CURRENT HISTORY:: December 2007 BISLIOTECA 2S CIE CIEE aay i OCIA! “In Iraq itself, the unintended consequences of the war have been worse even than Turkey’ alienation and fran’ triumph.” After Iraq: Picking up the Pieces PETER W. GALBRAITH any of the consequences of the Iraq War ME a common feature: They are cata- strophic for Us interests. Consider Turkey, Iran, and Iraq itself. Attacks by Kurdish rebels hid- ing in northern Iraq have left Turkey, a NATO ally and erstwhile close friend of the United States, furious with Washington. The Turkish parliament recently voted to authorize cross-border operations into Iraq, a dangerous prospect. Meanwhile, the triumph of Shiites in Iraq has left the cletics who rule neigh- boring Iran with enhanced influence in the region and a strategic victory that they never could have imagined the United States would hand them. As for Iraq, it temains violent and ungovernable, while the administration of George W. Bush persists in trying, to reassemble a country that no longer can cohere TURNABOUT IN TURKEY AND IRAN Turkey, a Muslim and historically pro-Western nation, is the third-most populous member of the Nato alliance, after the United States and Ger- many. It was a key American partner in the cold war, proximate as it was to the Soviet Union. Bor- dering Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Caucasus, and the Bal- kans, Turkey remains an important player in one of the most volatile and geostrategically significant parts of the world. In 2000, the last full year of Bill Clinton's presidency, the United States was viewed favorably by 60 percent of Turks. A recent survey conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project indicates that, thanks to President Bush and his policies, 9 percent of Turks now view the United States favorably while 83 percent disapprove. ‘Some of Bush's critics may derive momentary satisfaction in thinking the administration is get- PETER W. GALBRAITH, a former US ambassador to Croatia, is ‘the author of The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (Simon 6 Schuster, 2006). 403 ting what it deserves. But the fact that the president of the United States, and indeed America itself, are held in such low regard by a key ally in a critical region surely constitutes a strategic disaster. Practi- cal ramifications already are evident. This fall the Turkish government amassed troops along the Iraqi border. On October 17, as noted, the parliament voted overwhelmingly to allow the military to invade northern Iraq to hunt Kurdish separatists, based in Iraqi Kurdistan, who have been launching guerrilla attacks against Turks. If Turkey is provoked enough to catry out such an operation, it could end up destabilizing Iraq’ ‘one successful area, the one area that has turned out the way the Bush administration hoped all of Iraq would turn out. The Turkish military, many of ‘whose members no longer trust the United States, strongly favors crossing into Iraq, This is obviously a stick in the eye for Bush, since Iraq remains the signature project of his presidency. But it is also a body blow to the US-Turkish alliance, since there are 160,000 American troops already stretched to the breaking point by the fighting in other parts of Iraq, For Turkey even to contemplate such a move would have been inconceivable seven years ago. With regard to iran, it is worth considering President Bush’ latest justification for continuing the war in Iraq. In an August 2007 speech to the Americar Legion, Bush said: “For all those who ask whether the fight in Iraq is worth it, imagine an iraq where militia groups backed by Iran con- rol large parts of the country.” But why imagine this? A militia supported by Iran in fact already controls large parts of Iraq. This militia, the Badr Corps, is also the dominant force in the Iraqi army. ‘The Badr Corps was created by the Supreme Coun- cil for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SciRt), which changed its name this May to the Supreme Istamic Iraqi Council (SiC). stic is today the largest Shi- AL iAS i404 + CURRENT HISTORY * December 2007 ite party in Iraq. And it was founded in Tehran, by none other than Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini Likewise the Badr Corps was established, funded, armed, trained, and officered by the Iranians. In the spring of 2003, because the United States invaded Iraq without a plan for providing either security or effective administration of the country after defeating Saddam Hussein, the Badr Corps was easily able to infiltrate Iraq. It took over security in much of the Shiite south while sci, its politi- cal affiliate, seized de facto political control of the region, along with parts of Baghdad. Then the US ‘occupation authority appointed Badr Corps leaders 10 top positions in the Iraqi army and police, and installed Scint political operatives in key adminis- trative posts in southern Iraq and the capital. Thus, the very adverse consequence of failure in Iraq that President Bush now cites to justify continued occu- pation—that is, the empowerment of Iran and the takeover of large parts of the country by pro-Iranian militia groups—is a conse- quence Washington itself haas facilitated. Today the Bush adminis- tration supports sic, along with its militia, And rightly so, because the most pro- Iranian faction in Iraq is preferable to the other Shi- ite alternative: the firebrand cleric Moktada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army. Sadr’s and his militia’ political