SECOND DIVISION public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by
the municipal government.
[G.R. No. 40243. March 11, 1992.]
CELESTINO TATEL, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A.
SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO,
in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his
capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as
Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of
Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac,
Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes;
and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac,
Catanduanes, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; DEFINED. It is a settled principle
of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order
to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority
emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code.
2. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY. For an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must
also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance
with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles
require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW; NOT VIOLATED
IN CASE AT BAR. As to the assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as
that of petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal
authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality
allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is
discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which
said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement.
There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other
bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that complaints
have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing
anything about it. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance
have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government.
No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but
merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouses because of the
danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE; HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION FOR CIVIL
SUIT FOR ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE. As to petitioners contention of want of jurisdiction
by the lower court we find no merit in the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement
of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction of which falls under the then Court of First Instance.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Court of First Instance
of Catanduanes. filed by appellant, Celestino Tatel, a businessman engaged in the import
and export of abaca and other products against the Municipal Council of Virac, Catanduanes
and its municipal officials enjoining them from enforcing Resolution No. 29 1 of the Council,
declaring the warehouse of petitioner in barrio Sta. Elena of the said municipality a public
nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and directing
the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two (2)
months from receipt of the said resolution.cralawnad
It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of
barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the
abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and
tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the
machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the
matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads
and the surroundings residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the
warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of the activity inside the warehouse
and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the
people within the neighborhood.
Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22,
1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within
the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. 2
His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Municipal Council of Virac,
petitioner instituted the present petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioners warehouse was constructed in
violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses
near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by
accidental fire.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to
the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not
having been passed in accordance with law.
The issue then boils down on whether petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the
meaning of Article 694 of the Civil Code and whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the
Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
In a decision dated September 18, 1969, the court a quo ruled as follows:
"1. The warehouse in question was legally constructed under a valid permit issued by the
municipality of Virac in accordance with existing regulations and may not be destroyed or
removed from its present location;
2. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the
Municipal Council of Virac is not (sic) unconstitutional and void as claimed by the petitioner;
3. The storage by the petitioner of abaca and copra in the warehouse is not only in violation
of the provisions of the ordinance but poses a grave danger to the safety of the lives and
properties of the residents of the neighborhood due to accidental fire and constitutes a
public nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and
may be abated;
4. Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby directed to remove from the said warehouse all
abaca and copra and other inflammable articles stored therein which are prohibited under
the provisions of Ordinance No. 13, within a period of two (2) months from the time this
decision becomes final and that henceforth, the petitioner is enjoined from storing such
prohibited articles in the warehouse. With costs against petitioner."
Seeking appellate review, petitioner raised as errors of the court a quo:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. In holding that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, of the Municipality of Virac,
Catanduanes, is a legitimate and valid exercise of police power of the Municipal Council, and
therefore, constitutional;
2. In giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by
declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and
copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of
warehouses.
3. In refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous
establishments similarly situated as appellants warehouses but which are not prosecuted.
We find no merit in the Petition.
Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the
exercise of its police power. It is a settled principal of law that municipal corporations are
agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as
such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause
under the Administrative Code, which reads:
"The municipal council shall enact such ordinance and make such regulations, not repugnant
to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort
and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein." 4
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statue (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must no
be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable 5 Ordinance No.
13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria.
As to the petitioners second assignment of error, the trial court did not give the ordinance
in question a meaning other than what it says. Ordinance No. 13 passed by the Municipal
Council of Virac on December 29, 1952, 6 reads:
"AN ORDINANCE STRICTLY PROHIBITING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WAREHOUSE IN ANY
FORM NEAR A BLOCK OF HOUSES EITHER IN POBLACION OR BARRIO WITH NECESSARY
DISTANCE TO AVOID GREAT LOSSES OF PROPERTY AND LIVES BY FIRE ACCIDENT."
Section 1 provides:
"It is strictly prohibited to construct warehouses in any form to any person, persons, entity,
corporation or merchants, wherein to keep or store copra, hemp, gasoline, petroleum,
alcohol, crude oil, oil of turpentine and the like products or materials if not within the
distance of 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios to avoid
great losses of properties inclusive lives by fire accident."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 2 provides: 7
"Owners of warehouses in any form, are hereby given advice to remove their said
warehouses this ordinance by the Municipal Council, provided however, that if those
warehouses now in existence should no longer be utilized as such warehouse for the above-
described products in Section 1 of this ordinance after a lapse of time given for the removal
of the said warehouses now in existence, same warehouse shall be exempted from the spirit
of the provision of section 1 of this ordinance, provided further, that these warehouses now
in existence, shall in the future be converted into non-inflammable products and materials
warehouses."cralaw virtua1aw library
In spite of its fractured syntax, basically, what is regulated by the ordinance is the
construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such
warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the
construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in As to petitioners contention of want of jurisdiction by the lower court we find no merit, in
case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. the same. The case is a simple civil suit for abatement of a nuisance, the original jurisdiction
of which falls under the then Court of First Instance.
This was also the observation of the trial court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
"A casual glance of the ordinance at once reveals a manifest disregard of the elemental rules
of syntax. Experience, however, will show that this is not uncommon in law making bodies SO ORDERED.
in small towns where local authorities and in particular the persons charged with the
drafting and preparation of municipal resolutions and ordinances lack sufficient education
and training and are not well grounded even on the basic and fundamental elements of the
English language commonly used throughout the country in such matters. Nevertheless, if
one scrutinizes the terms of the ordinance, it is clear that what is prohibited is the
construction of warehouses by any person, entity or corporation wherein copra, hemp,
gasoline and other inflammable products mentioned in Section 1 may be stored unless at a
distance of not less than 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or
barrios in order to avoid loss of property and life due to fire. Under Section 2, existing
warehouses for the storage of the prohibited articles were given one year after the approval
of the ordinance within which to remove them but were allowed to remain in operation if
they had ceased to store such prohibited articles.

The ambiguity therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in
grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is
prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable
articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in
the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of
accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government." 8

Clearly, the lower court did NOT add meaning other than or different from what provided in
the ordinance in question. It merely stated the purpose of the ordinance and what it intends
to prohibit to accomplish its purpose.

As to the third, assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of petitioner
were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of
Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating
Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction
must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by
the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for
the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him
are operation in violation of the ordinance and that complaints have been lodged against the
bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been
substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue
restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a
prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of
fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is
concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal
government.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121215. November 13, 1997.]
MAYOR OSCAR DE LOS REYES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION,
and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE; VETO
POWER; CONFERS AUTHORITY BEYOND MECHANICAL ACT OF SIGNING AN ORDINANCE OR
RESOLUTION. Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the
approval of an ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his signature,
is purely a ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the Local Government
Code outlines the veto power of the Local Chief Executive. Contrary to petitioners belief, the
grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the simple mechanical act of signing an
ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its enforceability. Such power accords the local
chief executive the discretion to sustain a resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to
veto it and return it with his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider
the same. The Sanggunian concerned, however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3)
vote of all its members thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal
intents and purposes. It is clear, therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in
the enactment of an ordinance or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the
application of judgment after meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WILL NOT APPLY WHERE
THE FORMER CASE WAS SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE COMPLAINT AND HAS NO RELATION
WITH THE ONE IN QUESTION. Petitioners other contention that the Ombudsman should
have dismissed the present case in view of a previous dismissal of a similar complaint
involving the same factual context is likewise misplaced. As explained by Deputy Special
Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo in his comment, the other case relied upon by petitioner has
no relation whatsoever with the one in question. Notably, the former case was subject of a
separate complaint and preliminary investigation, hence, the findings and records therein
could not be "made part of the case under consideration."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; COURT ACCORDS FULL RECOGNITION TO THE MINUTES AS
THE OFFICIAL REPOSITORY OF WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRES IN EVERY PROCEEDING;
CASE AT BAR. It must be stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes
taken during the session of the Sangguniang Bayan held last July 27, 1992, which petitioner
regards as inconclusive evidence of what actually transpired therein. In a long line of cases,
the Court, in resolving conflicting assertions of the protagonists in a case, has placed
reliance on the minutes of the transcribed stenographic notes to ascertain the truth of the
proceedings therein. In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner
attended the session of the Sangguniang Bayan on on July 27, 1992. It is evident,
therefore, that petitioner approved the subject resolution knowing fully well that "the
subject matter treated therein was neither taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the
Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative session." Thus, the Court accords full recognition
to the minutes as the official repository of what actually transpires in every proceeding. It
has happened that the minutes may be corrected to reflect the true account of a proceeding,
thus, giving the Court more reason to accord them great weight for such subsequent
corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve the accuracy of the records. In light of
the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at bar, the Court, without resorting to the
minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the dispute at hand.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; LATE SUBMISSION OF JOINT AFFIDAVIT TO
BOLSTER PETITIONERS POSITION, CANNOT AID CAUSE. With regard to the joint affidavit
of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to the actual passage and approval of
Resolution No. 57-8-92, the Court finds the same to have been belatedly submitted as a last
minute attempt to bolster petitioners position, and, therefore, could not in any way aid the
latters cause.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The significance of the minutes taken during the session of a local legislative assembly is the
determinant issue in this present petition.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Petitioner, along with the two others, was charged with the crime of falsification of a public
document, specifically Resolution No. 57-S-92 dated July 27, 1992 of the Municipal Council
of Mariveles, Bataan. The complaint 1 alleged that the resolution, appropriating the amount
of P8,500.00 for the payment of the terminal leave of two municipal employees, was
anomalous for not having been approved by the said Council, as the minutes of the
proceedings therein made no reference to the supposed approval thereof. It contended that
its seeming passage was carried out by petitioner in connivance with Sangguniang Bayan
(SB) Member Jesse Concepcion and SB Secretary Antonio Zurita.
After preliminary investigation, the deputized prosecutor of Balanga, Bataan recommended
the filing of an information 2 for Falsification of Public Document against petitioner and
Concepcion, excluding Zurita who died during the pendency hereof.
On September 21, 1994, the information filed before the Sandiganbayan reads as follows:
"That on or about July 27, 1992 or sometimes (sic) prior or subsequent thereto, in
Mariveles, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, OSCAR
DELOS REYES and JESSE CONCEPCION, both public officers, being Municipal Mayor of
Mariveles, Bataan and Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles, Bataan, passed and
approved the said resolution appropriating the amount of P8,500.00 for payment of the
terminal leave of two (2) employees of the municipality, when in truth and in fact as both
accused knew well the same is false and incorrect as the said resolution was not approved
by the aforesaid Sangguniang Bayan for which both accused has the obligation to disclose
the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
On October 14, 1994, prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
arguing, among other things, "that the Ombudsman previously dismissed a similar
complaint against him involving the same factual setting." 4 Likewise adduced in the motion
is the joint affidavit of the other members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mariveles attesting
to the actual passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92.
In a resolution dated December 29, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan denied the Motion for
Reinvestigation, the pertinent portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Acting on accused Mayor Oscar delos Reyes Motion for Reinvestigation and accused Jesse
Concepcions Manifestation, the same are hereby DENIED, being without merit and the
prosecution having vigorously opposed the Motion. The allegations of fact and the
arguments of counsel are best taken up in the trial on the merits. As found by the
prosecution, a prima facie case exists.
Consequently, let the arraignment of the above entitled case be set on March 03, 1995, at
8:30 A.M." 5
After the motion for reconsideration was denied on May 24, 1995, petitioner filed this instant
petition forcertiorari. On September 18, 1995, the Court resolved to issue the temporary
restraining order prayed for by petitioner.
The order of respondent Sandiganbayan must be sustained.
In an effort to exonerate himself from the charge, petitioner argues that the deliberations
undertaken and the consequent passage of Resolution No. 57-S-92 are legislative in nature.
He adds that as local chief executive, he could not have taken advantage of his official
position in committing the crime of falsification as defined and punished under Article 171 6
of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner would like to impress upon this Court that the final step in the approval of an
ordinance or resolution, where the local chief executive affixes his signature, is purely a
ministerial act. This view is erroneous. Article 109(b) of the Local Government Code outlines
the veto power of the Local Chief Executive which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 109 (b). The local chief executive, except the punong barangay shall have the power
to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or
resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program or an
ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Contrary to petitioners belief, the grant of the veto power confers authority beyond the
simple mechanical act of signing an ordinance or resolution, as a requisite to its
enforceability. Such power accords the local chief executive the discretion to sustain a
resolution or ordinance in the first instance or to veto it and return it with his objections to
the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The Sanggunian concerned,
however, may override the veto by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members thereby
making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. It is clear,
therefore, that the concurrence of a local chief executive in the enactment of an ordinance
or resolution requires, not only a flourish of the pen, but the application of judgment after
meticulous analysis and intelligence as well.
Petitioners other contention that the Ombudsman should have dismissed the present case
in view of a previous dismissal of a similar complaint involving the same factual context is
likewise misplaced.
As explained by Deputy Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo in his comment, the other
case relied upon by petitioner has no relation whatsoever with the one in question. Notably,
the former case was subject of a separate complaint and preliminary investigation, hence,
the findings and records therein could not be "made part of the case under consideration."
7
It must be stressed that the Ombudsman correctly relied on the minutes taken during the
session of the Sangguniang Bayan held last July 27, 1992, which petitioner regards as
inconclusive evidence of what actually transpired therein. In a long line of cases, the Court,
in resolving conflicting assertions of the protagonists in a case, has placed reliance on the
minutes or the transcribed stenographic notes to ascertain the truth of the proceedings
therein.
The following cases illustrate the importance of the minutes:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It was held that "contrary to petitioners claim, what the minutes only show is that on
August 12, 1994 the Sanggunian took a vote on the administrative case of respondent
Mayor and not that it then rendered a decision as required by Section 66(a) of the Local
Government Code." 8
With the same factual context as in the case at bar, petitioners herein were "accused of
having falsified or caused the falsification of the excerpts of the minutes of the regular
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quirino province on August 15, 1988 and
September 19, 1988. . . ." 9
"In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public
hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as
required by Article 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor
were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper
of general circulation pursuant to Article 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that
the obligatory public hearings had been held." 10
"It appears from the minutes of the board meeting of February 28, 1958 that the names of
the members present as well those who were absent have been recorded, and that all those
present took active part in the debates and deliberations. At the end of the session, when
the presiding officer asked the members if there were any objections to the approval of the
proposed budget, only one councilor raised an objection. The minutes, therefore, could
readily show who of the members present in the deliberations voted pro and who voted
con." 11
"The certification of the election registrar relied upon by the petitioner is correct as far as it
goes. Only 80 votes appear to have voted according to the precinct book in the sense that
only 80 voters affixed their signatures thereon after voting. But this does not necessarily
mean that no other voters cast their ballots in the questioned precinct: there were 279 in
all, according to the minutes of voting, although only 80 of them signed the precinct book."
12

