Evidence 1-19 Case Digest

EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST
* Question of law and fact
1. CIR vs CA (1998) - Galicinao
FACTS:
In 1980, YMCA earned an income of 676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to
small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and 44,259 from parking fees collected
from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an assessment to YMCA for deficiency taxes
which included the income from lease of YMCAs real property. YMCA formally protested the
assessment but the CIR denied the claims of YMCA. On appeal, the CTA ruled in favor of YMCA and
excluded income from lease to small shop owners and parking fees. The CIR elevated the case to the
CA which reversed the CTA ruling. YMCA filed a motion for reconsideration stating that the findings
of fact of the CTA, being supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive. The CA found
merit in the motion and reversed itself.
ISSUE:
Whether what the CA reversed was legal conclusion and not the factual finding of the CTA.
HELD:
Yes. It is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when supported by
substantial evidence, will be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the said court committed
gross error in the appreciation of facts. In the present case, this Court finds that the February 16,
1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate from this rule. The latter merely applied the law to the facts
as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised by the CIR: "Whether or not the collection or
earnings of rental income from the lease of certain premises and income earned from parking fees
shall fall under the last paragraph of Section 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as
amended." 15
Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the aforementioned issue, as
indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different from that of the CTA did not necessarily
imply a reversal of factual findings.
The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been held that
"[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts." 16 In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less change,
the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts. That its interpretation or
conclusion is different from that of the CTA is not irregular or abnormal.
1
2. Villanueva vs CA (1998) - Galicinao
FACTS:
In 1991, private respondent, Almario Go Manuel filed a civil action for sum of money with
damages before the RTC against petitioner, Felix Villanueva and his wife Melchora. The subject matter
of the action involved a check dated June 30, 1991 in the amount of P167,600.00 issued by petitioner
in favor of private respondent. The check supposedly represented payment of loans previously
obtained by petitioner from private respondent as capital for the former's mining and fertilizer
business. When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. A
demand was made upon petitioner to make good the check but he failed to do so. Private respondent
then filed a criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 before the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office and the
subject civil complaint for sum of money. Petitioner, on the other hand, avers that his principal
obligation only amounts to P23,420.00.
The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondent, but both parties appealed the decision to the CA.
The petitioner prayed for the reversal the RTCs decision and contended that his principal obligation
is only P23,420.00, while private respondent sought interest, attorneys fees, and damages. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC but also granted interest, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses to
private respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the SC, alleging issues regarding questions of fact as follows: (a) the Court of
Appeals erred in not ruling that the five (5%) and ten (10%) percent interest imposed is not enforceable
due to absence of such stipulation in writing; (b) the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that
petitioner is only liable for the amount P23,420.00; and (c) the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring
that the Central Bank and Monetary Board has no power or authority to repeal the usury law.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition should prosper
HELD:
No. Time and again it has been ruled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it
from the Court of Appeals is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such, this Court is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
The rule, however, admits of the following exceptions: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
2
*Factum porbandum and Factum probans
3. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991) - Galicinao
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in civil case entitled "Republic
of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants in the
misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail,
bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of
power; (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be incorporator, director,
board member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal
defendants; (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another, in flagrant
breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and scandalous
abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines,
embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; (4) he (petitioner) taking undue
advantage of his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform
his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and
questionable use of government funds; and (5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by
allowing himself to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or member
of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R.
Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery
of assets illegally obtained.
On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by
respondent court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of
Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public
officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities,
in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the
factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the
particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is
necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein.
In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill of particulars as
well as its resolution, dated 29 May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the
respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to
exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of
particulars; and to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner
until the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions
and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course
of law other than the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the disputed resolutions.
HELD:
3
Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of
mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact.
The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversible facts essential
to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not
the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.
The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is
perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner
allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what
petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders,
and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is supposed to
be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the
petitioner's name does not even appear in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged
"Positions and Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the complaint, above-referred
to, pertaining to petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law
and presumptions unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in
petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare
his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations,
dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as
would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the
contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the
complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him
to the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The petition
is granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set aside. The respondents are ordered
to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner, or otherwise,
respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the herein petitioner as defendant in the above-
mentioned civil case.
4
4. Fareast Marble, Inc., and Tabuenas v. CA, BPI (1993) Galicinao
FACTS:
In 1976, petitioner Fareast Marble received from private respondent (the former Commercial Trust Bank
Company which was absorbed by BPI) the following, viz:
several loans evidenced by promissory notes; AND
the former was extended by the latter credit facilities in the form of Trust Receipts;
Petitioner Tabuena (Ramon and Luis) executed in favor of BPI a continuing guaranty whereby they
bound themselves, jointly and severally, to answer for the loan obligations of Far East to the bank.
Far East failed to pay its obligations (both the promissory note and the trust receipts) and Ramon and
Luis Tabuena also did not comply with their solidary liability under the continuing guaranty. As a result, in
1987, private respondent BPI filed a complaint for foreclosure of chattel mortgage with replevin against
petitioners.
Far East filed a compulsory counterclaim where it admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the promissory notes but alleged further that it has already prescribed, so it raised the defense of
prescription and lack of cause of action; it also denied that BPI made prior demands for payment;
BPI filed an opposition to the motion to hear affirmative defenses, alleging that its cause of
action against Far East have not prescribed, since within 10 year from the time its cause of action
accrued, various written extrajudicial demands were made by BPI to Far East.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of cause of action and on grounds of prescription.
BPI filed an appeal and the CA ruled in its favor and remanded the case for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the interruption of the prescriptive period to institute an action is an ULTIMATE
FACT which had to be expressly and indispensably pleaded by BPI in its complaint, and that failure
to so alleged such circumstance is fatal to BPI's cause of action.
HELD:
NO. Section 3 of Rule 6 state that a "complaint is a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action." Further elaborating thereon, Section 1 of Rule
8 declares that every pleading, including, of course, a complaint, "shall contain in a methodical and
logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts . . . omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts." "Ultimate facts" are the essential and substantial facts which either form the
basis of the primary right and duty or which directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the
defendant (Tantuico, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., et al., 204 SCRA 428 [1991]), while "evidentiary
facts" are those which tend to prove or establish said ultimate facts.
Clearly then, the general allegation of BPI that "despite repeated requests and demands for payment,
Far East has failed to pay" is sufficient to establish BPI's cause of action. Besides, prescription is not
a cause of action; it is a defense which, having been raised, should be supported by competent
evidence. But even as Far East raised the defense of prescription, BPI countered to the effect that the
prescriptive period was interrupted and renewed by written extrajudicial demands for payment and
acknowledgment by Far East of the debt.
A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the
allegation may be vague or indefinite, for in such case, the recourse of the defendant would be to file
a motion for a bill of particulars. It is indeed the better rule that, pleadings, as well as remedial laws,
should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims so as to avoid possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities.
In the case at bar, the circumstances of BPI extending loans and credits to Far East and the failure
of the latter to pay and discharge the same upon maturity are the only ultimate facts which have to
be pleaded, although the facts necessary to make the mortgage valid enforceable must be proven
during the trial
5
* Uses of Evidence
5. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. 90478 - Jacinto
FACTS:
PCGG filed a complaint against private respondents Tantoco , Jr. and Santiago together with the
Marcoses for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages, and was avowedly filed
pursuant to Executive Order no. 14 of President Corazon Aquino before the Sandiganbayan. After the
case was set for pre-trial, the defendant filed a pleading denominated interrogatories to the plaintiff,
amended interrogatories to plaintiff, as well as Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents
relevant to the issue of the case. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the pleading
contending that the interrogatories are defective because they do not name the particular individuals
