REID ON PARTICULARISM, HABIT, AND PERSONAL IDENTITY

JONG WON KIM

Songang University, South Korea

abstract

Are the first principles in the philosophy of Thomas Reid derived inductively from
particular experience, or are they self-evident? Is Reid an epistemic particularist,
or a methodist? Some scholars interpret him as an epistemic particularistic, while
others hold that he is a methodist like other philosophers of his time. This
debate was central to an exchange between Roderick Chisholm and Keith Lehrer.
Taking the general belief in personal identity as an example, this paper aims to
show which interpretation is more consistent with Reids whole philosophical
system. Although Reid believes that the general belief is self-evident without
reasoning, it is not self-evident in the way that beliefs in particular cases are.
Reids overall philosophical method makes the self-evidence of particular beliefs
more basic, the self-evidence of general beliefs being transferred from particular
beliefs by means of habit. I conclude that the particularistic interpretation
is more consistent with his whole philosophical system than the methodist
interpretation.

Keywords: Thomas Reid; Particularism; habit; personal identity; Roderick

Chisholm; Keith Lehrer

In general, when we examine a certain view of personal identity, there are at least
two kinds of questions that need to be addressed in advance. One is a metaphysical
question, and the other is an epistemological question. In other words, in order to

The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13.3 (2015): 203217

DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2015.0104
Edinburgh University Press
www.euppublishing.com/journal/jsp

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re-identify my present me with a previous me, I need to be able to answer at

least two kinds of following questions:1
1) What constitutes my personhood and in what does its continuity consist?
2) How do I know that I am the same person that I was yesterday?
The former is a metaphysical question that tries to grasp the essential constituents
of a person, and the latter is an epistemological question that tries to find the
criteria of personal identity. Since most philosophers believe that we should first
define the essential nature of a person before dealing with how we can have
epistemic access to it, most philosophers start with an answer to the metaphysical
question and then move onward to the epistemological one. However, it seems
to be inevitable for them to assume hypotheses when they try to define the
nature of a person; for example, Aristotles form and matter, Descartes thinking
substance, Humes bundle theory and the reductionists view based on physical or
psychological continuity all presuppose certain metaphysical hypotheses.
Even if someone who emphasizes the empirical inductive method tries to
establish a theory of personal identity from epistemic criteria, the result is not
so promising, either. We can see this in Lockes view of personal identity: he
starts with an epistemic faculty such as extended consciousness or memory,
without first defining the essential nature of a person. That is, he claims that
extended consciousness or memory constitutes personal identity. As a result,
Locke substitutes metaphysical entities with epistemic faculties. However, as
Butler and Reid criticize correctly, this is absurd since a person must first exist
in order to be conscious of, or remember, his personal identity. The consciousness
of personal identity should presuppose personal identity, not constitute it. If so, the
grand plan for establishing the objective knowledge of the existence of personal
identity faces the dilemma of supposing that there is an unchangeable personhood
without any proof, or that a personhood can be constituted by epistemic faculties
that should presuppose the personhood (a vicious circle).
What is Reids position on personal identity? Reid considers the belief of
personal identity to be a first principle as a self-evident and contingent truth. He
claims that we have an immediate conviction that every man has of his identity,
as far back as his memory reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it
(EIP 262). Therefore, at first glance, if we focus on the belief in personal identity
as an innate truth, it seems that Reid starts with a metaphysical hypothesis,
since the belief should presuppose the existence of immutable personhood over
time as a metaphysical entity. However, there is room for another interpretation.
That is, when we focus on the phrase as far back as memory reaches, since
memory seems to constitute personal identity, it is possible to think that Reid is
following a Lockean approach through epistemic criteria. Which one is Reids
position then? Neither of these positions are Reids, since he refuses to start
with metaphysical hypotheses, and since he thinks that it is absurd for memory