"As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan do
not mention the execution of any deed to perfect the agreement. An engineer was appointed
to survey the old abandoned road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the
abandoned road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguishes their ownership over the land
traversed by the new provincial highway." 13

In the case at bar, the minutes of the session reveal that petitioner attended the session of
the Sangguniang Bayan on July 27, 1992. It is evident, therefore, that petitioner approved
the subject resolution knowing fully well that "the subject matter treated therein was neither
taken up and discussed nor passed upon by the Sangguniang Bayan during the legislative
session." 14

Thus, the Court accords full recognition to the minutes as the official repository of what
actually transpires in every proceeding. It has happened that the minutes may be corrected
to reflect the true account of a proceeding, thus giving the Court more reason to accord
them great weight for such subsequent corrections, if any, are made precisely to preserve
the accuracy of the records. In light of the conflicting claims of the parties in the case at
bar, the Court, without resorting to the minutes, will encounter difficulty in resolving the
dispute at hand.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

With regard to the joint affidavit of some members of the Sangguniang Bayan attesting to
the actual passage and approval of Resolution No. 57-S-92, the Court finds the same to
have been belatedly submitted as a last minute attempt to bolster petitioners position, and,
therefore, could not in any way aid the latters cause.

Indeed, the arguments raised by petitioners counsel are best taken up in the trial on the
merits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated December 29, 1994, and May 24, 1995, are hereby
AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September 18, 1995, is
hereby LIFTED.

The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 21073 for arraignment and trial.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 107916. February 20, 1997.]
PERCIVAL MODAY, ZOTICO MODAY (deceased) and LEONORA MODAY, Petitioners,
v. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S. YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (B.P. 337); POWER OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN TO REVIEW ORDINANCES, RESOLUTIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
PROMULGATED BY THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR; DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY MUST BE ON
THE SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN BAYAN OR
MAYOR TO ISSUE THE RESOLUTION, ORDINANCE OR ORDER UNDER REVIEW. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigans disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm
action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section
153 of B.P. BLG. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law
but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Courts pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas,
where we cited significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. "The only
ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or
order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred
upon the council or president making the same. Absolutely no other ground is recognized
by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a
municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (boards) disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact that such
resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers conferred by law. If a
provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions of the municipal
council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive authority." Thus, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No.
43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly Anuncio has the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said resolution,
pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution
No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the
condemnation of petitioners property.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate private
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and resolution,
promulgated on July 15, 1992 and October 22, 1992 respectively, 1 and a declaration that
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the Bunawan Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur
passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National Highway
Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government
Sports Facilities." 2
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C.
Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval On September 11,
1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the
comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." 3
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a Petition for
Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court at
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. 4 The complaint was later amended to include the registered
owners, Percival Modays parents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party defendants.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the
Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already deposited with the
municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the governments best interest for public
respondent to be allowed to take possession of the property.
Despite petitioners opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial Court
granted respondent municipalitys motion to take possession of the land. The lower court
held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigans failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves it
effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to review the
ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under Section 208 (1) of B.P.
Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the exercise of eminent domain is not one of
the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. 5 The dispositive portion of the lower courts Order dated July 2, 1991 reads:
"WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been deposited as per Official
Receipt No. 5379647 on December 12, 1989 which this Court now determines as the
provisional value of the land, the Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of the
Property filed by petitioner through counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Sheriff of this Court is
ordered to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved.
Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 oclock in the morning for the purpose of
ascertaining the just compensation or fair market value of the property sought to be taken,
with notice to all the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED." 6

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on October 31, 1991.
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court but the same was dismissed by respondent appellate court on July
15, 1992. 7 The Court of Appeals held that the public purpose for the expropriation is clear
from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur
did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation of petitioners property could
proceed.
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on October
22, 1992. 8
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject
property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool, both
wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of concrete.
In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks the reversal
of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and a declaration that Resolution No.
43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void.
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and
restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2, 1991 Order
and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings constructed and
from further constructing any building on the land subject of this petition. 9
Acting on petitioners Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for
Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal
mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to demolish the
"blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the restraining order. 10
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May 8,
1995 election. 11 The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to
Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and
Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan. 12
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the
condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the
expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for the
purpose. Petitioners also pray that the former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo be ordered to pay
damages for insisting on the enforcement of a void municipal resolution.
The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigans reason for disapproving
the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where are those
available lots." Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
did not declare the municipal boards resolution as invalid, expropriation of petitioners
property could proceed. 13
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case,
is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It is governments
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for
public use or purpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national legislature the power of
eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and
public utilities. 16 For the taking of private property by the government to be valid, the
taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. 17
The Municipality of Bunawans power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed
as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government Code 18 in
force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law states:
"Section 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and
institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose."cralaw virtua1aw library
What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right
since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
"Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within thirty days after receiving
copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the
municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit
them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the .provincial fiscal, who shall
examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or
impropriety which he may discover therein and make such comments or recommendations
as shall appear to him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution or
executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it
shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part,
entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities thereof.
The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or executive order in
question in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigans disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm
action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section
153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal
resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan
or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of law but different factual
milieu then obtaining, the Courts pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited
significant early jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar.
"The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the same. Absolutely no other
ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in its
consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (boards)
disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the
fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers
conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative functions
of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of executive
authority." 20

Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the
right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said
resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce; it follows that
Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used. as lawful authority to petition
for the condemnation of petitioners property.

As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday incurred
the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the latters candidacy
for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used
the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their land even if there were other properties
belonging to the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the
municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to petitioners land, evidenced
by a sketch plan. 21

