Escolar Documentos
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Cultura Documentos
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XIX
I In this transliteration of Russian, 'y' represents the vowel jery and 'j' represents the
jot-sound as in Czech ja,jest, German ja, Jahr, Latin judex,jubeo.
291
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292 The Science of Idiom
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Murat H. Roberts 293
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294 The Science of Idiom
but rather as the thing referred to, the material not the formal part."
(Greek-English Lexicon [N.Y. 1885], p. 862.) Other derivations of the
same root have a similar orientation. Thus logikos means rational or
intellectual; logizomai means to count, reckon, calculate, consider, reason.
In this transcendental sense logos has always been used by philosophers
and theologians. For Heraclitus, the logos was the universal principle of
fire; for the Stoics, the Seminal Word which made the world; for Saint
John the Creative Word of God; for Saint Augustine, the interior lan-
guage of the soul, whereby man may, at least to some extent, apprehend
the Divine Mystery. All these usages center around the basic Indo-
European meaning: a logos, whether sacred or secular, is a res exprimenda,
a res cogitata, prior and apart from its embodiment in the glotta, or lingua.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, it must be explained at this point
that discourse or logos does not coincide with la parole as defined by
Saussure.2 In his system the generic language falls into two parts, langue
and parole, langue being the formula of language and parole the act of
language. The word discours is not included in this classification by
Saussure. All that Saussure discusses lies within the realm of language,
outside the realm of discourse or logos proper.
Just as little does discourse or logos coincide with the parole interieure
of Egger.3 Let that writer speak for himself through the following quo-
tations from La Parole IntErieure:
La parole interieure a l'apparence d'un son, et ce son est celui que nous nom-
mons parole ou langage: (p. 66)
La parole interieure est une parole: nous la nommons naturellement ainsi;
elle ressemble donc a la parole proprement dite, a la parole exterieure, elle en est
comme une imitation ou comme un echo. (p. 65)
Malgr6 l'intimite si remarquable de leur union, la parole interieure parait
n'6tre en nous que le vetement le plus ext6rieur de cette chose subtile et cachee
que nous appelons la pensee. (p. 212)
Il n'est pas moins inexact de pr6tendre que la pensee discursive ne peut jamais
se passer d'un langage interieur; le mot n'est pour elle qu'un accessoire, et nulle-
ment indispensable, utile, s'il est impartial, mais alors seulement, pour maintenir
la gen6ralite des idees generales, nuisible dans le cas contraire; il n'existe aucun
raison de penser que les faits d'experience ne pourraient, sans les mots, se grouper
en idees generales. (p. 286)
A traduire litteralement une phrase souvent citee des Analytiques, il semblerait
pourtant qu'Aristote ait connu la parole interieure; nous croyons que, dans ce
passage, le logos eso ou logos en te psyche qu'Aristote oppose au logos exo, n'est pas
la parole interieure, mais une certaine determination de la pensee. (p. 13)
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Murat H. Roberts 295
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296 The Science of Idiom
longs to Lincoln and no other could have constructed it. Yet it comes to
us through a public system of reference, the English language. Persons
make discourse; communities make language.
It is vital to observe that this distinction between private logos and
public language constitutes a more profound antithesis than the opposi-
tion between utterance (la parole) and linguistic organon (la langue), as
defined by Saussure. Utterance or parole is not exclusively individual; it
consists of the words of language, whose pronunciation, rhythm, intona-
tion, denotation, and connotation are very precisely determined by so-
ciety. Parole is the dynamic side of the static langue. Discourse, however,
includes neither langage, langue, nor parole. It is anterior to all language
and has language for its exterior effect.
In discourse alone can be found the possibility of absolute individual-
ism. Society controls words, the ego controls its thoughts, if it has the
energy to be independent. In this truth is rooted the common observa-
tion that in proportion as thought is original, its embodiment in language
is difficult. Egger (Parole Interieure, p. 234) has phrased the matter well:
La difficulte de l'expression est en raison de l'originalite de la pensee; a l'abstrac-
tion croissante des concepts, a l'imprevu toujours plus grand des jugements, cor-
respond un ecart toujours plus difficile a combler entre le langage usuel et le role
nouveau qu'il est appele a remplir, entre l'offre du langage, pourrait-on dire, et la
demande de la pensee.
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Murat H. Roberts 297
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298 The Science of Idiom
The static list of words has become dynamic discourse. The abstract be-
comes vivid and particular. All is specific, concrete, evocative. The
Trojan ships sail the sea; there is no more land; everywhere sea and
everywhere sky; the storm-cloud, bringing night and tempest, hangs
overhead, and the sea is covered with dreadful darkness. These objects
and events are represented as actualities which occurred at a particular
time. Vergil is describing a unitemporal, utterly unique, unrecurrent and
special scene. The discourse of Vergil is real and coherent and pictorial;
it lives. Yet to communicate it he has used the categories of the Latin;
its lexical and grammatical frames of reference enable us to comprehend
his discourse.
