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Advanced Capitalism
Author(s): Michael Burawoy
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 5 (Oct., 1983), pp. 587-605
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094921 .
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MICHAEL BuRAwoy
Universityof California-Berkeley
The paper develops the concept of politics of production through a double critique:
first, of recent literature on the organization of work for ignoring the political and
ideological regimes in production; and second, of recent theories of the state for
failing to root its interventions in the requirements of capitalist development. The
paper distinguishes three types of production politics: despotic, hegemonic, and
hegemonic despotic. The focus is on national variations of hegemonic regimes. The
empirical basis of the analysis is a comparison of two workshops, one in Manchester,
England, and the other in Chicago, with similar work organizations and situated in
similar market contexts. State supportfor those not employed and state regulation of
factory regimes explain the distinctive production politics not only in Britain and the
United States but also in Japan and Sweden. The different national configurations of
state intervention are themselves framed by the combined and uneven development
of capitalism on a world scale. Finally, consideration is given to the character of the
contemporary period, in which there emerges a new form of production
politics-hegemonic despotism-founded on the mobility of capital.
This paper has two targets and one arrow. Although organization theory has recently
The first target is the underpoliticizationof begun to pay attentionto micropolitics(Bums
production:theories of productionthat ignore et al., 1979; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; Zey-
its political moments as well as its determi- Ferrelland Aiken, 1981),there has been a fail-
nations by the state. The second target is the ure to theorize about, first, the difference be-
overpoliticizationof the state: theories of the tween the politics of productionand the politi-
state that stress its autonomy, dislocating it cal apparatusesof productionthat shape those
from its economic foundations. The arrow is politics; second, how both are limited by the
the notion of a politics of production which laborprocess on one side and marketforces on
aims to undo the compartmentalization of pro- the other; third, how both politics and appara-
ductionand politics by linkingthe organization
of work to the state. The view elaboratedin tics by its arena, so that state politics refers to strug-
this paper is that the process of production gles in the arena of the state, production politics to
contains political and ideological elements as struggles in the arena of the workplace, gender poli-
well as a purelyeconomic moment.Thatis, the tics to struggles in the family. For others, such as
process of production is not confined to the Stephens (1979:53-54), politics is always state poli-
labor process-to the social relations into tics and what distinguishes one form from another is
which men and women enter as they transform the goal. Thus, production politics aims to redistri-
raw materialsinto useful products with instru- bute control over the means of production, con-
ments of production. The process of produc- sumption politics focuses on the redistribution of the
means of consumption, and mobility politics in-
tion also includes political apparatuses which volves struggles to increase social mobility. These
reproducethose relationsof the labor process differences in the conception of politics are not
throughthe regulationof struggles.I call these merely terminological but reflect alternative under-
apparatusesthe factory regime and the associ- standings of the transition from capitalism to so-
ated struggles the politics of production or cialism. Whereas Stephens sees the transition as a
simply production politics.' gradual shift in state politics from consumption and
mobility issues to production issues, I see it in terms
* Direct all correspondence to: Michael Burawoy, of the transformation of production politics and state
Department of Sociology, University of California, politics through the reconstruction of production ap-
Berkeley, CA 94720. paratuses and state apparatuses. What Stephens re-
I should like to thank Steve Frenkel and three gards as the driving force behind the transition to
anonymous referees for their detailed comments. socialism-the 'changing balance of power in civil
Erik Wright has read more versions of this paper society," in effect the organization of labor into trade
than he cares to remember. As ever, I am grateful for unions-I regard as the consolidation of factory re-
his persistent encouragement and criticism. gimes which reproduce the capital-labor relationship
I Definitions are not innocent. I have defined poli- more efficiently.
American Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48 (October:587-605) 587
lation of production.Now managementcan no hegemonic regimes, the decisive basis for pe-
longer rely entirely on the economic whip of riodizationremainsthe unity/separationof the
the market. Nor can it impose an arbitrary reproductionof laborpower and capitalistpro-
despotism. Workers must be persuaded to duction.
cooperate with management. Their interests Exceptions to this demarcation further il-
must be coordinatedwith those of capital. The luminate it. Thus, Californiaagribusiness of-
despotic regimes of early capitalism,in which fers examples of monopoly industrywith des-
coercion prevails over consent, must be re- potic control. There are two explanations for
placed withhegemonic regimes, in which con- this anomaly. First, agriculture has been
sent prevails, althoughnever to the exclusion exempt from national labor legislation so that
of coercion.Not only is the applicationof coer- farm workers are not protectedfrom the arbi-
cion circumscribedand regularized,but the in- trarydespotismof managers.Second, workers
fliction of discipline and punishmentitself be- are frequently not citizens and often illegal
comes the object of consent. Thegeneric char- immigrants,so they are unable to draw any
acter of the factory regime is, therefore, de- social insurance and must constantly live in
terminedindependentlyof the formof the labor fear of apprehension.In effect, Californiaag-
process and competitive pressures among ribusiness has successfully established a re-
firms. It is determinedby the dependence of lationship to the state akin to that between
the livelihoodof workerson wage employment industry and state under early capitalism in
and the dependence of the latter on perfor- order to enforce despotic regimes (Thomas,
mance in the place of work. State social insur- 1983;Wells, 1983). Urban enterprise zones-
ance reduces the first dependence, while labor selected geographicalareas in which capital is
legislation reduces the second. encouraged to invest by lowering taxes and
While despotic regimes are based on the relaxing protective legislation for labor-are
unity of the reproductionof labor power and similarattempts to restore nineteenth-century
the process of production,and hegemonic re- marketdespotism. However, they remain ex-
gimes on a limitedbut definiteseparationof the ceptional.
two, their specific charactervaries with forms As others have argued(Piven and Cloward,
of labor process and competitionamong firms 1982; Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1982), attempts
as well as with forms of state intervention. to dismantle what exists of the welfare state
Thus, the form of despotic regime varies can achieve only limitedsuccess. More signifi-
among countries accordingto patternsof pro- cant for the developmentof factory regimes is
letarianization,so that where workers retain the vulnerability of collective labor, in the
ties to subsistence existence various pater- contemporaryperiod, to the national and in-
nalistic regimes with a more or less coercive ternationalmobilityof capital, leadingto a new
characteremerge to create additionalbases of despotism built on the foundations of the
dependence of workers on their employers hegemonic regime. That is, workers face the
(Burawoy, 1982). Hegemonic regimes also threatof losing theirjobs not as individualsbut
differ from country to country based on the as a resultof threatsto the viabilityof the firm.
extent of state-provided social insurance This enables management to turn the
schemes and the characterof state regulation hegemonic regime against workers, relying on
of factory regimes. Furthermore,the factors its mechanisms of coordinating interests to
highlighted by Braverman, Friedman and command consent to sacrifices. Concession
Edwards-skill, technology, competition bargainingand qualityof worklifeprogramsare
among firms, and resistance-all give rise to two faces of this hegemonic despotism.
variations in regimes within countries. Thus, The periodization just sketched, from
variationsin deskillingand competitionamong market despotism to hegemonic regimes to
firms created the conditions for very different hegemonic despotism, is rooted in the
despotic regimes in nineteenth-centuryLanca- dynamics of capitalism. In the first period the
shire cotton mills: marketdespotism, patriarc- searchfor profitled capital to intensifyexploi-
hal despotism, and paternalistic despotism tation with the assistance of despotic regimes.
(Burawoy, 1982). Under advanced capitalism This gave rise to crises of underconsumption
the form of hegemonic regime also varies ac- and resistancefrom workers,and resolutionof
cording to the sector of the economy. In the these conflicts could be achieved only at the
competitive sector we find the balance be- level of collective capital-that is, through
tween consent and coercion furthertowardthe state intervention. This took two forms-the
latter than in the monopoly sector, although constitutionof the social wage and the restric-
where workers retain considerable control tion of managerialdiscretion-which, as we
over the labor process we find forms of craft have argued, gave rise to the hegemonic re-
administration.Notwithstandingthe important gime. The necessity of such state intervention
variationsamong despotic regimes and among is given by the logic of the development of
capitalism.But the mechanismsthroughwhich from smaller firms. The other enterprise, Al-
the state comes to do what is "necessary"vary lied, was the engine division of a multinational
over time and from country to country. Here corporation whose primary sales ventures
we draw on an arrayof explanationsthat have were in agriculturaland construction equip-
figuredprominentlyin recent debatesaboutthe ment. For ten months, in 1974-1975, I worked
nature of the capitalist state: the state as an -in the small parts department of this South
instrument of an enlightened fraction of the Chicago plant as a miscellaneous machine
dominant classes, the state as subject to the operator. Donald Roy (1952, 1953, 1954) had
interests of "state managers,"the state as re- studied the same plant thirty years earlier,
sponsive to struggles both within and outside when it was a largejobbing shop, before it was
itself. There is, of course, nothinginevitableor taken over by Allied. It was then known as
inexorable about these state interventions; Geer.