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to constitute personal identity. If so, then what exactly is Reids position on

personal identity? Without falling into the dilemma that I mentioned above,
how does Reid claim that personal identity exists over time? Without leaning
on any metaphysical hypothesis, how do we know that there is the identity of
a thing that is called me over time? With regard to these questions, I will argue
that Reids inductive method and the principles of common sense can provide
epistemic access to metaphysical contents of a person. To reach such a conclusion
is, however, a little complicated and requires some explanation. That is, we need
to examine Reids epistemic approach in general in order to understand his way
out of such a dilemma. Therefore, we will study Reids particularistic approach in
epistemological perspective, which results from his thorough inductive method.
This study will naturally give an insight into Reids notion of personhood and
personal identity. Let us begin with what epistemological particularism is.
Originally, particularism was first proposed when R. Chisholm raised the
problem of the criterion of knowledge in his 1973 book The Problem of the
Criterion. According to Chisholm, there are two pairs of questions for a theory of
knowledge in general (Chisholm 1973: 12):
1) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
2) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of
knowledge?
Many philosophers would say that we need an answer to questions 2) before
we can answer questions 1). This approach is commonly called methodism.
However, particularists claim that we already have an answer to questions 1) in
many particular cases, and that, based on the answer we have to questions 1), we
can find the way to answer questions 2). Chisholm explains this as follows:

If you are a methodist, then you will begin with certain general epistemological
principles and you will hope that, by applying these principles to particular
cases, you will find out whether the cases in question are cases of knowing.
And if you are a particularist, then you will examine particular cases of
knowing, or particular cases of what you believe to be of knowing, and on
the basis of this examination, you will hope to discover general principles of
the sort that the methodist thinks that he begins with (Chisholm 1990: 34).

There are two characteristics that define epistemic particularism: 1) we should

start with particular cases, and 2) there are some particular things that we
know without any proof. This is how particularists try to establish a system of
knowledge.
Chisholm categorizes Reid as a particularist. Reids theory of knowledge has
these two characteristics. According to Reid, mental operations such as sensation,
perception, remembrance and reflection function on the individual level; this

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means that all things that really exist and are observable are individuals.2
Therefore, every truth is a primary truth about individuals, and general truth
comes after generalizing the truth about particular cases. For Reid, universals
and attributes do not really exist. They are just the results of our generalization
from individuals.3 To start from individual truths and move onward to general
truths is the first characteristic of particularism. This is the natural result of Reids
inductive method.4
Another characteristic of particularism can be found in Reids principles of
common sense.5 According to Reid, there are some truths that we know without
any proof. They are called axioms, self-evident truths, or principles of common
sense. These axioms are not hypotheses (which are inventions of philosophers),
but common to all people given by our constitution. For example, we know that
the world has its regularity of nature, whatever begins to exist, must have a
cause which produced it, 2+2 = 4 or every complete sentence must have a
verb. We know self-evidently that these propositions are true. These are what
Reid calls the first principles of truths, which are not deduced or inferred from
others, but are self-evident.
If Reids inductive method and innate principles of common sense make him
a particularist, then how do these two elements work together in order to form
particularism? Simply put, I know that there is a black square computer in front
of me at the very moment. I just know this particular perceptual belief is true,
although I may be unable to tell how I know it. When these kinds of beliefs
are accumulated, I can generalize them and formulate a criterion of perceptual
knowledge, which makes it possible to access metaphysical entities: I know that
there are entities as the bearers of qualities in my perceptual process although
what I really perceive by my senses are only qualities. Of course, I do not know
the essences of the entities as such, since I do not hypothesize. However, with the
help of common sense, I just know that when I perceive qualities, the entities of
their bearers really exist. In this way, the existential belief in particulars through
our epistemic faculties becomes one of the innate principles that common sense
provides (EIP 496). This principle makes Reids epistemic particularism possible
and gives reason for why Reid admits epistemic access to metaphysics, even
though the access does not give the concrete contents of the entities. In the light
of common sense, pure epistemic inductive reasoning allows us to find the entities
of metaphysics.
The same thing can be applied to our concern of personal identity. In order
to know personal identity, we do not need hypotheses. With the help of common
sense and my epistemic faculties, such as memory and consciousness, I just know
that the I in the present who is typing these letters is the same as the me in
the last evening who ate dinner with my family. And I repeatedly experience such
particular beliefs. When these particular beliefs of mine are accumulated, with the
help of inductive reasoning, I can know that there is an unchangeable personhood