The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. 22 The Supreme
Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, 23 has ruled that the
necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character. 24
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary support for
petitioners allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively
prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners property suited to
the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court
similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any of
respondent municipalitys "other available properties available for the same purpose." 25
The accusations of political reprisal are likewise unsupported by competent evidence.
Consequently, the Court holds that petitioners demand that the former municipal mayor be
personally liable for damages is without basis.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday, Et. Al. v. Municipality of Bunawan, Et.
Al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court on December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137718. January 28, 2000.]
REYNALDO O. MALONZO, in his capacity as City Mayor of Caloocan City, OSCAR
MALAPITAN, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Caloocan City, CHITO ABEL,
BENJAMIN MANLAPIG, EDGAR ERICE, DENNIS PADILLA, ZALDY DOLATRE, LUIS
TITO VARELA, SUSANA PUNZALAN, HENRY CAMAYO, in their capacities as Members
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City,Petitioners, v. HON. RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government,
and EDUARDO TIBOR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
On March 15, 1999, the Office of the President (OP) through Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, rendered a Decision 1 the dispositive portion of which reads,
viz.:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, herein respondents Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Oscar G. Malapitan
and Councilors Chito Abel, Benjamin Manlapig, Edgar Erice, Dennis Padilla, Zaldy Dolatre,
Susana Punzalan, Henry Camayo, and Luis Tito Varela, all of Caloocan city are hereby
adjudged guilty of misconduct and each is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION from office for
a period of three (3) months without pay to commence upon receipt of this Decision. This
Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
On March 22, 1999, petitioners Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Oscar G. Malapitan
and councilors Chito Abel, Benjamin Manlapig, Edgar Erice, Dennis Padilla, Zaldy Dolatre,
Luis Tito Varela, Susana Punzalan, and Henry Camayo, all of the City of Caloocan, filed a
petition assailing the OP decision.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On July 27, 1999, We granted the petition and accordingly annulled and set aside the OP
decision for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion and/or excess of
jurisdiction. We held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [T]he instant petition has been properly brought before us in the light of the
importance of the subject matter and the transcendental nature of the issues raised.
Realignment of [items in the annual budget] is a common practice borne of necessity and
sanctioned by law. Just how such a common practice may be carried out within the bounds
of law, considering the fact that public funds are at stake, is, we believe, an issue that is not
only one of first impression, but likewise of considerable significance as a guide to local
governance . . . .
". . . The OP found petitioners guilty of misconduct on the ground that . . .
". . . the P39,352,047.75 appropriated in Ordinance 0254 to fund the expropriation of Lot 26
of the Maysilo Estate was merely a portion of the P50 million included and appropriated in
the 1998 Annual Budget for expropriation purpose and . . . the judicial action for
expropriation . . . is still pending with the court. This being so, the amount allocated for the
expropriation cannot be reverted to or be deemed as savings to serve as funds actually
available for the supplemental budget. . . .
"We cannot, however, agree . . .
"The OPs premise, in our opinion, rests upon an erroneous appreciation of facts on record.
The OP seems to have been confused as to the figures and amounts actually involved. A
meticulous analysis of the records would show that there really is no basis to support the
OPs contention that the amount of P39,352,047.75 was appropriated under Ordinance No.
0254, S. 1998, since in truth and in fact, what was appropriated in said ordinance was the
amount of P39,343,028.00. The allocation of P39,352,047.75 is to be found in the earlier
Ordinance no. 0246, S. 1997 which is a separate and distinct ordinance. . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
"Section 322 of the Code upon which the OP anchored its opinion that petitioners breached a
statutory mandate provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 322. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing
Appropriations. Unexpended balances of appropriations authorized in the annual
appropriations ordinance shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the general funds at
the end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available for expenditure except by
subsequent enactment. However, appropriations for capital outlays shall continue and
remain valid until fully spent, reverted or the project is completed. Reversions of continuing
appropriations shall not be allowed unless obligations therefor have been fully paid or
settled."chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"Based on the above provision, the OP reached the determination that Ordinance No. 0254,
S. 1998 could not have lawfully realigned the amount of P39,352,047.75 which was
previously appropriated for the expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate since such
appropriation was in the nature of a capital outlay until fully spent, reverted, or the project
for which it is earmarked is completed.
"The question, however, is not whether the appropriation of P39,352,047.75 could fall under
the definitions of continuing appropriation and capital outlays, considering that such amount
was not the subject of realignment made by Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. Rather,
the issue is whether petitioners are liable for their actions in regard to said ordinance which
actually realigned a position of the P50 million which was simply denominated in a general
manner as "Expropriation of Properties" and classified under "Current Operating
Expenditures" in the 1998 Annual Budget of Caloocan City. Clearly, these are two distinct
amounts separate from each other. . . . [T]he P50 million was NOT appropriated for the
purpose of purchasing Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate but rather for expenses incidental to
expropriation such as relocation of squatters, appraisal fee, expenses for publication,
mobilization fees and expenses for preliminary studies. . . . The appropriation of
P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997 is, we believe, still a subsisting
appropriation that has never been lumped together with other funds to arrive at the sum of
P50 million allocated in the 1998 budget. To be sure, denomination of the P50 million
amount as "Expropriation of Properties left much to be desired and would have been
confused with the appropriation for expropriation under Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997, but
had respondents probed deeper into the actual intention for which said amount was
allocated then they would have reached an accurate characterization of the P50 million.
Bearing in mind, therefore, the fact that it is the P50 million which is now being realigned,
the next logical question to ask is whether such amount is capable of being lawfully
realigned. To this we answer in the affirmative.
". . . [R]espondents . . . argued . . . that realignment shall not be allowed when what is
involved are continuing appropriations or capital outlays. But this argument becomes clearly
inapplicable in view of our disquisition above. The realignment pertained to the P50 million
which was classified as "Current Operating Expenditures." . .
". . . [W]hat is being realigned is the P50 million appropriation which is classified, neither as
a capital outlay nor a continuing appropriation . . .
As to the alleged violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring the adoption of house
rules and the organization of the council, we believe that the same hardly merits even
cursory consideration. We cannot infer that no other business [like the enactment of the
ordinance] may be transacted on the first regular session except to take up the matter of
adopting or updating rules.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
"The foregoing explanation leads us to the ineluctable conclusion that, indeed, respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion. Not only [is] their reasoning flawed bit [it is] likewise
lacking in factual and legal support. Misconduct, being a grave administrative offense for
which petitioners stood charged, cannot be treated cavalierly. There must be clear and
convincing proof on record that petitioners were motivated by wrongful intent, committed
unlawful behavior in relation to their offices, or transgressed some established and definite
rules of action. But, as we have stressed above, petitioners were acting within legal
bounds."cralaw virtua1aw library
The dispositive portion of Our Decision of March 22, 1999, reads,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the office of
the president in O.P. Case No. 98-H-8520 dated March 15, 1999 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction. Consequently,Respondents, their subordinates, agents,
representatives, and successors-in-interest are permanently enjoined from enforcing or
causing the execution in any manner of the aforesaid decision against petitioners."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On August 12, 1999, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for Reconsideration 2
contending that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. The OP did not err in its appreciation of facts;
II. Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was passed without funds actually available;
III. Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was also enacted without sufficient compliance with
Section 50, Chapter 3, Title II of the Local Government Code of 1991;
IV. Petitioners failure to observe the stricture in the enactment of the Supplemental Budget
Ordinance constitutes misconduct; and
V. Assuming arguendo that the OP did err in its appreciation of the facts on record, still this
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion which can be reviewed by this Court through a
special civil action forcertiorari.
On October 20, 1999, petitioners filed their Comment and/or Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration. 3
These issues have already been discussed in Our Decision of July 27, 1999. As respondents
persist in their stance, we must also thus restate our position to dispel any and all doubts on
the matter.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary
First. Respondents aver that in their Consolidated Answer which petitioners filed before the
OP 4 , petitioners admitted that the sum of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246,
Series of 1997 was included in the P50,000,000.00 denominated in a general manner as
"Expropriation of Properties" and classified under "Current Operating Expenditures" in the
1998 Budget of Caloocan City. Petitioners however allegedly only took a different position in
their pleadings on appeal and during the oral argument before the Court as they clarified
that the sum of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 is separate and
distinct from and not part of the sum of P50,000,000.00 categorized as "Current Operating
Expenditures" in the 1998 Budget of Caloocan City. Respondents insist that petitioners may
not change their theory for the first time on appeal since their admissions before the OP
bind them, and to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice.
We disagree.
There is nothing in the records to indicate that the sum of P39,352,047.75 appropriated
under Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 is actually part of the P50,000,000.00 allotted for
"Expropriation of Properties," under the "Current Operating Expenditures" of the 1998
Annual Budget of Caloocan City.
Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997 5 appropriated P39,352,047.75 for the expropriation of
Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. It is, however, not this but the sum of P39,343,028.00
appropriated under Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 6 which was sourced from the
P50,000,000,00 allotted for "Current Operating Expenditures." It should be noted that the
P50,000,000.00 under "Current Operating Expenditures" of the 1998 Annual Budget was
denominated as for "Expropriation of Properties" but the particular properties subject of
expropriation were not specified. In fact, Petitioners, in the same consolidated answer cited
by respondents, have unequivocally stated that "as will be noted from the budget, the
expropriation of properties does not refer to any particular property." 7 Thus, it can be said
that petitioners, as early as when the case was pending before the OP, were already arguing
about the character of the P50,000,000.00 as proper subject of realignment.chanrobles.com
: virtual law library
The source of confusion lies in the denomination of P50,000,000.00 as money for
"Expropriation of Properties" under "Current Operating Expenditures." As such, it was to be
spent for the expropriation of various properties, including incidental expenses for
expropriation. What was exclusively appropriated for the expropriation of the Maysilo Lot
was the P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246, Series of 1997. It is significant to note
that this is a 1997 ordinance while the P39,343,028.00 which was originally intended for
incidental expenses for expropriation of the Maysilo Lot was under a 1998 ordinance.
That what was being realigned was the P50,000,000.00 under "Current Operating
Expenditures" to fund the P39,343,028.00 expense under Ordinance No. 0254, Series of
1998, and not the P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0247, Series of 1997, was further
clarified by petitioners during their oral argument before this Court on April 20, 1999. 8
Second. Respondents insist that Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was passed without
funds actually available. In support of their contention, they cite the dissenting opinion of
Justice Kapunan that "there was no "unavoidable discontinuance" or an "abandonment of
the work or activity" as contemplated under Section 321 of the Local Government Code
since the records do not indicate that the expropriation case before the Regional Trial Court
was actually withdrawn, suspended, discontinued or abandoned by the City of
Caloocan.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
This argument however is wrongfully premised as it presupposes the identity, which does
not however exist, between the P39,352,047.75 appropriated under Ordinance No. 0246,
Series of 1997, and the P39,343,028.00 appropriated under Ordinance No. 0254, Series of
1998. The former which was a 1997 appropriation was never touched for the expropriation
of the Maysilo Lot and did not materialize, while the latter was sourced from the 1998
Annual Budget under "Current Operating Expenditures" by realigning the allocation of
P50,000,000.00 therefrom to fund the items in Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. Since
the P50,000,000.00 appropriation is classified neither as capital outlay nor as a continuing
appropriation 9 but as "Current Operating Expenditures," it could be a valid subject of
realignment.
Third. Respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998 was enacted without
sufficient compliance with the requirement of Section 50 of the Local Government Code
requiring that house rules be adopted or updated.
The records satisfactorily show, however, that the Sanggunian took up the matter of
adopting a set of house rules in its general meeting entitled, "Katitikan ng Karaniwang
Pulong ng Sangguniang Panlungsod na ginanap noong ika-2 ng Hulyo 1998 sa Bagong
Gusali ng Pamahalaang Lungsod ng Caloocan." 10 During said meeting, the Sanggunian
created an Ad Hoc Committee composed of seven (7) members to study the existing house
rules. Thereafter, it enacted Ordinance No. 0254,-Series of 1998.
As we have held in our Decision dated July 27, 1999, such succession of events is legally
permissible. The law does not require the completion of the updating or adoption of the
internal rules of procedure before the Sanggunian could act on any other matter like the
enactment of an ordinance. It simply requires that the matter of adopting or updating the
internal rules of procedure be taken up during the first day of session. It would be
inequitable to read something more into the requirement of the law and use it as a basis for
finding petitioners guilty of misconduct, especially when the charge is serious enough to
warrant a penalty of suspension from office for three (3) months without pay.
Fourth. Respondents maintain that assuming that the Sanggunian can legally take up
matters pertaining t o the supplemental budget even before the adoption or updating of its
existing rules of procedure, the circumstances that preceded the enactment of the
supplemental budget were irregular since there was undue haste in conducting the three
readings of Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, in one session day.
There is nothing in the law, however, which prohibits that the three readings of a proposed
ordinance be held in just one session day. Respondents themselves are aware of this. And it
certainly is not the function of this Court to speculate that the councilors were not given
ample time for reflection and circumspection before the passage of the proposed ordinance
by conducting the three readings in just one day considering that it was a certain Eduardo
Tibor, by himself as taxpayer, and not the councilors themselves, who raised such
complaint. It might not be amiss to point out that the salaries of the city employees were to
be funded by the said ordinance which embodied the supplemental budget for 1998, hence,
the urgency for its passage. Even the five (5) councilors 11 who abstained from voting for
the passage of Ordinance 0254, Series of 1998 took advantage of its benefits by submitting
to the office of petitioner Malonzo the names of the employees assigned to their respective
offices for salary and accounting purposes. 12
Finally. Respondents assert that assuming that the OP erred in its appreciation of the facts
on record, no grave abuse of discretion correctible by a special civil action for certiorari may
be attributed thereto.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
But there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the OP. Its findings are totally devoid
of support in the record. Hence, the Decision of respondent Executive Secretary suspending
the petitioners, on the basis of the said findings, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to an act done in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the respondents motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129093. August 30, 2001.]
HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.
CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, Petitioners, v. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY
CALVENTO, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1
dated February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93,
enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He
asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open
the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The
ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 which was issued on September 18, 1995. The
ordinance reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO
SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
SAPAGKAT, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na;
SAPAGKAT, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalot higit sa mga
kabataan;
KUNG KAYAT DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. Gat-
Ala A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang
sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong;
IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng
sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalot higit ang Lotto;
IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng
Philippine National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa
lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng." 3
As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said
complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch
93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business
permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.
On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his
decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby
enjoined from implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the province
of Laguna.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order
dated April 21, 1997, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiffs
counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for the defendants which were duly noted,
the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were
committed by the respondent trial court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING
KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA
PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA.
II
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS
THAT BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE
NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED.
Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial
Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of
gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial governments police power under
the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991. 6 They also maintain that respondents lotto operation is illegal because no
prior consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was
implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.
7cralaw : red
For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a
curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had
already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the country. 8 As for the
allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang
panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a
requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of
the Local Government Code of 1991. 9 He also states that his operation of the lotto system
is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted
a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress. 10
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial
Government of Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been
authorized by the national government. 11 He argues that this is based on the principle that
ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of
the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which
have been conferred on them by Congress. This being the case, these councils, as
delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for
Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has
allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to
its legislative grant of authority, the provinces Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the
exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress.
The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit based
thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned
Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government
unit.
The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayors
permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private Respondent. According to the
mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in
the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council
to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is
not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto
system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much when they stated in their
petition that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The
Resolution is a policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement
opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the
Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna. 12
As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which
may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to exercise
contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this
case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the
operation of lotto.
The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through
an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law
which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent
provision reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government
agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and
services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers
conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as
amended, and shall have the authority:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in
such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and
regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.
This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national
government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek
to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law,
such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution.
In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact
ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in
Tatel v. Virac, 13 ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp. 14chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise
only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from
the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As
it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we
can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of
the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of
no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so
to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton v. Ceder Rapids, etc.
Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455).
Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different
conclusion.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has
not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now
be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the
principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 15
Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of
autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the
extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the
1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization." It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." 16chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail of
Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to
prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local
legislative unit concerned. The Boards enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its
source of power, the national legislature.
As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and
27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply
mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. These provisions
state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. . . .
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct
periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
peoples organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or
program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented
by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26
hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained;
Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be
evicted unless, appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution.
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs
and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is
neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution,
the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto
falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof. 17 Section 26
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological
Balance. It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or
program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to
consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors
concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon
the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the
measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean
projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to
wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may
cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-
land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the
planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of
these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an
afterthought on their part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this
was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely
but erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna.
In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from
enforcing or implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna
provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation.
It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayors refusal to issue the permit
sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by
a law passed by Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court
of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or
Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 122846 : January 20, 2009]
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE
CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject,
the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and
individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance
barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-
Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits
those same establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or
"wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance
against our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law.
The same parameters apply to the present petition.
This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the
reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the
validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time
Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels,
Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila"
(the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to
protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general
and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in
the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or
other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of
room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms
more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of
said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this
ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person,
the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable:
Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business
license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or
contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order ( TRO)5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9
impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor
Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as
owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge
customers wash up rates for stays of only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene
and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly
affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.8 The
three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.10 The RTC also notified
the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw.12 The RTC issued a
TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the
Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is
a legitimate exercise of police power.14
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to
desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.15 A month later, on March 8, 1993, the
Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for
decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.16 On October 20, 1993,
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is
hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution."18 Reference was made to the
provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless
be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the
ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,19 where the legitimate purpose
of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an
inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a Petition for Review on Certiorariwith the Supreme Court.20 The petition
was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the
Court treated the petition as a Petition for Certiorariand referred the petition to the Court of
Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on
cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III,
Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a
single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right
to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is
an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
the Ordinance.24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that
admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is
only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a
lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect
on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as
held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is
regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari .25 In their
petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before
the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of
police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners' standing. Petitioners allege that as
owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is being unlawfully
interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection
rights of their clients are also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether
or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their
patrons' equal protection rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party's
participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle
of separation of powers,26 sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the
judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from
the Constitution.27 The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts
which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy
of "a direct and personal interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard
test for a petitioner's standing.29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements
of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the
overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines,
the doctrine of transcendental importance.31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the United States Supreme Court
wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third
parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an
'injury-in-fact,' thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the
issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must
exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests." Herein,
it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance.
They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to
be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional
litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties
Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring
suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed
standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of
other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the
United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive
health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected
unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential
relation to them."36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United
States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal
protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of
beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The United States
High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of
third parties who seek access to their market or function."38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the
former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In
overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the
rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the
overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights.39 In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping
intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the allegations in
the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the
recent City of Manilaruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.40 Ermita-Malate concerned the
City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information
such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be
admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the
annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar
establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the constitutionality of the ordinance
in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances
were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there
is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the
State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be
rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government
Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room
for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.42 Police power is based upon
the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people.43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and
cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its
hundred or so years of presence in our nation's legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its
guarantees to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of
Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process
or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the
co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are
compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If
the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate
many political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the
judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good
standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of
law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and
sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and
far-reaching constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise
definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment
against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are
protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due process."
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with
government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the
private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a
hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It
inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected
dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more
rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due
process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve
a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives
of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the
sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for
its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best
tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court
in U.S. v. Carolene Products.51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that
the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
"discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right."52 Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of
the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by
the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender53 and
legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55 after
the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.56While the test may have first been articulated
in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive
due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges.57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.58 Under intermediate review,
governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered.59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms.60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of
laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.61 The United States
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such
as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the
petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard -
the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons - those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in
question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial
since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of
cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still,
the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental
freedoms - which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of
their constitutional consequence - that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by
the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is
not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but
rather an atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother
presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately
understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld
in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[65]
In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and
to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the
meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of
"liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of
sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have
gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and fornications' in Manila since they
'provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus
became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.' "68 Whether or not this depiction
of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior
among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected 69 will
be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski,
so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which
his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which
are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience
personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is
set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no
longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of
which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the
right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or
impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than
twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the
power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and
rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels.
Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of
a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look
to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product
and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the
legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under
the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power
is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.73 However, this is not in
any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity.74
Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to
candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.75 The Ordinance makes no
distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons
engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities
are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and
subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its
longtime home,76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city - the Pearl of
the Orient - as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still
steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila
like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such
as Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in
the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from
offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new
businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new
grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing
the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day
rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a
portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is
a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well' -intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the
right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not
with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our
recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and
protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral
duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their
expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are
entrusted by the people to uphold the law.81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to
governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due
process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is
possible for the government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious,
less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9,
is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court
is sworn to protect.77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the
State is as old as Aristotle.78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy
does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on
which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little
shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply
variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.79

