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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.172707October1,2013

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA,
RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND
JOHNDOES,ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS.

DECISION

PEREZ,J.:

BeforethisCourtforAutomaticReviewistheDecision1dated28June2005oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA
G.R. CRH.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
PasayCity,Branch109dated16October1998,findingaccusedappellantsHalilGambaoyEsmail,EddieKarimy
Uso,EdwinDukilmanySuboh,TonyAbaoySula,RaulUdalyKagui,TengMandaoyHaron,ThengDilangaleny
Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
RevisedPenalCode,asamendedbyRepublicAct(R.A.)No.7659.

Theaccusedappellants,alongwithanunidentifiedperson,werechargedunderthecriminalinformation3 which
reads:

CriminalCaseNo.980928

ForKidnappingforRansomasamendedbyRA7659

ThatonAugust12,1998ataround7:30oclockintheeveningatNo.118FBHarrisonPasayCityandwithinthe
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above namedaccused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
oneanotherandgroupingthemselvestogether,didthenandtherebyforceandintimidation,andtheuseofhigh
poweredfirearms,willfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslytake,carryawayanddepriveLuciaChanyLeeofherliberty
againstherwillforthepurposeofextortingransomasinfactademandforransomwasmadeasaconditionfor
herreleaseamountingtoFOURHUNDREDTHOUSANDPESOS(P400,000.00)tothedamageandprejudiceof
LuciaL.Chaninthesaidamountandsuchotheramountsasmaybeawardedtoherundertheprovisionsofthe
CivilCode.

Theantecedentfactswereculledfromtherecordsofthecase:4

LuciaChan(Chan)wasafishdealerbasedinManila.Sheusuallyexpectedfishdeliveries,whichwereshippedby
hersuppliersfromtheprovinces.Sometimeintheafternoonof11August1998,twopersons,oneofwhomwas
identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chans residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire
about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her.
Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion
identifiedasTonyAbao(Abao),returnedlookingforChanbutweretoldthatshewasout.Whenthetworeturned
intheafternoon,Chaninformedthemthatthefishdeliveryhadyettoarrive.Chanofferedinsteadtoaccompany
themtotheairporttoretrievetheboxoffishallegedlycontainingthepassport.DilangalenandAbaodeclinedand
toldChanthattheywouldbebacklaterthatevening.5

Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chans residence that
evening. Chans houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified
companionofDilangalenpointedhisgunatChansson,LevyChan(Levy),andthehousecompanions.7Asthe
unidentifiedmanforciblydraggedChan,hersonLevytriedtostopthemanbygrabbinghismothersfeet.Seeing
this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levys head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chans feet.8 Levy
thereafterproceededtothePasayPoliceHeadquarterstoreporttheincident.9

Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a
certain house. Accusedappellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun
pointedathermouth.Chanwasorderedtogowithtwowomen,11lateridentifiedincourtbyChanasappellants
MonetteRonas(Ronas)andNoraEvad(Evad).12Chanwasbroughtinsideahouseandwasmadetoliedownon
a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened
Chanthatshewouldbekilledunlessshepaid20MillionPesos.14

On13August1998,ChanwasawakenedbyEvadandwasaskedtoboardthe"TamarawFX"van.Aftertravelling
forabouttenminutes,thevanstoppedandthegroupalighted.Chanwasbroughttoaroomonthesecondfloor
ofthehouse.InsidetheroomwerethreepersonswhomChanidentifiedincourtasMacalinbol,RaulUdal(Udal)
and Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At
about9:00oclockintheevening,amanwhowaslateridentifiedasTengMandao(Mandao),enteredtheroom
with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in
courtasEddieKarim(Karim),orderedMandaooutoftheroom.KariminformedChanthathewassentbytheir
bosstoaskherhowmuchmoneyshehas.18Chanwasinstructedtotalktohersonthroughacellphoneandshe
gaveinstructionstohersontogettheP75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chans
sonandnegotiatedtheransomamountinexchangeforhismothersrelease.ItwasagreeduponthatLevywas
todeliverP400,000.00atthe"Chowking"RestaurantatBuendiaAvenue.20

