clear strategies, and frameworks for implementing in
them. In Africa, China is developing natural resources and markets for its
goods and services. In doing so, it is acting much as the United States did
in the post-World War II Middle East. In Central Asia, the SCO is not just
a means of deconflicting Chinas and Russias roles but also a guarantee
and enforcement mechanism to counter Islamist politics and ethnic
separatism in adjacent areas of China. The Uyghurs now fighting with
Daesh in Iraq and Syria whatever their number have leapfrogged
the SCOs barriers to the internationalization of their anti-Chinese
insurgency in Xinjiang and linked it directly to the revolutionary
theocracies of the Middle East. Religious affinities connect Chinese
Muslims to the region. These bonds are becoming an avenue of religious
and political contagion from the intensifying strife in the Arab world.
Daeshs acquisition of a Uyghur component and constituency has
led it to endorse armed jihad in China. For its part, China has pledged to
aid the Iraqi governments fight against Daesh from the air. (Most
likely this means arming Baghdad and Erbil with drones, a dual-use
technology in which China is now a world leader.) This is a small but
significant step toward military involvement in the politico-military
affairs of a region far from the Chinese homeland.
Meanwhile, despite preemptive withdrawals, there are still many
thousands of Chinese oil and construction company employees in Iraq to
attract the malevolent interest of Daesh. Both Chinese citizens working in
current and potential conflict zones in the Middle East like Iraq, Egypt,
Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen and their relatives back
home expect Beijing to look after them. Just so, a few years ago, Chinese
shipping companies and their crewmen sought and eventually obtained
action from the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to protect them
from piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
Clearly, there is mounting pressure from Chinese enterprises and
individuals for China to take a more active role in the security of its
companies investments and the safety of their personnel in the Middle

East. In the end, much as Beijing may wish to stick to economics, other
elements of Chinas national power cannot remain totally unengaged.
There are striking parallels with the way an infant United States was
driven to develop power projection capabilities in order to protect
American citizens and shipping in the Barbary states of North Africa.
Still, there are clear limits to the potential for Chinese involvement in the
Middle East outside the realm of commerce. Chinas interests in the
region remain far narrower than our own. It has no allies anywhere whose
economic or other interests it must defend on the battlefield or in
international fora. It has no protectorates or client states in the region and
pursues no ideological agenda there.
By contrast, the United States has unilaterally assumed
responsibility for ensuring untrammeled access to Middle Eastern energy
supplies to sustain the health of the global market economy. As a
corollary, the U.S. Navy has undertaken to police the global commons to
assure that merchant vessels of all nations can navigate to and from the
region freely. This hegemonic role entails moral hazard. To the extent the
United States is prepared to act to protect the interests of all the worlds
consumers of energy, other countries like China feel no need to
develop the capability to do so or do anything at all to protect even their
own interests.
Only when United States and other countries efforts to protect
Chinese interests prove inadequate as happened with Somali piracy in
the Gulf of Aden does China move to project its own power to protect
those interests. When it does this, the Somali precedent suggests, China
will be prepared to recognize the parallel interests of others and
coordinate its actions with them. But it will not put its forces under
foreign command. Nor will it join a coalition outside the context of the
United Nations (in whose peacekeeping operations the Peoples
Liberation Army has become a major participant).
As a country without entangling alliances, China has felt free to
stand on principle in the United Nations Security Council. Beijing has
cast a total of nine vetoes, all in support of non-interference in the
internal affairs of member states. The four most recent such vetoes saw
China join Russia in blocking calls for the reorganization of Syrian
politics to facilitate the ouster of its government, to whose survival
Russia, but not China, is bilaterally committed. By contrast, the United

States has cast 79 vetoes, 44 of which were to prevent criticism of Israel
or international interference in the Israel-Palestine problem.
So far China has managed to straddle the Israel-Palestine issue. It
has supported both self-determination for the Palestinians and U.S.-led
efforts to achieve acceptance for Israel as a legitimate part of the Middle
East, but it has kept its own distance from these controversies. There is
no reason to expect it will alter this stance anytime soon. As the
international action on issues in the Holy Land migrates away from the
United States to the international courts and Western consumer and
investor boycotts, China will remain a bystander. It will try, as in the past,
to maintain productive, if low-key ties to Israel while remaining on
untroubled terms with the Palestinians and their supporters. To the
disappointment of both, it will not take sides.
How China will deal with the rising tide of Islamist terrorism is,
however, an open question. Western counter-terrorist operations have not
just failed to contain Islamism and the extremist violence with which it is
associated, they have helped it spread to many areas beyond the Middle
East in the Sahel, South Asia, Europe, Russia, and now China. A major
unintended consequence of the global war on terrorism launched after
9/11 has been to institute or strengthen garrison states and to reverse
earlier advances in both Muslim and Western societies toward expanded
civil liberties and the rule of law. The spread of Islamist terrorism to
China is now having the same illiberal consequences there.
Beijing has responded to terrorist attacks in Xinjiang by
repressing Muslim religious practices. This Islamophobic overreaction
increases the probability of escalating armed resistance by Uyghur and
other Muslim minorities. It also risks a backlash against China from the
57 member countries of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
and undercuts Beijings efforts to cultivate good relations with them. The
consequences of a bad image for China among Muslims extend well
beyond the Middle East. Three-fifths of the worlds Muslims live in
Chinas own Indo-Pacific region. Chinas reputation among them has
been much better than that of the United States. It is now worsening.
To sum up, China is not going to fix the mess in the Holy Land.
Nor will it mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It will not be a bridge
between the Turks and Arabs. It will not conciliate Sunnis with Shiì. It
will neither help to impale America on its own mistakes in the Middle
East or to take us off the hook there.
China is the champion and vindicator only of its own interests. It
is determined to guard its independence while demonstrating respect for
that of the states of the Middle East. It is neither a potential ally nor an
enemy of any country there. It will not ally with one Middle Eastern
country against another. In the Middle East, Chinas interests are limited
to access to energy and markets, the safety of Chinese citizens who labor
or do business there, and the avoidance of contagion from the regions
religious wars. Barring direct challenges to these interests, Beijing is
neither a potential rival or partner to Washington in the region. In the
Middle East, China is a friend to all that epitomizes the dispiriting insight
of the late King Àbdullah ibn Àbdulaziz Al-Saùd, who said: a friend
who does not help you is no better than an enemy who does you no
harm.
Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. is a former U.S. Assistant

Secretary of Defense, ambassador to Saudi Arabia, acting
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Charg
d'affaires at both Bangkok and Beijing. His most recent book,
Interesting Times: China, America, and the Shifting Balance of
Prestige, was published in March 2013. He chairs Projects
International, Inc., a Washington-based firm that helps American
and foreign clients create ventures across borders.
The Dragon Heads West: China-Arab

Cooperation in the New Era1
Degang Sun
It has been over ten years since the establishment of China-Arab States
Cooperation Forum (CASCF) in 2004. In the new era, China-Arab
cooperation is based on historical, economic and geo-political links. The
first is the traditional and cultural ties, i.e. their shared knowledge of the
Ancient Silk Road; the second is the modern market principles of win-
win trade and investment; and the third is strategic and security interests
of both sides.
With the further development of its economy, Chinas dependence
on overseas markets, raw materials, fuels and resources is accumulating,
particularly that of the Arab world. Under the new concept of One Road
and One Belt Strategy, i.e. the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road, both proposed by President Xi Jinping in
2013, the dragon begins to look west--China has shifted its diplomatic
priority from the developed economies, such as the United States,
European Union, Japan, Australia and Canada, to the developing
countries with the Arab world as one of the priorities.
Chinas new posture to look west is driven, first and foremost,
by its practical and commercial interests in the 21st century. With its
domestic market increasingly saturating, Beijing has to explore and
expand its overseas market for its oversupplied commodities. The
geographically broad and potential budding markets from Central Asia to
1 This research is jointly supported by the research program The Theoretical and Empirical
Studies of Chinas Participation in the Middle East Governance in the New Era (14JJD810017)
granted by Chinas Ministry of Education, by the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in
Universities (NCET), by Shanghai Pujiang Talent Program (14PJC092) and by the 2014
innovative research team of Shanghai International Studies University for their joint supports. The
author is indebted to Professor Yahia ZOUBIR for his invaluable evaluation and suggestions.
West Asia, and from North Africa to the Black Africa are of great
significance. The 22 Arab states stand at the strategic corridor connecting
Central Asia, South Asia, Africa and Europe, and become Chinas
economic beachhead to expand its economic presence further to Africa
and Europe.
It is not a light job for Beijing to secure a position in the Arab
world. Currently, the major powers, including the United States, Europe,
Japan, Russia, India, and even Latin American countries are trying to
expand their influence in the region. Besides, the Arab countries are too
divergent, making it hard for Beijing to design a smart and unified policy.
So far, the Arab states can be roughly divided into three blocs: first, the
stable and pro-West moderate monarchies, represented by the six GCC
countries, Jordan and Morocco; second, the stable and politically
independent transitional republics, represented by Egypt, Sudan, Algeria,
Mauritania, and Tunisia; and third, the unstable and failing countries,
such as Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, South Sudan, Palestine and Lebanon,
etc.
As to the first group, these eight monarchies seek geo-political
and geo-economic dichotomy--they look west for military and defense
cooperation with the United States and European Union, but look east
for trade, investment and energy cooperation with China, India, South
Korea and Japan. As to the second group, they underscore to stand on
their own two feet, and meanwhile pursue sound relations with all outside
players: both established and emerging powers; as to the third group,
their current overwhelming task is to maintain stability and restore order
at home, and have yet formed clear foreign strategies, but they are all on
good terms with China. The above three groups eastward strategy has
provided a favorable condition for the development of China-Arab
relations.
Therefore, in the 21st century, the Arab countriesboth Arab
monarchies and republics, both oil rich and oil poor countries, have
proposed the Arab version of Orientalism, emphasizing the necessity of
active diplomatic relations with East Asia countries with China as the
pivot. They seek to carry out equidistance diplomacy with great
powersthey need China to reduce unemployment and to
counterbalance western powers pressure on their domestic political
reform. The equilibrium of great powers is believed to serve the interests
of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria and other major Arab
states.
Dynamics of China-Arab Cooperation

The dynamics of China-Arab cooperation are twofold: economic and
political. In the 21st century, the political and economic relations are two
sides of a coin: healthy political relations normally lead to good
economic links, vice versa; trade and economic relations between China
and the Arab World are the barometer of their political relations as
well.
From the economic dimension, China and Arab states are
essential partners, and they have maintained a good momentum of
development in economic and trade ties. In 2008, Chinese enterprises
made direct investments of $700 million in Arab states, an increase of
40% compared to the previous year. The actual amount invested in China
from Arab countries was $400 million, an increase of 61%.2 In 2009, in
spite of the impact of the global financial crisis, the mutual trust between
the two sides still had a positive and strong impetus to their bilateral trade
and economic relations. As a result, bilateral trade volume reached
$108.24 billion in that year, and cooperation in the fields of energy,
finance, investment and infrastructure also continued to make headway.
Chinese and the Arab countries signed bilateral economic, trade and
technological cooperation agreements at various levels, set up economic
and trade committee, and held meetings regularly or irregularly.3 In 2013,
China-Arab trade volume reached a historical record of $240 billion.
China is number one trading partner to nine Arab countries, and number
two trading partner to most of the rest Arab countries. The rocketing
bilateral trade volume, together with Beijings substantial economic
presence in the Arab world has substantially changed the Middle East
geo-economics at present and geo-politics in the near future.
Since the Chinese new leadership was elected in 2012, the Arab
world is an important component in Chinas One Road and One Belt
2 West Africa Division, Department of Commerce, China-Arab economic and trade relations are
developing steadily, International Business Daily, April 21, 2009.
3 China-Arab Relations, June 19, 2006, Retrieved March 8, 2015 from http://
news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2006-06/19/content_4716235.htm.
Strategy. The Middle East plays an essential role in strengthening

Chinas energy security, expanding overseas markets and propelling soft
power in the next decade. Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, Kuwait and Oman
are among the top ten oil exporters to China. The Arab world is also
crucial for China to fight against Somali piracy, to deploy peacekeeping
forces in South Sudan and Sudan as well as in Lebanon, to establish
economic presence through CNPC, SINOPEC, among others, to build
Confucius institutes, and to protect its overseas investment projects in
case of emergency. Chinas economic growth also provides an important
impetus for the local economic growth and employment in the Arab
countries. The two sides are all developing countries, so their
development-oriented strategies are similar and compatible with each
other.
Apart from economic dynamic, the political impetus for China-
Arab cooperation is also crucial. Indeed, since the outbreak of the Arab
Revolts, both Chinese and the Arabs have strong belief that the
international system is characterized by a rising East vis--vis a
declining West. Although China was criticized as supporting
dictatorship of Syrian regime after it vetoed the UNSC resolution for
three times, anti-China sentiment in the Arab world faded away since
2014. Chinese and the Arabs have enhanced their political trust and both
highlight the importance of non-interference in others internal affairs,
including the GCC countries. Their bilateral political consensus has been
consolidated in recent years.
First, Beijing underlines that the two sides are not only
geographically adjacent to each other, but also share a lot of political
commonalities. Compared with East Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe, the
United States and other western powers predominance over the Middle
East is weak. China and the Arab countries belong to the greater oriental
society, and they share similar views on international order, democracy
and human rights protection. For example, the Gulf monarchies, Egypt,
Algeria, Sudan etc. all believe that democracy cannot be exported, nor
transplanted by outsiders. Instead, democracy should be in line with
domestic valuesthey must be either socialist democracy with Chinese
characteristics or Islamic democracy with Arab characteristics, not
western democracy with western characteristics. They both believe that
the world should be divergent; cultural diversity and different
development modes can better help realize the harmonious coexistence of

sovereign states; countries should resolve their disagreements through
dialogue and negotiation instead of foreign intervention; the economic
and social transformations of the transitional Arab countries should
follow an incremental instead of a radical manner.
Second, both China and the Arab states perceive each other as the
reliable and rising political force in the new era. Beijing highlights that it
has never colonized or conquered the Arab world, and it has maintained
good brotherhood with all Arab countries; Beijing places emphasis on
Four-NO foreign policy, that is non-alignment, non-interference in the
others internal affairs, no political conditions attached in offering aid and
no foreign military bases abroad, which are welcomed by the Arabs.
Beijing also points out that the two sides have been supporting and
sympathizing each other in the international affairs. In the United Nations
Security Council, China always sides with Palestinian cause, and
supports the independence of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its Capital,
opposing the Israeli building of Jewish Settlements in the West Bank,
which is universally appreciated by the Arab world.
The Arabs are politically reliable too. Currently, none of the 22
Arab countries have official connection with Taiwan authorities; none of
them have publicly echoed Taiwan independence, East Turkistan
separatism or Tibetan separatism. Their support may help China
uphold national unity and territorial integrity, the vital interests of China.
In addition, China-Arab strategic partnership will help prevent China
from being caught in an isolated position in case of conflicts with its
neighbors due to territorial disputes (Japan and the Philippines in
particular), as these countries could at least stay in benevolent
neutrality.
China-Arab Cooperation through Pivotal States