to whom they are propounded, being only addressed to the PCGG and are the same matters(private
respondents) sought to be clarified through their Bill of Particulars. Secondly, it contended that the
interrogatories deal with factual matters which will be part of the PCGGs proof upon trial. As to the
Motion for Production and Inspections of Documents, the plaintiff prayed for the nullity of the
pleading contending there is no good cause in the production of the documents sought for.
Furthermore, it contended that some of the documents are non-existent. The Court decided in favor
of the defendants motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the interrogatories to the plaintiff and Motion for the Production and
Inspection of Documents were in accordance with the Rules of Court as to consider it to be valid
HELD:
YES. The Court ruled in favor of the defendant.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-
trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. The inquiry extends
to all facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those matters
which are privileged
The first part of petitioner's submission is adequately confuted by Section 1, Rule 25 which states
that if the party served with interrogatories is a juridical entity such as "a public or private corporation
or a partnership or association," the same shall be "answered . . by any officer thereof competent to
testify in its behalf."
As to the second contention, the Court opined that as already pointed out, it is the precise purpose
of discovery to ensure mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts on the part of all parties even before
trial, this being deemed essential to proper litigation. This is why either party may compel the other
to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession; and the stage at which disclosure of evidence is
made is advanced from the time of trial to the period preceding it.
As to the Motion for the Production and Inspection of Documents, the court ruled that t, contrary to
the petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the production and inspection of the documents subject
of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some of the documents are, according to the verification of
the amended complaint, the basis of several of the material allegations of said complaint. Others,
admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which inquiry
is precisely allowed by the rules of discovery, to the end that the parties may adequately prepare for
pre-trial and trial. The only other documents sought to be produced are needed in relation to the
allegations of the counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their disclosure may not be opposed.
6
6. FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION - Jacinto
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City disallowing the
taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the chairman of the Board Directors of private respondent. An action for breach
of contract was filed by the petitioner against the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer petitioner served them with written
interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9, February 12 and April 22, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the latter that
petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent filed an Urgent Motion
Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiffs Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination alleging that: a) petitioner has
previously availed of one mode of discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral
deposition, c) such taking would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, d) deponent has no
intention of leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is available to testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits.
Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope appears unwarranted
since the proposed deponent had already responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has signified his availability to testify
in court. The petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to the CA for further adjudication on the merits.
CA ruled dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if
there are valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the right of the party
to take depositions as means of discovery is not absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had earlier responded to the written
interrogatories; b)deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the deposition would deprive the trial court of the
opportunity to ask clarificatory question.
With the denial of the petitioners MFR the instant petition was filed with the SC.
ISSUE: 1.WON that the decision of respondent court dismissing its petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the proper
remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such ruling is based on facts which are not obtaining in the case at bar, viz.: (a) that
petitioner had already obtained a deposition, which it had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as evidence, which was not done because
there was nothing yet to offer, and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen because there was nothing to reject as nothing
was offered.
2. WON the trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the deposition be not taken in the absence of good cause therefor. It
asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court cannot
be considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law, which reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the proposed deponent had earlier
responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in court; and (c) that to allow
the deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital witness.
HELD: The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment of the judiciarys
primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases. The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the conceded inadequacy
and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue formulation and face revelation theretofore performs primarily by the
pleadings. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a device, along with the pretrial hearing under Rule 20,
to narrow and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The evident
purpose is to enable the parties consistent with recognized privileges to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered by depositions
or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify orally at trial.
I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by
any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among
others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes the authority
to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is well settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited: that it must
be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously, or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the
end that its purpose may be attained.
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. 11 This is because,
like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, 12 considering that they do not
finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary
acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does
not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the
remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. It is our considered opinion that on the bases
of circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, and which will hereinafter be discussed, certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned
order of the trial court. SC ruled that certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court.
II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29 imposes serious
sanctions on the party who refuses to comply with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as dismissing his action or proceeding or
part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party;
payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into
as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
7
designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings. Section 16 of Rule 24 clearly
states that it is only upon notice and for good cause shown that the court may order that the deposition shall not be taken. The matter of
good cause is to be determined by the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. The requirement, however, that good cause be shown for
a protective order puts the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific
demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance of a protective
order. 16 What constitutes good cause furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is sought.
The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of the deposition, nor
that whatever the witness knows is protected by the "work product doctrine," nor that privileged information or trade secrets will be sought
in the course of the examination, nor that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in writing. 18 In the present case, private
respondent failed to sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be
taken.
1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken after service of interrogatories, the courts took a relatively liberal view. In
Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which this question was raised, Judge Hilbert said that:
"Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in a proper case should
exercise, discretion to permit an oral examination. But it should be made to clearly appear that the relevant subject matter will not involve
the interrogation of the witness with respect to those particulars upon which he was examined by interrogatories." It is quite clear, therefore,
and we so hold that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent
use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other
party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence.
2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that his deposition
shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in
court during the trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed in taking
depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use. Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact investigation, our legal
system is now thoroughly committed to the notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva voce testimony of witnesses whose
demeanor and manner are subject to the observation of the judge is superior to the use of written statements of the same witnesses.
Preference for oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use of depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence
was originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper, the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the limitations on their
use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery with use on
trial not necessarily contemplated and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than relevancy and privilege
have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral
testimony wherever practicable.
3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe the behavior
of the deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent when we
consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap being common to all depositions alike. Finally, in
the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support
the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are
complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed;
(c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party.
4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot
ably support the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following requirements are
complied with: (a) that there is a motion made by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the motion has been seasonably filed;
(c) that there is good cause shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to the other party. Inconvenience to the party whose
deposition is to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his deposition. 32 No doubt, private respondent and its representative who
is to be examined will be inconvenienced as are all parties when required to submit to examination but this is no ground for denial of
the deposition-discovery process.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing an
order that the deposition shall not be taken in this case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the same.
8
*Admissibility and weight or credibility of evidence
7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABELARDO PARUNGAO (1996) - Jacinto
FACTS:
Parungao was arraigned and tried separately for the information filed against him and the
other 15 jail-breakers of the Provincial Jail of Pampanga of the crime of robbery with homicide upon
which on the incident of the jailbreak 2 jail guards were killed on the discharge of their duties and of
the missing 6 firearms and for serious physical injury caused to the other jail guard, he was convicted
as a co-conspirator and principal by inducement. Unsatisfied with the lower court's ruling hence the
case was elevated to the CA upon which the accused contended that the testimonies of the 4 witnesses
presented by the prosecution are merely hearsays of which the witnesses testified and conveyed
matters to court that are not of their own personal knowledge and were merely narrated to them with
