Lim v.
CA HELD:
In 1994, Pastor Lim died. His wife, Rufina Lim
petitioned with the lower court, acting as a
probate court, for the inclusion of 5
corporations into the inventory of the estate of
Pastor Lim. The 5 corporations were: Auto Truck
Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation,
Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc.
and Action Company. Rufina alleged that the
assets of these corporations were owned wholly
by Pastor; that these corporations themselves
are owned by Pastor and they are mere
dummies of Pastor. The corporations filed a
motion for exclusion from the estate. They
presented proof (Torrens Titles) showing that
the assets of the corporations are in their
respective names and titles. The probate court
denied their motion. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the probate court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the corporations and/or
their assets should be included in the inventory
of the estate.
HELD: No. As regards the assets, the
corporations were able to present their
respective Torrens Titles over the disputed
assets. It is true that a probate court may pass
upon the question ownership albeit in a
provisional manner but still, a Torrens Title
cannot be attacked collaterally in a probate
proceeding, it must be attacked directly in a
separate proceeding.
Pecson v. Coronel
FACTS: Dolores Coronel had suspicions that her
nephew was accomplices in the robbery of her
house. Thus, in her will, she bequeathed all her
properties to her nieces husband,Lorenzo
Pecson. Upon the probate of the will, the
deceaseds relatives opposed its
contending that it was improbable for her to
give her properties to a stranger, or noteven
her close relatives.
ISSUE: Whether the will was valid for preteriting
the said heirs of Dolores.
No. the liberty to dispose of ones estate by will
when there are no forced heir
s is valid. Although the institution of the
beneficiary is not usual, it is not void
for Lorenzo has rendered services to Dolores. In
the absence of any statutory restriction, every
person possesses absolute dominion over his
property and may bestow to anyone he please.
Fluemer v. Hix
FACTS: Fleumer, the special administrator of
the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appealed
from a decision of Judge of First Instance
Tuason denying the probate of the document
alleged to by the last will and testament of the
deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on
this appeal. We think, however, that the
appellant, who appears to have been the
moving party in these proceedings, was a
person interested in the allowance or
disallowance of a will by a Court of First
Instance,' and so should be permitted to appeal
to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of
the will. It is theory of the petitioner that
the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West
Virginia, on November 3, 1925 by Hix who had
his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the
laws of West Virginia Code, Annotated, by
Hogg, Charles E., and as certified to by the
director of the national library, should govern.
ISSUE
Whether or not the laws of West Virginia should
govern.
RULING
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove
themselves in our courts. the courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take
American Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts. Here the requirements of the law were
not met. There was no was printed or published
under the authority of the state of West
Virginia, as provided in section 300 of civil
procedure ;Nor was the extract from the
law attested by the certificate of the officer
having charge of the original, under the sale of
the State of West Virginia, as provided in
section 301 of the civil procedure. ;No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the
time the alleged will was executed.
Note: In addition, the due execution of the will
was not established. The only evidence on this
point is to be found in the testimony of the
petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to
indicate that the will was acknowledged by the
testator in the presence of two competent
witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed
the will in the presence of the testator and of
each other as the law of West Virginia seems to
require. On the supposition that the witnesses
to the will reside without the Philippine Islands,
it would then the duty of the petitioner to
prove execution by some other means It was
also necessary for the petitioner to prove that
the testator had his domicile in West Virginia
and not establish this fact consisted of
the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony
of the petitioner. Also in beginning
administration proceedings originally in the
Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his
own theory by attempting to have the principal
administration in the Philippine Islands. While
the appeal pending submission in this court, the
attorney for the appellant presented an
unverified petition asking the court to accept as
part of the evidence the documents attached to
the petition. One of these documents discloses
that a paper writing purporting to be the was
presented for probate on June 8, 1929 to the
clerk of Randolph Country State of West
virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the
oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. Madden,
the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered
to be recorded and filed. It was shown
by another document that, in vacation, on June
8, 1929 the clerk of court of Randolph country,
West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as
administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the
estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In
this connection, it is to be noted that
the application for the probate of the will in the
Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929,
while the proceedings in West Virginia appear
to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These
facts are strongly indicative of an intention to
make the Philippines the principal
administration and West Virginia the ancillary
administration. However this maybe, no
attempt has been made to comply with
civil procedure, for no hearing on the question
of the allowance of a will said to have been
proved and allowed in West virginia has been
requested. There is no showing that the
deceased left any property at any place other
than the Philippine Islands and no contention
that he left any in West Virginia.Reference has
been made by the parties to a divorce
purported to have been awarded Edward
Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on
October 8, 1925, in the state of west specific
pronouncements on the validity or validity
of this alleged divorce. For all of the
foregoing, the judgment appealed from will
be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant
Vda. De Perez v. Tolete
FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr.
Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens and residents of New York, each
executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in
the event that it is not known which one of the
spouses died first, the husband shall be
presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later,
the entire family perished in a fire that gutted
their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named
trustee in Joses will, filed for separate probate
proceedings of the wills. Later, Evelyns
mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for
reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing
that Salud was not an heir according to New
York law. He contended that since the wills
were executed in New York, New York law
should govern. He further argued that, by New
York law, he and his brothers and sisters were
Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the
reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to
give. For her part, Salud said she was the sole
heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two
wills were in accordance with New York law. But
before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already
issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the
wills should be allowed
HELD:
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses,
who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with
the following provision of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in
conformity with those which this Code
prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the
formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated
outside the Philippines
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or
allowance of wills which have been probated
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the
due execution of the will in accordance with the
foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in
the foreign country and not in the Philippines;
(3) the will has been admitted to probate in
such country; (4) the fact that the foreign
tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of
wills. Except for the first and last requirements,
the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the
foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them.
On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved
without touching on a very glaring fact -
petitioner has always considered herself the
sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to
notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
Thus, even in the instant petition, she only
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a
judge whose order is being assailed is merely a
nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor
General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over
the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with
regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an "original will"
or a will that is presented for probate for the
first time. Accordingly, compliance with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to
the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines" and to the
executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan,
contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the
wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause
copies of the notice of the time and place fixed
for proving the will to be addressed to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit
evidence needed for the joint probate of the
wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that
the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan
are given all notices and copies of all pleadings
pertinent to the probate proceedings.
Uy. V. CA
Facts: The husband of petitioner Gilda
Jardeleza, Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. suffered stroke
which has rendered him comatose, and in line
with the said illness his wife Gilda seeks to
dispose property of her husband in favor of co-
petitioners daughter Glenda Jardaleza-Uy and
her husband Jose Uy. Respondent Teodoro
Jardeleza which is a son of Gilda and Ernesto Jr.,
filed a petition to the Iloilo RTC upon knowledge
of the pending sale of his fathers real property
contending that there shall be a court-
appointed guardian in administering his fathers
property while the senior Jardeleza is
incapacitated to do so.
Petitioner contends that the sale of her
husbands property in Lot 4291 and its
improvements are necessary as to cover costs
of his hospitalization.
While the proceedings are still ongoing,
petitioner has sold the said property to her co-
petitioners daughter and son-in-law. Teodoro
appealed the said sale to the Court of Appeals
which has likewise reversed the order of the
RTC Iloilo. Petitioner submitted an appeal via
certiorari of the decision to the Supreme Court
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Gilda L.
Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr.
who suffered a stroke, a cerebrovascular
accident, rendering him comatose, without
motor and mental faculties, and could not
manage their conjugal partnership property
may assume sole powers of administration of
the conjugal property and dispose of a parcel of
land with its improvements.
Held: The court ruled in favor of respondent
Teodoro, further specifying that petitioner only
holds the power of administration and not the
power of disposition and encumbrance of
property as these powers require consent of
the other spouse or court authority.