China-Arab strategic partnership can mainly be promoted in two ways:
through bilateral channels and multilateral arena. First, objectively
speaking, there exist some ideological and political differences between
China and the Arab countries. Among the Arab countries, political
systems, religion-society relations and the degree of intimate relations
with Western countries vary greatly, which requires China to treat them
differently when building a strategic partnership, and to find the greatest
common interests in cooperation. From Beijings perspective, the major

Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and Algeria, are
constantly enriching their bilateral cooperation with China. These
countries, perceived as pivotal states, are of geo-economic and geo-
political significance in the Gulf, eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and
northern Africa respectively.
First, the strategic partnership between China and Saudi Arabia
continues to heat up in recent years. Saudi Arabia is a great regional
power in the Gulf region, as well as a leader in the Arab world. It is one
of the initial sponsors of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC, renamed Organization of the Islamic Cooperation), and plays an
active role in the Middle East and the Islamic world at large. Saudi
Arabia is the guardian of the two holy sites of Mecca and Medina, so
developing bilateral economic, political and security relationship with
Saudi Arabia will enhance Beijings influence from the Gulf to the Red
Sea. More importantly, Saudi Arabia is of special significance for China's
energy security. In the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia is a top oil producer and
exporter. In recent years, with the decline of U.S. import from Saudi
Arabia and more dependence on shale gas at home, there is a promising
prospect of Sino-Saudi cooperation in oil production, sale and refinery.
Officials and the public opinions of Saudi Arabia are dissatisfied with the
U.S. policy of abandonment since the Arab Revolution, which has
added an important motivation in Sino-Saudi Arabia strategic partnership.
The complex US-Saudi relations, balance of power strategy of Saudi
Arabia in recent years and the eastward strategy actually provide an
opportunity for a Sino-Saudi strategic relationship.4 Former President Hu
Jintao visited Saudi Arabia twice in 2006 and in 2009, and Chinese new
President Xi Jinping received then Crown Prince Salman in 2014 in
Beijing, which indicates Chinas attention on its relationship with Saudi
Arabia. Since Saudi Arabia strides at the converging points of Silk Road
Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century, China
will promote Sino-Saudi relations to a new height.
Second, Egypt and Algeria are located at the crossroads of Asia,
Europe, and Africa, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, as well as the
4 B. Korany & A. Dessouki, The Foreign Policies of Arab States (Cairo and New York: The
American University in Cairo Press, 2008), 343-396.
East and the West. Their locations are of geo-political importance,

perceived as the pivotal states by China too. In recent years, Egypt and
Algeria are facing the dual tasks of developing economy and maintaining
domestic stability; they enjoy a strategic relationship with China that
shares the similar domestic governance tasks. The United States puts
pressure on the Mubarak and thereafter Morsi administration as well as
the Algerian Abdelaziz Bouteflika government, forcing them to follow a
Western path of democracy. This leaves the two countries no choice but
to seek external support, such as using China to softly balance the
Western powers.5 Egypt and Algeria are not only Arab republics, but also
African countries. The two are crucial to both China-Arab and China-
Africa relations. In November 2014, Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of
Chinese Peoples Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) visited
Algeria; in December 2014, Egyptian President Al-Sisi paid a visit to
China and had a successful discussion with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Finally, in terms of the strategic cooperation between China and
Sudan, China's performance on South Sudan and Darfur issue has
successfully paved roads for the development of bilateral relations and
mutual trust. Since a substantial reserve of oil was discovered in Sudan in
the 1990s, the two countries have begun to gradually establish a strategic
partnership through energy and trade ties. Sino-North Sudan cooperation
in the energy sector has become a tie between the two countries for
further strategic cooperation.6
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Sudan has been the largest oil
producing base of CNPC. In 1999, CNPC started to develop petroleum
resources in Muglad Basin; in 2002, this project achieved an annual
output of 12.68 million tons of oil; on July 25, 2003, CNPC made a major
breakthrough in the 3/7 district, discovering a world-class oil field which
was proven to have geological reserves of about 2 billion barrels and
recoverable reserves of about 600 million barrels.7 Energy cooperation is
the foundation of the Sino- Sudan strategic cooperation, and CNPCs oil
5M. Kamrava, The Middle Easts Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective, in M. Parvizi
Amineh, ed., The Greater Middle East in Global Politics (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007),
177-202.
6 Liu H. & Li X., Darfur Issues under a Global Perspective (Beijing: World Knowledge Press,
2008), 246-247.
7 Qian Xuewen, Oil and Gas in the Caspian Sea and the Middle East and Chinas Energy Security
Strategy (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2007), 248-249.
projects in Sudan represented Beijings largest overseas interest. In 2006,

gross profit of CNPC in Sudan amounted to $25.8 billion, with net profit
of $14.69 billion; in contrast, Sudans GDP in that year was just $38
billion. 8 China and Sudan have formed a de facto community of interests,
as the two sides agreed.
In recent years, military exchanges and cooperation between
Sudan and China are also expanding. On April 2, 2007, the former vice
chairman of the Central Military Commission Cao Gangchuan met with
the Chief of Staff of Sudanese Armed Forces Haj Ahmed El Gaili. Cao
pointed out that although China and Sudan are far away from each other,
the two countries had a strong friendship, and the military exchanges
went smoothly. Cao expressed his wish that the two sides should expand
their cooperation to various fields.9
In May 2007, China established a Special Representative Office
on the Darfur issue, and repeatedly visited Sudan, South Sudan, other
African countries, Europe and the United States to carry out its mediation
diplomacy. In recent years, there has been a great progress in the Sino-
Sudan strategic partnership. On February 4, 2009, Former Chinese
President Hu Jintao exchanged congratulatory messages with Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The
Chinese government said, China and Sudan are developing countries,
and the further development of sincere and friendly bilateral relations of
equality and mutual benefit is of great significance to deepen South-
South cooperation, common development, regional peace and stability, as
well as China-Africa and China-Arab states new strategic partnership.10
China-Arab Cooperation on the Multilateral Arena

In addition to bilateral channels, China has propelled the strategic
partnership with the 22 Arab members through multilateralism, such as
8 Liu H. & Li X., Darfur Issues under a Global Perspective (Beijing: World Knowledge Press,
2008), 246.
9 See http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200704/02/eng20070402_363135.html for more
information on China-Sudan military diplomacy.
10 Chinese and Sudanese leaders exchanged congratulatory messages to mark the 50th
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Peoples
Daily, February 5, 2009.
the CASCF, the Arab League, the GCC, Arab Maghreb Union, UN, IMF,
World Bank, G20, etc. China has an age-old history regarding its
relationship with the Arab world on the world arena. On December 21,
1963, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai proposed five principles to deal with
relations with Arab countries during his visit to the United Arab
Republic. They were: first, China supports the Arabian cause to fight
against imperialism, win and safeguard national independence; second,
China supports the Arab countries to pursue peaceful and non-alignment
policy; third, China supports the Arabian people to achieve national
solidarity and unity in their own ways; fourth, China supports the Arab
countries to resolve their disputes through peaceful negotiation; fifth,
sovereignty of Arab countries should be respected by all countries and
China is against any aggression and interference.11 In 1971, 13 Arab
countries, together with African countries, voted in favor of restoring the
Peoples Republic of China's seat in the United Nations. Meanwhile,
China stood aside with the Arab countries in all United Nations
resolutions on Palestine issues.
Among these multilateral arenas mentioned above, the CASCF
is the most far-reaching, and both sides view their relations as a strategic
partnership. In September 2004, the first Ministerial Conference of the
CASCF was held in Cairo, headquarter of the Arab League. The
Declaration on CASCF and the Action Plan on CASCF were
released during the meeting. As the framework of collective dialogue and
cooperation between the two sides on the basis of equality and mutual
benefit, the forum is in line with the common aspiration and interests of
both sides, establishing a new partnership of equality and comprehensive
cooperation.12 In July 2007, the fourth Senior Officials Meeting of
CASCF was held in Cairo, the Arab League headquarters; on June 23,
2009, the Sixth Senior Officials Meeting of CASCF was held in
Beijing;13 in November 2009, former Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out in
his speech at the Arab League headquarters of Cairo that similar
11 Communist Party Literature Research Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Selected Works of
Zhou Enlai in Diplomacy (Beijing: Central Literature Publishing House, 1990), 387.
12 J. Luo, African Integration and China-Africa Relations (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic
Press, 2006), 318.
13 Since the establishment of the Forum, the two sides have held cultural activities such as
China-Arab States Cultural Dialogue Seminar, China-Arab Friendship Conference, Arab
Arts Festival, China-Arab Press Cooperation Forum, etc.
experiences and the pursuit of common goals of development have

endowed Chinese and the Arab countries with profound friendship.
Chinese people view Arabian people as good friends, good partners, and
good brothers.14 In terms of opposition to hegemonism and great power
politics, the pursuit of political multi-polarization, civilization diversity,
and deeper economic and energy cooperation, Chinese and the Arabs
boast a solid foundation for strategic cooperation. On May 13, 2010, the
Fourth Ministerial Conference of the CASCF was held in Tianjin. In this
meeting, both sides defined their relations as a strategic partnership
officially for the first time. Former Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao showed
up at the opening ceremony of the Conference and delivered a keynote
speech. He illustrated comprehensively the Chinese government's views
on the international political and economic situation and relevant
policies. He proposed to establish the strategic partnership and
comprehensive cooperation between Chinese and the Arabs to promote
common development as well as world peace, development, and
progress. Chinas strategic partnership with 22 Arab countries has created
a new picture of China-Arab relations, and provided the two sides with
more strategic resource.
In June 2014, at the sixth Ministerial Conference of the CASCF,
President Xi Jinping pointed out that China and Arab countries should
carry forward the spirit of the Silk Road, advocating dialogue and peace.
China firmly supports the Middle Easts effort in pursuit of peace, and
has continuously supported an independent state of Palestine with East
Jerusalem as its capital and based on the 1967 borders and China wishes
it could enjoy full right of a sovereign state.15At the conference, President
Xi proposed the establishment of a 1+2+3 pattern of cooperation,
namely, to take energy cooperation as the core, infrastructure
construction and trade and investment facilitation as two wings, and three
high and new tech fields of nuclear energy, space satellite and new energy
as new breakthroughs. In the next 10 years, President Xi underscored that
14 Wen Jiabao delivered an important speech on respecting the diversity of civilizations and
China-Arab relations at the Arab League headquarters, Peoples Daily, November 8, 2009.
15 Xi Jinping, Carry forward the spirit of the silk road, deepen China-Arab cooperation,
Peoples Daily, June 6, 2014.
efforts should be made to increase the bilateral trade volume from $240
billion of 2013 to $600 billion.16
In multilateralism, China would establish closer multilateral
strategic partnership with the GCC in the next decade. As a first step, the
two sides would choose to accelerate the pace of establishing a free trade
area; China and the GCC would establish a closer strategic relationship to
promote the consistency of Arab countries in foreign policy. China would
expand its overseas interests in the Gulf and even throughout the Middle
East via multilateral mechanisms of the GCC. China would support the
GCC and hope it would play a more active role in regional affairs, such
as maintaining Gulf stability, combating the Islamic State, etc. It would
also enhance the strategic cooperation with the GCC countries through
United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, G20,
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
(CICA)17, IMF and other multilateral and regional organizations. In 2014,
China initiated the Silk Road Fund ($ 40 billion) and Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB, with registered capital of $100 billion). As of
2015, five Arab countries of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Jordan
have joined AIIB as founding members, and their membership will
reshape international financial architecture in the years to come.
China-Arab Cooperation: Styles and Hurdles