nothingguaranteesthe success or even the ac-
tivation of the appropriatemechanisms.Thus, The Labor Process
althoughwe have theories of the conditionsfor
the reproductionof capitalism in its various Allied's machine shop was much the same as
phases, and therefore of the corresponding any other, with its assortment of mills, drills
necessary state interventions,we have only ad and lathes, each operated by a single worker
hoc accounts of the actual, specific and con- who depended on the services of a variety of
crete interventions. auxiliaryworkers:set-up men, who mighthelp
Nevertheless, the form and timing of "set up" the machinesfor each new "job";crib
capitalist development frame the nature of attendants, who controlled the distributionof
state interventionas well as shape the form of fixtures and tools kept in the crib; the forklift
factory regime. As will be discussed below we "trucker," who transported stock and un-
can begin to locate the rapidityandunevenness finished "pieces" from place to place in large
of state interventions in the context of the tubs; the time clerk, who would punch oper-
combined and uneven development of ators in on new jobs and out on completed
capitalismat an internationallevel. Moreover, ones; the schedulingman, who was responsible
in the contemporaryperiod the logic of capital for directing the distribution of work and
accumulationon a world scale determinesthat chasing materialsaround the department;and
state interventionbecomes less relevantfor the the inspectors, who would have to "okay" the
determinationof changes and variationsin the first piece before operators could "get going"
form of production politics. This is the argu- and turn out the work. Finally, the foreman
ment of the paper's final section. The very would oversee operations, coordinating and
success of the hegemonic regime in constrain- facilitatingproductionwhere necessary: sign-
ing managementand establishing a new con- ing double red cards, which guaranteeda basic
sumptionnormleads to a crisis of profitability. "anticipated piece rate" when operators,
As a result, managementattemptsto bypass or throughno fault of their own, were unable to
underminethe stricturesof the hegemonic re- get ahead, and negotiatingwith auxiliarywork-
gime while embracing those of its features ers on behalf of the operators.
which foster worker cooperation. The laborprocess at Jay's was similarin that
workers controlled their own instruments of
productionand were dependenton the services
FACTORYPOLITICSAT JAY'S of auxiliary workers. In the erection section,
AND ALLIED operators used hand tools such as soldering
To highlightboth the generic characterof the irons, wire clippers and spanners. There was
hegemonic regime and its different specific no mass productionsequence: each electrical
forms, we will compare two workshops with assembly was completed by an erector, or by
similarlabor processes and systems of remun- two and sometimes even three "working
erationsituatedwithin similarmarketcontexts mates" (Lupton, 1963:104-105). There were
but differentnationalcontexts. The first com- fewer auxiliary workers than at Allied: the
pany, Jay's, is Britishand was studiedby Tom floor controller ("scheduling man"), the in-
Luptonin 1956. It was a Manchesterelectrical spector, the charge hand ("set-up man"), the
engineeringcompany with divisions overseas. store-keeper ("crib attendant") and the time
Lupton was a participant observer for six clerk. There was less intrasectiontension and
months in a department which erected conflict than at Geer and Allied, which sprang
transformersfor commercial use. Jay's was fromthe dependenceof piece-rateoperatorson
partof the monopolysector of Britishindustry, day-rateauxiliaryworkers. The lateralconflict
dominatedby such giants as Vicker's. It was a at Jay's was instead between sections over de-
member of an employers' association which livery of the rightparts at the righttime and in
engagedin price fixing and barredcompetition the right quantity. Thus, the erectors at Jay's
over the laborprocess and thereforemore bar- lied the balanceof class forces was inscribedin
gainingpower with managementat Jay's than ruleswhose form was stablebut whose content
at Allied. was determined in three-year collective
agreements negotiated between management
and union. For the durationof the contract,all
Rate Fixing
partiesagreedto abide by the constraintsit set
In broadoutline, there are close resemblances on the realization of interests. Strikes broke
in the patterns of conflict and cooperation as out when the contract under negotiation was
they are playedout in the two shops. However, unacceptableto the rankand file. At Jay's, by
the continual bargainingand renegotiationat contrast, the balance of class forces was con-
Jay's contrast with the broad adhesion to a tinuallyrenegotiatedon the shop floor. "Unof-
common set of proceduralrules at Allied. This ficial" short strikes were part and parcel of
is particularlyclear in the relationshipbetween industriallife. In the one, the political appara-
rate fixers and operators.The Allied rate fixer tuses of productionare severed from the labor
was an "industrial engineer" who retired to process; in the other, the two are almost indis-
distant offices. Rather than stalkingthe aisles tinguishable.The differences between the two
in pursuitof loose rates, as had been the cus- patternscan be clearly discerned in the opera-
tom at Geer, he had become more concerned tion of the "internallabor market."
