Case Brief: White Light Corporation v City of Manila

NOVEMBER 26, 2013 JEFF REY

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM,Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No.
7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates,
and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and
Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist
and Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro
Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the
ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in
turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution. Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation
that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the
power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III
Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the
promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the
city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to
privacy and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance.
First, it held that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement,
as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short
time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a
lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is
justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.

Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it
is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but
the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City
Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar
goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three
ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit
activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein
there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the
State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila
has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash
rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to
be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed
strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint
imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained
by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short
time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question. The rights at stake
herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the
Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be
free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the
right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and
the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact
be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective
in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations
penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the
ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any
hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact
collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly
be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a
leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of
their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and
renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous
intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774
is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending
and Promotions, Inc.
G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

Respondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and

Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro
Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and
Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC
would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to
the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending &
Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC.
Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in
the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle
the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009,
whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of
billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts,
trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded
to dismantle the formers billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages
and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of
the MRT3.

Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising
media in the MRT3 from MRTCs authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial
premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer
debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the
expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this
case, and until this date, MRTCs entering into the contract for advertising services with
Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this
Court expressly recognized Trackworks right to install the billboards, signages and other
advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latters right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks
billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to
dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on
the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air
Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation
Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion
to rule that MMDAs powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system,
and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CAs ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC
Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks billboards, signages and other
advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards,
signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private
property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of
the areas as to which the prohibition applied.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC

G.R. No. 78742 [July 14, 1989]
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

FACTS
The association of the Small Landowners of the Philippines invokes the right of retention
granted by PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are
cultivating on intend to cultivate the same. Their respected lands do not exceed the statutory
limits but are occupied by tenants who re actually cultivating such lands.
Because PD No. 316 provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural land primarily devoted to rice
and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farm holding until such time as the respective
rights of the tenant-farmers and the land owners shall have been determined, they petitioned
the court for a writ of mandamus to compel the DAR Secretary to issue the IRR, as they could
not eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention.

ISSUE
Whether or not the assailed statutes are valid exercises of police power.
Whether or not the content and manner of just compensation provided for the CARP is violative
of the Constitution.
Whether or not the CARP and EO 228 contravene a well accepted principle of eminent domain
by divesting the land owner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation
HELD
Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself,
which satisfies the first requirement of the lawful subject. However, objection is raised to the
manner fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is judicial prerogatives. However, there
is no arbitrariness in the provision as the determination of just compensation by DAR is only
preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts will still have the
right to review with finality the said determination.
No. Although the traditional medium for payment of just compensation is money and no other,
what is being dealt with here is not the traditional exercise of the power and eminent domain.
This is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, which involves not mere millions of pesos. The
initially intended amount of P50B may not be enough, and is in fact not even fully available at
the time. The invalidation of the said section resulted in the nullification of the entire program.
No. EO 228 categorically stated that all qualified farmer-beneficiaries were deemed full owners
of the land they acquired under PP 27, after proof of full payment of just compensation. The
CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner.
warrantless arrest

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said
Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural)
was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of
the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for
subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing
offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. . . .
instances of warrantless searches

Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless search is valid. These
are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12 [now
Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14
ARREST : CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 113

RULE 113

Arrest

Section 1. Definition of arrest. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

Section 2. Arrest; how made. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be

arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person arrested shall
not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention. (2a)

Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. It shall be the duty of the officer executing the warrant to
arrest the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail without unnecessary
delay. (3a)

Section 4. Execution of warrant. The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest was
delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days from its
receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to whom it was
assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the warrant. In case of his
failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor. (4a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)

Section 6. Time of making arrest. An arrest may be made on any day and at any time of the
day or night. (6)

Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. When making an arrest by virtue
of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of
the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists
before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the
arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him
as soon as practicable. (7a)

Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. When making an arrest without a
warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the
arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists before the officer has
opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (8a)

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. When making an arrest, a private person shall
inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless
the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its
commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person making the arrest has
opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (9a)

Section 10. Officer may summon assistance. An officer making a lawful arrest may orally
summon as many persons as he deems necessary to assist him in effecting the arrest. Every
person so summoned by an officer shall assist him in effecting the arrest when he can render
such assistance without detriment to himself. (10a)
Section 11. Right of officer to break into building or enclosure. An officer, in order to make an
arrest either by virtue of a warrant, or without a warrant as provided in section 5, may break
into any building or enclosure where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to
be, if he is refused admittance thereto, after announcing his authority and purpose. (11a)

Section 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure. Whenever an officer has entered
the building or enclosure in accordance with the preceding section, he may break out therefrom
when necessary to liberate himself. (12a)

Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued,
any person may immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any
place within the Philippines. (13)

Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. Any member of the
Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his behalf, have
the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other place of custody at
any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a relative of the person arrested
can also exercise the same right. (14a)

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN OF LGU ( SEC. 19 of R.A. 7160)

Section 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite
offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon
the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of
at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.

GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURE IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 13

SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS

TO: ALL EXECUTIVE JUDGES AND JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURE IN THE ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANTS.

Under Administrative Order No. 6 of this Court, dated June 30, 1975, the Executive Judge
derives his powers and prerogatives through delegation thereof by this Court some of which
are to improve judicial services, in coordination with court related government agencies, and to
further provide leadership in the management of all courts within his area of administrative
supervision.

As a measure to better serve the public good and to facilitate the administration of justice, the
Court is prescribing hereunder the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants:

1. All applications for search warrants, if filed with the Executive Judge, shall be assigned, by
raffle, to a judge within his administrative area, under whose direction the search warrant shall
be issued for the search and seizure of personal property;
2. After the application has been raffled and distributed to a Branch, the judge who is assigned
to conduct the examination of the complainant and witnesses should immediately act on the
same, considering that time element and possible leakage of information are primary
considerations in the issuance of search warrants and seizure;
3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in cases where an application for search
warrant may be filed directly with any judge in whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the
applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours,
or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays;
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant, properties are seized thereunder and the
corresponding case is filed in court, said case shall be distributed by raffle conformably with
Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and decided by the
judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who is issued the search
warrant.
5. New applications. In order to insure maximum legitimate effect and give meaning and
substance to the constitutional guarantee on the security of every person, his house and his
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, the following procedure should be strictly
observed:
a. A warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property 1) subject of the
offense; 2) stolen or embezzled or are the proceeds or fruits of an offense; and, 3) used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense;
b. A warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in laid connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the judge or such other responsible officer authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
on facts personally known to them, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized so that they could be properly identified;
c. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted;
d. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is
based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant,
which must be substantially in the form prescribed by the Rules;
e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the judge. The duplicate copy thereof
must be given to the person against whom the warrant is issued and served. Both copies of the
warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid and must direct that it be
served in the daytime. If the judge is satisfied that the property is in the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, a direction may be inserted in the warrants that it be served at any
time of the day or night;
f. In every court, there shall be a log under the custody of the Clerk of Court wherein shall be
entered within 24 hours after the issuance of the search warrant, the following:
1. Date and number of the warrant;
2. Name of the issuing judge;
3. Name of the person against whom the warrant is issued;
4. Offense cited in the warrant; and
5. Name of the officer who applied for the warrant and his witnesses.
Each branch or branches of a court shall have a separate and distinct log book from the
log book kept by the other branches of the same court stationed in another city or
municipality;
a. The search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issuance, and after which the
issuing judge should ascertain if the return has been made, and if there was none, should
summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return
was made. If the return has been made, the judge should ascertain from the officer who seized
the property under the warrant if a detailed receipt of the property seized was left with the
lawful occupants of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in
the absence of such occupants, whether he left a receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality, and should require that the property seized by virtue of the
warrant shall be delivered to the judge who issued the warrant. The judge should see to it that
an accurate and true inventory of the property seized duly verified under oath is attached to the
return and filed with the court; and
b. The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
who shall also enter in the log book, the date of the return, the result, and such other actions
the judge may have taken thereon.
This circular shall take effect immediately from receipt of notice. Melencio-Herrera and Relova,
JJ., are on leave.
rule 126: SEARCH AND SEIZURE rules.

RULE 126

Search and Seizure

Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the
court. (1)

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following:

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known,
or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in
the court where the criminal action is pending. (n)

Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. (2a)

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the existence of
facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they
exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these
Rules. (5a)

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance
to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein
to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully
detained therein. (6)

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence of two witnesses. No

search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)

Section 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time,
unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or
night. (8)

Question: What is the life span of a search warrant?

Section 10. Validity of search warrant. A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days
from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)

Section 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property. (10a)

Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings
thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued
the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain
if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the
 warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return
has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been
complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The
judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log
book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and
other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.(11a)

Question: Give an example of a warrantless search?

Answer: Search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant. (12a)

Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A
motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed
in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action
has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued the
search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequent filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court. (n)

terry search: o stop and frisk: the story behind it

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark decision by the United States Supreme
Court which held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and
seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect on the street and frisks him
without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that
the person "may be armed and presently dangerous." (392 U.S. 1, at 30).

For their own protection, police may perform a quick surface search of the persons outer
clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is armed. This
reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts" and not merely upon an
officer's hunch. This permitted police action has subsequently been referred to in short as a
"stop and frisk," or simply a "Terry frisk". The Terry standard was later extended to temporary
detentions of persons in vehicles, known as traffic stops; see Terry stop for a summary of
subsequent jurisprudence.

The rationale behind the Supreme Court decision revolves around the understanding that, as
the opinion notes, "the exclusionary rule has its limitations." The meaning of the rule is to
protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures aimed at gathering evidence, not
searches and seizures for other purposes (like prevention of crime or personal protection of
police officers).

On October 31, 1963, while on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many
years, Cleveland Police Department detective Martin McFadden, aged 62,[1] saw two men, John
W. Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a street corner at 1276 Euclid Avenue and acting in a
way the officer thought was suspicious. Detective McFadden, who was well-known on the
Cleveland police force for his skill in apprehending pickpockets,[1] observed the two proceed
alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window.
Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner. The
two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiecein all, roughly a
dozen trips. After one of these trips, they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly after
a brief conversation. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up", detective McFadden
followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store.

The plainclothes officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked
their names. The men "mumbled something", whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted
down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He reached inside the
overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. The officer ordered the three into the
store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall
with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a
revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer
garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a
weapon), or under Terry's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were
taken to the police station. Terry and Chilton were subsequently charged with carrying
concealed weapons.

The defense of the charged individuals moved to suppress the use of the seized weapons as
evidence on grounds that the search and subsequent seizure were a violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution
theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court
denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the
officer had cause to believe that Terry and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their
interrogation was warranted, and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat
down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The
trial court made a distinction between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a
"frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime.

Terry and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction,
and the Ohio State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial
constitutional question" was involved.

Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court began by reciting first principles. The Fourth
Amendment protects "people, not places", against "unreasonable searches and seizures". The
question the Court confronted was whether "in all the circumstances of this on-the-street
encounter", Terry's reasonable expectation of privacy had been impermissibly invaded.

The procedure called "stop and frisk" was controversial. Police argue that they require a certain
flexibility in dealing with quickly evolving and potentially dangerous situations that arise during
routine patrol of the streets. On the other hand, those suspicious of giving the police broad
investigatory power contended that the police should not be able to assert their authority over
citizens without some specific justification upon intrusion into protected personal security,
coupled with judicial oversight to ensure that the police do not routinely abuse their authority.
For the Court, however, the question was not the propriety of the police actions in the abstract
but the admissibility of the evidence obtained through that police action. "In our system
evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion
approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other
actions by state agents." For this purpose the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), had evolved and been applied against both state and federal agents.

Thus the question was not whether the stop-and-frisk procedure was proper by itself, but
whether the exclusionary rule was an appropriate deterrent of police misconduct during such
encounters.

Proper adjudication of cases in which the exclusionary rule is invoked demands a

constant awareness of these limitations. The wholesale harassment by certain elements
of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently
complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial.
Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against
practices which it can never be effectively used to control, may exact a high toll in
human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 1415

In view of these concerns, the Court next asked whether it is "always unreasonable for a
policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is
probable cause for an arrest."

When is a person seized and what constitutes a search?

The Supreme Court first had to determine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, when is a
person "seized" and what constitutes a "search". The Court rejected the idea that a "stop and
frisk" could categorically never be a search or seizure subject to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, it made room for the idea that some police action short of a traditional
arrest could constitute a seizurethat is, "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." The Court also noted that "... it
is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of
the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons
is not a 'search.' "

Thus, when the police detective took hold of Terry and patted him down on that Cleveland
street, the detective "seized" Terry and subjected him to a "search" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. But the Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable searches
and seizures, so the Court next had to determine whether Terrys seizure and search were
"reasonable".

What is reasonable?

The Court assessed the reasonableness of the police activity here by comparing it to activity
that would ordinarily require a warrant. ... in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. In a situation where the police
obtained a warrant, they would have brought these facts and inferences to the attention of a
judicial officer before embarking on the actions in question. Post hoc judicial review of police
activity is equally facilitated by these facts and inferences.

The Court also emphasized that the test standard courts should employ is an objective one.
Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Lesser evidence
would mean that the Court would tolerate invasions on the privacy of citizens supported by
mere hunchesa result the Court would not tolerate. Moreover,

And simple " 'good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.' ... If
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,' only in the discretion of the police." quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)

The reasonableness inquiry takes into account the "nature and extent of the governmental
interests involved", including the general interest in crime prevention, the officer's specific
concern for his own safety, the citizen's interest in his own privacy and dignity, and the extent to
which the particular search in question intruded upon those interests. "Our evaluation of the
proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be
a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the
police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."

Even searches that start out as reasonable may "violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of
their intolerable intensity and scope." Thus, the scope of the search must be justified by the
circumstances that led the police to undertake it in the first place.

The stop and frisk of Terry was very reasonable

These principles led the Court to conclude that the evidence found on Terry's person was
properly admitted because the search was reasonable. The detective had observed Terry and his
companions acting in a manner he took to be a preface to a stick-up. A reasonable person in the
detective's position would have thought that Terry was armed and thus presented a threat to
his safety while he was investigating the suspicious behavior he was observing. The events he
had witnessed made it reasonable for him to believe that either Terry or his cohorts were
armed. "The record evidences the tempered act of a policeman who in the course of an
investigation had to make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from
possible danger, and took limited steps to do so."

The police detective here limited his search to the outer surfaces of Terry's clothing. Thus, the
search was reasonably related in scope to the concern for his own safety that justified the stop
from the beginning. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the revolver found on Terry's person
was properly admitted into evidence.

The sole justification for the search is protection of the officer and public

The Ohio Court of Appeals allowed the search, but made it clear that such a search was limited
to discovering dangerous weapons that could be used against the officer, as Chief Justice
Warren noted:

"In this case, for example, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that 'we must be careful to
distinguish that the "frisk" authorized herein includes only a "frisk" for a dangerous
weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or
anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled
by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential.' " (392
U.S. 1, at 16, Fn 12, quoting State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, at 130)

Chief Justice Warren later made it clear that this was also the opinion of the Court:

"The sole justification of the search ... is the protection of the police officer and others
nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer." (392 U.S. 1, at 29)
Is such a search a "petty indignity"?

"... it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a

policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised,
is a 'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken
lightly." (392 U.S. 1, at 1617)

Concurring opinion

Justice White joined the opinion of the Court but suggested that

"There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing

questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circumstances, the person
approached may not be detained or frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his
way. However, given the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me
the person may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are
directed to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may
not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may
alert the officer to the need for continued observation." (392 U.S. 1, at 34).

With regard to the lack of obligation to respond when detained under circumstances of Terry,
this opinion came to be regarded as persuasive authority in some jurisdictions, and the Court
cited these remarks in dicta in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), at 439. However,
in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the Court held that
neither of these remarks was controlling in a situation where a state law required a detained
person to identify himself.

Dissenting opinion

Justice Douglas strongly disagreed with permitting a stop and search absent probable cause:

"We hold today that the police have greater authority to make a 'seizure' and conduct a
'search' than a judge has to authorize such action. We have said precisely the opposite
over and over again." (392 U.S. 1, at 37).