To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is
ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is
more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are
widely at variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.80 Our penal laws, for one,
are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted
distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 181367 : April 24, 2012]
LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR, HON.
JEFFREY P. FERRER, AND THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF LA CARLOTA CITY,
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE-MAYOR, HON. DEMIE JOHN C.
HONRADO, PETITIONERS, VS. ATTY. REX G. ROJO, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This petition for review assails the 14 September 2007 Decision[1] and the 18 January 2008
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01377. The Court of Appeals
affirmed Resolution Nos. 0506543 and 051646[4] of the Civil Service Commission, which
affirmed the Decision dated 20 September 2004 of the Civil Service Commission Regional
Office (CSCRO) No. VI, Iloilo City, approving the appointment of respondent Atty. Rex G.
Rojo (respondent) as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary under a permanent status.cralaw
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On March 18, 2004, [the] then Vice-Mayor Rex R. Jalandoon of La Carlota City, Negros
Occidental appointed Atty. Rex G. Rojo (or Rojo) who had just tendered his resignation as
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod the day preceding such appointment, as
Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary. The status of the appointment was permanent. The
next day, March 19, 2004, the Vice-Mayor submitted Rojos appointment papers to the Civil
Service Commission Negros Occidental Field Office (CSCFO-Negros Occidental) for
attestation. In a Letter dated March 24, 2004, the said CSCFO wrote Jalandoon to inform
him of the infirmities the office found on the appointment documents, i.e. the Chairman of
the Personnel Selection Board and the Human Resource Management Officer did not sign the
certifications, the latter relative to the completeness of the documents as well as to the
publication requirement. In view of the failure of the appointing authority to comply with the
directive, the said CSCFO considered the appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or
withdrawn, in a subsequent Letter to Jalandoon dated April 14, 2004.
Jalandoon deemed the recall a disapproval of the appointment, hence, he brought the
matter to the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Iloilo City, by way of an appeal. He averred that
the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City refused to affix his signature on
Rojos appointment documents but nonetheless transmitted them to the CSCFO. Such
transmittal, according to Jalandoon, should be construed that the appointment was
complete and regular and that it complied with the pertinent requirements of a valid
appointment. Before the said CSC Regional Office No. 6 [could resolve the appeal], the City
of La Carlota represented by the newly elected mayor, Hon. Jeffrey P. Ferrer and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod represented by the newly elected Vice-Mayor, Hon. Demie John C.
Honrado, collectively, the petitioners herein, intervened. They argued that Jalandoon is not
the real party in interest in the appeal but Rojo who, by his inaction, should be considered to
have waived his right to appeal from the disapproval of his appointment; that the
appointment was made within the period of the election ban prior to the May 14, 2004
national and local elections, and finally, that the resignation of Rojo as member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is ineffective having not complied with the provision on quorum
under Section 82(d) of R.A. No. 7160.
In a Decision dated September 20, 2004, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 reversed and set
aside the CSCFOs earlier ruling. On the argument of the intervenors that the former Vice-
Mayor lacked legal personality to elevate the case on appeal, the regional office cited settled
jurisprudence that the disapproval of an appointment affects the discretionary authority of
the appointing authority. Hence, he alone may request for reconsideration of or appeal the
disapproval of an appointment. The regional office likewise ruled that Rojos appointment on
March 18, 2004 was made outside the period of the election ban from March 26 to May 9,
2004, and that his resignation from the Sangguniang Panlungsod was valid having been
tendered with the majority of the council members in attendance (seven (7) out of the
thirteen councilors were present). Considering that the appointment of Rojo sufficiently
complied with the publication requirement, deliberation by the Personnel Selection Board,
certification that it was issued in accordance with the limitations provided for under Section
325 of R.A. 7160 and that appropriations or funds are available for said position, the
regional office approved the same. x x x
Mayor Ferrer and Vice-Mayor Honrado appealed the foregoing Decision of the CSC Regional
Office No. 6 to the Civil Service Commission (or Commission). On May 17, 2005, the
Commission dismissed said appeal on the ground that the appellants were not the
appointing authority and were therefore improper parties to the appeal. Despite its ruling of
dismissal, the Commission went on to reiterate CSC Regional Offices discussion on the
appointing authoritys compliance with the certification and deliberation requirements, as
well as the validity of appointees tender of resignation. x x x
It likewise denied the motion for reconsideration thereafter filed by the petitioners in a
Resolution dated November 8, 2005.[5]
Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 14 September 2007, the
Court of Appeals denied the petition, and affirmed Resolution Nos. 050654 and 051646 of
the Civil Service Commission, dated 17 May 2005 and 8 November 2005, respectively.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution dated 18 January 2008.
Hence, this petition for review.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing Section 9(h), Article V of Presidential Decree No. 807 [6] or the Civil Service Decree,
the Court of Appeals held that in the attestation of an appointment made by a head of
agency, the duty of the Civil Service Commission does not go beyond ascertaining whether
the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility and the minimum statutory
qualifications.[7] In this case, the Court of Appeals found that respondent met the minimum
qualifications for the position of Secretary of the Sanggunian, as enumerated under Section
469(b), Article I, Title V of the Local Government Code.[8] In fact, the Court of Appeals held
that respondent is more than qualified for the position considering that respondent is a
lawyer and an active member of the bar. Furthermore, the requirements for the
appointment of respondent have been substantially complied with: (a) publication; (b)
Personnel Selection Board deliberation; and (c) certification from the appropriate offices that
appropriations or funds are available for the position. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled that
there was no sufficient reason for the Commission to disapprove respondents appointment.
On the issue of the lack of signature of the Human Resource Management Officer of La
Carlota City on respondents appointment papers, the Court of Appeals held that such
refusal of the officer to affix his signature should not affect the validity of the appointment.
Otherwise, it would be tantamount to putting the appointing power under the mercy of a
department head who may without reason refuse to perform a ministerial function, as what
happened in the instant case.[9]
The Court of Appeals also found that the appointment of respondent on 18 March 2004 did
not violate the election ban period which was from 26 March to 9 May 2004. Furthermore,
there was no substantial evidence to show that the appointment was a midnight
appointment.
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that since respondent possessed the minimum
qualifications for the position ofSangguniang Panlungsod Secretary, and the appointing
authority has adequately complied with the other requirements for a valid appointment,
then the Civil Service Commissions approval of the appointment was only proper.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE APPOINTMENT OF RESPONDENT AS SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD SECRETARY VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION
AGAINST ELIGIBILITY OF AN ELECTIVE OFFICIAL FOR APPOINTMENT DURING HIS
TENURE; and
2. WHETHER RESPONDENTS APPOINTMENT AS SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD SECRETARY WAS ISSUED CONTRARY TO EXISTING CIVIL SERVICE
RULES AND REGULATIONS.[10]
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners allege that respondents appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary is
void. Petitioners maintain that respondents irrevocable resignation as a Sangguniang
Panlungsod member was not deemed accepted when it was presented on 17 March 2004
during the scheduled regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City,
Negros Occidental for lack of quorum. Consequently, respondent was still an incumbent
regular Sangguniang Panlungsod member when then Vice Mayor Jalandoon appointed him
as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary on 18 March 2004, which contravenes Section 7,
Article IX-B of the Constitution.11
The resolution of this case requires the application and interpretation of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
The pertinent provisions read:
Section 82. Resignation of Elective Local Officials. (a) Resignations by elective local
officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance by the following
authorities:
(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vice-mayors of
highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city mayors and
city vice-mayors of component cities;
(3) The sanggunian concerned, in case of sanggunian members; and
(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials.
(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action taken
by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished the Department of Interior and Local
Government.
(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned
within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof.
(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted
upon presentation before an open session of the sanggunian concerned and duly
entered in its records: Provided, however, That this subsection does not apply to
sanggunian members who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws
prescribe the manner of acting upon such resignations.
Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the
municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the
sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian
session, the members present and consisting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from the passage of
ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he
temporarily presided.
Section 52. Sessions. (a) On the first day of the session immediately following the election
of its members, the sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the day, time, and place of its
regular sessions. The minimum number of regular sessions shall be once a week for the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, and twice a
month for the sangguniang barangay.
(b) When public interest so demands, special session may be called by the local chief
executive or by a majority of the members of the sanggunian.
(c) All sanggunian sessions shall be open to the public unless a closed-door session is
ordered by an affirmative vote of a majority of the members present, there being a quorum,
in the public interest or for reasons of security, decency, or morality. No two (2) sessions,
regular or special, may be held in a single day.
(d) In the case of special sessions of the sanggunian, a written notice to the members shall
be served personally at the members usual place of residence at least twenty-four (24)
hours before the special session is held. Unless otherwise concurred in by two-thirds (2/3)
vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum, no other matters may be
considered at a special session except those stated in the notice.
(e) Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its proceedings which may be
published upon resolution of the sanggunian concerned.
Section 53. Quorum. (a) A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have
been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business.
Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall
immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results.
(b) Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare a recess until such time as
a quorum is constituted, or a majority of the members present may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the immediate attendance of any member absent without justifiable cause
by designating a member of the sanggunian, to be assisted by a member or members of the
police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, to
arrest the absent member and present him at the session.
(c) If there is still no quorum despite the enforcement of the immediately preceding
subsection, no business shall be transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper motion duly
approved by the members present, shall then declare the session adjourned for lack of
quorum.
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the legislative body of
the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular
sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga
barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members.
(b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives: one (1) from the
women; and as shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days
prior to the holding of the local elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial workers;
and one (1) from the other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons.
(c) The regular members of the sangguniang panlungsod and the sectoral representatives
shall be elected in the manner as may be provided for by law. (Boldfacing supplied)
Petitioners insist that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, should not be counted in determining whether a quorum exists. Excluding the
vice-mayor, there were only six (6) out of the twelve (12) members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod who were present on 17 March 2004. Since the required majority of seven (7)
was not reached to constitute a quorum, then no business could have validly been
transacted on that day including the acceptance of respondents irrevocable resignation.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that in this case, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod consists of the presiding officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-
officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members. Citing the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) Opinion No. 28, s. 2000,12 dated 17 April 2000, respondent
asserts that the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, should be included in determining the
existence of a quorum. Thus, since there were six (6) members plus the presiding officer, or
a total of seven (7) who were present on the 17 March 2004 regular session of
theSangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such that the irrevocable
resignation of respondent was validly accepted.
The 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code which provides,
among others, the powers, functions and duties of local officials and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local government units. Section 3, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of the local units. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Local Government Code shall x x x provide for the x x x powers and functions
and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation
of the local units. In short, whether a vice-mayor has the power, function or duty of
a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is determined by the Local Government
Code.
On 10 October 1991, the Congress approved RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. Under
RA 7160, the city vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, thus:
Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the
sangguniang panlalawigan; the city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the
municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and the punong barangay, of the
sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian
session, the members present and consisting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a
temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten (10) days from the passage of
ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which he
temporarily presided.
Section 457. Composition. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, the legislative body of
the city, shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular
sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga
barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members.
(b) In addition thereto, there shall be three (3) sectoral representatives: one (1) from the
women; and as shall be determined by the sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days
prior to the holding of the local elections, one (1) from the agricultural or industrial workers;
and one (1) from the other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons.
(c) The regular members of the sangguniang panlungsod and the sectoral representatives
shall be elected in the manner as may be provided for by law. (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)

RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be composed of the city
vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the
city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng
mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members. Blacks Law
Dictionary defines composed of as formed of or consisting of. As the presiding Quorum is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in
officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes
when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor,
as presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is
mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would
create an anomalous and absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a
tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a member of theSanggunian.
The Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155 (Local Government Code) show the intent of
the Legislature to treat the vice-mayor not only as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod but also as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. The pertinent portions of
the deliberations read:
Senator Pimentel. Before Senator Rasul and Senator Lina take the floor, Mr. President, may
I reiterate this observation, that changes in the presiding officership of the local
sanggunians are embodied for the municipality where the vice-mayor will now be the
presiding officer of the sanggunian and the province where the vice-governor will now be
the presiding officer. We did not make any change in the city because the city vice-mayor is
already the presiding officer.
The President. All right.
Senator Rasul, Senator Lina, and Senator Gonzales.
Senator Gonzales. May I just add something to that statement of Senator Pimentel?
The President. All right.
Senator Gonzales. Reading this bill, there is also a fundamental change in the sense
that the provincial governor, the city mayor, the municipal mayor, as well as, the
punong barangay are no longer members of their respective sanggunian; they are
no longer members. Unlike before, when they were members of their respective
sanggunian, now they are not only the presiding officers also, they are not
members of their respective sanggunian.
Senator Pimentel. May I thank Senator Gonzales for that observation. (Boldfacing supplied)
During the deliberations, Senator Pimentel, the principal author of the the Local Government
Code of 1991, clearly agrees with Senator Gonzales that the provincial governor, the city
mayor, and the municipal mayor who were previously the presiding officers of their
respective sanggunian are no longer the presiding officers under the proposed Local
Government Code, and thus, they ceased to be members of their
respective sanggunian.[13] In the same manner that under the Local Government Code of
1991, the vice-governor, the city vice-mayor, and the municipal vice-mayor, as presiding
officers of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan,
respectively, are members of their respective sanggunian.
In the 2004 case of Zamora v. Governor Caballero,[14] the Court interpreted Section 53 of
RA 7160 to mean that the entire membership must be taken into account in computing the
quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan. The Court held:
their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number
which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any
valid act. Majority, when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. In fine, the entire membershipmust be taken into
account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the
constitution merely states that majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, Section
53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the majority of all members of
the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum.
The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a quorum on the
total number of members of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of
absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may, for reasons of political
affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is
already addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority
ofsanggunian members present when there is no quorum.
A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of
the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only
represent the interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of
decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the
Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally
infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all such acts
cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during
an unauthorized session.[15]
In stating that there were fourteen (14) members of the Sanggunian,[16] the Court
in Zamora clearly included the Vice-Governor, as presiding officer, as part of the entire
membership of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which must be taken into account in
computing the quorum.
DILG Opinions, which directly ruled on the issue of whether the presiding officer should be
included to determine the quorum of the sanggunian, have consistently conformed to the
Courts ruling in Zamora.
In DILG Opinion No. 46, s. 2007, the Undersecretary for Local Government clearly stated
that the vice-mayor is included in the determination of a quorum in the sanggunian. The
DILG Opinion reads:
DILG Opinion No. 46, s. 2007
02 July 2007
MESSRS. JAMES L. ENGLE,
FEDERICO O. DIMPAS, JR.,
MARIFE G. RONDINA,
PORFERIO D. DELA CRUZ, and
WINSTON B. MENZON
Sangguniang Bayan Membership
Babatngon, Leyte
Dear Gentlemen and Lady:
This has reference to your earlier letter asking our opinion on several issues, which we
quoted herein in toto:
(1) What is the number that would determine the quorum of our sanggunian that
has a total membership of eleven (11) including the vice-mayor?
(2) Are the resolutions adopted by a sanggunian without quorum valid?
In reply to your first query, may we invite your attention to Section 446 (a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) which provides and we quote:
SECTION 446. Composition. (a) The Sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the
municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice-mayor as the presiding officer, the
regular sangguniang members, the president of the municipal chapter of the liga ng mga
barangay, the president of the pambayang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and
the sectoral representatives, as members.
Based on the aforequoted provision, the Sangguniang Bayan is composed of eight (8)
regular members, the Liga ng mga Barangay President, the SK Federation
President, the Vice-Mayor as Presiding Officer and the sectoral representatives.
Under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), the Presiding
Officer then of the sanggunian was the Mayor. Thus, there was a dilemma as to
whether or not the Vice-Mayor, as Presiding Officer, is to be included in the
determination of quorum in the Sangguniang Bayan. This issue was, however,
resolved with the advent of the new Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160)
providing the aforequoted provision. Hence, the vice-mayor is included in the
determination of a quorum in the sanggunian.
Based on the aforequoted provision, sectoral representatives are also included in the
determination of quorum in the sangguniang bayan. Let it be noted however that sectoral
representatives in the local sanggunian are, pursuant to Section 41 (c) of RA 7160 and
Section 10 (b) of RA 9264, to be elected in a manner as may be provided for by law.
Meantime however, Congress has yet to enact a law providing for the manner of electing
sectoral representatives at the local sanggunians. Such being the case, sectoral
representatives are not, in the meantime, included in the determination of quorum in the
local sanggunians.
In view of the foregoing, the Sangguniang Bayan is composed of the 8 regular
members, the Liga ng mga Barangay President and the SK Federation President as
ex-officio members, and the Vice-Mayor as Presiding Officer. The total membership
in that sanggunian, therefore, is eleven (11). Relative thereto, Section 53 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 provides that a majority of all the members of the sanggunian
who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business.
Majority has been defined in Santiago vs. Guingona, et al. (G.R. No. 134577, 18
November 1998) as that which is greater than half of the membership of the body.
Following the said ruling, since the total membership of the sanggunian being 11, 11 divided
by 2 will give us a quotient of 5.5. Let it be noted however that a fraction cannot be
considered as one whole vote, since it is physically and legally impossible to divide a person
or even his vote into a fractional part. Accordingly, we have to go up to the next whole
number which is 6. In this regard, 6 is more than 5.5 and therefore, more than one-half of
the total membership of the sangguniang bayan in conformity with the jurisprudential
definition of the term majority. Thus, the presence of 6 members shall already constitute a
quorum in the sangguniang bayan for it to conduct official sessions.
xxxx
Very truly yours,
(signed)
AUSTERE A. PANADERO
OIC, OUSLG[17]
In another DILG Opinion dated 9 February 2010, the Undersecretary for Local Government
opined that the Vice-Governor, as a Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is a
composite member thereof and is included in the determination of the quorum. DILG
Opinion No. 13, s. 2010 reads:
DILG Opinion No. 13, s. 2010
09 February 2010
GOVERNOR JESUS N. SACDALAN
VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL F. PIOL
Provincial Capitol Building
Province of Cotabato
Gentlemen:
This has reference to your earlier separate letters, which we herein consolidated,
considering that they both pertain to one subject matter.
Per your letters, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session on 12 January 2010
where the August Body embarked upon the approval of the Annual Budget. According to
you, all fourteen (14) members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan attended said session,
namely: ten (10) regular Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members, three (3) ex-officio
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members and the Vice-Governor as the Presiding Officer. You
further represented that when said approval of the Annual Budget was submitted for
votation of said August Body, the result was: seven (7) members voted for the approval of
the Annual Budget and six (6) voted against.
Specifically, you want us to shed light on the following issues:
1) Whether or not the august body has reached the required majority of all the members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided for in Sections 53 and 54 of the Local
Government Code and in relation to Article 107 (g) of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations?

2) Whether or not the vice governor as the presiding officer is included in the
count in determining the majority of all the members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan to validly pass an appropriation ordinance.
3) Whether or not the board member who signed the Committee Report endorsing the 2010
Proposed Annual Performance Budget may withdraw without just and valid cause his
signature thereon and vote against the approval thereof?
4) In the event that the Province operates under a re-enacted budget, what are those
expenditures included in the term essential operating expenses that may be incurred by
the Province?
xxxx
For the sanggunian to officially transact business, there should be a quorum. A quorum is
defined by Section 53 of the Local Government Code of 1991 as referring to the presence of
the majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been duly elected and
qualified. Relative thereto, generally, ordinary measures require for its enactment only the
approval of a simple majority of the sanggunian members present, there being a quorum.
These pertain to the normal transactions of the sanggunian which are approved by the
sanggunian through a vote of simple majority of those present. On the other hand, there are
certain measures where the Local Government Code requires for its approval the vote of
majority of all the members who were duly elected and qualified. This is what we call
approval by the qualified majority of the sanggunian. In this case, the approval is to be
voted not just by the majority of those present in a session there being a quorum but by the
majority of all the members of the sanggunian duly elected and qualified regardless of
whether all of them were present or not in a particular session, there being a quorum.
xxxx
In determining a quorum, Section 53 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that a
majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall
constitute a quorum. Along this line, it bears to emphasize that per Section 467 (a) of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is a composite body where
the Vice-Governor as Presiding Officer is a composite member thereof. As a composite
member in the sangguniang panlalawigan, he is therefore included in the determination of a
quorum.
Majority has been defined by the Supreme Court in Santiago vs. Guingona, et al. (G.R. No.
134577, 18 November 1998) as that which is greater than half of the membership of the
body or that number which is 50% + 1 of the entire membership. We note, however, that
using either formula will give us the same result. To illustrate, using the 50% +1 formula,
the 50% of a sanggunian composed of 14 members is 7. Hence 7 + 1 will give us a sum of
8. On the other hand, if we use the second formula which is that number greater than half,
then 8, in relation to 7, is definitely greater than the latter. The simple majority of the
sangguniang panlalawigan with fourteen (14) members where all of them were present in
that particular session is therefore 8.
xxxx
Very truly yours,
(signed)
AUSTERE A. PANADERO
Undersecretary[18]
In the same manner, a quorum of the Sangguniang Panlungsod should be computed based
on the total composition of theSangguniang Panlungsod. In this case, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental is composed of the presiding officer, ten
(10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members.
A majority of the 13 members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7)
members, is needed to constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since seven (7)
members (including the presiding officer) were present on the 17 March 2004 regular
session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such that the
irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly accepted.
The Perez[19] case cited in the Dissenting Opinion was decided in 1969 prior to the 1987
Constitution, and prior to the enactment of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.
In fact, the Perez case was decided even prior to the old Local Government Code which was
enacted in 1983. In ruling that the vice-mayor is not a constituent member of the municipal
board, the Court in the Perez case relied mainly on the provisions of Republic Act No. 305
(RA 305) creating the City of Naga and the amendatory provisions of Republic Act No.
2259[20] (RA 2259) making the vice-mayor the presiding officer of the municipal board.
Under RA 2259, the vice-mayor was the presiding officer of the City Council or Municipal
Board in chartered cities. However, RA 305 and 2259 were silent on whether as
presiding officer the vice-mayor could vote. Thus, the applicable laws in Perez are no
longer the applicable laws in the present case.
On the other hand, the 2004 case of Zamora v. Governor Caballero,[21] in which the Court
interpreted Section 53[22] of RA 7160 to mean that the entire membership must be taken
into account in computing the quorum of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, was decided under
the 1987 Constitution and after the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991. In
stating that there were fourteen (14) members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Compostela Valley,[23] the Court inZamora clearly included the Vice- Governor, as presiding
officer, as part of the entire membership of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which must be
taken into account in computing the quorum.
On the issue that respondents appointment was issued during the effectivity of the election
ban, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service
Commission that since the respondents appointment was validly issued on 18 March 2004,
then the appointment did not violate the election ban period which was from 26 March to 9
May 2004. Indeed, the Civil Service Commission found that despite the lack of signature and
certification of the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City on respondents
appointment papers, respondents appointment is deemed effective as of 18 March 2004
considering that there was substantial compliance with the appointment requirements, thus:
Records show that Atty. Rojos appointment was transmitted to the CSC Negros Occidental
Field Office on March 19, 2004 by the office of Gelongo without his certification and
signature at the back of the appointment. Nonetheless, records show that the position to
which Atty. Rojo was appointed was published on January 6, 2004. The qualifications of
Atty. Rojo were deliberated upon by the Personnel Selection Board on March 5, 2004,
attended by Vice Mayor Jalandoon as Chairman and Jose Leofric F. De Paola, SP member
and Sonia P. Delgado, Records Officer, as members. Records likewise show that a
certification was issued by Vice Mayor Jalandoon, as appointing authority, that the
appointment was issued in accordance with the limitations provided for under Section 325 of
RA 7160 and the said appointment was reviewed and found in order pursuant to Section 5,
Rule V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 292. Further, certifications
were issued by the City Budget Officer, Acting City Accountant, City Treasurer and City Vice
Mayor that appropriations or funds are available for said position. Apparently, all the
requirements prescribed in Section 1, Rule VIII in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, series
of 1999, were complied with.[24]