InspectorsNarcisoOuano,Jr.(InspectorOuano)andCesarMancao(InspectorMancao),whowereassignedat
the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors
called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chans release.21 During their surveillance the following day,
Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victims
residence.Theinspectorsobservedthattheoccupantsofthetaxicabkeptonlookingatthesecondfloorofthe
house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the
ElizabethResortandstoppedinfrontofCottage1.Convincedthatthewomantheteamsawinthecottagewas
thevictim,theysoughtclearancefromPhilippineAntiOrganizedCrimeTaskForce(PAOCTF)toconductarescue
operation.22

On14August1998,P/Insp.VicenteArnado(InspectorArnado)receivedinformationthattheabductorsacceded
to a P400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00
am. Upon learning of the information, the team immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the
vicinityoftherestaurant.Atabout2:00am,alightblue"TamarawFX"vanwith4peopleonboardarrived.The
four took the ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team
successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and
Dukilman.TheteamwasalsoabletorecovertheP400,000.00ransom.23

Atabout5:00oclockinthemorningofthesameday,thepoliceteamassaultedCottageNo.1,resultinginthe
saferescueofChanandtheapprehensionofsevenofherabductors,lateridentifiedincourtasDilangalen,Udal,
Macalinbol,Mandao,Perpenian,EvadandRonas.24

Duringthe7October1998hearing,afterthevictimandhersontestified,Karimmanifestedhisdesiretochange
his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of
plea,stating:"Itwouldmeanthemomentyouwithdrawyourpreviouspleasofnotguiltyandenterapleaofguilty,
thecourtofcourse,afterreceivingevidence,asinfactithasreceivedthetestimoniesof[the]twowitnesses,will
[outrightly]sentenceyoutothepenaltyprovidedbylawaftertheprosecutionshallhavefinishedthepresentation
ofitsevidence.NowthatIhaveexplainedtoyoutheconsequencesofyourenteringapleaofguilty,areyoustill
desirous of entering a plea of guilty?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellantslikewisemanifested,throughtheircounselwhohadearlierconferredwiththemandexplainedtoeach
of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court
separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas
andEvadiftheyunderstoodtheconsequenceofchangingtheirpleas.Allofthemansweredintheaffirmative.26
Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the
consequences of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their rearraignment. After they
pleadedguilty,28thetrialcourtdirectedtheprosecutiontopresentevidence,whichitdid.

On16October1998,theRTCrenderedadecisionconvictingGambao,Karim,Dukilman,Abao,Udal,Mandao,
Dilangalen,Macalinbol,Ronas,EvadandPerpenianofKidnappingforRansom.Hence,theyappealedtotheCA.

InaDecisiondated28June2005,theappellatecourtaffirmedwithmodificationsthedecisionofthetrialcourt.
ThedispositiveportionoftheCAdecisionreads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accusedappellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE
KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y
HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and
NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under
Article267oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbyRA7659andimposinguponeachofthemthesupreme
penaltyofdeathisAFFIRMEDWITHMODIFICATIONthateachofthemisorderedtopayjointlyandseverallythe
victimintheamountofP50,000.00bywayofmoraldamages.

It appearing that accusedappellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the
commissionofthecrime,sheisherebysentencedtosufferthepenaltyofreclusionperpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00503SC, the appellate court
certifiedthecasetothisCourtandaccordinglyorderedtheelevationoftherecords.

In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. The
issuesraisedbytheaccusedappellantsintheirrespectivebriefs,supplementalbriefsandmanifestationswillbe
discussedcollectively.

InsufficiencyofEvidence

AccusedappellantsDukilman,Ronas,EvadwouldhavethisCourtbelievethatthewitness,Chan,wasnotableto
positivelyidentifythembecauseofherfailingeyesightduetooldage.

Thisargumentisbereftofmerit.WenotethatboththetrialcourtandtheCAfoundChanstestimonycredibleand
straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the accusedappellants. If she had not met them
before, she could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused
appellantswasfurtherestablishedthroughthetestimoniesoftheotherprosecutionwitnesses.

Timeandagain,thisCourthasmaintainedthatthequestionofcredibilityofwitnessesisprimarilyforthetrialcourt
todetermine.Forthisreason,itsobservationsandconclusionsareaccordedgreatrespectonappeal.Theyare
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or
circumstanceofweightandinfluencehasnotbeenconsidered.31InPeoplev.Taedo,32thisCourthadoccasion
toreiteratetherulingthatfindingsoffactofthetrialcourtpertainingtothecredibilityofwitnessescommandgreat
respectsinceithadtheopportunitytoobservetheirdemeanorwhiletheytestifiedincourt.33Itcanbeobserved
that the briefs submitted by the accusedappellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant
particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court regarding the
credibilityofwitnessChan.

