Ong v.

Ong

Facts:

On February 25, 1976, Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other valuable
considerations, executed a quitclaim over a parcel of land in Makati in favor of Sandra
Maruzzo, then a minor. On November 19, 1980, Imelda revoked the quitclaim and
donated the property to her son Rex. On June 20, 1983, Sandra, through her guardial
ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an action to recover the land and to declare the donation to
Rex null and void. In their responsive pleading, petitioners claimed that the quitclaim is
equivalent to a donation which requires acceptance by the donee, and since Sandra
was a minor, there was no valid acceptance. The trial court ruled that the quitclaim is
equivalent to a sale. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision.

Issue:

Whether the quitclaim is equivalent to a deed of sale or to a deed of donation

Held:

The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima

facie evidence of the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of
consideration has the burden of proving such allegation. Even granting that the
Quitclaim deed in question is a donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that the
requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor of minor by parents of legal
representatives applies only to onerous and conditional donations where the donation
may have to assume certain charges or burdens. Donation to an incapacitated donee
does not need the acceptance by the lawful representative if said donation does not
contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal acceptance is not
important for the donor requires no right to be protected and the donee neither
undertakes to do anything nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim now in question
does not impose any condition.
Quiao v. Quiao

FACTS:

Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977.
They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said
marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for
legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55.
Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the
custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject
to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial
court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was
partially executed.

After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to
define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts.

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that
NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of
the FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples
property relations.
HELD:

Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of
martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a
marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative
community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, the
husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
People v. Jumawan

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. On
February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed
her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause
marital problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent
and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately
remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist
his sexualambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouses bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the
matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead,
rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: Why are you lying on the cot?, and to instantaneously order: You transfer
here to our bed.

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache
and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease
him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall
causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.
 The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried
to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the
sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKKs daster,41 stretched her legs apart and
rested his own legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and
succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued
to protest by desperately shouting: Don t do that to me because Im not feeling well.

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the
rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and management of
their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
their wives bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape
cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause.

The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital
rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense
of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property
rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.
 The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to
him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or
abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapists
legal relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was
raised by the accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed
between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual

violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape
under R.A. No. 8353.
Ayala Investment v. CA

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching made
himself jointly answerable to the debt as added security. Upon PBMs failure to pay the
loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and respondent Ching in the CFI
of Pasig.

After trial, the court rendered decision in favor of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching
to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of the loan with interests. Pending
the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued a writ of execution and thereafter, the deputy
sheriff caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of
sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.

Respondent spouses then filed an injunction contending that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Nevertheless, a certificate of sale
was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder for the property.

ISSUE:

WON the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

No. Petition is DENIED.

RATIO: The loan obtained by the husband from AIDC was for the benefit of PBM and
not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.

PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Chings family despite their being
stockholders of the said company. The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt and
the right of recourse to respondent as surety is only to the extent of his corporate
stocks.
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted
only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as
falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership.
Rustan Ang vs. Irish Sagud

Facts:

After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a
picture of a naked woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed
an action against said accused for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.

The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a
shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that
it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to
spread the picture he sent through the internet.

The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On
Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming
the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in
the case?

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes
an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
(A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for
the first time before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have
objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in
evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.

Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element
of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.