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called me, which goes through these temporary me-nesses. However, it is not
the case that my epistemic faculties (consciousness and memory) substitute the
essential natures of my personhood like Locke suggests. Rather, it is right to say
that although the belief of my personal identity is already given to me by common
sense and inductive reasoning, it is only revealed when my epistemic faculties
function properly. Of course, there can be a concern about why the notion of my
personhood that is given by epistemic faculties should be the same and permanent
me, since it is possible that there are many different or transient mes that
correspond to each of my epistemic faculties respectively. However, if we know
how my epistemic faculties work, the concern can disappear. That is, when we
look into how my epistemic faculties work in order to reveal the belief of my
personal identity, we realize that my several epistemic faculties often function not
only simultaneously but also in a way that overlaps. For instance, when I perceive
an external object, I have a perception of the object and sensations of the objects
qualities at the same time. Moreover, at that moment, I can reflect that it is me
who has such a perception. That is, my reflection can appear simultaneously with
my perception and my sensation. Or when I perceive an object, I can remember
that the object that I see now is the same object that I saw yesterday. In this
case, my memory can be concurrent with my present perception. In this way, in
order for my epistemic faculties to function properly, the bearer of my epistemic
faculties should be one unchangeable person. Otherwise, I cannot properly have
particular epistemic beliefs. Therefore, we can say that my epistemic faculties not
only reveal the general belief of my personal identity, but also give the reason why
the personhood called me should be the same and unchangeable me. This is
how Reids particularistic approach can also be applied to the belief of personal
identity.
Nevertheless, there is still a problem in order to interpret Reid as a particularist.
In some examples of the principles of common sense we saw (the world has
its regularity of nature, whatever begins to exist, must have a cause which
produced it, 2+2 = 4 or every complete sentence must have a verb), Reid
seems to admit that the foundation of his belief system begins with general
principles, not particular cases, and at the same time these principles are self-
evident, not the results of inductive reasoning. If so, these general principles will
become the criterion by which we know the truth about particular cases. If this
is really what Reid says, Reid will not be a particularist, but a methodist, and
as a result, his explanation of personal identity will be no different from other
philosophers who also begin with the general hypothesis that a person has its
identity.
Therefore, in order to elucidate Reids philosophical methodology, it is
important to know whether Reid is a methodist or a particularist. As a supporter
of a particularistic interpretation of Reid, Chisholm suggests that it might be
the case that when Reid establishes general principles as the foundation of his

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belief system, Reid omits the preceding process, which starts from induction of
particular facts and goes into generalization. He states:

Reid, of course, cites many general principles which he calls principles of

common sense. And most, if not all, of these principles are entirely reasonable
. . . Does Reid cite these principles on the ground that they are principles of
common sense? Or does he defend common sense on the ground that it is our
common sense that enables us to arrive at such principles? Could it be that
the philosophy of common sense is a version of particularism rather than of
methodism? In this case, we would characterize commonsensism by reference
to a certain set of truths. And this is the way that some of the followers of Reid
proceeded. If we are particularistic commonsensists, then we do not pick out
our list of truths on the ground that they are common sense truths. How, then,
do we pick them out? The answer has to be we just do which is not an
entirely satisfactory answer. But, in any case, we just do pick them out and
we give them the label truths of common sense (Chisholm 1990: 3435).

Chisholm suggests that Reid begins with knowing particular facts and discovers
first principles by generalizing them.
On the other hand, Keith Lehrer thinks differently about this issue. He claims
that Reid is a methodist (Lehrer 1990: 39). Lehrer states that, for Reid, general
principles of common sense are self-evident and that they do not come from
particular facts.6 However, he does not claim that Reid is a methodist in the sense
that the particular beliefs should be justified by self-evident general principles.
Rather, Lehrer admits that particular beliefs as well as general principles are
immediately evident in themselves, without the use of reasoning.7 However, he
also claims that general principles give rise to particular beliefs in a certain way,
even if they are not the criteria of knowledge. Lehrers ground of the interpretation
that Reid is a methodist lies in the interpretation of the seventh of Reids first
principles of contingent truths, which Lehrer calls a meta-principle (Lehrer
1989: 162): the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are
not fallacious (EIP 480). According to Lehrer, this general principle is a looping
principle that vouches for its own truth as well as the truth of all other principles.
Without it, the principles of common sense and our epistemic faculties lose their
trustworthiness. Therefore, Lehrer puts the seventh principle above the others.
Although Lehrer believes that both particular basic beliefs as well as general
principles are self-evident, this is why he believes that Reid is a methodist.
Given this analysis then, what is Reids position? Is Reid a particularist or
a methodist? The answer seems to depend on whether the seventh principle is
a meta-principle or not. However, this is a big controversy even among Reid
scholars.8 One of the reasons for this controversy is that Reids text about the
seventh principle is not clear (EIP 480482). For example, Philip de Bary, one

