Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent.
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991
ANTI-GRAFT LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and CRISPIN T.
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIP ELLA C. JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform; CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ, as Secretary of Agriculture; LOURDES QUISUMBING,
as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports; FULGENCIO
FACTORAN, JR., as Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources; VICENTE V. JAYME, as Secretary of Finance; SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, as Secretary of Justice; FRANKLIN N. DRILON, as
Secretary of Labor and Employment; LUIS SANTOS, as Secretary of
Local Government; FIDEL V. RAMOS, as Secretary of National
Defense; TEODORO F. BENIGNO, as Press Secretary; JUANITO
FERRER, as Secretary of Public Works and Highways; ANTONIO
ARRIZABAL, as Secretary of Science and Technology; JOSE
CONCEPCION, as Secretary of Trade and Industry; JOSE ANTONIO
GONZALEZ, as Secretary of Tourism; ALFREDO R.A. BENGZON, as
Secretary of Health; REINERIO D. REYES, as Secretary of
Transportation and Communication; GUILLERMO CARAGUE, as
Commissioner of the Budget; and SOLITA MONSOD, as Head of the
National Economic Development Authority, respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David
for petitioners in 83896.
Antonio P. Coronel for petitioners in 83815.
FERNAN, C.J.:p
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9,
19881 and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed
Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his
position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two
positions in the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that
this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive official of the Executive Department
holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they
(sic) must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any
official hold more than two positions other than his primary
position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in
government-owned or controlled corporations, at least one-third
(1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should
either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries
to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,2 which provides as
follows:
 Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
It is alleged that the above-quoted Section 13, Article VII prohibits public
respondents, as members of the Cabinet, along with the other public
officials enumerated in the list attached to the petitions as Annex "C" in
G.R. No.
838153 and as Annex "B" in G.R. No. 838964 from holding any other office
or employment during their tenure. In addition to seeking a declaration of
the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284, petitioner Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines further seeks in G.R. No. 83815 the issuance of
the extraordinary writs of prohibition and mandamus, as well as a
temporary restraining order directing public respondents therein to cease
and desist from holding, in addition to their primary positions, dual or
multiple positions other than those authorized by the 1987 Constitution
and from receiving any salaries, allowances, per diems and other forms of
privileges and the like appurtenant to their questioned positions, and
compelling public respondents to return, reimburse or refund any and all
amounts or benefits that they may have received from such positions.
Specifically, petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines charges that
notwithstanding the aforequoted "absolute and self-executing" provision of
the 1987 Constitution, then Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez,
construing Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article
IX-B, rendered on July 23, 1987 Opinion No. 73, series of 1987,5 declaring
that Cabinet members, their deputies (undersecretaries) and assistant
secretaries may hold other public office, including membership in the
boards of government corporations: (a) when directly provided for in the
Constitution as in the case of the Secretary of Justice who is made an ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under Section 8, paragraph
1, Article VIII; or (b) if allowed by law; or (c) if allowed by the primary
functions of their respective positions; and that on the basis of this
Opinion, the President of the Philippines, on July 25, 1987 or two (2) days
before Congress convened on July 27, 1987: promulgated Executive Order
No. 284.6
Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion
No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together"
Section 13, Article VII and the general provision in another article, Section
7, par. (2), Article I-XB. This "strained linkage" between the two
provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group of public
officers one, the President and her official family, and the other, public
servants in general allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher,
exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition
against multiple jobs for the President, the Vice-President, the members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of
government expected to lead by example."7 Article IX-B, Section 7, par.
(2)8 provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
The Solicitor General counters that Department of Justice DOJ Opinion No.
73, series of 1987, as further elucidated and clarified by DOJ Opinion No.
129, series of 19879 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988,10 being the
first official construction and interpretation by the Secretary of Justice of
Section 13, Article VII and par. (2) of Section 7, Article I-XB of the
Constitution, involving the same subject of appointments or designations
of an appointive executive official to positions other than his primary
position, is "reasonably valid and constitutionally firm," and that Executive
Order No. 284, promulgated pursuant to DOJ Opinion No. 73, series of
1987 is consequently constitutional. It is worth noting that DOJ Opinion
No. 129, series of 1987 and DOJ Opinion No. 155, series of 1988
construed the limitation imposed by E.O. No. 284 as not applying to ex-
officio positions or to positions which, although not so designated as ex-
officio are allowed by the primary functions of the public official, but only
to the holding of multiple positions which are not related to or necessarily
included in the position of the public official concerned (disparate
positions).