appeal is based on Iraqi nationalism. He calls the sitc leaders “Persians” and emphasizes his own Arab roots. He, like the Bush administration, wants to keep Iraq intact. Yet Sadr is vehemently anti-Ameri- can; his militia has in the past engaged in attacks on American troops Iran’ allies, in short, are not the Mahdi Army; they are the militiamen and political operatives whom the United States installed in Iraq's secu- rity forces and helped to become important play- ers in Iraq’ government. Indeed, the government, in Baghdad has quietly signed military coopera- tion agreements with Tehran. These have not been implemented yet, for the simple reason that the Iranians see no reason to provide support now for a Shiite-dominated Iraqi army that is receiving tens of billions of dollars in assistance from America THE BROKEN NATION In Iraq itself, the unintended consequences of the war have been worse even than Turkey's alien- ation and Iran’ triumph. The war was intended to The question is whether it will be a two-state or a three-state solution, and whether it occurs at a time and in a manner that minimizes violence. transform Iraq into a democracy that would serve as a beacon in the Middle East, by example sub- verting the region's authoritarian regimes. The war’ architects hoped the first domino to fall might be Syria, followed by Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with Iraq liberation having the same effect in the Middle East as events in Poland and Hungary in 1989 had in Eastern Europe. They believed all of this, moreover, would come easily. The United States would send a relatively light force into Iraq, quickly remove Hussein, and be largely out in a matter of months. That, of course, is not what happened. Iraq has broken up. Its Sunni and Shiite Muslims are engaged in a civil war. And the United States, which had intended to draw down to 20,000 or 30,000 troops six months after the invasion, has instead—more than four and a half years after the invasion—increased its deployment by 20,000 to 30,000 troops, as part of the so-called surge. The us surge has been accompanied, at least recently, by a genuine and significant improvement in security in areas policed by American forces. Both Iraqi and American military casualties have declined. Yet the question remains: What happens when the United States withdraws? ‘The surge was supposed to enable political recon- ciliation in Baghdad and precede Iraqi forces’ assum- ing more responsibility for security. Neither of these outcomes has occurred. In the case of the security forces, the problem is simple. Much of the discourse about Iraq in the United States, even among critics of the war, seems to assume that the composition of the security forces somehow is not Shiite or Sunni or Kurdish, but Iraqi. In fact, the security forces are ‘more sectarian than the population, Many in the ammy and police come from militias; many are foot soldiers or in some cases officers of political move- ments. They are mostly Shiite, and they are clearly sectarian. While the US military can train them to be more effective fighters, it cannot train them to be Iraqis—-that is, loyal to an inclusive Iraq. The reality is that no Iraqi security unit in mixed areas of the country is trusted by both Sunnis and Shi- ites. There is every reason to believe, therefore, that once US forces withdraw, the civil war will escalate. While violence has declined in recent months, it has dropped only to the intolerably high 2006 levels. Iraq is by no means a normal country.On the political side, the idea behind the us surge was that it would buy breathing space for the Iraqi government to implement a series of steps toward national reconciliation, referred to as “benchmarks.” These include a law that would allow some former members of Hussein’: Baath Party to return to their jobs, constitutional changes, provincial elections, and a law govern- ing the sharing of oil revenues. Not one of these benchmarks has been reached Many Americans, including critics of the war, think of Iraq's political leaders as especially frac tious, unwilling to compromise, and pethaps lazy (the parliaments summer break while the US surge was under way did not go over well in the United States). In fact, the reason the politicians cannot agree is that they are the elected representatives of their constituents, and their constituents do not share a common vision of Iraq IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES The differences among the visions of the nation are not small. Ninety percent of the Shiite Arabs have voted for Shiite religious parties. Their basic agenda assumes that the Shiites, by virtue of their majority, are entitled to rule and define Iraq as a Shiite state. The Sunni Arabs, some 20 percent of the population, ruled Iraq from its founding after the First World War until 2003. Plenty of Sun- nis hated Hussein, but no Surmis can accept that, the country they created should be defined by a branch of Istam that is not theirs. Consider how Protestants in the United States might react, even. if they are not particularly religious, if the US gov- ernment were to declare America a Catholic state. ‘Whaat is more, the Sunnis cannot accept that those who rule Iraq, though democratically elected, are aligned with the country that they regard as their nation’s number one enemy: Iran. The Kurds’ vision of Iraq is of a country that does not include them. In a 2005 referendum, 98.5, percent of them voted for an independent Kurdis- tan. Their