Manila G.R. No.
L-46496 February 27, 1940
EN BANC
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney
Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion,
we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion
of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo,
sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada,
termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada
vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun
costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado
contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo
fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual
tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato
colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega
a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager
and propietor, and
un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en
la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que
dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero,
puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays
for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this
Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial
Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938,
there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by
Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent
the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his
CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated
September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from
the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT
with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is
a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro,
the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
 5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation
are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had
been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil
war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace
has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair
labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor
Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the
respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion
for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead
with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass
upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall
proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of
orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations
regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations
and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in
the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire
record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations
in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or
activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting
statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit
their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of
views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of
the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive,
acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court
of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law,
is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial
or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions in the determination of
disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question,
matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations
between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment,
between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted
to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties
to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing
and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be
dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4,
ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the
dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and
study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for
such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos"
or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes;
may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the
more effective system of official investigation and compulsory
arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor
and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No.
46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out
that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that
the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it
may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands
made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may
include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination
which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural
disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules
recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court
to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.
Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this
court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile
if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the
more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301
U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v.
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989;
National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir.,
97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The
statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S.
25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co.,
227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United
States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74
Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv.
Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L.
& N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right
to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may
be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are
only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In
the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates
to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to
observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang
Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record
is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which
to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new
trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is
alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the
members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records
of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers
in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang
Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro,
the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such
far reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation
which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts
is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not
entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to
the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the
case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So
ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran,

JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, petitioner, vs.
JUDGE FILOMENO PASCUAL, respondent.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Intimating as to what the ideals of a good judge should be, Sir Francis
Bacon wants judges to remember that their office is jus dicere and not
jus dare, to interpret law, and not to make law or give law. They
ought to be more learned than witty, more revered than plausible, and
more advised 3than confident. Above all things, INTEGRITY is their
portion and proper virtue.i[1]
The Constitution and the statutes, however, limit the legal
qualifications of judges to only three bare essentials: citizenship, age
and experience. The virtues of probity, honesty, temperance,
impartiality and integrity, most often used to measure an aspirant to
the bench, lose their meaning in individual perception.
While people perceive judges to be above the ordinary run of men,
they know that a perfect judge, like a perfect priest, exists only in
fantasy.
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that the integrity of respondent
judge in this administrative case stands challenged for committing acts
of extortion or bribery.
The following antecedent facts appear on record:
Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter,
addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and
corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of
Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and
corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Orderedii[2] to
conduct a discreet investigation by the then NBI Director Epimaco
Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo,
HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They
proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the
letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character.
In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence
of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondents sala.
In his affidavitiii[3] executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward
Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No.
2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent
judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case,
decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so,
respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed
that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his
favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00.
Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability,
would need money to serve his vice.
In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused
respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was
thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta
and Olazo filed the following report:
On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ
met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the
Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the
graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL
that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is
asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money
because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then
instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his
office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993),
CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the
Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him
four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope
previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder.
In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and
after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and
signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already
received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the
room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied
having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough
search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a
blue book on top of his table.
Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he
was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subjects
right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked,
photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard
Operating Procedure (S.O.P.).
On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person
of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest
Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with
the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as
defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of
the Philippines. (Rollo, pp. 47-48.)
On May 11, 1994, by resolution of the Third Division of this Court,
this case was referred to Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon for
investigation, report and recommendation.iv[4]
In connection with this investigation, respondent filed a Memorandum,
dated July 28, 1995, wherein respondent presented his version of the
case:
Sometime in February 1993, one Ceferino Tigas, a fictitious person
according to the NBI, wrote a letter to Court Administrator Ernani
Pao of the Supreme Court, alleging irregularities committed by the
accused. Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez endorsed
the letter to the NBI Director requesting `discreet investigation of the
Tigas letter. An NBI tandem of Agents Edward Villarta and Reynaldo
Olazo proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, to investigate. Said tandems
assignment was merely to conduct discreet investigation supposedly,
but it led to incriminatory machinations, planting evidence, unlawful
arrest, illegal search and seizure. They contacted Candido Cruz who
was mentioned in the letter. They, however, discovered that Ceferino
Tigas, the alleged letter writer, was an inexistent person, fictitious as
shown by the synopsis report of the NBI agents (Exhibit 8). Having
contacted Candido Cruz, the NBI agents persuaded him to participate
in what they called `entrapment operation. The NBI agents prepared
an affidavit, then a supplementary affidavit and had them signed by
Candido Cruz. They also went to the NBI Headquarters and had four
(4) P500 bills dusted with fluorescent powder which they used in
theoperation against the accused.
In the afternoon of March 25, 1993, the NBI, along with Candido
Cruz, proceeded to the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan, where
the accused judge was holding office. However, they learned that the
accused judge was not in his office but was then attending the
graduation rites of his son at the nearby Colegio de Sta. Monica, and
so they decided to move their operation to the school grounds. The
ceremonies had not yet begun. Candido Cruz saw the accused in one
corner of the compound and approached him. He tried to give the
accused an envelope allegedly containing money, but the judge refused
to accept it and angrily drove Candido Cruz away. Rebuffed, the NBI
agents decided to reset their operation the following day.
At around 9:30 in the morning of March 26, 1993, the NBI agents and
Candido Cruz arrived at the municipal building of Angat, Bulacan.
Cruz, as planned, entered the accused judges chambers and placed an
envelope, allegedly containing marked money, right on his (judges)
desk. He thought it was a pleading for filing and he told Candido Cruz
to file it with the office of the clerk of court at the adjacent room.
Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon
hearing the reply, the accused suddenly erupted in anger, he grabbed
the envelope on the desk and hurled it to Cruz. The envelope fell on
the floor, the accused picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of
Cruzs polo shirt and drove him out of the chamber.