In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the
Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided
in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and
(2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7,
par. (2), Article I-XB on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers
and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do
not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies
specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and
their deputies or assistants.
There is no dispute that the prohibition against the President, Vice-
President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants
from holding dual or multiple positions in the Government admits of
certain exceptions. The disagreement between petitioners and public
respondents lies on the constitutional basis of the exception. Petitioners
insist that because of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII, the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution, as in the case of the Vice-President
being allowed to become a Member of the Cabinet under the second
paragraph of Section 3, Article VII or the Secretary of Justice being
designated an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council under
Article VIII, Sec. 8 (1). Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain
that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section
13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar
as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The threshold question therefore is: does the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made
for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB
which, for easy reference is quoted anew, thus: "Unless otherwise allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
We rule in the negative.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that
the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the
reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in
order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that
reason and calculated to effect that purpose.11
The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants as members of the governing bodies or boards of various
government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned
and controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative
powers in this country were exercised by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of
newly-created agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and
controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and other modes of
presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or
assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with
the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other
perquisites of office. Most of these instrumentalities have remained up to
the present time.
This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government
soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of
this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the holding of
multiple offices in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the
Batasang Pambansa.12 This condemnation came in reaction to the
published report of the Commission on Audit, entitled "1983 Summary
Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations,
Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4
a "Roaster of Membership in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
Particularly odious and revolting to the people's sense of propriety and
morality in government service were the data contained therein that
Roberto V. Ongpin was a member of the governing boards of twenty-nine
(29) governmental agencies, instrumentalities and corporations; Imelda R.
Marcos of twenty-three (23); Cesar E.A. Virata of twenty-two (22); Arturo
R. Tanco, Jr. of fifteen (15); Jesus S. Hipolito and Geronimo Z. Velasco, of
fourteen each (14); Cesar C. Zalamea of thirteen (13); Ruben B. Ancheta
and Jose A. Roo of twelve (12) each; Manuel P. Alba, Gilberto O.
Teodoro, and Edgardo Tordesillas of eleven (11) each; and Lilia Bautista
and Teodoro Q. Pea of ten (10) each.13
The blatant betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes
of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and
in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the
1986 Constitutional Commission, convened as it was after the people
successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft into its
proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration which are
envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils that flow from the holding of
multiple governmental offices and employment. In fact, as keenly
observed by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz during the deliberations in these
cases, one of the strongest selling points of the 1987 Constitution during
the campaign for its ratification was the assurance given by its proponents
that the scandalous practice of Cabinet members holding multiple positions
in the government and collecting unconscionably excessive compensation
therefrom would be discontinued.
But what is indeed significant is the fact that although Section 7, Article I-
XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and
appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit
to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants from holding any other office or employment during their
tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the
Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the
government or elsewhere is concerned.
Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13,
Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications
of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or
employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, "(N)o Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . .". Under Section 5(4), Article XVI, "(N)o member of the
armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any
capacity to a civilian position in the Government,including government-
owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries." Even
Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents provides "(U)nless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government."
It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold
other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or
employment in the government and government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of
Section 13, Article VII which states that "(T)he President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure." In the latter provision, the
disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase "in the
Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official
family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office
or employment.
Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides:
"They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries." These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the
President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly
imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the
armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the
President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said
class stricter prohibitions.
Such intent of the 1986 Constitutional Commission to be stricter with the
President and his official family was also succinctly articulated by
Commissioner Vicente Foz after Commissioner Regalado Maambong noted
during the floor deliberations and debate that there was no symmetry
between the Civil Service prohibitions, originally found in the General
Provisions and the anticipated report on the Executive Department.
Commissioner Foz Commented, "We actually have to be stricter with the
President and the members of the Cabinet because they exercise more
powers and, therefore, more cheeks and restraints on them are called for
because there is more possibility of abuse in their case."14
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to
hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President,
the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
This being the case, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII cannot possibly refer to the
broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article I-XB of the 1987
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as respondents would
have us do, would render nugatory and meaningless the manifest intent
and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding other offices or
employment in the government during their tenure. Respondents'
interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found
in Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so
carefully set by the framers of the Constitution as to when the high-
ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant
Secretary, on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the
rank immediately below Assistant Secretary downwards, on the other, may
hold any other office or position in the government during their tenure.