Clearly, the appointment of respondent on 18 March 2004 was validly issued considering
that: (1) he was considered resigned as Sangguniang Panlungsod member effective 17
March 2004; (2) he was fully qualified for the position ofSanggunian Secretary; and (3)
there was substantial compliance with the appointment requirements.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 14 September 2007 Decision and the
18 January 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01377.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 182069 : July 03, 2012]
ARNOLD D. VICENCIO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR AND HON.
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITY AS ACTING CHAIRMAN AND
COMMISSIONER, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE HON. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND
ELIZABETH S. ZOSA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64, in realtion to Rule 65 of the Rules or Court,
seeking to annul Decision No. 2008-022 dated 15 February 2008 of the Commission on
Audit (COA).[1]chanrobles virtual law library
On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM),
presided over by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved
City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-
Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services
for Consultants in the SanggunianSecretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of
Concern x x x.[2]chanrobles virtual law library
On 9 December 2003 and 1 March 2004, the City of Malabon, represented by Hon.
Galauran, entered into separate Contracts for Consultancy Services with Ms. Jannette O.
Vijiga,[3] Mr. Meynardo E. Virtucio[4] and Mr. Hernando D. Dabalus (2003 Consultancy
Contracts).[5]chanrobles virtual law library
Subsequently, during the May 2004 elections, petitioner was elected City Vice-Mayor of
Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the
same time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat.cralaw
To complement the manpower requirements of the existing Sanggunian Secretariat,
petitioner deemed it necessary to hire the services of consultants with the end view of
augmenting and upgrading its performance capability for the effective operation of the
legislative machinery of the city.cralaw
Petitioner thus wrote a letter dated 19 July 2004 to Atty. Danilo T. Diaz , the City Legal
Officer of Malabon, inquiring as to whether it was still necessary for the SPM to ratify a
newly entered contract of consultancy services between it and the candidate for the
consultancy position. The letter states in part:chanrobles virtualaw library
This is an inquiry regarding the hiring of consultants by virtue of an ordinance giving
authority to the City Vice Mayor to enter into consultancy services (Ordinance no. 15-
2003).cralaw
As you very well know, the services of the consultants hired by the former administration,
particularly by the Sangguniang Panglungsod, ended last June 30, 2004. Hence, we are
confronted by this inquiry:chanrobles virtualaw library
Would there still be a need for the Sangguniang Panglungsod to ratify a newly entered
contract of consultancy services between the SP and the candidate for said consultancy
position?
Kindly render your humble opinion on the matter.[6]
Atty. Diaz then responded to the said inquiry through a letter dated 26 July 2004, which
categorically stated that ratification was no longer necessary, provided that the services to
be contracted were those stipulated in the ordinance. The letter states thus:chanrobles
virtualaw library
In response to your query contained in your letter dated July 19, 2004, regarding the hiring
of consultants for the Sanggunian Secretariat by virtue of Ordinance No. 15-2003, giving
authority to the City Vice Mayor to enter into consultancy services and whether there is still
a need for ratification of said consultancy contract by the Sanggunian, the answer is, such a
ratification is no longer necessary provided that the contract of consultancy services to be
executed is precisely the services stipulated in said ordinance. In essence, the Ordinance no.
15-2003 already stated what consultancy services should be secured and hence, if the
contract for consultancy services to be executed is precisely those as provided in said
ordinance, ratification is a mere suplasage.[7]
On 21 January 2005, the SPM adopted City Ordinance No. 01-2005 entitled An Ordinance
Appropriating Funds to Cover the Various Expenditures and Activities of the Local
Government of Malabon City for the Period from January 01, 2005 to December 31, 2005.
The total amount of funds appropriated was P511,070,019 for the spending of the entire city
government. Out of this amount, P792,000 was earmarked for consultancy services under
the Legislative Secretariat.cralaw
On 1 February 2005, petitioner, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered
into Contracts for Consultancy Services with Ms. Jennifer S. Catindig [8] and Atty. Rodolfo C.
delos Santos (2005 Consultancy Contracts).[9] On 11 February 2005, another Contract for
Consultancy Services was entered into between Mr. Marvin T. Amiana10 and the city
government.cralaw
After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants rendered consultancy
services to the SPM. Thereafter, they were correspondingly paid for their services pursuant
to the contracts therefor.cralaw
On 19 December 2005, Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-12-01911 was
issued by Ms. Atenie F. Padilla, Supervising Auditor of the City Auditors Office, Malabon
City, disallowing the amount of three hundred eighty-four thousand nine hundred eighty
pesos (P384,980) for being an improper disbursement. The AOM disclosed the following
pertinent findings:chanrobles virtualaw library
City Ordinance No. 15-2003 dated October 30, 2003 was used as basis of authority
in hiring consultants. Analysis of the said City Ordinance revealed that it specifically
authorized the former Vice-Mayor, Hon. Mark Allan Jay G. Yambao to enter into a
contract for consultancy services in the Sangguniang Secretariat covering the period
June to December 2003 only. Said ordinance does not give authority to the
incumbent City Vice-Mayor Arnold D. Vicencio to hire consultants for CY 2005.cralaw
 Progress accomplishment report for the month, to determine the services rendered
were not attached to the disbursement vouchers.cralaw
No information as to what method had been made by BAC in the hiring of individual
consultants whether through the selection from several registered professionals who
offered consulting services or through direct hiring without the intervention of the
BAC.cralaw
Copies of the approved contracts together with supporting documents were not
submitted to the City Auditors Office within five (5) days from execution of the
contract for review and evaluation contrary to COA Circular No. 76-34 dated July 15,
1976, thus the City Auditors Office was precluded to conduct timely
review/evaluation to inform management of whatever deficiencies noted so that
immediate remedial measures could be properly taken.[12]
On 12 May 2006, respondent Elizabeth S. Zosa issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 06-
009-101 (05)13 containing the result of the evaluation conducted on the AOM issued by Ms.
Padilla. The persons held liable for the disallowed amount relative to the hiring of the three
consultants were the following: (1) petitioner, in his capacity as City Vice- Mayor, for
certifying that the expenses/cash advances were necessary, lawful and incurred under his
direct supervision and for approving the transaction; (2) Mr. Eustaquio M. Angeles, in his
capacity as Officer-in- Charge, City Accountant, for certifying to the completeness and
propriety of the supporting documents of the expenditures; and (3) Ms. Catindig, Atty. Delos
Santos, and Mr. Amiana, as payees. The above-named persons were further directed to
settle the said disallowance immediately. Pursuant to Sections 48, 50 and 51 of Presidential
Decree No. (P.D.) 1445, the parties found liable had a period of six months within which to
file an appeal. The disallowance was anchored on the following findings:chanrobles virtualaw
library
- There was no authority for the incumbent City Vice-Mayor Arnold D. Vicencio to hire
consultants for CY 2005. City Ordinance No. 15-2003 dated October 30, 2003 which was
used as basis of authority to hire consultants specifically authorized the former Vice-Mayor,
Hon. Mark Allan Jay G. Yambao to enter into a contract for consultancy services in the
Sangguniang Secretariat covering the period June to December 2003 only.
- There were no Progress Accomplishment Reports for the month, to determine the services
rendered.
- No information as to what method had been made by BAC in the hiring of individual
consultants whether through the selection from several registered professionals who offered
consulting services or through direct hiring without the intervention of the BAC.[14]
On 22 June 2006, the SPM wrote a letter[15] informing Ms. Padilla that the three consultants
hired by petitioner rendered services covering the period January to December 2005. In its
view, the hiring of these consultants and the services they rendered were in good
faith.cralaw
Aggrieved by the disallowance, petitioner appealed it to the Adjudication and Settlement
Board (ASB) of the COA. On 12 June 2007, the ASB issued Decision No. 2007-030,[16] the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:chanrobles virtualaw library
Premises considered, the instant appeal of Hon. Arnold Vicencio is hereby denied.
Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 06-009-101 (05) dated 12 May 2006 involving the
amount of P384,980.00 representing fees to consultants Mr. Marvin T. Amiana, Atty. Rodolfo
Delos Santos and Ms. Jennifer Catindig, is hereby affirmed. However, the instant appeal of
Mr. Estaquio Angeles is hereby granted. Mr. Angeles is therefore excluded from the persons
liable listed under Notice of Disallowance No. 06-009-101 (05).[17]
Thereafter, herein petitioner filed a letter dated 7 July 2007,[18] addressed to Hon. Guillermo
N. Carague, COA Chairperson. The letter prayed for the reversal and setting aside of the
earlier Decision of the ASB.cralaw
On 15 February 2008, public respondent issued the assailed Order. It appears that the letter
of petitioner was treated as an appeal to the Commission Proper of the COA and was
subsequently denied. The dispositive portion states:chanrobles virtualaw library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration, which was
treated as an appeal, is denied.[19]
On 28 March 2008, the instant Petition was filed, raising the following issue:chanrobles
virtualaw library
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED ASB DECISION NO. 2007-030, RELATIVE TO THE
DISALLOWANCE OF DISBURSEMENTS CONCERNING THE SERVICES RENDERED BY HIRED
CONSULTANTS FOR THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG MALABON.
On 8 April 2008, this Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition. On 28 July
2008, they filed their Comment, in which they averred that Ordinance No. 15-2003
specifically authorized the expenditure of funds for the compensation of consultants only
from June to December 2003. Thus, the contracts for consultancy entered into in 2005 were
contrary to the ordinance cited and were therefore void for being unauthorized and bereft of
any legal basis. There is also no room for interpretation of the ordinance, as the same is
clear, and, additionally, actually contains no preamble. Further, respondents argue that to
allow the disbursement of public funds to pay for the services of the consultants, despite the
absence of authority for the same, would allow a circumvention of the applicable COA rules
and circulars.cralaw
Petitioner thereafter filed his Reply to the Comment, in compliance with this Courts 12
August 2008 Resolution. In his Reply, he contended that he had the authority to enter into
the consultancy contracts pursuant to Ordinance No. 15-2003. As the ordinance was
ambiguous, there was a need to interpret its provisions by looking into the intent of the law.
He also manifested that the Ombusdman had dismissed the administrative and criminal
Complaints for violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6713 and for Usurpation of Authority,
previously filed against him over the same transactions. The Ombudsman held that, while
Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically mentions then Vice-Mayor Yambao, the intent in passing
the law may not be ignored. It was the intention of the city council to authorize the Office of
the Vice-Mayor to enter into consultancy contracts, and not Vice-Mayor Yambao only.
Petitioner also argued that the ends of substantial justice and equity would be better served
by allowing the disbursement for consultancy services that have already been
rendered.cralaw
We deny the Petition.cralaw

At the outset, we note that the Petition has a procedural flaw that should merit its outright
dismissal. Through the Verification and Certification attached to the instant Petition,
petitioner states that the contents of the Petition are true and correct of [his] own personal
knowledge and belief and based on authentic records and/or documents.[20] Section 4, Rule
7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on information and belief or knowledge, information and belief, shall
be treated as an unsigned pleading. A pleading, therefore, in which the verification is based
merely on the partys knowledge and belief as in the instant Petition produces no legal
effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to be
remedied.[21]chanrobles virtual law library
In any case, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA in issuing the
assailed Decision.cralaw
Petitioner contends that the ordinance authorizes the Office of the Vice-Mayor, and not Vice-
Mayor Yambao in particular, to enter into consultancy contracts. Notably, it was even Hon.
Vice-Mayor Benjamin C. Galauran, who was acting Vice-Mayor at the time, who entered into
the 2003 Consultancy Contracts. Petitioner also argues that there is no indication from the
preamble of the ordinance, which can be read from the minutes of the SPM meeting, that
the ordinance was specifically designed to empower only Vice-Mayor Yambao, or to limit
such power to hire for the period June to December 2003 only.cralaw
We disagree.cralaw
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, the following are the
powers and duties of a city vice-mayor:chanrobles virtualaw library
ARTICLE II
The City Vice-Mayor
SECTION 456. Powers, Duties and Compensation. (a) The city vice-mayor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign all warrants drawn on
the city treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of the sangguniang
panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and employees of
the sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose manner of appointment is specifically
provided in this Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the event of
permanent vacancy as provided for in Section 44, Book I of this Code;
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the city mayor in cases of
temporary vacancy as provided for in Section 46, Book I of this Code; and
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law or ordinance.cralaw
(b) The city vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-eight (28) for a highly urbanized city and Salary Grade twenty-six (26) for a
component city, as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued
pursuant thereto.
Under this provision, therefore, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-
mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided
for the city mayor.[22] Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf
of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003
specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services.
As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance
No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a continuing authority for any person who enters the
Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.cralaw
Ordinance No. 15-2003 provides in full:chanrobles virtualaw library
City Ordinance No. 15-2003
An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay G. Yambao, to
Negotiate, and Enter into a Contract for Consultancy Services in the Sanggunian Secretariat
Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern, as Aforementioned, To
Wit:chanrobles virtualaw library
(1) A Legal Consultant
(2) A Consultant on Education Affairs and
(3) A Management Consultant
That said consultants shall be paid/compensated at the rate of Twenty Two Thousand Pesos
(P22,000.00) each, per month, effective upon approval of this ordinance subject to the
usual accounting and auditing procedures, rules and/or regulations;
That the source of funds for appropriations thereof shall be made available for expenditures
to be earmarked for payment/compensation for said consultants, covering the period from
June to December of 2003, thereby authorizing further the City Vice Mayor to effect the
necessary funding thereof, pursuant to the pertinent provision, aforecited, in Chapter 4,
Section 336 of R.A. 7160;
That copies of this ordinance be furnished all concerned for their information and
guidance.cralaw
Adopted: October 30, 2003.[23]
Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for interpretation. It only
authorized the then City Vice-Mayor to enter into consultancy contracts in the specific areas
of concern. Further, the appropriations for this particular item were limited to the savings
for the period June to December 2003. This was an additional limitation to the power
granted to Vice-Mayor Yambao to contract on behalf of the city. The fact that any later
consultancy contract would necessarily require further appropriations from the city council
strengthens the contention that the power granted under Ordinance No. 15-2003 was
limited in scope. Hence, petitioner was without authority to enter into the 2005 Consultancy
Contracts.cralaw

Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.[24] Thus, the ordinance should
be applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice.[25] In the instant case, there is no reason to depat1 from this rule, since the
subject ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.cralaw

Section 103 of P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds or uses of
government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the
of1icial or employee found to be directly responsible therefor. The public official's personal
liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. In
this case, petitioner's act of entering into a contract on behalf of the local government unit
without the requisite authority therefor was in violation of the Local Government Code.
While petitioner may have relied on the opinion of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only
serves to buttress his good faith. It does not, however, exculpate him from his personal
liability under P.D. 1445.cralaw

In sum, the COA's assailed Decision was made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in
judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution[26] The
COA was merely fulfilling its mandate in observing the policy that government funds and
property should be fully protected and conserved; and that irregular, unnecessary,
excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be
prevented.[27] Thus, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed to the COA.cralaw