Just seconds thereafter, agents Villarta and Olazo entered the door of
the chamber which door was open at that time. They introduced
themselves and told the accused that the money that Cruz gave him
was marked. Accused told them that he did not receive or accept
money from Cruz. But they proceeded to search the room, the table,
its drawers, and every nook and cranny of his room, including the
pockets of the accuseds pants. After scouring the place, the agents
failed to find the envelope with the marked money. And so, one of the
agents called for Candido Cruz who was waiting outside at a waiting
shed fronting the municipal building, and asked him where the
envelope was. Cruz came back to the room and, together with agent
Olazo, approached the cabinet and said heto pala.
Then, the accuseds humiliating experience began. Thereafter, despite
the strident protestations of the accused, the envelope, which came
from the pocket of Cruzs polo shirt, was placed on top of the table of
the judge, pictures were taken, and the accused was arrested by the
NBI agents.v[5]
On August 11, 1995, Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon submitted
the following report and recommendation:
The Investigating Judge respectfully submits her findings based on
the evidence at hand.
As against the respondent judges denials, the undersigned submits
that the sworn affidavits of complainants and NBI Agents and
documentary proofs attached to the records are more convincing and
nearer to the truth. They have no motive for fabricating this charge,
except to bring justice. Credence should be given to the testimony of
the NBI Agents coming as it does from an unpolluted source. These
Agents had no reason to testify falsely against the respondent judge.
They were just doing their duty. On the other hand, the respondent
judge had to protect himself against the testimonial and
technical/scientific evidence that he had received the envelope and to
reject its implications of such evidence.
Furthermore, his defense that he was just instigated to commit a crime
is likewise untenable. The principle evolved from the cases appears to
be that in a prosecution for an offense against the public welfare, such
as accepting bribe, the defense of entrapment cannot be successfully
interposed; x x x.
One may well wonder over the manner the envelope containing the
money was proffered to the respondent judge as he narrated his story
on how he got mad at Candido Cruz when he proffered the said
envelope, how he threw, picked it up and placed it in the pocket of the
latter and how he drove him away. He even testified that it was just
planted by the NBI Agents when the latter allegedly placed the
envelope inside a directory which was placed on top of a cabinet.
x x x. Why was he not surprised that somebody barged into his
chamber or was he really accustomed with people directly dealing or
negotiating at his chamber, as what Cruz did, instead of dealing with
his staff. His angry words and his actuations, according to his
testimony, were not convincing at all to show that he was that fuming
mad at Candido Cruzs offer. More so, his claim that NBI Agents
connived with Candido Cruz just for their own personal glory was not
even persuasive. His excuse of the presence of fluorescent powder on
his hand was flimsy and incredible.
The act of the respondent shows that he can be influenced by monetary
considerations. This act of the respondent of demanding and receiving
money from a party-litigant before his court constitutes serious
misconduct in office. It is this kind of gross and flaunting misconduct,
no matter how nominal the amount involved on the part of those who
are charged with the responsibility of administering the law that will
surely erode the peoples respect for law and lose faith and trust in the
courts which are expected to render fair and equal justice to all.
Such act go against Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which state: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities and a judge should perform official duties
honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.
xxx xxx xxx
With the above, the Investigating Judge respectfully recommends that
appropriate penalty be imposed upon the respondent.
We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction.
We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation
submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The
Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of
respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was,
therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can
confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an
administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge.vi[6] The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no
less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only
after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence,
especially since the charge is penal in character.vii[7] The above-quoted
Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen
short of the requirements of due process.
The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the
testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI
Reynaldo Olazo on several material points.
It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who
must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by
reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did
not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The
letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes
committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with
anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been
expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from
such vague accusations.
While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the
Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a discreet
investigation of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an
instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found
letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they
sought out an accused before respondents court who could possibly be
respondent judges virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was
Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal
Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the
charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the
effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical
injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to
try the case.
But, respondents action in this regard was perpetrated some time
before Candido Cruz was persuaded to participate in what they (the
NBI agents) called entrapment operation. The opportune time to
bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing
Cruz criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries.
No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask
for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable
verdict having been rendered already.
It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admittedviii[8] that,
despite the fact that he scoured the table of the respondent in search
of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and
so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz
can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the
allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30
oclock in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with
the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan.
Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judges chambers,
located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope
containing marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was
placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido
Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room
adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money
the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge
suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and
hurled it at Candido Cruz. The envelope fell on the floor. Respondent
judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz polo
shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and
Olazo immediately entered the door of the judges chambers,
introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that
Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did
not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent
judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the
room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of
respondents chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent
judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI
Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly
given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
Candido Cruz, who had gone down to the waiting shed, was called for
by one of the agents. Candido Cruz was asked as to the whereabouts
of the envelope containing money. Candido Cruz went back to the
judges chambers and made the motions of conducting a search.
Eventually, he went straight to the top of a cabinet and, in the manner
of a magician, produced the envelope with marked money, saying,
heto pala.
Thereafter, photographs were taken of respondent judge who was
humiliated no end by the fact that the envelope with marked money
was placed on top of his desk with respondent judge in front of it.
In his testimony before the Sandiganbayan, NBI Agent SI Reynaldo
Olazo stated that the marked money used in their entrapment operation
actually came from Candido Cruz and not from the NBI; ix[9] and he
was not able to see what actually transpired between Candido Cruz
and respondent judge inside the chambers of the judge. He was
outside the judges chambers and entered it only after Candido Cruz
gave the signal that the money was already delivered by him to the
respondent.x[10] Candido Cruz, on the other hand, testified that the
marked money used in the alleged entrapment operation was given to
him by the NBIxi[11] and, when he went out of the judges chambers
after giving the money, he signaled to one, Col. Javier, who was then
positioned immediately outside the chambers.xii[12]
In view of the foregoing facts, it is easy to conclude that the acts of the
NBI agents which triggered the incident that transpired inside
respondent judges chambers constituted instigation and not
entrapment as claimed by the prosecution. It is evident that Candido
Cruz was induced to act as he did in order to place respondent judge in
a compromising situation, a situation which was not brought about by
any request of respondent judge. It is surprisingly strange that an
accused in a case would simply barge into the judges chambers
without rhyme or reason, place bribe money on top of the judges desk
without so much as explaining what the money was for. Respondent
judges action on Candido Cruzs case which favored Cruz was
effected long before. We can believe the fact that, under the
circumstances, respondent judge did react in anger and threw the
envelope at the accused Candido Cruz. The judge must have given
back the money to Candido Cruz and literally drove Cruz out of his
chambers bringing the money with him. This explains the reason why
the NBI Agents notwithstanding a relentless search did not find the
money inside the chambers. Four (4) NBI Agents made the search and
they were unable to find the envelope with the marked money in it.