China-Arab relations have the following characteristics. The first is
policy flexibility. China does not identify friends and enemies by their
political systems, nor by how close a country is with other great powers.
Instead, China has been actively developing relations with any country as
long as it can contribute to Chinas national security and overseas
interests in the new era. For example, Saudi Arabia is a special security
partner of the United States, but in recent years, the relationship between
Saudi Arabia and China has made tremendous improvements. By this
means, China seeks zero-problem with all Arab partners.
17 Jordan, Egypt, Palestine, UAE, and Bahrain are the full members, while Qatar and the Arab
League are observers.
The second is to keep a low key. Building an official alliance or

quasi-alliance with the Arab League or its members may cause suspicion
of the United States, Europe, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Iran and Israel.
Moreover, currently it is not Chinas long-term interests to overtly
challenge the hegemony of Western countries in the Middle East. Instead,
China seeks to build a new model of great power relations with the
United States in the region. Therefore, when constructing China-Arab
strategic partnership, China has emphasized cooperation of mutual
benefits, avoiding targeting any third party and keeping its geo-political
implications at the minimum level.
The third attribute is its limited scope. A strategic partnership
between China and the Arab countries is compatible with the Dos and
Donts approach, and Chinas participation is largely confined to
economic cooperation, thus avoiding entanglement of the Middle East
security disputes. For instance, in combating the Islamic State, China
voted in favor of the West and some Arab countries to launch air strikes
at the UNSC, but avoided taking any concrete steps. China keeps a
balance between Sunni and Shia, between Israel and Palestine, between
monarchies and republics, between Arabs and non-Arabs, and between
moderate and radical Arab countries under the excuse of non-
interference in others internal affairs.
After the U.S. launch of the global anti-terror war in 2001, the
Arab countries have been pushed to the forefront of conflicts between the
Islamic world and the West. Although the tension between the Arab world
and the West has been greatly eased after Obama took presidency,
contradictions and differences in culture, values and views on Palestine-
Israel peace process, on Iranian nuclear issue, and on Syrian crisis remain
intact. Therefore, the Arab countries as a whole are important for China
in terms of its rich oil and gas reserves, its important destination for
Chinese investment, and its implications as an essential political asset.
Apart from the above-mentioned opportunities, there is also vast
room for further improvement in economic and political relations
between the two sides. In the next decade, Chinese and the Arabs are
facing with a number of hurdles in building a strategic partnership,
which, if not properly addressed, will be bound to affect the depth and
breadth of the bilateral cooperation.
First, the Arab countries are facing pressing tasks to maintain

internal solidarity. After the Middle East upheaval broke out in late 2010,
the Arab states, which have divergent interests, national conditions and
political development models, hold different positions on their respective
external strategies. They even disagreed on issues such as Gaza crisis,
Syrian civil war, Israel policy, Iranian nuclear issue, Muslim brotherhood,
combating the Islamic State and some other major issues, affecting the
effectiveness of their bilateral cooperation with China. Today, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a fully fledged
regional organization with a global influence, and the China-Africa
summit is institutionalized within the framework of China-Africa
Cooperation Forum, but the CASCF is still at the ministerial level,
which is related to the inconsistency inside the Arabs.
Second, regional integration in the Arab world is relatively low.
Compared to North America, Europe, South America, Southeast Asia,
and even Africa, the Arab world has a lower degree of regional
integration, although its regional organizations were set up earlier. The
Arab League, the Arab Maghreb, the GCC, and OAPEC all have
problems in decision-making and implementation. The Arab world has
long been at a low level of regional integration, which will also affect its
cooperation with China as a united force.
Third, China and Arab countries role in each others overall
diplomacy is relatively low. Regarding Chinas diplomacy, the grand
strategy is described like this: regarding great powers as the key,
surrounding neighbors as the primary, developing countries as the
fundamental and multilateral relations as the stage. For a long time,
China has regarded the United States, Russia, Europe, East Asia,
Southeast Asia and Central Asian countries as diplomatic priorities; in
contrast, Arab country is still in a relatively minor role. Since Xi took
presidency in 2012, he has paid visits to Russia, Europe, Africa, North
and Latin America, South and South East Asia, and even the tiny South
Pacific islands, but he skipped the Middle East.
For the counterpart, many of the Arab countries also view their
relations with the United States, the European Union, surrounding
countries and Islamic world as their priority, especially in security issues.
For example, in recent years, the United States has maintained its military
presence on the territory of all Gulf countries, including 3,432 people in
Qatar, 1,496 people in Bahrain, 500 people in Saudi Arabia, 5,000 people
in Kuwait, 546 people in United Arab Emirates, 26 people in Oman, as
well as 3 thousand troops in Turkey and Djibouti respectively.18Then
French President Nicolas Sarkozy officially announced the establishment
of the first permanent military base in the Gulf on May 26, 2009the
Abu Dhabi military base in UAE. This military base can accommodate
up to 500 soldiers of army, navy and air force.19 In 2014, the Cameron
government of Britain declared that it would reestablish a new military
base in Bahrain. In addition, France, the United States, and Japan have
also stationed military bases in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. Apart
from GCC countries, Egypt under President Al-SiSi, Jordan, Morocco
and some other Arab countries also view security cooperation with the
United States and European Union as the priority in a long-term.
Fourth, it is an issue on how to improve the bilateral trade. China
has now been the largest trading partner of the Arab world. In the next
five years, Chinas foreign direct investment will reach more than $10
trillion. However, in 2013, Chinese imports from Arab countries were
only $140 billion, 7% of estimated total annual imports of goods (average
$2 trillion each year). Chinese foreign direct investment in the Arab
countries was only $2.2 billion, or 2.2% of the estimated annually $100
billion in the following years. The gap is still very large.20 The market
share of Arab countries exceeds $2 trillion, while China-Arab trade
volume was only $240 billion in 2013, about 10%, and only 5.3% of
Chinas total international trade volume, which amounted to $2.5
trillion.21
Conclusion
China does not have a clear Middle East strategy. The essence of Chinese
strategic cooperation with Arab countries is to maintain strategic
18See R. Grimmett, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2009
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2010).
19 Iran slams UAE over French military bases, Tehran Times, May 27, 2009.
flexibility and thus readjustments in front of opportunities, and decisions

are made on the case-by-case bases according to the decision-makers
trade-off.
Alliance politics is a tool of the United States to seek and
maintain its Middle East leadership; China-Arab strategic partnership
only aims at creating a favorable environment for bilateral economic and
political cooperation instead of targeting the third party. In terms of
implementation of strategic cooperation with Arab countries, China can
not only make use of bilateral channels through regional pivotal states,
but also take advantage of the multilateral arena, such as the CASCF,
the UN, IMF, G20, CICA, AIIB, the Silk Road Fund, Arab Maghreb
Union, the GCC, the OAPEC, and the OIC, etc.
To deepen China-Arab strategic partnership, the two sides will be
likely to continue to take the following measures: first, efforts would be
made to continue to strengthen the political cooperation within CASCF
and transform the forum to a regional organization like SCO; second, the
two sides would have a stable energy supply relationships and carry out
mutually benefitial trade relations; third, Chinese and the Arabs would
support each other in political issues: China would actively support the
Arab countries right of development, particularly the Palestinians, and
the Arab countries would support Chinas reunification and overseas
interest protection in the Middle East; fourth, the two sides would
increase security cooperation, including training officers and arms sales
to the Arab countries; fifth, efforts would be made by the two sides to
increase visits between high-level officials, as well as non-governmental
exchanges and the frequency of student exchanges.
In a word, the strategic cooperation with Arab countries will play
an important role in enhancing Chinas energy security, expanding
overseas markets for goods and services, safeguarding national unity,
promoting multi-polarization, and carrying out the One Belt and One
Road strategy, initiated by President Xi. Chinese government highlights
that the two sides share similar dreams of achieving their respective
national rejuvenation in the 21st century. However, the intertwined geo-
political and geo-economic factors that have emerged since the Arab
revolts might make it harder for China to reap economic benefits while
shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the

long run. 22
Dr. Degang Sun is professor of Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai

International Studies University, Shanghai, China. He is the author of
Quasi-alliance Diplomacy in Theory and Practice: An Empirical Study of
Relations between Big Powers and the Middle East (World Affairs, 2012).
He can be reached by email at sdgsdg@163.com
22 Degang Sun and Yahia Zoubir, Chinas Response to the Revolts in the Arab World: A Case of
Pragmatic Diplomacy, Mediterranean Politics, 19(1), 2014, p. 2.
Does China Enhance Stability in the Middle

East?
Double Games, Elements of Power, Energy, SLOCs and more
Paul Sullivan1
Write up of talking points for the China in the Middle East Conference
that was to be at USIP on February 17, 2015.
As I prepared for this I was remembering a meeting I had with the East-
West Institute for the China-EU-US Trialogue in Berlin many years ago.
We discussed terrorism, the Middle East, energy and more. I was quite
impressed with the quality and the knowledge of the military and
diplomatic leaders from China who were part of that meeting. However, I
also got a sense of the growing sense of power of China, and how it
needed to show that power to the world.
I am defining the Middle East as North Africa, the Gulf area,
including Iraq, Iran and the GCC, as well as the Levant and Turkey.
However, this could easily be stretched to Pakistan, Afghanistan and
more given the interconnected nature of the usually defined Middle East
with other areas, which would also include The Sahel, Central Asia, and
more. Given the heterogeneity and complexity of the region it would be
best to look at Chinas relations with each country separately and then as
a whole, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
1 All opinions are Professor Sullivans alone

The Politics of Policy

Chinas views on the Middle East are quite nuanced and complex. They
may often seem contradictory.2 However, the Chinese, like we, have
competing agendas within their government and leadership. Some of the
main competing agendas in China seem to be between the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. As with here, one can
consider how different responsibilities, objectives, institutional cultures
and more of the diplomats can sometimes not fully correspond with those
of the military. One could think of various conflicts and tensions we
2 Stenslie, Stig, China debates its role in the Middle East, Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Center, May 2014, http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/
original/application/ca7bfac3f738854c217662c8176b4fb5.pdf ,
Singh, Michael, Chinese policy in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab uprisings,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2014,
Sloan, Alexander, Chinas complex relations with the Gulf States, Middle East
Monitor, 8 June 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-east/11953-
chinas-complex-relations-with-the-gulf-states ,
Sayigh, Yezid, Chinas position on Syria, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 8 February
2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/08/china-s-position-on-syria ,
Schenker, David, What a changing Middle East means for China, Carnegie
Endowment for Peace, July 1, 2013, http://carnegietsinghua.org/2013/07/01/what-
changing-middle-east-means-for-china/ ,
Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Position paper of the Peoples
Republic of China at the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 5
September 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1188610.shtml,
Neill, Alexander, China and the Middle East, Middle Eastern Security, The Pivot and
the rise of ISIS, IIIS, 205-224, 2014,
Niblock, Tim, Security dynamics of East Asia and the Gulf, Gerlach Press, 2014,
Hiro, Dilip, China courts the Middle East, Yale Global Online, 30 January 2012,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-courts-middle-east .
Brown, Kerry, Mixed signals: China and the Middle East-Analysis, Eurasia Review
and Analysis, 12 May 2014, http://www.eurasiareview.com/05122014-mixed-signals-
china-middle-east-analysis/ ,
Antipov, Konstantin, Aspects of the evolution of Chinas Middle East policy, Far
Eastern Affairs, 2014, http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/FEA_FROM%20THE
%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.%202_2014.pdf ,
Alterman, John, Chinas balancing act in the Gulf, CSIS, August 2013, http://csis.org/
publication/gulf-analysis-paper-chinas-balancing-act-gulf Alterman,
John, China in the Middle East, Statement before the US-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, June 6, 2013, CSIS, http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/ALTERMAN_testimony.pdf ,
Alterman, John and Michael Garver, The vital triangle: China, the United States and
the Middle East, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080624-alterman-vitaltriangle.pdf
have had where our State Department and our Defense Department
compete for a voice in policy development.3
Some of the determining factors of whether China could be a
source of instability or stability in the future could be found in the
outcomes of the bureaucratic battles between the Chinese Ministry of
Defense, their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, major banks and businesses in
China and other stake holders who see the Middle East as being
important for China and how and why they see the Middle East as
important.
The policies of a country are often defined by the personalities of
the bureaucracies and others who may counter, directly support, or tacitly
support leadership policies and ideas. It is impossible to tell who will be
in charge in China in the coming years and decades, and what changes in
policies, behaviors and actions may occur. Future personality and
leadership changes could bring significant instability.
Stability or Instability?
What is meant by stability in the region? It is not exactly stable now. As
far as I can judge China had little to do directly with the present
instability in the region. Some of its votes in the Security Council at the
3 Bagwandeen, Mandira, Navigating the Gulf: Chinas balancing strategy,

Stellenbosch University, December 2014, http://www.ccs.org.za/?p=10508 ,
Chen, Xianming, China and the Middle East: more than oil, European Financial
Review, February 14, 2014, http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=355 ,
Freeman, Chas, China and the CENTCOM AOR, http://chasfreeman.net/
centcomaorchina/ ,
Deutsche Welle, Soft power Chinas expanding role in the Middle East, 4 February
2015, http://www.dw.de/soft-power-chinas-expanding-role-in-the-middle-east/
a-18233271 ,
DIIS, Is China challenging the US in the Persian Gulf?, DIIS Report 2014: 19, Gang,
An, Doing more in the Middle East, Beijing Review, 6 march 2014, http://
www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2014-03/03/content_600490_2.htm ,
Garver, John, Is China playing a dual game in Iran?, The Washington Quarterly,
Winer 2011, pp. 75-88,
Hokayem, Emile, The Gulf States in an era of American retrenchment, Middle
Eastern Security, The Pivot and the rise of ISIS, IIIS, 135-164, 2014,
Hong, Zhao, Chinas dilemma on Iran: between energy security and a responsible
rising power, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 23, No. 87, pp. 408-424, 2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2013.843880 ,
Jisi, Wang, China in the Middle, The American Interest, 2 February 2015, http://
www.the-american-interest.com/2015/02/02/china-in-the-middle/
UN, or rather its non-votes, especially on Syria and Libya may have
jolted situations.4 The Russians seem more of a destabilizer in Syria than
the Chinese, especially considering their stonewalling in the early years
of the Syrian uprising to protect their naval base in Tartus, their military
sales to the Syrian regime and their troops and advisers on the ground in
Syria. The NATO intervention and the rise of insurgent groups on many
parts of the political spectrum seemed to more of a destabilizer in Libya
than the Chinese.
Chinas actions in the region, even including those in Iran, do not
seem destabilizing so far. It is also better for China to have a stable
Middle East. Although sometimes it gains from instability given that this
keeps greater competition for its businesses out of places like South
Sudan, Iran and the like. Overall, Chinese policy looks more like
business, money, strategic thinking in the long run, and every so often
trying to present difficulties for the United States by supporting those we
have some difficulties with. Russia is often far more aggressive and
outward in its attempts to present difficulties for the United States and to
destabilize the region than the Chinese so far.
There are many factors and actors within and from outside the
Middle East which have a very large impact on the stability of the region.
How much more can China add to the instability of the region beyond
what other groups, countries and other factors have already done? This
should have been the question.
The U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, its failures to contain
the Syria conflict, its failures to properly deal with ISIS, its slippery
slope to the loss of Egypt, and its inability and seeming unwillingness to
deal with the Palestinian-Israeli issues are for more important than
anything China has done. Although the question does arise: what could
4 Garwood-Gowers, Andrew, China and the responsibility to protect: the implications

of the Libyan intervention, Asian Journal of International Law, July 2012, http://
journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?
fromPage=online&aid=8660591&fileId=S204425131200015X ,
Lin, Chris, Al Qaeda and ISIS have declared war on China will Beijing now arm the
Kurds?, ISPSW, October 2014, http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/al-qaeda-and-isis-have-
declared-war-on-china-will-beijing-now-arm-the-kurds/ ,
Sayigh, Yezid, Chinas position on Syria, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 8 February
2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/08/china-s-position-on-syria,
Singh, Michael, Chinese policy in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab uprisings,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 2014
the United States have done differently? Also, should all of this have
been left up to the United States to resolve? China could have been a
much greater source of stability in the region if cooperation with the
United States were better and if we learned from each other, the region
and others along the way on how to handle the dangerous and complex
problems of the region better.
An even odder question may be: if China were in the United States place
in the region over the last 50 years, and they were as rich and as powerful
as the United States would they have behaved differently? I doubt they
would have been so much involved, or involved in the ways we were.
Regional Thinking, Direct and Indirect Connections