the other detainees.
ISSUE: W/N hearsay evidence are admissible.
HELD: The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to
hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into
thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not be given credence for it has no probative value.
Plainly the foregoing testimony of Quito, Pilapil, and Aldana that accused-appellant was the
mastermind of the jailbreak is not sufficient to prove such fact, such evidence being merely hearsay
because said witnesses testified and conveyed to the court matters not of their own personal
knowledge but matters only narrated
The court also emphasizes that the trial court gravely erred in giving weight to the hearsay evidence
that was presented since it is violative of the hearsay rule and same was unconstitutional for said
act-the accused was not given an opportunity to meet the witnesses face-to-face and to subject the
source of the information to the rigid test of cross-examination. Conspiracy against the accused-
appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The court ruled in favor of the accused acquitting the latter of the crime charged.
9
8. PRATS & COMPANY VS. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY
FACTS: Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership instituted an action in the RTC of the City of Manila
for recovery from the Phoenix Insurance Co. the sum of P117, 800.60 with interest, by reason of a
loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff from a fire for said loss was covered by insurance
issued by the defendant company. Phoenix Insurance admitted the insurance of the insurance but
by way of special defense, alleged that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff, or with its
connivance, and the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss
in contravention of the express terms of the policy. The trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint with respect to the obligation created by the policy but ordered the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P11, 731.93 with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys
received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of remnants of the insured stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or connived therein and submitted
fraudulent proof as the trial judge found.
HELD: YES. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure manipulations were
used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of
the contents of the bodega before the fire. It appears that cases of old stock were shipped to Manila
before the fire but instead of being taken directly to the bodega they were housed for a time in the
back part of the lower floor where the petitioner had office. Also, the manipulation of one of their
people to attend to the alarm box not to allow others to touch it and reasoned out that he already
have done it, when in fact the fire chief noticed that it was never touched and he himself turned on
the alarm. The finding of the trial court in the effect that plaintiff had submitted false proof in the
support of his claim is also well founded. First, the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in
the fire as of a value of P 12,800 when the true value of the said jewelry was about P 600; and
secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to recover from the insurance company the value of the goods
which had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. As a conclusion, not
only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connive therein, but also that it submitted
fraudulent proof.
The court commends the maintenance of a liberal attitude on the part of trial judges in the matter of
admission of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality, or
relevancy, or technical objections to the questions, should be avoided.
10
*Classification of Evidence
9. People vs. Precioso (Gr No. 95890, 12 May 1993) - Robinos
Facts: Accused Precioso and Monforte were held guilty of the crime of robbery in band with rape.
They appealed, on the contention that the trial court erred in (1)finding that the guilt of the accused
had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; (2) ruling that the two accused had been positively
identified by the rape victims, allegedly basing its decision not on a correct findings of facts but on
inferences, surmises and presumptions; and (3) finding no motive or reason whatsoever the
complainants to charge the accused, its decision being supposedly contrary to the common
experience of man, the natural course of events, and existing jurisprudence.
The facts are as follows:
The accused, wearing masks that covered their faces, robbed the store and then the house of the
Galvadores. They first woke Leah Alimpoos in the store. The latter started to recognize Precioso in his
voice and general physical appearance. They escorted Alimpoos to the house. They told her to wake
the Galvadores couple. Suddenly, Teresita Pescador was also awakened, and recognized Precioso
through his voice, clothes, and physical appearance.
Precioso raped Alimpoos in the store, thereby removing his mask making the latter recognize him. On
the other hand, Monforte raped Pescador in the pigpen at the house. The latter scratched the formers
face, thus his masked was removed.
Issue/s: Whether or not the witnesses and their testimonies are credible. (Yes)
Held: The transcripts of the notes taken at the trial reveal that the witnesses for the prosecution
testified in a clear, consistent and forthright manner. The testimonies of the complainants were
basically congruent with and mutually corroborative of each other, and were confirmed by those of
the other prosecution witnesses. Their minor errors and inconsistencies do not affect the substance
of their declaration or adversely reflect on their veracity.
In contrast, the testimonies of appellants consist merely of denials and alibi, without any other
credible evidence to sustain their exculpatory claims and defense. The Supreme Court consistently
ruled that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the
testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserve more credence.
Appellants further argue that they were not properly identified. However, the records show that
Precioso and Monforte were positively identified by the two rape victims in a police line-up and in
open court. They were further definitely identified by complainant Irene Galvadores and her husband,
complainant Rafael Galvadores. All these witnesses had sufficient time and ample opportunity to
recognize and identify appellants. In People vs. Calixtro, the Supreme Court ruled that private
complainant's identification of the accused through the latter's voice may be accepted considering
that they are barriomates and friends. Here, with much more reason can we accept the identification
of appellants since the prosecution witnesses not only heard their voices but actually saw their faces.
The Supreme Court also gather from the evidence that the complainants have no ill motives or
any plausible reason whatsoever to impute the commission of such serious offenses upon appellants
11
if, in truth, the latter are guiltless as claimed. Accordingly, as the Supreme Court have held in a
number of cases, the absence of evidence of any improper motive impelling the principal witness
sustains the conclusion that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
The foregoing doctrine squarely applies to the multiple rapes committed by appellants on their
two victims. Furthermore, considering the inbred modesty and antipathy of a Filipina to airing in
public things that affect her honor, it is hard to conceive that the complainant would assume and
admit the ignominy she had undergone if it were not true. Complainants Leah Alimpoos and Teresita
Pescador, both young barrio girls, would not have publicly admitted that they had been criminally
ravished if that was not true, for their natural instinct is to protect their honor. Their testimony given
at a public trial wherein they narrated their ordeal with all the sordid details thereof, as synthesized
in appellee's brief and set forth earlier could not have been conjured and fabricated by these hapless
and innocent victims.
The defense of alibi interposed by appellants is evidentially sterile and jurisprudentially weak
as they were not able to demonstrate by convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The defense of alibi is an
issue of fact that hinges on credibility, and is an unavailing defense especially if contradicted by
eyewitness testimony.
Precioso claimed that when the crime was committed, he was sleeping in the house of his
grandmother, but said house is admittedly only around 150 meters away from the house of the
Galvadores spouses. His pretension, therefore, cannot be sustained in the face of the settled rule that
it is not enough to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must
likewise show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
Monforte, on the other hand, would like to convince the trial court that he was working at the
time. However, the lower court correctly made short shrift of said defense with this terse documented
observation: "Gerardo Monforte also negated the accusation, giving as a reason thereof that they had
overtime at the bandsaw of Lucio Cortes that fateful evening. Nonetheless, the prosecution on
rebuttal, presented a (c)ertification that at the time of the incident, there was no operation at the
Cortes' bandsaw because their electrical power was disconnected by ASELCO on July 25, 1985 (Exhs.
"H" and "H-1") and reconnected only on August 12, 1985 (Exhs. "I" and "I-1") for non-payment of
electric bills. (TSN, p. 4 & E, . . . August 8, 1989). Not a tiny thread of evidence was introduced to
contradict this vital aspect nor was it shown that the Cortez sawmill has its own source of electric
power or generator. As a matter of fact, sole reliance on the ASELCO electric current was confirmed
by defense witness, Francisco Bolanio (TSN, p. 19, . . . September 12, 1982).
Finally, appellant Precioso's assertion that "(a) man who is guilty flees. But being a close friend
and confidant, accused Rolando Precioso remained and helped the robbery victim load the latter's
things preparatory to their evacuation," is a simple pettifogging argument to evade complicity. This
uncorroborated imposture was categorically belied by complainant Leah Alimpoos.
Furthermore, we have ruled that an accused may not have fled from the scene of the crime,
but this is not necessarily indicative of a clear conscience. The crime may have been committed with
impunity and the accused may have thought that the victim or his heirs would not complain, or that
eyewitnesses will not be able to identify him. Appellant's pretended innocence is clearly non-
sequitur to his decision not to flee. Apart from the fact that there is no case law holding that non-
flight is a conclusive proof of innocence, the argument does not hold weight in the light of definite
and inarguable identification of appellant. The material factor here is that, there is positive
identification of him as the author of the crime.
12
*Judicial Notice
10. Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (GR No.152392, 26 May 2005) - Robinos
Facts: Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and has
been granted license to do business in the Philippines. On 6 September 1999, KAL, through its legal counsel,
Atty. Mario Aguinaldo filed a complaint against Expertravel & Tours, Inc. (ETI) with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, for the collection of sum of money totaling PhP260,150.00 plus attorney's fees and exemplary
damages. The complaint was attached with verification and certificate of non-forum shopping wherein indicated
that Atty. Aguinaldo is the agent and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the said complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute
the above-mentioned verification and non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court. KAL, thereafter, opposed the motion contending that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was
registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It was also alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo
also served as the company's corporate secretary.
During the hearing, Atty Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through the
resolution approved by the KAL Board of Directors during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Thereafter.
KAL submitted an Affidavit executed by its General Manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that the board of directors
conducted a special teleconference which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also averred that in that
Teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the said complaint. Furthermore, Su Kyoo Kim alleged that the
corporation had no written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
The Trial Court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo
and Su Kyoo Kim. ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order alleging that it is inappropriate for
the court to take judicial notice of the said teleconference without any prior hearing.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition and ruling that the verification and certificate
of non-forum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court.
Issue/s: Is the petitioner correct in assailing that until and after teleconferencing is recognized as a legitimate
means of conducting meetings, gathering quorum of board of directors, such cannot be taken judicial notice of