"To give the police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the
totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is desirable to cope with modern forms of
lawlessness. But if it is taken, it should be the deliberate choice of the people through a
constitutional amendment." (392 U.S. 1, at 38).

Subsequent jurisprudence

Terry set precedent for a wide assortment of Fourth Amendment cases. The cases range from
street stop-and-frisks to traffic stops in which pat-down searches could be conducted on the
driver or passengers. Relevant cases are Ybarra v. Illinois, Minnesota v. Dickerson, Florida v. J.
L., Muehler v. Mena, Alabama v. White, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, Maryland v.
Wilson and Brendlin v. California. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court
ruled that car compartments could be constitutionally searched if an officer had reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Thus the compartments are viewed as an
extension of the suspect's person. This is known as "frisking the lunge area," as an officer may
protect himself by searching any areas the suspect could grab a weapon from.

The Terry doctrine was markedly extended in the 2004 Supreme Court case Hiibel v. Sixth
Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), which held that a state law requiring the
suspect to identify himself during a Terry stop did not violate the Fourth
Amendment prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures or the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Court did not legalize this process in all
states but instead left it up to the states to decide whether they would pass such laws. So far 24
states have passed such laws.

The Court most recently cited Terry v. Ohio in Arizona v. Johnson. In that 2009 case, the Court
ruled 9-0 in favor of further expanding Terry, granting police the ability to frisk an individual in a
stopped vehicle if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is armed and
dangerous. This fulfills only the second prong of Terry (the first prongreasonable suspicion
that a crime has, is, or will be committedis fulfilled by whatever traffic violation prompted the
pull-over). According to Whren v. United States, any traffic violation, no matter how small, is
legitimate basis for a traffic stop.

BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION 2010, G. R. No. 192935. December 7, 2010 (CASE
DIGEST)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I CASE DIGEST

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,

respondent.

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and
REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.
G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause
exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public

office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC
had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC G.R. No. 176951 August 24, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)

FACTS:

Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section
10, Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was
denied by the Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on
the 18th of November 2008, the judgement became final and executory.

The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding
the constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered.
RULING:

Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional

law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but
the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left
undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or
modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such
as the payment of salaries and supplies by the new cities or their issuance of licenses or
execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the
Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these
unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people
who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts
declaration of their unconstitutionality.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directingnewspapers to provide

free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties
and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public
Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper

and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declareComelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor Generalclaimed that the
Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec
over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel
print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal
property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover,
the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of
private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of
just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police
power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national
emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

Dumlao vs COMELEC

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate
of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.
Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such,
has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa

Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the

Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as
disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of
 age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore,
class legislation.

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions, among others:

Sec. 4.

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a
candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political
activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
(Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the
accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the Constitution,
which provides that a bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of
harassment and discrimination. The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case
but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue has been
squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

1. W/N retirement from government service may be a reasonable disqualification ground

for elective local officials.
2. W/N the disqualification of a candidate on the ground that charges have been filed
against him before a civil and military tribunal is constitutional?
HELD:

1. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for
elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages,
say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old
retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from
which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood
assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would
like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the
application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection
neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly
situated are sinlilarly treated.
The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid even
it at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).

2. NO. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of
the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may
be rebutted, yet. there is clear and present danger that because of the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

Lambino vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(b) and (c)2
and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act.

The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals
constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino
Group also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.

The Lambino Groups initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7
of Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)
and by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory Provisions. These proposed changes will shift
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735 inadequate to
implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative;

2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and

HELD:
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
peoples initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that before they sign there is already a draft shown to them. The
framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the
proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a
petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only
if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

There is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in

gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a
copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

2. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not
change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago
which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution
to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.

People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968)

People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968)

FACTS: The accused were charged for murder. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the
motions for bail of the defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead
of in a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had
presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the same
despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses to
present. Bail was granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when trial court
granted bail without allowing the prosecution to present their other witnesses?
HELD: YES. Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be
resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire
to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case
involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court
granting bail should be considered void on that ground. The orders complained of dated
October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be
considered null and void.
The courts discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a
summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled
and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the courts order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the
five defendants are defective in form and substance because they do not contain a summary of
the evidence presented by the prosecution. They only contain the courts conclusion that the
evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders
complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand.

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355 (1D), 31 October 1919

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for
the purpose of constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue,
Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary.
Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for
many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not
be converted into a street for public purposes.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of
land in question.
Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the
authority to expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method
adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the
expropriation?
HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity,
and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry.
Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co.,
72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right
to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of
municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions
imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and
propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of
in the question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks
Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent
domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the
law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu

Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of Cebu
GR 95770, 29 December 1995; En Banc Resolution, Kapunan [J]

FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated
raising the same issue whether school children who are members or a religious sect known as
Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private), for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a
band) or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge.

All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory
in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.

Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion
akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional
limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the Court upheld the
explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and
state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any religious
ceremony. The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be exempted from participation in the
flag ceremony. They have no valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest of the school population
which by far constitutes the great majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable
and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of religion?
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners from the school was not justified.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom
to act on ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of
grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right
to prevent.
Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who
choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in disruptive
behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.

PICOP v. Asuncion Case Digest

PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its]
control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense,
or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept] and
conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any
agent of the law to take possession and bring to the described properties. After propounding
several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search
warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound
and seized a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the
search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion
to SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which
denied petitioners motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested
Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In the present case,
the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally the
complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the
hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners
were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not
described with particularity.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano Case Digest

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)
FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest
took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were
searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized.
Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased
residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents
seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscals office
merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque
asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the
search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with
particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been
properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:
NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
 complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are;
what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to
enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court,
search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.

October 10, 2012

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Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest
Aberca vs. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1989)
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and
liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known
as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about
CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided
several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during
these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the
courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers;
that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military
men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in
order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all
violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to
forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass
and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General
Estelito Mendoza, alleging among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into
the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain
the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of
their official duties.

ISSUE:
1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for
damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution?

2. If such action for damages may be maintained, may a superior officer under the notion of
respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to
the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?

HELD:
1. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners
right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or
detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from
detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

2. YES. Article 32 of the Civil Code renders any public officer or employee or any private
individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as
enumerated therein. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its
application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates. Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the
language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or
indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages
under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5
acquires added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his
vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does
not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally
protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in
February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent
to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would
 certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the
prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible
for the transgression joint tortfeasors.

October 10, 2012

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People vs. Albofera Case Digest
People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 (1987)
FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed Teodoro Carancio a
forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the accused but did not participate in the
killing.
The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and
accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was subsequently arrested.

Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated
therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear of his life; that said group had
ordered the arrest of the victim, Carancio, and that the group sentenced him (the victim) to
die by stabbing.

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera sent a
letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence by prosecution. In his letter,
accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his
favor instead.

Later the accused were convicted of murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Alboferas letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence in light of alleged
unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accuseds privacy?
HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result of an unlawful
search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Alboferas privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who
produced and identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is
nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Alboferas) favor. Furthermore, nothing Alboferas
tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

SECTION 3 Privacy Of Communication and Correspondence- Philippines Constitution CASE

DOCTRINES
(1)The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this and the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
anypurpose in any proceeding.

A. Exclusionary Rule (Second paragraph of Section 3)

People v. Marti package bound for Switzerland The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked
against act of private individuals. It is directed against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. The constitutional against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by a private individual.

B. Waiver of Rights

Veroy v. Layague search of rebels in a house Permission was granted by Veroy to enter the
house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Where permission to enter a
residence was given,
it is illegal to search the rooms therein and seize firearms without as search warrant.
Okabe v. Gutierrez estafa case An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the
accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
therefore.. An application for bail SHALL NOT BE considered as a waiver of rights. A valid waiver,
requisites. 1) rights must exist; 2) there must be clear and convincing proof that there was an
actual intention to relinquish the right

C. Anti-Wire Tapping Act

Navarro v. CA police complaint gone bad where the exchange between two persons is not
private, the tape recording is not prohibited

Salcedo-Ordonez v. CA annulment with damages husband is cheating on me case

Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations not admissible
D. Privacy of Bank Accounts

Marquez v. Desierto secrecy of bank deposits exceptions: 1) depositor consents in writing;

2) subject of an impeachment case; 3) by court order in cases of bribery and dereliction by
public officials, 4) deposit is subject of litigation; 5) unexplained wealth

E. Privacy of Communication

Roxas v. Zuzuaregui contempt of the Supreme Court the letter ceased to be private when
Roxas furnished the letter to the all the justices and not just to the one whom it is addressed

Waiver of Rights
Art. 6.- Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right to be recognized by law.

Generally, rights may be waived given that:

1. The person making the waiver is capacitated to do so. Meaning not a minor or Insane.
2. The waiver must be made clearly but not necessarily express.
3. The person must have the right he is renouncing,
4. It must comply to formalities if it calls for one.
5. The waiver must concur with Art. 6.

Citizen's Arrest- Method of arrest by private person

Method of arrest by private person. When making an arrest, a private person shall
inform the person to be arrested of the intention to arrest him and the case of the
arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the commission of an offense, is pursued
immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists before the person
making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest.

Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence

inShare
Section 3 Rules of Court. Admissibility of evidence- Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to
the issue and is not excluded by law or these rules.

I. Introduction.

A. Admissibility- the character or quality which any material must necessarily possess for it to be
accepted and allowed to be presented or introduced as evidence in court. It answers the
question: should the court allow the material to be used as evidence by the party?

B. Weight- the value given or significance or impact, or importance given to the material after it
has been admitted; its tendency to convince or persuade. Hence a particular evidence may be
admissible but it has no weight. Conversely, an evidence may be of great weight or importance
but it is not admissible.

II. Conditions for admissibility (Axioms of admissibility per Wigmore)

A. RELEVANCY (None but facts having rational probative value are admissible). Per section 4,
Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence.

1. The material presented as evidence must affect the issue or question. It must have a bearing
on the outcome of the case. It requires both:
a). rational or logical relevancy in that it has a connection to the issue and therefore it has a
tendency to establish the fact which it is offered to prove. The evidence must therefore have
probative value
b). legal relevancy in that the evidence is offered to prove a matter which has been properly put
in issue as determined by the pleadings in civil cases, or as fixed by the pre-trial order, or as
determined by substantive law. If so the matter has materiality.

Illustration: (i). Criminal case: the fact that the crime was committed at nighttime is rationally or
logically relevant to a killing at 12 midnight but evidence thereon would be not be legally
relevant if nighttime was not alleged in the Information. It would be immaterial. (ii) Civil Case: In
an action for sum of money based on a promissory note, evidence that the defendant was
misled into signing the note would be rationally relevant but if fraud was never alleged as a
defense, then evidence thereof would be legally irrelevant or immaterial.
 The components of relevancy are therefore probative value and materiality.

2. Rule as to collateral matters: Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except
when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the facts
in issue

a). collateral matters-facts or matters which are not in issue. They are not generally allowed to
be proven except when relevant.
b) In criminal cases, the collateral matters allowed to be proven, being relevant include:
(i). Antecedent Circumstances, or those in existing even prior to the commission of the crime.
They include such matters as habit, custom, bad moral character when self defense is invoked;
or plan design, conspiracy, or premeditation, agreement to a price, promise or reward
(ii) Concomitant circumstances or those which accompany the commission of the crime such as
opportunity to do the act or incompatibility
(iii).Subsequent circumstances or those which occur after the commission of the crime, such as
flight, escape, concealment, offer of compromise

c). Example: Motive is generally irrelevant and proof thereof is not allowed except: when the
evidence is purely circumstantial, when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, or when
it is an element of the crime.

B. COMPETENCY ( All facts having rational probative value are admissible unless some specific
law or rule forbids). In short the evidence is not excluded by law or rules.

III. Principles which exclude relevant or material evidence:

A. The Exclusionary Rule Principle - the principle which mandates that evidence obtained from
an illegal arrest, unreasonable search or coercive investigation, or in violation of a particular law,
must be excluded from the trial and will not be admitted as evidence.
1. The principle judges the admissibility of evidence based on HOW the evidence is obtained or
acquired and not WHAT the evidence proves.
 2. The principle is to be applied only if it is so expressly provided for by the constitution or by a
particular law. Even if the manner of obtaining the evidence is in violation of a certain law but
the law does not declare that the evidence is inadmissible, then such evidence will be
admissible.

Example: The accused claimed that information about his bank accounts i.e. trust funds, was
obtained in violation of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law ( R.A. 1405) and moved to have them
be excluded as evidence. HELD: R.A. 1405 nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of
bank accounts shall render the evidence there from inadmissible in evidence. If Congress has
both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its violation, the court would
encroaching upon the prerogatives of congress if it authorizes a remedy not provided for by
statute. Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to
read such a provision into the act. ( Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan, 509 SCRA 190, Nov. 30, 2006).

3. The phrase is attributed to Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme and has its biblical
reference to Mathew 7: 17-20.

B. The Doctrine of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

1. Evidence will be excluded if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an illegal arrest,
unreasonable search or coercive interrogation, or violation of a particular exclusionary law.
2. It is an offshoot of the Exclusionary Rule which applies to primary evidence. The doctrine
applies only to secondary or derivative evidence. There must first be a primary evidence which
is determined to have been illegally obtained then secondary evidence is obtained because of
the primary evidence. Since the primary evidence is inadmissible, any secondary evidence
discovered or obtained because of it may not also be used.
a. The poisonous tree is the evidence seized in an illegal arrest, search or interrogation. The fruit
of this poisonous tree is evidence discovered because of knowledge gained from the first illegal
search, arrest, or interrogation or violation of a law.
b. It is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to
gain other evidence because the original illegally obtained evidence taints all those
subsequently obtained.

C Illustrations:
A suspect as forced to make a confession where he revealed he took shabu from the room of X.
Based on this knowledge the police went to the house of X and with the consent of X, searched
his room and found the shabu. The confession is inadmissible because of the exclusionary. It is
the poisoned tree. The shabu is inadmissible because knowledge of its existence was based on
the confession. It is the fruit.

D. Exceptions to the two principles- when evidence is still admissible despite the commission of
an illegal arrest, search or interrogation, or violation of a particular exclusionary law.

1. Under the Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery- Evidence is admissible even if obtained through
an unlawful arrest, search, interrogation, or violation of an exclusionary law, if it can be
established, to a very high degree of probability, that normal police investigation would have
inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence

2. Independent Source Doctrine- evidence is admissible if knowledge of the evidence is gained

from a separate or independent source that is completely unrelated to the illegal act of the law
enforcers.

3. Attentuation Doctrine: evidence maybe suppressed only if there is a clear causal connection
between the illegal police action and the evidence. Or, that the chain of causation between the
illegal action and the tainted evidence is too attenuated i.e too thin, weak, decreased or fragile.
This takes into consideration the following factors:

a). The time period between the illegal arrest and the ensuing confession or consented search
b). The presence of intervening factors or events
c). The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct

E. Remedy : By filing a Motion to Suppress the Evidence

III. Evidence Excluded by the Constitution

A. Under Article III of the Constitution the following evidence are inadmissible
1. evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure
2. evidence obtained in violation of the privacy of communication and correspondence, except
upon lawful order of the court or when public safety or order requires otherwise
3. evidence consisting of extra-judicial confessions which are uncounselled, or when the
confessant was not properly informed of his constitutional rights, or when the confession was
coerced
4. evidence obtained in violation of the right against self-incrimination

B. Principles:

1. The exclusionary rule in all the foregoing provisions is TOTAL in that the inadmissibility or
incompetency applies to all cases, whether civil criminal or administrative, and for all purposes.
2. The incompetency applies only if the evidence was obtained by law enforcers or other
authorized agencies of the government. It does not apply if the evidence was obtained by
private persons such as private security personnel or private detectives even if they perform
functions similar to the police whenever a crime was committed.
a). Thus evidence obtained by the following are not covered by the constitutional provisions: (i)
the security personnel or house detectives of hotels or commercial establishments or schools
(ii) private security agencies even if they are guarding public or government buildings/offices (iii)
employers and their agents.