This fact NBI Agent Olazo in effect admitted because he had to call
back Candido Cruz in order to make Cruz divulge as to where the
bribe money was placed. When, after all, Candido Cruz produced the
money when he went back to the judges chambers, it became obvious
that the money when offered to respondent judge was not received by
the latter.
The foregoing set of facts smacks of unlawful prosecution and planting
of evidence amounting to persecution. It is reprehensible to say the
least that NBI agents should entrap the respondent judge by illegal
means, besmirch his reputation by the planting of evidence against him
and make public the foregoing charges of bribery against him in the
face of the unjustified and illegal incriminatory machinations
perpetrated by the NBI agents in connivance with Candido Cruz.
We, thus, hold respondent Judge Filomeno Pascual blameless of the
charge of bribery against him.
It should be noted that Candido Cruz insisted that he had participated
in the alleged entrapment operation only because of the fact that the
NBI agents made him believe that there was an order therefor from the
Supreme Court.xiii[13] Considering that he is illiterate and is already
more than 70 years of age, it is understandable why he was easily
persuaded by the NBI agents to cooperate without need of any threat
whatsoever. Inconsistencies in his testimony is likewise attributed to
his aforesaid personal circumstances for it does not jibe with practical
experience that a person telling the truth will still have to struggle to
remember everything that transpired, he having been a participant in
the operation. Gross mistakes on very important points not easily
forgotten are very strong indicia of the falsity of the story given by a
witness.xiv[14]

We reiterate the ruling in the case of Raquiza v. Castaneda, Jr.,xv[15]

that:

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established

beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on
which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.

Reasonable doubt is the inability to let the judicial mind rest easy upon
the certainty of guilt after a thorough investigation of the whole
evidence.xvi[16] The principle of reasonable doubt being applicable in
the instant case, therefore, we find that the alleged act of bribery
committed by respondent has not been sufficiently and convincingly
proven to warrant the imposition of any penalty against respondent.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent judge is hereby

exonerated and the administrative case against him is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 [Adm. Matter No. MTJ-00-1241. January 20, 2000]
ATTY. NAPOLEON S. VALENZUELA, complainant vs. JUDGE
REYNALDO B. BELLOSILLO, respondent
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
The Affidavit-Complaint dated October 17, 1997 of Attorney Napoleon S.
Valenzuela charged respondent Judge Reynaldo Blanco Bellosillo of Branch
34 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City with gross violation of the
constitutional right of subject accused to assistance by counsel of her own
choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the Code of
Judicial Ethics; averring:
"2. That on September 4, 1997, I was hired as counsel for the
accused in Criminal Case No. 65382-86 entitled People of
the Philippines vs. Ms. Meriam V. Colapo for Violation of
B.P. 22 which case is being heard before Quezon City
Metropolitan Trial Court Branch 34, presided by Hon. Judge
Reynaldo Blanco Bellosillo;
3. That subsequently, I then filed a Manifestation praying for
the Honorable Court to allow the accused to post bail; a copy
of the Manifestation is hereto attached as Annex A and A-1
and made as integral parts hereof;
4. That Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo as was his custom, talked
to my client before granting bail for her provisional liberty
inside his chambers and in my absence;
5. That the next day, September 5, 1997, my client Meriam
Colapo informed me that Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo had
angrily ordered her to remove me as counsel and even
suggested one Atty. Puhawan of the PALAO QUEZON
CITY as my replacement; xxx
6. That as a consequence thereof, the undersigned had no
recourse but to file a Notice of Withdrawal with the
conformity of my client Meriam V. Colapo xxx;
7. That although I was aghast and flabbergasted with the
unfathomable actuation of Judge Bellosillo, I can think of no
reason what impelled him with anger to order my client for
my replacement;
7. [sic] That the actuation of Judge Reynaldo Blanco
Bellosillo is certainly oppressive, arrogant, and a gross
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency which
merits a dismissal from the service;
8. That such despotic act of Judge Bellosillo is likewise
indicative of partiality and gross ignorance of the
Constitution and the constitutional right of accused Meriam
Colapo to choose her own counsel to defend her in court;
9. That such arrogant act of Judge Bellosillo would certainly
violate and kill my right to earn and practice law; Spped
xxx."i[1]
The Answer, dated February 16, 1998, of respondent Judge denied the
allegations of the complaint, branded the same without any legal and factual
basis; theorizing:
"1. That when Complainants Accused Client and Witness,
Meriam J. [sic] Colapo, appeared before the undersigned
respondent to post Bail she was unassisted by Complainant-
Counsel and upon inquiry informed that she is allegedly
changing him not having liked the idea of being referred by a
Metro-TC Branch 34 Personnel to its PAO Lawyer Joseph
B. Sia, who rejected her due to the Prohibitive policy of his
office to represent an Accused in BP 22 Cases and instead
referred her to the Complainant-Lawyer, Napoleon S.
Valenzuela, a former PAO Employee, who allegedly
changed [sic] her unreasonably for the preparation of a mere
Manifestation To Post Bail;
 2. That respondent could not have referred Complainants
Accused Client Witness to tha [sic] PALAO knowing its
Prohibitive Policy to also represent Accused in BP 22 Cases
as previously made clear by its Chief, Atty. Jose Puhawan;
3. That out of delicadeza and in recognition of
Complainants right to practice the law profession,
respondent never talked to him about it;
4. That the Motion to Withdraw filed by Complainant with
the Conformity of his Accused Client Witness, Meriam V.
