Bura Woy 1983

Between the Labor Process and the State: The Changing Face of Factory Regimes Under
Advanced Capitalism
Author(s): Michael Burawoy
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 5 (Oct., 1983), pp. 587-605
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094921 .
Accessed: 18/07/2013 10:35
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
American Sociological Review.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
BETWEEN THE LABOR PROCESS AND THE STATE:
THE CHANGING FACE OF FACTORY REGIMES UNDER
ADVANCED CAPITALISM*
MICHAEL BuRAwoy
Universityof California-Berkeley
The paper develops the concept of politics of production through a double critique:
first, of recent literature on the organization of work for ignoring the political and
ideological regimes in production; and second, of recent theories of the state for
failing to root its interventions in the requirements of capitalist development. The
paper distinguishes three types of production politics: despotic, hegemonic, and
hegemonic despotic. The focus is on national variations of hegemonic regimes. The
empirical basis of the analysis is a comparison of two workshops, one in Manchester,
England, and the other in Chicago, with similar work organizations and situated in
similar market contexts. State supportfor those not employed and state regulation of
factory regimes explain the distinctive production politics not only in Britain and the
United States but also in Japan and Sweden. The different national configurations of
state intervention are themselves framed by the combined and uneven development
of capitalism on a world scale. Finally, consideration is given to the character of the
contemporary period, in which there emerges a new form of production
politics-hegemonic despotism-founded on the mobility of capital.
This paper has two targets and one arrow. Although organization theory has recently
The first target is the underpoliticizationof begun to pay attentionto micropolitics(Bums
production:theories of productionthat ignore et al., 1979; Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980; Zey-
its political moments as well as its determi- Ferrelland Aiken, 1981),there has been a fail-
nations by the state. The second target is the ure to theorize about, first, the difference be-
overpoliticizationof the state: theories of the tween the politics of productionand the politi-
state that stress its autonomy, dislocating it cal apparatusesof productionthat shape those
from its economic foundations. The arrow is politics; second, how both are limited by the
the notion of a politics of production which laborprocess on one side and marketforces on
aims to undo the compartmentalization of pro- the other; third, how both politics and appara-
ductionand politics by linkingthe organization
of work to the state. The view elaboratedin tics by its arena, so that state politics refers to strug-
this paper is that the process of production gles in the arena of the state, production politics to
contains political and ideological elements as struggles in the arena of the workplace, gender poli-
well as a purelyeconomic moment.Thatis, the tics to struggles in the family. For others, such as
process of production is not confined to the Stephens (1979:53-54), politics is always state poli-
labor process-to the social relations into tics and what distinguishes one form from another is
which men and women enter as they transform the goal. Thus, production politics aims to redistri-
raw materialsinto useful products with instru- bute control over the means of production, con-
ments of production. The process of produc- sumption politics focuses on the redistribution of the
means of consumption, and mobility politics in-
tion also includes political apparatuses which volves struggles to increase social mobility. These
reproducethose relationsof the labor process differences in the conception of politics are not
throughthe regulationof struggles.I call these merely terminological but reflect alternative under-
apparatusesthe factory regime and the associ- standings of the transition from capitalism to so-
ated struggles the politics of production or cialism. Whereas Stephens sees the transition as a
simply production politics.' gradual shift in state politics from consumption and
mobility issues to production issues, I see it in terms
* Direct all correspondence to: Michael Burawoy, of the transformation of production politics and state
Department of Sociology, University of California, politics through the reconstruction of production ap-
Berkeley, CA 94720. paratuses and state apparatuses. What Stephens re-
I should like to thank Steve Frenkel and three gards as the driving force behind the transition to
anonymous referees for their detailed comments. socialism-the 'changing balance of power in civil
Erik Wright has read more versions of this paper society," in effect the organization of labor into trade
than he cares to remember. As ever, I am grateful for unions-I regard as the consolidation of factory re-
his persistent encouragement and criticism. gimes which reproduce the capital-labor relationship
I Definitions are not innocent. I have defined poli- more efficiently.
American Sociological Review 1983, Vol. 48 (October:587-605) 587

588 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
tuses at the level of productiondifferfrom and capitalist caricatureof the social regulation
relate to state politics and state apparatuses. of the labourprocess which becomes neces-
The purposeof this paperis to specify the form sary on a large scale and in the employment
of politics at the levels both of productionand in common of instruments of labour, and
of the state and to examine their interrelation- especially of machinery. The overseer's
shipthrougha comparisonof an Englishand an book of penalties replacesthe slave-driver's
Americanfactory. The first part of the paper lash. All punishments naturally resolve
develops the concept of productionpolitics and themselves into fines and deductions from
the associated political apparatusesof produc- wages, and the law-givingtalent of the fac-
tion in the context of the dynamics of tory Lycurgus so arranges matters that a
capitalism and its labor process. The second violation of his laws is, if possible, more
part uses the two case studies to highlightna- profitableto him than the keeping of them.
tional variationin the form of productionpoli- (Marx, [1867] 1976:549-50)
tics. The thirdpartexplainsthose variationsin
terms of the relationshipbetween apparatuses Although Marx never conceptualizes the idea
of productionand apparatusesof the state, a of political apparatusesof production,he is in
relationshipwhich is decisively determinedby fact describinga particulartype of factory re-
the combined and uneven developmentof the gime which I will call marketdespotism. Here
capital-laborrelationship. The final part con- the despotic regulationof the labor process is
siders the emergence of new forms of produc- constituted by the economic whip of the
tion politics in the latest phase of capitalist market. The dependence of workers on cash
development. earningsis inscribed in their subordinationto
the factory Lycurgus.
FROM MARKET DESPOTISMTO Marx does not recognize factory regimes as
HEGEMONICREGIMES analyticallydistinct from the labor process be-
cause he sees market despotism as the only
The Marxisttraditionoffers the most sustained mode of labor process regulationcompatible
attemptto understandthe developmentof pro- with modern industry and the pressure for
duction within a systemic view of profits.In fact, marketdespotismis a relatively
capitalism-that is, a view which explores the rareform of factory regimewhose existence is
dynamics and tendencies of capitalismas well dependenton three historicallyspecific condi-
as the conditions of its reproduction.Produc- tions: (1) Workers have no other means of
tion is at the core of both the perpetuationand livelihood than throughthe sale of their labor
the demise of capitalism.The act of production power for a wage. (2) The labor process is
is simultaneouslyan act of reproduction. At subjectto fragmentationand mechanizationso
the same time that they produceuseful things, that skill and specialized knowledge can no
workers produce the basis of their own exis- longer be a basis of power. The systematic
tence as well as that of capital. The exchange separationof mentaland manuallaborand the
value added through cooperative labor is di- reduction of workers to appendages of ma-
vided between the wage equivalent, which be- chines strip workers of the capacity to resist
comes the means of the reproductionof labor arbitrarycoercion. (3) Impelled by competi-
power so that the workercan turn up the next tion, capitalists continuallytransformproduc-
day, and surplus value, the source of profit tion throughthe extension of the workingday,
which makes it possible for the capitalist to intensificationof work and the introductionof
exist as such and thus employ the laborer. new machinery.Anarchyin the marketleads to
How is it that the labor power-the capacity despotism in the factory.
to work-is translated into sufficient labor- If history has more or less upheld Marx's
application of effort-so as to provide both analysis of competitive capitalism, it has not
wages and profit? Marx answers, through upheldthe identificationof the demise of com-
coercion. In his analysis, the extractionof ef- petitive capitalism with the demise of
fort occurs through a despotic regime of pro- capitalismper se. What Marxperceivedas the
duction politics. embryonicforms of socialism, in particularthe
socializationof productionthroughconcentra-
In the factory code, the capitalistformulates tion, centralizationand mechanization,in fact
his autocraticpower over his workerslike a laid the basis of a new type of capitalism,
private legislator, and purely as an emana- monopoly capitalism. The hallmark of
tion of his own will, unaccompanied by twentieth-centuryMarxismhas been the char-
either that division of responsibilityother- acterizationof this new form of capitalism-its
wise so much approved of by the politics, its economics, and its culture. Curi-
bourgeoisie, or the still more approved rep- ously, it is only in the last decade that Marxists
resentativesystem. This code is merely the have begun to reconsider Marx's analysis of