It will be some other appropriate principle on the admissibility of evidence which will govern.

b). However, by way of exception, the rule of incompetency applies if what are involved are the
private correspondence of an individual. In Zulueta vs. CA ( Feb. 1986) it was held that pictures
and love letters proving the infidelity of the husband, kept by him in his private clinic, taken by
the wife without the knowledge of the husband, are inadmissible as evidence for being
obtained in violation of the husbands privacy of communication and correspondence.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them breaking the drawers
and cabinet of the other and ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his or her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is available to him or her

3. Secondary evidence resulting from a violation of the foregoing provisions is inadmissible

under the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine.
IV. R.A. 4200 ( The Anti Wire Tapping Law) Exclusion as to evidence obtained through
mechanical, electronic or other surveillance or intercepting devises. (Intercepted
communications)

A. Coverage: R.A 4200 declares that evidence is inadmissible if obtained through any of the
following ways:

1. By using any device to secretly eavesdrop, overhear, intercept or record any communication
or spoken word

a. The person who obtained the evidence may be a third person or a participant in the
conversation or communication.

FACTS: Ramirez and Garcia had a confrontation in the office of Garcia. Ramirez secretly taped
their verbal confrontation and used it as evidence in her action for damages against Garcia who
in turn filed a criminal case against Ramirez for violation of R.A. 4200. Ramirez held that the
taping by a participant to a conversation is not covered by the law.

HELD: 1. The law does not make a distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized is a
party or not to the private conversation. 2. The nature of the conversation is immaterial What
is penalized is the act of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording private communications
by the devices enumerate under Section 1. (Ramirez vs. C.A., September 28, 1995)

b. To be admissible the consent of the person speaking or of all the parties to the conversation.
However consent is not necessary if the words which were taped or recorded were not
intended to be confidential as when the were intended to be heard by an audience or when
uttered under circumstances of time, place, occasion and similar circumstances whereby it may
reasonably be inferred that the conversation was without regard to the presence of third
persons.

c. Questions:
i). Does this apply if the recording of the words was unintentional or inadvertent, such as
conversations captured by a moving video camera?
ii). Are conversations in a police entrapment included?
iii). Is lip-reading included?
iv). Are conversations captured in surveillance cameras included?
v). Does this apply to secret taping through spy cameras purposely made to be aired in
television programs, such as Bitag, XXX and Cheaters?
vi). Are the gestures, snores, laughs, weeping, included as communication or spoken words?
vii). What about satellite discs and similar facilities? Google earth?

2. By the unauthorized tapping of any wire or cable as to communications used via

telephone/cable, as opposed to verbal communications.

a). There must be a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to over hear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
i). hence over hearing through an extension telephone wire is not included even if intentional
because each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have
an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation ( Ganaan vs. IAC,
1986)
ii). Does the Ganaan ruling apply to overhearing by telephone operators of hotels, schools,
hospitals and similar establishments?

B. Exceptions: when evidence through secret recording or tapping is admissible

1. When Judicial Authorization was granted upon a written petition filed pursuant to the
provisions of R.A. 4200 if the crimes involve (a). treason (b) espionage (c) provoking war and
disloyalty ( d). piracy and mutiny in the high seas (e) sedition, inciting to sedition (g)kidnapping
(h) other offenses against national security.

The list is exclusive and does not include offenses which are equally or more serious as those
enumerated, such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, Trafficking in Persons, Rape, Murder.

2.When Judicial Authorization is granted upon a written petition under R.A. 9372 ( The Human
Security Act of 2007) in connection with the crimes of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism. If granted the authority covers written communications.
VI. Exclusion by Certain Rules of Evidence

1. The rule excluding secondary evidence when the primary or best evidence is available
2. The rule excluding hearsay evidence
3. The rule excluding privilege communications

VII. Kinds of Admissibility

A. Multiple Admissibility: when a material is asked by a party to be admitted as evidence, the

party presenting must inform the court of the purpose which the material is intended to serve
and the court then admits the material as evidence. Multiple admissibility may mean either (i)
the evidence is admissible for several purposes or (ii) an evidence is not admissible for one
purpose but may be admitted for a different purpose if it satisfies all the requirements of the
other purpose
1. Examples of the first concept: (a) a knife may be admitted to prove the accused was armed
with a deadly weapon; to prove the weapon is far deadlier than the weapon of the victim; to
prove it was the weapon of the accused which cause the wounds and not some other
instrument; to corroborate the statement of a witness who claims he saw the accused holding a
bladed instrument.
2. Example of the second concept: (a). the extra judicial confession of one of several accused
may not be admitted to prove there was conspiracy among them or to prove the guilt of the
other co-accused but it maybe admitted to prove the guilt of the confessant (b) the statement
of the victim may not be admitted as a dying declaration but as part of the res gestae.

B. Curative admissibility or fighting fire with fire or Opening the Door

1. This applies to a situation when improper evidence was allowed to be presented by one
party, then the other party may be allowed to introduce or present similar improper evidence
but only to cure or to counter the prejudicial effect of the opponents inadmissible evidence.
2. The party presenting must have raised an objection to the improper evidence, for if he did
not, then it is discretionary for the court to allow him to present curative evidence
3. The evidence sought to be countered should not refer to those which are incompetent due to
an exclusionary rule
4. Example: P vs. D for sum of money. P was allowed to introduce evidence that D did not pay
his debt as shown by his refusal to pay his indebtedness to X, Y and Z. Defendant may introduce
evidence that he paid his debts to A, B and C.

C. Conditional Admissibility: An evidence is allowed to be presented for the time being or

temporarily, subject to the condition that its relevancy or connection to other facts will later be
proven, or that the party later submit evidence that it meets certain requirements of the law or
rules. If the conditions are not later met, the evidence will be stricken from the record.

1. Example: A Xerox copy of a document may be allowed to presented subject to the condition
that the original be later presented
2. Example: P vs. D to recover a parcel of land. P presents a document that the land belonged to
X. If D objects to it as being irrelevant, P can state that he will alter show that X sold the land to
Y who in turn sold it to Z and then to P. The Court may admit the document conditionally.

VIII. Policy on the Admissibility of Evidence

A. Policy of Liberality: In case a question arises as to whether or not a particular material should
be admitted as evidence, Courts are given wide discretion what to admit and to be liberal in
admitting materials offered as evidence, unless the material is clearly incompetent. The reasons
are: (i) so that it may have a substantial range of facts as basis for deciding the case and (ii) in
case of appeal the appellate court may have before it all the evidence to determine whether the
decision appealed from is in accordance with the evidence, (iii) to minimize any adverse effect
of the non-admission upon the party affected.

B. Limitations:

1. Evidence may be excluded even if relevant if its probative value is outweighed by the risk that
its admission will cause:
a). undue or unfair prejudice
b). confusion of the issues
c). misleads the court
d). undue delay or waste of time
2. The court has the power to limit the presentation of additional evidence which are but
cumulative, or to prove points which a party has already well presented

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Criminal Procedure

inShare

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before
the court.

WHAT IS A SEARCH WARRANT?

> A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.

WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF A SEARCH WARRANT?

> It is a criminal process akin to a mode of discovery
> It is a special and peculiar remedy, which is drastic in nature

ARE SEARCH AND SEIZURES PROHIBITED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION?

> No. The constitutional guarantee embodied in Article 3, Section 2 of the Constitution is not
a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against
unreasonable searches and seizures

WHEN IS THE SEARCH OR SEIZURE UNREASONABLE?

> A search and seizure is unreasonable if it is made without a warrant, or the warrant
was invalidly issued.
> In all instances, what constitutes reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is a
purely judicial question determinable from a consideration of the attendant circumstances.

WHAT ARE THE THREE SITUATIONS WHEREIN THERE MUST BE FINDING OF PROBABLE
CAUSE?
1. Probable cause in filing of an information
> Facts and circumstances that would engender a well-grounded belief that a crime
has been committed and the person to be charged is probably guilty thereof
2. Probable cause in the issuance of a search warrant
> Facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man
to believe that there has been a crime committed and the things and objects connected to
the crime committed are in the place to be searched
3. Probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest
> Facts and circumstances that would engender a well-grounded belief that a crime
has been committed and the person to be arrested committed it

WHY ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT MORE
STRINGENT THAN THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST?
> The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a core right implicit in the natural right
to life, liberty and property. Even in the absence of a constitution, individuals have a
fundamental and natural right against unreasonable search and seizure under natural law.
> Moreover, the violation of the right to privacy produces a humiliating effect that
cannot be rectified anymore.
> This is why there is no other justification to speak of for a search, except for a warrant.
> On the other hand, in a warrant of arrest, the person to be arrested can always post
bail to prevent the deprivation of liberty.

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
WHERE SHOULD ONE FILE AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT?
> As a general rule, any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed
BUT FOR COMPELLING REASONS stated in the application, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known,
or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
> For example, a drug syndicate keeps his drugs in a warehouse in Pasay for the reason that
it has connections in Pasay and can easily get a tip when the police officers will file for
a search warrant. To avoid the drug syndicate from getting a tip of the impending
search, the police officers apply for a search warrant in Makati stating the compelling reason.
> However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

WHAT MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEARCH WARRANT?

1. Subject of the offense;
2. Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
3. Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

IS IT NECESSARY THAT THE PERSON NAMED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT BE THE OWNER OF
THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED?
> No, ownership is of no consequence.
> What is relevant is that the property is connected to an offense.

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF A VALID SEARCH WARRANT?
1. There must be probable causefacts and circumstances that would engender a well-
founded belief in a reasonable prudent and discreet man that a crime has been committed and
the things and objects to be seized can be found in the place to be searched
2. Which must be determined by the judge personally through searching and probing
questionsquestions not merely answerable by yes or no but could be answered by the
applicant and the witnesses on facts personally known to them
3. (Upon whom?) The complainant and the witnesses he may produce are personally
examined by the judge, in writing and under oath and affirmation
4. (Based on what?) The applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to
them
5. The probable cause must be in connection with the specific offense
6. The warrant specified describes the person and place to be searched and the things to
be seized
7. The sworn statement together with the affidavits of the witnesses must be attached to the
record

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE FOR THE PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE

SEARCHED AND THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED?
> The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrantto leave officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, that abuses may not be
committed.

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

WHEN IS THE AFFIDAVIT OR TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS SAID TO BE BASED ON

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE?
> The test is whether perjury could be charged against the witness

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF THE PERSONAL EXAMINATION THAT THE JUDGE MUST
CONDUCT BEFORE ISSUING THE SEARCH WARRANT?
1. The judge must examine the witness personally
2. The examination must be under oath
3. The examination must be reduced into writing in the form of searching questions and
answers

Sec. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the existence
of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed
by these Rules.

WHAT IS A SCATTER SHOT WARRANT?

> It is a warrant of arrest that is issued for more than one offense
> It is void for the law requires that a warrant of arrest should only be issued in connection
with one specific offense

A WARRANT WAS ISSUED FOR THE SEIZURE OF DRUGS CONNECTED WITH THE VIOLATION OF
THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT. IS THE WARRANT VALID?
> The warrant is valid
> Although there are many ways of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act, it is not a scatter
shot warrant since it is in connection with only one penal law

POLICE OFFICERS APPLIED FOR A WARRANT TO SEARCH DOOR #1 OF AN APARTMENT

COMPLEX. THE COURT ISSUED THE WARRANT. WHEN THEY WENT TO THE APARTMENT
COMPLEX, THEY REALIZED THAT WHAT THEY THOUGHT WAS DOOR #1 WAS ACTUALLY DOOR
#7. CAN THEY SEARCH DOOR #7?
> No, what is controlling is what is stated in the warrant, and not what the peace
officers had in mind, even if they were the ones who gave it the description to the court.
> This is to prevent abuses in the service of search warrants

CAN THE POLICE OFFICER SEIZE ANYTHING THAT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE WARRANT?
> No, anything not included in the warrant cannot be seized EXCEPT if its mala prohibita, in
which case, the seizure is justified under the plain view doctrine.
> Even if the object was related to the crime, but it is not mentioned in the warrant nor is it
mala prohibita, it still cannot be seized
POLICE OFFICERS WENT TO THE HOUSE TO EXECUTE A SEARCH WARRANT. THEY FOUND A
PISTOL ON THE TABLE, BUT THE PISTOL WASNT INCLUDED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. CAN
THEY SEIZE THE PISTOL?
> No, it is not mala prohibita and they have no proof that it is unlicensed.

WHAT SHOULD THE POLICE OFFICER OR COURT TO DO THINGS SEIZED ILLEGALLY?

> Anything seized illegally must be returned to the owner unless it is mala prohibita. In such a
case, it should be kept in custodia legis.

Sec. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority,
may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant to liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him
when unlawfully detained therein.

Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. No

search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

NOTE: The two witness rule only applies in the absence of the lawful occupants of the
premises searched

PEACE OFFICERS RAIDED A HOUSE, WHICH WAS SUSPECTED TO BE A FACTORY FOR ILLEGAL
DRUGS. DURING THE RAID, 8 CHINESEMEN WERE FOUND INSIDE WHO COULDNT
SPEAK ENGLISH OR FILIPINO. THE CHINESE WERE LOCKED INSIDE A ROOM AND TWO
WITNESSES WHO WERE NOT OCCUPANTS WERE USED WHILE SEARCHING THE
HOUSE AND SEIZING THE PROHIBITED DRUGS. VALID?
> No.
> The two-witness rule can only apply when there is absence of the lawful occupants of the
premises searched.
> In this case, they locked the occupants in a room while doing the search and seizure and
used 2 witnesses who werent the occupants of the premises.

Sec. 9. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time,
unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be
searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or
night.
WHEN SHOULD THE SEARCH WARRANT BE EXECUTED?
> If possible, it should be executed during the daytime
> But in certain cases, such as when the things seized are mobile or are in the person of the
accused, it can be served during nighttime

Sec. 10. Validity of search warrant. A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from
its date. Thereafter, it shall be void.

FOR HOW LONG IS THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID?

> It is valid for 10 days, after which the police officer should make a return to the judge who
issued it
> If the police officer doesnt make a return, the judge should summon him and require
him to explain why no return was made
> If the return was made, the judge should determine if the peace officer issued the receipt
to the occupant of the premises from which the things were taken.
> The judge shall also order the delivery to the court of the things seized.

IF THE WARRANT WAS EXECUTED EVEN BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE 10-DAY PERIOD,
CAN THE PEACE OFFICER USE THE WARRANT AGAIN BEFORE IT EXPIRES?
> No, of the purpose for which it was issued has already been carried out, the warrant
cannot be used anymore.
> The exception is if the search wasnt finished within 1 day, the warrant can still be
used the next day, provided it is still within the 10-day period

Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing the property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in
whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must,
in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.

WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE OFFICER WHEN HE SEIZES THE PROPERTY?

> The officer seizing the property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for
the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in whose presence the search and seizure
were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which
he found the seized property.
CAN THE OWNER OF THE THINGS SEIZED BE MADE TO SIGN THE RECEIPT?
> No since this would be tantamount to a violation of ones right against self-
incrimination. It is a confession without the assistance of counsel.

IS THERE PERIL TO THE OWNER OF THE THINGS SEIZED IF HE IS MADE TO SIGN THE BOOKING
SHEET?
> There is no peril since he would just be made to acknowledge that a case has been
filed against him

THE ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED DURING A BUY-BUST OPERATION. PESO BILLS WERE SEIZED
FROM HIM. CAN THE ACCUSED BE MADE TO SIGN THE BILLS?
> Yes, having the bills is not a crime.
> This applies even if the bills involved is marked money.

Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the
return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made,
the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complied with and shall
require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that
subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other
actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

WHAT IS THE DUTY OF THE OFFICER AFTER THE PROPERTY SOUGHT UNDER THE SEARCH
WARRANT HAS BEEN SEIZED?
> The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the
warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.

IN WHAT INSTANCES WOULD A SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT A WARRANT BE ALLOWED?

1. A warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
a. Arrest must be lawful
b. It must be contemporaneous with the arrest in both time and place
c. Within the vicinity of the person arrested, immediate control, which is the evidence
of the offense or weapon
2. Search of evidence in plain view
3. Search of a moving vehicle
a. Must be cursory
b. Cant make a thorough search; just have to take a look; not to open trunks
4. Consented warrantless searches
a. The right exists
b. Person making the consent knows that he has the right
c. In spite of the knowledge of the right, he voluntarily and intelligently gives his consent
5. Customs searches
6. Stop and frisk
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
8. Checkpoints
9. Republic Act requiring inspections or body checks in airports
10. Emergency
11. In times of war and within military operations

WHAT ARE THE INSTANCES OF A PERMISSIBLE WARRANTLESS ARREST?