Colapo, is a matter strictly just between the two of them, to
which respondent was never a privy;
5. That had Complainant been more prudent, he could have
just verified from the respondent the veracity of his clients
statements which for legal intents and purposes are
inadmissible for being hearsay, thus, this unfounded time
consuming Complaint could have been avoided;
6. That respondent discharges his functions with all integrity
and good faith and without fear or favor knowing that justice
must never be distorted as to do so would make even the
wise blind and subvert tha [sic] cause of the innocent;
xxx"i[2] Jo spped
In the Resolutioni[3] issued on June 16, 1999, this Third Division referred
the Complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
On September 22, 1999, Executive Judge Perlita J. Tria Tirona sent in the
following Report and Recommendation, to wit:
"Complainant alleged that: on September 4, 1997, he filed a
motion praying that his client Meriam V. Colapo accused in
a BP 22 case then pending in Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 34, Quezon City, presided over at that time by
respondent, be allowed to post bail for her provisional
liberty. Respondent before acting on the Motion allegedly
talked to the accused and ordered her to replace her counsel,
herein complainant, with Atty. Puhawan from PALAO,
Quezon City. Accused Colapo informed him of this incident
and told him she was terminating his services pursuant to the
instructions of the respondent.
In deference to his clients wishes, complainant filed a
Notice of Withdrawal of his appearance with his clients
(Colapos) conformity. Spped jo
According to complainant, he could not think of any reason
for respondent to order his client to replace him.
On cross examination, complainant stated that he worked
with the Public Attorneys Office for seven (7) to eight (8)
years. He resigned in 1995. Complainants wife used to be
an officemate of respondent at the Public Attorneys Office
in Makati in 1988.
Complainant admitted that his client Colapo was referred to
him by Atty. Sia, his friend, who is with the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO) where he used to work. He is aware
of the PAO/PALAO policy not to represent any person
charged with BP 22. Complainant likewise admitted that he
filed his notice of withdrawal on the basis of what his client
Colapo told him. However, he did not confront the
respondent about it. He believed his client because she was
agitated. According to his client Colapo, respondent
recommended Atty. Puhawan and he right away filed his
withdrawal as counsel.
At first, complainant stated that the affidavit of his client
Colapo was prepared by the Notary Public Lino Soriano.
Then he stated that he assisted her in the preparation of the
same.
Complainant further alleged that it was also on September 5,
1997 (when his clients bond was approved) that Colapo
informed him that respondent wanted him changed as
counsel.
However, in his Notice of Withdrawal as counsel which he
filed in Court, he stated that he was informed by his client
Colapo on September 7, 1997, which complainant again
claims to be a typographical error.
Complainant further admitted that his Notice of Withdrawal
was with the conformity of his client Colapo.
No other witness was presented by the complainant.
Respondent Judge Bellosillo, testified that he does not
personally know Miriam [sic] Colapo. He first met her when
she appeared before him in his Court for the approval of her
bail bond. She was allowed to post bail on the basis of the
manifestation filed by her counsel on record, complainant
Atty. Napoleon S. Valenzuela. At that time she was
notassisted [sic] by her counsel (complainant was absent) but
he (respondent) allowed her just the same to post bail
because according to him he personally knows Colapos
counsel complainant Atty. Valenzuela.
Respondent further stated that when he inquired from Ms.
Colapo where her lawyer was, Ms. Colapo, in a very
disappointing mood said that she was going to change her
counsel because she did not like the idea of paying
somebody who could not appear for her at the time she
needed him most. Later on he was informed of the notice of
withdrawal filed by complainant Napoleon Valenzuela with
the conformity of his client Colapo. He did not bother to
read the withdrawal anymore because anyway it contained
the conformity of his client Colapo. It was only when he
received the 1st indorsement of the Court Administrator
which contained the complaint and the annexes to the
complaint of Atty. Valenzuela that he came to read the
notice of withdrawal. Had he read the notice of withdrawal
earlier, he could have called them for a conference, and
confront both of them, considering that the information
given to him (complainant) by Colapo is different from what
appeared in the notice of withdrawal as counsel, filed by
herein complainant. Respondent likewise stated that in all
honesty and good faith, he honored the entry of appearance
of the new counsel and dismissed the case against Ms.
Colapo on the basis of the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
the complaining witness in the case against Colapo. Miso
On cross examination, respondent admitted that he talked to
accused Colapo before he approved the bail, who was then
not assisted by her counsel, to find out if she is the one who
appears in the picture attached to the bail bond, and to
inform her of her undertaking under the bail, and when he
inquired from Colapo where her lawyer was, she answered
in a very disappointed manner that she was going to change
her counsel because she did not like the idea of paying
somebody who could not represent her at the time she
needed him most and because of the fact that she was
referred to one Atty. Sia of the PAO Office who in turn
referred her (Colapo) to complainant who allegedly charged
her (complainant) so much for the preparation of the
manifestation.
Respondent likewise denied that he ever referred Ms.
Colapo, complainants client to the PALAO knowing fully
well that the PALAO does not represent an accused in a BP
22 case. Besides, according to respondent, it was none of his
business whether Colapo would want to change her counsel.
He (respondent) stated that he is not aware whether Atty.
Gusapos, the lawyer who replaced the complainant, is a
PALAO lawyer since he used his private or residential
address when he entered his appearance."
Prescinding from the foregoing, Judge Tirona concluded:
"The undersigned finds the evidence adduced by the
complainant insufficient to substantiate his charges against
respondent Judge Bellosillo.
The basis of complainants complaint is the affidavit of his
client Meriam Colapo to the effect that respondent Judge
suggested to her (Meriam Colapo) that she should change
her counsel (herein complainant), and that respondent
recommended Atty. Puhawan of the PALAO.
However, Meriam Colapo was not presented by complainant
to testify because she is presently in Brunei. While
complainant claims that Meriam Colapo is willing to testify,
said willingness is not sufficient to lend credence to the
present charge since respondent has every right to cross
examine said witness.
It should likewise be noted that the lawyer who replaced
complainant as counsel for Meriam Colapo was not Atty.
