ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION V.

CITY OF CEBU
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION V. CITY OF CEBU

FACTS: Ordinance No. 207 was passed by the Municipal Board of Cebu, requiring the shipping concerns
whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National
Government to pay for wharfage. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation paid the wharfage charges under protest.
The petitioner questioned the validity of the said ordinance contending that the said ordinance could not
have been enacted because the right to collect wharfage in question belongs to the National Government.
Respondent on the other hand cited Sec 17 (w) of the Charter of Cebu which gives the Municipal Board
the power xxx To fix the charges to be paid by all watercrafts landing at or using public wharves, docks,
levees, or landing places. They further contest that the legislature made no distinction between those
owned by the National Government and those owned by the City of Cebu. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not under its charter, the City of Cebu may provide by ordinance for the collection of
wharfage from shipping concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city
but owned by the National Government.

HELD: The City of Cebu may not provide by ordinance for the collection of wharfage from shipping
concerns whose vessels dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the National
Government because Sec 17 (w) of the Charter of Cebu as cited by the respondent in consonance with
its preceding section, would refer only to those public wharves or landing places owned by the City of
Cebu and not to those owned by the National Government under the exclusive supervision of the Bureau
of Customs, according to section 1142 of the Revised Administrative Code. Legislative intent must be
ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular
provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction.

RCBC vs. IAC G.R. No. 74851, December 9, 1999

Facts: On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a Petition for

Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments with the SEC.

RCBC, one of the creditors listed in BF Homes inventory of creditors and

liabilities, on October 26, 1984, requested the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to
extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF
Homes. BF Homes opposed the auction sale and the SEC ordered the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioners filing of a bond. Presumably
unaware of the filing of the bond on the very day of theauction sale, the sheriff
proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest bidder for
the properties auctioned. But because of the proceedings in the SEC, the sheriff
withheld the delivery to RCBC of the certificate of sale covering the auctioned
properties.

On March 13, 1985, despite the SEC case, RCBC filed with RTC an action for
mandamus against the provincial sheriff of Rizal to compel him to execute in
its favor a certificate of sale of the auctioned properties.
On March 18, 1985, the SEC appointed a Management Committee for BF
Homes.
Consequently, the trial court granted RCBCs motion for judgment on the
pleading ordering respondents to execute and deliver to petitioner the
Certificate of Auction Sale.

On appeal, the SC affirmed CAs decision (setting aside RTCs decision

dismissing the mandamus case and suspending issuance to RCBC of new land
titles until the resolution of the SEC case) ruling that whenever
adistressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and suspension of
payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference but stand
on equal footing with other creditors. Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: When should the suspension of actions for claims against BF

Homes take effect?

Held: The issue of whether or not preferred creditors of distressed

corporations stand on equal footing with all other creditors gains relevance and
materiality only upon the appointment of a management committee,
rehabilitation receiver, board or body.

Upon cursory reading of Section 6, par (c) of PD 902-A, it is adequately clear

that suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation
is counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management
committee or a rehabilitation takes effect as soon as the application or a
petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may to some, be more logical and
wise but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law.
To insist on such ruling, no matter how practical and noble would be to
encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law --- plainly
judicial legislation.

Once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is

appointed pursuant to PD 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed
corporation pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly; Suspension shall not prejudice or render ineffective the
status of a secured creditor as compared to a totally unsecured creditor. What it
merely provides is that all actions for claims against the corporation,
partnership or association shall be suspended. This should give the receiver a
chance to rehabilitate the corporation if there should still be a possibility for
doing so. In the event that rehabilitation is no longer feasible and claims against
the distressed corporation would eventually have to be settled, the secured
creditors shall enjoy preference over the unsecured creditors subject only to the
provisions of the Civil Code on Concurrence and Preferences of Credit.
China Banking Corporation vs Ortega
Digest
Facts:

Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest Development Corporation. To
satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest
Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of
garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its
cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit in the
CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and
not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to comply with a
court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions
of Republic Act No. 1405 ( Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any
information concerning to bank deposits.

Issue:

Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court processes garnishing
the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

Held:

No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B & B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether
or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking
Corporation only for the purposes of the garnishment issuedby it, so that the bank would hold the same
intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against
examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to
insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and the existence of the
deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard
to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of
their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash
and depositing the same in a bank. (China Banking Corporation vs Ortega, G.R. No. L-34964, 31 January
1973)
Case Brief: Chavez v JBC
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that
JBCs action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses
which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase a representative of
congress refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two
houses are permanent and mandatory components of congress as part of the bicameral system of
legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative
from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBCs practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the
constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase a representative of
congress should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house,
not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the
legislative.
It is evident that the definition of Congress as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role
of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term
Congress must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.

RIMOS-VIDAL VS COMELEC
Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual
absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of
the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before

the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estradas
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him
by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered
the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of
Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is
complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional
interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardons text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C,
provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons,
along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all
the Members of the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of

election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2)
cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations
of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by
way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights, expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of
the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in

relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in
absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who
has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether
local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the
conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective
office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it
is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of
the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to

show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the
meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor
restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondents

promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated
the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make
this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that
the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended
to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21,
2015)