FACTORYREGIMES UNDER ADVANCED CAPITALISM 589
the labor process, in particularits transforma- simple control, as Edwards maintains. Thus,
tion over time. Littler(1982)and Clawson(1980)underlinethe
These studies have generally dwealt on his- importanceof subcontracting,both inside and
toricizing the second and third conditions of outside the firm, as an obstacle to direct con-
marketdespotism: deskillingand perfect com- trol by the employer. Nor can the period of
petitionamongfirms. Braverman(1974)argues advancedcapitalismbe reducedto the consoli-
that deskilling really established itself only in dation of deskilling. New skills are continually
the periodof monopoly capitalismwhen firms created and do not disappear as rapidly as
were sufficiently powerful to crush the resist- Bravermansuggests (Wrightand Singelmann,
ance of craft workers. Friedman's (1977) 1983).Finally, Edwardsquite explicitly recog-
analysis of changes in the laborprocess in En- nizes that each successive period contains and
gland counters Braverman's unilinear de- actively reproduces forms of control originat-
gradation of work by underlining the im- ing in previous periods. All these works point
portanceof resistance in shapingtwo manage- to the distinction between the labor process
rial strategies: direct control and responsible conceived of as a particularorganization of
autonomy. Direct control corresponds to tasks and the political apparatusesof produc-
Braverman'sprocess of deskilling,whereasre- tion conceived of as its mode of regulation.In
sponsible autonomy attaches workers to the contrastto Braverman,who ignores the politi-
interestsof capitalby allowingthem limitedjob cal apparatusesof production, and Edwards,
control, a limited unity of conception and Friedman, Littler and Clawson, who collapse
execution. In the early period of capitalism, them into the labor process, I treat them as
responsibleautonomy was a legacy of the past analytically distinct from and causally inde-
and took the form of craft control, whereas pendentof the labor process. Moreover, these
under monopoly capitalism it is a self- political apparatusesof production provide a
conscious managerial strategy to preempt basis for the periodizationof capitalistproduc-
worker resistance. tion.
In an even more far-reachingreconstruction Whilenot denying the importanceof histori-
of Braverman'sanalysis, Edwards(1979)iden- cally rooting Marx's second and third condi-
tifies the emergence of three historically suc- tions of market despotism-competition
cessive forms of control: simple, technical and amongfirmsand the expropriationof skill-for
bureaucratic.In the nineteenthcentury, firms an understandingof the transformationof labor
were generallysmall and marketscompetitive, controls, I want to dwell on the first condition,
so that managementexercised arbitrary,per- the dependenceof workerson the sale of their
sonalistic dominationover workers. With the labor power. In this connection we must ex-
twentieth-centurygrowth of large-scaleindus- amine two forms of state intervention which
try, simple control gave way to new forms. breakthe ties bindingthe reproductionof labor
After a series of unsuccessful experiments, power to productiveactivity in the workplace.
capital sought to regulate work through the First, social insurance legislation guarantees
drive system and by incorporatingcontrol into the reproductionof labor power at a certain
technology, epitomized by the assembly line. minimal level independent of participationin
This mode of control generated its own forms production. Moreover, such insurance effec-
of struggle and, after World War Two, gave tively establishes a minimumwage (although
way to bureaucraticregulation,in which rules this may also be legislatively enforced), con-
are used to define and evaluate work tasks and strainingthe use of payment by results. Piece
govern the applicationof sanctions. Although rates can no longer be arbitrarilycut to extract
each period generates its own prototypical ever greatereffort for the same wage. Second,
formof control, all neverthelesscoexist within the state directly establishes limits on those
the contemporaryU.S. economy as reflections methods of managerial domination which
of various market relations. In a more recent exploit the dependence of workers on wages.
formulation,Gordonet al. (1982)have situated Compulsorytradeunionrecognition,grievance
the development of the three forms of labor machinery and collective bargainingprotect
control in three social structuresof accumula- workersfrom arbitraryfiring, fining and wage
tion correspondingto long swings in the U.S. reductions and thus further enhance the au-
economy. tonomy of the reproductionof labor power.
While all these accounts add a great deal to The repeal of Mastersand Servantslaws gives
our understandingof the transformationof labor the right to quit and so underminesem-
work organizationand its regulation,they are ployers' attemptsto tie domestic life to factory
unsatisfactory as periodizations of capitalist life.
production.We know that the period of early Although many have pointed to the devel-
capitalism was neither the haven of the craft opment of these social and political rights,few
worker,as Bravermanimplies, nor confined to have explored their ramificationsfor the regu-

590 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
lation of production.Now managementcan no hegemonic regimes, the decisive basis for pe-
longer rely entirely on the economic whip of riodizationremainsthe unity/separationof the
the market. Nor can it impose an arbitrary reproductionof laborpower and capitalistpro-
despotism. Workers must be persuaded to duction.
cooperate with management. Their interests Exceptions to this demarcation further il-
must be coordinatedwith those of capital. The luminate it. Thus, Californiaagribusiness of-
despotic regimes of early capitalism,in which fers examples of monopoly industrywith des-
coercion prevails over consent, must be re- potic control. There are two explanations for
placed withhegemonic regimes, in which con- this anomaly. First, agriculture has been
sent prevails, althoughnever to the exclusion exempt from national labor legislation so that
of coercion.Not only is the applicationof coer- farm workers are not protectedfrom the arbi-
cion circumscribedand regularized,but the in- trarydespotismof managers.Second, workers
fliction of discipline and punishmentitself be- are frequently not citizens and often illegal
comes the object of consent. Thegeneric char- immigrants,so they are unable to draw any
acter of the factory regime is, therefore, de- social insurance and must constantly live in
terminedindependentlyof the formof the labor fear of apprehension.In effect, Californiaag-
process and competitive pressures among ribusiness has successfully established a re-
firms. It is determinedby the dependence of lationship to the state akin to that between
the livelihoodof workerson wage employment industry and state under early capitalism in
and the dependence of the latter on perfor- order to enforce despotic regimes (Thomas,
mance in the place of work. State social insur- 1983;Wells, 1983). Urban enterprise zones-
ance reduces the first dependence, while labor selected geographicalareas in which capital is
legislation reduces the second. encouraged to invest by lowering taxes and
While despotic regimes are based on the relaxing protective legislation for labor-are
unity of the reproductionof labor power and similarattempts to restore nineteenth-century
the process of production,and hegemonic re- marketdespotism. However, they remain ex-
gimes on a limitedbut definiteseparationof the ceptional.
two, their specific charactervaries with forms As others have argued(Piven and Cloward,
of labor process and competitionamong firms 1982; Skocpol and Ikenberry, 1982), attempts
as well as with forms of state intervention. to dismantle what exists of the welfare state
Thus, the form of despotic regime varies can achieve only limitedsuccess. More signifi-
among countries accordingto patternsof pro- cant for the developmentof factory regimes is
letarianization,so that where workers retain the vulnerability of collective labor, in the
ties to subsistence existence various pater- contemporaryperiod, to the national and in-
nalistic regimes with a more or less coercive ternationalmobilityof capital, leadingto a new
characteremerge to create additionalbases of despotism built on the foundations of the
dependence of workers on their employers hegemonic regime. That is, workers face the
(Burawoy, 1982). Hegemonic regimes also threatof losing theirjobs not as individualsbut
differ from country to country based on the as a resultof threatsto the viabilityof the firm.
extent of state-provided social insurance This enables management to turn the
schemes and the characterof state regulation hegemonic regime against workers, relying on
of factory regimes. Furthermore,the factors its mechanisms of coordinating interests to
highlighted by Braverman, Friedman and command consent to sacrifices. Concession
Edwards-skill, technology, competition bargainingand qualityof worklifeprogramsare
among firms, and resistance-all give rise to two faces of this hegemonic despotism.
variations in regimes within countries. Thus, The periodization just sketched, from
variationsin deskillingand competitionamong market despotism to hegemonic regimes to
firms created the conditions for very different hegemonic despotism, is rooted in the
despotic regimes in nineteenth-centuryLanca- dynamics of capitalism. In the first period the
shire cotton mills: marketdespotism, patriarc- searchfor profitled capital to intensifyexploi-
hal despotism, and paternalistic despotism tation with the assistance of despotic regimes.
(Burawoy, 1982). Under advanced capitalism This gave rise to crises of underconsumption
the form of hegemonic regime also varies ac- and resistancefrom workers,and resolutionof
cording to the sector of the economy. In the these conflicts could be achieved only at the
competitive sector we find the balance be- level of collective capital-that is, through
tween consent and coercion furthertowardthe state intervention. This took two forms-the
latter than in the monopoly sector, although constitutionof the social wage and the restric-
where workers retain considerable control tion of managerialdiscretion-which, as we
over the labor process we find forms of craft have argued, gave rise to the hegemonic re-
administration.Notwithstandingthe important gime. The necessity of such state intervention
variationsamong despotic regimes and among is given by the logic of the development of

FACTORY REGIMES UNDER ADVANCED CAPITALISM 591
capitalism.But the mechanismsthroughwhich from smaller firms. The other enterprise, Al-
the state comes to do what is "necessary"vary lied, was the engine division of a multinational
over time and from country to country. Here corporation whose primary sales ventures
we draw on an arrayof explanationsthat have were in agriculturaland construction equip-
figuredprominentlyin recent debatesaboutthe ment. For ten months, in 1974-1975, I worked
nature of the capitalist state: the state as an -in the small parts department of this South
instrument of an enlightened fraction of the Chicago plant as a miscellaneous machine
dominant classes, the state as subject to the operator. Donald Roy (1952, 1953, 1954) had
interests of "state managers,"the state as re- studied the same plant thirty years earlier,
sponsive to struggles both within and outside when it was a largejobbing shop, before it was
itself. There is, of course, nothinginevitableor taken over by Allied. It was then known as
inexorable about these state interventions; Geer.
nothingguaranteesthe success or even the ac-
tivation of the appropriatemechanisms.Thus, The Labor Process
althoughwe have theories of the conditionsfor
the reproductionof capitalism in its various Allied's machine shop was much the same as
phases, and therefore of the corresponding any other, with its assortment of mills, drills
necessary state interventions,we have only ad and lathes, each operated by a single worker
hoc accounts of the actual, specific and con- who depended on the services of a variety of
crete interventions. auxiliaryworkers:set-up men, who mighthelp
Nevertheless, the form and timing of "set up" the machinesfor each new "job";crib
capitalist development frame the nature of attendants, who controlled the distributionof
state interventionas well as shape the form of fixtures and tools kept in the crib; the forklift
factory regime. As will be discussed below we "trucker," who transported stock and un-
can begin to locate the rapidityandunevenness finished "pieces" from place to place in large
of state interventions in the context of the tubs; the time clerk, who would punch oper-
combined and uneven development of ators in on new jobs and out on completed
capitalismat an internationallevel. Moreover, ones; the schedulingman, who was responsible
in the contemporaryperiod the logic of capital for directing the distribution of work and
accumulationon a world scale determinesthat chasing materialsaround the department;and
state interventionbecomes less relevantfor the the inspectors, who would have to "okay" the
determinationof changes and variationsin the first piece before operators could "get going"
form of production politics. This is the argu- and turn out the work. Finally, the foreman
ment of the paper's final section. The very would oversee operations, coordinating and
success of the hegemonic regime in constrain- facilitatingproductionwhere necessary: sign-
ing managementand establishing a new con- ing double red cards, which guaranteeda basic
sumptionnormleads to a crisis of profitability. "anticipated piece rate" when operators,
As a result, managementattemptsto bypass or throughno fault of their own, were unable to
underminethe stricturesof the hegemonic re- get ahead, and negotiatingwith auxiliarywork-
gime while embracing those of its features ers on behalf of the operators.
which foster worker cooperation. The laborprocess at Jay's was similarin that
workers controlled their own instruments of
productionand were dependenton the services
FACTORYPOLITICSAT JAY'S of auxiliary workers. In the erection section,
AND ALLIED operators used hand tools such as soldering
To highlightboth the generic characterof the irons, wire clippers and spanners. There was
hegemonic regime and its different specific no mass productionsequence: each electrical
forms, we will compare two workshops with assembly was completed by an erector, or by
similarlabor processes and systems of remun- two and sometimes even three "working
erationsituatedwithin similarmarketcontexts mates" (Lupton, 1963:104-105). There were
but differentnationalcontexts. The first com- fewer auxiliary workers than at Allied: the
pany, Jay's, is Britishand was studiedby Tom floor controller ("scheduling man"), the in-
Luptonin 1956. It was a Manchesterelectrical spector, the charge hand ("set-up man"), the
engineeringcompany with divisions overseas. store-keeper ("crib attendant") and the time
Lupton was a participant observer for six clerk. There was less intrasectiontension and
months in a department which erected conflict than at Geer and Allied, which sprang
transformersfor commercial use. Jay's was fromthe dependenceof piece-rateoperatorson
partof the monopolysector of Britishindustry, day-rateauxiliaryworkers. The lateralconflict
dominatedby such giants as Vicker's. It was a at Jay's was instead between sections over de-
member of an employers' association which livery of the rightparts at the righttime and in
engagedin price fixing and barredcompetition the right quantity. Thus, the erectors at Jay's