Puhawan, the lawyer allegedly suggested by respondent but
one Atty. Gusapos allegedly of the PALAO, although no
evidence was presented by complainant to show that indeed
Atty. Gusapos is also with PALAO notwithstanding the fact
that he promised to submit a certification from PALAO that
Atty. Gusapos is indeed an employee of said office. Nex
old
If Meriam Colapo has to discharge complainant as allegedly
suggested by respondent so as not to antagonize said
respondent judge, why did they not engage the services of
Atty. Puhawan, the lawyer allegedly suggested by
respondent to take complainants place as counsel?
On the other hand, respondent in denying the charge, stated
that he could not have even suggested Atty. Puhawan of
PALAO to take complainants place as counsel since
PALAO lawyers are not allowed to represent an accused in a
BP 22 case.
Besides, even complainant himself could see no reason why
respondent would suggest to Meriam Colapo to change
complainant as counsel and instead to engage the services of
Atty. Puhawan.
Thus, the only evidence of the complainant, which is the
Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, cannot be the basis of
a finding of guilt even in an administrative case.
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the charges against respondent Judge
Reynaldo B. Bellosillo be dismissed for lack of evidence."
All the facts of the case studiedly considered, with a thorough evaluation of
the records on hand, the Court finds merit in the findings and
recommendations of Executive Judge Tirona, absent any discernible basis for
adjudging respondent Judge Bellosillo liable under the premises.
Apart from his testimony and affidavit-complaint, complainant did not
adduce enough evidence to prove his charges. He did not even present his
primary witness, Meriam Colapo, to support the charge that respondent
Judge Bellosillo pressured the latter to replace him as defense counsel. The
affidaviti[4] of Meriam Colapo cannot be given credence and is inadmissible
without the said affiant placed on the witness stand to give the respondent
Judge an opportunity to test the veracity of affiants allegations.i[5] An
affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented for cross-examination.i[6]
Mani kx
Sans the testimony of witness Meriam Colapo, to corroborate complainants
allegations and submission, the case against the respondent judge cannot
prosper. The employment or profession of a person is a property right within
the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.i[7] Respondent judge
cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without
affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo;
otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Complaint at bar against
respondent Judge Reynaldo Blanco Bellosillo is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents.
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast
and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against
oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights
which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether
to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad
duties under a treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as
the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons
Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded
on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern
for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the
state where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the
Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter into
similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said
treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America"
(hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way
of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said
treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents
accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal
diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department
of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of
arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and
other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers
submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with
violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each
count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-
three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating
and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case
pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the
panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition
request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the
"official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached
to the request and that there are some other matters that needed to be
addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private
respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to
petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested
that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a
copy of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after
receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his
request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-
letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August
4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition
request and supporting documents from the United States
Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law.
Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the
United States enumerates the documentary requirements and
establishes the procedures under which the documents submitted
shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements
under our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No.
1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is
not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation
of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied
with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not
available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the
person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with
copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this
Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time
to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains
grand jury information and documents obtained through grand jury
process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The
United States had to secure orders from the concerned District
Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury
information to Philippine government and law enforcement
personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further
disclosure of the said information is not authorized by the United
States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the
United States Government requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This
Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine
Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department
of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign
governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a
party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith".
Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective,
requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons
must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a
petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to
compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition
documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to
comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the
request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner
from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition
petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of
private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp.
104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and
thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila
which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999.
Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample
time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous
day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely:
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or
representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from
committing the acts complained of; from conducting further
proceedings in connection with the request of the United States
Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the
corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the
United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on
respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997
Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the
preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties
herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The
respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written comment
and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or
before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM
COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST
FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE
OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND
FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY
TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE
REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
IN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO
CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE
MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM
PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION
TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND
PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
 PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT
NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT
SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his
comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order
(TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until
further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C.
Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting
in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST
from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by
public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the
parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive
issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive
arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the
pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is
private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at
the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which are substantially the
same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the
immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999,
thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the
extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the
event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights
at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement
constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the
Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming
that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict between private
respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go
directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral
procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-
94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of
the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-
US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994,
ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a
charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State,
addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the
warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the Requesting State
having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the
fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the accused, his
whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the time and place of the commission of these
acts;
 3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of
said law, and the designation or description of the offense by the law,
sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the
request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant
treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the
related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately
designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority
given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting
documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of
this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is
supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which
describe the identity and probable location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history
of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential
elements of the offense for which extradition is requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for
the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit
on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in
paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State,
would provide probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if
the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other
competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that
the accompanying documents received in support of the request had been
certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested
State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S.
Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign
Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition
shall not be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State
determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a
military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition
request and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and
substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge
of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated
shall then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the
province or city, with a prayer that the court take the extradition request
under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for
extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the
prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and
hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears
that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to
prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition
proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless,
Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the
extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as
practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings,
shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that the
attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting
State, represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the
extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence
of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision
is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and
immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of
Court governing appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply
in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to file
brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the
petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule
and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which
extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the
following query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the
Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the
Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all
the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition
papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the
Treaty, to determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or
that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-
military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1],
Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial
duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear
that there was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the
Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less
than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request,
apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of
thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The
statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that
his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which
reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice,
indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in
taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took
it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate
the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements laid down in
the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner
ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no
obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to
go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August
31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private
respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request
and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having
a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in
support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in
abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and
authority, one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission.
The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor
General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its
own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the
extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to participate in the
process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the
Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request
and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that
the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The
Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately
review the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of
attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his undersecretary, in less
than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs
to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is
also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At
such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b)
to outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting
documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a
determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the
offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3],
Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be
characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a
proceeding conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-
judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and
evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence
presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts
proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198,
citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is
also known as examining or investigatory power, is one or the determinative
powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its
quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).