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of the contemporary Reid scholars, claims that the seventh principle is just one of
many contingent truths that is only related to our powers of judging and reasoning.
By removing the comma from the original text (the natural faculties by which
we distinguish truth from error), he argues that the term natural faculties here
does not refer to all the faculties, but only refers to the faculties of judging and
reasoning (de Bary, 2002:7582). Lehrer, on the other hand, says that Reids
seventh principle is a meta-principle that vouches for the truths of other principles.
His assertion is based on Reids statement that if any truth can be said to be prior
to all others in the order of nature, this seems to have the best claim; because,
in every instance of assent, whether upon intuitive, demonstrative, or probable
evidence, the truth of our faculties is taken for granted, and is, as it were, one of
the premises on which our assent is grounded (EIP 481). If this passage is about
the seventh principle, it shows that the seventh principle has priority over other
principles.9
Although this issue is important in order to determine whether Reid is a
particularist or a methodist, it is not my intention to answer the question of how
we interpret this original passage of Reid. Rather, my solution to the question of
whether Reid is a particularist or a methodist is related to the context of Reids
whole structure.
When we consider that Reid follows the inductive method as his only method,
it is difficult to believe that Reid already knows what the criterion of knowledge
is just as methodists do. It is because the inductive method is always handled
on the individual level. Reid believes that general truths always come after
particular truths. This fact is well illustrated when Reid talks about conceptions.
According to him, conceptions are categorized into three kinds: imaginative
conceptions, conceptions of individual things and conceptions of universals. And
Reid distinguishes conceptions of individual things from those of universals as
follows:

The first kind is analogous to pictures taken from the life. We have conceptions
of individual things that really exist, such as the city of London, or the
government of Venice. Here the things conceived are the originals . . . . . . . The
second kind is analogous to the copies which the painter makes from picture
done before. Such I think are the conceptions we have of what the ancients
called universals; that is, of things which belong or may belong to many
individuals these are kinds and species of things; such as, man or elephant,
which are species of substances; wisdom or courage, which are species of
qualities; equalities or similitude, which are species of relations (EIP 302).

According to Reid, while individuals, individual qualities, and individual relations

really exist, general conceptions, which are the results of abstraction from the
conception of individuals, do not really exist.10 The fact that observable entities

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are only individuals is an inevitable result of the inductive method.11 If all the
objects of our inductive inquiry are individual objects, then why are there so many
general words and very few proper words in our everyday language? Reid claims
it is because we need these general words in order to communicate our knowledge
of individual objects to others (EIP 355). That is, it is for our practical convenience
that we classify individuals into general kinds or sorts such as human, dog and
horse. Otherwise, we would not be able to communicate with each other at all
because of the innumerable proper words.
In order to explain how we form general conceptions, Reid splits the forming
process into three steps: abstraction, generalization and combination. First, we
abstract individual qualities from individual objects that really exist. Second,
we generalize these qualities to attributes that are common to many individual
objects. For instance, we generalize the whiteness of this paper to whiteness in
general.12 Finally, we combine those attributes into a whole. By doing so, we
form general conceptions of the genera and species of things. This is how we
get general conceptions from individuals. Even Lehrer agrees that Reid believes
that general concepts are dependent upon our prior acquaintance with particular
individuals (Keith Lehrer and Vann Mcgee 1992: 37), although he claims that
particular beliefs and general principle are self-evident on the same level. If I am
correct, it is right to say that general principles come after particular truths, since
they result from inductive reasoning and generalization from particular cases.
How then can we explain Lehrers interpretation of Reids first principles that
both particular basic beliefs and general principles are self-evident on the same
level? I believe that it is by habit that general principles and particular beliefs
become self-evident on the same level. Let us observe how Reid explains the
function of habit.
According to Reid, habit is a power of the mind that is acquired by use,
exercise or study (EIP 21).13 Habits appear when the faculties of our mind repeat
themselves in similar situations. Since we cannot have this power until habits
are formed by this process of repetition, habit-forming is an acquired capacity.
However, if habits are already formed, then they operate immediately without
will or intention, just as instincts do.
Let us look at the forming process of habit in more detail. In order to
understand the forming process of habit, it will be helpful to look into the
forming process of acquired perception, since the same kind of habit is at work
in both. When Reid explains perception in general, he distinguishes original
perception with acquired perception. Unlike original perception, acquired
perception occurs by customs or habits of experience (EIP 237). Let us see what
exactly acquired perception is by examples. If I perceive by tactile sensation that
there is a hard round object in front of me, it is an example of original perception,
since my sensation of touch is constitutionally designed to correspond to this
perception. Likewise, when I see directly a circular cone that is in front of me