with changes in the organizationof work, in-
troducingnew machines and computingrates The Internal Labor Market
on his pocket computer. At Jay's, where
piecework earnings were a more important We speak of an internallabormarketwhen the
element of the wage packet, the rate fixer was distribution of employees within the firm is
still the time-and-motionman with stopwatch administeredthrougha set of rules defined in-
in hand. His presence, as at Geer, created a dependently of the external labor market. At
"spectacle"to which all workersin the section Allied it worked as follows: when a vacancy
were drawn. occurred in a department, any worker from
But the air of tyranny that pervaded that departmentcould "bid" for the job. The
Geer-the sly attempts of time-study men to bidder with the greatest seniority usually re-
clock jobs while they had their backs to the ceived the job, and his old job became vacant.
operators-was absent at Jay's. First, unlike If no one was interested in the opening, or if
both Geer and Allied, operatorsat Jay's had to management deemed the applicants unqual-
agree to new rates before they were intro- ified, the job would be posted plantwide. If
duced. Second, the conflict which broughtthe there were still no acceptable bids, someone
rate fixer and operatorinto oppositionobeyed would be hiredfrom outside, from the external
certain principles of fair play which both ob- labormarket.Generally,then, new employees
served. The shop steward in particularmain- enteredon those jobs that no one else wanted,
tained a constant vigilance to prevent any usually the speed drills. Similarly, workers
subterfugeby the rate fixer or hastiness by the who were being laid off could "bump" other
operator. On those rare occasions when in- employees whose jobs they could performand
dustrial engineers came down from their of- who had less seniority. An internal labor
fices at Allied, shop stewards were usually far marketnot only presupposessome criteriafor
fromthe scene. They shruggedtheirshoulders, selecting amongbids-in this case a heavy em-
denyingany responsibilityfor ratebusters who phasis on seniority-but also some hierarchy
would consistently turn in more than 140%o. of jobs based on basic earningsand looseness
Bargaining over "custom and practice" of piece rates. Otherwiseworkerswould be in
(Brown, 1972)rather than consent to bureau- constantmotion. Efficiency in the organization
cratically administeredrules shaped produc- of the plantdependson a certainstabilityofjob
tion politics at Jay's. Thus, jobs without rates tenure, particularlyon the more sophisticated
became the subject of intense disputationbe- machines whose operation requires a little
tween foreman and worker, whereas at Allied more skill.
such jobs were automaticallypaid at the "an- The internal labor market has a number of
ticipated rate" of 125%. In the allocation of importantconsequences. First, the possessive
work, operators in Jay's transformersection individualism associated with the external
were in a much stronger position to bargain labor marketis now importedinto the factory.