Moreover, respondents' reading of the provisions in question would render
certain parts of the Constitution inoperative. This observation applies
particularly to the Vice-President who, under Section 13 of Article VII is
allowed to hold other office or employment when so authorized by the
Constitution, but who as an elective public official under Sec. 7, par. (1) of
Article I-XB is absolutely ineligible "for appointment or designation in any
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure." Surely, to say
that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" found in
Section 13, Article VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB
would render meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution
authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet,15 and
to act as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the
President shall not nave been chosen or fails to qualify.16 Such absurd
consequence can be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions under
consideration as one, i.e., Section 7, par. (1) of Article I-XB providing the
general rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article VII as constituting the
exception thereto. In the same manner must Section 7, par. (2) of Article
I-XB be construed vis-a-vis Section 13, Article VII.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.17 Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution18 and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.19
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative,
rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.20
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the
exception to this prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face,
the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily,
wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation.21 The
phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a
literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member
of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President
in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;
and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and
Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required22 by the primary functions of said officials'
office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office"
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.23 To
characterize these posts otherwise would lead to absurd consequences,
among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the
National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115
(December 24, 1986). Neither can the Vice-President, the Executive
Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor and
Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then
have no reason to exist for lack of a chairperson and members. The
respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would also be
prohibited.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment cannot chair the Board of
Trustees of the National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC) or the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), both of which are
attached to his department for policy coordination and guidance. Neither
can his Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries chair these agencies.
The Secretaries of Finance and Budget cannot sit in the Monetary
Board.24 Neither can their respective undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. The Central Bank Governor would then be assisted by lower
ranking employees in providing policy direction in the areas of money,
banking and credit.25
Indeed, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended such
absurd consequences. A Constitution, viewed as a continuously operative
charter of government, is not to be interpreted as demanding the
impossible or the impracticable; and unreasonable or absurd
consequences, if possible, should be avoided.26
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be
interpreted as covering positions held without additional compensation
in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official's office. The term ex-officio means "from
office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character,
but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio likewise denotes an
"act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office."27 An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by
virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment.28 To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officioChairman of the Board
of the Philippine Ports Authority,29 and the Light Rail Transit Authority.30
The Court had occasion to explain the meaning of an ex-officio position
in Rafael vs. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board,31 thus:
"An examination of section 2 of the questioned statute (R.A. 3137) reveals
that for the chairman and members of the Board to qualify they need only
be designated by the respective department heads. With the exception of
the representative from the private sector, they sit ex-officio. In order to
be designated they must already be holding positions in the offices
mentioned in the law. Thus, for instance, one who does not hold a
previous appointment in the Bureau of Customs, cannot, under the act, be
designated a representative from that office. The same is true with respect
to the representatives from the other offices. No new appointments are
necessary. This is as it should be, because the representatives so
designated merely perform duties in the Board in addition to those already
performed under their original appointments."32
The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of
importance and thus means chief or principal function. The term is not
restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural.33 The additional
duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the
official's primary functions. Examples of designations to positions by virtue
of one's primary functions are the Secretaries of Finance and Budget
sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime
Industry Authority34 and the Civil Aeronautics Board.
If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely
related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary
function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the
purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. An example
would be the Press Undersecretary sitting as a member of the Board of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. The same rule applies to
such positions which confer on the cabinet official management functions
and/or monetary compensation, such as but not limited to chairmanships
or directorships in government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
Mandating additional duties and functions to the President, Vice-President,
Cabinet Members, their deputies or assistants which are not inconsistent
with those already prescribed by their offices or appointments by virtue of
their special knowledge, expertise and skill in their respective executive
offices is a practice long-recognized in many jurisdictions. It is a practice
justified by the demands of efficiency, policy direction, continuity and
coordination among the different offices in the Executive Branch in the
discharge of its multifarious tasks of executing and implementing laws
affecting national interest and general welfare and delivering basic services
to the people. It is consistent with the power vested on the President and
his alter egos, the Cabinet members, to have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices and to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.35 Without these additional duties and functions being assigned
to the President and his official family to sit in the governing bodies or
boards of governmental agencies or instrumentalities in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by their primary
functions, they would be supervision, thereby deprived of the means for
control and resulting in an unwieldy and confused bureaucracy.