WHEREFORE, the Commission on Audit Decision dated 4 January 2008 is

hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 112497. August 4, 1994.]
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, Petitioner,
v. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER
ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF
MANILA, Respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code reading as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and
revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That
public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided,
further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of
receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a
taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null
and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. 1
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila
revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the
procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of
the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of
Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on
the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. 2
The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the
annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code has indeed not been
observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with
Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the
challenged decision. 3 However, on motion for reconsideration with the required certified
true copy of the decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of
the issues raised therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power
to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, 4 even
as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the co
institutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against
him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of
the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and
orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality
upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the
questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or
both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the
higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined
after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority
of those who participated in its discussion. 5
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the
measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only
when such a conclusion is reached by the requipped majority may the Court pronounce, in
the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck
down.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to
review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction
between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second is "the power of a
superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with
law." 6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of
control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the
Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4
thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments, 8 and the policy of
local autonomy in general.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality
of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When
he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his
own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his
own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad
law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions is accordance with law, that is,
with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers
to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not
of control but of mere supervision.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even
decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay
down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed
rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act
not of control but of mere supervision.
The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the
jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the
Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by
constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or
control.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which
provided in its Section 2 as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the
ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall
have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty
days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or
imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared
national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity
of such ordinance shall suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days
within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet
the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise,
the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as
revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimposed the same tax or fee until
such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if,
in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not
merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had
been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power
was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given
the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his
opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to
wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom
or reasonableness of the tax measure.chanrobles law library : red
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code is another matter.
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public
hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as
required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were
copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive issues of a newspaper of
general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the
obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the measure as approved
posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local
Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or
Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance,
conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not
been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only
five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25
exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.
To get to the bottom of his question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents
and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one
of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as
evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1,
M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in the
Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the
July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper
of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the
approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local
government unit and not to tax ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their
validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the
Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 130775 : September 27, 2004]
THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, represented by ALEX L. DAVID in his
capacity as National President and for his own Person, President ALEX L.
DAVID, Petitioners, v. HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 124, Caloocan City, and THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR and LOCAL GOVERNMENT, represented the HON. SECRETARY ROBERT Z.
BARBERS and MANUEL A. RAYOS, Respondent.
[G.R. NO. 131939 : September 27, 2004]
LEANDRO YANGOT, BONIFACIO LACWASAN and BONY TACIO, Petitioners, v. DILG
Secretary ROBERT Z. BARBERS and DILG Undersecretary MANUEL
SANCHEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
At bottom, the present petition inquires into the essential nature of the Liga ng mga
Barangay and questions the extent of the power of Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), as alter ego of the President. More immediately, the petition
disputes the validity of the appointment of the DILG as the interim caretaker of the Liga ng
mga Barangay.
On 11 June 1997, private respondent Manuel A. Rayos [as petitioner therein], Punong
Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for
prohibition andmandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan,1 alleging
that respondent therein Alex L. David [now petitioner], Punong Barangay of Barangay 77,
Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of
the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice,
venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangayelections in 1997.
According to the petition, the irregularities consisted of the following: (1) the publication of
the notice in the Manila Bulletin but without notifying in writing the individual punong
barangays of Caloocan City;2 (2) the Notice of Meeting dated 08 June 1997 for the Liga
Chapter of Caloocan City did not specify whether the meeting scheduled on 14 June 1997
was to be held at 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and worse, the meeting was to be held in
Lingayen, Pangasinan;3 and (3) the deadline for the filing of the Certificates of Candidacy
having been set at 5:00 p.m. of the third "day prior to the above election day", or on 11
June 1997,4 Rayos failed to meet said deadline since he was not able to obtain a certified
true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate,
which were needed to be a delegate, to vote and be voted for in the Liga election. On 13
June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for
seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general membership and election
meeting of LigaChapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975.5
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David, and so the
election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as scheduled.6 Petitioner David was
proclaimed President of the Liga - Caloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the
position of ex-officio member of theSangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7 Rayos alleged that
he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997
by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-
97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents
David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for
the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for
the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-
two (72) hours.9
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner David's instance, Special Civil Action (SCA) No. C-
512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-508 pending before
Branch 124.10
Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through respondent
Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent Motion,11 invoking the President's
power of general supervision over all local government units and seeking the following
reliefs:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of the much-needed delivery of basic services to the people,
the maintenance of public order and to further protect the interests of the forty-one
thousand barangays all over the country, herein respondent respectfully prays:
a) That the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), pursuant to its
delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage
and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga
Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office; ...12
The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the DILG
Secretary exercises the power of general supervision over all government units by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18 February 1992; (2) the Liga ng mga Barangay is a
government organization; (3) undue interference by some local elective officials during the
Municipal and City Chapter elections of theLiga ng mga Barangay; (4) improper issuance of
confirmations of the elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David and the
National Liga Board; (5) the need for the DILG to provide remedies measured in view of the
confusion and chaos sweeping the Liga ng mga Barangay and the incapacity of the
National Liga Board to address the problems properly.
On 31 July 1997, petitioner David opposed the DILG's Urgent Motion, claiming that the
DILG, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed to seek any sanction against a co-
respondent like David, such as by filing a cross-claim, without first seeking leave of
court.13 He also alleged that the DILG's request to be appointed interim caretaker
constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the Liga is not subject
to DILG control and supervision.14
Three (3) days after filing its Urgent Motion, on 28 July 1997, and before it was acted upon
by the lower court, the DILG through then Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, issued
Memorandum Circular No. 97-176.15 It cited the reported violations of the Liga ng mga
Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David and "widespread chaos and confusion" among
local government officials as to who were the qualified ex-officio Liga members in their
respective sangunians.16 Pending the appointment of the DILG "as theInterim Caretaker of
the Liga ng mga Barangay by the court and until the officers and board members of the
national Liga Chapter have been elected and have assumed office," the Memorandum
Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice mayors,
members of thesangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional directors and
other concerned officers, as follows:
1. All concerned are directed not to recognize and/or honor any Liga Presidents of the
Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio members of the sanggunian concerned
until further notice from the Courts or this Department;
2. All concerned are directed to disregard any pronouncement and/or directive issued by Mr.
Alex David on any issue or matter relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay until
further notice from the Courts or this Department.17
On 04 August 1997, public respondent Judge Victoria Isabel A. Paredes issued the assailed
order,18 the pertinent portions of which read, thus:
The authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory jurisdiction over local government
units, including the different leagues created under the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA
7160) finds basis in Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992. Specifically,
Section 1 (a) of the said Administrative Order provides a broad premise for the supervisory
power of the DILG. Administratively, the DILG's supervision has been tacitly recognized by
the local barangays, municipalities, cities and provinces as shown by the evidences
presented by respondent David himself (See Annexes "A" to "C"). The fact that the DILG has
sought to refer the matters therein to the National Liga Board/Directorate does not ipso
facto mean that it has lost jurisdiction to act directly therein. Jurisdiction is conferred by law
and cannot be claimed or lost through agreements or inaction by individuals. What
respondent David may term as "interference" should caretakership be allowed, this Court
would rather view as a necessary and desirable corollary to the exercise of supervision.19
Political motivations must not preclude, hamper, or obstruct the delivery of basic services
and the perquisites of public service. In this case, the fact of confusion arising from
conflicting appointments, non-action, and uninformed or wavering decisions of the
incumbent National Liga Board/Directorate, having been satisfactorily established, cannot
simply be brushed aside as being politically motivated or arising therefrom. It is incumbent,
therefore, that the DILG exercise a more active role in the supervision of the affairs and
operations of the National Liga Board/ Directorate at least until such time that the regular
National Liga Board/Directorate may have been elected, qualified and assumed office.20
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion of the DILG for appointment as
interim caretaker, until such time that the regularly elected National Liga Board of Directors
shall have qualified and assumed office, to manage and administer the affairs of the
National Liga Board, is hereby GRANTED.21
On 11 August 1997, petitioner David filed an urgent motion for the reconsideration of the
assailed order and to declare respondent Secretary Barbers in contempt of Court.22 David
claimed that the 04 August 1997 order divested the duly elected members of the Board of
Directors of the Liga National Directorate of their positions without due process of law. He
also wanted Secretary Barbers declared in contempt for having issued, through his
Undersecretary, Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, even before respondent judge issued the
questioned order, in mockery of the justice system. He implied that Secretary Barbers knew
about respondent judge's questioned order even before it was promulgated.23
On 11 August 1997, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-193,24 providing
supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and
metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. The Memorandum Circular set the synchronized elections for the provincial and
metropolitan chapters on 23 August 1997 and for the national chapter on 06 September
1997.
On 12 August 1997, the DILG issued a Certificate of Appointment25 in favor of respondent
Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Caloocan City. The appointment
purportedly served as Rayos's "legal basis for ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Caloocan City" and "to qualify and participate in the forthcoming National
Chapter Election of the Liga ng mga Barangay."26
On 23 August 1997, the DILG conducted the synchronized elections of Provincial and
Metropolitan LigaChapters. Thereafter, on 06 September 1997, the National Liga Chapter
held its election of officers and board of directors, wherein James Marty L. Lim was elected
as President of the National Liga.27
On 01 October 1997, public respondent judge denied David's motion for
reconsideration,28 ruling that there was no factual or legal basis to reconsider the
appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker of the National Liga Board and to cite
Secretary Barbers in contempt of court.29
On 10 October 1997, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari30 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, seeking to annul public respondent judge's orders of 04 August 1997 and
01 October 1997. They dispute the latter's opinion on the power of supervision of the
President under the Constitution, through the DILG over local governments, which is the
same as that of the DILG's as shown by its application of the power on the Liga ng mga
Barangay. Specifically, they claim that the public respondent judge's designation of the DILG
as interim caretaker and the acts which the DILG sought to implement pursuant to its
designation as such are beyond the scope of the Chief Executive's power of supervision.
To support the petition, petitioners argue that under Administrative Order No. 267, Series of
1992, the power of general supervision of the President over local government units does
not apply to the Liga and its various chapters precisely because the Liga is not a local
government unit, contrary to the stance of the respondents.31
Section 507 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160) 32 provides that
the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and By-laws. Petitioners posit that the
duly elected officers and directors of the National Liga elected in 1994 had a vested right to
their positions and could only be removed therefrom for cause by affirmative vote of two-
thirds (2/3) of the entire membership pursuant to the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, and
not by mere issuances of the DILG, even if bolstered by the dubious authorization of
respondent judge.33 Thus, petitioners claim that the questioned order divested the then
incumbent officers and directors of the Liga of their right to their respective offices without
due process of law.
Assuming the Liga could be subsumed under the term "local governments," over which the
President, through the DILG Secretary, has the power of supervision,34 petitioners point out
that still there is no legal or constitutional basis for the appointment of the DILG as interim
caretaker.35 They stress that the actions contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker go
beyond supervision, as what it had sought and obtained was authority to alter, modify,
nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga Board of Directors and even to substitute its
judgment over that of the latter - which are all clearly one of control.36Petitioners question
the appointment of Rayos as Liga-Caloocan President since at that time petitioner David was
occupying that position which was still the subject of the quo warranto proceedings Rayos
himself had instituted.37 Petitioners likewise claim that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-
193, providing supplemental guidelines for the synchronized elections of the Liga, replaced
the implementing rules adopted by the Liga pursuant to its Constitution and By-laws.38 In
fact, even before its appointment as interim caretaker, DILG specifically enjoined all heads
of government units from recognizing petitioner David and/or honoring any of his
pronouncements relating to the Liga.39
Petitioners rely on decision in Taule v. Santos,40 which, they claim, already passed upon the
"extent of authority of the then Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga
barangay or the barangay councils," as it specifically ruled that the "Secretary [of Local
Government] has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of
officers of the katipunan."41
For his part, respondent Rayos avers that since the Secretary of the DILG supervises the
acts of local officials by ensuring that they act within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions and since members of the various leagues, such as the Liga in this case, are
themselves officials of local government units, it follows that the Liga members are subject
to the power of supervision of the DILG.42 He adds that as the DILG's management and
administration of the Liga affairs was limited only to the conduct of the elections, its actions
were consistent with its rule-making power and power of supervision under existing
laws.43 He asserts that in assailing the appointment of the DILG as interim
caretaker, petitioners failed to cite any provision of positive law in support of their stance.
Thus, he adds, "if a law is silent, obscure or insufficient, a judge may apply a rule he sees fit
to resolve the issue, as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with general interest, order,
morals and public policy,"44 in consonance with Article 9 of the Civil Code.45
On the other hand, it is quite significant that the Solicitor General has shared petitioners'
position. He states that the DILG's act of managing and administering the affairs of the
National Liga Board are not merely acts of supervision but plain manifestations of control
and direct takeover of the functions of the National Liga Board,46 going beyond the limits of
the power of general supervision of the President over local governments.47 Moreover, while
the Liga may be deemed a government organization, it is not strictly a local government
unit over which the DILG has supervisory power.48
Meanwhile, on 24 September 1998, James Marty L. Lim, the newly elected President of the
NationalLiga, filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment in Intervention,49 with his Comment
in Interventionattached,50 invoking the validity of the DILG's actions relative to the conduct
of the Liga elections.51 In addition, he sought the dismissal of the instant petition on the
following grounds: (1) the issue of validity or invalidity of the questioned order has been
rendered moot and academic by the election ofLiga officers; (2) the turn-over of the
administration and management of Liga affairs to the Liga officers; and (3) the recognition
and acceptance by the members of the Liga nationwide.52
In the interim, another petition, this time for Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order,53 was filed by several presidents of Liga Chapters, praying that this Court
declare the DILG Secretary and Undersecretary are not vested with any constitutional or
legal power to exercise control or even supervision over the National Liga ng mga Barangay,
nor to take over the functions of its officers or suspend its constitution; and declare void any
and all acts committed by respondents therein in connection with their caretakership of
the Liga.54 The petition was consolidated with G.R. No. 130775, but it was eventually
dismissed because the petitioners failed to submit an affidavit of service and proof of service
of the petition.55
Meanwhile, on 01 December 1998, petitioner David died and was substituted by his legal
representatives.56
Petitioners have raised a number of issues.57 Integrated and simplified, these issues boil
down to the question of whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in appointing the DILG as interim caretaker to administer and manage the affairs
of the National Liga Board, per its order dated 04 August 1997.58 In turn, the resolution of
the question of grave abuse of discretion entails a couple of definitive issues, namely: (1)
whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is a government organization that is subject to the DILG
Secretary's power of supervision over local governments as the alter ego of the President,
and (2) whether the respondent Judge's designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of
the Liga has invested the DILG with control over the Liga and whether DILG Memorandum
Circular No. 97-176, issued before it was designated as such interim caretaker, and DILG
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and other acts which the DILG made in its capacity as
interim caretaker of the Liga, involve supervision or control of the Liga.
However, the Court should first address the question of mootness which intervenor Lim
raised because, according to him, during the pendency of the present petition a general
election was held; the new set of officers and directors had assumed their positions; and
that supervening events the DILG had turned-over the management and administration of
the Liga to new Liga officers and directors.59 Respondent Rayos has joined him in this
regard.60 Forthwith, the Court declares that these supervening events have not rendered the
instant petition moot, nor removed it from the jurisdiction of this Court.
This case transcends the elections ordered and conducted by the DILG as interim caretaker
of the Ligaand the Liga officers and directors who were elected to replace petitioner David
and the former officers. At the core of the petition is the validity of the DILG's
"caretakership" of the Liga and the official acts of the DILG as such caretaker which
exceeded the bounds of supervision and were exercise of control. At stake in this case is the
realization of the constitutionally ensconced principle of local government autonomy; 61 the
statutory objective to enhance the capabilities of barangays and municipalities "by providing
them opportunities to participate actively in the implementation of national programs and
projects;"62 and the promotion of the avowed aim to ensure the independence and non-
partisanship of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The mantle of local autonomy would be
eviscerated and remain an empty buzzword if unconstitutional, illegal and unwarranted
intrusions in the affairs of the local governments are tolerated and left unchecked.
Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and political subdivisions
should enjoy genuine meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals.63 In the case of De Leon v. Esguerra,64 the Court ruled that
even barangays are meant to possess genuine and meaningful local autonomy so that they
may develop fully as self-reliant communities.65
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot
and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."66 For the question of
whether the DILG may validly be appointed as interim caretaker, or assume a similar
position and perform acts pursuant thereto, is likely to resurrect again, and yet the question
may not be decided before the actual assumption, or the termination of said assumption
even.
So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness could lead to the wrong
impression that the challenged order and issuances are valid. Verily, that does not appear to
be the correct conclusion to make since by applying opposite precedents to the issues the
outcome points to invalidating the assailed order and memorandum circulars.
The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG
supervision, and whether the questioned "caretakership" order of the respondent judge and
the challenged issuances and acts of the DILG constitute control in derogation of the
Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of thebarangay, as the lowest LGU, and the Liga,
as a vehicle of governance and coordination.
As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing
unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community, and
as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and
considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled.67
On the other hand, the Liga ng mga Barangay68 is the organization of all barangays, the
primary purpose of which is the determination of the representation of the Liga in
the sanggunians, and the ventilation, articulation, and crystallization of issues
affecting barangay government administration and securing solutions thereto, through
proper and legal means.69 The Liga ng mga Barangay shall have chapters at the municipal,
city and provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels.70 The municipal and city
chapters of the Liga are composed of the barangay representatives from the municipality or
city concerned. The presidents of the municipal and city chapters of the Liga form the
provincial or metropolitan political subdivision chapters of the Liga. The presidents of the
chapters of theLiga in highly urbanized cities, provinces and the Metro Manila area and other
metropolitan political subdivisions constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.71
As conceptualized in the Local Government Code, the barangay is positioned to influence
and direct the development of the entire country. This was heralded by the adoption of the
bottom-to-top approach process of development which requires the development plans of
the barangay to be considered in the development plans of the municipality, city or
province,72 whose plans in turn are to be taken into account by the central government73 in
its plans for the development of the entire country.74 The Liga is the vehicle assigned to
make this new development approach materialize and produce results.
The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels, automatically
become ex-officiomembers of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan,respectively. They shall serve as such only
during their term of office as presidents of the Liga chapters, which in no case shall be
beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.75
The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal aim, namely: to promote the development
of barangaysand secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.76 In line with this,
the Liga is granted the following functions and duties:
a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the barangays and in
consonance with the policies, programs and projects of the national government;
b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for people's participation in local
government administration in order to promote untied and concerted action to achieve
country-wide development goals;
c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment within the
barangay;
d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials;
e) Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with government and non-
governmental organizations and thereby promote the social, economic and political well-
being of the barangays; andcralawlibrary
f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions which will bring
about stronger ties between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay
inhabitants.77
The Ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code. However,
they are empowered to make their own constitution and by-laws to govern their operations.
Sec. 507 of the Code provides:
Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All other matters not
herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local
government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-laws which are
hereby made suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided, That said Constitution
and By-laws shall always conform to the provision of the Constitution and existing laws.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted its own
Constitution and By-Laws. It provides that the corporate powers of the Liga, expressed or
implied, shall be vested in the board of directors of each level of the Liga which shall:
a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the said Liga; including the
power of appointment, assignment and delegation;
b) Have general management of the business, property, and funds of said Liga;
c) Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and expenditures for the
year, including the plans or schemes for funding purposes; andcralawlibrary
d) Have the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or member of the said
board on grounds cited and in the manner provided in hereinunder provisions.78
The National Liga Board of Directors promulgated the rules for the conduct of its Liga's
general elections.79 And, as early as 28 April 1997, the Liga National Chapter had already
scheduled its general elections on 14 June 1997.80
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the Constitution,
which reads in part:
Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the President's power of
supervision over local governments and his power of control of the executive departments
bureaus and offices.81 Similar to the counterpart provisions in the earlier Constitutions, the
provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.82
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al.,83 this Court defined supervision as
"overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his subordinates to
perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.84 In Taule v.
Santos,85 the Court held that the Constitution permits the President to wield no more
authority than that of checking whether a local government or its officers perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments.86 Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body.87
The case of Drilon v. Lim88 clearly defined the extent of supervisory power, thus:
'The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace
them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to
conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the
act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the rules are followed' 89
In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga Barangay?
Otherwise put, is theLiga legally susceptible to DILG suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez,90 where the Court ruled that the
President's power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as
his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Does the President's power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay,
which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice
ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association,
federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either
appointed or elected government officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng
mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining
the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and
crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and securing, through
proper and legal means, solutions thereto.91
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident, whether from
the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an aggroupment of barangays which
are in turn represented therein by their respective punong barangays. The representatives
of the Liga sit in an ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As
such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal
councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga
is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances and
formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang
barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of
development.
In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG as interim
caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176, directing
local government officials not to recognize David as the National Liga President and his
pronouncements relating to the affairs of the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it
even smacked of superciliousness and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government
agency which maintains coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government
units and its multi-level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect and
supportive in its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The
indispensable role played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the
promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and
respect of the other agencies of government. As the Court held in the case of San Juan v.
Civil Service Commission,92 our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty
upon which these provisions are based.93
When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage
and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the
National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at the
DILG's prayer for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga "to manage and
administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of
National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office" reveals that what the
DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. Even if said "caretakership" was
contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until a new set of officers assume office, the
fact remains that it was a conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution.
With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga, Secretary Barbers
nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No.
97-193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997
synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the
national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay; scheduled dates for the new provincial,
metropolitan and national chapter elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president
of Liga-Caloocan Chapter.
These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted direct
interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but more importantly, of the
barangay as an institution. The election of Liga officers is part of the Liga' s internal
organization, for which the latter has already provided guidelines. In succession, the DILG
assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over theLiga affairs, issued supplemental guidelines
for the election, and nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the
DILG wielded was the power of control which even the President does not have.
Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent Rayos as president of
the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled general Liga elections, although
petitioner David's term had not yet expired. The DILG substituted its choice, who was
Rayos, over the choice of majority of thepunong barangay of Caloocan, who was the
incumbent President, petitioner David. The latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as
an ex-officio member of the sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with
the Liga Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the DILG extended the appointment to respondent
Rayos although it was aware that the position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding
instituted by Rayos himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad
enough that the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made use of the
power with evident bias and partiality.
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILG's authority
over the Ligais limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it cannot lay down such
rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case,
the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in
the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any violation of the Liga's
Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules. If the National Liga Board and its
officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG should have ordered the Liga to conduct another
election in accordance with the Liga's own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated
guidelines. Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of
the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the
Chief Executive or his alter ego.
In the Bito-Onon94 case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar
as it authorized the filing of a Petition for Review of the decision of the Board of Election
Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation electoral protest, involved
the exercise of control as it in effect amended the guidelines already promulgated by
the Liga. The decision reads in part:
xxx. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it
is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers
merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor
does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done to conform for to the prescribed rules. He cannot
prescribe his own manner the doing of the act.
xxx
xxx. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have
over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and
other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring
compliance by local government units of such issuances. To monitor means to "watch,
observe or check" and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary
over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides,
any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be
resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.95
In Taule,96 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no authority to pass
upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers of katipunan ng mga barangay or
barangay councils. In that case, a protest was lodged before the Secretary of Local
Government regarding several irregularities in, and seeking the nullification of, the election
of officers of the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes.
Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of
officers and ordered a new one to be conducted. The Court ruled:
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President
over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon
the validity or regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to
do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give
him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be
achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the
Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political
affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments.97
All given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of
discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including DILG Memorandum Circulars
No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all entailed the
conferment or exercise of control - a power which is denied by the Constitution even to the
President.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 04
August 1997 isSET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