4 Eneid, v, 8-11.
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Murat H. Roberts 299
From the foregoing analysis it follows that all idioms, in origin designs
of thought, can have come into communal language only through in-
dividual discourse. Every traditional phrase, as for example English to
stand him in good stead, to leave him in the lurch, to ransack the house, to
grapple with problems, to tell the difference, to be at a loss, to fall on evil days,
must first have arisen as a personal innovation. Somebody had to say it
first. This first speaker, whether inadvertently or deliberately, coined the
phrase. His mode of speech was imitated by his friends, his village, his
province, his nation, so that in the end after countless repetitions the
phrase became a part of the standard equipment of the language. In this
manner the imagination of individuals has furnished the material from
which the idioms of the language are drawn.
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300 The Science of Idiom
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Murat H. Roberts 301
German heilago originally meant 'the holy one.' When the definite mean-
ing began to fade out of the ending, the definite article was added as
compensation, ther heilago. The final step was taken when a masculine
noun was appended, ther heilago man. The connection thus idiomatically
established between originally separate elements, ther, heilago, man was
at first a matter of discourse; today, the meaning and the origin of the
permutation forgotten, the quondam idiom has become a matter of
language, an automatic rule of grammar. Unless he is a scientific linguist,
the speaker of Modern German has not the remotest idea why he makes
the adjective weak after a der-word.
Similarly in English, when we use have with the past participle to form
the perfect tense of intransitive verbs, we are using an analogical imita.
tion of the transitive have-construction. The latter once had idiomatic
meaning; its imitation is pure grammar, pure mechanism. Thus in the
expressions he has come, he has appeared, has is no longer a semanteme.
It is a morpheme only, a mere token of grammar. Spanish el ha llegado,
Swedish han har kommit are other cases in point.
The postpositive articles, as we find them in Scandinavian, in Bul-
garian, and in Russian, provide an excellent example of idiom which has
become grammar. In Old Norse, a noun was followed by a demonstrative
which became an ending of the noun: konungr inn 'king, that one'
solidified into konungrinn, the genitive konungs ins into konungsins. In
Swedish the process has gone further, the article having become simply
an integral part of the noun: thus konungen, genitive konungens, the s
of the genitive now being used only once. That the post-article is no
more than an ending is shown by the fact that when an independent
article is put before an attributive adjective, the post-article of the noun
is retained, e.g. den store konungen. The den means today what the en
originally meant when it was still separate; the need of den in the modern
language proves that the post-article en has now become merely an in-
flection with little more than a shadow of its demonstrative power.
In Russian, the attributive or definite form of the adjective is derived
from the addition of a demonstrative; Primitive Slavonic dobri jy 'good,
that one' coalesces into Russian dobry*; neuter dobroje into dobroe. In Bul-
garian and in some dialects of Northern Great Russian the demonstra
tive t~, ta, to (plural te) are added to substantives to provide a definite
form: Bulgarian rekata 'the river,' poleto 'the field.' If an adjective pre-
cedes, the demonstrative is attached to the adjective: goliamata reka 'the
great river'; azijatiskite varvari 'the Asiatic barbarians.' Here the transi-
tion from idiom to grammar is more clearly visible than in literary Great
Russian.
To be sure, not all grammatical elements can be so distinctly traced
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302 The Science of Idiom
to an idiom. Some inflections may have arisen in other ways. The agree-
ment of noun and adjective, for instance, in Latin termplum bonum et
magnum may be partly a mechanical echo, the syllable um serving as a
subconscious mechanism of phonetic consolidation, just as in literary
language alliteration, assonance, and rhyme help to consolidate a line of
poetry. But in all such cases, even if the agreement is an echo, a discourse-
like factor must enter the equation. Were there no semantic connection
between noun and adjective, did they not together make up a structure
of meaning, the resemblance of sound could hardly have arisen. In the
last analysis, all grammar has grown up in some manner from the coales-
cence of juxtaposed elements which in the beginning were linked together
by a syntactical, that is a semantic or discourselike vinculum. Whether
or not we are willing to accept the coalescence theory completely, even
if we realize that inflections can have developed in other psychological
ways such as the transfer of single phonemes from one word to another,
one thing is certain: all grammar has to do with sentences. In some way
or other all grammar has grown out of the sentence as a whole.
The development of analytical grammar in the European languages
affords a cogent illustration of the way by which idiom provides new
relational elements. When thought becomes obviously more complex
than language, new instruments of language must be devised. Because
relations are many and cases few, prepositions were developed to supple-
ment the cases. Because tenses and aspects of action are many and verbal
endings relatively few, auxiliaries and preverbs were developed to supple-
ment the main verbs. In similar manner, case forms and adverbs were
specialized into conjunctions, and articles arose to particularize and
generalize the nouns.
