Republic of the Philippines

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Quezon City

JACINTO V. PARAS AND IMPEACHMENT CASE

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, No. ________
Complainants,

-versus-

HON. JUAN ANDRES D. BAUTISTA,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR IMPEACHMENT

COMPLAINANTS, assisted by counsel, unto this honorable

House of Representatives, respectfully aver: THAT -

PREFATORY

1. Enshrined in the Constitution is the principle that a public

office is a public trust and that public officers must always be
accountable for the faithful discharge of their office.

2. The Constitution likewise provides that certain public

officials in order to be accountable for their wrongdoings, may be
removed by impeachment. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 65
described the subject of impeachment as those offences which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from
the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which
may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as they relate
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. (Constitutional
Grounds for Presidential Impeachment. Report by the Staff of the Impeachment
Inquiry, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (93rd Congress,
2nd session, Feb. 1974), p. 13)

3. The fundamental law authorizes the impeachment of the

President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman.
And these officials may be impeached upon the following grounds of
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and

1
corruption, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust. Culpable
violation of the Constitution pertains to a willful violation of the
Constitution and excludes acts committed unintentionally or through
an honest mistake of judgment. (Carmelo V. Sison, et al., Impeachment Q
& A, 2000 Ed., p. 2) Treason and bribery should be understood in
accordance with their meanings in the Revised Penal Code. Treason is
committed in times of war by levying war against the Philippines or
adhering to the enemy, giving them aid and comfort. Bribery is
committed by a public officer who (1) receives a gift in connection
with the performance of his official duties in order to perform an act
whether constituting a crime or not, or (2) accepts gifts offered to him
by reason of his office, or (3) being a public officer entrusted with law
enforcement, refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who
has committed a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death, in
consideration of a gift or present. (Id. at 3) Graft and corruption, on
the other hand, refers to those acts enumerated in the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, including receiving any gift in connection with
any transaction wherein the public officer in his official capacity has
to intervene under the law, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. (Id.) The terms other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust have not been given any definitive
meaning in law and jurisprudence. (Id.)

4. Quoting from the Report of the Special Committee on the

Impeachment of President Quirino, the eminent constitutionalist Fr.
Joaquin Bernas explained that high crimes refer to those offenses
which, like treason and bribery, are indictable offenses and are of
such enormous gravity that they strike at the very life or orderly
working of the government. (Joaquin G., Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 1152-1153) The
phrase betrayal of public trust was intended as a catch-all phrase
to cover any violation of the oath of office. Commissioner de
los Reyes, who had been responsible for the insertion of the phrase,
said that it referred to all acts, even if not punishable by statute as
penal offenses, which would render the officer unfit to continue in
office. He enumerated betrayal of public interest, inexcusable
negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty
by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the
prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring the office into

2
disrepute. To which Commissioner Romulo added
obstruction of justice. (Id. at 1153)

5. In the leading case of Francisco, Jr. v. House [415 SCRA 44

(2003)], the Supreme Court pronounced that:

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left
to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six

grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination
of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut
definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

6. In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission

of Committee Report No. 17 of the Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers (Resolution Proposing to Incorporate in the 1986
Constitution an Article on Accountability of Public Officers), the
nature of an impeachment proceeding was exhaustively discussed:

MR. MAAMBONG. xxx I will start by asking the Committee this

question: What is really the thinking of the Committee as far as
impeachment proceedings are concerned? Are impeachment proceedings
criminal in nature or not? In order to answer this very clearly, I would like
to indicate the following: In the case of State v. Lerse, 70 Nebraska 92,
which is a United States case, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceeding
is likened to a proceeding by indictment in a court of criminal jurisdiction.
It is in its nature highly penal and is governed by rules of law applicable to
criminal prosecution. On the other hand, I would like to indicate this to
the Committee that in the case of official misconduct, we have here
statements which I think the Committee should comment on. Official
misconduct is supposed to fall into three categories: One, exceeding the
constitutional bounds of the powers of the office in derogation of the
powers of another branch of government; two, behaving in a manner
grossly incompatible with the proper function and purpose of the office;

3
and, three, employing the power of the office for an improper purpose or
personal gain.

The provision which we have here says:

impeachment and the criminal law serve fundamentally different

purpose. Impeachment is the first step in a remedial process. The process
is not personal punishment. Its function is primarily to maintain
constitutional government. The general applicability of the criminal law
also makes it inappropriate as the standard. In an impeachment
proceeding, a President is called to account for abusing powers which only
a President possesses. Impeachable conduct may include the serious
failure to discharge the affirmative duties imposed on the President by the
Constitution. Unlike a criminal case, the cause for removal may be based
on his entire course of conduct in office. It may be a course of conduct
more than individual acts that has a tendency to subvert constitutional
government. (Power of Impeachment Guide to Congress, p. 149)

For purposes of proper elucidation, what is the thinking now of the

Committee as far as this impeachment procedure is concerned? Is this a
criminal proceeding? If so, we have to use the principle of criminal law.