This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and
premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under
its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means
or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of
documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing
evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agency's
performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably,
investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had
occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole
power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is
limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The
Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication
signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts
and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make
a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of
judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body
authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to
adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State
and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the
papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore,
sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus
merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or
not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The
body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition
petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the
evaluation procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it
sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may
result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the
prospective extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so
because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may
request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of
the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall
be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted
(Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of
20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the
provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the Requested State,
the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not,
subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty),
for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the
purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested
State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree
No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as
early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his
liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation
process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such
technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described
by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78,
Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of
a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain
constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral
arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had
been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to
counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135;
Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335;
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held
that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the
1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions,
extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is
charged with immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to
practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal
vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's
license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than
forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained
wealth against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or
the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may
result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are deemed
criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There
is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where
the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to determine
whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute
such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the
criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil
in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is
meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer
for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of
one's property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the
case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which,
based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second
only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited
property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is
irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person
to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the
criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation
procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may
have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the
person charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a
preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an information
against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation
of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992])
(p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece
of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken.
Wright is not authority for petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary
processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of
a treaty in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition
against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of the right
to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal
proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or
custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in
furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserved these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law"
(Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process
requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the
suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the
same time, both States accord common due process protection to their
respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not
only worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more
importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have
expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and
impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient
character which make them capable of meeting every modern problem, and
their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due
process are interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not
denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this
effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts
instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the
decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).
Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"
(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs. City Mayor of
Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process
which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which
consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee
of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional
Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and
hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in
administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will
invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any
pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the position of the
opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory
proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the
respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a
copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and
the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within
ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right
to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain
instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action,
like the summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil
Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B.P.
Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing
obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats
to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a
person sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is,
where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person
affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a
delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee;
and
 3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to
exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked:
Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the
described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings
which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the
U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or
extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution
(Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate
rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to
deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the
implementing statute are given a liberal construction to carry out their
manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of
persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime
(31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all
the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on
the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in
the demanding state at the time the offense charged was committed, and that
the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or
magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with
the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and
documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the
instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an
indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements
with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said
papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the
asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision
requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or
judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments accompanying the
demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his
attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been
held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte
Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324,
S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the
presentation to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition
or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the
particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation
(31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto
a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and
principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and
judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic
channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial arrest of an
individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of
Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event
of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted
subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine
extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the
Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that
under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are
covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the
documents have been authenticated in accordance with the federal
statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition
hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or
magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence
offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person
arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court must also
determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and
jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought
for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and
 (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person
sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify
extraditability after having received a "complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in
the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted
that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary
examination before a committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the
guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are
present, it incorporates its determinations in factual findings and
conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The
court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the
Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The
ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the
Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions
concerning the motives of the requesting government in seeking his
extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State,
who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition
begins and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the
power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning,
and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on
the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the
Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of
the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier mentioned (see
pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the
Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over
the request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of
evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing,
and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S.
Government should the person sought to be extradited be given due process
rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that
petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court
ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance
in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the
Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular,
that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy
that may characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and
perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine
Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills
of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is
sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where
the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also
necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with
the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral
conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right
 (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of
criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the
surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair
procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash
in discord. Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a
disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At
that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word.
Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of
the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled
to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the
extradition papers, he may hold that federal and statutory requirements,
which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819).
Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the
requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the
Department of Justice for the filing of the extradition petition since non-
compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government
with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted
notable efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and
the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in
the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the
official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In
fact, petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to
take place between the lawyers in his Department and those from the U.S.
Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which
cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its
intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently
necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be
dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of
administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right
to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the
peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one
hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an
administrative if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate
incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the
extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential
Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the
extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation
proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty
and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and
manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process
cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent
likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to
citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of
public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records
documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to
information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of
access to official records is likewise conferred. These cognate or related
rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The
1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the
premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-
request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing
provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of
public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the
distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are
of purely private interest only becomes material when a third person, who is
not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to
information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly
speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental
process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any
citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action
because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him
some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be
notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to
information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal
proceeding, he invokes Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information
within the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be
contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to
official government action from the U.S. Government. No official action
from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some
relation to matters of foreign relations with the U.S. Government.
Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating
that the extradition papers are matters of public concern since they may result
in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted,
at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper
functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the
extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern,
because our government by then shall have already made an official decision
to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be
forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal
duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between
the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to
pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves
only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to
private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental
maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their
agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties
under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution
which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the and land
no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or
local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the observance of the
Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz,
Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal
law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101
Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga
& Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international
law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international
law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes
effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In
states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and
municipal or national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of
the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose
which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No.
1069, as regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the procedures earlier
abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing
are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the
law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures
also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights.
Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical
assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting
documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair
play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the
Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective
extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition
pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as
explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of
the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he
does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35
C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine
Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.
Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel
of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by
petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage
would be obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the
U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of certain grand
jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy
cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during
trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law,
as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any
prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings.
We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by
analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process
and a preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest
of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a
provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law
(Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No.
1069). Following petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its
availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the
Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ or habeas corpus
shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the
public safety requires it"? Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not
available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition
petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069
does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. .
." Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of
a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in
the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due
process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side
or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained
of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA
457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs.
NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602
[1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due
process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona
vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]).
This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in
the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State
may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its
commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not
be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit
ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance
System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National
Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary
proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the
Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with
Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its Powers and Functions and for
Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal
Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be
charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary
System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and
for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although
summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal
investigation, the minimum requirements of due process still operate. As held
in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is
saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even
without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear
to us that an employee must be informed of the charges preferred
against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so
informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against
him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot
dispense with and still remain consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that
the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must
have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is
to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to
present evidence in support of his defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we
upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present
danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may
eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence
of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation
of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is
aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements
(Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-
Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue
in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since
private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or
by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to
the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees
against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing
currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of
freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to
grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been
rendered moot and academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., I join Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissent.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., please see my dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., I join the dissents of Puno and Panganiban, JJ.
Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.
Pardo, J., I join J. Puno & J. Panganiban.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., I join the dissent of Justices Puno & Panganiban.