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without tactile sensation, I should be able to perceive something triangular in

two-dimensions, since visual sensation are constitutionally designed to directly
correspond to two-dimensional qualities. However, by visual sensation, I actually
perceive a circular cone that has three-dimensionality, even if I do not have tactile
sensation. Such perception is called an acquired perception (EIP 237).
Another example of acquired perception is the perception of concrete objects
by a specific sensation that is not designed to directly perceive them. For
instance, when we smell a rose, we have an olfactory sensation and therefore we
perceive a thing with such a smell and nothing more. The original perception
by olfactory sensation is that there is an object with such and such a smell.
However, it is possible that we can immediately perceive a rose by olfactory
sensation, if we learned that roses have a specific scent by repeated previous
experiences of olfactory sensation. This can also be called an acquired perception
(EIP 235).
According to Reid, this kind of perception is acquired by repeated experiences,
i.e. habit or custom. If we have not yet developed such a habit, this kind of
perception will be considered as the result of inference. However, if the habit
has already been formed, then there is no room for inference.14 Reid states:

We learn to perceive, by one sense, what originally could have been perceived
only by another, by finding a connection between the objects of the different
senses. Hence the original perceptions, or the sensations of one sense become
signs of whatever has always been found connected with them; and from the
sign the mind passes immediately to the connection and belief of the thing
signified: And although the connection in the mind between the sign, and the
thing signified by it, be the effect of custom, this custom becomes a second
nature, and it is difficult to distinguish it from the original power of perception
(EIP 236).

According to Reid, acquired perception has equal status with original perception,
even though acquired perception is something derived from original perception by
the help of habit.15 That is, both original perception and acquired perception are
self-evident and are immediately known to us (EIP 236). Likewise, Reid claims
that habit is intrinsically different from any kind of inference. The beliefs formed
by the help of habit are immediate and self-evident, whereas the beliefs formed
by inference are not. In this respect, Reids notion of evidence is different from
that of other modern philosophers. When we normally talk about evidence in an
epistemic way, it is related to the normative use. In other words, when we say
that this belief has enough evidences in order to be believed, it means that this
kind of evidence plays a role as a sort of justification for true belief. Therefore,
these evidences are linked with truth. We can see this through the evidences of

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reasoning: the veracity of premises is delivered to the conclusion by reasoning.

Reid states:

When we speak of the evidence of reasoning as a particular kind of evidence,

it means the evidence of propositions that are inferred by reasoning, from
propositions already known and believed. . . . In all reasoning, there must be
one or more premises, and a conclusion drawn from them. And premises are
called the reason why we must believe the conclusion which we see to follow
from them (EIP 230).

There is, however, another meaning of evidence. That is, from time to time,
the notion of evidence has its meaning in a psychological/descriptive sense
(Alston 1985: 441).16 When Reid talks about evidence that is related to sensation,
perception, reflection, and remembrance, it has this aspect.17 This kind of
evidence does not require any further proof or demonstration. Reid states:

That the evidence of sense is of a different kind, need little proof. No man
seeks a reason for believing what he sees or feels; and if he did, it would be
difficult to find one. But though he can give no reason for believing his senses,
his belief remains as firm as if it were grounded on demonstration (EIP 230).