MR. ROMULO. Yes. Firstly, we agree with the quotation that the
Commissioner has just read. Insofar as we are concerned, the procedure is
analogous to a criminal trial but it is not a criminal prosecution per se. The
goal of an impeachment is merely to remove the fellow from office for the
crimes indicated. However, Section 3(6) of this proposed Article itself
and this is really very close to the provision of the 1935 Constitution
says:

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than the

removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust, or profit under the Government of the Philippines, but the
party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law.

In essence, I think that answers the Commissioners question. He is then

subject to a separate prosecution, whether civilly or criminally, for the acts
that he had committed.

MR. MAAMBONG. May I proceed now to two very short questions

considering that we have already identified the problem and the answer is
it is not a purely criminal prosecution in terms of procedure. We have here
a statement in the book of Simpson which reads:

A person subject to impeachment by Congress is entitled to due process of

law although presently there is little judicial authority. It can be suggested
that he is also entitled to his privilege against self-incrimination, right to
counsel, right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation

4
against him, and the right to be confronted with adversary witnesses.
(Treaties on Federal Impeachment, p. 27)

Would this statement be applicable to an impeachment proceeding?

MR. ROMULO. As the provisions now read, I think the Senate, as well as
the House, will set up its own rules. I do not know whether or not we have
to adhere to that because what the Commissioner has read, strictly
speaking, is a criminal proceeding. But the President like any citizen is
entitled to the bill of rights, like confrontation of witnesses, notice of the
charges and so on. I think those are fundamental and he is entitled to
them.

MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to a bottom-line question then. When the

Senate acting as a body will now try the impeachment case, will it conduct
the proceeding using principles of criminal procedure?

MR. ROMULO. I do not think, strictly speaking, that it need be criminal

procedures. The important thing, I believe, is that the involved party
should know the charges. He must have the opportunity to answer the
charges and the proceedings must be, in total, fair and impartial. I do not
think we have to go to the minutiae of a criminal proceeding because that
is not the intention. This is not a criminal proceeding per se.

MR. MAAMBONG. In the matter of presentation, for example, of evidence,

when it comes to treason and bribery, would the rules on criminal
procedure be applied, considering that I am now particularizing on the
ground which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code, like treason or
bribery?

MR. ROMULO. Yes, but we will notice that, strictly speaking, for the crime
of treason under the Revised Penal Code, he is answerable for the crime
somewhere else. So my conclusion is that obviously, it is in the criminal
court where we will apply all the minutiae of evidence and proceedings
and all these due processes. But we can be more liberal when it comes to
the impeachment proceedings, for instance, in the Senate, because we are
after the removal of that fellow, and conviction in that case really amounts
to this removal from office. The courts of justice will take care of the
criminal and civil aspects.

MR. MAAMBONG. Last point, just to enrich the records. I would like the
Committee to comment on the quotation from Philippine Constitution by
Former Chief Justice Fernando, wherein he said:

In the United States Constitution, the term is high crime and

misdemeanors. The Philippine Constitution speaks only of high crimes.
There is support for the view that while there need not be a showing of the
criminal character of the act imputed, it must be of sufficient seriousness
as to justify the belief that there was a grave violation of the trust imposed
on the official sought to be impeached. (pp. 460-461)

5
 Would the Committee agree to this statement?

MR. ROMULO. Yes, Let me say that essentially, impeachment is a political

act.

7. Bautista culpably violated the Constitution and/or betrayed

the public trust when he failed to truthfully, accurately, or completely
disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth
as required under section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards Act; he betrayed the public trust when he neglected his
duties and responsibilities as head of agency, particularly in collecting
and further processing of personal data, which led to unnecessary
exposure of personal and sensitive information of millions of
Filipinos, and obstructed justice when he cleared Smartmatic and
Comelec IT specialists of any wrongdoing for the so-called script
tweak during the consolidation/canvassing of results in the May 2016
election, among others.

NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT

8. This is a verified complaint for the impeachment of

incumbent Comelec Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista upon the
grounds mentioned below. This complaint is filed pursuant to
sections 2, 3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

9. This complaint is endorsed by Rep. Harry Roque, Jr. as

evidenced by a copy of the Resolution of Endorsement hereto
attached as ANNEX A.

PARTIES

10. The parties in this complaint are:

Complainants Jacinto V. Paras and Ferdinand S. Topacio

(Complainants, for brevity) are both of legal age, married,
Filipinos, with postal address at c/o Atty. Manuelito R. Luna
Law Office, Room 412 FEMII Bldg. Annex, A. Soriano, Jr.
Avenue, 1002 Intramuros, Manila, where they may be served
with the processes of the honorable House of Representatives.