Regional thinking often lacks the vision to deal with problems that some
may think are within a region, but actually extend and reverberate across
regions and even globally. China-Middle East relations do not exist in a
vacuum. This is particularly so when considering the importance of the
Uighurs, terrorism, energy flows, trade, investments, etc. Also, relations
between China and the Middle East can also be far more complex and
indirect than those presented in the media or even at academic
conferences, which are often more narrow than effective.
Examples of such indirect connections include how a drought in
China could have helped produce a supply and price shock in food
markets, which helped lead the Middle East into the Arab Spring.5 The
consumptive power of China for raw materials can have a destabilizing
impact on many regions, not just the Middle East, via the energy-water-
minerals-food nexus and other resource connections via global and
regional supply chains.
Then there are the problems of global or supra-regional non-state
actors, such as ISIS, AQIM, and AQAP, criminal gangs, smuggling
5 Aulakh, Raveena, How a drought in China may have sparked the Arab Spring, The
Star, 5 March 2013, http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/03/05/
climate_change_played_role_in_arab_spring_report_suggests.html,
Werrell, Caitlin and Femia, Francesco, The Arab Spring and Climate Change, Center
for American Progress, 2013, https://climateandsecurity.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/
climatechangearabspring-ccs-cap-stimson.pdf
groups and other organized crime.6 These cut across many regions and
often are more fluid, shadowy and intractable than many state-led
problems, where there may be some mechanisms and institutions to help
resolve the problems and threats.
Double Games with Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, the
Palestinians and Israel
China is playing a double game in Iran trying to outflank sanctions, while
at the same time getting massive oil service deals to develop some of the
6 Chen, Xianming, China and the Middle East: more than oil, European Financial
CFR, The East Turkistan Islamic Movement, http://www.cfr.org/china/east-turkestan-
islamic-movement-etim/p9179,
Gurcan, Metin, Oppressed by China, Uighurs drawn to Salafist ideas, Al Monitor, 19
January 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-china-
uyghurs-to-salafist-oppressive.html,
Kan, Shirley, US-China counterterrorism cooperation: issue for U.S. policy, CRS,
2010, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33001.pdf ,
Kausch, Kristina, Competitive multipolarity in the Middle East, IAI, September 2014,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ord866=grp1&id=183837 ,
Sun, Degang, China and the global jihad network, Journal of the Middle East and
Africa, Volume 1, 196-207, 2010,
Van Dongen, Teun, Chinas counterterrorism policy ---and why the Chinese will not
confront the Islamic State, Apsenia Online, 12 April 2014, https://
www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia-online/print/article/china%E2%80%99s-counterterrorism-
policy-%E2%80%93-and-why-chinese-will-not-confront-islamic-state ,
Van Neiuwenhuizen, Simone, China may regret free riding in Iraq, The Diplomat, 26
August 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-may-regret-free-riding-in-iraq/,
Zenn, Jacob, An overview of Chinese fighters and anti-Chinese militant groups in
Syria and Iraq, China Brief, Volume 14, No. 19, Jamestown Foundation. October 10,
2014, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?
tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42944&cHash=e2bb019a522a651982945abb50c5ff48#.VQ3Rn-
HqVbw
largest oil fields in Iran.7 About 60% of Irans oil exports go to China.8 It
has also garnered contracts to help Iran with the development of rail, road
and communications systems. China even tried to , help develop, for a
while the South Pars natural gas field and the LNG (liquefied natural gas)
facilities that may be attached to that and other fields in Iran to aid
Iranian export of natural gas.9
China has invested in and worked on developing energy facilities,
roads, rail networks, desalination plants and more in Irans arch enemy,
Saudi Arabia.10 China is deeply involved with trade with another arch
enemy of Iran, the UAE.11 There are many Chinese in the UAE. They are
mostly traders and business people. Interestingly, China relations with
Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have all been going fairly well. China
has also worked with Qatar and the rest of the GCC in business and other
dealings even during the toughest times in the sometimes rollercoaster
like relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The
sometimes fraught relations between Qatar and the UAE seemed to have
little effect on Chinese economic and other developments in both. The
Chinese have been masters at playing all sides in the Gulf.
7 BBC, China to double Iranian investment, 16 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/

news/business-30075807,
DIIS, Is China challenging the US in the Persian Gulf?, DIIS Report 2014: 19,
Dipoala, Anthony, Growing Iran oil exports challenge US sanctions, Bloomberg
Business, 12 January 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-12/
growing-iran-oil-exports-challenge-u-s-nuclear-sanctions ,
Winer 2011, pp. 75-88,
Harold, Scott, and Neda, Alireza China and Iran: economic, political and military
relations Rand, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP351.html
8 EIA, China, h-p://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?ps=CH
9 Faucon. Benoit, Sinopec advances on Iran oil-field plans despite cancelled China
deal, Wall Street Journal, 22 May 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702303749904579578333079768774,
EIA, Iraq, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=IZ , International Energy
Agency, Update on overseas investments by Chinas national oil companies,
IEA, 2014, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
PartnerCountrySeriesUpdateonOverseasInvestmentsbyChinasNationalOilCompanies.pd
f
10 Arab news, China Civil builds on its Saudi success, http://www.arabnews.com/
saudi-arabia/news/637996
11 http://www.dragonmart.ae/
China is involved with Egyptian free trade zones,12 Egyptian

weapons procurement and some developments of Egyptian
infrastructure.13 Both ousted President Morsi and present President El-
Sissi visited China.14 China seems to have supported both leaders at
different times. Again, they are masters at playing both major sides of the
political divide in Egypt.
China has been supportive of the Palestinian causes,15 but at the
same time had military and technology deals with the Israelis, such as the
infamous Phalcon weapons systems deals.16 China has a special envoy to
12 Scott, Emma, China goes global in Egypt: the special economic zones in Egypt,
Center for Chinese Studies, Stellenboch University, 2013, http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/CCS_DP_China_Goes_Global_Emma_Scott_2013_Final1.pdf
Scott, Emma, Chinas silk road strategy:: a foothold in the Suez, but looking to Israel,
China Brief, Volume 14, Number 19, Jamestown Foundation, October 10, 2014, http://
www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?
tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42943&cHash=cd567bb412105564276319db84ddec33#.VQ3PN-
HqVbw
13China Daily, China to work with Egypt on infrastructure projects, 2014, 24
December 2014, http://www1.china.org.cn/world/2014-12/24/content_34394735.htm
14OReilly, Brendan, Egypt joins the China club, Asia Times, 12 August 2012, http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NH31Ad01.html ;
Al Ahram, Photo gallery: El Sissi visits China, 24 December 2014, http://
english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentMulti/118751/Multimedia.aspx,
Schleiffer, Abdullah, Shifting sands, El Sissi goes all out in China, Al Arabiya, 26
December 2014, h-p://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/world/2014/12/26/
ShiLing-sands-Egypt-s-Sisi-goes-all-out-on-China-visit.html
15Chen, Yiyi, The basis of Chinas pro-Palestinian stance and the current status of its
implementation, DOMES, Fall 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dome.
12029/abstract
16 Alpher, Yosi, Israels growing relationship with China: a problematic buffer against
European sanctions?, Norwegian Peacebuilding Research Center, February 2014,
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/
7b85c95349b938d53896d7cf37600d42.pdf ,
Evrom, Yaram, Between Beijing and Washington: Israels technology transfer to
China, Journal of East Asian Studies, December 2013, http://journals.rienner.com/doi/
abs/10.5555/1598-2408-13.3.503 ,
Adelman, Jonathan, The Phalcon sale to China: lesson for Israel, Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp473.htm
help resolve the Palestinian-Israeli disputes.17 It is playing a double game

here as well.
The Energy Connection

We are lucky to have the wonderful Canadians to our north and
our own shale gas and shale oil for a big part of our energy security.18
Our production of oil and gas has blossomed in the last few years.19 Our
net imports of oil and gas have plummeted.20 We have become a
significant exporter of refined oil products and we could become a major
exporter of LNG and oil, if technological, legal and financial issues
allow.21 We can rely a lot on North Dakota, Texas and Alberta. Our
reliance on the Middle East has declined significantly since the shale
revolution began in earnest in the mid-2000s. However, that does not
mean that we will leave or that we will leave it to China.
Chinas energy use is about 70% coal. They do not rely at all on
the Middle East for the coal. About 18% of its energy needs are for oil.
Most of that is for transportation and its oil needs are growing quickly, as
is its reliance on the Middle East for it. The Chinese rely hugely on the
GCC and Iran for their oil imports, and they rely hugely on Qatar for
their LNG. They do not have a Canada equivalent to bolster their energy
security as a solid, stable nearby base supplier as we have.
China became a net importer of oil in 1993.22 Its demand for oil
really started to take off only after 2000 or so as its economy also took
17 Tiezzi,
Shannon, China appoints special envoy to the Middle East, The Diplomat, 5
September 2014
18
EIA, US imports from Canada of crude oil and petroleum products, http://
www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUSCA1&f=M
19 EIA, Petroleum and other liquids, h-p://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/
pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_m.htm
20EIA, US net imports of crude oil and petroleum products, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/
pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTNTUS2&f=M
21EIA, US exports of refined products, http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/
LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTPEXUS2&f=A
22 EIA, China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH
off23. That is also when their consumption of oil from the Middle East,
especially form the Gulf region started to take off and become a vital
source of energy for them. Oman was the first Middle Eastern country to
export oil to China back in 1983, but it was not a large amount and not a
very big deal politically for China or for the region. China in 1983 was
seen as a far different place than it is seen now.24
Chinas oil imports grew from zero in 1993 to about 2 million
barrels a day in 2008 then on to about 5.7 million barrels a day in 2013 to
7.2 million barrels a day recently. That recent leap may be to grab the
cheaper oil to stockpile it, but it may also keep up that demand growth
pace for a while. Its overall oil consumption grew from about 2.5 million
barrels a day in 1993 to close to 12 million barrels a day recently. China
gets about 60% of its oil imports from the Middle East. Except for its oil
from Oman, about 9% of its total imports of oil, all of the rest of its oil
imports from the region come from the inside of the Straits of Hormuz.
Chinas exports out of the Straits of Hormuz and The Red Sea and Africa
also go via the Straits of Malacca.25 Its most important sources of
23 Google
Public Data, China, GDP, http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?
ds=d5bncppjof8f9_#!
ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&scale_y=lin&ind_y=
false&rdim=region&ifdim=region&tdim=true&hl=en_US&dl=en_US&ind=false, EIA,
China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH
24 Al-Sudairi, Mohammed Turki, Sino-Saudi relations: an economic history, The Gulf
Research Center, 2012, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?
id=156677 ,
IEA, Emergency response systems of individual partner countries: Peoples Republic
of China, http://www.iea.org/media/freepublications/security/
EnergySupplySecurity2014_China.pdf ,
Noel, Pierre, Asians energy supply and maritime security, Survival, June-July 2014,
pp. 201-216, http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2014-4667/survival--
global-politics-and-strategy-june-july-2014-3d8b/56-3-13-no-l-20a5 ,
Noel, Pierre, Securing Middle Eastern Oil, IISS, http://www.iiss.org/en/manama
%20voices/blogsections/2014-b2cd/md-book-11securing-middle-east-oil-79d1
25EIA, Algeria, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=AG , See also: entries for
China, East China Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya,
Middles East and North Africa, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South China Sea, Sudan and
South Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, World oil transit chokepoints, Yemen.
EIA, China is now the worlds largest net oil importer, 24 march 2014, http://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15531 ,
imported oil are Saudi Arabia (19%), Angola (14%), Russia (9%), Iran
(9%), Oman (9%), and Iraq (8%). About 52% of its oil imports are form
inside Hormuz26.
Natural gas is only about 5-6% of Chinas energy needs, but it is
turning more and more to natural gas for environmental, cost and other
reasons. There is access to natural gas via pipelines via Myanmar and
Central Asia. A pipeline from Russia will be completed in a few years.
China is now the third largest importer of LNG in the world. It is
building many LNG facilities to increase these LNG imports in the
future. About 35% of its LNG comes from Qatar via the Straits of
Hormuz and the Malacca. Yemen used to be a fairly important source, but
that is just not going to happen again until Yemen settles down, if at all.
About of Chinas gas imports are LNG.27 They have a diversity of
sources from Asia, Australia, Africa and Russia, but are still heavily
reliant on Qatar and are likely to remain that way for some time. Hence,
their interest in Qatar.
Importantly, China has the largest estimated technically
recoverable shale gas reserves known in the world, but it is having lots of
trouble trying to exploit this resource.28 Once they get their production of
domestic shale gas up to speed then the importance of the Middle East for
their natural gas will wane. If it does not get to exploit its shale gas fields
then its reliance on imported gas will increase and a lot of that will come
from the Middle East.
If all of the oil and gas China needs was in China or in its region
then it might just have minimal interest in a region in such turmoil other
than as a market for exports, a place to find investment opportunities, and
as a source for financial capital, and energy. However, that separation
from the Middle East seems unlikely.
26 EIA, China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH

27 EIA, China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH ,
International Gas Union, World LNG Report 2014, http://www.igu.org/sites/default/
files/node-page-field_file/IGU%20-%20World%20LNG%20Report%20-
%202014%20Edition.pdf,
28EIA, World Shale oil and shale gas resource assessment, China, http://
www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/chaptersxx_xxvi.pdf ,
EIA, Technically recoverable shale oil and shale gas resources, http://www.eia.gov/
analysis/studies/worldshalegas/
Supply Networks and Transit Chokepoints

Frankly, China would much rather not have to deal with the Straits of
Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the Malacca and other such
choke points. However, the reality is that supply chains and transport
chains of trade can get in the way. The Middle East is important for
Chinas energy, trade, investment, commerce, and transport.
However, Europe is their largest trading partner and for that trade
China needs to use all of various choke points and container routes, such
as the Malacca, Aden, The Red Sea, The Suez Canal and more open and
working up to par. The alternative is to go all around Africa, which could
add a huge amount of time and a lot of cost. This could also put even
greater strain on tanker and container markets.29
China is trying to at least partially get around these sorts of
chokepoints via new pipeline networks and canals in the works. It also is
trying to develop new trading systems via a maritime and land New Silk
Road. This New Silk Road could add stability to the Middle East via
increased economic development. It could add instability if that
development is uneven, especially after the problems of the Arab Spring.
The Chinese are hoping this New Silk Road will tie the Middle East
and other areas to it via trade, investment and more. Trade and
investments of China with the Middle East have been increasing, but
29 EU, European Commission, Trade, Policy, Countries and Regions, China, http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/china/ ,
MIT, The Observatory of Economic Complexity, China, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/
profile/country/chn/ ,
Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal traffic statistics, http://www.suezcanal.gov.eg/
TRstat.aspx?reportId=1 ,
World Shipping Council, Trade Routes, http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-
industry/global-trade/trade-routes,
clearly China wants this to go much further.30 However, as China

becomes a bigger part of the Middle East and its influence grows its
ability to play its many double games may decline.
30 BBC, China to double Iranian investment, 16 November 2014, http://

www.bbc.com/news/business-30075807,
Blakes Lawyers, GCC investment outlook 2014, http://www.blakesfiles.com/Guides/
2014-Blakes_GCC.pdf,
Review, February 14, 2014, http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=355,
Deutche Bank, The GCC going East: economic ties with developing Asia on the rise,
Deutche Bank, February 18, 2014, http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/
DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000329687/The+GCC+going+East%3A
+Economic+ties+with+developing+Asia+on+the+rise.pdf ,
Deutsche Welle, Soft power Chinas expanding role in the Middle East, 4 February
2015, http://www.dw.de/soft-power-chinas-expanding-role-in-the-middle-east/
a-18233271 ,
Haider,Faraz, Bountiful South, ACT Middle East Treasurer, Summer 2014, http://
www.treasurers.org/node/10264 ,
Liu, Ted, Chinas economic engagement in the Middle East and North Africa, FRIDE,
http://fride.org/download/PB_173_China_economic_engagement_in_MENA.pdf,
Rayhall, Charlene, Arab FDI pivots to China, MEI, http://www.mideasti.org/content/
map/arab-fdi-%E2%80%9Cpivots%E2%80%9D-china ,
Scissors, Derek, Chinas outward investment healthy, puzzling, American Enterprise
Institute, 7 January 2015, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Chinas-
outward-investment.pdf ,
Scott, Emma, China goes global in Egypt: the special economic zones in Egypt,
Center for Chinese Studies, Stellenboch University, 2013, http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/CCS_DP_China_Goes_Global_Emma_Scott_2013_Final1.pdf
Scott, Emma, Chinas silk road strategy:: a foothold in the Suez, but looking to Israel,
China Brief, Volume 14, Number 19, Jamestown Foundation, October 10, 2014, http://
www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?
tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42943&cHash=cd567bb412105564276319db84ddec33#.VQ3PN-
HqVbw ,
Shambaugh, David, China at the Crossroads: ten major reform challenges, Brookings,
October 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/10/01-
china-crossroads-reform-challenges-shambaugh-b.pdf ,
The Economist, GCC trade and investment flows, 2014, http://
www.economistinsights.com/sites/default/files/GCC%20Trade%20and%20investment
%20flows.pdf ,
The Heritage Foundation, China global investment tracker, http://www.heritage.org/
research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map ,
Wildua, Gabriel, New silk road raises hopes for increases China-Arab trade, 29 June
2014, Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/11190312-
f874-11e3-815f-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl
Chinas Reach and Its Elements of Power

China's strategic reach in the region can be found in the following aspects
of national power: economic, diplomatic, cultural and informational,
military and cyber. The least understood seems to be cyber. The most
important seems to be the economic.
China is the number one export partner for Iran, Saudi Arabia, and
Oman. It is the number two export partner for the UAE and Iraq. It is the
number one import source for Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait. It is
the number two source of imports into Israel, Iraq, Algeria, and Turkey.31
Yiwu, China is a major center of trade between China and the Arab
world.32 Dubai has one "Dragon City" and its looks like another one
coming, and about 200,000 Chinese. Flights between many Arab cities
and China are increasing rather quickly. Investments by China into the
region and Middle East investments into China have growing rapidly and
are increasing in complexity and importance for both.33
31 See: MIT, The Observatory of Economic Complexity, Algeria, http://

atlas.media.mit.edu/profile/country/dza/ , for: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Iran,
Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, Yemen.
32
Shaery, Roshanack, Arabs in Yiwu, Confucius in Beirut, MERIP, http://
www.merip.org/mer/mer270/arabs-yiwu-confucius-east-beirut
33 Azmeh, Shamel, and Nadvi, Khalid, Greater Chinese global production networks in the
Middle East: the rise of the Jordanian garment industry, Development and Change, 44(6), pp.
1317-1340, International Institute of Social Studies, 2013, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/56409/ ,
BBC, China to double Iranian investment, 16 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/
business-30075807,
Blakes Lawyers, GCC investment outlook 2014, http://www.blakesfiles.com/Guides/2014-
Blakes_GCC.pdf,
Harold, Scott, and Neda, Alireza China and Iran: economic, political and military relations
Rand, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP351.html ,
Hiro, Dilip, China courts the Middle East, Yale Global Online, 30 January 2012, http://
yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-courts-middle-east ,
Hokayem, Emile, The Gulf States in an era of American retrenchment, Middle Eastern Security,
The Pivot and the rise of ISIS, IIIS, 135-164, 2014,
International Energy Agency, Update on overseas investments by Chinas national oil
companies, IEA, 2014, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/
PartnerCountrySeriesUpdateonOverseasInvestmentsbyChinasNationalOilCompanies.pdf,
The Economist, GCC trade and investment flows, 2014, http://www.economistinsights.com/
sites/default/files/GCC%20Trade%20and%20investment%20flows.pdf,
The Heritage Foundation, China global investment tracker, http://www.heritage.org/research/
projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map
Diplomatic clout seems to be on the rise. Cultural and

informational reach seems limited so far, but is growing. In some places
it is more powerful than in others, but does not come near to the
informational and cultural reach of the United States and Europe in the
region. However, the injection of Confucius institutes, sending Arab
students to China, and a huge influx of Chinese goods into the region are
yet a few examples of the cultural clout of China in the Middle East.
China is not particularly proactive militarily in the regionyet. It
does little military training in the region. It has had significant weapons
sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Israel, Iraq and more. It is,
however, not one of the bigger suppliers to the region, as what might be
said for the United States, the UK, Russia, and France.34 China has
34 Cordesman, Anthony, The Gulf military balance, CSIS, 2015, http://csis.org/

publication/gulf-military-balance-volume-i , http://csis.org/publication/gulf-military-
balance-volume-ii and http://csis.org/publication/gulf-military-balance-volume-iii,
Grimmet, Richard and Kerr, Paul, Conventional arms transfers to developing
countries, CRS, 2011, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R42678.pdf ,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Chinas exports of small arms and
light weapons, http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP38.pdf ,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Trends in international arms 2013,
http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1403.pdf , See also: 2014 report
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, TIV of arms imports from China,
2003-2013, SIPRI, 2014, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php , See
Also: TIV of arms imports from (France, Russia, The United Kingdom, The United
States)
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, TIV of arms imports to the top 50
arms exporters, 2003-2013, SIPRI, 2014, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/
toplist.php ,
U.S., Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments involving the Peoples Republic of China, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf
helped Iran with its nuclear systems developments.35 It has helped both
Saudi Arabia and Iran with missile developments via missile sales.36 It
played both sides in the Iran-Iraq War. It is playing both sides in the Shia-
Sunni tensions of recent times.
Military seems to be the smallest component of national power
for China in the region given China's lack of a blue water navy,
insufficient air lift and other limitations. Its lack of lift reach was
exhibited by its inability to evacuate its people from Libya. They needed
to lease vessels and aircraft at short notice.37 Interestingly, they had a
frigate nearby to help. They have also had few ships go through the Red
Sea and the Mediterranean. This may seem like a less than impressive
show of reach, but these events could be the starts of something much
bigger.38
35FAS, "China-Iran Nuclear Cooperation". http://fas.org/news/iran/

1992/920917-243261.htm ,
Daines, Kenneth, Sino-Iranian relations: history and nuclear proliferation
implications, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?
q=cache:hD1VLsEUbUIJ:https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/sigma/article/download/
33161/31146+&cd=9&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us ,
NTI, Iran: Nuclear, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/nuclear/ ,
ISISNuclearIran, Irans nuclear history from the 1950s to 2005, http://
www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_Nuclear_History.pdf.
Kan, Shirley, China and the proliferation of weapons and mass destruction and
missiles: policy issues, 5 January 2015, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf ,
Winer 2011, pp. 75-88
36NTI, Saudi Arabia, Missile, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/saudi-arabia/
delivery-systems/ ,
Meick, Ethan, Chinas reported ballistic missile sale to Saudi Arabia: background and
potential implications, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff
Report, June 16, 2014, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff
%20Report_China%27s%20Reported%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Sale%20to%20Saudi
%20Arabia_0.pdf ,
Kan, Shirley, China and the proliferation of weapons and mass destruction and
missiles: policy issues, 5 January 2015, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31555.pdf
37 Mile, Tom, Libya evacuaTon: China evacuates 12,000 naTonals via frigate, Al
Monitor, 25 February 2011, h-p://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/

2011/0225/Libya-evacuaTon-China-evacuates-12-000-naTonals-via-naval-frigate
38 Cole, J. Michael, Chinas Navy in the Mediterranean?, The Diplomat, 30 July 2012,
http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/whys-chinas-navy-in-the-mediterranen/
China looks a long way from developing a real military-strategic

reach in the Middle East even as it is in a huge drive to modernize its
military and its military budget is growing quite quickly. It is now
number two in the world on military expenditures and its military budget
is growing at the 12-25% range.39 However, they lack aircraft carriers,
excepting one in motion and one in development. They lack sufficient
stealth capability and long distance bombers, and, once again, lift to
effectively take on some of the challenges that the region may face in the
future. Most of their military hardware, software, and thinking seems
focused on its nearer neighbors. Its sense of strategic and tactical threats
seems more focused on India, Taiwan, China and Southeast Asia.40
For the Middle East the Chinese are mostly free-riding off the
U.S. military, and also off of our strategic mistakes. However, they are
part of peace keeping forces in Africa, Lebanon and sent troops into
South Sudan.41 They are marginally militarily involved in other activities.
Militarily, especially in Africa and the Middle East they are almost
always under the auspices of the U.N.42 They are part of the task forces
trying to reduce piracy off Somalia and Yemen, but that was initiated
39International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2015, Routledge,

London, 2015, Chapter 2, Comparative defense statistics, IISS, 2015,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Recent Trends in military
expenditures, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/recent-trends or http://
books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf ,
Global Firepower, China, http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
detail.asp?country_id=China
40 U.S.,
Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security
Developments involving the Peoples Republic of China, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/
2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf
41 Al Jazeera, Chinas motives in South Sudan, 15 January 2015, http://
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2015/01/china-motive-south-
sudan-201511319545502114.html ,
Bariyo, Nicholas, China deploys troops in South Sudan to defense oil fields, Wall
Street Journal, 9 September 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/
2015/01/china-motive-south-sudan-201511319545502114.html
42 Wang, Ben, The dragon brings peace?, Stimson Center, 12 July 2013, http://
www.stimson.org/spotlight/the-dragon-brings-peace-why-china-became-a-major-
contributor-to-united-nations-peacekeeping-/
mostly from the hijacking and attacking of their ships in that area.43
Nevertheless, it would be hardly surprising to see much more military
activity and investment by the Chinese in the region given how important
it is to them.
How it uses these elements of power in the future could determine
its additions to stability or instability in the region. So far it seems that
they are trying to feel the stones in the running river of the Middle East,
much like they did when trying to figure out economic policy and
economic changes starting at the time of Deng Zhao Ping. But that could
change and change quickly. And therein may lie some of the potential
instability.
Turning Points in Policy

There are some major turning points in recent Chinese policies in the
region. These include the astounding economic growth and subsequent
need for resources such as energy since 2000 in particular.44 The events
of 9/11 helped drive a wedge between the United States and Saudi Arabia
and China has not only been finding space in that wedge, but also seems
to be widening it. The 2003 invasion of Iraq drove a wedge between the
Arab world and the United States. It also helped open up oil fields in Iraq
to China. The 2008 financial crisis and the loss of economic face by the
United States during and after that allowed the continuously growing
China to present itself as an alternative system to American capitalism
43 Erickson, Andrew, No substitute for experience, US Naval War College, 2013,

https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute/
Publications/documents/CMS10_Web_2.aspx
44 Google Public Data, China, GDP, http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?
ds=d5bncppjof8f9_#!
ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_cd&scale_y=lin&ind_y=
false&rdim=region&ifdim=region&tdim=true&hl=en_US&dl=en_US&ind=false ,
EIA, China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH ,
Andrews-Speed, Philip, etal, Chinas Energy Cross Roads, NBR, 2014, http://
www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=490 ,
Antipov, Konstantin, Aspects of the evolution of Chinas Middle East policy, Far
Eastern Affairs, 2014, http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/FEA_FROM%20THE
%20CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.%202_2014.pdf
and the American growth and development model.45 The Arab

revolutions and insurrections, oddly enough developed openings for
China in some places, such as Egypt, and closed doors to them in others,
such as Libya. When the United States cut military aid to Egypt in 2013
this created opportunities not only for Russia, but also China.
China is deeply involved with Iran and Saudi Arabia. It also odd
and sometimes two-faced bridge of sorts between these two enemies. The
United States attempts to negotiate with Iran on its nuclear program have
backfired in the Sunni Arab world. The United States is eroding the trust
it has enjoyed with some Arab leaders from these attempts at
rapprochement with Iran. China applies a much more nuanced and
strategic approach to Iran, while at the same time keeping good relation
with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and others which have quite negative
views of Iran. China is playing all sides in a complex game. The United
States needs to figure out a new strategic path to counter this and not fall
into a trap of complacency.
The Asia pivot or rebalancing to Asia of the United States
seems to have helped push China in its western movement towards the
Middle East. Could China's movements into the region be a strategic
diversion for the United States as the pivot develops or are China's moves
to the west strictly for national interest and independent of what is
happening with the Asia pivot? Likely both are happening and will
happen. The United States needs to take care in understanding this or
greater instability could result from misunderstandings from all sides.
The Future?
What might be the future shocks coming globally, in the Middle East, in
China, in the United States, etc. to change stability in the region, and
what might be China's reactions to those events or trends? That is
impossible to tell right now.
However, one thing one can be sure of is that China will become
more involved with the Middle East given its energy, investment, trade,
diplomatic, military, and other ties with the region. It will surely be in
Chinas advantage to help stabilize the region. My expectation is that it
45
Moyo, Dambisa, Is China the new idol for emerging economies?, Ted Talk, http://
www.ted.com/talks/dambisa_moyo_is_china_the_new_idol_for_emerging_economies
will do just that, but then there are other factors and other players that
may get involved. And these are nearly completely unpredictable. The
biggest sources of instability in the region in the future will likely be
internal. The biggest sources of instability brought from the outside may
just be a competition for influence in the region between the United
States, China, Russia and others and the misunderstandings, tactical and
strategic and other errors that may happen.
Dr. Paul Sullivan is a professor of economics at the National

Defense University, an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at
Georgetown University, and an Adjunct Senior Fellow for Future
Global Resource Threats at the Federation of American
Scientists. He is also a columnist for newspapers in Turkey and
Mongolia. He has advised senior US officials and others on many
issues related to energy, water, food, economic, political and
military security issues. He obtained his Ph.D. from Yale
University and graduated from Brandeis University.
How Syria, Israel, the Palestinians, and Egypt

View Chinas Growing Role in the Middle
East
Sam Chester
Chinas growing role in the Middle East tends to be discussed through the
prism of Beijings interest and activities while ignoring the agency and
concerns of regional actors.1 The focus on China is reasonable given that
the Chinese state and corporate representatives largely dictate the breadth
of Sino-Middle East relations.2 If Beijing wants to accelerate its
economic or political engagement in the region tomorrow, it can do so. If
Damascus, Jerusalem or Cairo want to deepen ties with China, their
ability to do so is limited to proposing new investment schemes or
security frameworks to the mandarins in Beijing. The Chinese retain the
buyers right of refusal.
Of course, China is not the only foreign buyer in the complex
bazaar of competing interests and turbulent local politics that is the
modern Middle East. In the twenty-first century, however, they are the
regions most significant new customer. Like every foreign customer,
they arrive seeking a range of local specialties in Chinas case, these
include consumer markets, transport corridors, diplomatic goodwill, tech
products and, especially, energy resources. And like most markets, in this
1 See for example Michael Singh, Chinese Policy in the Middle East in the Wake of the
Arab Uprisings, Washington InsTtute For Near East Policy, Dec. 2014; Also see a
collecTon of essays published by the University of No^nghams China Policy InsTtute
Blog in Feb. 2015, h-p://blogs.no^ngham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinsTtute/2015/02/23/
special-issue-china-and-the-israeli-palesTnian-conict/.
2 The importance of Chinese companies, public and privately owned, in advancing
Chinas engagement in the Middle East is grossly under appreciated and under-
researched. My unpublished masters thesis explores this topic through the prism of
Beijings economic statecraL in the Middle East.
one the salesmen are far more motivated to close a deal than our
decidedly cautious Chinese buyer.
I have been asked to discuss the perspective of these regional
salesmen, to explain how and why local actors view Chinas growing role
in their backyard. I will limit my comments to Syria, Israel, the
Palestinian territories and Egypt, leaving my fellow panelists to discuss
the important countries in the Persian Gulf and Turkey. I will conclude
with recommendations for policymakers and researchers, two groups
whose growing interest in this subject is an important and encouraging
development.3
Syria, Israel, the Palestinians and Egypt face very different
contemporary political challenges. Syria is a failed state, divided into
warring militias, each dependent to varying degrees on outside support.
Israel is a developed state, whose surging economy is offset by an
inability to improve security and political relations with its Arab
neighbors. The Palestinians are divided between an isolated Hamas rump
state and a faltering Palestinian Authority: together they form an
embryonic state whose leadership, territory, financing and path to future
independence teeter on the brink of near total collapse. Egypt is a state in
transition, gradually readopting the mores of the Mubarak regime while
struggling to overcome the same economic challenges that undermined
previous regimes.
Before evaluating how audiences in each state view China, four
common themes can be identified. First, Chinas growing engagement in
the region is viewed by everyone except Syrias Islamic State as not only
a positive development but a valuable commercial opportunity to
embrace strategically. Second, Chinas economic resources, above all its
investment capabilities and domestic market, motivate regional actors to
strengthen ties with China. Third, Chinas political resourcesboth its
potential for a more involved role and its circumscribed contemporary
policyare less compelling for most regional states and sub-state actors.
Fourth, Chinas most significant political impact in the region is the way
in which it is perceived as a rival or alternative to the United States.
While this view is often self-fulfilling, it is also very much informed by
3 My remarks are based on eldwork in Israel and Egypt in 2015 as well as ten years of
professional and academic involvement in China-Middle East relaTons.

what regional actors see as declining U.S. engagement in the region

alongside the absence of a clearly communicated American strategy for
engaging Chinas growing regional presence.
Syria
Before Syria devolved into violence in 2011, China was emerging as a
strategic ally for the Assad regime. Bilateral ties escalated in 2004
following Bashar Assads visit to Beijing.4 With China investing in
Syrias oil sector and rising bilateral trade, Syrian authorities spoke
glowingly of a Pivot East and cited China as Syrias model for
successful economic development.5 Once the civil war began, the Assad
regime continued to view Beijing as a friend, sparing no length to thank
China for defending Assad in the UN Security Council.6 While Chinese
diplomatic statements have toned down their overt support for the
beleaguered dictator, Beijings strategic support for Iranian influence in
the region means that the Assad regime has reason to remain confident
4 AFP, Assad Cuts Short Visit to China, Daily Star, June 25 2004, h-p://
dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2004/Jun-25/63402-assad-cuts-short-visit-to-
china.ashx
Andrew Tabler, Is China Syrias Next Main Trading Partner, Daily Star, June 26 2004,
h-p://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2004/Jun-26/63638-is-china-syrias-
next-main-trading-partner.ashx.
5 Ben Simpfendorfer, Syria and the China Growth Model, Forbes, May 21 2009,
h-p://www.forbes.com/fdc/welcome_mjx.shtml;
Chris Zambelis, China Tests Its Me-le in Syria, Asia Times, Nov. 6 2008, h-p://
www.aTmes.com/aTmes/China/JK06Ad02.html;
Shahid Qureshi, Syria and Chinese Silk Road, London Post, Oct. 29 2009, h-p://
www.thelondonpost.net/tm02dec09.html;
Phil Sands, Chinas Inuence in Syria Goes Beyond Trade Boom, The NaTonal, Aug. 26
2008, h-p://www.thenaTonal.ae/news/worldwide/asia-pacic/ chinas-inuence-in-
syria-goes-beyond-trade-boom;
ChrisTana Lin, Syria in Chinas New Silk Road Strategy, Jamestown Chine Brief, April 16
2010, h-p://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_-news%5B-_news
%5D=36264&cHash=ac6dfc2626#.VRCIpvmUcpU.
6 Syria Envoy Bouthania Shaaban Praises China Ahead of Talks in Beijing, Nahar-Net,
Aug. 15 2012, h-p://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/50197.

that China is in its corner.7 As long as a civil war rages, Assad recognizes
that Chinas utility as an economic partner is limited. But to a regime
whose stability remains uncertain, Beijings tacit diplomatic support is
valuable.
One of the major lessons China derived from the Arab Spring was
the necessity of developing ties beyond the palace grounds.8 During the
early months of the Syrian civil war, China cautiously reached out to
opposition groups while advocating a solution that would grant all parties
a voice in a post-conflict government.9 Whatever goodwill this may have
earned China has dissipated due to Beijings disinterest in providing cash
or weapons to increasingly desperate opposition groups.10 If Syria is
eventually taken over by these Sunni opposition groups, it is likely the
new regime will conveniently forget Chinas reluctance to support them
military. Instead, they will likely follow the pattern of every other Sunni
regime and look east for critical economic resources.
Syrias most infamous opposition group, the Islamic State,
became one of the first Islamic terror groups to publicly target China. In a
July 2014 video, the extremist Sunni groups leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi announced plans to exact revenge on China for persecuting
7 Lauren Dickey & Helia Ighani, Iran Looks East, China Pivots West, Diplomat, Aug. 25,
2014, h-p://thediplomat.com/2014/08/iran-looks-east-china-pivots-west/; John

Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Sea-le: U of
Washington, 2006).
8 Jonathan Pollak, Unease From Afar, Brookings, Nov. 18 2011, h-p://
www.brookings.edu/research/arTcles/2011/11/18-arab-awakening-china-pollack.
9 Kathrin Hille, China Opens Door to Syrian OpposiTon, Financial Times, Feb. 9 2012,
h-p://www.L.com/intl/cms/s/
0/20cc6a8c-5318-11e1-950d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3VFbeQ3AI.
10 Beijing formally opposes supplying weapons to all combatants in Syria and has
limited cash transfers to modest humanitarian aid to the Assad regime. Chinese
weapons are sTll playing a large role in the Syrian conict through Sudanese arms
trackers, a development Chinese opinion makers have welcomed as a valuable
opportunity to adverTse Chinese weaponry and boost future arms sales, see Tim
Fernholz, Chinas Arms Industry is Hoping for Some Good PR from the Syrian Rebels,
Quartz, Aug. 14 2013, h-p://qz.com/114918/while-china-backs-the-syrian-
government-its-arms-industry-is-hoping-for-some-good-pr-from-the-rebels/.
Muslims in Xinjiang.11 With reports that anywhere from a few dozen to

several hundred Uyghur have joined the Islamic State, Beijing would
seem to have met its first regional actor with whom it will not be able to
establish any form of positive relations.12 However, were the Islamic
State to solidify its position in Syria, it would not be too surprising if
China sought to develop an understanding similar to the ties it began
cultivating with the Taliban in 2000.13 It remains difficult to assess how
the Islamic State would respond to discreet overtures from Beijing since
in its current iteration the group has demonstrated no interest in
developing ties with any foreign government. As unlikely as a Chinese/
Islamic State linkage may seem at present, if one materialized it would
largely be a continuation of a policy Beijing has utilized throughout the
region: achieving friendly ties with everyone by keeping its political
engagement to a minimum.
Israel
In 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Israel and declared that
the two countries were at the dawn of a golden age of bilateral relations.14
Jiangs confidence turned out to be premature, when two months after his
visit, his Israeli hosts succumbed to American pressure and canceled a
billion dollar sale to Beijing of the military grade Phalcon radar system.
At the time, Israeli officials had hoped that the sale of advanced Israeli
weapons to China could provide the necessary leverage to balance
Chinas growing dependence on Arab oil.15 Israeli know-how can be
more valuable than Arab oil, is how then-Prime Minister Benjamin
11 Alexa Olesen, China Sees Islamic State Inching Closer to Home, Foreign Policy, Aug.
11 2014, h-p://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/11/china-sees-islamic-state-inching-closer-
to-home/.
12 Peter Lee, Curtain Coming Down on Erdogans Excellent Uyghur Adventure?
Counterpunch, Feb. 24 2015, h-p://www.counterpunch.org/2015/02/24/curtain-

coming-down-on-erdogans-excellent-uyghur-adventure/.
13 Andrew Small, Why is China Talking to the Taliban, Foreign Policy, June 2013,
h-p://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-to-the-taliban/.
14 Chinese Presidents Israel Visit Reects a Deepening RelaTonship, JTA, April 10
2000, h-p://www.jta.org/2000/04/10/archive/chinese-presidents-israel-visit-reects-
a-deepening-relaTonship.
15 Interview with Israeli Embassy ocials in Beijing, Dec. 2011.
Netanyahu expressed this sentiment to his hosts on a 1997 visit to

China.16
Fast-forward to 2015 and Sino-Israeli relations are undergoing a
renaissance.17 Although China and Israel ceased weapons sales in 2005,
their contemporary trade in non-military goods is driven by similar
objectives. Israel remains addicted to the export potential of the vast
Chinese market. China is still interested in acquiring Israeli technology. A
key difference from the past is that Chinas interest in Israel is no longer
about modernizing the Chinese military. With Beijing trying to build an
economy that relies on innovation rather than imitation, Israeli
technologies are desired across a range of industries.18
2014 was the watershed year for this new relationship. Chinese
investors made billion dollar investments in major Israeli foodservice and
insurance companies.19 Tech investments rose to $300 million, $50
million more than the previous year.20 Chinas big three internet
companiesBaidu, Alibaba and Tencent as well as Huawei and
Lenovo all announced plans to open R&D centers in Israel.21 Meanwhile,
the first Israeli startup designed from day one for the Chinese market
16 China Assures Israel it will Not Aid Iran Nuke Program, AP, Aug. 24 1997,
h-p://www.apnewsarchive.com/1997/Report-China-assures-Israel-it-will-not-aid-Iran-
nuke-program/id-ba150add5f8205476047250fd1440568.
17 Resurgent Sino-Israel relaTons date from 2010, as the global nancial crisis propelled
Israeli rms towards Asian markets and bolstered Chinas Going Out Policy. The
expansion of commercial Tes brought a successful end to a sustained Israeli eort to
restore trust following the Phalcon and Harpy weapons scandals of 2000 and 2005. For
more on contemporary Sino-Israeli Tes, see Sam Chester, As Chinese-Israeli RelaTons
Enjoy a Second Honeymoon, America Frets, Tablet, June 28 2013,
h-p://tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-poliTcs/136348/china-israel-united-states.
18 Steve Lohr, When InnovaTon too is Made in China, New York Times, Jan. 1 2011,
h-p://www.nyTmes.com/2011/01/02/business/02unboxed.html?_r=1.
19 Notably, none of these major deals (for Israeli rms such as Tnuva, Clal and Phoenix)
have been nalized as of April 2015.

20 Orr Hirschauge, Israeli Tech Startups A-ract Chinese Investors, Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 16 2014, h-p://www.wsj.com/arTcles/israeli-tech-startups-a-ract-chinese-

investors-1418725681.
21 Eugene Kandel, The Economic Ties Between Israel and China, InsTtute for NaTonal
Security Studies, Tel Aviv, Jan. 27 2015, Conference PresentaTon.

received a major Chinese investment (Alibaba in Visualead).22 Israels

leading venture capitalists are calling 2014 the year of Chinese
investment, and funds are now looking east to raise further capital.23 The
Israeli pitch in China is not limited to Israels reputation as the Start-Up
Nation, named for Israels success as a hotbed for entrepreneurial
startups. Israeli officials report that Chinese public and private investors
cite Israels holistic economic and political strength as a key attraction in
their decision to do business.24
Although most of the commercial activity is taking place in the
private sector, the Israeli government has played a prominent role in
prioritizing business ties with China. Following a visit to China by
Netanyahu in May 2013 that he described as focused on drumming up
business, a binational government taskforce was established.25 Led by
Eugene Kandel, a senior Netanyahu economic advisor, the taskforce has
accelerated FTA negotiations, added more direct flights and has several
major infrastructure projects in the pipeline that are intended, like the
weapon deals of old, to reposition Chinese interests into closer alignment
with Israel.26
Israels embrace of China is largely a commercial endeavor. That
said, there are a variety of serious political consequences that Israeli
officials are moreand often lessaware of. The main political concern,
as mentioned above, is how growing Sino-Israel ties may unsettle
audiences in Washington. Israeli leaders have not forgotten how the
previous era of Sino-Israel ties collapsed under severe pressure from the
United States. While there is little interest in doing anything that would
force Israel to again have to choose between the two superpowers, there
22 Gillian Wong, Alibaba Invests in QR Company Visualead, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 20
2015,
h-p://www.wsj.com/arTcles/alibaba-invests-in-qr-code-company-
visualead-1421741411.
23 Chemi Peres, The Economic Ties Between Israel and China, InsTtute for NaTonal
Security Studies, Tel Aviv, Jan. 27 2015, Conference PresentaTon.

24 Ibid, Matan Vilnai, Israeli Ambassador in Beijing.
25 Sami Peretz, Netanyahu in Shanghai, Looks to Boost Business CooperaTon with
China, May 7 2013,

h-p://www.haaretz.com/business/netanyahu-in-shanghai-looks-to-boost-business-
cooperaTon-with-china.premium-1.519707.
26 Kandel, INSS Conference Jan. 2015.
are early signs that in contrast to past impasses, Israel may not
automatically side with the United States over China. One example
emerged in the fall of 2013, when Netanyahu caved in to Chinese
pressure and refused to let an Israeli official testify in U.S. federal court
on behalf of American citizens who are suing the Bank of China for
laundering terrorist blood money.27 Netanyahu turned a deaf ear to his
allies on Capitol Hill, deciding instead to prioritize Beijing over
Washington.
Chinas no political strings attached approach to doing business
is especially attractive to many members of Israels ruling right-wing.28
They are all too happy to embrace a narrative that suggests China can
replace Europe as Israels major trade partner, reducing the sting of any
potential European boycotts due to Israels occupation of Palestinian
territory.29
In embracing ties with China, these Israeli officials are enthralled
by Chinas strength as a commercial partner and elaborate courtesies as a
diplomatic interlocutor. But they tend to ignore the strategic implications.
Few Israeli officials consider whether Israel and China share strategic
27 Sam Chester, Netanyahu Favors Chinese Interests in Terror Case, Causing Dismay All
Around, Tablet, Aug. 20 2013, h-p://tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-poliTcs/

141261/netanyahu-chooses-china.
28 A study of the role Israels right wing has played in nurturing Tes with China remains
to be wri-en. In the interim, this right wing perspecTve on China is encapsulated in

statements by far-right leader NaLali Benne-, who visited China several Tmes while
serving as Commerce Minister from 2013-2015. See, Elad Benari, Benne-: The
Chinese Dont Care About the OccupaTon [Youtube], Israel NaTonal News, July 12
2012, h-p://www.israelnaTonalnews.com/News/News.aspx/169817#.VRHX4_mUcpW.
29 Herb Keinon, Netanyahu: Israel must open Asian Markets Due to AnT-SemiTsm in
Europe, Jan. 18 2015, h-p://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/PoliTcs-And-Diplomacy/

Netanyahu-Israel-must-open-Asian-markets-due-to-IslamizaTon-anT-SemiTsm-in-
Europe-388164.
interests in the Middle East.30 And if they indeed do not (given Chinas
preference for a strong Iran), little consideration is given to whether
Israel can accept a foreign power deeply invested in its resources whose
interests may lie elsewhere. As Efraim Halevy, a former director of
Israels Mossad and perhaps the preeminent skeptic of Sino-Israeli
relations, cautions about tentative plans to have a Chinese state-owned
firm build and manage a new port in Israels Red Sea town of Eilat, Do
we really want to be building Chinas final String of Pearls, thereby
completing their trans-Asian naval strategy?31
Palestinians
During the Cold War, Palestinian leaders could hardly have been more
satisfied with China. Beijing recognized the Palestinian people as a
nation in 1964 and was the first state outside the Arab world to give
diplomatic recognition to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).32
In 1984, China gave the PLOs Beijing delegation embassy status and
recognized PLO leader Yasser Arafat as a state president. Arafat was a
frequent visitor to Beijing until his death in 2004, leading one Chinese
30 Comparing China and the United States underlines the strategic myopia of Israeli
policymakers. In the short term, Israeli ocials revel over the diplomaTc honors they
receive in China while relaTons between Israel and the United States are fraught with
tension over Iran and personal distrust between Netanyahu and the Obama
AdministraTon. But Israelis ignore the divergent long term interests of the two great
powers: Washington shares Israels strategic interests peace with the PalesTnians on
Israels terms, a restrained Iran, etc.whereas Beijing is disinterested in the resoluTon
of the PalesTnian conict and prefers a strong Iran.
31 Efraim Halevy, INSS Jan. Conference. Also, see: Amir Ben-David, Halevy Warns
Against China Involvement in Railway to Eilat, Ynet, Oct. 4 2013, h-p://

www.ynetnews.com/arTcles/0,7340,L-4436634,00.html.
32 No stand-alone study of China-PalesTnian relaTons has been wri-en since the 1970s,
reecTng the declining importance of this bilateral relaTonship since Beijing began its
modernizaTon campaign in 1978. See Yitzhak Shichor, The PalesTnians and Chinas
Foreign Policy, in Dimensions of Chinas Foreign Rela<ons, ed. Chun-tu Hsueh (NY:
Praeger, 1977), 156-190, h-p://www.academia.edu/280898/
The_PalesTnians_In_Chinas_Foreign_Policy.
analyst to characterize the late Palestinian leader as Chinas only true

friend in the Middle East.33
In the last two decades, however, Chinas attitude to the
Palestinians has noticeably cooled. In response to pressure from the Arab
League, China appointed a Special Middle East Envoy in 2002.34
Thirteen years later, the envoy is still making the occasional visit to
Ramallah, repeating banal statements and keeping a respectful distance
from any active peacemaking. In the biannual China Arab States
Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the Arab delegates frequently beseech
their Chinese peers to get more involved on the Palestinian issue.35 The
Chinese representatives tend to agree and then limit their actual response
to releasing hackneyed press statements that are carefully balanced to
avoid antagonizing Israel or the Palestinians. The Chinese have also
become very good at highlighting their role in international aid packages
for the Palestinians, even though their share in most donation is
negligible.36
While reducing their vocal support for the Palestinians, Beijing
has been quick to engage rival Palestinian groups. Indeed, the fragmented
nature of Palestinian politics made the Palestinians the first Arab nation
to witness Chinas post-Arab Spring policy of developing relations with
rival actors within a given state. Chinas willingness to embrace Hamas
rule in Gaza has largely gone unnoticed in Washington but is duly
appreciated by Hamas and its Iranian and Qatari patrons.37
Some observers interpret Beijings declining support for the Palestinians
as a consequence of Chinas changing ideology or the uptick in Sino-
33 Pan Zhenqiang, China and the Middle East, in Chinas Growing Role in the Middle
East: Implica<ons for the Region and Beyond, (DC: Nixon Center, 2010), 73-95, h-p://
www.cLni.org/full-monograph-chinas-growing-rolein-me.pdf.
34 Zhu Zhiqun, Chinas New Diplomacy: Ra<onale, Strategies and Signicance (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2010), 69.

35 Interviews with EgypTan ocials in Cairo in Jan. 2009.
36 At the 2007 PalesTnian Donors Conference, China pledged just $11 million from the
$7.4 billion raised in total. See, Harsh Pant, Chinas Rising Global Prole (Portland:
Sussex Press, 2012), 78.
37 China Urges Hamas to Recognize Israel, invites al-Zahar to Summit, Haaretz, May 17
2006, h-p://www.haaretz.com/news/china-urges-hamas-to-recognize-israel-invites-al-
zahar-to-summit-1.187878.
Israel relations.38 However, nothing has really changed. The Palestinians,

today as well as historically, occupy a symbolic position for Chinas Arab
economic partners as well as for China itself as a former revolutionary
state. But materially, the Palestinians have very little to interest Beijing.
Palestinian territory has no oil and is a miniscule consumer market.
Unless Beijing decides of its own volition to ramp up its activity in the
international effort to create a functioning Palestinian state, its
perspective on the Palestinians will not change. For the Palestinians, this
means they will continue to have little reason to concern themselves with
China. Since China has expressed support for every conceivable iteration
of Palestinian leader from secular Marxists to corrupt autocrats to
religious extremists it is likely that the next generation of Palestinian
leaders will maintain a similar blend of casual appreciation yet material
disregard for the authorities in Beijing.
The visit of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing in
May 2013 illustrates this trend. During the brief visit, the new Chinese
President Xi Jinping shared a four-point proposal for the settlement of the
Palestinian question. This proposal, combined with the Israeli premiers
impending visit to Beijing later in the week, set off a firestorm of media
speculation that China was inaugurating a new era of active
peacemaking.39 The reality was that Abbas was in Beijing to provide
diplomatic cover for Netanyahus visit, continuing a tradition the Chinese
have employed since the 1990s of having Palestinians balance out their
engagement with Israelis.40 Even the Chinese presidents proposal was
underwhelming, given that it recycled the same language from previous
38 Sara Irving, What Does Chinas Ascendance Mean for PalesTne? Electric InTfada,
Oct. 26 2009, h-p://electronicinTfada.net/content/what-does-chinas-ascendance-

mean-palesTne/8506.
39 See for example, SCMP Editorial, Chinas New Role as Peacemaker, May 15 2013,
h-p://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/arTcle/1237838/chinas-new-role-
peacemaker.
40 Sam Chester, Why Netanyahu and Abbas Went to China, Tablet, May 13 2005,
h-p://tabletmag.com/scroll/132220/why-netanyahu-and-abbas-went-to-china.
Chinese peace proposals, save for one noticeable exception: it removed

the clause stating that China seeks an ac<ve role in the peace process.41
Egypt
In December 2014, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi visited
Beijing and signed a strategic partnership that his Chinese hosts hailed
as an important milestone in the histories of the two countries.42 His
deposed predecessor, Mohammed Morsi, visited Beijing in August 2012,
surprising observers in selecting China as his first visit outside of the
Middle East.43 The previous deposed president, Hosni Mubarak, visited
China nine times over the course of his 29 years in office, far more than
any other Middle East leader.44 Mubaraks most significant visit may
have taken place in 1999, when the Egyptian and Chinese presidents
signed a strategic partnership, affirming Egypts leadership role in
Chinas strategic expansion into Africa and the Middle East.45
41 Yoram Evron, Chinas DiplomaTc IniTaTve on the PalesTnian Issue: Hollow Words or
Concrete SoluTons, China Policy InsTtute Blog, University of No^ngham, Feb. 24

2015, h-ps://blogs.no^ngham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinsTtute/2015/02/24/chinas-
diplomaTc-iniTaTves-on-the-palesTnian-issue-a-quest-for-a-role-or-hollow-slogans/.
42 China, Egypt Elevate Bilateral Ties to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Xinhua,
Dec. 23 2014, h-p://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-12/23/

c_133874597.htm.
43 Brian Spegele & Ma- Bradley, Egypts Morsi Firms China Ties, Wall Street Journal,
Aug. 29 2012, h-p://www.wsj.com/arTcles/

SB10000872396390444230504577617271550304082.
44 China, Egypt Pledge Stronger Ties on AnT-GraL Chiefs Cairo Visit, Xinhua, June 14
2009, h-p://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hellochina/egyptambassador09/2009-06/14/
content_8608685.htm.
45 David Shambaugh & Dawn Murphy, U.S.-China InteracTons in the Middle East,
Africa, Europe, and LaTn America, in Tangled Titans, ed. D. Shambaugh (Lanham:
Rowman & Li-leeld, 2013), 324. The strategic partnership Beijing signed with
Mubarak in 1999 was absent from the headlines that greeted the strategic
partnership Beijing signed with Sisi in Dec. 2014. EgypTan and Chinese ocials were
likely seeking to provide Sisis visit with added luster, easily accomplished by using the
term strategic partner which Beijing has used uidly for the last two decades. See,
Feng Zhongping & Huang Jing, Chinas Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Engaging with
a Changing World, European Strategic Partnerships Observatory, June 2014, h-p://
fride.org/download/WP8_China_strategic_partnership_diplomacy.pdf.
This brief review of Egyptian presidents Beijing travel itinerary

highlights that Sino-Egyptian relations are not a bold new initiative of a
reformist, anti-Islamist, career soldier. Nor are they a sudden policy
reversal by the Muslim Brotherhood, designed to redirect Egypt away
from its traditional American ally. Egypt has pursued a strategic
relationship with China since the early 1990s under Mubarak. While the
ideological motive for each Egyptian president was distinct, the
commercial and strategic incentives remains the same: attracting Chinese
investment and tourism, reducing an imbalanced trade deficit, and
establishing Cairo as Chinas regional headquarter in Africa and the
Middle East.
Investment
Investment and tourism are the two key economic areas in which Egypt
has focused in its economic relations with China. Egyptian officials have
preached the same message to Chinese investors for the last twenty years,
calling attention to Egypts relatively cheap labor force and the proximity
and attractive trade agreements Egypt has with consumer markets in
Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Under Mubarak, China and Egypt
initiated what remains the flagship hub for Chinese investment in Egypt:
a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Suez, modeled and managed by a
Chinese company responsible for SEZs in China.46 Although ground was
broken on this project as early as 1994, an agreement was not signed until
2010 and Chinese investment in the Suez-SEZ remains modest as of
2015. Chinese investment, according to Chinese and Egyptian officials, is
largely driven by strategic positioning rather than profit.47 Sisi has sought
to dramatically expand Chinas investment footprint by pitching
ambitious infrastructure projects to China that align with Chinas New
Silk Road initiative. The key project is an $8 billion proposal to expand
46 Deborah BrauTgam & Tang Xiaoyang, African Shenzhen: Chinas Special Economic
Zones in Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies 49:1, 2011, 27-54, h-p://
www.american.edu/sis/faculty/upload/BrauTgam_Tang_JMAS-2011.pdf.
Emma Sco-, China Goes Global in Egypt: A Special Economic Zone in Suez, Discussion
Paper, Stellenbosch University, Aug. 2013, h-p://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/
2013/08/CCS_DP_China_Goes_Global_Emma_Sco-_2013_Final1.pdf.
47 Interviews with EgypTan and Chinese ocials in Cairo in Jan. 2009 and Feb. 2015.
the Suez Canal.48 Egypt targeted Chinese investors with this and other
projects at a global investment conference in March 2015 in Sharm el-
Sheikh.
Tourism
While investment in Egypt was slowed by the 2011 Revolution, tourism
was devastated. Over 100,000 Chinese visited Egypt in 2010.49
Following the revolution, China placed travel restrictions on Egypt and
Chinese visitors slowed to just a few thousand in 2011.50 One of Morsis
key achievements while in China in 2012 was to persuade Beijing to
remove this restriction.51 Following Sisis visit in December 2014, which
included numerous meetings with Chinese tourism agencies, Egyptian
officials are expecting the number of Chinese tourists to exceed 200,000
in 2015.52
Trade Decit
Trade between Egypt and China increased tenfold from 2003 to 2013,
jumping from $1.1 million to 10.2 billion.53 Egyptian officials report that
bilateral trade in 2014 reached $11.5 billion, as China passed the United
48 Maria Golia, The New Suez Canal Project and Egypts Economic Future, Middle East
InsTtute, Dec. 19 2014, h-p://www.mei.edu/content/arTcle/new-suez-canal-project-

and-egypt%E2%80%99s-economic-future.
49 Rany Mostafa, DelegaTon of Chinese Tourist Operators Visit Cairo, Cairo Post, Jan. 7
2015, h-p://www.thecairopost.com/news/132444/inside_egypt/delegaTon-of-
chinese-tour-operators-visits-cairo.
50 Interviews with EgypTan and Chinese ocials in Cairo, Feb. 2015.
51 Chinese Tourists Free to Visit Egypt: China President Hu Jintao, Ahram Online, Aug.
28 2012,
h-p://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/51506/Business/Economy/Chinese-
tourists-free-to-visit-Egypt-China-Preside.aspx.
52 Tourism Minister: 200,000 Chinese Tourists to Visit Egypt by end of 2015, State
InformaTon Service (Egypt), Jan. 23 2015, h-p://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/

ArTcles/tmpArTcleNews.aspx?ArtID=88096#.VRJUh_mUcpU.
53 InternaTonal Trade StaTsTcs 2014, World Trade OrganizaTon, h-ps://
www.wto.org/english/res_e/staTs_e/its2014_e/its2014_e.pdf. Also, see A. Abu Hatab,

N. Shoumann, Huo X., Exploring Egypt-China Bilateral Trade: Dynamics and Prospects,
Journal of Economic Studies 39:3, 2012, 314-326.
States to become Chinas top trade partner.54 But with Egyptian exports
only representing a small share of the overall trade ($1.8 billion in 2013),
the trade balance is titled dramatically against Egypt. The influx of cheap
Chinese goods has devastated many traditional Egyptian industries,
especially the textile and clothing sector.55 Persuading Chinese investors
to establish manufacturing in Egypt is a key goal for Egyptian officials,
and a gradually improving trade deficit suggests steady headway is taking
place over the Mubarak, Morsi and Sisi regimes.56
Regional Headquarter
Attracting Chinese investment to Egypt is also a means of promoting
Egyptand Cairo in particularas Chinas preferred beachhead for
commercial and political engagement with Africa and the Middle East.
Under Mubarak, Egypt made a point of taking a leadership role in the
multilateral forums that China organized with Africa (FOCAC, fourth
meeting in Sharm el-Sheik) and with the Arab states (CASCF, first
meeting in Cairo in 2004). The personnel charged with engaging China in
each Egyptian regime have fluctuated. Nevertheless, every such officer
has repeated a remarkably uniform message about the way in which
Egypt sees a new world order evolving, especially in the Middle East and
Africa, and that because China is seen as a rising power in that new world
order, Egypt is obligated to develop ties with the new foreign power.57
Recommendations
I will close by offering some recommendations that are particularly
relevant for the American policy community, as well as future analysts of
Chinas engagement in the Middle East.
1. Multilateralism Should be Privileged Over Bilateral Frameworks
54 Mohamed Mostafa, Minister: Egypt-China Trade Exchange to Reach $11.5 bn by
2015, Egypt Independent, Dec. 17 2014, h-p://www.egypTndependent.com/news/

minister-egypt-china-trade-exchange-reach-115-bn-2015.
55 Ben Simpfendorfer & Mohammed al-Sudairi, Chinas Economic Impact on Egypt, In
N. Lenze & C. Schriwers Converging Regions: Global Perspec<ves on Asia and the
Middle East (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 9-24.
56 Interviews with EgypTan ocials, Cairo Feb. 2015.
57 Ibid.
Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East has traditionally been limited
to bilateral relations (save for interaction with the Arab League, such
as CASCF, or free trade discussions with the GCC). New programs like
Beijings New Silk Road initiative implicitly challenge this limitation
with their stated goal of breaking the connectivity bottleneck in Asia.58
Multilateral input into Silk Road projects need not balloon into a
Shanghai Cooperation Organization style platform for this input to play a
modest yet potentially efficient role in promoting improved regional
coexistence.59
The dangers of utilizing only bilateral frameworks can already be
seen in Egypt and Israel, where the two countries are presently
competing to have China build new transport corridors between the Red
and Mediterranean Seas.60 Chinese officials have engaged each country
separately, fostering further suspicion between the two neighbors. Beijing
indicated a newfound readiness to engage both countries in December,
when the Chinese and Egyptian presidents met and reportedly discussed
the role that Israel could play in resolving some concerns. In recognizing
the need for multilateralism, the two leaders may have been applying
lessons learned from Egypts recent crisis with Ethiopia and China over
the damning of the Nile River.61 In any case, this experience underscores
the importance of privileging multilateralism in regional actors
engagement with China.
58 APEC Members Agree on ConnecTvity Blueprint, Xinhua, Nov. 11 2014, h-p://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-11/11/c_133782132.htm.
59 Sam Chester, Is China Part of the SoluTon or Part of the Problem in the Arab-Israeli
Peace Process, China Policy InsTtute Blog, University of No^ngham, March 2 2015,
h-p://blogs.no^ngham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinsTtute/2015/03/02/is-china-part-of-the-
soluTon-or-part-of-the-problem-in-the-arab-israeli-peace-process/.
60 Emma Sco-, Chinas Silk Road Strategy: A Foothold in the Suez but Looking to
Israel, Jamestown China Brief 14:9, Oct. 10 2014, h-p://www.jamestown.org/

programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_-news%5b-_news%5d=42943&tx_-news%5bbackPid
%5d=25&cHash=cd567bb412105564276319db84ddec33#.VRJbtvmUcpX.
61 Jacey ForTn, Dam Rising in Ethiopia STrs Hope and Tension, New York Times, Oct.
11 2014, h-p://www.nyTmes.com/2014/10/12/world/dam-rising-in-ethiopia-sTrs-
hope-and-tension.html?_r=1.
2. Free-Rider Concern
US officials, including President Obama in an interview with Thomas
Friedman in August 2014, have accused China of being a free-rider in
the Middle East, taking advantage of U.S. security while exclusively
pursuing their own commercial interests.62 Do regional states share this
American concern?
This charge is usually levied against Chinas behavior in Iraq or in
the Persian Gulf at large. The reality is that it is equally relevant in Israel
and Egypt, where the U.S. government leverages significant security and
political capital while Beijing prioritizes economics. That said, regional
actors are less concerned about Chinas free-riding. Since they share
Chinas focus on commerce, and at times may even find the American
political presence suffocating, few regional voices voice any concern
with Chinas free-riding. As for China, to paraphrase a description by
Yiyi Chen, a Chinese Middle East expert, all drivers must first ride free
in order to learn.63
3. Failure of American Strategy and Communication
Chinas growing role in the region is not necessarily a challenge to U.S.
interests. The two superpowers share similar objectives and by
combining their distinct capabilities, could potentially achieve these
objectives while advancing regional development. For this to happen, it is
essential that Washington communicate a strategy that takes into account
a realization widely accepted in the Middle East, namely that Chinas role
in the region will grow exponentially over the next 10-20 years. U.S.
allies in Jerusalem, Cairo and Riyadh need to clearly understand how
America intends on engaging a Middle East that will increasingly by
shaped, at least in economic terms, by China and other Asian states.
62 Thomas Friedman, Obama on the World, [youtube] New York Times, Aug. 8 2014,
h-p://www.nyTmes.com/2014/08/09/opinion/president-obama-thomas-l-friedman-
iraq-and-world-aairs.html?_r=0.
63 Yiyi Chen, A PosiTve Role for China in the Israeli-PalesTnian Conict, China Policy
InsTtute Blog, University of No^ngham, Feb. 26 2015, h-ps://blogs.no^ngham.ac.uk/

chinapolicyinsTtute/2015/02/26/will-china-interfere-with-the-israeli-palesTnian-
conict/.
4. Knowledge Promotion
In the Middle East, the level of understanding about China and US-China
ties is remarkably truncated. Israel and Turkey are two of the only
countries with more than a handful of specialists in Chinese politics. Save
for an occasional ambassador and an emerging generation of Chinese-
speaking diplomats, local governments are bereft of any comprehensive
understanding of China. The Arab Spring may unintentionally help
counter this trend thanks to the thousands of young Arabs that have
relocated temporarily to Chinese commercial centers like Yiwu and
Guangzhou, developing business and language skills that could help
advance economic ties between their home countries and China over the
next twenty plus years.
With an overabundance of informed China experts, America is
well placed to help address the limited understanding of China in the
Middle East. Academic exchange programs and policy conferences could
leverage American soft-power in the region while improving U.S. and
regional actors understanding of how best to engage China in the Middle
East.
This academic exchange would also be an excellent opportunity
to improve the study of Sino-Middle East relations, a field which suffers
from a surfeit of derivative summaries and an absence of original and
detailed research. A generation of young scholars, like Dawn Murphy,
Mohammed al-Sudairi and Makio Yamada, are pioneering much needed
in-depth studies that prioritize fieldwork and local perspectives. More
scholars, in China, the Middle East, the United States and globally, need
to be encouraged to follow their lead and explore issues beyond the
media headlines.
Sam Chester is an expert on contemporary relations between

China and the Middle East. Sam is an analyst for Clarity Capital,
a global investment firm based in Tel Aviv and New York. His
research into Chinese investment in the Middle East has included
fieldwork in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, Syria, and Israel, as well
as China. Sam has a M.A. in China and Middle East Studies from
Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International
Studies and holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Johns
Hopkins University.

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Georgetown Security Studies Review: China in the Middle East !

Georgetown Security Studies Review

A Publication of the Center for Security Studies at

Georgetown Security Studies Review

Published by the Center for Security Studies

Mike Burnham, Editor-in-Chief

Access Georgetown Security Studies Review online at http://

The Middle East and China ................................................1

The Dragon Heads West: China-Arab Cooperation in the

Does China Enhance Stability in the Middle East? .........27

How Syria, Israel, the Palestinians, and Egypt View

The Middle East and China

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)

Western-style government on an Arab people. His well-intentioned but

they view as a justifiable counterattacks and counter-humiliations of the

are not members of ethnic minorities, though ten of Chinas 55 officially

popular superstition. There is something inherently alarming to Chinese

principles were an effective repudiation of the hegemonic tributary

companies investments and the safety of their personnel in the Middle

Russia, but not China, is bilaterally committed. By contrast, the United

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. is a former U.S. Assistant

The Dragon Heads West: China-Arab

Dynamics of China-Arab Cooperation

Strategy. The Middle East plays an essential role in strengthening

development modes can better help realize the harmonious coexistence of

China-Arab Cooperation through Pivotal States

common interests in cooperation. From Beijings perspective, the major

East and the West. Their locations are of geo-political importance,

projects in Sudan represented Beijings largest overseas interest. In 2006,

China-Arab Cooperation on the Multilateral Arena

experiences and the pursuit of common goals of development have

China-Arab Cooperation: Styles and Hurdles

The second is to keep a low key. Building an official alliance or

First, the Arab countries are facing pressing tasks to maintain

flexibility and thus readjustments in front of opportunities, and decisions

shelving political entanglement to sustain this economic diplomacy in the

Dr. Degang Sun is professor of Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai

Does China Enhance Stability in the Middle

1 All opinions are Professor Sullivans alone

The Politics of Policy

3 Bagwandeen, Mandira, Navigating the Gulf: Chinas balancing strategy,

4 Garwood-Gowers, Andrew, China and the responsibility to protect: the implications

Regional Thinking, Direct and Indirect Connections

7 BBC, China to double Iranian investment, 16 November 2014, http://www.bbc.com/

China is involved with Egyptian free trade zones,12 Egyptian

help resolve the Palestinian-Israeli disputes.17 It is playing a double game

The Energy Connection

26 EIA, China, http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH

Supply Networks and Transit Chokepoints

clearly China wants this to go much further.30 However, as China

30 BBC, China to double Iranian investment, 16 November 2014, http://

Chinas Reach and Its Elements of Power

31 See: MIT, The Observatory of Economic Complexity, Algeria, http://

Diplomatic clout seems to be on the rise. Cultural and

34 Cordesman, Anthony, The Gulf military balance, CSIS, 2015, http://csis.org/

35FAS, "China-Iran Nuclear Cooperation". http://fas.org/news/iran/

Monitor, 25 February 2011, h-p://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/

China looks a long way from developing a real military-strategic

39International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2015, Routledge,

Turning Points in Policy

43 Erickson, Andrew, No substitute for experience, US Naval War College, 2013,

and the American growth and development model.45 The Arab

Dr. Paul Sullivan is a professor of economics at the National

How Syria, Israel, the Palestinians, and Egypt