Perpenianlikewisearguedthattheevidenceforherconvictionisinsufficient.Wealsofindherargumentbereftof
merit.

ThetestimonyofInspectorOuano,establishingPerpenianasoneofthesevenpeopleapprehendedwhenthey
conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 oclock in the morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the positive
identificationofPerpenianbyChanconstitutedadequateevidenceworkingagainstherdefenseofdenial.

Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accusedappellants proffered was denial. It is established
jurisprudencethatdenialcannotprevailoverthewitnessespositiveidentificationoftheaccusedappellants,more
sowherethedefensedidnotpresentconvincingevidencethatitwasphysicallyimpossibleforthemtohavebeen
presentatthecrimesceneatthetimeofthecommissionofthecrime.35

The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the
absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the
findingsofthelowercourts.

ImprovidentPlea

AsprovidedforbyArticle267oftheRevisedPenalCode,asamendedbyRA7659,thepenaltyforkidnappingfor
ransomisdeath.Areviewoftherecords36showsthaton7October1998,theaccusedappellantswithdrewtheir
pleaof"notguilty"andwererearraigned.Theysubsequentlyenteredpleasof"guilty"tothecrimeofkidnapping
for ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the
accusedpleadsguiltytoacapitaloffense.Thetrialcourtismandated:

(1)

toconductasearchinginquiryintothevoluntarinessandfullcomprehensionoftheconsequencesofthepleaof
guilt,

(2)

torequiretheprosecutiontostillprovetheguiltoftheaccusedandtheprecisedegreeofhisculpability,and

(3)

to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.38

Therationalebehindtheruleisthatthecourtsmustproceedwithmorecarewherethepossiblepunishmentisin
its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The
primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are
involvedsincehemightbeadmittinghisguiltbeforethecourtandthusforfeitinghislifeandlibertywithouthaving
fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea.39Moreover,therequirementoftaking
furtherevidencewouldaidthisCourtonappellatereviewindeterminingtheproprietyorimproprietyoftheplea.40

Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and
informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by
jurisprudence41andthus,adoptsthesame:

Althoughthereisnodefiniteandconcreteruleastohowatrialjudgemustconducta"searchinginquiry,"wehave
heldthatthefollowingguidelinesshouldbeobserved:

Ascertainfromtheaccusedhimself

(a)howhewasbroughtintothecustodyofthelaw

(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary
investigationsand

(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to
ruleoutthepossibilitythattheaccusedhasbeencoercedorplacedunderastateofduresseitherbyactual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judges intimidating
robes.

Askthedefensecounselaseriesofquestionsastowhetherhehadconferredwith,andcompletelyexplainedto,
theaccusedthemeaningandconsequencesofapleaofguilty.

Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socioeconomic status, and
educationalbackground,whichmayserveasatrustworthyindexofhiscapacitytogiveafreeandinformedplea
ofguilty.

Informtheaccusedtheexactlengthofimprisonmentornatureofthepenaltyunderthelawandthecertaintythat
hewillservesuchsentence.Fornotinfrequently,anaccusedpleadsguiltyinthehopeofalenienttreatmentor
uponbadadviceorbecauseofpromisesoftheauthoritiesorpartiesofalighterpenaltyshouldheadmitguiltor
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressionsbecauseapleaofguiltycarrieswithitnotonlytheadmissionofauthorshipofthecrimeproperbut
alsooftheaggravatingcircumstancesattendingit,thatincreasepunishment.

Inquireiftheaccusedknowsthecrimewithwhichheischargedandfullyexplaintohimtheelementsofthecrime
whichisthebasisofhisindictment.Failureofthecourttodosowouldconstituteaviolationofhisfundamental
righttobeinformedoftheprecisenatureoftheaccusationagainsthimandadenialofhisrighttodueprocess.

Allquestionsposedtotheaccusedshouldbeinalanguageknownandunderstoodbythelatter.

The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be
requiredtonarratethetragedyorreenactthecrimeorfurnishitsmissingdetails.