Respondent Comelec Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista

(Bautista, for brevity) may be served with summons and other
processes of the honorable House of Representatives at the

6
 Office of the Chairman, Commission on Elections, 8th Floor
Palacio del Gobernador, 1002 Intramuros, Manila.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

11. On April 28, 2015, Bautista was appointed Comelec

Chairman by President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, and thereafter
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Unless sooner
remove from public office, Bautista will be serving until February 2,
2022.

12. The relevant facts may be stated, thus:

On May 2, 2017, Comelec Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista filed his
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) as of December 31, 2017.

In the said SALN, he declared assets consisting of various real properties

and personal properties totaling to Php241,800,000.00, as well as liabilities
totaling to Php65,500,000.00. He declared a net worth (Total Assets less Total
Liabilities) of Php176,300,000.00.

Except for his business interest in the XMA Corp. - a holding company
with offices at 32 12th Street, Quezon City he has not declared any interest in
other corporations or businesses, here and abroad.

Bautistas SALN shows that his spouse is Patricia C. Bautista and Andres
Xavier C. Bautista, Jose Mateo C. Bautista, Juan Alvaro C. Bautista and Rafael
Jacobo C. Bautista, are his children. (Certified copy of the SALN is hereto
attached as ANNEX B)
Sometime between 20 and 27 March 2016, or before the May 2016
election, a massive personal data breach involving the Commission on Elections
website and/or data processing system transpired, and which catastrophic event
was investigated motu propio by the National Privacy Commission (NPC)
composed of Commissioner Raymund E. Liboro and deputy commissioners Ivy
D. Patdu and Damian Domingo O. Mapa.

Based on the hearings conducted, the preliminary findings were:

1. That COMELEC published a notification, which was different from the

one submitted to the NPC.

2. That the NPC issued a Compliance Order dated 21 June 2016.

3. That COMELEC officials so named in the case may have violated several
provisions of the Data Privacy Act:

a. There are facts that tend to show that the personal data in COMELEC
database was accessed due to lack of foresight, lack of skill or an
inexcusable lack of precaution.

7
b. There are facts that tend to show that COMELEC, as personal
information controller, failed to implement reasonable and appropriate
measures to protect personal data against human dangers, such as, but not
limited to, unlawful access, fraudulent misuse, unlawful destruction,
alteration, and contamination; COMELEC failed to implement stricter
security measures, which include:

i. Removal of variables from the database that were not necessary

for the COMELEC to achieve the intended purposes of the
Precinct Finder and Post Finder applications; in other words, the
privacy and security policy did not adhere to the principles of
transparency, legitimate purpose, and proportionality.

ii. A data classification process that would have allowed COMELEC

to implement greater security measures; COMELEC knew or ought
to have known that pursuant to Section 11 of the Data Privacy Act of
2012, data collected should be accurate, relevant, adequate and not
excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected
and processed, and retained only if necessary for the fulfillment of
the purposes for which the data was obtained.

iii. A process for identifying and accessing reasonably foreseeable

vulnerabilities in its computer networks, and for taking preventive,
corrective and mitigating action against data breaches.

iv. The Head of Agency is responsible for complying with security

arrangements, adhering to the most appropriate standard
recognized by the information and communications technology
industry. There should have been adherence to the minimum
standards provided in the issuances from the Department of
Science and Technologys ICTO.

c. There was no designation of an individual accountable for the

organizations compliance with the Data Privacy Act of 2012, either by
appointing a data protection officer, or by designating another employee
or official to take over that role.

d. There is reason to probe further and investigate whether there is

substantial evidence of the commission of a crime, and to determine the
recommendation of criminal prosecution for the above-named
respondents for violating Section 26 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012,
nominated as Accessing Personal Information and Sensitive Personal
Information due to Negligence.

i. There is evidence that shows that COMELEC had been informed

formally and informally that COMELEC website was not as secure
as perceived.

ii. COMELEC did not approve requests for additional personnel.

iii. There is a lack of a clear data governance policy in the

processing of personal data.

8
 iv. The website vulnerabilities and failure to monitor regularly for
security breached allowed unlawful acces to COMELEC database.

e. While COMELEC designated Commissioner Parreno and Lim as

Champion and Vice-Champion, respectively, for Technological
Capacity, it was not made clear at the hearings that these designations
carry no duty of direct of direct supervision over the personnel of the ITD.

f. According to the COMELEC website as of June 2016, the ITD reports

directly to COMELEC Executive Director Tolentino.

4. There is thus a need to investigate the above-named respondents jointly

and severally as responsible officials of COMELEC, acting as a Personal
Information Controller. Particularly, there is a need to investigate the
personal liability of the named respondents for Violation of Sections 11,
20, 21, 22 and 26 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012.