1. Arrest in flagrante delicto
2. Arrest effected in hot pursuit
3. Arrests of escaped prisoners

WHAT IS THE AREA OF COVERAGE OF AN OFFICERS SEARCH? IS IT LIMITED TO THE PERSON OF

THE ACCUSED?
> Under this rule, the search being an incident to a lawful arrest may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under his immediate control
> The search must be made after the arrest. The objective is to make sure that the
life of the peace officer will not be endangered. It must be contemporaneous with the
arrest in both time and place.
WHEN IS THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE ALLOWED?
> It is allowed when it is not practicable to secure a warrant

WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL

ARREST?
1. Arrest must be lawful
2. It must be contemporaneous with the arrest in both time and place
3. Within the vicinity of the person arrested, immediate control, which is the evidence of
the offense or weapon

WHO SHOULD GIVE CONSENT TO A WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND WHAT ARE THE
REQUISITES?
> Only the person whose right may be violated can give the consent; it is a personal
right that cannot be availed of by third parties. The requisites are:
1. The person has knowledge of his right against the search
2. He freely and intelligently gives his consent in spite of such knowledge

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE TO APPLY?
1. There must have been a prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties
2. The evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are
3. The evidence must be immediately apparent
4. There was no need for further search

WHAT IS A STOP AND FRISK SITUATION? WHEN IS IT VALID?

> It is a situation wherein there is a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons
> While probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate such a procedure.
> A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person has detained the weapons concealed about
him.
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A motion
to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be filed in and
acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no criminal action
has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that issued search
warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is
subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter court.

A POLICE OFFICER WAS GRANTED TO SEARCH THE HOUSE FOR REBEL OFFICERS. CAN THE
POLICEMAN CONDUCT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH?
> NO, the permission didnt include the room to room search and anything confiscated
will be inadmissible

IF AN OBJECT HAS BEEN SEIZED UPON ORDERS OF THE COURT, MAY A COORDINATE
COURT ISSUE A REPLEVIN ORDER FOR THE RELEASE OF THE OBJECT?
> No, only the court that ordered its confiscation may release the object

IF THE ARRESTED PERSON SIGNS THE RECEIPT OF THE PROPERTY SEIZED WITHOUT THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IS THE RECEIPT ADMISSIBLE?
> No, because it was done without assistance of counsel

WHAT IS THE MULTI-FACTOR BALANCING TEST?

> It requires officers to weigh the manner and intensity of the interference of the right
of the people, the gravity of the crime committed, and the circumstances attending the
incident.

WHERE SHOULD ONE FILE THE NOTION TO QUASH WARRANT OR TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE?
1. In the court where the action has been instituted
2. If no criminal action has been filed, in the court that issued the warrant
3. However, if said court failed to resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently
filed in another court, the motion shall be filed in the latter court

A MOTION TO QUASH WAS FILED IN THE COURT WHERE THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS
FILED. DURING THIS TIME, THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS ONGOING. THE
ACCUSED MOVES FOR THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. VALID AND
PROPER?
> No, the preliminary investigation is of different nature from deciding on whether to
grant the motion to quash the warrant
> The result of one will not affect the other. One deals on probable cause on whether there
are facts and circumstances that would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. The other deals on whether the
things and objects were seized legally or not.

NOTE: The Motion To Quash, filed in the issuing court, or to Suppress Evidence, filed
with the court trying the case, are alternative, not cumulative remedies. If one is filed, the
other can no longer be availed of. The court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to
exclusion of the other. The proceedings thereon are subject to the omnibus motion rule
and the rule against forum shopping.

WHEN IS AN ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT LAWFUL?

Criminal Procedure

WHEN IS AN ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT LAWFUL?

> A peace officer or private person may arrest without warrant:
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
4. In hot pursuit

A POLICE OFFICER WAS CHASING A PERSON WHO HAD JUST COMMITTED AN OFFENSE.
THE PERSON WENT INSIDE A HOUSE, SO THE POLICE OFFICER FOLLOWED. INSIDE THE
HOUSE, THE POLICE OFFICER SAW DRUGS LYING AROUND. CAN HE CONFISCATE THE
DRUGS AND USE THEM AS EVIDENCE?
> Yes. The plain view doctrine is applicable to this case because there was a valid prior
intrusion. The police officer inadvertently discovered the evidence, he had a right to be
there, and the evidence was immediately apparent.
WHAT IF THE OFFICER MERELY PEEKS THROUGH THE WINDOW OF THE HOUSE AND SEES THE
DRUGS, CAN HE CONFISCATE THEM AND USE THEM AS EVIDENCE?
> He can confiscate them, without prejudice though to his liability for violation of domicile.
> He cannot use them as evidence because the seizure cannot be justified under the plain
view doctrine, there being no previous valid intrusion.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT IF A WARRANTLESS ARREST IS ILLEGAL?

> It doesn't render void all other proceedings, including those leading to the conviction of
the accused nor can the state deprived of its right to convict the guilty when all the facts of
record point
to his culpability
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

WHAT IS THE TOTAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE?

> Things and objects seized in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures are fruits of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible as evidence

WHEN IS THERE A LAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST?

1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it;

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another

4. Hot pursuit

WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF THE PERSON ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT IF HE WANTS

A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

> Before the complaint or information is filed, he may ask for a preliminary investigation
provided he signs a waiver of his rights under Article 125 of the RPC (Delay in the Delivery
to Judicial Authorities) in the presence of counsel

o He may still apply for bail in spite of the waiver

o The investigation must be terminated within 15 days

> After the complaint was filed but before arraignment, the accused may within 5 days from the
time he learns of the filing, ask for a preliminary investigation

WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF THE PERSON ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT IF HE WANTS

A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
> Before the complaint or information is filed, he may ask for a preliminary investigation
provided he signs a waiver of his rights under Article 125 of the RPC (Delay in the Delivery
to Judicial Authorities) in the presence of counsel

o He may still apply for bail in spite of the waiver

o The investigation must be terminated within 15 days

> After the complaint was filed but before arraignment, the accused may within 5 days from the
time he learns of the filing, ask for a preliminary investigation
Rights of an Accused Under Custodial Investigation

Constitutional Law

inShare1

Article 3, SECTION 12, Philippines Constitution (RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)

----- Rights under Section 12: origins and rationale -----

1. Magtoto v. Manguera
murder; admissibility of confession A confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right to silence and right to
counsel is INADMISSIBLE as evidence; Miranda and Escobedo

----- When the rights become available -----

2. People v. Taylaran
accidental killing
Right to silence and to counsel NOT applicable where no written confession was to be
presented in evidence as a result of a formal custodial investigation

3. Galman v. Pamaran
assassination of Ninoy; Agrava Commission The fact that the framers of the Constitution did
not use the word custodial investigation shows that it did not entirely adopt the Miranda
Doctrine; The accused are also entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to remain
silent, to counsel and be informed that any or all statements given by them may be used against
them; This also applies in other cases, not just those criminal in nature

4. People v. Ayson
irregularity in the sale of plane tickets Right against self incrimination is accorded to every
person
who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena in any proceeding.
The right is NOT to be compelled to be a witness against himself and NOT a prohibition of
inquiry; The right can only be claimed when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness; It does not give the right to refuse a subpoena. This right must be
claimed, it is not automatically operational | Miranda rights | Custodial investigation
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken away into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
way; A defendant on a trial or preliminary investigation is NOT under custodial investigation;
Accused

RIGHTS: BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

(or with public prosecutor for preliminary investigation; taken into custody)
a. right to remain silent
b. right to counsel
c. right to be informed
d. right to have evidence obtained in violation of those above rejected

RIGHTS: AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

a. right to refuse to be a witness

b. not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him because of such refusal
c. right to testify in his own behalf , subject to cross examination by the prosecution
d. while testifying: to refuse to answer an specific question which tends to incriminate him for
some crime other that which he is being prosecuted

----- Police line-ups; paraffin test; signature -----

5. Gamboa v. Cruz
vagrancy The right to counsel attaches at the start of the investigation (when investigating
officers elicit information/ admission/ confession. Police line-up not part of the inquest.
6. People v. Dimaano
robbery with homicide A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest so at this stage,
they have no right to counsel yet. They are not being held to answer for criminal offense for
which they are being charged or convicted.

----- Right to counsel -----

7. Estacio v. Sandiganbayan
- estafa thru falsification When the waiver of the right to remain silent and assistance by
counsel was not made in the presence of counsel, the defect was cured when the lawyer arrived
at the closing stage of the interrogation, read the statement and talked to the accused before
the latter signed it.

8. People v. De Jesus
robbery with homicide Right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation;
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on the particular suspect who had been taken
into custody; questions initiated when a person is taken into custody and deprived of his
freedom of action

9. People v. Lucero
extrajudicial confession; lawyer was away when accused gave his uncounselled confession -
doctrine same as above

----- Right to be informed -----

10. People v. Pinlac

robbery The constitutional right of the accused to be informed of his rights to remain silent
and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information and not just a mere
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Police officer is
duty bound not just to recite
the rights; he must explain it as well; Waiver MUST BE MADE in the presence of counsel

----- Waiver -----

11. People v. Rous

robbery with homicide
A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward of leniency; Presumption that a confession
was made
deliberately and knowingly.

Procedure in Conducting Preliminary Investigation

The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents
to establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents,
plus two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he
personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall
either dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a
subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting
affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If
the evidence is voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he
intends to present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for
examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for
examination, copying, or photographing at the expense of the requesting party.

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting
affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his
witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-
affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this
section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The respondent shall not
be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating office shall resolve the complaint
based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified
from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right
to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer
questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and
other documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be
terminated within five
(5) days.

(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

WHAT IS THE PROCEDURE IN CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

> The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

1. The complaint shall state:

> The address of the respondent and
> Shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as
other
supporting documents to establish probable cause.
> The affidavits must be subscribed and sworn before the prosecutor or government
official
authorized to administer such or notary public
2. Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either:
> Dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or
> Issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting
affidavits and documents.

The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is
voluminous, the complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to
present against the respondent, and these shall be made available for examination or
copying by the respondent at his expense.

3. Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and
that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The
counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified. The respondent shall
not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.

4. If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit

counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating office shall resolve the
complaint based on the evidence presented by the complainant.

5. The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified
from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to
examine or cross-examine. The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of
the counter-affidavits and other documents or from the expiration of the period for their
submission. It shall be terminated within five (5) days.

6. Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS

Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. The following may conduct
preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by
the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.

WHO MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS?

1. Provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants
2. National and Regional State prosecutors
3. COMELEC with respect to election offenses
4. Ombudsman with respect to Sandiganbayan offenses and other offenses committed by
public officers
5. PCGG with respect to ill-gotten wealth

CAN RTC JUDGES CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS?

> No, but this should not be confused with the authority of the RTC to conduct an
examination for the purpose of determining probable cause when issuing a warrant of arrest

RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

WHEN SHOULD THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION BE INVOKED?

> The accused should invoke it before plea, or else, it is deemed waived

IF THE COURT DENIES THE INVOCATION OF THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION,

WHAT IS THE REMEDY OF THE ACCUSED?
> He must immediately appeal it to the appellate court
> He cannot raise later the issue for the first time on appeal

IF THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS AMENDED, SHOULD A NEW PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED?
> No, unless the amended complaint or information charges a NEW offense

IF THE NEW COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS SUBSTITUTED, SHOULD A NEW PI BE

CONDUCTED?

IS THE LACK OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION A GROUND FOR DISMISSING A COMPLAINT?

> No, the absence of a Preliminary Investigation doesn't affect the jurisdiction of the court but
merely the regularity of the proceedings
> Neither is it a ground to quash the information or nullify the order of arrest issued against him
or justify the release of the accused from detention
> The court cannot dismiss the complaint on this ground, and it should instead conduct
the investigation or order the fiscal or lower court to do it considering that the inquest
investigation conducted by the state prosecutor is null and void
> The trial court should suspend proceedings and order a Preliminary Investigation where the
inquest conducted is null and void

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF CERTIFICATION THAT PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED?
> It is of no consequence
> The important thing is that there was actually an investigation and that the accused was
informed thereof and was allowed to present controverting evidence

CAN THE ACCUSED DEMAND THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE HIS WITNESSES
DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?
> No, the preliminary investigation is not part of the trial
> It is summary and inquisitorial in nature
> Its function is not to determine the guilt of the accused but merely to determine the existence
of probable cause

WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

> Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and it is often the only means of
discovering whether the offense has been committed and the persons responsible for it to
enable the fiscal
to prepare his complaint or information
> It is not a trial on the merits and has no purpose BUT to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably
guilty of it
> It doesn't place the accused in double jeopardy
RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Criminal Procedure

RULE 112 - PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. Preliminary investigation is
an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
Except as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to
be conducted before the filing of a compliant or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
without regard to the fine.

WHAT IS A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

> It is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial

WHAT IS THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

1. It is merely inquisitorial
2. Only means of discovering whether the offense has been committed and the
persons responsible for it
3. To enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint and information
4. Not a trial on the merits
5. Determine whether there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty of it
6. Doesn't place the accused in jeopardy
7. Doesn't affect the jurisdiction of the courtonly the regularity of the proceedings
8. Accused cannot assert lack of preliminary investigation. Court cannot dismiss the case
based on this groundit should conduct the investigation or order the fiscal or lower court to
do it
9. Preliminary investigation may be waived
10. Accused should invoke right to PI before plea, otherwise it is deemed waived
11. Accused doesn't have full gamut of rights yet. He doesn't have right to counsel unless
a confession is being obtained from him.
12. There is also no right to confront witnesses against him.

WHEN IS IT REQUIRED?
> Before a complaint or information is filed, preliminary investigation is required
for all offenses punishable by imprisonment of at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day,
regardless of the fine, except if the accused was arrested by virtue of a lawful arrest without
warrant
> In case of lawful arrest without warrant: the complaint or information may be filed
without a preliminary investigation unless the accused asks for a preliminary investigation
and waives his rights under Article 125 of the RPC
> Whether or not there is a need for PI depends upon the imposable penalty for the crime
charged in the complaint filed with the city or provincial prosecutors office and not upon
the imposable penalty for the crime fund to have been committed by the respondent
after a preliminary investigation

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

1. To determine if there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial
2. To protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense, and burden of defending
himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt has been first
ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer
3. To secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial
4. To protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials

IS THE RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?

> No, it is a statutory right

> May be waived expressly or by silence

> It is not an element of due process unless it is expressly granted by law

> While the right to a PI may be substantial, nevertheless it is not a constitutional right

CAN THE ACCUSED FILE A MOTION TO QUASH BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE?

> No, he cannot preempt the trial by filing a motion to quash on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence

> Whether the function of determining probable cause has been correctly discharged by the
prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself doesn't and may not pass upon

CAN THE ACCUSED FILE A MOTION TO QUASH BASED ON INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE?

> No, he cannot preempt the trial by filing a motion to quash on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence

> Whether the function of determining probable cause has been correctly discharged by the
prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself doesn't and may not pass upon

IS THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE A JUDICIAL OR EXECUTIVE FUNCTION?

> It depends
> Executive function: purpose of determining whether there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused has committed the offense and should be held for trial
> Judicial function: issuance of warrant of arrest by a judge

WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE?

> Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted
> Based on the evidence that would be adduced by the parties

WHEN IS THERE A LAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST?

1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

2. When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it;

3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another

4. Hot pursuit

IS THE FINDING OF A JUDGE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ISSUING A
WARRANT OF ARREST SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW?
> No, that would be tantamount to asking the court to examine and assess such evidence
submitted by the parties before trial and on the basis thereof and to make a conclusion as to
whether or not it suffices to establish the guilt of the accused

WHAT IS A WARRANT OF ARREST?

> Legal process issued by a competent authority, directing the arrest of a person or persons
upon grounds stated therein

WHEN MAY A WARRANT OF ARREST BE ISSUED?