According to Reid, beliefs properly formed by sensation, perception, reflection,

and remembrance are given to us immediately. This kind of evidence is all fitted
by nature to produce the belief in the human mind (EIP 229). That is, by our
constitution, the evidences of sensation, perception, reflection, and remembrance
cannot help to produce certain beliefs. This is a reliabilists approach about
evidence. It just shows that our evidence is reliable to produce the belief. It doesnt
entail the truth. There is no guarantee that what those evidences testify are true.18
And as Alston says, the fact that they are sources of evidence is not of crucial
epistemological significance (Alston 1985: 438). There is only a conceptual link
between the belief and the epistemic faculties at best.
This notion of evidence can also apply to a notion of self-evident-ness. That
is, Reids notion of self-evident-ness does not entail necessity in itself.19 It is not
self-evident in the sense that it contains absolute certainty. Rather, it is self-evident
in a sense that it is not on the basis of support from other propositions believed
or known (Alston 1985: 440). That is, for Reid, being self-evident is identical
with being immediately evident.20 If we consider habit as one of these reliable
faculties, we can know that it is by habit that the self-evidence can be transmitted
from original perception to acquired perception.
Now, with an understanding of habit, we can go back to the question: How can
we interpret Reids assertion that both particular beliefs and general principles
are self-evident? It is true that Reid, as an inductivist, claims that particular

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beliefs come first. As Chisholm mentions, Reid claims that I know that when
I perceive the whiteness of the paper at T1 , my perception about it is true and
not fallacious; and that when I am conscious of my fear of a dog at T2 , the fear
really exists. These are beliefs about particular cases that I know through the use
of my common sense. Therefore, this kind of fact is not only self-evident, but is
also known immediately. Based on these particular beliefs, Reid forms general
principles like the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truths from error,
are not fallacious (EIP 480), or I hold the existence of everything of which I am
conscious (EIP 470). That is, repeated experience and inductive reasoning make
such a generalization possible.21 This is a basic interpretation of Reids theory of
generalization.
Nevertheless, the completed structure of Reids theory of generalization is
slightly more complicated. Reid thinks that it is possible to form general
conceptions without inference. This is possible by habit. Of course, if we do
not have such a habit yet, inference will be needed. However, if habit is already
formed, experience and inference are no longer needed. They will be replaced by
habit.
These non-inferential general conceptions are similar to the cases of acquired
perception. Just like the cases of acquired perception, Reid holds that the general
principles formed by such a habit are self-evident. In this respect, habit has a
kind of transitive character. If the proposition when I perceive the whiteness of
the paper at T1 , my perception about it is true and not fallacious is self-evident,
then, by the help of habit, the general principle the natural faculties, by which
we distinguish truths from error, are not fallacious will also become self-evident.
In this way, habit makes general principles self-evident.22 If this is correct, we
can say without inconsistency that particular beliefs are self-evident under the
influence of common sense and that general principles are also self-evident under
the influence of common sense by the help of habit.
Now, we can address the argument between Chisholm and Lehrer. As Lehrer
claims, it is true that both particular basic beliefs and general principles are self-
evident. This is accomplished through the use of habit. However, as Chisholm
claims, it is also true that particular basic beliefs come first and general principles
second, arising from particular basic beliefs. It seems that there are two layers in
our judgment. On the first layer, we deal with particular basic beliefs. However,
these particular beliefs quickly pass to the next layer, the layer of general beliefs,
with the aid of habit. On the second layer, beliefs consist of two kinds: first
principles thath are also self-evident and other general beliefs that are inferred
from first principles or other beliefs (EIP 452).
If this is the case, then how does our mind operate when the particular beliefs
on the first layer pass to first principles on the second layer? Does the operation
need the power of reasoning or does our mind operate immediately without
reasoning? The answer is equivocal. Before we form such a habit, we need

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experience and inductive inference, even if we need a very small amount of

them. However, after we form a habit, we no longer need reasoning. General
principles are immediately given to our mind. Nevertheless, when we consider
Reids inductive method and his view on individuals, together with his principles
of common sense, the particularist interpretation seems to be legitimate.
Now we can deal with our original concern of personal identity. If the
particularist interpretation is correct, Reids way out of the dilemma will be
more convincing. That is, Reids belief regarding personal identity may start from
purely particular cases in the first place. When my memory23 (and consciousness)
appear, common sense informs me at that time that there is a me who is the
bearer of this memory and this me is the same me as far as my memory
reaches. I know this particular truth by common sense. However, if we undergo
such a process repeatedly, the associated habit will be formed by induction. If so,
by the help of this habit, the range of common sense will be extended. That is, my
common sense, which expands through repeated operation of my memory and
consciousness, lets me know not only that my personhood has its identity over
time, but also that others personhood has its identity over time. Therefore,
this general principle about personal identity given by extended common sense
will be self-evident. Of course, the contents given by common sense are not so
concrete, since they are not metaphysical hypotheses. However, it is enough for
us to know that we have personal identity over time. Reids particularism, which
is structured by the inductive method, common sense and habit, is also valid for
Reid explanation of personal identity.