5. There is a need to investigate Chairman Bautista for having violated

Section 22 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012.

After affording the respondents due process, the NPC concluded that:

It is quite clear from the foregoing that there was very little to no
awareness on the part of COMELEC Chairman Bautista regarding his
accountability toward handling personal data. There is no documentation that
shows that there were continuous efforts to increase the level of protection of
personal data that was in COMELEC custody, or what other steps were taken to
achieve adherence to data protection standards, as required by the Data Privacy
Act of 2012.

COMELEC Chairman Bautistas abdication of his responsibility comes into

further, stark relief when placed in contrast with efforts from other personal data
controllers similarly placed. As early as 2013, there were policies, initiatives, and
programs for data protection in the public and private sector in response to the
Data Privacy Act of 2012.

COMELECs failure cannot pass liability.

The failure of COMELEC Chairman Bautista to recognize these duties and

responsibilities under the Data Privacy Act of 2012 is an inexcusable neglect of
duty punishable under Section 26 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012. Indeed,
COMELEC Chairman Bautistas acts were to be measured by standards to which
other public officers are held, there is ground to consider him culpable for several
administrative offenses. xxxx

xxxx

COMELEC Chairman Bautistas indifference was manifest with his failure

to consider the security implications of his programs; ITD only became relevant
in his mind when considering praise given to the Department for its work on the
website. The acts of COMELEC Chairman Bautista partake that of an
administrative offense of gross negligence xxxx

9
 xxxx

Considering the negligence on display, the personal liability upon the

Head pf Agency imposed under Section 22 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012, and
the consequent access to personal and sensitive information arising from the
negligence of COMELEC Chairman Bautista, there is basis to hold him liable for
the data breah under Section 26 of the Data Privacy Act of 2012.

NPC thus held, inter alia, that:

a. The respondent Commission on Elections, as personal information

controller, violated Sections 11, 20, and 21 of Republic Act No. 10173 (the
Data Privacy Act of 2012).

b. The respondent, J. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA, has violated the provisions

of Section 11, 20, 21 and 22 in relation to Section 26 of Republic Act No.
10173 (the Data Privacy Act of 2012).

NPC further forwards the Decision and a copy of the pertinent case
records to the Secretary of Justice, recommending the prosecution of respondent
J. ANDRES D. BAUTISTA for the crime of Accessing Personal Information Due
to Negligence under Section 26 of the Data Privacy Act , and for its further
action. (Certified copy of the Decision is hereto attached as ANNEX
C.)
That is not all.

Bautista obstructed justice when he cleared Smartmatic and Comelec ITD

personnel whom the Department of Justice (DOJ) later indicted for changing the
script of the transparency server in the 2016 elections.

The DOJs resolution which was signed by Undersecretary Deo Marco

ordered charged in court for violating Sections 4(a)(),(3) and (4) of Republic Act
No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act, Smartmatic technical support team
head Marlon Garcia and his subordinates Neil Baniqued and Mauricio Herrera as
well as Comelec Information Technology experts Rouie Penalba, Nelson Herrera
and Frances Mae Gonzales.

Respondents were able to access the transparency server to change the

same without notifying the Comelec en banc.

It must be noted that the Comelec IT personnel assigned at the PPCRV

center had no authority to allow any Smartmatic personnel to tweak the script of
the transparency server as a result of which, the hash codes failed to match, it
stated.

The DOJ indicated that Marlon Garcia himself, admitted that he made
the change in the script of the transparency server as advised by Mauricio
Herrera.

Rouie Penalba, along with Fances Mae Gonzale and Nelson Herrera, as
Comelec representatives assigned to the PPCRV Center and holding of the

10
password to access the system, acquiesced to the access or interference effected
by the Smartmatic personnel, beyond their authority, the DOJ indicated.

Bautistas alleged receipt of referral fees from the Divina Law Office, the
counsel of Smartmatic, as revealed by the Comelec chairmans wife Patricia
Bautista, is constitutive of betrayal of public trust and/or graft and corruption
warranting his impeachment.

Moreover, Bautistas assets, account deposits and business interests worth

hundreds of millions, as revealed by his wife, and which he did not disclose to the
public or in his SALN as of December 31, 2016 is presumed illegally acquired,
and, hence, his non-disclosure thereof is constitutive of betrayal of public trust.

Doubtless, Bautista has committed impeachable offenses and should be

held to account by the House of Representatives in accordance with the
Constitution and its rules.