It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The questions
propoundedbythetrialcourtjudgefailedtoensurethataccusedappellantsfullyunderstoodtheconsequencesof
theirplea.Infact,itisreadilyapparentfromtherecords43thatKarimhadthemistakenassumptionthathisplea
ofguiltwouldmitigatetheimposablepenaltyandthatboththejudgeandhiscounselfailedtoexplaintohimthat
such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not
warnedbythetrialcourtjudgethatincaseswherethepenaltyissingleandindivisible,likedeath,thepenaltyis
not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judges seemingly annoyed
statementthataconditionalpleaisnotallowed,asprovidedbelow,isinadequate:

Atty.Ferrer:

YourHonorplease,maywebeallowedtosaysomethingbeforethetrial.ForaccusedEddieKarimwemanifest
and petition this court that he be allowed to be rearraigned Your Honor please, considering that he will plead
guiltyaschargedbuttheimposablepenaltyislowered,YourHonor.

Court:

You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty, no condition attached.
Conditionalpleaisnotallowed.

Atty.Ferrer:

Considering,YourHonor,accusedEddieKarimisalreadyrepenting

Court:

Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition attached. We cannot
makethatconditionanddictatetothecourtthepenalty.44

Althoughthepleasrendered,saveforPerpenians,wereimprovidentlymade,thisCourtwillstillnotsetasidethe
condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judges shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused
appellantsculpability.
Asageneralrule,convictionsbasedonanimprovidentpleaofguiltaresetasideandthecasesareremandedfor
furtherproceedingsifsuchpleaisthesolebasisofjudgement.Ifthetrialcourt,however,reliedonsufficientand
credibleevidencetoconvicttheaccused,asitdidinthiscase,theconvictionmustbesustained,becausethenit
ispredicatednotmerelyontheguiltypleabutonevidenceprovingthecommissionoftheoffensecharged.45The
manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
convictioncanbebasedonindependentevidenceprovingthecommissionofthecrimebytheaccused.46

Contrarytoaccusedappellantsassertions,theywereconvictedbythetrialcourt,notonthebasisoftheirpleaof
guilty,butonthestrengthoftheevidenceadducedbytheprosecution,whichwasproperlyappreciatedbythetrial
court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accusedappellants and their degrees of culpability
beyondreasonabledoubt.

DegreeofCulpability

Accusedappellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they
wereconcerned,wasnotconvincinglyestablished.Dukilmanhingeshisargumentonthefactthathewasnotone
ofthosearrestedduringtherescueoperationbasedonthetestimonyofInspectorOuano.48Ontheotherhand,
RonasandEvadbasetheirargumentonthefactthattheyhadnoparticipationwhatsoeverinthenegotiationfor
theransommoney.

We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue
operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people
apprehendedwhenthepoliceinterceptedthe"TamarawFX"attheNicholsTollgate.49Likewise,thetestimonyof
PoliceInspectorOuanosufficientlyestablishedthatRonasandEvadweretwoofthosewhowerearrestedduring
the rescue operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every
detail of the execution he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performedbytheothersintheexecutionoftheconspiracy.51Onceconspiracyisshown,theactofoneistheact
ofalltheconspirators.Thepreciseextentormodalityofparticipationofeachofthembecomessecondary,since
alltheconspiratorsareprincipals.52Moreover,Chanpositivelyidentifiedtheaccusedappellantsandplacedallof
thematthecrimescenes.

UnderArticle8oftheRevisedPenalCode,thereisconspiracywhentwoormorepersonscometoanagreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the
conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the
partiesbefore,duringorafterthecommissionofthecrimeindicatingacommonunderstandingamongthemwith
respecttothecommissionoftheoffense.53Thetestimonies,whentakentogether,revealthecommonpurposeof
the accusedappellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were
testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accusedappellants kept coming back to the victims
house(2)duringthekidnapping,accusedappellantschangedshiftsinguardingthevictimand(3)theaccused
appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was
conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas
andEvadwasestablishedbeyondreasonabledoubtbasedontheprofferedevidenceoftheprosecution,theact
ofoneistheactofalltheconspirators.

In Perpenians Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Courts attention to the manifestation made by the
prosecutionregardingtheirdisinterestinprosecuting,insofarasshewasconcerned.55However,pursuanttothe
ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any disposition of the case or
dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and
discretionofthecourtsmoresointhiscase,wherenoMotiontoDismisswasfiledbytheprosecution.