Ynares-Santiago, J., please see separate concurring opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, Presiding Judge Regional Trial
Court of Manila and
MARC JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARCIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondent
Davide Jr., CJ, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Morales and Callejo, Sr.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and
hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are
they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions
is "No." The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to,
this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 1 and July 3,
2001 2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The
first assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of
a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a
warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion
of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds
probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a
Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and
taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail
for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php
1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this
Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is
likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold
Departure List." 4
Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the
cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice
v. Ralph C. Lantion. 5
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine
Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by
Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as
Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the
secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was
granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila,
Branch 25. 7 The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing
with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR
No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition.
The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. 8
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued
its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three
justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier
Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18,
2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as
Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez
was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been
issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281
CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain
offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in
violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and
437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate
arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it
an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioners
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez
and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance
of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative
prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. 11 After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional
liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001. 12
Hence, this Petition. 13
Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential
extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to
go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the
absence of any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987
Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the
Rules of Court, as amended, which [were] relied upon,
 cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition
proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition
proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not
a matter of right but only of discretion upon clear showing
by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition
proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of
special circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special
circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief
that he will not flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual
and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its
obligations under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May
10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs.
The Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-
G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in
granting bail, had been recalled before the issuance of the
subject bail orders." 14
In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether
Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while
the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the
alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners
failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in
the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court. 15 We shall also
preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in
disposing of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: "(1) the issues were fully
considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda and position papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders
are a patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need
for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give
Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues
raised are purely of law." 16
For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the
following reasons: "(1) even if the petition is lodged with the Court of
Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides
them, the parties would still bring the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all
lower courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one
case 17 ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below refused to
recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise
adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending issues on bail
both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided
by the decision that this Honorable Court will render in this case, would
resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would give them
opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the
Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extradition treaties."
18
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not
prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,
though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law, (2)
when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency. 19 As a fourth
exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua
non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been
squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. 20 Aside
from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special and important
reasons therefor. 21 In Fortich v. Corona 22 we stated:
[T]he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take
cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant.
This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been
reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,
Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs.
Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy.
x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary
jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice
and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x x
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of
Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests
of justice is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said
in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals: 23
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted
a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests
of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy
disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by
the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases, 24 we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional
Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we
entertain direct resort to us in cases where special and important
reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
same."
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of
bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the
present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over
which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or
construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the
interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. 25
Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition
treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory, 26 understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised
here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of
suppressing crime 27 by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer 28 of a fugitive 29 from one state to the other.
 With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the
flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the
purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become
more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their
methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend
international boundaries.
Today, "a majority of nations in the world community have come to
look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of
international co-operation in the suppression of crime." 30 It is the
only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the
jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with
municipal and international law. 31
An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the
principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction
competent to try and punish them is that the number of
criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the
extent that efficient means of detection and the threat of
punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime
within the territorial limits of a State, so the existence of
effective extradition arrangements and the consequent
certainty of return to the locus delicti commissi play a
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order
to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence
of extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious
criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly
does the commission of crime itself." 32
In Secretary v. Lantion 33 we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing
crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons
covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and
more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws
involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing
universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities
threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the
great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible
movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially
transnational crimes."
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and
an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to
be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to
improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and
judicial process. 34 More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited. 35 That signature signifies our full faith that the
accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant
and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein;
otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been
directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 36 extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the
constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui
generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not.
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of
extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
 There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a
criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature
while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an
extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less
stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing
of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal
case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final,
in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite
him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the
Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities
of the case and the demands of the nations foreign relations before
making the ultimate decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon
to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. 37
Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in
needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of
international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to enter into
questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. 38 The ultimate purpose
of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. 39
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national
interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40
with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations
thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community.
Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. 41
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our
obligations under the Treaty. 42 This principle requires that we deliver the
accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition,
as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding
government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do,
is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant,
and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender." 43
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima
facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience 44 of the executive
branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not
flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition
to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought
to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed,
extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing
to submit to trial in the requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent -
- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning
that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes
in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost.
These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight.
He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled
once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a
second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the
accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition Petition has been filed
against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to
escape and to avoid extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such
procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be
extradited -- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may
invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be
hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without
due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule
setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after
the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of
that procedure is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It
states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service
of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the
accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour
fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest
of the accused which may be served any where within the
Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends
of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after
having received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed,
the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the
hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if
issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and the
attorney having charge of the case." (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately
setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? We rule in the
negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses
the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification
would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, 46 receiving
facts and arguments 47 from them, 48 and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the word
as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of
urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected
to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual
situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge
and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a
good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication
among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on
May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign
Financing Task Force of the Criminal Division of the US Department of
Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that
constituted evidence of the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1
to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes
charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I "Appendix of
Witness [excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Angela Byers"
and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J "Table
of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary Appendix" with enclosed Exhibits
121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L "Appendix of Witness
[excerpts] Statements Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward" and
enclosed Statements in two volumes. 49
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression
from these records adequate for him to make an initial determination of
whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in
order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether
such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie
meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these supporting
documents that "probable cause" did exist. In the second questioned Order,
he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in
support of [its] request for extradition of herein respondent are
enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to
proceed with the hearing against the extraditee." 50
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the
petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from
the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion
of Jimenez. 51
Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the
answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons.
In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word
"hearing" is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of
a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided.
It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary 52 in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to
the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with
a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something
reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally recognized
principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations
towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a treaty is
ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the
unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x x ." 53
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a
notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future
date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape.
Neither the Treaty nor the Law could have
intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been
defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation
-- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of
arrest.
In Ho v. People 54 and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge
required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of
personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
All we required was that the "judge must have sufficient supporting
documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very
least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence
of probable cause." 55
In Webb v. De Leon, 56 the Court categorically stated that a judge was not
supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely
determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally
 review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence."