> If issued by the RTC,
1. Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence.
2. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause.
3. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if
the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the MTC judge who
conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was
filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule.
o Pangay v. Ganay modified this rule by providing that investigating judges power to order
the arrest of the accused is limited to instances where there is necessity for placing him
in custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice
4. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of
information.
5. If the warrant of arrest is issued by the MTC and if the preliminary investigation was
conducted by the prosecutor, the same procedure as above is followed

WHEN IS A WARRANT OF ARREST NOT NECESSARY?

> A warrant of arrest is not necessary in the following instances:
1. When the accused is already in detention issued by the MTC
2. When the accused was arrested by virtue of a lawful arrest without warrant
3. When the penalty is of a fine only
4. Those covered by a summary procedure

WHAT ARE THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF A WARRANT OF ARREST?
> There is a distinction between the objective of determining probable cause as done by
the prosecutor and that done by the judgethe prosecutor determines it for the
purpose of filing the complaint or information; while the judge determines it for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest to determine whether there is a necessity of placing the
accused under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice
> Since the objectives are different, the judge shouldn't rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrant of arrest
> He must decide independently and must have supporting evidence other than the
prosecutors bare report

WHEN IS A JOHN DOE WARRANT VALID? ARE THEY VALID?

> A John Doe warrant is a warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is
unknown
> Generally, this kind of warrants are void because the violate the constitutional provision
which requires that warrants of arrests should particularly describe the person or persons to
be arrested
> But if there is sufficient description to identify the person to be arrested, the warrant is
valid
HOW SHOULD THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION BE FILED WHEN THE ACCUSED IS LAWFULLY
ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT?
> The complaint or information may be filed by the prosecutor without need of
preliminary investigation provided an inquest proceeding has been conducted in accordance
with existing rules
> In the absence of an inquest prosecutor, the offended party may file the complaint directly in
court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or police officer

Equal Protection Clause

Q Petitioner served in the AFP for 32 years. He retired in 1982. At the time of his
retirement, PD 1638 was already existing. It provides that if a retired AFP member
loses his citizenship, then, he will not continue to receive his pension and shall be
removed from the retired list. He went to Hawaii and became an American citizen,
hence, the AFP removed him from the list and stopped his pension. He questioned the
validity of the law, contending that it is unconstitutional because the obligation
imposed on him to retain Filipino citizenship as a condition for his continued
entitlement to retirement benefit violates the equal protection and due process clause
of the Constitution. He argued that the retirement law is in the nature of a contract
between the government and its employees and that said PD discriminates against
AFP retirees who have changed their nationality. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) agreed with him. Were they correct? Why?

ANS: No. The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to
reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be based on
 substantial distinctions which make for real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose
of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to
each member of the class.

There is compliance with all these conditions. There is substantial difference between
retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by
naturalization in another country. The constitutional right of the State to require all citizens to
render personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizens but also
citizens who have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship
already renounced his allegiance to the State. Thus, he may no longer be compelled by the
State to render compulsory military service when the need arises. His loss of Filipino
citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that differentiates him from other retirees who
retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions
that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.

R.A. 7077 affirmed the constitutional right of the State to a Citizen Armed Forces. Section 11
of said RA provides that citizen soldiers or reservists include ex-servicemen and retired
officers of the AFP. Hence even a retiree is still part of the Citizen Armed Forces. Thus the
requirement imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638 is not oppressive, discriminatory, or contrary
to public policy. The State has the right to impose a reasonable condition necessary for
national defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interest of the State.

There is also no denial of due process in this case. When he lost his Filipino citizenship, the
AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27, PD 1638.
He had the opportunity to contest the termination when he requested for reconsideration
before the JAGO who denied his request. (Parreo v. COA and AFP Chief, G.R. No. 16224,
June 7, 2007).

Note:

Under a recent law (RA 9225), Francisco can reacquire Filipino citizenship in which case he
will be entitled to received his monthly pension since he will again be entitled to the benefits
and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition (Parreno v.
Commission on Audit and AFP Chief, G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007).

Writ of Habeas Corpus

Scope of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular
function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical
liberty. (Sangca v. The City Prosecutor of Cebu, et al., G.R. No. 175864, June 28, 2007;
citing In Re: Arguelles, Jr. v. Balajadia, Jr., G.R. No. 167211, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA
653, 657).

Search and Seizure

Description of the place to be search; when
sufficient.

Q The search warrants commanded any peace officer to make an immediate search of
MASAGANA compound located at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece
Martires, Cavite City. It was contended that there was no proper description since
there are many structures inside the compound, hence, the warrants are general, thus,
void. Is the contention correct? Why?

ANS: No. The longstanding rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the
officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
and distinguish if from other places in the community. Any designation or description known
to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the
officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.

Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be

searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officers prior
knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had
been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the
compound described in the affidavit.

Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no need to
particularize the areas to be searched because these structures constitute the essential and
necessary components of the petitioners business and cannot be treated separately as they
 form part of one entire compound. The compound is owned and used solely by MASAGANA.
What the case law merely requires is that the place to be searched can be distinguished in
relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably, this requisite was complied with in
the instant case. (Yao, Sr., et al. v. People, et al., G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007).

Q It was contended that the search warrants did not indicate with particularity the items to
be seized since the search warrants merely described the items to be seized as LPG
cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE without specifying their
sizes. Is the contention correct? Why?

ANS: No. A search warrant may be said to have particularly described the things to be seized when
the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact, not of law, by which the warrant officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described
therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be
specific only insofar as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law does not require that
the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities; otherwise it would be virtually impossible
for the applicants to obtain a search warrant, as they would not know exactly what kind of
things they are looking for. Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and
seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between
those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles
described as a class or species would suffice. (Yao, Sr., et al. v. People, et al., G.R. No.
168306, June 19, 2007).

Q Is ownership required of the things seized? Explain.

ANS: No. The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence,
and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized. Hence, even if, as petitioners claim, the
properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the
search warrant is still valid. (Yao, Sr., et al. v. People, et al., G.R. No. 168306, June 19,
2007).

Return of the things seized after dismissal of

criminal case.
Q There was a criminal action for the prosecution of the crime of trademark infringement.
However, the case was dismissed. Should the court having custody of the seized
objects order the return of the same? Explain.

ANS: Yes. All things considered, it should be noted that there is no law prohibiting the trial court from
returning the articles seized before a case is actually filed in court and even before the final
determination by the prosecutor or the DOJ of whether a case should be filed in court. It is
true that in most cases, the release of the articles seized would be unjustified. However, in
the case at bar, the return of the playing cards and the printing machines would better serve
the purposes of justice and expediency. (Summerville Gen. Merchandising Co. v. CA, et al.,
G.R. No. 158767, June 26, 2007).

There exists a constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures, which
refers to the immunity of ones person from interference by the government, included in
which is his residence, his papers and other possessions. The Constitution, however, does
not provide a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures; rather, the fundamental
protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that, between persons and the
police, there must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with the power to
issue or refuse such search warrant. Yet, the responsibilities of the magistrate do not end
with the granting of the warrant, but extends to the custody of the articles seized. In
exercising custody over these articles, the property rights of the owner should be balanced
with the social need to preserve evidence, which will be used in the prosecution of a case.

Where the parties seized have already been found not to be the subject of the offense and
the purpose of presenting them as evidence is no longer served, there is no justification for
severely curtailing the rights of a person to his property.

Examination of complainant/applicant for search

warrant.

The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on
the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule governing how a judge
should conduct his investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the
intent and justification of the application. (Yao, Sr., et al. v. People, et al., G.R. No. 168306,
June 19, 2007).
When can there be search without warrant.

Q As a rule, search can only be made if there is a search warrant. State some exceptions
and the minimum requirement for their validity. Explain.

ANS: As a rule, search and seizure must be carried through with judicial warrant, otherwise, such
search and seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.

The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap, G.R. No. 132165,
March 26, 2003, 399 SCRA 503, the SC listed the exceptions where search and seizure may
be conducted without warrant, thus: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in
plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.
The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause
is the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet,
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought
in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. (Sony Music Ent. (Phils.) Inc.
v. Espaol, G.R. No. 156804, March 14, 2005, 453 SCRA 360). In People v. Aruta, the Court
ruled that in warrantless searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable
ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
There is no hard and fast rule or fixed formula in determining probable cause for its
determination varies according to the facts of each case. (351 Phil. 868 (1998); Espie, Jr., et
al. v. Hon. Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo, et al., G.R. No. 148117, March 22, 2007).

Q At around 2:30 p.m. of September 6, 1998, a confidential informer disclosed to SPO2

Ngina that a passenger jeepney with Plate No. AYB 117 loaded with Benguet pine
lumber was at Km. 96, Atok, Benguet. The lumber was covered with assorted
vegetables. A PNP roadblock was then placed in Acop, Tublay, Benguet to intercept
the jeepney. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day, the police spotted the vehicle. They
flagged it down but it did not stop, forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan,
La Trinidad. A search of the vehicle disclosed several pieces of Benguet pine lumber.
Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to cut and transport the
same. May there be search of the moving vehicle? Explain.

ANS: Yes. In People v. Vinecarao, the Court ruled that where a vehicle sped away after noticing a
checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, in an apparent
attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists probable
cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on board
said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were
instruments of some offense. This ruling squarely applies to the present case, hence, the
 warrantless search is valid and that the lumber seized is admissible in evidence against
petitioners. (Espie, Jr., et al. v. The Hon. Nelsonida T. Ulat-Marredo, et al., G.R. No. 148117,
March 22, 2007).

Search of a moving vehicle.

Q A confidential informer tipped the police that a Gemini car was going to deliver shabu
at Marville Subdivision. Pursuing said lead, the Antipolo City police sent a team to
Marville Subdivision to monitor said vehicle. The information provided by the informer
turned out to be correct as, indeed, the Gemini car was spotted in the place where it
was to be bringing shabu. When they stopped the car, they saw a gun tucked in
appellants waist. Appellant did not have any document to support his possession of
said firearm which all the more strengthened the polices suspicion. After he was told
to step out of the car, they found on the drivers seat plastic sachets containing white
powdery substance. Was there a valid search of the moving vehicle? Explain.

ANS: Yes, because the circumstances taken together are sufficient to establish probable cause for
the warrantless search of the car. When a vehicle is flagged down and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search is valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe prior to the search that they would find
the evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (People v. Bagista, G.R.
No. 86218, September 18, 1992, 214 SCRA 63; People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 175783,
September 3, 2007).

Q State the rationale for the validity of search of a moving vehicle. Explain.

ANS: The rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be
searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which
borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. A warrantless search
of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. (People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991, 193
SCRA 122).

Nevertheless, the exception from securing a search warrant when it comes to a moving
vehicle does not give the police authorities unbridled discretion to conduct a warrantless
search of an automobile. To do so would render the aforementioned constitutional
 stipulations inutile and expose the citizenry to indiscriminate police distrust which could
amount to outright harassment. Surely, the policy consideration behind the exemption of
search of moving vehicles does not encompass such arbitrariness on the part of the police
authorities, in recognition that probable cause exist in order to justify the warrantless search
of a vehicle. (Caballes v. CA, 424 Phil. 263 (2002); People v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 175783,
September 3, 2007).

Warrant of Arrest
Illustrative Cases
Q In a case, the accused claimed that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Is the contention that the
judge should personally conduct personal examination of the complainant and
the witnesses correct? Explain.

ANS: No. In the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, it was explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally
examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally
evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he
may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses. Thus:

The addition of the word personally after the word determined and the
deletion of the grant of authority by he 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to
other responsible officers as may be authorized by law, has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of

the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden
with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints
instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
(G.R. Nos. L-82585; 82827; 83979, November 14, 1998, 167 SCRA 393).

In Webb v. De Leon, 317 SCRA 758 (1995) it was held that before issuing warrants
of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an
accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported
by substantial evidence. (AAA v. Hon. Antonio Carbonell, et al., G.R. No. 171465,
June 8, 2007)

It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry

which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should
be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes
of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of the investigating
prosecutor.

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized
that such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The
necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the
existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary
evidence in support thereof.

Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge
is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In
Okabe v. Gutierrez, the Court stressed that the judge should consider not only
the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and
his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with
the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is
not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses be conducted. (G.R. No. 150185, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 685).
Right to Information
Constitutional Law

inShare

Right to Information

In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., the Supreme Court explicated this way:

An essential element of these freedom is to keep open a continuing

dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and
be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its
will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the
issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

Q What is the rationale behind the right to information? Explain.

ANS: The twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in
the operations of the government, as well as to provide the people sufficient information to
exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are essential to the
exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its official acts,
transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any
restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential
to hold public officials at all time x x x accountable to the people, for unless citizens have
the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything. Armed with
the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation
of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential
to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. (Chavez v. PEA; Chavez v. NHA,
et al., G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007).

Q State the nature of the right of the people to information and exceptions.
ANS: Section 28, Article II compels the State and its agencies to fully disclose all of its transactions
involving public interest. Thus, the government agencies, without need of demand from
anyone, must bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction and the contents of the perfected contract. Such
information must pertain to definite propositions of the government, meaning official
recommendations or final positions reached on the different matters subject of negotiation.
The government agency, however, need not disclose intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in
the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. The limitation also covers
privileged communication like information on military and diplomatic secrets; information
affecting national security; information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused; information on foreign relations,
intelligence, and other classified information. (Chavez v. NHA, et al., G.R. No. 164527,
August 15, 2007).

It is unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the 1987
Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics for the compulsory
duty of the government agencies to disclose information on government transactions.
Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see the light of day if and when Congress
decides to approve the proposed Freedom of Access to Information Act. In the meantime, it
would suffice that government agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents
incorporating the information on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements
and the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information on their
respective websites for easy access by interested parties. Without any law or regulation
governing the right to disclose information, the NHA or any of the respondents cannot be
faulted if they were not able to disclose information relative to the SMDRP to the public in
general.

Q What is the other aspect of the peoples right to know? Explain.

ANS: The other aspect of the peoples right to know apart from the duty to disclose is the duty to
allow access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. The gateway to information opens to the public the following: (1) official
records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and
(3) government research data used as a basis for policy development. (Chavez v. NHA, et
al., G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007).

Q Distinguish the duty to disclose information from the duty to permit access to
information.
ANS: There is no need to demand from the government agency disclosure of information as this is
mandatory under the constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available. On the other
hand, the interested party must first request or even demand that he be allowed access to
documents and papers in the particular agency. A request or demand is required; otherwise,
the government office or agency will not know of the desire of the interested party to gain
access to such papers and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of
information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency.
(Chavez v. NHA, et al., G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007).

Freedom of Religion
Conflict between CSC rule and religion.

A married woman cohabited with a man. She was charged administratively as she is an
employee of the court. The Supreme Court upheld the defense of freedom of religion.

There is no question that the State has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage
and the family or even in the sound administration of justice.

Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights the most inalienable and sacred of human rights, in the
words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the states interest is important,
because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must
articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which
must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit
the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the
Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.

Thus, it is not the States broad interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the
family, or even in the sound administration of justice that must be weighed against
respondents claim, but the States narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the
cohabitation which respondents faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do
more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and
to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the
Solicitor General failed to do. (Estrada vs. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006).
 Freedom of Assembly
The right of peaceful assembly enjoys primacy in
the hierarchy of rights.

In relation to other rights, how do you classify or consider the right to peaceably assemble
and petition for redress of grievances? The Supreme Court in a case said that the right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of
speech, of expression and of the press, a right that enjoy primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic
policy, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in
Jacinto vs. CA, 346 SCRA 665 (1997) the right to assembly and petition has been upheld
thus:

There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful

assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and, for that
matter, to organize or form associations for purposes not contrary to law, as
well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities. These rights are
guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. Jurisprudence abounds with
hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the peoples rights. As
early as the onset of this country, the Court in U.S. vs. Apurado, already
upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to
acknowledge:

It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder

will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because eon such
occasions feelings is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more
intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefore, but the utmost discretion must be
exercised in drawing the line between an essentially
peaceably assembly and a tumultuous uprising. (citing U.S.
vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422; Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), et al. vs. Ermita, et al., G.R.
No. 169838, April 25, 2006).

Party List and the Right of Information.