formed a relatively cohesive group based on Making Out
their antagonismtoward and dependence on
other sections and departments. The similarityin systems of remunerationand
labor process at the two factories gave rise to
similaroperatorstrategies. At both Allied and
Jay's piecework was constituted as a game,
The System of Remuneration called "making out" in both plants, in which
The systems of remunerationin the two shops operators set themselves certain percentage
were also organized on similar principles. output targets. Shop-floor activities were
Operatorsat Allied were paid according to a dominated by the concerns of making out;
piece-rate system which worked as follows: shop-floor culture was couched in the suc-
each job had a rate attached to it by the cesses and failures of playingthe game. It was
methods department, which stipulated the in these terms that operators would evaluate
numberof pieces to be producedper hour-the each other. The activities of the rate fixer and
"100o" bench mark.Operatorswere expected the distributionof "stinkers" (jobs with diffi-
to performat 125%,the "anticipatedrate" de- cult or "tight" rates) or "gravy" work (jobs
fined in the contract as productionby a "nor- with easy or "loose" rates)were the subjectsof
mal experiencedoperatorworkingat incentive eternal animationand dispute.
gait." Producingat 125%would earn the oper- The rules of makingout were similarin both
ator an extra 25% of the base earningsestab- shops. Workersengaged in the same forms of
lishedfor the particularlaborgrade. In termsof "restrictionof output." That is, there was a
total earnings, producingat 125%brought in jointly regulatedupper limit on the amount of
about 15%more than did producingat 100o. work to be "handed in" (Allied) or "booked"
Whenoperatorsfailed to makeout at the 100% (Jay's), viz. 140Woand 190Wo,respectively.
level, they nevertheless received earningscor- Higherpercentagesinvited the rate fixer to cut
respondingto 100%.An operator'stotal earn- the rates. Holding back work which was com-
ings were thus composed of base earnings;an pleted at higher than these ceilings was called
incentive bonus, based on percentage output; "banking"(Jay's)or "buildinga kitty"(Allied).
override, which was a fixed amount for each This practice enabled workers to make up for
labor grade; a shift differential;and a cost of earningslost on badjobs by handingin pieces
living allowance. saved from easy jobs. However, such "cross-
The weekly wage packet at Jay's was made booking" ("fiddling"at Jay's, "chiselling" at
up of three items. First, there was the hourly Allied) was easier and morelegitimateat Jay's.
rate or guaranteed minimum wage-either a Allied had clocks for punchingon and off jobs,
"timerate"for day workor a "pieceworkrate" makingcross-booking more difficult, whereas
for piecework. Second, there was a bonus, there was no such constraint at Jay's.
which was itself composed of threeelements:a Moreover,cooperationfrom auxiliaryworkers
bonus of 45%on the piece rate for time spent in making out and fiddling by pieceworkers
waiting for materials or inspection or wasted was more pronouncedat Jay's.
on defective equipment;a negotiatedpercent- This form of output restriction, known as
age bonus for jobs that did not have a rate quotarestriction,in which workerscollectively
(known as "covered jobs," as at Allied); and enforce an upper limit on the amount of work
the piecework bonus itself. The third item of to be handed in, affects the second form of
the wage packet was a group productivity restriction."Goldbricking"occurs when oper-
bonus based on the outputof the entire section ators find making the rate for a certain job
for the week. impossibleor not worth the effort. They take it
The piecework bonus was derived as fol- easy, content to earn the guaranteedminimum.
lows: each job was given a rate in terms of Goldbrickingwas more common at Allied than
"allowed time." A job completed in the at Jay's, for two reasons. First, as already
allowed time obtaineda bonus of 271/2% of the stated, it was much easier to cross-book at
rate. Rate fixers were supposed to set the Jay's, and it was therefore more likely that a
allowed times so that the erectors could, with bad performanceon a lousy job could be made
little experience, earn an 80o bonus. Workers up with time saved on easierjobs. Second, the
were content when they could produce at percentages earned on piecework were much
190%.Thus, the anticipatedrate of 125%at higher at Jay's, and the achievement of 100lo
Allied correspondedto the 180%o rate at Jay's. was virtually automatic. Accordingly, the
In monetaryterms, then, the expected earnings bimodalpattern,observed by Roy at Geer and
frompieceworkrelative to base rates were sig- still discernible at Allied, in which output
nificantlyhigherat Jay's than at Allied, where levels clustered around both upper and lower
the 140%0output was the collectively under- limits, could not be found at Jay's. These dif-
stood upper limit. ferences suggestthat workershad morecontrol

over the laborprocess and thereforemore bar- lied the balanceof class forces was inscribedin
gainingpower with managementat Jay's than ruleswhose form was stablebut whose content
at Allied. was determined in three-year collective
agreements negotiated between management
and union. For the durationof the contract,all
Rate Fixing
partiesagreedto abide by the constraintsit set
In broadoutline, there are close resemblances on the realization of interests. Strikes broke
in the patterns of conflict and cooperation as out when the contract under negotiation was
they are playedout in the two shops. However, unacceptableto the rankand file. At Jay's, by
the continual bargainingand renegotiationat contrast, the balance of class forces was con-
Jay's contrast with the broad adhesion to a tinuallyrenegotiatedon the shop floor. "Unof-
common set of proceduralrules at Allied. This ficial" short strikes were part and parcel of
is particularlyclear in the relationshipbetween industriallife. In the one, the political appara-
rate fixers and operators.The Allied rate fixer tuses of productionare severed from the labor
was an "industrial engineer" who retired to process; in the other, the two are almost indis-
distant offices. Rather than stalkingthe aisles tinguishable.The differences between the two
in pursuitof loose rates, as had been the cus- patternscan be clearly discerned in the opera-
tom at Geer, he had become more concerned tion of the "internallabor market."
with changes in the organizationof work, in-
troducingnew machines and computingrates The Internal Labor Market
on his pocket computer. At Jay's, where
piecework earnings were a more important We speak of an internallabormarketwhen the
element of the wage packet, the rate fixer was distribution of employees within the firm is
still the time-and-motionman with stopwatch administeredthrougha set of rules defined in-
in hand. His presence, as at Geer, created a dependently of the external labor market. At
"spectacle"to which all workersin the section Allied it worked as follows: when a vacancy
were drawn. occurred in a department, any worker from
But the air of tyranny that pervaded that departmentcould "bid" for the job. The
Geer-the sly attempts of time-study men to bidder with the greatest seniority usually re-
clock jobs while they had their backs to the ceived the job, and his old job became vacant.
operators-was absent at Jay's. First, unlike If no one was interested in the opening, or if
both Geer and Allied, operatorsat Jay's had to management deemed the applicants unqual-
agree to new rates before they were intro- ified, the job would be posted plantwide. If
duced. Second, the conflict which broughtthe there were still no acceptable bids, someone
rate fixer and operatorinto oppositionobeyed would be hiredfrom outside, from the external
certain principles of fair play which both ob- labormarket.Generally,then, new employees
served. The shop steward in particularmain- enteredon those jobs that no one else wanted,
tained a constant vigilance to prevent any usually the speed drills. Similarly, workers
subterfugeby the rate fixer or hastiness by the who were being laid off could "bump" other
operator. On those rare occasions when in- employees whose jobs they could performand
dustrial engineers came down from their of- who had less seniority. An internal labor
fices at Allied, shop stewards were usually far marketnot only presupposessome criteriafor
fromthe scene. They shruggedtheirshoulders, selecting amongbids-in this case a heavy em-
denyingany responsibilityfor ratebusters who phasis on seniority-but also some hierarchy
would consistently turn in more than 140%o. of jobs based on basic earningsand looseness
Bargaining over "custom and practice" of piece rates. Otherwiseworkerswould be in
(Brown, 1972)rather than consent to bureau- constantmotion. Efficiency in the organization
cratically administeredrules shaped produc- of the plantdependson a certainstabilityofjob
tion politics at Jay's. Thus, jobs without rates tenure, particularlyon the more sophisticated
became the subject of intense disputationbe- machines whose operation requires a little
tween foreman and worker, whereas at Allied more skill.
such jobs were automaticallypaid at the "an- The internal labor market has a number of
ticipated rate" of 125%. In the allocation of importantconsequences. First, the possessive
work, operators in Jay's transformersection individualism associated with the external
were in a much stronger position to bargain labor marketis now importedinto the factory.
with the foreman than were the operators at The system of bidding and bumping elevates
Allied. Indeed, this was the basis of much of the individual interest at the expense of the
the factionalismwithin the section, intensified collective interest. Grievances related to the
by the absence of well-definedprocedures. job can be resolved by the employee's simply
These differences exemplify a more general biddingon anotherjob. Second, the possibility
distinctionbetweenthe two workshops.At Al- of biddingoff a job gives the workera certain

autonomy vis-a-vis first-line supervision. If a tempts by specific groups to maintaintheir po-