It bears repeating though that in order that such additional duties or
functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions
must be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is
to perform the same in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation therefor.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is
that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the
Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-
officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation
performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
monetary and banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his
department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect
any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per them or an
honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever
name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by the
Constitution.
It is interesting to note that during the floor deliberations on the proposal
of Commissioner Christian Monsod to add to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-
B, originally found as Section 3 of the General Provisions, the exception
"unless required by the functions of his position,"36 express reference to
certain high-ranking appointive public officials like members of the Cabinet
were made.37 Responding to a query of Commissioner Blas Ople,
Commissioner Monsod pointed out that there are instances when although
not required by current law, membership of certain high-ranking executive
officials in other offices and corporations is necessary by reason of said
officials' primary functions. The example given by Commissioner Monsod
was the Minister of Trade and Industry.38
While this exchange between Commissioners Monsod and Ople may be
used as authority for saying that additional functions and duties flowing
from the primary functions of the official may be imposed upon him
without offending the constitutional prohibition under consideration, it
cannot, however, be taken as authority for saying that this exception is by
virtue of Section 7, par. (2) of Article I-XB. This colloquy between the two
Commissioners took place in the plenary session of September 27, 1986.
Under consideration then was Section 3 of Committee Resolution No. 531
which was the proposed article on General Provisions.39 At that time, the
article on the Civil Service Commission had been approved on third
reading on July 22, 1986,40 while the article on the Executive Department,
containing the more specific prohibition in Section 13, had also been
earlier approved on third reading on August 26, 1986.41 It was only after
the draft Constitution had undergone reformatting and "styling" by the
Committee on Style that said Section 3 of the General Provisions became
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B and reworded "Unless otherwise allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position. . . ."
What was clearly being discussed then were general principles which would
serve as constitutional guidelines in the absence of specific constitutional
provisions on the matter. What was primarily at issue and approved on
that occasion was the adoption of the qualified and delimited phrase
"primary functions" as the basis of an exception to the general rule
covering all appointive public officials. Had the Constitutional Commission
intended to dilute the specific prohibition in said Section 13 of Article VII,
it could have re-worded said Section 13 to conform to the wider exceptions
provided in then Section 3 of the proposed general Provisions, later placed
as Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission.
That this exception would in the final analysis apply also to the President
and his official family is by reason of the legal principles governing
additional functions and duties of public officials rather than by virtue of
Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B At any rate, we have made it clear that only
the additional functions and duties "required," as opposed to "allowed," by
the primary functions may be considered as not constituting "any other
office."
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be
had only when other guides fail42 as said proceedings are powerless to
vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear.1wphi1Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as
showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the
large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face."43 The proper interpretation therefore depends
more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers's understanding thereof.44
It being clear, as it was in fact one of its best selling points, that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to
posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during
the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution's manifest intent and the people' understanding
thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation
to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive
Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and
government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to
hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.
The Court is alerted by respondents to the impractical consequences that
will result from a strict application of the prohibition mandated under
Section 13, Article VII on the operations of the Government, considering
that Cabinet members would be stripped of their offices held in an ex-
officio capacity, by reason of their primary positions or by virtue of
legislation. As earlier clarified in this decision, ex-officio posts held by the
executive official concerned without additional compensation as provided
by law and as required by the primary functions of his office do not fall
under the definition of "any other office" within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition. With respect to other offices or employment held
by virtue of legislation, including chairmanships or directorships in
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
suffice it to say that the feared impractical consequences are more
apparent than real. Being head of an executive department is no mean
job. It is more than a full-time job, requiring full attention, specialized
knowledge, skills and expertise. If maximum benefits are to be derived
from a department head's ability and expertise, he should be allowed to
attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other
governmental offices or employment. He should be precluded from
dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and inefficiency. Surely
the advantages to be derived from this concentration of attention,
knowledge and expertise, particularly at this stage of our national and
economic development, far outweigh the benefits, if any, that may be
gained from a department head spreading himself too thin and taking in
more than what he can handle.

Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court

hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government45 Luis
Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health
Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to
immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein
defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. With respect to the other named
respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are
no longer occupying the positions complained of.

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be

considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual
services rendered.46 It has been held that "in cases where there is no de
jure,officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the
office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled
to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover
the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This
doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems
unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de
facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such
services.47 Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the
respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned
positions may therefore be retained by them.

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are

GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is
accordingly set aside.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento and Grio-Aquino, JJ., took no part.