13. This verified complaint for the impeachment of respondent

Bautista is anchored on the following GROUNDS:

DISCUSSION

First Ground: RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC

TRUST FOR NEGLECTING HIS DUTIES AND RESPON-
SIBILITIES AS HEAD OF AGENCY, IN THAT HE FAILED
TO ADOPT SAFEGUARDS AS MANDATED UNDER RA
10173, OR THE DATA PRIVACY ACT OF 2012, THAT COULD
HAVE PREVENTED THE DATA BREACH OR HACKING
OF THE COMELEC WEBSITE, TO THE GREAT
PREJUDICE AND DAMAGE OF MILLIONS OF FILIPINOS

14. Bautista betrayed the public trust when he neglected his

duties and responsibilities as head of agency, in that he miserably
failed to adopt adequate safeguards as mandated under Republic Act
No. 10173 or the Data Privacy Act of 2012, that could have
prevented the data breach or hacking of the Comelec website, to the
great prejudice and damage of millions of Filipinos.

15. His lackadaisical attitude towards complying with relevant

laws fosters a suspicion of a complete abandon of the functions and
duties of a head of agency. Further, even the National Privacy
Commission has aired its complaint of the difficulty as well as slow
pace in obtaining documents from the Commission relevant to their
investigation.(www.gmanetwok.com/news/story/571138/news/nation/comel
ec-commissioners-score-poll-chief-bautista-for-failure-of-leadership; visited on
1/12/2017 at 9:12PM)

11
 16. It need not be stressed that personal data handling is a
public trust and carries with it burden of accountability, and no
amount of ignorance or legal naivete can erase that accountability.
[see Janvic Mateos report entitled: Agencies reminded to appoint data
protection officers, Philippine Star, 1/15/2016)]

17. The Data Privacy Act of 2012 is about making sure those we
entrust with our personal data are usually trustworthy by compelling
them to do everything they can to protect such data. (Id.)

18. Among the findings of the National Privacy Commission

(NPC) was that the COMELEC failed to appoint a Data Protection
Officer (DPO) who would be accountable for data privacy as required
by law. DPOs are individuals or groups of people who are accountable
for the organizations compliance with the privacy law. The DPO is
focused on protecting data from the time that it was collected up to
storage, sharing and even destruction. [see Janvic Mateos report entitled:
Agencies reminded to appoint data protection officers, Philippine Star,
1/15/2016)]

19. NPC commissioner Raymund Liboro warned that agencies

not complying with the provision of the Data Privacy Act of 2012 on
the appointment of DPO, could not escape liability. Chapter 8 of the
law or the Act Protecting Individual Personal Information and
Communications Systems in the Government and the Private Sector
and which also created the NPC, states the penalties for those
violating the law. (Id.)

20. The DPO is essentially tasked to champion peoples privacy

rights from within his or her organization. In so doing, the DPO is
able to minimize the risks of privacy breaches, address underlying
problems and reduce the damage arising from breaches if and when
they do occur. (Id.)

21. Suffice it to say that the massive data breach is very serious
privacy violation the implications of which may be beyond
quantification and arguably long-lasting. Hence, Bautistas neglect of
his duties and responsibilities irrefutably constitutes a betrayal of
public trust. Unless he is impeached, the dictum public office is a
public trust; public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,

12
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives, will be meaningless.

22. In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in Francisco v.

House, Justice Puno traced the historical roots of impeachment
which appear to have been lost in the mist of time, viz:
Some trace them to the Athenian Constitution. It is written that
Athenian public officials were hailed to law courts known as heliaea
upon leaving office. The citizens were then given the right to charge the
said officials before they were allowed to bow out of office. Undoubtedly,
however, the modern concept of impeachment is part of the British legacy
to the world, especially to the United States. It was originally conceived
as a checking mechanism on executive excuses. It was then the only
way to hold royal officials accountable. The records reveal that the first
English impeachments took place in the reign of Edward III (1327-1377). It
was during his kingship that the two houses of Lords and Commons
acquired some legislative powers. But it was during the reign of Henry IV
(1399-1413) that the procedure was firmly established whereby the House
of Commons initiated impeachment proceedings while the House of Lords
tried the impeachment cases. Impeachment in England covered not only
public officials but private individuals as well. There was hardly any
limitation to the imposable punishment. Impeachment in England
skyrocketed during the period of institutional strifes and was most intense
prior to the Protestant Revolution. Its use declined when political reforms
were instituted. Legal scholars are united in the view that English
impeachment partakes of a political proceeding and impeachable offenses
are political crimes. The history of impeachment in colonial America is
scant and hardly instructive. In the royal colonies, governors were
appointed by the Crown wile in the propriety colonies, they were named by
the proprietor. Their tenure was uncertain. They were dismissed for
disobedience or inefficiency or political patronage. Judges were either
commissioned in England or in some instances appointed by the
governor. They enjoyed no security of office. The first constitution relied
heavily on common law traditions and the experience of colonial
government. In each state, the Constitution provided for a Chief Executive,
a legislature, and a judiciary. Almost all of the Constitutions provided for
impeachment. There were differences in the impeachment process in the
various states. Even the grounds for impeachment and their penalties were
dissimilar. In most states, the lower house of the legislature was
empowered to initiate the impeachment proceedings. In some states, the
trial of impeachment cases was given to the upper house of the legislature;
in others, it was entrusted to a combination of these fora. In the national
level, the 1781 Articles of Confederation did not contain any provision on
impeachment.