with the foreman than were the operators at The system of bidding and bumping elevates
Allied. Indeed, this was the basis of much of the individual interest at the expense of the
the factionalismwithin the section, intensified collective interest. Grievances related to the
by the absence of well-definedprocedures. job can be resolved by the employee's simply
These differences exemplify a more general biddingon anotherjob. Second, the possibility
distinctionbetweenthe two workshops.At Al- of biddingoff a job gives the workera certain
terms of deskilling, but in terms of the depen- tections and the abrogation of minimum wage
dence of workers on the class of employers, laws, health and safety regulations, and na-
the bindingof the reproductionof laborpower tional labor relations legislation. In other
to the production process through economic countries such as Italy and, to a lesser extent,
and extra-economic ties. This provided the the United States, one finds the re-emergence
basis for the autocraticdespotism of the over- of artisanal workshops and sweated domestic
seer or subcontractor. work subcontracted out by large firms (Sabel,
Despotism was not a viable system from the 1982: chapter 5). Portes and Walton (1981)
point of view of either capital or labor. On the refer to this phenomenon as the peripheraliza-
one side, workers had no security and there- tion of the core. Sassen-Koob (1982) describes
fore sought protection from the tyranny of a more complex picture of peripheralization
capital through collective representation in and recomposition. The exodus of basic man-
productionand social insurance outside pro- ufacturing from some of the largest cities, such
duction. An external body, the state, would as New York, has been followed by the cre-
have to impose these conditionson capital. On ation of small-scale manufacturing based on
the other side, as capital expanded through low-paid immigrant labor servicing the ex-
concentrationand centralizationit requiredthe panding service industry and the gentrifiede"
regulationof class relationsin accordancewith life styles of its employees.
the stabilization of competition and interde- Peripheralization at the core, although
pendence among firms. At the same time the growing, is still a marginal phenomenon, sub-
success of despotic regimeshad so reducedthe ordinate to the (albeit declining) manufacturing
purchasingpower of workersthat capital now core. In the old manufacturing industries such
faced worsening crises of overproduction-it as auto, steel, rubber and electrical, a changing
could not realize the value it produced. Indi- balance of class forces is giving rise to a new
vidual capitalists, therefore, had an interest in despotism. Two sets of conditions, in particu-
boosting the wages of the workers of other lar, are responsible for this new political order
capitalistsbut not of their own. Again only an in the workplace. First, it is now much easier
externalbody, the state, could enforce, for all to move capital from one place to another, as a
capitalists, mechanisms for the regulationof result of three phenomena: the generation of
conflict and a minimal social wage. In short, pools of cheap labor power in both peripheral
both capital and labor had an interest in state countries and peripheral regions of advanced
interventionsthat would establish the condi- capitalist societies; the fragmentation of the
tions for a hegemonic productionpolitics; the labor process, so that different components
specific form of that intervention was influ- can be produced and assembled in different
enced by the characterof the state itself. places (sometimes at the flick of a switch); and
However, if the separationof the reproduc- the metamorphoses of the transportation and
tion of labor power from the productionpro- communications industries (Frdbel et al., 1980).
cess helped to resolve the crisis of overpro- All these changes are connected to the pro-
ductionand to regulateconflict, it also laid the cesses of capital accumulation on an interna-
basis of a new crisis of profitability.Thus, in tional scale, whereas a second set of changes is
the United States hegemonic regimes estab- located in the advanced capitalist countries
lished in the leadingsectors of industryplaced themselves. The rise of hegemonic regimes,
such constraintson accumulationthat interna- tying the interests of workers to the fortunes of
tional competition became increasingly their employers, embodying working-class
threatening.First, in some countries such as power in factory apparatuses rather than state
Japan the hegemonic regime gave capital apparatuses, and the reinforcement of individ-
greater room to maneuver. Second, in semi- ualism have left workers defenseless against
peripheral countries such as South Africa, the recent challenges from capital. Even in-
Braziland Iran,manufacturingindustrydid not dustrial workers in England, the acme of
installhegemonicregimesbut insteadreliedon shop-floor control, find themselves helpless
a combination of economic and extra- before job loss through rationalization, tech-
economic means of coercion. Third, in yet nological change, and particularly the intensifi-
other countries with export processing zones, cation of work (Massey and Meegan, 1982).
women workershave been subject to an auto- The new despotism is founded on the basis
cratic despotism fostered by the state. of the hegemonic regime it is replacing. It is in
Advanced capitalist states have responded fact a hegemonic despotism. The interests of
by carvingout arenasin whichlaboris stripped capital and labor continue to be concretely
of the powers embodiedin hegemonicregimes. coordinated, but whereas before labor was
The urbanenterprisezone is one such attempt granted concessions on the basis of the expan-
to return restricted areas to the nineteenth sion of profits, now labor makes concessions
century through the withdrawalof labor pro- on the basis of the relative profitability of one
capitalist vis-a-vis another-that is, the op- indicative planning. Here different countries
portunity costs of capital. The point of ref- are in a more or less advantageousposition.