DILG Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for being
unconstitutional and ultra vires.

No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126661. December 3, 1999.]
JOSE S. ANDAYA and EDGARDO L. INCIONG, Petitioners, v. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, Cebu City, Branch 20, and THE CITY OF CEBU, Respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City,
Branch 20, commanding petitioner Jose S. Andaya as Regional Director, Regional Police
Command No. 7, to include P/Chief Inspector Andres Sarmiento in the list of five (5)
recommendees to be submitted to the mayor from which list the mayor shall select the City
Director, Cebu City Police Command (chief of police).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
On January 3, 1996, the position of City Director, Cebu City Police Command (chief of
police) became vacant after P/Supt. Antonio Enteria was relieved of command.
Sometime in January 1996, petitioner Andaya submitted to the City Mayor, Cebu City a list
of five (5) eligibles for the mayor to choose one to be appointed as the chief of police of
Cebu City. The mayor did not choose anyone from the list of five (5) recommendees
because the name of P/Chief Inspector Andres Sarmiento was not included therein.
However, petitioner Andaya refused to agree to Mayor Alvin B. Garcias request to include
the name of Major Andres Sarmiento in the list of police officers for appointment by the
mayor to the position of City Director (chief of police), Cebu City Police Command. Petitioner
Andayas refusal was based on his contention that Major Andres Sarmiento was not qualified
for the position of City Director (chief of police), Cebu City Police Command, under
NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 dated January 12, 1995, particularly Item No.
8, paragraph D thereof, which provides that the minimum qualification standards for
Directors of Provincial/City Police Commands, include completion of the Officers Senior
Executive Course (OSEC) and the rank of Police Superintendent.
Due to the impasse, on March 22, 1996, the City of Cebu filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Cebu City, a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order against P/Chief Supt. Jose S. Andaya
and Edgardo L. Inciong, Regional Director, National Police Commission. 2
On April 10, 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court their respective answer to the
complaint. Petitioners stated that the power to designate the chief of police of Cebu City
(City Director, Cebu City Police Command) is vested with the Regional Director, Regional
Police Command No. 7. However, the mayor is authorized to choose the chief of police from
a list of five (5) eligibles submitted by the Regional Director. In case of conflict between the
Regional Director and the mayor, the issue shall be elevated to the Regional Director,
National Police Commission, who shall resolve the issue within five (5) working days from
receipt and whose decision on the choice of the chief of police shall be final and executory.
Thus, petitioners prayed for dismissal of the complaint for lack of legal basis and failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. 3
On April 18, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner
Jose S. Andaya enjoining him from replacing C/Insp. Andres Sarmiento as OIC Director or
Chief of Police of the Cebu City Police Command by designating another as OIC Chief of
Police or appointing a regular replacement for said officer, and, from submitting to the
mayor a list of five (5) eligibles which did not include the name of Major Andres Sarmiento.
4
On July 12, 1996, the trial court rendered decision in favor of respondent City of Cebu, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as against defendants, declaring that P/CInsp. Andres Sarmiento is qualified under
RA 6975 to be appointed as Chief Director or Chief of Police of the Cebu City Police
Command and whose name must be included in the list of five (5) eligibles recommended as
regular replacement to the position of the Chief of Police of said Cebu City Police Command.
"The writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued in this case against defendants and
their agents, or, representatives or any other persons acting for and in their behalf enjoining
and preventing them from replacing P/CInsp. Andres Sarmiento as OIC Chief of Police of
Cebu City Police Command by designating anyone from the eligibles recommended in the
two (2) lists thereof submitted to Mayor Garcia or from any other list of said eligible
recommendees for said position is hereby made permanent.
"Let a permanent writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued against defendant Jose
S. Andaya or his successor ordering the latter to include Major Andres Sarmiento in the list
of five (5) eligible persons recommended for the replacement to the position of Chief of
Police of Cebu City Police Command.
"SO ORDERED.
"Cebu City, July 12, 1996.
"(s/t) FERDINAND J. MARCOS
"Judge" 5
In due time, petitioners filed with the trial court their joint motion for reconsideration 6 on
the ground that the decision is contrary to Section 51 of Republic Act 6975 which only
empowers the mayor to choose one (1) from the five (5) eligibles recommended by the
Regional Police Director to be named chief of police. The mayor cannot superimpose his will
on the recommending authority by insisting that his protg be included in the list of five
eligibles from which the chief of police is to be chosen.chanrobles law library
On September 11, 1996, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration ruling
that no new matters had been raised therein. 7

Hence, this petition 8 for review on certiorari on pure question of law. 9
On June 11, 1997, we gave due course to the petition. 10
At issue is whether or not the Mayor of Cebu City may require the Regional Director,
Regional Police Command No. 7, to include the mayors protg in the list of five (5)
eligibles to be recommended by the Regional Police Director to the mayor from which the
mayor shall choose the City Director, City Police Command (chief of police) City of Cebu.
We resolve the issue against the position of the city mayor.
Republic Act No. 6975, Section 51, gives authority to the mayor of Cebu City 11 to choose
the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Director,
Regional Police Command No. 7.
The National Police Commission has issued Memorandum Circular No. 95-04, dated January
12, 1995, for the implementation of Republic Act No. 6975. It provides that among the
qualifications for chief of police of highly urbanized cities are (1) completion of the Officers
Senior Executive Course (OSEC) and (2) holding the rank of Police Superintendent.
performing his statutory function. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 18,
1996, is contrary to law and thus void. Similarly, the lower courts decision sustaining the
City Mayors position suffers from the same legal infirmity.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, dated July 12, 1996, in Civil Case No. CEB-18545. In lieu
thereof, the Court renders judgment upholding the sole discretion of the Regional Director,
Regional Police Command No. 7, to submit to the mayor of Cebu City a list of five (5)
eligibles from which the mayor shall choose the chief of police. In case of the mayors
refusal to make his choice within a given period due to disagreement as to the eligible
nominees, the issue shall be submitted to the Regional Director, National Police Commission,
whose decision shall be final.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The mayor of Cebu City submits that Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 of the National Police
Commission prescribing such additional qualifications is not valid as it contravenes the law.

We do not agree. Under Republic Act No. 6975, Section 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be
deputized as representative of the Commission (National Police Commission) in his territorial
jurisdiction and as such the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of police from a
list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Police Regional Director. The City Police Station
of Cebu City is under the direct command and control of the PNP Regional Director, Regional
Police Command No. 7, and is equivalent to a provincial office. 12 Then, the Regional
Director, Regional Police Command No. 7 appoints the officer selected by the mayor as the
City Director, City Police Command (chief of police) Cebu City. It is the prerogative of the
Regional Police Director to name the five (5) eligibles from a pool of eligible officers
screened by the Senior Officers Promotion and Selection Board, Headquarters, Philippine
National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City, without interference from local executives. In
case of disagreement between the Regional Police Director and the Mayor, the question shall
be elevated to the Regional Director, National Police Commission, who shall resolve the
issue within five (5) working days from receipt and whose decision on the choice of the Chief
of Police shall be final and executory. 13 As deputy of the Commission, the authority of the
mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited
power of selecting one from among the list of five eligibles to be named the chief of police.
Actually, the power to appoint the chief of police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional
Director, Regional Police Command No. 7. Much less may the mayor require the Regional
Director, Regional Police Command, to include the name of any officer, no matter how
qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor. The purpose is to enhance police
professionalism and to isolate the police service from political domination.

Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in granting preliminary injunction that
effectively restrained the Regional Director, Regional Police Command, Region 7, from