Then came the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787. In

crafting the provisions on impeachment, the delegates were again guided

13
by their colonial heritage, the early state constitutions, and common law
traditions, especially the British legacy. The records show that Edmund
Randolph of the State of Virginia presented to the Convention what came
to be known as the Virginia Plan of structure of government. It was largely
the handiwork of James Madison, Father of the American Constitution. It
called for a strong national government composed of an executive, a
bicameral legislature and a judiciary. The Virginia Plan vested jurisdiction
in the judiciary over impeachment of national officers. Charles Pinckney of
South Carolina offered a different plan. He lodged the power of
impeachment in the lower house of the legislature but the right to try was
given to the federal judiciary. Much of the impeachment debates, however,
centered on the accountability of the president and how he should be
impeached. A Committee called Committee on Detail recommended that
the House of Representatives be given the sole power of impeachment. It
also suggested that the Supreme Court should be granted original
jurisdiction to try cases of impeachment. The matter was further referred
to a Committee of Eleven chaired by David Brearley of New Hampshire. It
suggested that the Senate should have the power to try all impeachments,
with a 2/3 vote to convict. The vice president was to be ex-officio president
of the Senate, except when the president was tried, in which event the
Chief Justice was to preside. Gouveneur Morris explained that a
conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the
judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after
the trial of the impeachment. James Madison insisted on the Supreme
Court and not the Senate as the impeachment court for it would make the
President improperly dependent. Madisons stand was decisively
rejected.

xxx Prof. Gerhardt points out that there are eight differences between the
impeachment power provided in the US Constitution and the British
practice: First, the Founders limited impeachment only to [t]he
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States.
Whereas at the time of the founding of the Republic, anyone (except for a
member of the royal family) could be impeached in England. Second, the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention narrowed the range of
impeachable offenses for public officeholders to Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors, although the English Parliament
always had refused to constrain its jurisdiction over impeachments by
restrictively defining impeachable offenses. Third, whereas the English
House of Lords could convict upon a bare majority, the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention agreed that in an impeachment trial held in the
Senate, no Person shall be convicted [and removed from office] without
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Fourth, the
House of Lords could order any punishment upon conviction, but the
delegates limited the punishments in the federal impeachment process to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
Honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States. Fifth, the King could
pardon any person after an impeachment conviction, but the delegates
expressly prohibited the President from exercising such power in the

14
 Constitution. Sixth, the Founders provided that the President could be
impeached, whereas the King of England could not be impeached.
Seventh, impeachment proceedings in England were considered to be
criminal, but the Constitution separates criminal and impeachment
proceedings. Lastly, the British provided for the removal of their judges by
several means, whereas the Constitution provides impeachment as the sole
political means of judicial removal xxxx [quoted in Jose Midas P.
Marquez The Constitutional Philosophy of Philippine Jurisprudence
(2005) at 315-318]

Second Ground: RESPONDENT BETRAYED

THE PUBLIC TRUST FOR NEGLECTING HIS
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS HEAD OF
AGENCY, IN THAT HE FAILED TO PROMPTLY
ACT ON THE HACKING OF THE COMELEC
WEBSITE AS WELL AS DECLINED TO ASSUME
DIRECT CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE
TASK FORCE CREATED AFTER THE INCIDENT

23. Without a peradventure of doubt, Bautista betrayed the

public trust for neglecting his duties and responsibilities as head of
agency, in that he failed to urgently act on the hacking of the
COMELEC website as well as declined to assume direct control and
supervision of the Task Force created after the incident.

24. He need be told that the hacking of the COMELEC website

before the 2016 National and Local Elections wherein which the
personal data of millions of voters were breached - was a serious
privacy violation or personal data breach requiring swift and decisive
actions. Had he acted with utmost urgency, the damage could have
been minimized.