foremanbegins to give trouble,an operatorcan sition relative to other groups rather than an
simplybid off thejob into anothersection. The implacable hostility to management.Techno-
possibility and reality of voluntary transfer logical innovations that upset customary dif-
deter foremen from exercising arbitrarycom- ferentialsare bitterly resisted by those whose
mand since turnover would lead to a fall in positionsare undermined.At Jay's, production
productivity and quality. The internal labor politics revolved more aroundnotions of social
marketis therefore much more effective than justice and fairness ratherthan the pursuit of
any human relations program in producing individualinterest throughthe manipulationof
supervisors sensitive to the personalities of established bureaucratic rules. These dif-
their subordinates. Indeed, the rise of the ferences are reflected more generally in the
humanrelationsprogramcan be seen as a mere system of bargaining.
rationalizationor reflection of the underlying
changes in the apparatusesof productionsince Systems of Bargaining
World War Two.
The third consequence of the internallabor Formally, the internal labor market at Allied
market is the coordinationof the interests of was an administrativedevice for distributing
workers and management. Because seniority employees into jobs on the basis of seniority.
dictated the distributionof rewards-not only By promotingindividualismand enlargingthe
the best jobs but vacation pay, supplementary arena of worker autonomy within definite
unemploymentbenefits, medicalcare and pen- limits, it was also a mechanismfor regulating
sions as well-the longer a person remainedat relations between workers and management.
Allied, the more costly it was to move to an- Its effects were similar to two other appara-
other firm and the more he or she identified tuses of production, viz. the grievance ma-
with the interests of the firm. From manage- chinery and collective bargaining.Here, too,
ment's standpoint, this involved not only bureaucratic regulations dominated. Union
greatercommitmentto the generationof profit contracts were renegotiated by the local and
but also reduced uncertainties induced by the managementof the engine division every
changes in the external labor market. Thus, three years. Once the contract was signed, the
voluntary separations were necessarily re- union became its watchdog. Processinggriev-
duced, particularlyamongthe more senior and ances was regularizedinto a series of stages
therefore more "skilled" employees. And which broughtin successively higherechelons
when layoffs occurred, the system of sup- of managementand union. Grievances would
plementary unemployment benefits retained always be referred to the contract. Workers
hold of the same labor pool for sometimes as would approachthe shop steward as a guard
long as a year. rather than an incendiary. The shop steward
At Jay's the distinctionbetween internaland would pull out the contract and pronounceon
external labor marketswas harderto discern. its interpretation.The contractwas sacrosanct:
There was no systematicjob hierarchy,such a it circumscribedthe terrainof struggle.
central feature of the organizationof work at Productionpolitics at Jay's followed a very
Allied. All pieceworkoperatorsin the erecting different course. There was no bureaucratic
section, except those undergoing training, apparatusto confine struggles within definite
were on the same piece or time wage. There limits. There the "collective bargain"was a
was no system of biddingon new jobs and the fluid agreement subject to spontaneous abro-
issue of transfers never seemed to come up. gation and continualrenegotiationon the shop
Opposition to managementcould not be re- floor. "Customand practice"providedthe ter-
solved by "bidding off' the job. Grievances rain of struggle, and diverse principles of
had to be lived with or fought out or, as a last legitimationwere mobilized to pursue strug-
resort, workers could leave the firm. Thus, in gles. Rules had not the stability, the authority
contrast to Allied's organizationof rights and nor the specificity they had achieved at Allied.
obligations in accordance with seniority, a The engineeringindustry,of which Jay's was a
radicalegalitarianismpervadedin the relations member, did have a regularizedmachineryfor
amongworkers.Factionalsquabbleswithinthe handling grievances, but there was no clear
section frequently arose from the foreman's demarcation between disputes over "rights"
supposedlydiscriminatorydistributionof work and disputes over "interests"-that is, be-
(Lupton, 1963:142,163).As others have argued tween issues pursuedas grievances and issues
(Hyman and Brough, 1975; Maitland, 1983), which were part of collective bargaining.The
English workers are acutely aware of dif- results are clear. Whereas the grievance ma-
ferentialsin pay and workingconditions. Con- chineryat Allieddampenedcollective struggles
flict on the shop floor often arises from at- by constituting workers as individuals with

specific rights and obligations, grievances at representation,union dues check-off systems,

Jay'swere the precipitantof sectionalstruggles and the greater number of paid officials en-
which brought managementand workers into joyed by unions in the United States contribute
continualcollision (Maitland, 1983). to a more complacent local. The complacency
We can begin to interpret the differences dovetails well with the union's role as night
between the two firms in termsof the structure watchmanover the collective agreement.
of relationsbetween managementand union in Not only do differentBritishunionscompete
the two countries. At Allied (and more gener- for the allegiance of the same workers, but a
ally in the organizedsectors of U.S. industry)a geographicalregionratherthanthe plantforms
single union (in this case the United Steelwor- the basic organizationalunit. Such interunion
kers of America)had exclusive rightsof repre- rivalryand the separationof the organization
sentation at the level of the plant. It was a base from the shop floor lead to shop steward
union shop, so that after fifty days' probation militancy. This is further encouraged by the
all employees covered by the contract had to limited financial ability of the branch to pay
join the union. Collectivebargainingtook place union officials and by the union's need to col-
at the plant level, although the issues were lect its own dues. Finally, unionrivalryand the
usuallyborrowedfromnegotiationswhichtook legacy of a powerful craft unionism in Britain
place between the union and the largestcorpo- continue to lead to demarcationdisputes and
rations, such as the United States Steel strugglesto protect wage differentials,thereby
Corporation-a system known as patternbar- threatening collective agreements. In the
gaining. Rank and file had the opportunityto United States the struggles for union repre-
ratify the agreement struck between manage- sentation in a given plant-jurisdictional
mentand unionbut, once signed, the collective disputes-are no longer as importantas they
bargainwas legally bindingon both sides of the were when industrialunionism was in its ex-
industry. pansionaryphase.
At Jay's, and more generally in England, a A second set of reasons for the contrasting
differentsituationpertained.Formalcollective status of "collective bargains" in the two
bargainingtook place at the national or re- countries revolves around the relationship
gional level of industry,not at the level of the between apparatusesof productionand appa-
plant. It established minimalconditionsof em- ratuses of the state. Thus, in Englandthe col-
ployment. Shop-floorbargainingwas therefore lective bargainis not legally binding. It is a
the adjustmentof the industry-wideagreement voluntary agreement of no fixed duration
to the local situation,which also explains why which can be broken by either side. Strikes
the wage system was much more complicated may be "unconstitutional"-in violation of the
at Jay's thanat Allied, despite the latter'sgrad- collective agreement-or "unofficial"-in op-
uated job hierarchy (Lupton, 1963:137-38). position to union leadership-but only under
The adjustmentto the conditions of the par- exceptional circumstances are they illegal. In
ticular firm or workshop explains why it is the United States, on the otherhand, collective
necessary to amend national and regional bargains are legally binding and no-strike
agreements,but why are "collective bargains" clauses can lead to legal action against the
not struck first at the plant level? union. Unlike its Britishcounterpart,the U.S.
One set of explanationsfor this concerns the trade union is a legal entity subject to legal
differences in union organization and repre- provisions:it is legally responsiblefor the ac-
sentationin the two countries. Until recently, tions of its members. The law is one mode
only a few British industries, such as coal throughwhich the state can shape factory poli-
mining, have had exclusive representationat tics: it is one expression of state regulationof
the plant level. At Jay's, for example, two factory regimes.
unions, the electrical Trades Union and the
National Union of General and Municipal
workers, competed for the allegiance of the PRODUCTIONAPPARATUSESAND
workers in the transformersection (Lupton, STATE APPARATUSES
1963:115). In the United States not only is We have now dealt with our first target by
there exclusive representation,guaranteedby showing that factory regimes both vary inde-
a union shop, but disaffiliationof a local from pendently of the labor process and effect
its internationalis notoriouslydifficult (Herd- shop-floor struggles. But how do we explain
ing, 1972:267-70). Attempts by some Allied the differencesbetween the hegemonicregime
workers hostile to the United Steelworkersto at Jay's based on fractionalbargainingand the
change affiliationto the United Auto Workers one at Allied based on bureaucraticrules? As
were effectively smotheredby union and man- we have controlled for labor process and
agement. Furthermore,the exclusive rights of market competition, these cannot be the