by the court? (Yes)
Held: Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind
as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known,
and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided,
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety
of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court
has no constructive knowledge.
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made
by individuals through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more
people in two or more locations) through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring
people together under one roof even though they are separated by hundreds of miles. This type of group
communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-
like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed communication through
13
keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional capacity
for telewriting or telecopying.
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was first introduced in the
1960s with American Telephone and Telegraphs Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for
the new technology. Travel costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly service
charge for using the picturephone, which was regarded as more of a novelty than as an actual means for
everyday communication. In time, people found it advantageous to hold teleconferencing in the course of
business and corporate governance, because of the money saved, among other advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldnt normally attend a distant FTF meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are shorter and more oriented to the
primary purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference from any location equipped with a
telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.
6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate teleconferencing.
7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information exchange, and procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences than an FTF meeting.
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because of the following
disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that arent made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person monopolizes the meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible.
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of group
communication. Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to
miscommunicate. Teleconferencing cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private
corporations is a reality, in light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related
to such conferences. Thus, the Court agrees with the RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a
teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business transactions or corporate
governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with
the respondents Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been
one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty.
Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent
failed to comply with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December
1, 1999, on its contention that Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its behalf. The
respondent, however, failed to establish its claim that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines.
Even the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo which the respondent appended to its pleading merely showed
that he is the company lawyer of the respondents Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during the hearing
of January 28, 2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to
submit the board resolution purportedly authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required
certification against forum shopping. The court granted the motion. The respondent, however, failed to comply,
and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said resolution, contending that it was with its main office
in Korea. The court granted the motion per its Order dated February 11, 2000. The respondent again prayed
for an extension within which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000. It was on the said date that
the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty.
14
Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly
approved the following resolution:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its lawyers are
hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect the collection of the
unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend,
sign and execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend
the Pre-trial Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim
But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent do[es] not keep a written copy of
the aforesaid Resolution because no records of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept.
This belied the respondents earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion for extension of time to submit
the questioned resolution that it was in the custody of its main office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial
court the impression that it needed time to secure a copy of the resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later
(via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no such written copy. Moreover, Suk Kyoo Kim stated in his
affidavit that the resolution was embodied in the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo. However, no such resolution was appended to the said certificate.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999 and
approved the said resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that no
such allegation was made in the complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999, long
before the complaint was filed, the respondent should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended
a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed,
for the first time, that there was such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on June 25, 1999; it even
represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege later that
no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged, for the first time, that the
meeting of the Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a Secretarys/Resident
Agents Certificate alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate
was appended to the complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1999. More importantly, the respondent did
not explain why the said certificate was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was
notarized one year later (on January 10, 2000); it also did not explain its failure to append the said certificate
to the complaint, as well as to its Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It was only on January 26, 2001 when the
respondent filed its comment in the CA that it submitted the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate dated
January 10, 2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took place,
and that the resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the said teleconference
was a mere concoction purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its
complaint against the petitioner.
15
11. Estrada vs. Desierto (GR No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001) - Robinos
Facts: Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998
with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a close friend of the President,
alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account
known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game. Singsons allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked
the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment
court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded not
guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow
at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be
held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not
run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying
that Estrada constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his office
to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a
peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioners allegation against respondent Ombudsman is meritorious. (No)
16
Held: The evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports
referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of
the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good
faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the
theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows
to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors
the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by
their superiors. They can be reversed but they cannot be compelled cases which they believe deserve
dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot
machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner
and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still
has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines
to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty social science evidence to
successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the
cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by
the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias
because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come
out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be
unfavorable to the petitioner.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability
of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco, we hold that this
Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government. Or to use the language
in Baker vs. Carr, there is a textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it. Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of
inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided by
this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.
That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
17
*Judicial Admissions
12. Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. V. Estrada (2008) - Janz
G.R. No. 171052
Facts:
Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare) formally appointed Estrada as its General
Agent evidenced by a letter-agreement granting her a commission equivalent to: 15 to 18% from individual,
family, group accounts.
Maxicare had a "franchising system" in dealing with its agents whereby an agent had to first secure
permission from to list a prospective company as client.
MERALCO account was included as corporate accounts applied by Estrada
Estrada submitted proposals and made representations to the officers of MERALCO regarding the MAXICARE
Plan but MERALCO directly negotiated with MAXICARE and was renewed twice for a term of 3 years each
March 24, 1992: Estrada through counsel demanded his commission for the MERALCO account and 9 other
accounts but it was denied by MAXICARE because he was not given a go signal to intervene in the negotiations
for the terms and conditions
RTC: Maxicare liable for breach of contract and ordered it to pay Estrada actual damages.
CA: Affirmed
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts disregarded Estradas admission that the negotiations with Meralco
failed.
Held:
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission
is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was
in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission.
For instance, if a party invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites the admission out of context,
then the one making the admission may show that he made no such admission, or that his admission was taken
out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear. That is
the reason for the modifier such.
There is no dispute as to the role that plaintiff-appellee [Estrada] played in selling [Maxicares] health
insurance plan to Meralco. Plaintiff-appellee [Estradas] efforts consisted in being the first to offer the Maxicare
plan to Meralco, using her connections with some of Meralco Executives, inviting said executives to dinner
meetings, making submissions and representations regarding the health plan, sending follow-up letters, etc.
These efforts were recognized by Meralco as shown by the certification issued by its Manpower Planning
and Research Staff.
This Court finds that plaintiff-appellee [Estradas] efforts were instrumental in introducing the Meralco
account to [Maxicare] in regard to the latters Maxicare health insurance plans. Plaintiff-appellee [Estrada] was
the efficient intervening cause in bringing about the service agreement with Meralco. As pointed out by the trial
court in its October 8, 1999 Decision, to wit:
Had not [Estrada] introduced Maxicare Plans to her bosom friends, Messrs. Lopez and Guingona of
Meralco, PHPI would still be an anonymity.
In this case, the letter, although part of Estradas Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an admission of the
statements contained therein, especially since the bone of contention relates to Estradas entitlement to
commissions for the sale of health plans she claims to have brokered. It is more than obvious from the entirety
of the records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently declared that her involvement as broker is the
proximate cause which consummated the sale between Meralco and Maxicare.
The petition is hereby DENIED.
18
13. UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION VS. CA (33 SCRA 1) - Janz