leaders negotiated an Iraqi constitution that creates a virtually powerless central govern- ment and gives Kurdistan all the trappings of an independent state, except international recog- nition. Kurdistan has its own army, its own flag, and its own governmental institutions, including a president and prime minister. The Iraqi govern- ment is not present in Kurdistan. The Iraqi army, along with the Iraqi flag, is banned. The Kurds’ agenda is essentially to keep what they have, which isa de facto independent state. Alfer rag: Picking up the Pieces * 405 Under these circumstances, in which the differ- ent parties have such diametrically opposed visions of the country, it is very hard to come together on benchmarks. Consider the Baath Party problem. Following a spectacularly ill-advised us decree, civil servants, teachers, doctors, and many others who had been members of the Baath Party were sacked from public service early in the American occupation. The Sunnis want a law allowing them to get their jobs back. But the Shiites look at the Baath Party the way Jews look at the Nazi Party. In most cases it is intensely personal. The sc leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, for example, lives with the knowledge that Hussein and his Baath Party murdered eight of his brothers. His ninth brother, Ayatollah Muhammad Bakr al-Hakim, was the leader of sciri until August 2003. He was killed when Sunni militants detonated a car bomb out- side Najaf's golden-domed shrine of Imam Ali, one of Shiite Islam’s holiest sites. Sadr, the rival Shiite leader, has a similar family history. His father and brothers were killed by Hussein in 1999. His uncle and father-in-law (one and the same person), a revered Grand Ayatollah, was arrested in 1980 and forced to watch while Baath Party men raped his sis- tet. The Baathists then set his beard on fire before killing him by driving nails into his head. Ordinary Shiites have experienced comparable atrocities. An estimated 100,000 of them were killed between March and September 1991. It is understandable that the Shiites would resist restoring respected positions and legitimacy to former Baathists. ‘An agreement on sharing oil revenues also has proved problematic. The Kurds, while prepared to share oil revenues, are not willing to allow the allo- cation to go through the Iraqi parliament, because they do not trust any of Iraq central institutions. The Kurds want their share of oil revenues auto- matically transferred to them from Iraq’ account at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. The Iraqi Arabs (this is one issue about which the Sunnis and Shiites agree) insist chat the revenues go through the central government’ budget and appropriation process. In short, Iraq's politicians cannot achieve the benchmarks because there is no trust among the country’s three communities, and there is no way the United States can create that trust WHAT REMAINS ACHIEVABLE What should be done? As long as the Us mis- sion in Iraq is to create, as President Bush says, a democratic, stable, and unified nation, the Ameri- cans will be there forever. The United States unin-406 * CURRENT HISTORY * December 2007 tentionally broke up Iraq in 2003 when it deposed Hussein, dissolved the Sunni-led army, and allowed looters to destroy the Sunni-dominated government administration (there were no offices to return to). Us Administrator L. Paul Bremer III delivered the coup de grace when he formally dissolved the Baath Party, the military, and the intelligence services and banned many Baathists from high positions. By taking these steps, the United States eliminated the institutions that had held Iraq together. 1t was hardly surprising that the country fell apart. Now there is no feasible way to put it back together. Nor, as a matter of equity, should Iraq be reassembled. Why, after all, should the Kurds be forced to live in a country that they hate? 1 have never met a Kurd—including those among, the top Iraqi leadership—who prefers a unified Iraq to an independent Kurdistan, As a moral matter, why are Kurds less entitled to self- determination than Lithuanians or Esto- nians or Croatians? There are practi- cal considerations that argue against an immediate breakup of Iraq, and certainly against immediate Kurdish independence. But as a goal, trying to force people to be part of a country they do not want, to assume an identity they do not share, does not make sense. The best option now is for the United States to accept what has happened in \raq, to give up the goal of nation building— which in any case it is incapable of achieving—and focus on missions that can be accomplished. A uni- fied and democratic Iraq is not one of them. Three things can be accomplished. First is the protection of Kurdistan—the one stable, success- ful, pro-Western pari of Iraq, an independent com- munity that aspires to be democratic. Second is the continued disruption of Sunni insurgents and for- eign jihadists who claim affiliation with Al Qaeda. Third is limiting the influence of Iran. President Bush's strategic gift to Iran cannot be taken back. But the United States can help limit Iran’s influence to the southern half of Iraq and the Shiite neigh- bothoods of Baghdad ‘TWO STATES OR THREE? The way to achieve these goals is to maintain a small Us force in Kurdistan as part of an exit strat- egy from the rest of Iraq. Such a force would serve as a deterrent to meddling in Kurdistan by Iran and As long as the US mission in Iraq is to create a