Linguists once argued over the relative merits of the synthetic and
analytic types of grammar. Such arguments, however, are of little
importance from the expressive point of view. The vital point is that the
edifice of thought be fully and explicitly represented, not scantily and
elliptically indicated. In explicitness resides the power of language,
whether that explicitness be embodied in endings, particles, compounds,
or syntatic arrangements. Ancient Greek, a highly explicit language,
employed all these methods at once. Rich in inflections, fertile in com-
pounds, replete with pronouns, prepositions, adverbs, prepositions, and
conjunctions, and possessing a variable order of words with many grada-
tions of emphasis, Greek symbolizes the contours of thought with full-
ness and precision.
All these different means of expression constitute the total idiom of
language, and by their simultaneous employment we delineate point by
point the res exprimenda. A language is best when it is most idiomatic,
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Murat H. Roberts 303
that is, most transparent, so that the thought of the speaker appears
distinctly and without linguistic distortion. The most excellent language
obtrudes itself the least; the most admirable wordings clings like a tight
garment to the body of its thought.
Albert Carnoy (Manuel de Linguistique Grecque, pp. 11-12) thus de-
scribes the explicit elegance of Greek:
Les Hellenes avaient a leur disposition une gamme tres complete de petites
particules n'allongeant pas la phrase et ne compliquant pas ses jointures de char-
nieres bruyantes, mais suivant de tres pres toutes les nuances du sentiment et
indiquant discretement les rapports existant entre les idees. Elles permettaient
d'introduire toutes les propositions exactement dans le cadre qui leur convenait.
L'abondance des formes impersonelles du verbe et des noms verbaux se pretait,
en outre, a disposer aisement toutes les idees circonstantielles autour du verbe
central et d'obtenir un degre de cohesion inconnu dans nos idiomes modernes
ou l'on doit choisir entre la periode pretentieuse et le style hache qui decoupe
brutalement la pensee.
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304 The Science of Idiom
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Murat H. Roberts 305
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306 The Science of Idiom
American English. The best field of study for the idiomatologist lies in the
subtle frontiers between almost identical languages and cultures. For
experience shows that the idiom is the first element to change, when two
languages begin to diverge from each other. This occurs because idiom
is the most intellectual, the most mobile, the most spontaneous factor
in language.
Fifty-two years ago, Georg von der Gabelentz saw the need of an in-
tegrating science which would link language to the other phenomena of
existence:
Es kann nicht anders sein: Alles muss mit Allem notwendig zusammenhiingen.
Diesen Zusammenhang zu begreifen, ist Ziel der induktiven Wissenschaft. Auch
unsere Wissenschaft hat dahin zu streben, schliesslich eine Statik und Dynamik
zu gewinnen, vermoge deren wir mit gleicher Sicherheit von den Ursachen auf
die Wirkungen, wie von den Wirkungen auf die Ursachen folgern. Jene Beziehung
zwischen der geistleiblichen Eigenart der Volker, ihren Schicksalen, Lebensbe-
dingungen und geistigen Anlagen, und ihren Sprachen, jene Beziehungen, die
wir heute mehr ahnen als nachweisen k6nnen: die miissten bis zu v6lliger Klarheit
blossgelegt werden; nichts diirfte mehr zufillig scheinen, nichts unerklart bleiben.
Wir wissen, das ist ein unerreichbares Ideal. Aber wir miissen uns unsere Ziele
so hoch stecken wie moglich. Nicht sie zu erlangen gilt es, sondern ihnen zuzu-
streben. Der Hinblick auf sie soil uns anspornen, nicht zu halsbrecherischen
Wagnis oder flimmernder Phantasterei, sondern zu streng methodischem
Forschen und zu folgerichtigem Denken. Entmutigen aber kann und darf er uns
am allerwenigsten. Unsere Wissenschaft ist noch kein Jahrhundert alt, und hat
schon herrliche Fortschritte und Errungenschaften aufzuweisen. Das wissen wir.
Wir konnen aber nicht wissen, wieviele Jahrtausende noch dem forschenden
Menschengeiste zu weiterer Arbeit verg6nnt sein m6gen.5
In the years which have elapsed since Gabelentz wrote these striking
lines, linguistic science has augmented its materials and improved its
methods in eminent degree. New possibilities are being disclosed, new
integrations discovered, new avenues explored. The time has come to
develop a science dealing with the idiomatic permutations of language at
their actual point of genesis in the mind of man.
MURAT H. ROBERTS
New York University
5 Georg von der Gabelentz, Die Sprachzoissenschaft, ihre Aufgaben, Methoden, und
bisherigen Ergebnisse (Leipzig, 1891), p. 466.
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