ThetrialcourttooknoteofthefactthatPerpeniangaveinconsistentanswersandliedseveraltimesunderoath
duringthetrial.57Perpenianliedaboutsubstantialdetailssuchasherrealname,age,addressandthefactthat
she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was
scared to be included or identified with the other accusedappellants. The lying and the fear of being identified
withpeoplewhomsheknewhaddonewrongareindicativeofdiscernment.Sheknew,therefore,thattherewas
anongoingcrimebeingcommittedattheresortwhileshewasthere.Itisapparentthatshewasfullyawareofthe
consequencesoftheunlawfulact.

Asreflectedintherecords,58theprosecutionwasnotabletoproffersufficientevidencetoholdherresponsible
asaprincipal.Seeingthattheonlyevidencetheprosecutionhadwasthetestimony59ofChantotheeffectthat
on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and
Ronasregardingstoriesunrelatedtothekidnapping,thisCourtopinesthatPerpenianshouldnotbeheldliableas
acoprincipal,butratheronlyasanaccomplicetothecrime.

Jurisprudence60isinstructiveoftheelementsrequired,inaccordancewithArticle18oftheRevisedPenalCode,
inorderthatapersonmaybeconsideredanaccomplice,namely,(1)thattherebecommunityofdesignthatis
knowingthecriminaldesignoftheprincipalbydirectparticipation,heconcurswiththelatterinhispurpose(2)
that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way and (3) that there be a relation between the acts
donebytheprincipalandthoseattributedtothepersonchargedasaccomplice.

ThedefensesraisedbyPerpenianarenotsufficienttoexoneratehercriminalliability. Assuming arguendo that

1 w p h i1

shejustcametotheresortthinkingitwasaswimmingparty,itwasinevitablethatsheacquiredknowledgeofthe
criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have
suspectedsomethingwaswrongandwouldhavereportedsuchincidenttothepolice.Perpenian,however,chose
to keep quiet and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being
present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accusedappellants presence and company
werenotindispensableandessentialtotheperpetrationofthekidnappingforransomhence,sheisonlyliableas
an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was
stressedthatincaseofdoubt,theparticipationoftheoffenderwillbeconsideredasthatofanaccomplicerather
thanthatofaprincipal.

Havingadmittedtheirinvolvementinthecrimeofkidnappingforransomandconsideringtheevidencepresented
bytheprosecution,linkingaccusedappellantsparticipationinthecrime,nodoubtcanbeentertainedastotheir
guilt.TheCAconvictedtheaccusedappellantsofkidnappingforransomandimposeduponthemthesupreme
penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds
accusedappellantsguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtasprincipalstothecrimeofkidnappingforransom.However,
pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to
ReclusionPerpetua,withouteligibilityforparole.

Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No.
9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering that
Perpenianactedwithdiscernmentwhenshewas17yearsoldatthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense,her
minority should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance
pursuanttoArticle68oftheRevisedPenalCode.

UnderSection38ofR.A.No.9344,66thesuspensionofsentenceofachildinconflictwiththelawshallstillbe
appliedevenifhe/sheisalreadyeighteen(18)yearsofageormoreatthetimeofthepronouncementofhis/her
guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because
underArticle40ofR.A.No.9344,67thesuspensionofsentencecanbeavailedofonlyuntilthechildinconflict
with the law reaches the maximum age of twentyone (21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to
pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
kidnappingforransom.SincethisCourthasruledthatdeathasutilizedinArticle71oftheRevisedPenalCode
shallnolongerformpartoftheequationinthegraduationofpenaltiespursuanttoR.A.No.9346,68thepenalty
imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion
Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the penalty of
PrisionMayor,thepenaltylowerthanthatprescribedbylaw(ReclusionTemporal),shouldbeimposed.Applying
theIndeterminateSentenceLaw,theminimumpenalty,whichisonedegreelowerthanthemaximumimposable
penalty,shallbewithintherangeofPrisionCorreccionalandthemaximumpenaltyshallbewithintheminimum
period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance.
Hence,theCourtimposestheindeterminatesentenceofsix(6)monthsandone(1)dayofPrisionCorreccional,
asminimum,tosix(6)yearsandone(1)dayofPrisionMayor,asmaximum.