Facts:
In 1938, plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. discovered a formula for the manufacture of a food seasoning
(sauce) derived from banana fruits popularly known as MAFRAN sauce. It was used commercially since 1942,
and in the same year plaintiff registered his trademark in his name as owner and inventor with the Bureau of
Patents. However, due to lack of sufficient capital to finance the expansion of the business, in 1960, said
plaintiff secured the financial assistance of Tirso T. Reyes who, after a series of negotiations, formed with others
defendant Universal Food Corporation eventually leading to the execution on May 11, 1960 of the aforequoted
"Bill of Assignment"
On May 31, 1960, Magdalo Francisco entered into contract with UFC stipulating among other things
that he be the Chief Chemist and Second Vice-President of UFC and shall have absolute control and supervision
over the laboratory assistants and personnel and in the purchase and safekeeping of the chemicals used in the
preparation of said Mafran sauce and that said positions are permanent in nature.
Thereafter, however, due to the alleged scarcity and high prices of raw materials, Secretary-Treasurer
of UFC issued a Memorandum duly approved by the President and General Manager Tirso T. Reyes that only
Supervisor Ricardo Francisco should be retained in the factory and that the salary of plaintiff Magdalo V.
Francisco, Sr., should be stopped for the time being until the corporation should resume its operation. On
December 3, 1960, President and General Manager Tirso T. Reyes, issued a memorandum to Victoriano
Francisco ordering him to report to the factory and produce "Mafran Sauce" at the rate of not less than 100
cases a day so as to cope with the orders of the corporation's various distributors and dealers, and with
instructions to take only the necessary daily employees without employing permanent employees. Again, on
December 6, 1961, another memorandum was issued by the same President and General Manager instructing
the Assistant Chief Chemist Ricardo Francisco, to recall all daily employees who are connected in the production
of Mafran Sauce and also some additional daily employees for the production of Porky Pops. On December 29,
1960, another memorandum was issued by the President and General Manager instructing Ricardo Francisco,
as Chief Chemist, and Porfirio Zarraga, as Acting Superintendent, to produce Mafran Sauce and Porky Pops in
full swing starting January 2, 1961 with further instructions to hire daily laborers in order to cope with the full
blast operation. Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. received his salary as Chief Chemist in the amount of P300.00 a
month only until his services were terminated on November 30, 1960. On January 9 and 16, 1961, UFC, acting
thru its President and General Manager, authorized Porfirio Zarraga and Paula de Bacula to look for a buyer of
the corporation including its trademarks, formula and assets at a price of not less than P300,000.00. Due to
these successive memoranda, without plaintiff Magdalo V. Francisco, Sr. being recalled back to work, he filed
the present action on February 14, 1961. Then in a letter dated March 20, 1961, UFC requested said plaintiff
to report for duty, but the latter declined the request because the present action was already filed in court.It is
alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint that what was ceded and transferred by virtue of the Bill
of Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the formula itself).
It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the respondents' complaint that what was ceded and transferred by virtue
of the Bill of Assignment is the "use of the formula" (and not the formula itself)
Issue:
WON UFC made a judicial admission
Held:
YES. The last part of paragraph 3 of the complaint and paragraph 3 of the answer are reproduced below
for ready reference:
3. ... and due to these privileges, the plaintiff in return assigned to said corporation his interest and rights
over the said trademark and formula so that the defendant corporation could use the formula in the preparation
and manufacture of the mafran sauce, and the trade name for the marketing of said project, as appearing in
said contract ....
3. Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint.
This incontrovertible fact is admitted without equivocation in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's answer.
Hence, it does "not require proof and cannot be contradicted.
19
*Relevance and conditional admissibility