democratic, stable, and unified nation, the Americans will be there forever. Turkey and, for that matter, Arab Iraq. It would discharge a moral debt that Americans owe the Kurds, who fought on the Us side in the 2003 war and are at risk for having done so. From bases in Kurdistan, the United States would be in a position to move against Al Qaeda on receiving intelligence of terrorist activity in the Sunni areas of Iraq. (No Shiite areas will harbor Al Qaeda, an organization ‘that has been killing Shiites, whom it considers to be apostates. Thus, Al Qaeda's potential base is limited to the Sunni 20 percent of Iraq—and most Sunnis do not like Al Qaeda either.) As for the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites, Iraq's constitution offers a solution. The consti- tution explicitly provides for creating regions of Iraq with the same rights as Kurdistan, including rights to their own flags, their own parliaments, and their own armies. These regions would also have the power to veto any law enacted by the ceniral gov- ernment regarding all but a tiny range of issues, such as foreign affairs. Bagh- dad retains control over defense policy, but not over armies raised by autonomous regions. The Shiite leadership, or at least silc, is moving, to establish a southern region with these powers. ‘The question is whether the Sunnis will do like- wise. They have been resisting until now, preferring the old system of a centralized Iraq. But it should be obvious to them that they will never control a centralized government. If there is a centralized Iraq, it will be dominated by the Shiites and Iran. ‘The Sunnis’ security would be better served by having a Sunni region with its own army. No one in the White House will say so, but the Bush administration's latest strategy in Iraq has in effect moved away from the idea of a single national army (which is not really a national army anyway, but a Shiite army) as the primary tool for combat- ing the insurgency, toward using Sunni militias in Anbar province and other Sunni-majority areas. This change in strategy accounts for the recent progress against Al Qaeda in Iraq. When the battle was between Sunnis and Shiites, most Sunnis felt they had no choice but to tolerate or support Al Qaeda. It is not that they liked foreign fighters and aggressive Islamists. They did not. But the difference between Al Qaeda and the Iraqi security forces is that Al Qaeda wanted to kill Shiites, while the IraqiBIBLIOTECA - clE security forces were sponsoring death squads that were killing Sunnis. The breakup of Iraq appears inevitable. The ques- tion is whether it will be a two-state or a three-state solution, and whether it occurs at a time and ina manner that minimizes violence. Kurdistan will never again be part of Iraq, but it is not clear if the Shiites will ultimately opt for a southern confeder- acy or a united Iraq. Although sic wants the former, the Sadrists want the latter, and who will prevail remains to be seen. The Sunnis have been support- ing a centralized Iraq, but the experience with their ‘own militia may lead them to see the broader ben- efits of having their own region. 1 believe separate Shiite and Sunni regions would reduce the violence that is currently related not to partition but to the struggle between Shiites. and Sunnis for dominion over Arab Iraq. Whether Shiites and Sunnis opt for partition is their deci sion and not one for outsiders to make. If they do move to set up separate regions, however, the United States could help both communities in establishing new governmental institutions and in negotiating the new regions’ parameters, including geographic boundaries. OPTIONS WITH IRAN Iran; meanwhile, is consohdating its strategic victory. Indeed, some in Washington now cite Iran's role in Iraq not only as a justification for continuing the Iraq War but also as a reason for military action against Iran. It seems perverse, to say the least, for President Bush to use his strate- gic gift to Iran as a reason for contemplating war with that country. Equally illogical is the adminis- tration’s charge that Iran is destabilizing Iraq. As Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi put it, “Why should we undermine a government in Iraq that we support more than anyone else?” The real problem is Iran’s nuclear program. if the choice comes down to attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities or accepting Iran as a nuclear power, both alternatives are fraught with risk. As long as the United States was willing to keep bombing nuclear facilities, it could probably prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power. But the Iranians could retaliate in devastating ways. Among their options, they could take their oil off global markets, with disastrous effect on the world’s economy (as well as their own). They could shut down traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, again taking more oil out of the system. They could launch attacks in the region through proxies such as Hezbollah. And they could Nuind spe ler ho: Picking up the Paces + 407 POLITICAS attack Us troops in Iraq, either directly or through their Shiite allies. It is optimistic to believe that Iraq security forces, faced with a choice between their Iranian allies and their American iberators, would support the Americans The risks of Iran going nuclear are obvious as well. Iran is not likely to give a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group; indeed, it is less of a prolifera- tion threat than