SY-JUCO and VIARDO v. SY-JUCO
January 12, 1920 | Avancena, J. | Agent acting in his own name;
exception
Digester: K Bernardo
SUMMARY: Santiago was appointed by the plaintiffs, his parents,
as administrator of their property and acted as such from 1902-
1916. The Syjucos allege that during Santiagos administration, he
acquired a launch, two cascos, and and automobile in his capacity
as administrator with their (Syjucos) money and for their benefit.
TC ruled in favor of the Syjuco and ordered Santiago to return the
properties. SC affirmed the TC, with the exception of casco no.
2545, which was lawfully sold to Santiago.
DOCTRINE: When an agency acts in his own name, the principal
shall have no right of action against the person with whom the
agent has contracted, cases involving things belonging to the
principal are excepted.
According to this exception (when things belonging to the
principal are dealt with) the agent is bound to the principal
although he does not assume the character of such agent and
appears acting in his own name
This means that in the case of this exception the agent's apparent
representation yields to the principal's true representation and
that, in reality and in effect, the contract must be considered as
entered into between the principal and the third person; and,
consequently, if the obligations belong to the former, to him alone
must also belong the rights arising from the contract.
FACTS:
1902: Defendant Santiago Sy-juco was appointed by plaintiffs
Vicente and Cipriana as administrator of their property, and
acted as such until June 30, 1916, when his authority was
cancelled.
o Santiago is the son of Vicente and Cipriana.
Vicente and Cipriana allege that during Santiagos
administration, Santiago acquired the property claimed in the
complaint in his capacity as the plaintiffs administrator with
their money and for their benefit.
TC Ordered Santiago to return to the plaintiffs: the launch 1
Malabon, two cascos2, an automobile, a typewriting machine,
the house occupied by Santiago, and the price of the piano.
1 launch, n. A large motorboat, used especially for short trips.
2 casco, n. A flat-bottomed, square-ended boat once used in the Philippines as a lighter to ferry
goods between ship and shore
Both parties appealed from this judgment.
WON the properties bought by Santiago in his own name, as
an administrator, belong to him. (NO, except the second
casco.)
RULING: Judgment appealed from affirmed except in so far as
casco no. 2545 is concerned.
As to the launch Malabon
Santiago bought it in his own name from the Pacific
Commercial Co., and afterwards registered it at the Custom
House.
But this does not necessarily show that he bought it for himself
and with his own money.
This transaction was within the agency which he had
received from the plaintiffs. The fact that he has acted in
his own name may be only, as we believe it was, a
violation of the agency on his part.
The question is not in whose favor the document of sale of the
launch is executed nor in whose name same was registered,
but with whose money was said launch bought.
The plaintiffs' testimony that it was bought with their money
and for them is supported by the fact that, immediately after
its purchase, the launch had to be repaired at their expense,
although said expense was collected from the defendant.
Santiago invoked the case of Martinez v. Martinez.
o Martinez, Jr., bought a vessel in his own name and in his
name registered it at the Custom House. This court then
said that although the funds with which the vessel was
bought belonged to Martinez Sr., Martinez Jr. is its sole and
exclusive owner.
But the Court ruled that this is not applicable to the case at
bar.
o In said case the relation of principal and agent, which
exists between the plaintiffs and the defendant in the
present case, did not exist between Martinez, Sr., and
Martinez, Jr. By this agency the plaintiffs herein clothed the
defendant with their representation in order to purchase
the launch in question.
o However, the defendant acted without this representation
and bought the launch in his own name thereby violating
the agency. If the result of this transaction should be that
the defendant has acquired for himself the ownership of the
 launch, it would be equivalent to sanctioning this violation
and accepting its consequences.
o But not only must the consequences of the violation of this
agency not be accepted, but the effects of the agency itself
must be sought.
o If the defendant contracted the obligation to but the
launch for the plaintiffs and in their representation,
but virtue of the agency, notwithstanding the fact
that he bought it in his own name, he is obliged to
transfer to the plaintiffs the rights he received from
the vendor, and the plaintiffs are entitled to be
subrogated in these rights.
From the rule established in Article 1717 of the Civil Code
that, when an agency acts in his own name, the principal
shall have no right of action against the person with
whom the agent has contracted, cases involving things
belonging to the principal are excepted.
o According to this exception (when things belonging
to the principal are dealt with), the agent is bound to
the principal although he does not assume the
character of such agent and appears acting in his own
name
o This means that in the case of this exception the agent's
apparent representation yields to the principal's true
representation and that, in reality and in effect, the
contract must be considered as entered into between the
principal and the third person; and, consequently, if the
obligations belong to the former, to him alone must also
belong the rights arising from the contract.
The money with which the launch was bough having come from
the plaintiff, the exception established in article 1717 is
applicable to the instant case.
There is sufficient evidence to show that its prices was paid
with plaintiffs' money. Defendant's adverse allegation that it
was paid with his own money is not supported by the evidence.
As to Casco no. 2545
Upon examination of the evidence relative to this casco, it was
found that it belonged to the plaintiffs but sold it afterwards to
the defendant by means of a public instrument.
The plaintiffs have not adduced sufficient proof of such deceit
(on the part of Santiago, when they signed) which would
destroy the presumption of truth which a public document
carries with it. Attorney Sevilla, who acted as the notary in the
execution of this instrument, testifying as a witness in the case,
said that he never verified any document without first inquiring
whether the parties knew its content.
Our conclusion is that this casco was lawfully sold to the
defendant by the plaintiffs.
(Fun fact: This casco had been leased and was sunk while in
the lessees hands before the complaint in this case was filed.
As such, the issue of ownership is determinative of who may
enforce the responsibility of damages for losses on the lessee.)

As to Casco no. 2584

Santiagos allegation that it was constructed at his instance
and with his money is not supported by the evidence.
In fact the only proof presented to support this allegation is his
own testimony contradicted, on the on hand, by the plaintiffs'
testimony and, on the other hand, rebutted by the fact that, on
the date this casco was constructed, he did not have sufficient
money with which to pay the expense of this construction.

As to the automobile