source of the differences. A more promising production apparatuses. The following table
variableis the form and content of state inter- sums up the different patterns. These, of
vention. Confirmationthat some such national
variable is at work comes from the industrial State Supportfor
relationsliteraturedealingwith the postwarpe- the Reproduction
riod which suggests that fractionalbargaining of Labor Power
has been typical of the manufacturingindustry HIGH LOW
in England(Hyman, 1975;Kahn-Freund,1977; HIGH Sweden United
Clegg, 1979; Maitland, 1983),just as bureau- Direct State States
cratic procedureshave been typical of the cor- Regulationof
porate sector of the United States (Strauss, Factory Regime
1962; Derber et al., 1965; Herding, 1972; LOW England Japan
Brody, 1979:chapter 5).
What is it about state interventions that course, representonly broadnationalpatterns.
creates distinctive apparatuses?The same two Withineach country, there may be wide varia-
interventionsthat served to distinguish early tions in the relationshipof productionappara-
capitalismfrom advancedcapitalismalso serve tuses to the state. State interventionsgive rise
to distinguish among advanced capitalist to only the generic form of factory regime: its
societies. The first type of state intervention specific forms are also determinedby the labor
separatesthe reproductionof laborpowerfrom process and marketforces.
the process of production by establishing But what determinesthe form of state inter-
minimallevels of welfare irrespectiveof work vention? We must now withdraw our arrow
performance.In the United States workersare fromthe first targetand point it in the opposite
more dependenton the firmfor social benefits, direction, at the second target:theories of the
althoughthese may be negligiblein the unorga- state that explain its interventionsin terms of
nized sectors, than they are in England,where its own structure,divorcedfrom the economic
state social insurance is more extensive. The context in which it operates. Nor is it sufficient
second type of state interventiondirectly reg- to recognize the importance of external eco-
ulates production apparatuses. As we inti- nomic forces by examiningtheir "presence"in
matedat the end of the last section, in England the state, as in corporatist bargaining
the state abstains from the regulationof pro- structures or the struggles of parties, trade
duction apparatuses whereas in the United unions, employers' associations, etc., at the
States the state sets limits on the form of pro- national level. As Panitch (1981) has argued,
duction apparatuses,at least in the corporate the effects of class forces cannot be reducedto
sector. their mode of "internalization"in state appa-
Our two case studies demonstratethe exis- ratuses. State politics do not hang from the
tence of differenthegemonicregimesand point clouds; they rise from the ground, and when
to the state as a key explanatoryvariable, but the ground trembles, so do they. In short,
they present a static view and, moreover, one while productionpolitics may not have a di-
in which the relevantcontexts appearonly in- rectly observable presence in the state, they
directly. We must now move away from Allied neverthelessset limits on and precipitateinter-
and Jay's themselves and examine state interventions of the state. Thus, for example, the
ventions in their own right-both their form strike waves in the United States during the
and their origins. We must develop a dynamic 1930s and in Sweden, France, Italy, and En-
perspective, situatingthe two factories in their glandin the late 1960sand early 1970sall led to
respective political and economic contexts attempts by the state to reconstruct factory
througha broader historical and comparative apparatuses.
analysis. To do this we must first complete the Accordingly,just as the state sets limits on
picture of state interventions by adding two factory apparatuses,so the latter set limits on
morenationalconfigurationsof state regulation
of factory regimes and state support for the 2 Although the focus of this paper is on differences
reproductionof labor power. Ourthirdcombi- between societies, the existence of variations within
nation is representedhere by Sweden, where societies cannot be overemphasized. Thus, in the
extensive safeguards against unemploy- United States the marked difference in factory re-
ment-an active manpower policy and a gimes between sectors is a product not merely of
market factors but of different relations to the state
well-developed welfare system-coexist with defined by Taft-Hartley provisions, exclusion of up
substantial regulation of factory regimes. to half the labor force from the NLRB, state right-
In Japan(ourfourthcombination),on the other to-work rules which outlaw union shops, free speech
hand, the state offers little by way of social amendments favoring employer interference in or-
insurance, this being left to the firm, and is ganizing campaigns, disenfranchisement of strikers
only weakly involved in the directregulationof in union elections, etc.

the form of state interventions. Examined kers, as evidenced in the prevalenceof systems
staticallythere is no way of giving primacyto of subcontracting (Littler, 1982: chapter 6).
one directionof determinationover the other. Competition among firms weakened capital
Considered dynamically, however, as I will and increased its dependence on labor. Thus,
suggest below, the direction of determination relative to other countries, English workers
springs from the substratum of relations of were often better organized to resist capital.
production.The combined and uneven devel- We can see this in the early development of
opment of capitalism-that is, the timing and craft unions, although as Turner has persua-
character of the juxtaposition of advanced sively argued(1962: part IV), the sectionalism
forms of capitalism and pre-capitalist of craft unions would eventually retardthe de-
societies-shapes the balanceof class forces in velopment of a cohesive labor movement,
production,setting limits on subsequentforms postponingthe developmentof general unions
of the factory regimeand its relationshipto the until late in the nineteenth century.
state. In the manufacturingsector, in particular
engineering industries, the strength of craft
unions retarded mechanization and provided
England
the basis of continuing shop-floor control, as
We can begin with Englandand its distinctive we saw at Jay's (Clegg, 1979:chapter2). Only
pattern of proletarianization. In the early in the last decade has there been a shift from
stages of industrialization,workerswere either informal,fragmentedworkplace bargainingto
expelled from the ruralareas or they migrated plant-wide agreements (Brown, 1981). Par-
to town of their own accord. By the end of the ticularlyin the new industrieswith automated
nineteenth century all new reserves of labor production, factory regimes more closely ap-
had been exhausted. Although being cut off proximatethe United States pattern(although
fromaccess to means of subsistence weakened comparisons with France suggest that this
workersas individuals,it also impelledthem to change shouldnot be exaggerated[Nichols and
develop collective organization. In countries Beynon, 1977; Gallie, 1978]).
which industrializedlater, wage laborersoften In England the transition from despotic to
had access to alternativemodes of existence, hegemonic regimes has been gradual. Craft
in particularsubsistence productionand petty traditionsled the labor movement to advance
commodity production, undermining its position throughthe control of production
working-classorganization. and labor market rather than through state-
Britain's second phase of industrialization imposed regulations. Trade unions and the
(1840-1895) was dominatedby the search for Labour Party aimed to keep the state out of
outlets for its accumulated capital, which production (Currie, 1979). Employers, con-
turnedto exports based on the developmentof cerned to protect their autonomy to bargain
heavy industryat home. In addition, Britain's directly with labor, were equally mistrustfulof
imperialexpansion laid the basis of class com- state intervention. As the postwar consensus
promise between labor and capital unraveledin the 1960s, Labourand Conserva-
(Hobsbawm, 1969:chapters 6-8). As the ero- tive governments tried to impose incomes
sion of the BritishEmpirewas gradual,so was policies, but with little success. As the Dono-
the changingbalance of class forces. As a re- van Commission of 1968 underlined, work-
sult, British labor history offers no parallelto place bargainingoutside the control of trade
the powerful wave of strikes that swept the union leadership underminedany centralized
United States in the 1930s. Even the General wages policy. Therefore, beginningin the late
Strike of 1926 soon fizzled out and markeda 1960sgovernmentssought to regulateproduc-
definite weakening of labor through the con- tion politics throughlegislativemeasures.Most
tainment of factory politics (Currie, 1979: famous of these was the IndustrialRelations
chapter 4). Act of 1971,which attempteda comprehensive
If the patternsof proletarianizationand col- restructuring of production politics by re-
onialism provided the impetus and the condi- stricting the autonomy of trade unions. For
tions for labor to erect defenses against the three years the trade unions mounteda unified
encroachmentof capital, it was the develop- assault on the act, until the Conservativegov-
ment of capitalistproductionthat providedthe ernment was forced out of office. The new
means. As a pioneer industrialnation, English Labour government repealed the law in 1974
capitaltraversedall the stages of development, and, as part of the "social contract,"a spate of
from handicraftsthroughmanufactureto mod- new laws was introduced. The Trade Union
em industry.From the earliestbeginningscap- and LabourRelationsAct of 1974(amendedin
ital and laboradvancedtogether, strengthening 1976),the EmploymentProtectionAct of 1975,
each other through struggle. Capital was de- the Healthand Safety at WorkAct of 1974,and
pendenton the skills of preindustrialcraftwor- the Sex DiscriminationAct and Race Relations

Act of 1976 all protected the rights of em- enthusiasm. Denounced by industry, ignored
ployees and trade unions, but within narrower by the Roosevelt administrationand the courts
limits. However, these statutory reforms did but supportedby the AF of L, RobertWagner,
not of themselves have much impact on pro- aided by a series of fortuitous circumstances,
duction politics (Clegg, 1979:chapter 10). The maneuveredthe National Labor RelationsAct
real forces behind changes in productionpoli- throughCongressin 1935(Skocpol, 1980).The
tics must be sought in the changingrelationsof National Labor Relations Board set about re-
capital and labor as part of broadereconomic placing despotic productionpolitics with new
changes, as we shall see in the last section. forms of "industrial government" based on
collective bargaining, due process, com-
promise and independentunions.
In the immediate aftermath, unions devel-
The United Stctes
oped through the momentum of self-
Comparedto England,capital moved through organization,but in the face of a renewed em-
its stages of development more rapidly in the ployer offensive in 1937-1939, the NLRB
United States while proletarianizationpro- helped to defend workers' gains. In 1939 the
ceeded more slowly. The development of en- Boarditself came underheavy attackfor being
claves of Bla~kand immigrantlaborcombined too partisan, forcing a moderation of its
with mobile white workers to balkanize and policies. Subsequently, the National War
atomize the labor force, militating against Labor Board (1942-1946) guided the develop-
strong unions. With the notable exception of ment of unions-establishing their security but
the IWW,those unions that did form were usu- curtailingtheir autonomy. Collective bargain-
ally craft unions. During World War One ing was confinedto wages, hours, and a narrow
unions enjoyed a short reprievefrom the open conception of working conditions; grievance
shop drive. Arbitrary employment practices machinery defined the role of unions as re-
such as blacklisting, imposition of "yellow active; and an army of labor experts was
dog" contracts, and discrimination against created to interpret and administer the law
unionmemberswere prohibited,and laborwas (Harris, 1982). Taft-Hartleyonly represented
protected from arbitrary layoff through the the culmination of a decade-long process in
enforcementof the seniority principle(Harris, which the pressure of class forces constrained
1982). Employers renewed their offensive factory politics within ever narrower limits.
against independent unions in the 1920s, and Over time the NLRB was molded to the needs
company unions were created in their stead. of capital: industrialpeace and stability.
This was the era of welfare capitalism when Nevertheless, the emergentlabor legislation
despotic factory regimes were combined with that governed the postwarperiod still bore the
materialconcessions in the form of social ben- marksof the period in which it was created, in
efits. Companypaternalismcollapsed with the particularthe response to despotic factory re-
Depression as unemployment increased and gimes and the dependenceof workerson capri-
wages and benefits were cut (Brody, 1979: cious market forces. On the one hand, social
chapter 2). Massive strike waves assaulted and laborlegislationoffered, albeit in a limited
productionapparatusesas the source of eco- way, the one thingworkersstrove for above all
nomic insecurity. Despite rising unemploy- else: security. Welfarelegislation, particularly
ment, workers were able to exploit the inter- unemploymentcompensation, although slight
connectedness of the labor process and the compared with that in other countries, meant
interdependence of branches to bring mass that labordid not have to put up with arbitrary
production industries to a standstill. At the employment practices. As we saw at Allied,
same time the exhaustion of new supplies of rightsattached to seniority and union recogni-
nonproletarianized labor limited capital's tion did offer certain protections within the
ability to counter the strikes (Arrighi and plant. On the other hand, dismayed with the
Silver, 1983). initial legislation, capital has managed to re-
Only an independentinitiativefromthe state shape it in its own image, containingconflict
in opposition to capital could pacify labor, an within narrowlimits throughrestrictivecollec-
eventualitymadepossible by the fragmentation tive bargaining and grievance machinery.
of the dominant classes in this period. The Internal labor markets may have offered se-
Norris-LaGuardiaAct of 1932,followed by the curity to labor but, by the same token, they
National IndustrialRecovery Act of 1933, in- introduceda predictabilityto the labor market
spired union organizing efforts, even though that corporatecapital had already achieved in
both had uncertainconstitutionalvalidity and supply and product markets. Even the social
ineffective enforcement mechanisms. Never- legislation which boosted the purchasing
theless, the newly created National Labor power of the workingclass, reconstitutingthe
Board pursued its mission with bureaucratic consumption norm around the house and the