14. Prats & Company vs. Phoenix Insurance Company (1929) Supra (No.8) Janz
Add info: EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE; LIBERAL ATTITUDE INDICATED.The court
commends the maintenance of a liberal attitude on the part of trial judges in the matter of admission
of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality, or relevancy, or
technical objections to the questions, should be avoided.
15. People vs Abalos. 30 scra 599

Facts:
An information was filed with said court, presided over by respondent Judge, accusing Mohammad
Ussam Dambong, et al., of the crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi Maoludani and Maoludani Habissi,
with multiple frustrated murder upon the persons of allegedly committed. When the case was called for trial,
the prosecution introduced evidence tending to show that defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong had, on
February 6, 1961, gone to the place aforementioned, accompanied by his co-defendants, and then fired at and
killed Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani, as well as shot and wounded the other persons named in
the information. After the reception of said evidence for the prosecution, the defense proceeded with the
presentation of its own evidence, in the course of which, defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that
the casualties and the injuries adverted to above were due to shots fired, not by him, but by Abdulkadil Habbisi
because, as a police sergeant in the performance of his duty, he (Mohammad Ussam Dambong) had merely fired
into the air, to stop a fight between two (2) groups of persons, to one of which the victims belonged. The defense
having, thereafter, completed the introduction of its evidence, on April 24, 1968, the prosecution called Majid
Andi as rebuttal witness.
After the preliminary questions propounded to him, the defense objected to further questions, The
prosecutor having announced that Madjid Andi would be its last witness and that he (prosecutor) would appeal
from the resolution of the court as soon as copy thereof had been furnished him, respondent Judge incorporated
his aforementioned resolution in an order, dated May 2, 1968, directing that the testimony of said witness, be
"discarded from the records on the ground that the testimony are answers to questions not proper in rebuttal"
and stating that "from the observation of the Court, the witness in rebuttal should have been presented as a
witness in the presentation of the evidence in chief of the prosecutor", and declaring that the case would be
deemed submitted for decision on May 15, 1968, unless the parties sought permission to file memoranda on or
before said date.
The prosecution presented evidence to show that the accused killed the persons mentioned in the
information, as well as wounded several other specified persons. The accused presented evidence to establish
the contrarythat he did not kill or wound said persons. He, however, went further, by testifying that it was
AH who killed and wounded the persons.
ISSUE:
May the prosecution present the testimony of MA as rebuttal evidence to show that it was the accused,
not AH who committed the crime alleged in the Information?
HELD:
Yes. The evidence of the accused that it was AH who killed and wounded the persons mentioned in the
information was a new matter not covered directly by the evidence for the prosecution It is true that if it was
the accused who caused the deaths and the injuries alleged, it would follow that AH was ot the author thereof.
The prosecution was entitled, however. as a matter of strict legal right, to introduce positive evidence to this
effect, instead of relying upon a mere inference from its evidence in chief.
Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the parties should be allowed to introduce
evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolutions on these matters are interlocutory in nature and will not generally
be reviewed, except on appeal taken from a decision rendered on the merits. Judicial discretion, however, is not
unlimited. It must be exercised reasonably, with a view to promoting the ends of justice, one of which is to
ascertain the truth.
As a matter of general practice, it is deemed best to resolve doubts in favor of the admission of the
contested evidence, without prejudice to such action as the court may deem fit to take in deciding the case on
the merits. This practice has added importance as regards the evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases,
for, once the accused has been acquitted, there is no means to secure a review by appeal, no matter how
erroneous the action of the lower court may have been.
20
*Object of Evidence
16. G.R. No. 109140. March 8, 1995.