AsregardsPerpenianspossibleconfinementinanagriculturalcamporothertrainingfacilityinaccordancewith
Section51ofR.A.9344,thisCourtheldinPeoplev.Jacinto70thattheageofthechildinconflictwiththelawat
the time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offensewhenhe/shewasstilloftenderage.ThisCourt,however,findssucharrangementnolongernecessaryin
viewofthefactthatPerpeniansactualservedtermhasalreadyexceededtheimposablepenaltyforheroffense.
Forsuchreason,shemaybeimmediatelyreleasedfromdetention.

WenotethatintheOrder71dated9October1998,thetrialcourtadmittedthedocumentaryevidenceofferedby
thecounselforthedefenseprovingthattherealnameofThianPerpenianisLarinaPerpenian.

In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary
penaltiesattendanttothecrime,hisdeath72havingoccurredbeforerenditionoffinaljudgement.73

Thereisprevailingjurisprudence,74oncivilliabilitiesarisingfromthecommissionofkidnappingforthepurposeof
extortingransomfromthevictimoranyotherpersonunderArticle267oftheRevisedPenalCode.Thepersons
convictedwereheldliableforP75,000.00ascivilindemnityP75,000.00asmoraldamagesandP30,000.00 as
exemplarydamages.

Wetakethisopportunitytoincreasetheamountsofindemnityanddamages,where,asinthiscase,thepenalty
for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No.
9346:75
 1.P100,000.00ascivilindemnity

2.P100,000.00asmoraldamageswhichthevictimisassumedtohavesufferedandthusneedsnoproof
and

3.P100,000.00asexemplarydamagestosetanexampleforthepublicgood.

Theseamountsshallbetheminimumindemnityanddamageswheredeathisthepenaltywarrantedbythefacts
butisnotimposableunderpresentlaw.

TherulingofthisCourtinPeoplev.Montesclaros76isinstructiveontheapportionmentofcivilliabilitiesamongall
the accusedappellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities
and actual participation. Hence, each principal accusedappellant should shoulder a greater share in the total
amountofindemnityanddamagesthanPerpenianwhowasadjudgedasonlyanaccomplice.

Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for the total
amountofP300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for P288,000.00 (or P32,000.00 each)
and Perpenian who shall be liable for P12,000.00. This is broken down into P10,666.67 civil indemnity,
P10,666.67 moral damages and P10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal and P4,000.00 civil
indemnity,P4,000.00moraldamagesandP4,000.00exemplarydamagesfortheloneaccomplice.

WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CRH.C. No. 00863 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accusedappellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO,
EDWINDUKILMANySUBOH,TONYABAOySULA,RAULUDALyKAGUI,THENGDILANGALENyNANDING,
JAMANMACALINBOLyKATOL,MONETTERONASyAMPILandNORAEVADyMULOKarefoundguiltybeyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
ReclusionPerpetua,withouteligibilityofparole.AccusedappellantTHIANPERPENIANyRAFONA.K.A.LARINA
PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accusedappellants are ordered to
indemnify the victim in the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00asexemplarydamagesapportionedinthefollowingmanner:theprincipalstothecrimeshalljointly
and severally pay the victim the total amount of P288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim
P12,000.00,subjecttoArticle110oftheRevisedPenalCodeonseveralandsubsidiaryliability.

TheCourtorderstheCorrectionalInstituteforWomentoimmediatelyreleaseTHIANPERPENIANA.K.A.LARINA
PERPENIANduetoherhavingfullyservedthepenaltyimposedonher,unlessherfurtherdetentioniswarranted
foranyotherlawfulcauses.

LetacopyofthisdecisionbefurnishedforimmediateimplementationtotheDirectoroftheCorrectionalInstitute
for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this Court,
withinfive(5)daysfromreceiptofacopyofthedecision,theactionhehastakenthereon.

SOORDERED.

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIO PRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

(Nopart)
TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
ARTUROD.BRION
AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

(OnOfficialLeave)
DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice
AssociateJustice

MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO ROBERTOA.ABAD
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

(onsickleave) (onofficialleave)
MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR. JOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice
 BIENVENIDOL.REYES ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice

MARVICMARIOVICTORF.LEONEN
AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
DecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes

1 CA rollo, pp. 419438 Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Associate Justices
EugenioS.LabitoriaandArturoD.Brion(nowamemberofthisCourt)concurring.

2Records,Vol.I,pp.282301.

3Id.at53.

4CArollo,pp.179186.