automobile, steered capital out of its crisis of World War Two, Japan adopted labor laws
overproduction(Aglietta, 1979). similarto those of the United States, but these
If, in the course of time, corporate capital have not led to the same extensive state regu-
would stamp its interests on the new labor lation of productionapparatuses.In the early
legislation, small-scale competitive capital years of the United States occupation, trade
could not afford concessions to labor, and unions expandedtheir membershipfrom under
unionizationin this sector faced greaterobsta- a million in 1946 to over 6.5 million in 1949.
cles. A distinctive dualismdeveloped in which However, the consequences of the top-down
the gains of the corporate sector came at the formation of unions through legislative acts
expense of the competitive sector. In England, were very different from the plant-by-plant
where unionizationhad developed before the conquests that shaped production politics in
consolidationof large corporationsand across the basic industries of the United States.
most sectors of industry, dualism has been Where militantenterprise unions did develop,
weaker. In summary, the very success of they were often replaced by management-
United States capital in maintainingits domi- sponsored "second unions" (Halliday, 1975:
nation over labor through factory despotism chapter 6; Kishimoto, 1968; Levine,
simultaneouslycreated crises of overproduc- 1965:651-60; Cole, 1971: chapter 7). Labor
tion and unleashed massive resistance from legislation has not held back the development
labor, demandingstate interventionand the in- of an authoritarianpolitical order within the
stallationof a new politicalorderin the factory. Japanese enterprise.
The hegemonic regimes which established The basic organizationalunit of the trade
themselves after World War Two, such as the union is the enterprise. Its leadershipis often
one at Allied, underminedlabor's strengthon dominated by managerialpersonnel and pro-
the shop floor, leading to its present vulnera- vides little resistanceto the unilateraldirection
bility. of work. At best, it is a bargainingagency for
wage and benefit increases, and even then it is
usually a matterof average increases, internal
Japan distributionbeing left largelyto management's
discretion(Evans, 1971:132).In the bargaining
It is difficult to penetrate the mythologies of itself unions generally accept the parameters
harmony and integration associated with the defined by managementwithout reference to
Japanese hegemonic regime, but for that rea- rankand file (Dore, 1973:chapters 4, 6; Cole,
son the task is all the morenecessary. It is easy 1971: chapter 7). Moreover, the few conces-
to miss the coercive face of paternalism.3Of sions unionized (permanent)employees may
our four cases, the Japanese most closely ap- obtainwithinlargeenterprisescome, at least in
proximates the despotic order of early part, at the expense of the temporary em-
capitalismin which the state offers little or no ployees (up to 50 percentof the total), of which
social insuranceand abstains from the regula- a large proportionare women. There are few
tion of factory apparatuses.In the aftermathof avenues for workers to process grievances.
They must rely on personal appeals to their
I Because few ethnographic studies of work in immediatesupervisor, who often is also their
Japanese factories have been available in English, union representative (Cole, 1971:230).
the translation of Satoshi Kamata's account (1983) of Moreover, in the absence of regularizedproce-
his experiences as a seasonal worker at Toyota is dures for moving betweenjobs, such as a bid-
particularly welcome. He presents a rich and de- ding system, workers can exercise little au-
tailed description of the factory regime: the company tonomy in relation to their supervisors (Cole,
union is inaccessible and unresponsive to the mem-
bership; outside work, life in the dormitories is sub-
1979:111, 114). The result is intense rivalry
ject to police-type surveillance; on the shop floor among workers (Cole, 1971: chapter 6). Un-
workers face the arbitrary domination of manage- doubtedlyJapanese "paternalism"has its des-
ment, whether this concerns compulsory transfers potic side.
between jobs, speed-up, overtime or the company's The unusually low level of state-provided
carefree attitude toward industrial accidents. Reg- social insurance compounds employees' sub-
ular employees face equally oppressive conditions ordination,makingthem dependenton the en-
but have more to lose (in terms of fringe benefits) by terprisewelfare system for housing, pensions,
quitting than do the seasonal workers. As one of sickness benefits and so on. Dore (1973:323),
Kamata's co-workers put it, life-time employment
becomes a life-time prison sentence. In his introduc-
for example, has calculated that receipts other
tion, Ronald Dore tries to explain away the coercive
than direct payment for labor were divided in
features at Toyota in the early 1970s as atypical, but the ratioof four-to-onein favor of enterpriseas
the fact that they exist at all in such a large corpora- opposed to state benefits in Japan, whereas in
tion says a great deal about hegemonic regimes in Britainthe division was roughly equal. In the
Japan. corporate sector of the Japanese economy,

where the nenko system of "lifetime employ- Sweden

ment" has been most fully developed, the im-
portance of enterprise benefits is corre- Ourfourthcase, Sweden, is the polar opposite
spondinglygreater. Since benefits and wages of Japan. Here we find state regulationof pro-
are linked to length of service, the longer ductionpolitics combinedwith one of the most
workers remain with a company the more highly developed welfare systems. Underpin-
costly it is to move to anotherfirm, the more ning this pattern is the "Swedish model" of
they identify with the firm's interests, and the class compromise, developed during the 44
greater their stake in company profits. This years of socialdemocraticrule (1932-1976)and
dependence on the enterprise, without the revolving around the centrally negotiated
countervailing feature of the United States "frame agreement" between the employers'
system of internallabormarketsand grievance federation (SAF), the federation of industrial
machinery,leaves labor with fewer opportuni- unions (LO) and the largest white-collarfeder-
ties to carve out arenas of resistance. ation (TCO). Sweden is unique among the ad-
One can begin to explain the Japanese sys- vanced capitalist countries in that 87% of its
tem of productionpolitics in terms of the tim- paid labor force is unionized. LO represents
ing of industrializationand the availabilityof 95%of blue-collarworkers, while TCO repre-
reserves of cheap labor. Late development sents 75%of salaried employees. SAF covers
meant that the early stages of industry- the entire private sector. Both LO and SAF
handicrafts and manufacture-were skipped, exercise power, includingsignificanteconomic
with direct entry into modern industry with sanctions, over their member organizations
large-scale enterprises. The recruitmentfrom (Korpi, 1978: chapter 8; Fulcher, 1973:50).
the ruralreserves of laborcompoundedlabor's The central frame agreement provides the
defenselessness againstcapital.Japaneselabor basis for both industry bargainingand collec-
never developedjob rights andjob conscious- tive bargainingat the plant level. Two princi-
ness, so central in the United States, because ples informthe central bargaining.The first is
industry never passed through an intensive an incomes policy which attempts to keep
phase of scientific managementand detailed wage increases withinlimits so as to guarantee
division of labor which rests on careful job the internationalcompetitiveness of Swedish
specification. The very concept of job is industry. The second is a "solidaristic wages
amorphous and job boundaries are more policy" which attempts to equalize wage dif-
permeablethan in the early industrializingna- ferentials across sectors. Apart from the goal
tions. Insteadof a system of rightsand obliga- of social equity, the principleof equal pay for
tions there developed a moreflexible system of equal work irrespective of the employer's
work-grouprelations and job rotation which abilityto pay is designed to encouragetechno-
permits a limited collective initiative that is logical change and to force uncompetitiveen-
carefully monitored from above (Cole, 1979: terprisesout of business. At the same time, the
chapter7). As in the United States, the corpo- Swedish welfare system offers compensation
rate sector with its welfare regimes has ad- for those laid off, and an active manpower
vanced at the expense of the subordinatecom- policy redistributes workers in accordance
petitive sector. Dualism is, if anything, more with the needs of capital. In short, whilecapital
markedin Japanthan in the United States by accepts the centralized wages policy, trade
virtueof the weakness of both laborand capital unionsare expected to cooperate in the pursuit
in sectors dependent on large corporations. of efficiency.
Just as welfare capitalism in the United Swedish central wage agreements are not
States broke down with the Depression, so the determinateat the level of the firm, although
Japanese "permanentemployment system" is they are more closely adhered to than in En-
also vulnerableto down-turnsin the economy. gland. Wagedrift-local deviationfromcentral
Cutbacks in production can be absorbed by stipulations-has accounted for about half of
transferring workers or expelling transient recent increases in actual earnings (Martin,
workers but at the expense of increasingthe 1980). Sectors of the labor force in stronger
proportionof permanentemployees. The more bargainingpositions have been able to extract
general problem afflicting the nenko system, higher wage increases, binding workers more
that of an aging labor force, is exacerbatedin effectively to individualfirms. The extensive
times of economic contraction so that older use of locally negotiated piece rates has
workersare demoted or displacedinto periph- facilitateddisproportionateincreases in actual
eral jobs or encouraged to retire (Thomas, earnings while basic wages conform more
1982).None of the solutions to these problems closely to central agreements. Unofficial
is satisfactory, as all would increase costs of strikes,althoughnot as frequentas in England,
production. have nevertheless been another major force

behindwage drift, indicatingthe independence and linked to social democraticparties. Early