references

Alston, William P (1985) Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles, History of Philosophy

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Braude, Stephen (2005) Personal Identity and Postmortem Survival, in Ellen Frankel
Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul (ed.), Personal Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 226249.
Chisholm, Roderick M. (1973) The Problem of the Criterion, Milwaukee: Marquette
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(1990) Keith Lehrer and Thomas Reid, Philosophical Studies, 60(12): 3338.
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 Reid on Particularism, Habit, and Personal Identity

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notes
1
According to Stephen Braude, when we speak about personal identity, two different
questions are asked 1) Epistemological question: How do we decide if an individual
is the same person as someone else? 2) Metaphysical question: what is it for one
individual to be the same person as another? While the latter is a question to grasp
constitutive elements that make a person remain as the same person even though he
undergoes various changes over time, the former is a question to set the extent of
knowledge about personal identity. See Braude 2005: 226.
2
The term individual means not only individual objects but also individual qualities and
individual relations. EIP 365.
3
Reid distinguishes qualities from attributes. While the former are individual properties,
the latter are general properties. EIP 367368.
4
As an empiricist, Reid undoubtedly claims that the inductive method is the scientific
true method. In fact, he accepts Newtonian inductive method thoroughly and defends
Newtons anti-hypotheticalism more than anyone else in his contemporary time.
Moreover, Reid applies Newtons hypotheses non fingo more broadly than Newton has
done. Newton bans only a priori hypotheses and leaves the door open for the use of a
posteriori reproductive hypotheses as heuristics, whereas Reid forbids not only a priori
hypotheses, but also any kind of hypothesis. See Dea 2005: 127; EIP 121 ; IHM 163.
5
Common sense belief actually differs from a hypothesis. While a hypothesis is a sort
of conjecture for deductive justification, common sense belief is something agreed
universally by both the learned and the unlearned. See EIP 40; EIP 507508. It is not
an invention of philosophers, but common to all people. The belief in the regularity of
nature and causality belong to this category.
6
Both Chisholm and Lehrer agree that Reids first principles of common sense are general
principles. However, there are actually two kinds of interpretation with regard to the
nature of first principles of contingent truths. The first and major interpretation is that the
first principles are general principles. They confer the self-evidence to general principles
themselves. For example, if the first principle is about perception, which is that those
things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses, and are what we
perceive them to be (the fifth principle), then it means that the reliability of perception
as an epistemic faculty is self-evident. However, according to the second interpretation,
the first principles are not about general principles. They do not confer the self-evidence
to general principles themselves. Rather, they confer the self-evidence to the particular
cases with which each general principle is involved. In the case of the fifth principle, it is
not the reliability of perception itself that the principle vouches for. What this principle
shows is that many particular cases which are under our perception are self-evident. It is