Furthermore, petitioner only sought
guardianship of property and has failed to
allege that Ernesto Jardaleza Sr., would have
consented on the said sale of property.
Suntay v. Suntay
FACTS: Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to
respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A.
Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the
grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father Emilio,
had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously
been decalred by the CFI as null and void.
Federico anchors his oppostion on this fact,
alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel
has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child.
The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to
Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari.
Federico contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the the decision declaring
the marriage of Isabels parents null and void
be upheld.
ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the
decision and the dispostive portion thereof,
which should prevail?
HELD:
Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil Code
states that in case of doubt in the interpretation
and application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon
courts in relation to its judgment. While the
dispositive portion of the CFI decision states
that the marriage be declared null and void,
the body had shown that the legal basis was
par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in
effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the
causes for which a marriage may be annulled.
As such the conflict between the body and the
dispositive portion of the decision may be
reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court.
The fundamental distinction between void and
voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The
effects of void marriages, with respect to
property relations of the spouses are provided
for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children
born of such marriages who are called natural
children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children under Article 89 irrespective of
whether or not the parties to the void marriage
are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other
hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid
and produces all its civil effects, until it is set
aside by final judgment of a competent court in
an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special
contract as if it had never been entered into but
the law makes express provisions to prevent the
effects of the marriage from being totally wiped
out. The status of children born in voidable
marriages is governed by the second paragraph
of Article 89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children,
and are also called natural children by legal
fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel
would be covered by the second paragraph of
Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that
children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate.
Lindain v. CA
Facts: Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parel of
registered land which their mother (Dolores) as
guardian, sold for P2,000.00 under a deed of
absolute sale to the spouses Apolonia and
Federico. The latter knew that the sale was
without judicial approval but still proceeded
with the transaction. The plaintiffs now contend
that the sale is null and void as it was without
the court's approval. The Regional trial Court
ruled that the sale is indeed null and void, while
upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
confirmed the sale as valid and dismissed the
complaint. Hence this petition.
Issue: Does the sale by a guardian of a minor's
property require judicial approval?
YES.
Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as
a legal administrator of the property of his
minor children does not have the power to
dispose of or alienate the property of the said
child without judicial approval. And under Rule
84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and
duties of the widow as legal administrator of
her minor children's property are merely
powers of possession and management. Hence,
the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or
dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89).
Moreover, the private respondent spouses are
not purchasers in good faith as they knew right
from the beginning the the transaction was
without judicial approval. Further, the minors'
action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed
Heir of Sandejas v. Lina
Facts:On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas,
Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying
that letters of administration be issued in his
favor for the settlement of the estate of his
wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of
Administration were issued by the lower court
appointing Eliodoro as administrator.
On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila
City Hall was burned and among the records
burned were the records of the Court where
Sandejas filed his petition.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for
motion to intervene and petition-in-
intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging
that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated
to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land.
Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in
Canada His counsel is still waiting for official
word on the fact of the death of the
administrator. He also alleged that the matter
of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to
be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court
issued an order directing the other heirs of
Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new
administrator within 15 days from receipt of the
order.
On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his
appointment as a new administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the
following reasons: that Alex has not received
any motion for the appointment of an
administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his
appointment would be beneficial to the heirs;
that he is willing to give away his being an
administrator as long as the heirs has found
one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new
administrator. They were reasoning out that it
was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the
appointment. The lower court substituted Alex
Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator.
On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus
Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale
executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and
to compel the heirs to execute a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court
granted Alex's motion.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the
contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and
respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the
ownership of the four lots was to remain in the
intestate estate of Remedios until the approval
of the sale was obtained from the settlement
court.
Issue: What is the settlement court's
jurisdiction?
Held: Court approval is required in any
disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89
of the Rules of Court. One can sell their rights,
interests or participation in the property under
administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the
effectivity of the sale as regards the selling
heirs. It merely implies that the property may
be taken out of custodia legis, but only with the
court's permission.