of productionpolitics from centrally imposed craft unions sponsored the Swedish Social
agreements(Fulcher, 1973). Democratic party in 1889, and the party was
Despite the centralized pattern of wage soon active in promotingfurtherunionization.
negotiations,productionapparatusesassume a The LO was formed in 1898,and a nationwide
form quite similarto the hegemonic regime at strike in 1902, demanding general suffrage,
Allied (Palm, 1977:9-65;Korpi, 1978:chapters prompted employers to form the SAF. Late
7, 8). industrializationhad led to highlyconcentrated
industrydominatedby the export-orienteden-
The work of Swedish and Americanwork- gineeringsector (Ingham, 1974:45-48). It was
place representatives, however, is deter- relatively easy for employers to form a pow-
mined less by union rules than by the proce- erful association. Following a major lockout,
dure agreementsunder which they operate. the first industry-wideagreementwas signed in
In other countries the substantivecollective 1905. And in 1906came the "December Com-
agreements are tightly drawn to provide promise," according to which employers
standards intended to be strictly followed would recognize unions and, in return,the LO
within the plan.... Consequently in both
accepted management'sright to hire and fire
countries, but especially in the United and to direct work (Korpi, 1978:62). Again,
States, the first and overridingjob of the because of late developmentand the resulting
workplace organizationis to supervise the mechanization of the labor process, craft
application of standards set by the unions were never strong and were soon sub-
agreementsand to raise "grievances"where ordinatedto industrialunions favored by the
the shop stewards discover any kind of in- SAF. These retained considerable power on
fringment.In both countries the procedure the shop floor while, in line with the customary
agreements prohibit the use of strikes and strategy of industrialunionism, they pursued
other sanctions so long as a grievance is in their interests through state politics-that is,
procedure,and since collective bargainingis throughpublic regulationof conditions rather
bindingin law in both countries, such strikes than exclusive controls over work and labor
are unlawful. . . . Consequently the
markets.
agreementswhich give workplacerepresen- In 1928 legislation made collective bargain-
tatives their authorityalso place limitations
ing legally binding, and strikes over issues in
on their power. (Clegg, 1976:61)
existing contracts became illegal. When the
Althoughplant-levelpolicing of the collective Depression came labor was widely organized
agreement assumes similar forms in the two into industrial unions and-supported a rela-
countries,there is a lower level of coordination tively strong social democratic party. During
of the interestsof laborand capital in Sweden. the Depression the major struggles therefore
On the one hand the extensive-rewards to would not be over the reconstructionof factory
seniority are absent, while on the other hand regimesbut over the extension of social insur-
social insuranceand the active manpowerpol- ance. Again we see how the form of factory
icy offer workers greater independence from regimeis shaped by the combinedand uneven
capital. development of capitalism, in particularthe
How do we explain the distinctivecombina- concentratedand centralizedcharacterof cap-
tion of state regulationof productionappara- ital resulting from late development and the
tuses and an extensive welfarestate? Are Weir legacy of weak craft traditions, both directly
and Skocpol (1983) correct when they argue and indirectly,throughcapital'srelationshipto
that the centralized character of the Swedish the state.
state accounts for the developmentof "social
Keynesianism"?Certainlythe formof the state THE RISE OF A NEW DESPOTISM?
shapes the solutions devised to meet specific
economic problems,but this doesn't mean that So far we have arguedthat the differentforms
the problems themselves are unimportantin of state interventionare conditionedby class
determiningpublic policy. Precisely because, interestsand class capacities definedprimarily
for example, the Swedish and Americanstates at the level of production. The autonomous
encountereda differentbalanceof class forces dynamiccomes from the relationsand forces of
inscribedin differentfactory regimes, their re- productionwhich shape both the characterof
sponses to the Depression were bound to be the factory regime and its relationshipto the
different regardlessof their state structure. state. We periodizedcapitalismin terms of the
Industrializationcame late and fast to Swe- transitionfrom despotic to hegemonicregimes.
den. It occurredwhen labormovementson the Thus, we characterizedearly capitalismnot in
continentwere alreadyinfluencedby socialism terms of competition among capitalists, not in

terms of deskilling, but in terms of the depen- tections and the abrogation of minimum wage
dence of workers on the class of employers, laws, health and safety regulations, and na-
the bindingof the reproductionof laborpower tional labor relations legislation. In other
to the production process through economic countries such as Italy and, to a lesser extent,
and extra-economic ties. This provided the the United States, one finds the re-emergence
basis for the autocraticdespotism of the over- of artisanal workshops and sweated domestic
seer or subcontractor. work subcontracted out by large firms (Sabel,
Despotism was not a viable system from the 1982: chapter 5). Portes and Walton (1981)
point of view of either capital or labor. On the refer to this phenomenon as the peripheraliza-
one side, workers had no security and there- tion of the core. Sassen-Koob (1982) describes
fore sought protection from the tyranny of a more complex picture of peripheralization
capital through collective representation in and recomposition. The exodus of basic man-
productionand social insurance outside pro- ufacturing from some of the largest cities, such
duction. An external body, the state, would as New York, has been followed by the cre-
have to impose these conditionson capital. On ation of small-scale manufacturing based on
the other side, as capital expanded through low-paid immigrant labor servicing the ex-
concentrationand centralizationit requiredthe panding service industry and the gentrifiede"
regulationof class relationsin accordancewith life styles of its employees.
the stabilization of competition and interde- Peripheralization at the core, although
pendence among firms. At the same time the growing, is still a marginal phenomenon, sub-
success of despotic regimeshad so reducedthe ordinate to the (albeit declining) manufacturing
purchasingpower of workersthat capital now core. In the old manufacturing industries such
faced worsening crises of overproduction-it as auto, steel, rubber and electrical, a changing
could not realize the value it produced. Indi- balance of class forces is giving rise to a new
vidual capitalists, therefore, had an interest in despotism. Two sets of conditions, in particu-
boosting the wages of the workers of other lar, are responsible for this new political order
capitalistsbut not of their own. Again only an in the workplace. First, it is now much easier
externalbody, the state, could enforce, for all to move capital from one place to another, as a
capitalists, mechanisms for the regulationof result of three phenomena: the generation of
conflict and a minimal social wage. In short, pools of cheap labor power in both peripheral
both capital and labor had an interest in state countries and peripheral regions of advanced
interventionsthat would establish the condi- capitalist societies; the fragmentation of the
tions for a hegemonic productionpolitics; the labor process, so that different components
specific form of that intervention was influ- can be produced and assembled in different
enced by the characterof the state itself. places (sometimes at the flick of a switch); and
However, if the separationof the reproduc- the metamorphoses of the transportation and
tion of labor power from the productionpro- communications industries (Frdbel et al., 1980).
cess helped to resolve the crisis of overpro- All these changes are connected to the pro-
ductionand to regulateconflict, it also laid the cesses of capital accumulation on an interna-
basis of a new crisis of profitability.Thus, in tional scale, whereas a second set of changes is
the United States hegemonic regimes estab- located in the advanced capitalist countries
lished in the leadingsectors of industryplaced themselves. The rise of hegemonic regimes,
such constraintson accumulationthat interna- tying the interests of workers to the fortunes of
tional competition became increasingly their employers, embodying working-class
threatening.First, in some countries such as power in factory apparatuses rather than state
Japan the hegemonic regime gave capital apparatuses, and the reinforcement of individ-
greater room to maneuver. Second, in semi- ualism have left workers defenseless against
peripheral countries such as South Africa, the recent challenges from capital. Even in-
Braziland Iran,manufacturingindustrydid not dustrial workers in England, the acme of
installhegemonicregimesbut insteadreliedon shop-floor control, find themselves helpless
a combination of economic and extra- before job loss through rationalization, tech-
economic means of coercion. Third, in yet nological change, and particularly the intensifi-
other countries with export processing zones, cation of work (Massey and Meegan, 1982).
women workershave been subject to an auto- The new despotism is founded on the basis
cratic despotism fostered by the state. of the hegemonic regime it is replacing. It is in
Advanced capitalist states have responded fact a hegemonic despotism. The interests of
by carvingout arenasin whichlaboris stripped capital and labor continue to be concretely
of the powers embodiedin hegemonicregimes. coordinated, but whereas before labor was
The urbanenterprisezone is one such attempt granted concessions on the basis of the expan-
to return restricted areas to the nineteenth sion of profits, now labor makes concessions
century through the withdrawalof labor pro- on the basis of the relative profitability of one

FACTORYREGIMESUNDER ADVANCED CAPITALISM 603
capitalist vis-a-vis another-that is, the op- indicative planning. Here different countries
portunity costs of capital. The point of ref- are in a more or less advantageousposition.
erence is no longer primarilythe success of Thus, in both the United States and Britain,
the firm from one year to the next but rates of but particularlyin the former, labor has sup-
profitthat mightbe earnedelsewhere. At com- ported the export of capital as partand parcel
panies losing profits workers are presented of the postwareconomic expansion. In Britain
with a choice between wage cuts (even zero- and the United States the state is unaccus-
pay plans have been announced)or the loss of tomed and ill-equipped to regulate flows of
theirjobs. The new despotismis not simplythe domesticcapital.These two hegemonicpowers
resurrectionof the old: it is not the arbitrary have maintainedtheir dominancethroughthe
tyranny of the overseer aimed at individual free movement of financialand industrialcap-
workers (although that happens too) but the ital. In other countries one finds an inverse
"rational"tyrannyof capital mobilityaimed at relation between the constraints imposed by
the collective worker. There is a renewed production politics on state politics and the
bindingof the reproductionof labor power to capacity of the state to regulate investment
the productionprocess, but, ratherthanvia the (Pontusson, 1983).Thus, in Sweden, where the
individual, it occurs at the level of the firm, welfare state reflects the constraints of pro-
region or even nation-state.The fear of being duction politics, the state has not had much
fired is replaced by the fear of capital flight, success in controllinginvestment, whereas in
plant closure, the transfer of operations, and Japan production politics pose weaker con-
disinvestment. straintsand the state has been more successful
The pre-existing hegemonic regime estab- in controlling the movement of capital. In
lished the ground for concession bargaining. Sweden the working class has supported at-
Alternatively, management may by-pass the tempts to collectivize the investment process
hegemonicregime. Recentfads such as Quality through the establishment of "wage earner
of Work Life and QualityCircles signify man- funds" from the taxation of company profits.
agement'sattemptto invade the spaces work- But in a country so dependent on the export
ers created under the pre-existingregime and sector such attempts graduallyto expropriate
mobilize consent for increased productivity. capitalare bound to meet with effective resist-
There have been concerted attemptsto decer- ance, even when the Social Democrats are in
tify unions and fire workers for trade union office.
activities. At the same time states and com- Irrespectiveof state interventionsthere are
munitiesare pitted againstone anotherin their signs that in all advanced capitalist societies
attemptto attractand retaincapital. They out- hegemonic regimes are developing a despotic
bid each other in grantingtax shelters and re- face. Responses may reflect the differentrela-
laxing both labor legislation and welfare pro- tions between production apparatuses and
visions (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). state apparatuses,but the underlyingdynam-
The response of labor has been conditioned ics, the changing international division
by pre-existing hegemonic regimes and their of labor and capital mobility, are leading
relationshipto the state. Thus, in the United towarda thirdperiod:the periodof hegemonic
States debates in the labor movementhave re- despotism.In this periodone can anticipatethe
volved aroundwhetheror not to makeconces- workingclasses beginningto feel their collec-
sions, symptomaticof the confinementof pro- tive impotenceand the irreconcilabilityof their
ductionpolitics to the level of the plant. Occa- interests with the development of capitalism,
sionally, plant closings have been followed by understood as an internationalphenomenon.
worker buy-outs, but it is hard to see these as The forces leading to working-classdemobili-
more than attempts to contain levels of com- zationmay also stimulatea broaderrecognition
munity devastation. In England, there were that the materialinterests of the workingclass
attemptsat extendingthe sphereof production can be vouchsafedonly beyond capitalism,be-
politicsfromthe regulationof the laborprocess yond the anarchy of the market and beyond
to the regulationof investment, with workers despotism in production.
either takingover plants or producingalterna-
tive plans (Coates, 1978; Wainwrightand El-
liott, 1982). This was a short-livedmovement REFERENCES
duringthe last Labourgovernment,which dis- Aglietta, Michael
solved before the unleashingof marketforces 1979 A Theory of Capitalist Regulation. London:
when the Conservative Party took office. New Left Books.
More ambitious and potentially more effec- Arrighi, G. and B. Silver
tive strategiesaim at state controlover the flow 1983 "Labor movements and capital migration: a
of capital, involving a rangeof measuresfrom comparative and world systemic view."
plant closing legislation to nationalizationand Unpublished Manuscript.