25. As head of agency, it was incumbent upon him to assume

direct control and supervision of the Task Force created to investigate
the said incident. Definitely, he could not decline on the plain
expediency that he has limited information technology knowledge,
since it is within his regular functions to direct and supervise
operations and administration of the poll body, including that of the
Information Technology Department. So even without being prodded
by his fellow Commission Members, much less tasked to do so, he
was nonetheless duty-bound to be steadfast in accepting such
responsibility. There are no ifs and buts in this. According to Rawls,
the delegation of important trusts affecting the higher interests of

15
society is always from various causes liable to abuse. The fondness
frequently felt for the inordinate extension of power, the influence of
party and of prejudice, the seductions of foreign states, or the baser
appetite for illegitimate emoluments are sometimes productions of
what are not unaptly termed political offenses (Federalist, No. 5),
which would be difficult to take cognizance of in the ordinary course
of judicial proceeding. The involutions and varieties of vice are too
many artful to be anticipated by positive law. [quoted in Dennis B. Funa,
The Law on the Administrative Accountability of Public Officers (2010) at 883]

26. Doubtless his gross neglect of duty constitutes betrayal of

public trust for which he should be impeached. The report of the
Committee on the Judiciary, investigating the then U.S. Attorney
General (4th session, 67th Congress, House Report No. 1372. January
25, 1923) is instructive:
It was strongly intimated if not directly contended by several
members of the committee that the Attorney General could not be
impeached except for an indictable offense. I think this view is absolutely
incorrect. Impeachment is an extraordinary remedy born in the
parliamentary procedure of England, and the principles which govern it
have long been enveloped in clouds of uncertainty. The practice of
impeachment began in the reign of Edward the Third of England, and
statutes for prosecutions for offenses of this character were first enacted in
the reign of Henry the Fourth. (Id. at 884)

Third Ground: RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE

PUBLIC TRUST FOR OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE,
HAVING SAID PENDING INVESTIGATION THAT
THE SCRIPT TWEAK WAS MERELY COSMETIC
WHICH WAS IN EFFECT AN EXONERATION
OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR IT

27. Bautista obstructed justice for saying that the script tweak
was merely a cosmetic change which was in effect an exoneration of
Smartmatic and Comelec IT specialists pending investigation.

28. Such action constitutes betrayal of public trust. The holding

of the Supreme Court in Francisco, Jr. v. House, supra, is in point,
viz:

The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a

16
 determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left
to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six

grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination
of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the
framers could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of
betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both
positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut
definition or even a standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this
court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the
scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.

29. Obviously, Bautista is unworthy and undeserving of the

office of Chairman, Commission on Elections, and should be
impeached. No less than six Commissioners of the Commission had
denounced his failed leadership and other transgressions.

Fourth Ground: RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE

PUBLIC TRUST FOR FAILING TO DISCLOSE
TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED
BY THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS

30. Bautista betrayed the public trust when he failed to disclose

to the public his Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth as
required under sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019), and Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards.

31. One of the reporters Nikko Dizon of the Philippine Daily

Inquirer who was present in the said press conference reported on
August 7, 2017 that Patricia Bautista, stated that she had discovered
several passbooks as well as bank and real property documents under
her husbands name and some of his relatives that were not included
in his 2016 statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN).
Bautista declared a net worth of P176.3 million only in his SALN. (A
video of the media interview is hereto attached as ANNEX D.)

32. Patricia Paz Tish Bautista suspected that her husband,

Comelec chief Juan Andres D. Bautista might have amassed nearly

17
Php1,000,000,000.00 worth of illegally-acquired assets while serving
as PCGG chairman and later, as chairman of the Comelec. Upon
discovery, she submitted an affidavit on Aug. 1, five days after she
sought an audience with President Duterte in Malacaang to tell him
about her discovery. In her affidavit, Patricia alleged, among others,
that she was disclosing certain information and documents that
would show that Andy (Bautistas nickname) might have had, or
currently has, misdealing and corrupt practices while in government
service. I understand that since Andy holds the position of Comelec
chair, he is liable to be impeached should there exist valid and
sufficient grounds to hold him in trial for an impeachable offense
under Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

33. Bautista was appointed to the Comelec by then President

Benigno Aquino III in May 2015. In 2010, Aquino III named him
chair of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Nikko
Dizon further reported that Patricia mentioned other pieces of
information which she disclosed to Mr. Duterte and the NBI, which
were not in Bautistas SALN. They are as follows, to wit:

35 Luzon Development Bank (LDB) passbooks with a total

balance of P329,220,962

A foreign currency account with Rizal Commercial Banking

Corp. RCBC) with $12,778.30, or P640,959.53 (at P50.16 [as
of Aug. 4] to $1.00)

An RCBC peso account with P257,931.60

An HSBC account with HK$948,358.97 or P6.10 million (at

P6.43 to HK$1.00)

A condominium unit in One Bonifacio High Street at

Bonifacio Global City (BGC) in Taguig City

A condo unit in The District in San Francisco, California

34. Patricia said that except for two adjoining condo units in
Pacific Plaza Towers at BGC in Taguig City, the family home, she was
not aware of the 13 other real properties listed in her husbands
SALN.