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely
further examine complainants and their witnesses. 57 In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing
the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the
rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and
necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest,
what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this
stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-
blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action
is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective
of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more
restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of
respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the
proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is
extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may
require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine
the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding 58 is possible, the petition may be
dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then
the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant,
the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency
of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate
the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the
ends of justice" in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision
secures the right to bail of all persons, including those sought to be
extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4 59 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent
with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the
Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the
subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction,"
the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt." 60 It follows that the constitutional
provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion." 61 Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision
on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in
the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the
offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti 62 in arguing that,
constitutionally, "[n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x without due
process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard 63 but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the
circumstances -- such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the
extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no
violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the
immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest
and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs
filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law
and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie
determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under
the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail
rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the
extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that
country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before
those proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with
the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the
risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez
his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for
Extradition? His supposed immediate deprivation of liberty without the due
process that he had previously shunned pales against the governments
interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with
the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed, "[c]onstitutional
liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to
individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable
government interests." 66
Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and
weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to
run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of
violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively
liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or
escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the
Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail
in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as
a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to
the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.1wphi1.nt
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place
with and gives life to Article 14 67 of the Treaty, since this practice would
encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut
short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for
their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.
However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion 68 and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect
and enforce constitutional rights. 69 Furthermore, we believe that the right to
due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the "life, liberty or
property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every
situation calling for its application." 70
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold
that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody
of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a
clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances 71 including, as a matter
of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with
clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising
from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest
concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states, which is
not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into
the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, so that the vital
international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably
impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of "the
sporting idea of fair play," it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that
are compelling enough for the Court to grant his request for provisional
release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall
now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a
member of the House of Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his
detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are
not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos, 72 the Court has already debunked the
disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if
voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a
terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no
longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question
of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of laws. This simply means that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor
prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that
allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner
from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from]
prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant
is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency
of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular
duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its
exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling
under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to
save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective
governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against
groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
those belonging to the same class." 73
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a
congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the
United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or
should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are
constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition
proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him during the
pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that
extradition cases are summary in nature. They are resorted to merely to
determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the
Extradition Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a
rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights available
to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly
delay the proceedings. This is quite another matter that is not at issue here.
Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and
academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the
more reason would the grant of bail not be justified. Giving premium to
delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would
be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he
stresses that he learned of the extradition request in June 1999; yet, he has
not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary
stages of the request for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as
he hears the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and
closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean
that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for
Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial
court at anytime after the applicant has been taken into custody and prior to
judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the
extradition court may continue hearing evidence on the application for bail,
which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is
totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties -- in particular,
Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity
both by the trial court and this Court to discuss fully and exhaustively private
respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not
only petitioners application for an arrest warrant, but also private
respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC
were memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for
bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the
Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers of both parties.
Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not
normally observed in the great majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover,
after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential
extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled
"Manifestations" by both parties and "Counter-Manifestation" by private
respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its
entirety. The trial court would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be
it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal
propositions, private respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even
he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual matters. Indeed,
the inadequacy lies not in the factual presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it
lies in his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack
of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring,
Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the learned justices themselves
-- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant
questions in this case. Thus, a remand will not serve any useful purpose; it
will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings, 74 which our
Extradition Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is
prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is
needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly "disregarding
basic freedoms when a case is one of extradition." We believe that this
charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length
and breath, this Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due
process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten
points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine
whether the request expressed in the petition, supported by its
annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of
the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are
intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing the accused
-- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so
that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to
have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of the legal and
judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the
pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a
criminal case in which guilt or innocence is determined.
Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is
more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the
arrest of the accused who is at large or has escaped detention or
jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting
state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person
would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its
supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie finding
whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it
complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to
require the petitioner to submit further documentation, or to
personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a
prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for
the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to
answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the
burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the
community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling
circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the
requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered,
under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In
extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to
fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due
to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the hearings on
the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of
extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a
bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience of
society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority
and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal
and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a
judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty
and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and
exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and
tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and "over-due
process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition
proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international
embarrassment due to our inability to comply in good faith with a
treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our
country should not be converted into a dubious haven where
fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock,
frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest for bilateral justice and
international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all
deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid
the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate
that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated
May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged
Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to
Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is
CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the
extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the
spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as
our Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ,
Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent
Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are:
(1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz,
private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002
denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by
the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented
by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition
alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision
in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China
and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap.
201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On
August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against
him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for
each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department
of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ
then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for
the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of
Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested
and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning
the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring
the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition
of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private
respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733,
raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his
part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which
was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting
bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further
hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided
by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent
judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to
post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of
civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues
raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors
handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any
time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before
this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal,
be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused
flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above
Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10,
2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution
or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right
to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged
deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall
not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to
resolve the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available
only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction
or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence
in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case.
However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international
law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2)
the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human
rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to
balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on
the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject
of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically
eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle
of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of
war, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the
Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These
significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights.
Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty
and all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While
not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this
Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law
of the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights."
The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting
the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those
detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order
their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies
which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the
various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this
Courts ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an
individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our
eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in
criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of
the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human
rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese
facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of
registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the
prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To
refuse him bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal
proceeding, some of the machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law."
Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal
criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality
of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied
upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees
right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the
person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of
the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every
individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from
the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the
execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other
state to surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition
proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis,
tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11
It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of
extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which
mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused"
if such "will best serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section
20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the
"provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for
extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-
arrest and extradition of the accused if a request for extradition is received
subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears
all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected
to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be
a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.
Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999,
and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court
ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for
over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a
motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as
that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is
premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganan
correctly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose
of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest
warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the
potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a
fugitive from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus
bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and
should be granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the
Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose
of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore,
deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence
used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing
our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice,
now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.
The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that
he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on
the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should
order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and
thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice