Felixberto Abellana v.

People & Spouses Alonto

DOCTRINE:

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to
spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses.

FACTS:

An Information was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through Falsification of Public Document
in connection with a Deed of Sale over a certain parcel of land owned by the spouses Alonto. After
trial in the RTC, the trial court found that petitioner had no intention to defraud and that the spouses
Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally appear before the notary
public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner of falsification of public
document. The trial court sentenced petitioner with imprisonment, ordered him to restore full
ownership and possession of the land to Sps. Alonto, and in case of his failure to do so, he shall
pay Sps. Alonto the value of the properties. He was further adjudged to pay damages and costs of
suit to Sps. Alonto. On appeal, CA acquitted petitioner as it opined that the conviction for an
offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged
violated petitioners constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Nevertheless, the imposition of the civil liability was sustained. Petitioner then filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court.

ISSUES:

Whether petitioner could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal by the trial court
and the CA?

Whether the alternative sentence imposed by the trial court to petitioner should be sustained?

HELD:

No. It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely
due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award
the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. In case of exoneration of the accused, the civil liability may still arise
when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage
to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the
acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. Based on the records of the case, Court
found that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses
Alonto. Moreover, the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when
on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos
title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons,
no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto.

No. the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, to wit: to
institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and
other kinds of damages. Sentences should not be in the alternative. There is nothing in the law
which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. While a judge has the discretion of
imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. He must fix positively
and with certainty the particular penalty.

Wherefore, Petition granted.

People vs Asis

Date: August 25, 2010

DOCTRINE:

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal
whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. (2) While certiorari may be availed of to correct
an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power
to dispense justice. (3) An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial court s
evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65
petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:
The RTC acquitted accused Abordo of the attempted murder of Montes, and only held him liable
of Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez, and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to
Majait. The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, but the
CA dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy. According to the CA, the remedy should
have been an appeal, not petition for certiorari.

Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home when an altercation ensued between him and
the three offended parties Montes, Calvez, and Majait. The accused Abordo shot Majait in the leg
while Calvez was hit in the abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt. 2. Abordo was charged with two
counts of attempted murder (Majait and Montes) and one count of frustrated murder (Calvez).

The RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less
Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait, when it found no treachery and evident
premeditation. Four mitigating circumstances were appreciated in favor of Abordo. Abordo was
acquitted with respect to the complaint of Montes. CA: (petition dismissed). The OSG filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the ground that Judge Asis of the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its
decision of acquitting Abordo in one case, only holding him liable for Serious Physical Injuries
and Less Serious Physical Injuries In the two other cases. The CA dismissed the petition, saying
that the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. It said that as the State was
questioning the verdict of the acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy
should have been an appeal. It said thus: a. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error
of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy. b. Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless
the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In filing the petition for certiorari, the accused is
thereby placed in double jeopardy. c. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for
certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence on double jeopardy. d. The petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong
remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such
action places the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari.

HELD: Yes. Certiorari is the proper remedy A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is
the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level.
Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordo s constitutionally guaranteed right
against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the appellate court. Exception to Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine In our
jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final
and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has
entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of,
criminal cases. In People v LouelUy, the Court said that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
appropriate upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court in acquitting the accused: (1)
Committed reversible errors of judgment (2) Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction or denial of due process. Such commission of the lower court renders its judgment
void. No double jeopardy When the order or dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court
in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.
OSG s petition for certiorari before the CA, however, is bereft of merit While the CA was
erroneous of dismissing the petition, the OSG s petition for certiorari if given due course is bereft
of merit. While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such
an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. A reading of the
OSG petition fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process. Also, what
the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating
Abordo s constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition
for certiorari cannot review a trial court s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors
of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of
jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion. Error of Judgment v
Error of Jurisdiction Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari
will botbe issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties,
and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.
People vs Baron

DOCTRINE:

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to produce a conviction that the appellant conspired with his
co-accused in committing the crime of robbery with homicide. His claim that he acted under the
impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury could not be sustained because there
was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat, preventing his escape that compelled him to take
part in the commission of the offense charged.

FACTS:

An information was filed against apellant accusing him of robbery with homicide.

The Prosecutions Version

Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the appellant is as follows:

On June 28, 1995, at around 8:30 in the evening, Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver,
was having a conversation with Canni Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julies Bakeshop at
Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The
appellant approached Berallo and asked if he could take him and his companions to Hacienda
Caridad for P30.00. When Berallo agreed, the appellant called Villatima, then wearing a fatigue
jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallos tricycle.

Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julies Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino and
Ballesteros were in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle while the
appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread, she approached Berallo and asked if he was
going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could ride with him. However, Berallo replied that he
still had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While
inside the jeep, she saw two more persons boarding Berallos tricycle.

On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide incident.
Together with other policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he saw
Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20 meters away from the highway. They also
noticed several traces of footprints near Berallos body and a tricycle sidecar in a canal beside the
Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.
Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Berallo.
She found that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage due to multiple
stab wounds. Five of them were considered as fatal and caused the immediate death of Berallo.
The wounds also indicated that they could have been inflicted by more than one person.

The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of the suspects. After
having been apprised of his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took Berallos
tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the sidecar, brought the motorcycle to Barangay
Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the house of Villatimas aunt,
Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).

Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew Villatima, together with
the appellant, and another companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to her house in
Kabankalan.

Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of Natividad as the
one stolen from her deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of money and the value of the
personal property stolen from her husband. She allegedly spent the sum of P2,400.00 for the
purchase of the burial lot.

The Version of the Defense

Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at around 7
oclock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to the
public transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle with two passengers passed by and its driver
inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded the tricycle and told the driver that
he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver requested him to accompany them up to Segundo
Diez. He agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon reaching Bangga Doldol,
however, the passengers announced a hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the
driver not to make any wrong move, or they would be killed. Thereafter, the passengers tied the
hands of the driver and dragged him towards the sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what
happened to the driver since he remained in the tricycle. However, he suspected that the driver was
killed by the two passengers.

Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of the tricycle. They
then took him to a house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the premises. The
following morning, they returned to Cadiz City. The two passengers even accompanied him to his
house and threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the incident to the police
authorities.

On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, policemen came to his house and asked
where the motorcycle was taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and insisted that he
had nothing to do with the incident. He stressed that the two passengers whose names he did not
know, were responsible for the crime committed.

RTC founded the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In his appeal to the CA the accused stated that the trial court failed to appreciate his defense of
exempting circumstance of irresistable force and/or uncontrollable fear, CA denied.

ISSUE:

Whether the defense of irresistable force and/or uncontrollable fear shall be appreciated.

HELD:

No. There is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and participated in committing
the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial evidence, which consists of
proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain
that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the perpetrator.

The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co-accused for more
than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried to escape or at
least request for assistance from the people around him.