PEOPLE vs TACIPIT - Vasquez
FACTS:
1. The complainant, Onelia Pamittan, was a 17-year old high school student at the Abulug School
of Fisheries in Abulug, Cagayan at the time of the commission of the offense.
2. In the afternoon of January 3, 1991, Eden, her friend, invited some of her friends, including
the complainant, over to her house.
3. When the group arrived at Eden's house, at about 4:30 p.m., Roland Tacipit was already there
with Eden's brother, Elmer Molina, the latter being a friend and co-worker of the accused.
4. According to the complainant, as she was about to leave the Molina house, the accused
restrained her, held her left hand and her notebooks and told her friends to go ahead. Despite her
cries and pleas for help, the owners of the house did nothing to help her.
5. On the other hand, defense witness Elmer Molina alleged that the complainant and the
accused were sweethearts. They left the house together, with their hands over each other's shoulders.
At any rate, it is undisputed that the complainant left the Molina household with the accused.
6. On the way, they passed through a coconut plantation. There, the accused committed the
alleged rape tearing her clothes.
7. After the carnal act, the accused accompanied the complainant to a point near her home and
before leaving her, threatened to kill her or her family if she reports the matter to anyone.
8. The complainant, however, did not heed the warning and immediately upon arriving at her
house, reported the incident to her uncle.
9. The following day, the complainant accompanied by her mother, aunt and cousin, reported the
incident to the police at the municipal building.
10. She submitted her clothing for examination and after being investigated, submitted herself for
medical examination.
11. After executing a sworn statement narrating the circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime and filed the corresponding complaint for rape and after a thorough investigation the
municipal trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.
As his defense, the accused claimed that he and the complainant were sweethearts since October
3, 1990 and that the complainant voluntarily yielded herself to him. As proof of their relationship,
the accused presented a ring engraved with the name "Onelia" and alleged that it was given to him
by the complainant as a token of her love. Defense witness Elmer Molina corroborated the
testimony of the accused, stating that he courted the complainant but was spurned by her because
she was already the accused's sweetheart.
On the other hand, these contentions were firmly denied by the prosecution. The complainant
testified that she knew the accused to be a married man and he never visited her house to court her.
She also denied that Elmer Molina courted her or that she told him that he was the accused's
girlfriend. As for the ring, the complainant denied ownership thereof. True enough, when the ring
was tried on her hand, it was loose and did not fit her finger.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tacipit is guilty of the crime rape.
21
HELD:
Yes. For one, although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of the
complainant, the clothes worn by her at the time of the offense speak well of the use of force and the
presence of a struggle. As the trial court noted: Her T-shirt was torn which corroborates her
testimony that it was forcibly removed. It also proves that she offered resistance to the criminal
advances of the accused. Her shorts, like her panty, had blood stains. Her panty was detached from
her shorts. Her bra was torn, also denoting that it was forcibly removed. These physical evidence x x
x are consistent only with the force and compulsion applied on her; they prove she offered resistance
and her defloration was against her will.
Thus, the accuseds reliance on the defense that he and the complainant were lovers is unfounded.
But even if it were true, such relationship would not give the accused the license to deflower the
complainant against her will, and will not exonerate him from the criminal charge for rape.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the testimonies of either the complainant or even the accused himself
which could indicate any sort of special relationship between the two. The alleged proof of such
relationship, the ring with complainants name engraved on it, does not even fit the fingers of the
complainant. Their actuations with respect to each other before, during and even after the
commission of the crime were consistent with the contention of the complainant that they are nothing
more than acquaintances. The evidence of the prosecution, therefore, completely negates the
existence of any relationship between the accused and the complainant. People vs. Tacipit, 242 SCRA
241, G.R. No. 109140 March 8, 1995
22
17. EMETERIA VILLAFLOR vs Summers 42 PHIL 62 - Vazquez
The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.
FACTS:
1. In a criminal case pending before the CFI of Manila, EMETERIA VILLAFLOR and FLORENTINO
SOUINGCO are charged with the crime of adultery.
2. On this case the court ordered the defendant Villaflor, petitioner herein, to submit her body to
the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not.
3. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was
a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.
4. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be imprisoned in Bilibid
Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court.
5. The sole legal issue arising from the facts is whether the compelling of a woman to permit her
body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant, violates that portion of the
Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of the Code of Criminal Procedure which find their origin in
the Constitution of the United States, providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.
6. Counsel for petitioner argues that such bodily exhibition is an infringement of the
constitutional provision; the representative of the city fiscal contends that it is not an infringement of
the constitutional provision.
7. The trial judge in the instant case has held with the fiscal; while it is brought to our notice that
a judge of the same court has held on an identical question as contended for by the attorney for the
accused and petitioner.
ISSUE: WON compelling a woman to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant

violates her right against self-incrimination.
HELD:
NO. Obviously a stirring plea can be made showing that under the due process of law clause
of the Constitution every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his
own body. It is extremely abhorrent to one's sense of decency and propriety to have to decide that
such inviolability of the person, particularly of a woman, can be invaded by exposure to another's
gaze. As Mr. Justice Gray in Union Pacific Railway Co. vs.Botsford said, "To compel any one, and
especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the touch of a stranger, without lawful
authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass." Conceded, and yet, as well suggested by the
same court, even superior to the complete immunity of a person to be let alone is the interest which
the public has in the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, all too frequently the modesty
of witnesses is shocked by forcing them to answer, without any mental evasion, questions which are
put to them; and such a tendency to degrade the witness in public estimation does not exempt him
from the duty of disclosure. Between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal
considerations, between a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and
justice cannot hesitate.
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first impression
is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the constitutional provision in this
jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental
influences. Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper
showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.
23
*Demonstrative Evidence
18. G.R. No. 104383. July 12, 2001