18
 35. She also said that she discovered investments abroad in the
form of his interests in corporations and loan agreements that were
not declared in his SALN to wit:

Bauman Enterprises Ltd., a company established in the British

Virgin Islands on Sept. 29, 2010; a trustee company that
Bautista set up with Bank of Singapore.

Mantova International Ltd., established in Brunei Darussalam

on April 26, 2011.

Mega Achieve Inc., established in Anguilla, a British overseas

territory in the Caribbean, on July 15, 2014.

36. Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that: A

public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as
often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration
under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of
the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions
and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in
the manner provided by law.

37. It is crystal clear that Bautista illegally acquired these assets

as they are disproportionate to his salary as a public official; besides,
his non-reporting of the same in his SALN further lends credence to
the allegations that they are ill-gotten.

38. Patricias disclosures may be verified from the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC), Bureau of Internal Revenue, Register of Deeds, as well as
other government offices through compulsory processes to be issued
by the House of Representatives.

39. Copies of other documents are hereto collectively marked as

ANNEX E.

19
BAUTISTA, BY HIS OWN ADMISSION,
HAD RECEIVED REFERRAL FEES FROM
THE SMARTMATIC, THE LARGEST TECH-
NOLOGY PROVIDER OF THE COMELEC,
THROUGH THE DIVINA LAW OFFICE

40. Bautista, by his own admission, had received referral fees

from the Smartmatic, the largest technology provider of the Comelec,
through the Divina Law Office.

41. Such receipt of referral fees is tantamount to indirect bribery

under the Revised Penal Code and constitutes a violation of Sec. 3(b),
(c), RA 3019. (Copy of the Affidavit of Patricia Bautista hereto
attached as ANNEX E-2, is made an integral part hereof by way of
reference.)

42. In conclusion, complainants wouLd like to quote from Sir

Walter Raleigh who, in his seminal work The Mutability of Human
Affairs, 1616, wrote:
For there is no man so assured of his honor, of his riches, health,
or life but that he may be deprived of either, or all, the very next hour or
day to come.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed

that this complaint be given due course and that respondent Comelec
Chairman Juan Andres D. Bautista be impeached by the House of
Representatives and tried by the Senate sitting as an impeachment
court.

Quezon City, August 23, 2017.

ATTY. JACINTO V. PARAS

Complainant

ATTY. FERDINAND S. TOPACIO

Complainant

20
 Assisted by:

ATTY. MANUELITO R. LUNA

Counsel for the Complainants
Rm. 412 FEMII Bldg. Annex
A. Soriano, Jr. Avenue, 1002 Intramuros, Manila
IBP No. 755876; Issued on Oct. 10, 2016 (for 2017)
at Zambasulta Chapter, Z.C.
PTR No. 1407297; Issued on Jan. 10, 2017 at Z.C.
MCLE No. V-0008706
attymanuelito_luna@yahoo.com

VERIFICATION

We, JACINTO V. PARAS and FERDINAND S. TOPACIO, both

of legal age, married, Filipinos, with postal address at c/o Atty.
Manuelito R. Luna Law Office, Rm. 412 FEMII Bldg. Annex, A.
Soriano, Jr. Avenue, 1002 Intramuros, Manila, after having been
sworn to an oath in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state:

That we are the Complainants in the above-entitled Verified

Complaint for Impeachment;

That we have caused the preparation of the said complaint;

That we have read and understood the same, and the allegations
thereof are true of our knowledge and belief and on the basis of
our reading and appreciation of documents and other records
pertinent thereto.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands this

23rd day of August, 2017 at Quezon City.

JACINTO V. PARAS
Affiant

FERDINAND S. TOPACIO
Affiant

21
 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of
August, 2017 at Quezon City.

22
 Republic of the Philippines
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Quezon City

RESOLUTION OF ENDORSEMENT

WHEREAS, incorporated herein by reference is the verified

complaint against COMELEC CHAIRMAN JUAN ANDRES D.
BAUTISTA, entitled, Jacinto V. Paras and Ferdinand S. Topacio v.
Hon. Juan Andres D. Bautista;
WHEREAS, under Article XI of the Constitution, the aid
verified complaint may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon resolution of endorsement of
any member thereof;
WHEREAS, we have examined the aforementioned verified
complaint and found the same to be sufficient in form and substance.
NOW, THEREFORE, we hereby resolve to endorse, as we
hereby endorse, the attached verified complaint by Jacinto V. Paras
and Ferdinand S. Topacio, and strongly recommend that the same be
given due course by the House of Representatives.

REP. ABRAHAM N. TOLENTINO

7TH DISTRICT CAVITE

REP. GWENDOLYN F. GARCIA

3RD DISTRICT CEBU

REP. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR.

KABAYAN PARTYLIST

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23 rd day of August

2017, in Quezon City, Affiant, exhibiting to me the following:

ATTY. CESAR S. PAREJA

Secretary General

23
24