Pakistan, an American ally. But an Iranian nuclear bomb would almost certainly trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, making that region and the world considerably more dangerous. ‘While the United States may ultimately face a choice between militaty strikes and accepting Iran as a nuclear power, there is no reason not to explore the possiblity ofa negotiated agreement that would keep Iran from developing atomic weapons. Iran has the same incentives to acquire nuclear arms that other states have: deterrence and prestige. Iran, however, can already deter a full-scale American invasion. After the disaster in Iraq, it is clear that no US president could contemplate such a course of action. The size of Iran's population and military provides sufficient deterrence. Prestige is another matter. From the Iranians’ perspective, the United States has treated their country with disrespect going back to American involvement in the 1953 coup against reformist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Bush's designation of Iran as part of an “axis of evil"— along with Iran and North Korea—was not only a foolish historical analogy (the World War II Rome-Berlin Axis was an alliance, whereas Iran and Iraq were bitter enemies when Bush uttered the phrase), but it also added to Iran’s sense of American disrespect. ‘The Bush administration points to ongoing talks between Iran and the Europeans as the appropriate forum for negotiation over Iran’ nuclear program, But the issues that concern Tehran are between Iran and the United States, not Iran and Europe. us-Iran issues are unlikely to be resolved on the European track. In May 2003, the Iranians sent a message to Washington via Tim Guldimann, the Swiss ambas- sador in Iran. It outlined a bargain in which the United States would end its stated hostility toward Iran and lift sanctions, in return for which Iran. offered to make its nuclear program completely transparent, end support for activities by Hez~ bollah and Hamas inside Israel, support a non- religious government in Iraq, and cooperate with408 + CURRENT HISTORY * December 2007 the United States in the war on terror. Flush with the illusion of “mission accomplished” in Iraq, the Bush admtinistration spurned the Iranian proposal At that time, Iran had a different president, and vs power in the region was much greater, s0 it is unclear if similar bargain is attainable today. But there is nothing to be lost by looking for a deal ENGAGING WITH TURKEY Restoring America’s relationship with Turkey poses a different set of challenges. The current dis- mal state of US-Turkey relations cannot be signifi- cantly improved until Iraq is resolved. And since Iraq is not going to be resolved any time soon, it is not likely that US-Turkey ties will be what they once were any time soon. That said, it makes sense to avoid aggravating the situation. Although the Ottoman Empire did commit genocide against Armenians in 1915, passing a resolution to con- demn it in the Us Congress would only have added gasoline to the fire and complicated American challenges in Iraq. The United States ought to be doing more to address Turkish concerns in Iraq, particularly the problem of terrorist attacks in Turkey originating from northern Iraq and the question of Kirkuk’s status, Turkey has had a very pragmatic approach toward Iraqi Kurdistan—for example, providing the bulk of the private investment that has gone into that region, with the support of the Iraqi gov- ernment. Yet remnants of the separatist insurgency affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), defeated by Turkey in 1999, continue to hide in remote mountainous areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The PKK's recent terrorist attacks against Turks have been small compared to the violence that occurred in the 1990s. But in the context of Turkish poli- tics, the issue has become extremely contentious. The Bush administration made a smart move in 2006 when it appointed General Joseph Ralston, the retired NATO commander, to work with Ankara Baghdad, and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil on the PKK problem, Ralston made some progress on refugee issues. Yet this fall, just as ten- sions were intensifying, Washington allowed his mission to lapse. If anything, Ralston’s mandate should have been expanded to include Kirkuk. The Iraqi con- stitution provides for a referendum to determine whether the oil-rich city will be part of Kurdistan or Arab Iraq. This marks'the first time Iraqis have agreed on a procedure to resolve an issue that has been a source of conflict between Iraq Kurds and Arabs for 80 years. At the same time, engaged US diplomacy could have addressed Turkey's concerns that the rights of ethnic Turkmens in Kirkuk be protected regardless of the outcome of the referen- dum, and that Kirkuk’s oil not be used to provide the economic foundation for a Kurdistan declara- tion of independence. A condition for effective policy is sound judg- ‘ment, and this unfortunately has been lacking int Washington's dealings with Iraq, Iran, and Tur- key. It does not help that President Bush refuses to face up to the reality that he cannot accomplish his stated objectives in Iraq. Indeed, he has clearly said he will leave the key decisions on the future us role in Iraq to his successor, in effect running out the clock on his time in office and leaving it to the next president to clean up the mess he created. Appalling consequences, as a result, con- tinue to proliferate .