erence is no longer primarilythe success of Thus, in both the United States and Britain,
the firm from one year to the next but rates of but particularlyin the former, labor has sup-
profitthat mightbe earnedelsewhere. At com- ported the export of capital as partand parcel
panies losing profits workers are presented of the postwareconomic expansion. In Britain
with a choice between wage cuts (even zero- and the United States the state is unaccus-
pay plans have been announced)or the loss of tomed and ill-equipped to regulate flows of
theirjobs. The new despotismis not simplythe domesticcapital.These two hegemonicpowers
resurrectionof the old: it is not the arbitrary have maintainedtheir dominancethroughthe
tyranny of the overseer aimed at individual free movement of financialand industrialcap-
workers (although that happens too) but the ital. In other countries one finds an inverse
"rational"tyrannyof capital mobilityaimed at relation between the constraints imposed by
the collective worker. There is a renewed production politics on state politics and the
bindingof the reproductionof labor power to capacity of the state to regulate investment
the productionprocess, but, ratherthanvia the (Pontusson, 1983).Thus, in Sweden, where the
individual, it occurs at the level of the firm, welfare state reflects the constraints of pro-
region or even nation-state.The fear of being duction politics, the state has not had much
fired is replaced by the fear of capital flight, success in controllinginvestment, whereas in
plant closure, the transfer of operations, and Japan production politics pose weaker con-
disinvestment. straintsand the state has been more successful
The pre-existing hegemonic regime estab- in controlling the movement of capital. In
lished the ground for concession bargaining. Sweden the working class has supported at-
Alternatively, management may by-pass the tempts to collectivize the investment process
hegemonicregime. Recentfads such as Quality through the establishment of "wage earner
of Work Life and QualityCircles signify man- funds" from the taxation of company profits.
agement'sattemptto invade the spaces work- But in a country so dependent on the export
ers created under the pre-existingregime and sector such attempts graduallyto expropriate
mobilize consent for increased productivity. capitalare bound to meet with effective resist-
There have been concerted attemptsto decer- ance, even when the Social Democrats are in
tify unions and fire workers for trade union office.
activities. At the same time states and com- Irrespectiveof state interventionsthere are
munitiesare pitted againstone anotherin their signs that in all advanced capitalist societies
attemptto attractand retaincapital. They out- hegemonic regimes are developing a despotic
bid each other in grantingtax shelters and re- face. Responses may reflect the differentrela-
laxing both labor legislation and welfare pro- tions between production apparatuses and
visions (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). state apparatuses,but the underlyingdynam-
The response of labor has been conditioned ics, the changing international division
by pre-existing hegemonic regimes and their of labor and capital mobility, are leading
relationshipto the state. Thus, in the United towarda thirdperiod:the periodof hegemonic
States debates in the labor movementhave re- despotism.In this periodone can anticipatethe
volved aroundwhetheror not to makeconces- workingclasses beginningto feel their collec-
sions, symptomaticof the confinementof pro- tive impotenceand the irreconcilabilityof their
ductionpolitics to the level of the plant. Occa- interests with the development of capitalism,
sionally, plant closings have been followed by understood as an internationalphenomenon.
worker buy-outs, but it is hard to see these as The forces leading to working-classdemobili-
more than attempts to contain levels of com- zationmay also stimulatea broaderrecognition
munity devastation. In England, there were that the materialinterests of the workingclass
attemptsat extendingthe sphereof production can be vouchsafedonly beyond capitalism,be-
politicsfromthe regulationof the laborprocess yond the anarchy of the market and beyond
to the regulationof investment, with workers despotism in production.
either takingover plants or producingalterna-
tive plans (Coates, 1978; Wainwrightand El-
liott, 1982). This was a short-livedmovement REFERENCES
duringthe last Labourgovernment,which dis- Aglietta, Michael
solved before the unleashingof marketforces 1979 A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. London:
when the Conservative Party took office. New Left Books.
More ambitious and potentially more effec- Arrighi, G. and B. Silver
tive strategiesaim at state controlover the flow 1983 "Labor movements and capital migration: a
of capital, involving a rangeof measuresfrom comparative and world systemic view."
plant closing legislation to nationalizationand Unpublished Manuscript.