Q After the accreditation of party-list organizations, the COMELEC refused to reveal the
names of the nominees. It based its ruling under Sec. 7, RA 7941 which provides that
the names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list of party-
 list groups. A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the COMELEC to reveal the
names of the nominees invoking the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution. Is the petition proper? Why?

ANS: Yes. The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: The names of the party-list
nominees shall not be shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the
COMELEC to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
COMELEC under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends
only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places
on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the
law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941
that prohibits the COMELEC from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than
the Certified List the names of the party-list nominees. The COMELEC obviously misread
the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure
before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the COMELEC virtually tacks
an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.

Q State the nature of the right of the people to information. Explain.

ANS: The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the
citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is
the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. (Legaspi v. CSC, 150 SCRA 530).
Without a governments acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to
uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by
the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.

By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of
his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. (Taada v. Tuvera, 136
SCRA 27). And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to
be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing. (Bantay Republic
Act or BA-RA 7941, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007).

Q Is the rule absolute? Explain.

ANS: No. Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion
right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi v. CSC, 150
SCRA 530, the peoples right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further
subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is
confined to transactions involving public interest and is subject to reasonable conditions
 prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on
some matters, such a military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting
national security. (Chavez v. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, 299 SCRA 744).

Freedom of Religion
Conflict between CSC rule and religion.

A married woman cohabited with a man. She was charged administratively as she is an
employee of the court. The Supreme Court upheld the defense of freedom of religion.

There is no question that the State has an interest in protecting the institutions of marriage
and the family or even in the sound administration of justice.

Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights the most inalienable and sacred of human rights, in the
words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the states interest is important,
because our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must
articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which
must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit
the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the
Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.

Thus, it is not the States broad interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the
family, or even in the sound administration of justice that must be weighed against
respondents claim, but the States narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the
cohabitation which respondents faith finds moral. In other words, the government must do
more than assert the objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and
to what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the
Solicitor General failed to do. (Estrada vs. Escritor, AM No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006).

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner

VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)

Facts:

Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the
non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at
a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on
the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a

Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4. Honasans failed coup

5. Communist insurgency movements

6. secessionist movements in Mindanao

7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents
to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of
President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also
questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest
of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the
President acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty,
property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said
that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article
3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.

Issue:
 1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution,
the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.

Decision:

No to both issues. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers.

According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it
does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article
it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the
president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary
powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution).
Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President
can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at
153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American
President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of
emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on
the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that
there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures
for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to
uphold the Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring
1. The presidents power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives
of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical
time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President.

2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present
danger. Thus, its the executives responsibility & obligation to prevent a
grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.

3. We cant sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic
gains to give in to Marcos wish to die in the country. Compassion must
give way to the other state interests.

Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos right to return, live & die in his
own country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals,
whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.

2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos return would pose a

threat to national security. Fears were mere conjectures.

3. Residual powers but the executives powers were outlined to limit her
powers & not expand.

Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos
right to return to the Philippines. .

2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she
should be buried w/in 10 days.
 3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is
powerless to restrict it. Its w/in police power of the state to restrict this
right if national security, public safety/health demands that such be
restricted. It cant be absolute & unlimited all the time. It cant be
arbitrary & irrational.

4. No proof that Marcos return would endanger national security or public

safety. Fears are speculative & military admits that its under control.
Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos return.

Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting

1. Presidents determination that Marcos return would threaten national

security should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear &
present.

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Marcos, petitioner

VS.

Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)

Facts:

In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven,
dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in
prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in
Honolulu, Hawaii.

President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the
safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and passionately
conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she
did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.

A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following
arguments:

1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to
return to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to all Filipinos.
 2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she
has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.

3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
Marcos.

Issue:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to
return in the Philippines be granted.

Decision:

No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied
because of lack of merit.

Ratio:

1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant

reconsideration.

2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not
changed. The threats to the government, to which the return of the
Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been
shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino
illegal claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.

3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive

power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal articles implied in
the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton).
Executive unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not
enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US).
This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted
Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino
with implied powers.

4. It is within Aquinos power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the
people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that she
acted arbitrarily
 SOLIVEN, petitioner VS.
JUDGE
MAKASIAR, respondent
167 SCRA 393
FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information
for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of
a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently by the President

2. Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were

violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable clause

3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the

Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the
petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petitions.

The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en
banc is LIFTED.
RATIO:

Background of the first issue

MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration

APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner

Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice

MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary,

affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice

MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive
Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.

-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he

filed a Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to
refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.

Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest:

Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to

personally examine the complainant and his witness in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.

-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable
cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally
evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable
cause.

Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for
the prosecution, bringing her under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in
an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or
perjury.

-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the
office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other
person in the Presidents behalf.

-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the

Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by
any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the
President from waiving the privilege).

Additional Issue:
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character of the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case
to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press freedom.

-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this
stage to rule on the chilling effect point.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.

Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three
principal issues. With regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a
chilling effect on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is
the most important and should be resolved now rather than later.
Quotable quotes: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust
accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
United States v. Bustos

No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such

exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath.
People v. Perfecto

G.R. No. 163193, June 15,

2004
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES,
JR., et.al, petitioner, VS.
COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
(Digest by Ali Caronongan Sourced from class digest)

FACTS :
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and
local elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new
electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May
11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the
machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its
implementation.

Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003,
allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the
May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing
the release of a further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of
the COMELEC.

The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting
and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with
companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized
voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the
COMELEC nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced
unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal
positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count."

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No.
6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that its advancement in tabulation
procedures is allowed within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the
Omnibus Election Code that:
Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic
devices, taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds
available for the purpose. Provided, That the Commission shall notify the
authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in
areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not
less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC
in authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for
the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional.

HELD:

YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts
the sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns
for the President and the Vice-President.
REASONS:
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority
vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and
Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored
the misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would
be in violation of the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in
effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President,
which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also
be lacking of any constitutional authority."

The existence of an accredited Citizens arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No.
7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act
No. 8436, the accredited citizens arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively
authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial"
counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other
entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of
the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count.

In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be
delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking
an "unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed only when
needed by to verify election results in connection with resolving election
disputes that may be established.

Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court

contends that Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the
COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the
use of the latest technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of
votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of
accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by the use or
adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior
to the effectivity of the use of such devices, after failing to submit any document
proving that it had notified all political parties of the intended adoption of
Resolution No. 6712.
 G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

MACALINTAL, petitioner
VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and
BONCODIN, respondents
(Digest by Tish Bahjin Sourced from Class Digest)

FACTS:

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a

declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to
file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and
convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino
people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the
implementation of said law.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:

(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines,
violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;

(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the
winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including
the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and
Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and

(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence
of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of
the Constitution.

2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of
the Constitution.

3) Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of
the Constitution.

HELD:

1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.

2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the
President and Vice-President, and not to the votes of the Senators and party-list
representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence
in its second paragraph allowing Congress to exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is
violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

REASONS:

1) Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting under

this Act:

xxx xxx xxx

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host

country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from
approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall
be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident
from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in that it violates the
requirement that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, as provided under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution which reads: Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years
of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.

For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has relied on, among others, the
discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of
absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art.
V of the Constitution, which reads: Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system
for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It was clearly shown from the said
discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much
as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is
in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2

immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of
necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in
construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates
that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual
residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not
in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency

requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of
debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No. 9189, was
deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further weakening petitioners claim on the
unconstitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.

2)Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote
for president, vice-president, senators, and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.

xxx xxx xxx

18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a
winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the
results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to
order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the
scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the
holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and
circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors
and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.

Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering
the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates for President and
Vice-President is unconstitutional and violative of the following provisions of
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

Sec. 4.

xxx xxx xxx

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in
the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but
in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A.

No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the
winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, granting merit to
petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the
authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning
candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the
power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.

3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee (JCOC), as follows:

Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.a Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws,
and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the
Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven
(7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7) members to be
designated by each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority
and the remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission.

All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming that
Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue
forged on this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court finds it expedient
to expound on the role of Congress through the JCOC vis--vis the independence
of the COMELEC as a constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1, which reads Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit.

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is

circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, one of which is the
aforementioned provision on the independence of constitutional commissions.
The Court has held that whatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted
it to be independent from the other departments of the Government.

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a

distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its
functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully
warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may
err, so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective
for which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree
fully with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute
gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-
finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge
derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a
peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an

independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is,
to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to
hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election
laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court
holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be
stricken off from the said law.

SECTION 8.

In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the

President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation
of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case
of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and
qualified.

G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March

2, 2001
JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA, petitioner VS. A
NIANO DESIERTO, in his
capacity as
 Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES et.al, responde
nts

G.R. No. 146738, March 2,

2001
JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA, petitioner VS. G
LORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, respondent
FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events that happened prior and
subsequent to the event we know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph
E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as president and vice-
president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began when
For. Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his expos that
petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of
money. After this expose, a lot of different groups and many personalities had
asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of which are the Catholic
Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of
Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and For. Pres. Corazon Aquino
who asked petitioner to make the supreme self-sacrifice. Respondent also
resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services and also
asked petitioner for his resignation. 4 senior economic advisers of the petitioner
resigned and then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47 representatives,
defected from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.

By November, an impeachment case was to be held as Speaker Manny Villar had

transmitted the Articles of Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21
senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial with SC CJ Hilario Davide,
Jr., presiding. The impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a battle royal
of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful day, when by the vote of 11-10,
the judges came to a decision to not open the second envelop allegedly
containing evidence showing that the petitioner had a secret bank account
under the name Jose Velarde containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the
2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the streets and the public prosecutors
withdrawing from the trial. On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes
marched to EDSA shrine and declared on behalf of your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government. PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson together with some Cabinet members made the same announcement.

June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM, negotiations started for
the peaceful transition of power. But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as
the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner and his family left
Malacanang. He issued the following Press Statement:

20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her
oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a
factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the
opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shirk from any
future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a

constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.

MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following
letter:

Sir:

By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am

hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and
duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President
shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative

Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12
SC justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened on January 20. Soon,
other countries accepted the respondent as the new president of the Philippines.
The House then passed Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the
House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Philippines. It also approved Resolution No.
176 expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the assumption
into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its
support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations
goals under the Constitution.

On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto Guingona to be the vice

president. On February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the Senate passed Resolution
No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated. Several cases were filed against the petitioner which are as follows:
(1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder,
forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of
the Code of Conduct for government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755
filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000
for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder,
etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28,
2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46,
and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on
December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.

A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent

Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose
de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the
aforementioned complaints against him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with
this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755,
1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his
office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738
for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the
Court, on the same day, February 6, required the respondents to comment
thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On
February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR
No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m.
of February 15.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of
resolution and press statement for Gag Order on respondent Ombudsman filed
by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:

(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20,
2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief
Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court
under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or
discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending
decision by the Court, and

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the
respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending
investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the
cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the respondent Ombudsman
may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven
(7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will make the
cases at bar moot and academic.

ISSUES:
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether
petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.

III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent

for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the
assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal
prosecution.

IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the

ground of prejudicial publicity.

DECISION:
I No. The case is legal not political.

II No. He is not a president on leave.

III No. The impeachment proceedings was already aborted. As a non-sitting

president, he is not entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution

IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.

RATIO/REASON:

1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political question

Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a political question. Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo became a President through the People power revolution. Her
legitimacy as president was also accepted by other nations. Thus, they conclude
that the following shall serve as political thicket which the Court cannot enter.

The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been defined by our Court as
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.

Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo administration should be

treated similarly with the Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the
situation of the Arroyo and Aquino administrations are similar. However, the Court
finds otherwise. The Court has made substantial distinctions which are the
following:

Aquino Arroyo
Government was a result of a Government was a result of a peaceful
successful revolution revolution

In the Freedom constitution, it was
stated that the Aquino government was
instilled directly by the people in
defiance of the 1973 Constitution as
amended.
Arroyo took the oath of the 1987
Constitution. She is discharging the
authority of the president under the
1987 constitution.

It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful

revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. But this would not apply as
the Court finds substantial difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would
show that there are differences between the 2 governments set up by EDSA I and
II. This was further explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA Revolutions.

EDSA I EDSA II

Extra-constitutional. Hence, Xxx IN Intra-Constitutional. Hence, the oath of

DEFIANCE OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION,
AS AMENDEDcannot be subject of
judicial review
the respondent as President includes
the protection and upholding of the
1987 Constitution.resignation of the
President makes it subject to judicial
review

exercise of the people power of exercise of people power of freedom of

revolution which overthrew the whole speech and freedom of assembly to
government petition the government for redress of
grievances which only affected the
office of the President

Political question Legal Question

In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and not political.

1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as President

Resignation is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. There is no required form of resignation. It can be expressed,
implied, oral or written. It is true that respondent never wrote a letter of
resignation before he left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court
would use the totality test or the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had resigned. The Court knows
the amount of stress that the petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an eye,
he lost the support of the legislative when then Manny Villar and other
Representatives had defected. AFP Chief of Staff General Angelo Reyes had
already gone to EDSA. PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other
cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking into the Angara diaries, it
was pointed out that the petitioner had suggested a snap election at May on
which he would not be a candidate. Proposing a snap election in which he is not
a candidate means that he had intent to resign. When the proposal for a dignified
exit or resignation was proposed, petitioner did not disagree but listened
closely. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he
had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he
could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The negotiations that had happened were about a peaceful transfer of power. It
was already implied that petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated
on the following: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners
resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and
(3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner. Also taken from the Angara diaries, The President says. Pagod na
pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too
painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to
clear my name, then I will go. The quoted statement of the petitioner was a
clear evidence that he has resigned.

The second round of negotiations were about the consolidating of the clauses
which were proposed by both sides. The second round of negotiation cements
the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this
second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated
as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.

When everything was already signed by the side of the petitioner and ready to be
faxed by Angara, the negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to
Angara saying that the SC would allow respondent to have her oath taking.
Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.

The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I
do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in
our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the
presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the
opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not shrik from any
future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!

By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1)

he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order
to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to
the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on
his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.

Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence. This
is evidenced by a letter which reads as follows:

Sir

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am

hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and
duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President
shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada

The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the
week long crisis. It would be very easy for him to say before he left Malacanang
that he was temporarily unable to govern, thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under
any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation
of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the resignation must
prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it
commands scant legal significance.

Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal basis is RA 3019 which
states:

Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an

investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him,
for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on bribery.
During the amendments, another section was inserted which states that:

During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as

section 15:

Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or

retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to
his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency.

The original senate bill was rejected because of the 2nd paragraph of section 15.
Nonetheless, another similar bill was passed. Section 15 then became section
13. There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the
cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20,
2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-
00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have
been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting
President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases
cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act
on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner
for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer
from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative

investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. The
Court holds otherwise. The impeachment proceeding may be arguable. However,
even if the impeachment proceeding is administrative, it cannot be considered
pending because the process had already broke down. There was also a
withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the impeachment case. In fact, the
proceeding was postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no impeachment case
pending when he resigned.

1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as

President

This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was addressed to then
Speaker Fuentebella and then Senate President Pimentel. Petitioners contention
is that he is a president on leave and that the respondent is an acting president.
This contention is the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President
on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within
five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the
issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within
forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if
not in session within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by
a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office."

After studying in-depth the series of events that happened after petitioner left
Malacanang, it is very clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is not
temporary. The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the
claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the
decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President
of the Philippines. The Court says that they cannot, for such is an example of a
political question, in which the matter has solely been left to the legislative,

1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. If yes, what is
the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him
before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not
been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil. The immunity
the petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.

The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief executive may not be
personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in
the performance of his official duties. He is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he cannot be said to have exercise
discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held
here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only
when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided
he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in
determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled
to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly,
he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which
two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he is
not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could
not honestly differ over its determination.

The Court rejects the petitioners argument that before he could be prosecuted,
he should be first convicted of impeachment proceedings. The impeachment
proceeding was already aborted because of the walking out of the prosecutors.
This was then formalized by a Senate resolution (Resolution #83) which declared
the proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in the Constitutional
Convention, when an impeachment proceeding have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, proper civil and criminal cases may be filed against
him.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a

non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch
of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from
liability for unlawful acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means immunity
from civil damages only covers official acts.