5TSN,6October1998,pp.25

6Id.at6.

7Id.

8Id.at7.

9Id.at8.

10TSN,5October1998,p.10.

11Id.at13.

12Id.at15.

13Id.at1516.

14Id.at17.

15Id.at1921.

16Id.at33.

17Id.at22.

18Id.at23.

19Id.at25.

20Id.at2627.

21TSN,7October1998,p.12.

22Id.at1416.

23TSN,8October1998,pp.46.

24TSN,7October1998,pp.1718.

25Id.at23.

26Id.at25.
27Id.at56.

28Id.at710.

29CArollo,pp.436437.

30Rollo,pp.2324.

31Peoplev.Montanir,etal.,G.R.No.187534,4April2011,647SCRA170,185186.

32334Phil.31,36(1997).

33Peoplev.YansonDumancas,378Phil.341,364(1999)citingPeoplev.Taedo,334Phil.31,36(1997).

34TSN,7October1998,pp.1718.

35Peoplev.Salcedo,G.R.No.186523,22June2011652SCRA635,644citingLumanogv.Peopleofthe
Philippines,G.R.No.182555,7September2010,630SCRA42,130131.
36TSN,7October1998,pp.110.

37471Phil.638(2004).

38Id.at648.

39Peoplev.Ernas,455Phil.829,838(2003).

40Peoplev.Pastor,428Phil.976,993(2002).

41Id.at986987.

42TSN,7October1998,pp.210.

43Id.at2.

44Id.

45Peoplev.Pastor,supranote40at997.

46Peoplev.Oden,supranote37at649.

47Peoplev.Ceredon,G.R.No.167179,28January2008,542SCRA550,568.

48TSN,7October1998,pp.1718.

49TSN,8October1998,pp.46.

50TSN,7October1998,pp.1718.

51Peoplev.Basao,G.R.No.189820,10October2012,683SCRA529,546.

52Id.

53Peoplev.DeChavez,G.R.No.188105,23April2010,619SCRA464,478.

54CArollo,pp.330357.

55TSN,7October1998,pp.67.

56235Phil.465,476(1987).

57TSN,8October1998,pp.2830.

58TSN,7October1998,p.5.

59Id.

60Peoplev.Tamayo,44Phil.38,49(1922).

61Peoplev.Toling,180Phil.305,321322(1979).
 62Peoplev.Ubia,97Phil.515,534(1955).

63128Phil.268,278279(1967).

64AnActProhibitingtheImpositionofDeathPenaltyinthePhilippines.

65 An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile
JusticeandWelfareCouncilUndertheDepartmentofJustice,AppropriatingFundsThereforeandforOther
Purposes.

66Sec.38.AutomaticSuspensionofSentence.Oncethechildwhoisundereighteen(18)yearsofageat
thetimeofthecommissionoftheoffenseisfoundguiltyoftheoffensecharged,thecourtshalldetermine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncementofhis/herguilt.

Uponsuspensionofsentenceandafterconsideringthevariouschcumstancesofthechild,thecourt
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
JuvenilesinConflictwiththeLaw.
67Sec.40inrelationtoSec.38ofRANo.9344.

Sec.40.ReturnoftheChildinConflictwiththeLawtoCourt.Ifthecourtfindsthattheobjectiveof
thedispositionmeasuresimposeduponthechildinconflictwiththelawhavenotbeenfulfilled,orif
thechildinconflictwiththelawhaswillfullyfailedtocomplywiththeconditionsofhis/herdisposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
executionofjudgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
orderexecutionofsentence,ortoextendthesuspendedsentenceforacertainspecifiedperiodor
untilthechildreachesthemaximumageoftwentyone(21)years(emphasissupplied).

68Peoplev.Bon,536Phil.897,940(2006).

69Article52RevisedPenalCode.

70G.R.No.182239,16March2011,645SCRA590,625.

71Records,Vol.I,p.200.

72Rollo,pp.84and96.

73Peoplev.Jose,163Phil.264,273(1976)Article89RevisedPenalCode.

74Peoplev.Tadah,G.R.No.186226,1February2012,664SCRA744,748Peoplev.Basaoetal,G.R.
No.189820,10October2012,683SCRA529,551.

75AnActProhibitingtheImpositionofDeathPenaltyinthePhilippines.

76G.R.No.181084,16June2009,589SCRA320,345.

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