Cesario Ursua vs Court of Appeals
April 10, 1996)
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then
asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the
Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that because the law firms messenger, a certain
Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he
feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent
in the said case. Perez then told him than he can go there as Oscar Perez so that he
does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as Oscar Perez.
When he was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as Oscar Perez.
However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario
Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua.
Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as
amended, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cesario Ursuas conviction is proper.
HELD: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict
application of C.A. No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity
something which could not have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to
use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized.
Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used
habitually and publicly in business transactions without prior authorization by
competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name Oscar Perez once, it
was not used in a business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of
Oscar Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was not
even required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was
requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about
when Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not
warranted. When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there
was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to
punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursuas act, said
law need not be applied.
Ursua vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112170.
FACTS:
Petitioner wrote the name Oscar Perez in the visitors logbook and used the same in
receiving the copy of a complaint against him at the Office of the Ombudsman. This
was discovered and reported to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that the
petitioner be accordingly charged. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating
Sec.1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 otherwise known as An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with
some modification of sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of
Commonwealth Act No. 142.
HELD:
NO. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the RTC was
reversed and set aside and petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged
RATIO:
[A]n alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly
and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. A mans name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is
commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes
a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the
use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single
instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name
in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
Time and again [courts] have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of
the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing
a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should
be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may
consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not
constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he
is prosecuted. Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed
strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is
the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a
certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
court limited.
ALIAS JOSE VELARDE
As a rule, a person is required to use the name with which he or she was registered at
birth in the office of the local civil registry. Generally, only a select group of persons
like Love Marie Ongpauco (a.k.a. Heart Evangelista), Phylbert Angellie Ranollo
Pagestrom (a.k.a. Bea Alonzo), Angelica Colmenares (a.k.a. Angel Locsin) and Joseph
Ejercito (a.k.a. Joseph Estrada) can use a pseudonym.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 142 provides:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a
normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which
he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered
in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been
authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry
of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of
name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the persons baptismal and family
name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrants name, if
an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real
name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for
the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrants name shall be recorded
in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other
than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper
local civil registry.
According to the Supreme Court, CA 142 is violated by the use of an alias. In People of
the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito, G.R. No. 164368-69, April 2, 2009, the Supreme Court,
citing the earlier case of Ursua vs. Court of Appeals, defined an alias as:
a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a
competent authority. There must be, in the words of Ursua, a sign or indication that
the user intends to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real name from
that day forth [for the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A.
No. 142 as amended.
The person must use the alias publicly and habitually. In relation to the public use of
an alias, the Supreme Court explained:
. . . the required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a
third person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in
an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be
held liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself
out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words,
the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
Given the foregoing, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutions evidence that
former President Estrada used the name Jose Velarde when he opened bank trust
accounts in the presence of PCIB officers Clarissa Ocampo and Manuel Curato,
Malacanang Chief of Staff Aprodicio Lacquian and Estrada lawyer-friend Fernando
Chua was not a public use of the alias. According to the Supreme Court:
Our close reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there be intention by
the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited above tells us that the
required publicity in the use of alias is more than mere communication to a third
person; the use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an
open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held
liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out
as a person who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the
intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose
Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his
intention to be publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada,
Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who had no access to Estradas
privacy and to the confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as
President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the
highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of
office and ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his
affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to
be for public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside
the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged representations with
Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be
admissible. All of Estradas representations to these people were made in privacy and
in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The Supreme Court also stated that the nature of the transaction on which the
indictment rests affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the alleged
criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a transaction that Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in nature:
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No. 1405 (the Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or recognized zones of privacy. Given
the private nature of Estradas act of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related
to the opening of the trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a
public use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need not even
consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank
officers; what is essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily implied
in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy
effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the
intent to use the alias publicly.

The Supreme Court noted the enactment of R.A. No. 9160 (the Anti-Money
Laundering Act), which prohibits the opening of accounts under fictitious names.
However, the Supreme Court stated that Anti-Money Laundering Act, which was
enacted after Estradas alleged use of an alias in opening the trust account, cannot be
applied to Estrada:

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a significant development only
because it clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or
anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed
by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada
using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the
constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws. . . . R.A.
No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the indictment against Estrada,
cannot be a source or an influencing factor in his indictment.

The Supreme Court pointed out that it did not decide whether Estradas use of an
alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the land was valid and legal;
according to the Supreme Court, it simply determined whether he may be made liable
for the offense charged based on the evidence presented.