PEOPLE vs AMESTUZO
FACTS:
1. On February 26, 1991, four days after a reported robbery with multiple rape, a group of policemen together with accused Federico
Ampatin, who was then a suspect, went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where accused-appellant was working
as a stay-in shell cutter.
2. They were looking for a certain "Mario" and "searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing to find said Mario, the
police hit Ampatin at the back of his neck with a gun and uttered, "Niloloko lang yata tayo ng taong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao
kahit sino."
3. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look
upon.
4. Thereafter, Bagas was arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin.
5. They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan Cityand placed under detention together with the other two accused,
Amestuzo and Vias.
6. When the complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to the left and then to the right and he
was asked to talk.
7. Complainant Lacsamana asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Vias.
8. Accused-appellant answered in the negative.
9. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional
frenzy, kicking and hitting him.
10. The accused were convicted by the trial court and from the judgment of conviction by the trial court, only herein accused-
appellant Bagas appealed to this Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1) the alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be
represented by counsel during his identification, (2) the trial courts error in giving due weight to the open court
identification of him which was based on a suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification, and (3) the trial courts
improper rejection of his defense of alibi.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant to the complainants.
Whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting Bagas defense of alibi.
HELD:
NO. The Court agree that complainants out-of-court identification of accused-appellant was seriously flawed as to preclude its
admissibility. In resolving the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, we have applied the totality of circumstances test
enunciated in the case of People vs. Teehankee which lists the following factors: x x x
(1) the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
(6) the suggestiveness of the identification process.
In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, an NBI agent first pointed the accused to the witnesses after which the latter identified the
accused. The Court held that such identification was doubtful as the same was not spontaneous and independent as there was improper
suggestion coming from the NBI agent. We ruled that a show-up or the presentation of a single suspect to a witness for purposes of
identification is seriously flawed as it constitutes the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police.
The Court also finds that the trial court erroneously rejected accused-appellants alibi.
Accused-appellant clearly and positively testified that at the time of the crime, February 22, 1991, he was working as a shell cutter in a
factory in Pasay City where he was a stay-in employee. He rendered overtime work until ten oclock in the evening that night because
they had to rush work.
This testimony of accused-appellant was materially corroborated by two of his co-employees and his employer who were with
him on the night of the incident. The defense of alibi or denial assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by a
credible witness.24 And to be given weight, accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed
but that he was so far away that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission.
Though inherently weak as a defense, alibi in the present case has been sufficiently established by corroborative testimonies of
credible witnesses and by evidence of physical impossibility of accused-appellants presence at the scene of the crime. Alibi, therefore,
should have been properly appreciated in accused-apellants favor.
Another significant evidence which the trial court failed to consider is the voluntary confession of accused Federico Ampatin
absolving accused-appellant Bagas of the crime. The testimony of witness Rosales corroborates Ampatins declaration in court that he
does not know herein accused-appellant and merely pointed to him out of fear of the police.
24
19. People vs Berame alias Doming (1976) - Vasquez
FACTS:
1. It was about 6:30 in the evening of April 13, 1966, that an assailant suddenly shot
QuiricoManingo, then seated on a chair facing the main door of the sala of his rented house in Rizal Street,
Suba District Danao City.
2. His adopted son Danilo Maningo, was seated one meter away from his right side. Several
successive shots were fired at Quirico Maningo.
3. He saw his father, Quirico Maningo, slump to the floor, wounded, with blood on his neck and
breast.
4. He looked towards the main door where the shots came from and saw the accused holding a .38
caliber revolver.
5. He was easily Identifiable, as there was a "big light" at the main door of the house.
6. Appellant was standing on a bright spot as he fired his gun several times at Quirico Maningo.
7. When the firing ceased, the witness ran towards the main door of the house and saw two persons,
one of them being the accuse Berame scampering away.
8. Quirico Maningo, the victim, was rushed to the Danao City General Hospital, but he was dead
on arrival.
9. The appealed decision did likewise note that later that same evening, the PC Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary with a Sergeant Armando Alfoja started the investigation of the
killing of Quirico Maningo.
10. In a swampy area at the back of the hospital near the cemetery of Danao City, where it was suspected
one of the alleged assailants was hiding, they saw footprints and recovered a rubber shoe. Appellant was
required at the trial to put it on.
11. It turned out that it corresponded exactly with his right foot.
12. Moreover, appellant took flight after the killing and hid himself He did not surrender until almost a
month later, on May 8, 1966.
13. There was in addition the statement from one of those accused in the original information, Anastacio
Montinola. As one of the suspects, he was pursued by the police authorities. When cornered, instead of
surrendering, he decided to shoot it out.
14. He was hit, it turned out, mortally. He admitted then and there that he was one of the killers of
Quirico Maningo, and his companions were a certain Doming and one Erning. He made the admission anew at
the Southern Islands Hospital when he was further questioned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rubber shoe left in the swampy area can be considered as a demonstrative evidence.
HELD:
YES. The appealed decision, moreover, finds impressive support from circumstances that point
unerringly to appellant's guilt. They simply cannot be explained away. That could be the reason why his counsel
did not even bother to do so. As noted in the decision, a rubber shoe left in a swampy area by someone leaving
in a hurry the scene of the crime was just the right size. It did fit appellant's right foot. That was demonstrative
evidence of the most persuasive kind. So it has been held time and time again. First there was United States.
v. Tan Teng. Of more recent vintage is People v. Otadora, promulgated in 1950. The appealed decision was
likewise based on the fact of appellant having been in hiding for sometime with the evident purpose of evading
arrest. He did not surrender until after the lapse of a month. That again was a circumstance that could not be
ignored. There is relevance to this excerpt from the opinion of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Sarikala:
"Third, Sarikala left the scene of the murder immediately thereafter. Flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance
from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. 'The wicked flee, even when no man pursueth but the righteous
are as bold as a lion "
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 8, 1967 finding the accused DomicianoBerame
alias Doming guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is affirmed, with the only modification that the indemnity due the heirs of the deceased should be in
the amount of P12,000.00 and not P6,000.00
25

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EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST

* Question of law and fact

1. CIR vs CA (1998) - Galicinao

2. Villanueva vs CA (1998) - Galicinao

*Factum porbandum and Factum probans

3. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (1991) - Galicinao

4. Fareast Marble, Inc., and Tabuenas v. CA, BPI (1993) Galicinao

5. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN GR NO. 90478 - Jacinto

6. FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS CORPORATION - Jacinto

*Admissibility and weight or credibility of evidence

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABELARDO PARUNGAO (1996) - Jacinto

ISSUE: W/N hearsay evidence are admissible.

8. PRATS & COMPANY VS. PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY

9. People vs. Precioso (Gr No. 95890, 12 May 1993) - Robinos

The facts are as follows:

13. UNIVERSAL FOOD CORPORATION VS. CA (33 SCRA 1) - Janz

*Relevance and conditional admissibility

15. People vs Abalos. 30 scra 599

16. G.R. No. 109140. March 8, 1995.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty.

17. EMETERIA VILLAFLOR vs Summers 42 PHIL 62 - Vazquez

ISSUE: WON compelling a woman to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant

18. G.R. No. 104383. July 12, 2001

19. People vs Berame alias Doming (1976) - Vasquez

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