Alaban v. CA
FACTS: Respondent Francisco Provido filed a
petition for the probate of the Last Will
and Testament of the late Soledad Provido
Elevencionado . Respondent alleged that he
was the heir of the decedent and the executor
of her will. The RTC allowed the probate of
the will and directed the issuance of letters
testamentary to the respondent. Four months
after the petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings. They
also filed an opposition to the allowance of the
will of the decedent, and the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent, claiming that they
are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition due to non-
payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other
heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could
not have been probated because: (1) the
signature of the decedent was forged; (2)
the will was not executed in accordance with
law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below
the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked
testamentary capacity to execute and publish a
will; (4) the will was executed by force and
under duress and improper pressure; (5) the
decedent had no intention to make a will at the
time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did
not know the properties to be disposed of,
having included in the will properties which no
longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that
the letters testamentary issued to respondent
be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent
disposed of under intestate succession.
RTC and CA both dismissed the petition
Petitioners maintain that they were not made
parties to the case in which the decision sought
to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they
could not have availed of the ordinary remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment and other appropriate remedies,
contrary to the ruling of the CA. And that the
proceedings in the
RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners
were made parties in the proceedings
RULING1. Yes the petitioners were made
parties to the proceedings Petitioners in this
case are mistaken in asserting that they are not
or have not become parties to the probate
proceedings. Under the Rules of Court,
any executor, devisee, or legatee named in
a will, or any other person interested in the
estate may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction
to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and
place for proving the will must be published for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, as well as
furnished to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the
probate of a will is one in rem, such that with
the corresponding publication of the petition
the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent As parties to the probate
proceedings, petitioners could have validly
availed of the remedies of motion for new trial
or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to
reopen, which is essentially a motion for new
trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening
of the case and the setting of further
proceedings. However, the motion was denied
for having been filed out of time, long after the
Decision became final and executory. According
to the Rules, notice is required to be personally
given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator. A perusal of the will shows that
respondent was instituted as the sole heir
of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and
nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory
nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified
of the probate proceedings under the
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate,
or to personally notify them of the same
Palaganas v. Palaganas
FACTS: On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C.
Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized
United States citizen, died single and
childless. In the last will and testament she
executed in California, she designated her
brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of
her will for she had left properties in the
Philippines and in the US. On May 19, 2003
respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas,
another brother of Ruperta, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a
petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for
his appointment as special administrator of her
estate. On October 15, 2003,
however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas
and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of
Ruperta, opposed the
petition on the ground that Rupertas will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in
the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and
Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will
could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid
nonetheless for having been executed under
duress and without the testators full
understanding of the consequences of such
act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified
to act as administrator of the estate. Meantime,
since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria
Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions
in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent
Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to
take their deposition, which it granted. On April,
13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties
to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be
probated in and allowed by a court in
the Philippines. On June 17, 2004 the RTC
issued an order: (a) admitting to probate
Rupertas last will; (b)appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request
of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in
the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special
Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by
the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel
and Benjamin appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the
Philippines. On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a
decision, affirming the assailed order of the
RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the
probate of the will, subject to respondent
Ernestos submission of the authenticated
copies of the documents specified in the order
and his posting of required bond. The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its
execution, before it can be probated in the
Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is
different from reprobate, which refers to a will
already probated and allowed
abroad. Reprobate is governed by different
rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the
decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this
Court.
ISSUE
Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner
abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated
and allowed in the country where it was
executed.
RULING
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of
wills executed by foreigners abroad although
the same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A
foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country. In insisting
that Rupertas will should have been first
probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously
have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of
will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or
re-authentication of a will already probated and
allowed in a foreign country is different
from that probate where the will is presented
for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by
Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies
only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to
apply to the present case. In reprobate, the
local court acknowledges as binding the findings
of the foreign probate court provided
its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.