1. V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined

to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from

conducting an investigation of the cases filed against him for he has already
developed a bias against the petitioner. He submits that it is a violation of due
process. There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on
how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and
trial of high profile cases. The British approach the problem with
the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily
stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a
threat. The American approach is different. US courts assume
a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right
of an accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the test of actual prejudice
shall be applied. The test shows that there must be allegation and proof that the
judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. The Court rules that there is notenough evidence to warrant
this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to
discharge his burden of proof.

According to the records, it was the petitioner who assailed the biasness of the
Ombudsman. The petitioner alleges that there were news reports which said that
the Ombudsman had already prejudged the cases against him. The Court rules
that the evidence presented is insufficient. The Court also cannot adopt the
theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be
treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman
resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the
finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

BILL OF RIGHTS CASE

DOCTRINES
POLICE POWER, EMINENT
DOMAIN AND TAXATION
City of Manila v. Laguio - closing down houses of sin or of ill-repute Local
government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. Their power however is subordinate to the
certain constitutional limitations. (related topics: procedural and substantive due
process, equal protection of the laws, deprivation of property)

Moday v. CA expropriation of one hectare of land eminent domain

governments right to appropriate, in the nature of compulsory sale to the state,
private property for public use. Inheresnt
possessed by the national legislature, it may be validly delegated to local
governments.
Roxas and Co. Inc. v. CA application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
the implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and
the power of eminent domain to the extent that the CARL prescribes retention
limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property but where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived
of their own lands they own in excess of the maximum area ed, there is taking
under the power of eminent domain (related topic: due process this must be
observed in the exercise of the police power and eminent domain)

LTO v. Butuan registration of tricycles LGUs under the Local Government

Code now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles for hire and grant
franchises thereof but they are still subject
to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. To regulate means to fix, establish or
control, to adjust by rule, method or established mode. Taxation the power of
the government to raise revenue in order to
support its existence and carry out legislative objectives

St. Lukes Employees Association v. NLRC radiologic technology while the

right of the workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the constitution, its
exercise may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police power of the state
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education et. al. The regulation is a
reasonable method of the protecting the public from the incompetence and
ignorance among those
who would practice such technology.

United BF Homeownes v. City Mayor of Paranaque reclassification from

residential to commercial areas the city council has the power to enact
ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality
or its inhabitants. Contractual restrictions on the use of property could not
prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power

by CDR

Case Doctrines-
Constitutional Law 2
SECTION 1
No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.

A. Life, Liberty or Property

American Inter-Fashion v. Office of the President export quota allocation
Glorious Suns export quota allocation was a initially a privilege evolved into
some form of property which should not be removed arbitrarily and without due
process and hurriedly confer it to another.

Chavez v. Romulo citizens right to bear arms - The right to bear arms cannot be
classified as a fundamental right under the 1987 Constitution the right is a
mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is erroneous to assume
that the US Constitution grants upon the people the
right to bear arms. The Second Amendment pertains to the citizens collective
right to take arms in defense of the state, not to the citizens individual right
to own and possess arms.

Exec. Secretary V. CA Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 A

profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our
constitutional guarantees; one cannot be deprived of the right to work or the
right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
Nevertheless, no right is absolute and the proper regulation of a profesion is a
valid exercise of police power.

Duncan v. Glaxo not ed to have a relationship with an employee of a competitor

company Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets. (related topic: equal
protection)
Alejano v. Cabuay Oakwood Mutiny Case writ of habeas corpus is available
where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is a denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but also unnecessary, and where a
deprivation og freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. (related topic:
privacy of communication and correspondence)

B. Procedural Due Process

Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca mortgage foreclosure due process implies
that: 1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with the power to hear or
determine the matter before it; 2) that jurisdiction has been lawfully acquired; 3)
defendant shall have to opputunity to be heard; 4) judgment shall be rendered
upon lawful hearing. | NOTICE must be given

Bautista v. CA land dispute When a party was afforded the opportunity to

participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process

Rural Bank of Buhi v. CA bank receivership; insolvency there is no requirement

whether express or implied that a hearing must first be conducted before a
banking institution may be placed in receivership

Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA untreated wastewater discharged to sewer

Ex parte proceedings - permitted by law in situations like these because
stopping the discharged of the wastewater cannot be
made to wait until protracted litigation; standards set by the board enough not
required to prove immediate danger to life, health et. al

Fabella v. CA public school teachers striking DUE PROCESS IN

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
requisites: 1) actual or constructive notice of the institution of the proceedings
which may affect ones legal rights; 2) real opportunity to be heard personally or
with counsel; 3) to present witnesses and
evidence is ones favor and to defend his rights; 4) tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality; 5)
finding is supported by substantial evidence
contained and made known to the parties

Guzman v. CA kicked out from school DUE PROCESS IN STUDENT DISCPLINE

PROCEEDINGS requisites: 1) student must be informed in writing the nature
and cause of the accusation against him; 2) right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel if desired; 3) they shall
be informed of the evidence against them; 4) right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf; 5) evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or officials hearing the case

Lao Gi v. CA DUE PROCESS IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS same requisites

as those required in criminal proceedings (Rules of Court) Secretary of Justice v.
Lantion extradition case of Jimenez - DUE PROCESS IN QUASIJUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS requisites: 1) taking and evaluation of evidence; 2)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; 3) rendering an order
based upon the facts proved Chavez v. COMELEC billboard of Chavez as
endorser A statute or regulation is considered void for overbreadth when it
offends the constitutionality principle that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may nor be
achieved by means
that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade protected freedoms

SECTION 2 - The right of

the people to be secure in
their persons, houses,
papers and effects against
unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be
determined personally by a
judge under oath or
affirmation of the
complainant and the
witnesses he may
produce, and particularly
describing the place to be
searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
CASE DOCTRINES
by: C D R
A. When is a search a reasonable search?

Valmonte v. De Villa checkpoints Section 2 is a personal right invocable only

by those whose rights have been infringed or threatened to be infringed;
reasonableness is determined by a fixed formula but from the circumstances of
the case; not all searches and seizures are not allowed; between the inherent
right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual; right
against warrantless search which was reasonably conductedm the former should
prevail

B. Requisites of a Valid Warrant

Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas definition of a search warrant an order in writing,

issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or
justice of peace and directed to a peace officer commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before court, OATH - any form of
attestation that a party signifies that he is bound by conscience to perform an
act faithfully or truthfully

People v. CA the general rule is that search warrants must be served during the
daytime (protect the public from the abrasiveness of official intrusions).
Exception: a search at any reasonable hour
of day or night may be made when the application asserts that the property in on
the person or place ordered to be searched. Absence of abuse of discretion, a
search conducted at night where so allowed is not improper

People v. Veloso parliamentary club - JOHN DOE WARRANTS Valid IF the best
description possible is given in the arrest warrant it must be sufficient to
indicate clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his occupation, personal
appearance or peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances which he
may be identified

Microsoft v. Maxicorp software probable cause such reasons, supported by

facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper; OATH must refer to the truth of the facts WITHIN THE
PERSONAL KNOLEDGE OF THE PETITIONER OR HIS WITNESSES; probable cause
deals with probability and not absolute certainty
Burgos Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP Metropolitan Mail and We Forum typographical
error in specifying the address to be searched not sufficient to invalidate search
warrant where the address intended appears on the face of the warrant;
probable cause such facts or circumstances which would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched

People v. CA Abigails Variety Store VOID warrant the claim that the place
actually searched although not the one specified in the warrant is exactly
what they had in view when they applied for the warrant is unacceptable. What is
material in determining the validity of the warrant is the place stated in the
warrant, not the one they had in their thoughts; particularization of description
may properly be done only by the judge and only in the warrant itself

Corro v. Lising Philippine Times conclusions of law of military officers will not
satisfy probable cause requirement for issuance of search warrants

Soliven v. Makasiar The judge is not required to personally examine the

complainant and his witnesses. He shall: 1) personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest OR 2) if on the basis thereof, he does not find probable cause,
he may disregard the fiscals report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion of the existence of probable cause

Lim Sr. v. Felix certification by the fiscal of the existence of probable cause
does not bind the judge. Preliminary inquiry determines probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant (prosecutor);
preliminary examination (judge) - investigation for the determination of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest; preliminary investigation
proper ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released.

Yao Sr. v. People GASUL and SHELLANE v. MASAGANA - examination of

complainant and witnesses must be probing and exhaustive not merely
routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma; law
does not require that the thihgs to be seized should be described in very precise
and minute details.
C. Warrantless Searches and Seizures

Nolasco v. Pano articles seized by void warrants should be retuned to its

owners Papa v. Mago Customs Search search warrant not necessary except if
the place to be searched is a dwelling or house Tariff and Customs Code

People v. CFI of Rizal search of moving vehicle Carroll doctrine search of

moving vehicles or automobiles no search warrant needed

People. V. Lo Ho Wing - exception to the issuance of search warrant: 1) search

incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) search of moving vehicle; 3) seizure of evidence
in plain view

People v. Evaristo evidence in plain view Harris v. Coolidge, Coolidge v. New

Hampshire no search warrant needed; Malacat v. CA valid waiver must be
made in writing and in the presence of
counsel; search incidental to a lawful arrest v. stop and frisk Terry Case
probable cause is not required to conduct stop and frisk but mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate it. A genuine reason must exist.

People v. De Gracia Eurocar Sales Office crime was in fact being committed
search incidental to lawful arrest valid

People v. Johnson inspection at airports Persons may lose the protection of

the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting lack of subjective
expectation of privacy

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo PP 1017 case doctrines same as the ones above

(related topics: freedom of expression; freedom to peaceably assemble)

People v. Nuevas illegal possession of marijuana - in cases of searches

incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; warrantless
search, when valid: 1) incidental to lawful arrest; 2) evidence in plain view [a)
valid prior intrusion, police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties, b) evidence was inadvertently discovered, c) evidence
immediately apparent, d) plain view justified mere seizure with =out further
search]; 3) search of moving vehicle; 4) consented warrantless search; 5)
customs search; 6) stop and frisk; 7) exigent and emergency circumstances
D. Searches and seizures of whatever nature
for any purpose

E. Warrantless Arrests

Umil v. Ramos subversion a continuing offense - arrest without a warrant is

justified if the person arrested in caught in flagrante delicto

People v. Aminudin - M/V Wilcon; marijuana not caught in flagrante delicto;

search was unreasonable; evidence inadmissible

Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago pedophiles the rights granted in Section 2 are

available to all persons including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not
People v. Mengote suspicious man outside a person may not be stopped and
frisked in broad daylight on a bust street on a mere unexplained suspicion

Posadas v. Ombudsan Sigma Rho v. Scintilla Juris Arrest made without a valid
warrant: Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court when in the presence of a
police officer or a private individual: 1) the person arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or attempting to commit an offense; 2) when an offense has
actually been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the
person to be arrested commited it; 3) when the person arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where his is serving final or
temporary judgment (pending), escaped while being transferred

Ladlad v. Velasco imprisoned by PP 1017; rebellion/sedition doctrine same as

above and People v. De Gracia

SECTION 3 Privacy Of
Communication and
Correspondence-
Philippines Constitution
CASE DOCTRINES

(1)The privacy of
communication and
correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this and the
preceding section shall be
inadmissible for anypurpose in
any proceeding.
A. Exclusionary Rule (Second paragraph of
Section 3)
People v. Marti package bound for Switzerland The Bill of Rights is not meant
to be invoked against act of private individuals. It is directed against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. The
constitutional against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended
to acts committed by a private individual.

B. Waiver of Rights

Veroy v. Layague search of rebels in a house Permission was granted by Veroy

to enter the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Where
permission to enter a residence was given,
it is illegal to search the rooms therein and seize firearms without as search
warrant.

Okabe v. Gutierrez estafa case An application for or admission to bail shall

not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of
the warrant issued therefore.. An application for bail SHALL NOT BE considered
as a waiver of rights. A valid waiver, requisites. 1) rights must exist; 2) there must
be clear and convincing proof that there was an actual intention to relinquish the
right
C. Anti-Wire Tapping Act

Navarro v. CA police complaint gone bad where the exchange between two
persons is not private, the tape recording is not prohibited

Salcedo-Ordonez v. CA annulment with damages husband is cheating on me

case Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone conversations not admissible

D. Privacy of Bank Accounts

Marquez v. Desierto secrecy of bank deposits exceptions: 1) depositor

consents in writing; 2) subject of an impeachment case; 3) by court order in
cases of bribery and dereliction by public officials, 4) deposit is subject of
litigation; 5) unexplained wealth

E. Privacy of Communication

Roxas v. Zuzuaregui contempt of the Supreme Court the letter ceased to be

private when Roxas furnished the letter to the all the justices and not just to the
one whom it is addressed

Case Doctrines Section 4- Constitution. No law

shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of
grievances.
A. Prior Restraint
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans The test of limitations on freedom of expression
continues to be the CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE that words are used
in such a circumstance and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantial evils that a lawmaker has a
right to prevent. Government has a right to be protected against broadcasts
which incite listeners to overthrow it

Chavez v. Gonzales Hello Garci Case Tests for restraint dangerous tendency
doctrine, clear and present danger rule and balancing of interest test; aspects of
freedom of the press freedom from prior restraint and freedom from subsequent
punishment

B. Subsequent Punishment
People v. Perez seditious remarks Criticisms against the branches of
government within the range of liberty and speech unless the intention and the
effect be seditious

Gonzales v. COMELEC prolonged political campaigns freedom of expression

not absolute; The speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to
discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship
or punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint to the communication of
views or subsequent punishment unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has the right to prevent.

C. Freedom of Expression and

the electoral process
Sanidad v. COMELEC prohibition regarding certain forms of propaganda a valid
exercise of police power of the state to prevent perversion and prostitution of
electoral process
Adiong v. COMELEC using stickers to campaign ed

ABS-CBN v. COMELEC exit polls allowed

SWS v. COMELEC releasing surveys results before the election allowed

D. Freedom of Expression and

the Courts
IN RE: EMIL JURADO journalist and lawyer at the same time - Right to private
reputation. Judges are commonly and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting
themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of
honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private
persons. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful
exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the
false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection.

PEOPLE V. GODOY - cited for contempt based on the latters article in the
newspaper - (1) Theres a need to make a distinction between adverse criticism
of the court's decision after the case is ended and
"scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is personal and
scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a
case of contempt. Contempt proceedings dismissed. Such comments may
constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in contempt of
the court's authority. (2) In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair
criticism of the court, its
proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of
court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended
by either of these two circumstances:

a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to
scandalize the court; or
b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice
would be impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of
expression usually resorted to as a defense in
contempt proceedings.

IN RE: RESOLUTION A.M. 98-7-02 SC - resolution prohibiting demonstrations

within a radius of 200 meters from the boundary of any hall of Justice. - The
Court, it would seem, has the power to
promulgate rules concerning conduct of demonstrations in the vicinity of the
courts to assure the people of an impartial and orderly administration of justice.
It was anchored on Art. VIII Sec. 5 (5)

RE: RADIO/TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA TRIAL - Can the trial of Estrada in the
Sandiganbayan or any other court be broadcasted in TV or radio? NO. An accused
has a right to a public trial, but it is
not synonymous with a publicized trial. Freedom of the press and the accuseds
protection from a possible prejudicial publicized trial must be taken into
consideration. And unless there are safety nets to prevent this event, broadcast
media cannot be allowed to publicize the trial.

E. UNPROTECTED SPEECH
LIBEL, OBSCENITY
BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS - Borjal published in his editorial column in the
Philippine Star about certain anomalous activities of an organizer of a
conference - (1) Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed
innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that
such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be
a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the
comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.

OCAMPO V. SUN STAR PUBLISHING - graft charges filed against the judge. - (1)
Generally, every defamatory information is presumed to be malicious, even if it
be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except
in the following instances:

a. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty;
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceeding which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.the subject articles are under this exemption.

Pita v. CA Pinoy Playboy - Miller test (3 Tests)

(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the
work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. (c) whether
the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.

F. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - public meeting at Plaza Miranda - (1) A statute requiring
persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special
license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement
of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute
is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in
them issuance of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the
parade and procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of
affording an opportunity to provide proper policing and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. (2) In the exercise of police power,
the council may, in its discretion, regulate the exercise of such rights in a
reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer.
The discretion with which the council is vested is
a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not discretion
to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitrary authority, making
him in its exercise a petty tyrant.

NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative to Plaza Miranda - The

Mayor cannot be compelled to issue the permit. A permit should recognize the
right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice,
another place may be designated by the licensing
authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no
change was made.

JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - a peaceful march and rally from Luneta park
to the gates of the US Embassy. - (1) The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. (2) If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. (3)
Application for permit should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant
but at another place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. (4)
Decision of the licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants at the
earliest opportunity.

MIRIAM COLLEGE V. COURT OF APPEALS Libog Article - (1) The right of the
students to free speech in school premises is not absolute. The right to free
speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment. Thus, while the court upheld the right of the students to free
expression in these cases, disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time,
place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others were not ruled out. (2) The
school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or
she has written, except when such articles materially disrupt class work or
involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS teachers and mass actions - mass actions then
staged. That given the return-to-work orders issued by the then DECS Secretary,
they still refused to return to work, they were then suspended and later on
dismissed from service. - Where public school teachers absent themselves
without proper authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order
to participate in mass protest, their absence ineluctably results in the non-
holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for which they
are responsible, and they may be penalized not for their exercise of their right to
peaceably assemble and to petition the government for a redress of grievances
but for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Freedom of Speech,
Expression, of the Press,
Right of the People
Peaceably to Assemble
Non-establishment Clause
Case Doctrines
SECTION 5, Philippines Constitution- No law
shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference shall forever be
ed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

A. Non-establishment of religion
Aglipay v. Ruiz - commemorative postage stamp Act. No. 4052 contemplates no
religious purpose. What it gives is the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance if special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government.
The only purpose of the commemorative postage stamps was to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists

Garces v. Estenzo statue of San Vicente Ferrer A resolution of the barangay

council for soliciting contributions to buy a statue of the barangays patron saint
and the use of such fund for said purpose does not violate the Constitutions
provision prohibiting use of public funds for religious purpose; statue was
purchased by barangay funds so it belongs to the barangay and not to the parish

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union joining a union is prohibited by the

Iglesia ni Cristo closed shop agreement freedom of religion takes precedent
over the right against impairment of contracts

Islamic Dawah v. Executive Secretary Hala food products Islamic Dawah v.

Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) Classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the Quran and Islamic
beliefs. State cannot classify food as halal.
B. Free Exercise of Religion
American Bible Society v. City of Manila selling bibles; tax - The constitutional
guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
such right could only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression
on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil
which the State has the right to prevent.

Ebralinag v. Superintendent saluting the flag; pledge abandoned the ruling in

Gerona. The 2-fold aspect of religious freedom, (1) the absolute freedom to
believe as long as such is limited within the realm of thought, (2) the freedom to
act on ones belief, which may be regulated. It underscored the rule that the only
justification for relief is the existence of clear and present danger, both grave
and imminent, which is of serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the
Court held that the Jehovahs Witnesses nonparticipation in the flag ceremony in
no way poses a clear and present danger to society. Thus, restraint on the part of
the government would be unjustified. Moreover, the petitioners right to quality
education, as granted by the Constitution was likewise violated by effecting the
expulsion.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals X rating of a TV show - Mere criticisms of

some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions do not impose a
clear and present danger, which the State should protect its citizens from. X-
rating not justified. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold
aspect, viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs . The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare It is error to think that the mere invocation of
religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting
the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to prevent
religious practices inimical to society. However, prior restraint on speech,
including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by
the showing.

Liberty Of Abode and

Travel
SECTION 6, Philippines
Constitution- The liberty of
abode and of changing the
same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be
impaired upon lawful order of
the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of
national security, public safety
or public health, as may be
provided by law.

Manotoc Jr. v. CA -
A court may prohibit an accused from leaving the Philippines even if he was
admitted to bail necessary consequence of a bail bond
Marcos v. Manglapus
Marcos wants to return to country - The right to return to ones country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, though it may
well be considered as
a generally accepted principle of international law, which is part of the law of the
land. However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.

The Right of the People to

Information on Matters
and Documents of Public
Concern
Constitutional Law

inShare1

Article 3, SECTION 7- Philippines Constitution

The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents
and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

Legaspi v. CSC
eligibility of sanitary people -
1. The right to information enshrined in the Bill of Rights is self executing. They supply the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the right and
mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right
therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without
need for any ancillary act of the legislature. What may be provided by the legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of
necessity be consistent with the declared state policy of full disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
2. Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information
of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed
by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be
exercised by the public.
3. In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern, there is no rigid
test which can be applied. It a term that eludes exact definition.
Valmonte v. Belmonte
loans from GSIS; Imelda Marcos as guarantor - The right to information goes hand-in-hand
with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in the governmental decisionmaking
as well as in checking abuse in the
government.
2. Right to information is not absolute, it is limited to matters of public concern and interest, and
is further subject to limitations as may be imposed by law.
3. Public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a manner of public interest and concern.
4. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity and cannot be invoked by
juridical entities like the GSIS.

Gonzales v. Narvasa
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform - The information to which the public is
entitled to are those concerning matters of public concern, a term which embrace[s] a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. It is for the courts to
determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public.

BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC

names of partylist representatives are a matter of public concern

Akbayan v. Aquino JPEPA

diplomatic communication; negotiation is privileged information
NON-IMPAIRMENT OF
CONTRACTS

Abella v. NLRC
illegal dismissal To come under the constitutional prohibition, the law must
effect change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not
with reference to non-parties. The contract in this case cannot have the effect of
annulling subsequent legislation for the protection of the workers.

Ortigas and Co. v. CA

MMDA ordinance; reclassification of a portion of Ortigas Ave. A later law
which enlarges, abridges or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to
the contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given
retroactive effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against the non-
impairment of contracts; Police power legislation is applicable not only to future
contracts but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts
must yield to the superior and
legitimate exercise by the State of police power to promote health, morals, etc.

National Development Company

v. Philippine Veterans Bank
mortgage liability; AGRIX While it is true that police power is superior to the
impairment clause, the principle will only apply only where the contract is so
related to the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible
to change by the legislature in the interest of the greater number.
Republic v. Caguioa
tax exemptions; granted but was later withdrawn by a latter law There is no
vested right in tax exemption, more so when the latest expression of legislative
intent render its continuance doubtful; Congress in the legitimate exercise of its
lawmaking powers, can enact a law withdrawing a tax
exemption just as efficaciously as it may grant the same.

Rights of an Accused
Under Custodial
Investigation
Constitutional Law

inShare1

Article 3, SECTION 12, Philippines Constitution (RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL

INVESTIGATION)

----- Rights under Section 12:

origins and rationale -----

1. Magtoto v. Manguera
murder; admissibility of confession A confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right to silence and right to
counsel is INADMISSIBLE as evidence; Miranda and Escobedo
----- When the rights become
available -----

2. People v. Taylaran
accidental killing
Right to silence and to counsel NOT applicable where no written confession was to be
presented in evidence as a result of a formal custodial investigation

3. Galman v. Pamaran
assassination of Ninoy; Agrava Commission The fact that the framers of the Constitution did
not use the word custodial investigation shows that it did not entirely adopt the Miranda
Doctrine; The accused are also entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to remain
silent, to counsel and be informed that any or all statements given by them may be used against
them; This also applies in other cases, not just those criminal in nature

4. People v. Ayson
irregularity in the sale of plane tickets Right against self incrimination is accorded to every
person
who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena in any proceeding.
The right is NOT to be compelled to be a witness against himself and NOT a prohibition of
inquiry; The right can only be claimed when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness; It does not give the right to refuse a subpoena. This right must be
claimed, it is not automatically operational | Miranda rights | Custodial investigation
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken away into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
way; A defendant on a trial or preliminary investigation is NOT under custodial investigation;
Accused
RIGHTS: BEFORE THE CASE IS
FILED IN COURT
(or with public prosecutor for preliminary investigation; taken into custody)
a. right to remain silent
b. right to counsel
c. right to be informed
d. right to have evidence obtained in violation of those above rejected

RIGHTS: AFTER THE CASE IS

FILED IN COURT
a. right to refuse to be a witness
b. not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him because of such refusal
c. right to testify in his own behalf , subject to cross examination by the prosecution
d. while testifying: to refuse to answer an specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other that which he is being prosecuted

----- Police line-ups; paraffin

test; signature -----

5. Gamboa v. Cruz
vagrancy The right to counsel attaches at the start of the investigation (when investigating
officers elicit information/ admission/ confession. Police line-up not part of the inquest.
6. People v. Dimaano
 robbery with homicide A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest so at this stage,
they have no right to counsel yet. They are not being held to answer for criminal offense for
which they are being charged or convicted.

----- Right to counsel -----

7. Estacio v. Sandiganbayan
- estafa thru falsification When the waiver of the right to remain silent and assistance by
counsel was not made in the presence of counsel, the defect was cured when the lawyer arrived
at the closing stage of the interrogation, read the statement and talked to the accused before the
latter signed it.

8. People v. De Jesus
robbery with homicide Right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation; Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has began to focus on the particular suspect who had been taken into custody;
questions initiated when a person is taken into custody and deprived of his freedom of action

9. People v. Lucero
extrajudicial confession; lawyer was away when accused gave his uncounselled confession -
doctrine same as above

----- Right to be informed -----

10. People v. Pinlac

robbery The constitutional right of the accused to be informed of his rights to remain silent
and to counsel contemplates the transmission of meaningful information and not just a mere
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Police officer is
duty bound not just to recite
the rights; he must explain it as well; Waiver MUST BE MADE in the presence of counsel

----- Waiver -----

11. People v. Rous

robbery with homicide
A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward of leniency; Presumption that a confession
was made
deliberately and knowingly.

Criminal Due Process

Article 3, SECTION 14, Philippines Constitution (CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS)

----- Military Tribunals -----

Olaguer v. Military Commission

subversion The trial contemplated in the Constitution is trial by judicial
process and military tribunals are not courts; A military court is ousted with
jurisdiction where it did not accord accused a chance to adduce evidence. Once
a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that
rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
----- Due process -----

Scotys Department Store v. Micaller

discharge of employee Court of Industrial Relations, no criminal jurisdiction;

----- Presumption of innocence

-----

US v. Luling
customs; wharf watchman
Presumption of innocence; The state has the right to declare what acts are
criminal, within certain well-defined limitation and also a right to specify what
acts or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute as
PRIMA FACIE evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant the burden of
showing that such act or acts are innocent and were not committed with any
criminal intent.

People v. Mingoa
malversation of public funds There is no constitutional objection to the
passage of a law providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence
shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence.
----- Right to Counsel -----

People v. Holgado
slight illegal detention When an accused unaided by counsel qualifiedly
admits his guilt to an ambiguous or vague information, it is not prudent for the
trial court to render a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense without absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts
of the case;

Duties of court when defendant appears without any attorney:

1) inform him that he has a right to have an attorney before arraignment;

2) after, court must ask him if he desires to have an attorney;

3) if he desires but unable to employ an attorney, court must assign an attorney

de oficio;

4) if he desires to procure one on his own, court must hive him reasonable time
to do so; In criminal
cases, there can be no fair hearing unless the accussed be given an opportunity
to be heard by counsel.

People v. Sim Ben

indecent and immoral cinematographic films The recommendation of the
fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon Sim Ben does not mean that he is not
guilty of the crime he is being charged; A promise to recommend a specific
penalty such as fine does not render the sentence void of the Court ignores the
recommendation and metes out a penalty which is provided by law.

Delgado v. CA
estafa thru falsification of public/official documents A part who was not
represented by a member of the bar is entitled to a new trial, otherwise, there
would be a denial of due process.
----- Right to be informed ------

People v. Regala
murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority defective
information; Accused cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with
assault absent any allegations in the information of the essential elements of an
assault that appellant knew that the assault victim was an agent of a person in
authority; The fact that the crime of assault was proved by evidence of the
prosecution without any objection on the part of the accused does not cure the
defect because to do so would be convicting an accused of a crime not properly
alleged in the information.

People v. Ortega
person cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information
that charged murder by means of stabbing The hornbook doctrine is that an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information.

----- Right to speedy trial ------

Conde v. Rivera and Unson

municipal midwife of Laguna Philippine organic and statutory law expressly
guarantee that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial;
Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the
trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable time, accused is
entitled relief through mandamus or habeas corpus.
----- Right to impartial trial ------

Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz

cold neutrality of an impartial judge Due process cannot be satisfied in the

absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to assure
litigants of his being fair and just; What a trial requires is an impartial and
disinterested tribunal.

----- Right to public trial ------

Garcia v. Domingo
trial conducted in an air conditioned room Public trial when anyone
interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts proceedings;

----- Compulsory process/

confrontation -----

Fajardo v. Garcia
request to serve written interrogatories to a doctor The constitutional
guarantee to an accused to
compulsory process to secure the production of evidence in his behalf was not
violated by the trial judge who refused to grant the request of the accused for
leave to serve written interrogatories to his doctor who treated their injuries who
already left abroad. That the said medical testimony on the injuries they
sustained was vital to their defense can still be adduced thru other witnesses
and hospital records.

People v. Ortiz-Miyake
hearsay rule the right of confrontation is not absolute as it is recognized that
it is sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already
testified in a previous proceeding, in which event, his previous testimony is
made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence by way of exception to
the hearsay rule; Exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of
testimonies of absent witness made is previous proceedings BUT DOES NOT
cover previous decisions or judgments (if used
proof only that he was previously convicted of a crime BUT not guilty in a
subsequent case.

People v. Seneris
parricide; prosecution witness died While the right of confrontation and cross-
examination are fundamental rights, they can be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right; If the party was given the
opportunity to confront or cross-examine a witness but failed to take advantage
of it, he forfeits the right and the testimonies given in direct examination will be
received or ed on record; Where the prosecution witness was partially cross-
examined but prior to the next hearing, he dies, his testimony cannot be stricken
off the record.

---- Trial in absentia; right to be

present -----

Carredo v. People
malicious mischief Accused may be compelled to be present at the trial for
the purposes of identification unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court after
his arraignment that he is the person
named; The provision in the constitution allowing trial in absentia means that he
waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face; an express waiver of
appearance has the same effect; HOWEVER, such waiver of right does NOT
release the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court
whenever so required; the accused may waive the right but not the obligation to
appear in court.

SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES
Article 3, Section 16, Case Doctrines

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
due process; speedy disposition of cases Long delay in termination of the
preliminary investigation
by the Tanodbayan in the instant case found to e violative of the constitutional
right of the accused to due process; Undue delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation can not be corrected

Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan
when is a delay justified; balancing test - The right to a speedy disposition of a
case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays;
unjustified postponements; balancing test: conduct of prosecution and defense.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF
INCRIMINATION
Article 3, Section 17, Case Doctrines

Bermudez v. Castillo
handwriting; refused to provide; perjury She was completely entitled to the
privilege invoked by her because she was compelled to write and were it proven
by means of what she might right later that the documents were written by her, it
would be impossible for her to evade persecution for perjury

Cabal v. Kapunan Jr.

graft; corrupt practices, unexplained wealth Proceedings for the forfeiture of
property are deemed criminal and penal and hence, the exemption of the
defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be a witness against
themselves are applicable thereto;

Almonte v. Vasquez
subpoena duces tecum; government agency At common law, a governmental
privilege is recognized
with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters.
In this case, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of EIIB (economic something).
People v. Malimit
robbery with homicide The right against self-incrimination is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the accuseds own lips, against
his ill, admission of his guilt. It does NOT apply when the evidence sought is NOT
an incriminating statement but an object evidence; Miranda rights
covers only inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or admission made during
custodial investigation; other evidence (like IDs, wallet, keys, etc) is not affected
even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.

US v. Tan Teng
substance taken from the body of the defendant The prohibition against
compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him and not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.

Standard Chartered Bank v.

Senate Committee on Banks et.
al.
The right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended in
administrative investigations that partake of the nature of or are analogous to
criminal proceedings the privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceeding sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to
be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.