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 Jong Won Kim

proposed by James van Cleve. See van Cleve 2008: 286309. Therefore, according the
second interpretation, there is no difficulty to interpret Reid as a particularist. However,
as van Cleve points out, there is a passage which Reid seems to disagree with the second
interpretation. See EIP 481. One of the reasons that I use the belief of personal identity as
the exemplar serving for the judgment of whether Reid is a particularist or a methodist
is that it has less ambiguity between these two interpretations. Unlike the beliefs of
epistemic faculties, the belief of personal identity seems to be always general belief,
since it is the belief that every man has of his identity, as far back as his memory
reaches, needs no aid of philosophy to strengthen it (EIP 262). Therefore, there seems
to be no room for particularistic interpretation.
7
Therefore, both the claim that the particular belief is true from the general principle
and the claim that the general principle is true from the particular beliefs are absurd.
Lehrer thinks the relation between general principles and particular facts is like links in
a chain. If we pick the chain up, the whole of it is lifted up, not just a part of it. See
Lehrer 1990: 40.
8
See de Bary 2002: 7582; Van Cleve 2003:155172.
9
Against Lehrers interpretation on this passage, De Bary says that we could, it is true,
try to defend Reid against the inconsistency by saying that the passage is couched
hypothetically If any truth can be said to be prior . . . this seems to have the best
claim . . . . See de Bary, 2002: 82.
10
Normally, Reid does not use the word universals is because of its implication of
existence. Instead, he uses general terms, general words or general conception. See
EIP 359.
11
This shows that Reids method links with his nominalism.
12
If we want to gain a general conception about a specific quality or relation, it will be
done in this second step. However, if we want to gain general conceptions about things,
then we need an additional step.
13
Reid, in fact, divides habit into two kinds. One is intellectual habit, and the other is habit
of action. While the former mainly appears when he explains the acquired perception,
the latter comes out when Reid deals with the mechanic principles of action. Reid
sometimes uses the terms a habit of understanding and a habit of will. Of course,
the habit we are concerned about here is intellectual habit. See EAP 88.
14
Although there is an argument about the status of acquired perception among Reid
scholars, it is true that acquired perception and original perception does not require any
kind of reasoning. See James van Cleve 2004: 101133; Copenhaver 2010: 285312.
While van Cleve claims that there are two kind of acquired perception in Reid and
that most cases of acquired perception probably do not count as perception (p.128),
Copenhaver claims that every acquired perception is a genuine perception.
15
The objects of acquired perception are always individuals just as the objects of original
perception are. However, unlike original perception, acquired perception is involved
in generalization via repeated experience. That is, in order for acquired perception
to be possible, we first should know the similarity between the present quality and
the previous quality which belongs to such and such an object. In order do know the
similarity, it is necessary to have the forming process of general conceptions and habit.
Only then we can grasp the similarity between the present individual quality and the
previous individual qualities, find the connection between the present individual quality
and its corresponding individual object and perceive the individual object through this
individual quality. See EIP 237.
16
Alston expresses it as first-personal evidence. See also Rebecca Copenhaver 2010:
285312.
17
See EIP 229231. Cf. EIP 41, 42, 254, 264, 266, 470, 474, etc.

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 Reid on Particularism, Habit, and Personal Identity

18
However, from the fact that the belief given by such evidence gains the status of
contingent truth, there is an interpretation which claims that there is weak connection
between reliability and truth. See de Bary 2002: 6489. Cf. Rysiew 2005: 107121.
19
For example, Propositions such as 1+1 = 2, all bachelors are unmarried or all
triangles have three sides are self-evident in this respect
20
Of course, the word evident here expresses a psychological/descriptive use.
21
Of course, in order to make repeated experiences possible, the notion of similarity is
a prerequisite. According to Reid, perception of a similar relation is particular and
instinctive at the first level. Even animals might have a notion of indistinct resemblance.
He says, I believe indeed we may have an indistinct perception of resemblance, without
knowing wherein it lies. Thus, I may see a resemblance between one face and another,
when I cannot distinctly say in what feature they resemble. . . . There is therefore an
indistinct notion of resemblance when we compare the objects only in gross; and
this I believe brute animals may have EIP 403. That is, when we see two objects
simultaneously, we can know immediately and unreflectively similar elements by our
natural constitution, although it is not distinct. For example, I just know immediately
that the color of this apple is similar to that of this cherry, not to that of this cucumber
without thorough rational analyzing. For Reid, each resemblance relation is particular
and instinctive, and therefore there is no problem of generality in subsuming those
relations, which most nominalists have as their weakness.
22
If we put this differently, it might be said that the first (general) principles are like the
programs of the module which are already programmed, but the content of its program
unknown to us. We do not know how this module works, until we give judgments about
particular cases as inputs and receive their outputs. That is, a considerable amount of
inputs and outputs make us discover the innate principles of our constitution. If we
discover the innate principles, we can judge various cases from these principles.
23
Therefore, when Reid says the phrase that as far back as his memory reaches, it
seems that memory is not considered as an epistemic faculty of the mind. Rather, it
is considered as a general phenomenon coming from the faculty.

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