Bluestone, Barryand Bennett Harrison Fulcher, J.

1982 The Deindustrializationof America. New 1973 "Class conflict in Sweden." Sociology
York: Basic Books. 7:49-70.
Braverman,Harry Gallie, Duncan
1974 Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: 1978 In Search of the New Working Class. Cam-
Monthly Review Press. bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brody, David Gordon, David, Richard Edwards and Michael Reich
1979 Workersin IndustrialAmerica.New York: 1982 Segmented Work, Divided Workers. Cam-
Oxford University Press. bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, W. Halliday, J.
1972 "A consideration of 'custom and prac- 1975 A Political History of Japanese Capitalism.
tice.' " British Journalof IndustrialRela- New York: Monthly Review Press.
tions 10:42-61. Harris, H. J.
Brown, W. (ed.) 1982 "Responsible unionism and the road to
1981 TheChangingContoursof BritishIndustrial Taft-Hartley." Unpublished Manuscript.
Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Herding, R.
Burawoy, Michael 1972 Job Control and Union Structure. Rotter-
1982 "Karl Marx and the satanic mills: factory dam: Rotterdam University Press.
politics under early capitalismin England, Hobsbawm, Eric J.
the United States and Russia." Unpub- 1969 Industry and Empire. Harmondsworth,
lished manuscript,Departmentof Sociol- Middlesex: Penguin Books.
ogy, University of California-Berkeley. Hyman, Richard
Burns, Tom, L. E. Karlssonand V. Rus (eds.) 1975 Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduc-
1979 Workand Power. Beverly Hills: Sage. tion. London: MacMillan.
Clawson, Daniel Hyman, Richard and I. Brough
1980 Bureaucracyand the Labor Process. New 1975 Social Values and Industrial Relations.
York: Monthly Review Press. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Clegg, Hugh Ingham, Geoffery
1976 Trade Unionism under Collective Bargain- 1974 Strikes and Industrial Conflict. London:
ing. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. MacMillan.
1979 The ChangingSystemof IndustrialRelations Kahn-Freund, 0.
in GreatBritain.Oxford:Basil Blackwell. 1977 Labour and the Law. London: Stevens.
Clegg, Stewartand David Dunkerley Kamata, S.
1,980 Organization,Class and Control. London: 1983 Japan in the Passing Lane. New York:
Routledge& Kegan Paul. Pantheon.
Coates, Ken (ed.) Kishimoto, I.
1978 The Right to Useful Work. Nottingham: 1968 "Labour-management relations and the
Spokesman. trade unions in postwar Japan (1)." Kyoto
Cole, Robert University Economic Review 38:1-35.
1971 Japanese Blue Collar. Berkeley and Los Korpi, Walter
Angeles: University of CaliforniaPress. 1978 The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism.
1979 Work, Mobilityand Participation:A Com- London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
parative Study of Americanand Japanese Levine, S.
Industry. Berkeley and Los Angeles: Uni- 1965 "Labor markets and collective bargaining in
versity of CaliforniaPress. Japan." Pp. 633-68 in W. Lockwood (ed.),
Currie,R. The State and Economic Enterprise in
1979 IndustrialPolitics. Oxford:OxfordUniver- Japan. Princeton: Princeton University
sity Press. Press.
Derber, M., W. Chalmersand M. Edelman Littler, C.
1965 Plant Union-ManagementRelations:From 1982 The Development of the Labor Process in
Practiceto Theory. Champaign:Instituteof Capitalist Societies. London: Heinemann.
Laborand IndustrialRelations, University Lupton, Tom
of Illinois. 1963 On the Shop Floor. Oxford: Pergamon
Dore, Ronald Press.
1973 British Factory-Japanese Factory. Berk- Maitland, I.
eley and Los Angeles: University of 1983 The Causes of Industrial Disorder. London:
CaliforniaPress. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Edwards, Richard Martin, Andrew
1979 Contested Terrain. New York: Basic 1980 "Distributive conflict, inflation and invest-
Books. ment: the Swedish case." Paper prepared
Evans, R. for the Brookings Project on the Politics
1971 The Labor Economics of Japan and the and Sociology of Global Inflation.
United States. New York: Praeger. Marx, Karl
Friedman,Andrew [1867] Capital. Volume One. Harmondsworth, En-
1977 Industryand Labour. London:MacMillan. 1976 gland: Penguin Books.
Frbbel, F., J. Heinrichsand 0. Kreye Massey, D. and R. Meegan
1980 The New InternationalDivision of Labor. 1982 The Anatomy of Job Loss. London: Me-
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press. thuen.

Nichols, T. and H. Beynon Department of Sociology, University of

1977 Livingwith Capitalism.London:Routledge Chicago.
& Kegan Paul. Stephens, John
Palm, G. 1979 The Transition from Capitalism to So-
1977 The Flight from Work. Cambridge:Cam- cialism. London: MacMillan.
bridge University Press. Strauss, G.
Panitch, Leo 1962 "The shiftingpower balance in the plant."
1981 "Trade unions and the state." New Left IndustrialRelations 1(3):65-96.
Review 125:21-44. Thomas, Robert
Piven, Frances and RichardCloward 1982 "Quality and quantity? Worker participa-
1982 The New Class War.New York:Pantheon. tion in the United States and Japanese
Pontusson, J. automobileindustries." Unpublishedman-
1983 "Comparative political economy of ad- uscript, Departmentof Sociology, Univer-
vanced capitalist states: Sweden and sity of Michigan.
France." UnpublishedManuscript. 1983 "Citizenshipand gender in work organiza-
Portes, Alejandroand John Walton tion: some considerationsfor theoriesof the
1981 Labor,Class and the InternationalSystem. labor process." Pp. 86-112 in Michael
New York: Academic Press. Burawoyand Theda Skocpol (eds.), Marx-
Roy, Donald ist Inquiries. Chicago: University of Chi-
1952 "Quota restriction and goldbrickingin a cago Press.
pieceworkmachineshop." AmericanJour- Turner, H.
nal of Sociology 57:427-42. 1962 TradeUnion Growth,Structureand Policy.
1953 "Work satisfaction and social reward in London: Allen & Unwin.
quota achievement." American Sociologi- Wainwright,H. and D. Elliott
cal Review 18:507-14. 1982 The Lucas Plan: A New TradeUnionismin
1954 "Efficiencyand the fix: informalintergroup the Making?London: Allison & Busby.
relations in a piecework machine shop." Weir, M. and Theda Skocpol
AmericanJournalof Sociology 60:255-66. 1983 "State structuresand social Keynesianism:
Sabel, C. response to the Great Depression in Swe-
1982 Work and Politics. Cambridge:Cambridge den and the United States." Unpublished
University Press. manuscript,Departmentof Sociology, Uni-
Sassen-Koob, S. versity of Chicago.
1982 "Recomposition and peripheralizationat Wells, M.
the core." ContemporaryMarxism 5:88- 1983 "Sharecropping in capitalist commodity
100. production:historical anomaly or political
strategy?"UnpublishedManuscript.
Skocpol, Theda Wright, Erik 0. and Joachim Singlemann
1980 "Political response to capitalist crisis: 1983 "Proletarianization in the changingAmeri-
neo-Marxisttheories of the state and the can class structure." Pp. 176-209 in
New Deal." Politics and Society 10:155- Michael Burawoy and Theda Skocpol
202. (eds.), MarxistInquiries.Chicago:Univer-
Skocpol, Theda and John Ikenberry sity of Chicago Press.
1982 "The political formationof the American Zey-Ferrell,M. and Michael Aiken (eds.)
welfare state in historicaland comparative 1981 Complex Organizations:Critical Perspec-
perspective." Unpublished manuscript, tives. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foreman.


Bura Woy 1983

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Bura Woy 1983

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Between the Labor Process and the State: The Changing Face of Factory Regimes Under

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

autonomy vis-a-vis first-line supervision. If a tempts by specific groups to maintaintheir po-

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

specific rights and obligations, grievances at representation,union dues check-off systems,

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

where the nenko system of "lifetime employ- Sweden

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

behindwage drift, indicatingthe independence and linked to social democraticparties. Early

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

Bluestone, Barryand Bennett Harrison Fulcher, J.

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

Nichols, T. and H. Beynon Department of Sociology, University of

This content downloaded from 130.60.206.43 on Thu, 18 Jul 2013 10:35:30 AM

Você também pode gostar