Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, G.R. No. 151258

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154954
Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO
ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR.,
JUNEL ANTHONY AMA,
ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO,
VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO
GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA
III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME
MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO
MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ,
AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO
SABBAN, PERCIVAL BRIGOLA,
PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS
KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO
BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO, andRONAN DE
GUZMAN,
Respondents.
x-------------------------x

FIDELITO DIZON, G.R. No. 155101

Petitioner,

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-------------------------x

GERARDA H. VILLA, G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA SERENO, and
II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN REYES, JJ.
RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO Promulgated:
ADRIANO, February 1, 2012
Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case
on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. [1] Due in
large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were
organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the
University of the Philippines in Baguio City.[6]

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case
the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe
a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime
unless it is made so by law.[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act
is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the
law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong
public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the
facts allowed in evidence.
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No.
155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).

FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the
trial court,[9] are as follows:
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila
University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo
Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
 On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members
of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled
to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which required
the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the
floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were
held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being
hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made
to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for
the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito

Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites.
The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes
to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the
carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were

jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to
be resolved first.[12]

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No.
C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29
November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine
accused commenced anew.[14]

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation.
Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only
to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,

Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim,
Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas,
and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual guilt
was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
 2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,
Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20
days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of
the victim the sum of 30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio

Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of 50,000 and to pay the
additional amount of 1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial.[16]Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.[17]On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.[19]

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520
first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[20]
 While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the
subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death
of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning
the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in
CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied
due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present
evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not
apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused.[22]
As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons
right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented
separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been
considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He
argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact
insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise
been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional
initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional
paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out
that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites decided
that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to
do the paddling.[24]Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General
that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in
Lennys death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr.
Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if
taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the
victim.[26]
Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill
will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons
father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same
place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive
of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space
were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites the testimony of Lennys
co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true and that he was
just making it up.[27]
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated
by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the
testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the
leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters
chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny
through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his
alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and
concern for the victims well-being.

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520,
insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the
accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.[28] According to the
Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy
to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at
the time Lenny died.
In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have
been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that
the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide,
pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article provides:
Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable.

According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of
conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of
the crime.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona

 Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for
the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17
May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the
dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for
accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall
have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340
involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For
various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005,
or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time.
She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original
records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the
appellate court.

We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes
denial of due process;

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adrianofor violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;
3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court
and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;

4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION

Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to
final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a
source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal
liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability
directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception
of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and
the 5thand 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that it will not entertain
any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented their
respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence
on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall
therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]
However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open
court that his client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence.
Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who
had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial courts
Order that the parties should be ready at all times down the line, the trial court
expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of
his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks
later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present
evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed
a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously
scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates
originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the
same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of
the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court
ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that
right.[41]

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of

law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him,
the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered
justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8
September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was
ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he
did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on
being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he
contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones
defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every
stage of the proceedings.[44]

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the

defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995
hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of the
Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing
was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to
attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety
bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence
because of his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling
against the Order, we held thus:
 Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely
a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates

xxxxxxxxx

Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not

have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the

present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally
made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence.
In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences
of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain
to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a
waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went
ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing
Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case

involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the
accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally conduct
a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since
counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial
evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled
to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing
dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly,
the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons
testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates
constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver

of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding
of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial
court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been
represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the
rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.[48]

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to

resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity
that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of
the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition
corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really
contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court
and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa
by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional
rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official
activity of the fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not request for the
extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned.[50]
For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one
judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme
Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon
would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for
almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to
decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed
to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that
they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their
co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the
movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require
were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[51]

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2)
and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial
free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated
when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause
or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements
of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the
defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of
delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.[57]

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. [58] As
a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a
violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on
double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order
of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy
from attaching.[62]

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case
against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation
of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the
following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case
below:

xxxxxxxxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals
and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.

xxxxxxxxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless
hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.

xxxxxxxxx
 [T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that
as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring
the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records
of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the
said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order
dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the
prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears,
however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the
disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said
court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002,
or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of
the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the
petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act
upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution
frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was
filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon,
Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or

inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the
accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation
of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases.[67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in
the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints
to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition
of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held
that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act
promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where
the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
 quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory
complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade
already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP

No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there
is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes
accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall
be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It
dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical
offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the
common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It
found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and
in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,[72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
 The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal
by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. [74] The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants
express consent.[75]

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict

of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear
out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents
the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of
securing a greater penalty.[76] We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal.[77]

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in
the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion.[80]

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law;
an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the
reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et
al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and
petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely
ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioners Comment x x x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when
it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy
by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. [86] The
Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only
by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to
hazing.[87]

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and
reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v.
Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors
of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore,
pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.

We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy
similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the
accused.[91]We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct
an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.
 In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of
the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him
were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can
be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical
attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a
prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity of the
penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner
as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950].
And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be
deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G.
4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to
rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug,
Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations
included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that
the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to
the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required.[95] The
reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that
the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims
injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even
serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.

On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own
findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings
that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple traumatic injuries
he suffered from the initiation rites.[100]Considering that the CA found that
the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it
was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical
injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be
liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended.
Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the
unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts
are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction
of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries

punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person,
punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other,
in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual
death occurs.[102]

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts,
in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own
findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of
bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we
therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a
crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a
felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling
against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it
was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.[104]

The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that
there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had
knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The
accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their
individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of
them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2
Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.

The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the
perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage
over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves
an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join a society of men
pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals,
just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal
laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to
make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as
well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as
hazing.

Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The
classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an
absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only
be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.[107]The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are
rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the
principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with
punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing
the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame
of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration.[111] Thus, it is
not enough to do what the law prohibits. [112] In order for an intentional felony to
exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]

The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements

of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act
done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[115] The second
element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts,
as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.[116] The last
element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.[117]

The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state
of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose
of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the
act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce the result.[121] On
the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together,
the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which
is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or
omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice
aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.[125]

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy

to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed
by means of doloor malice. The phrase coming to an agreement connotes the
existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted
on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial
lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a
felony committed by means of culpa.[128]
 The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital
ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent. [132] Furthermore, the
victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent
but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society. [135] It is said
that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with
organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that
elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new
students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these
values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked
to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain
membership through hazing.[141]

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student
wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for
a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters
long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to interview and to get to know
the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the
principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members. [144] Some
chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the
entire neophyte stage.[145]
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that
serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit,
pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization may
refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations,
like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147] It
encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually
involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149]

The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than
a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society
named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The
Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the
Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be
inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities
approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home
to each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were
brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series
of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa
balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow
of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a final step
in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the
his own blood.[156]

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the

Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following
instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that
inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.

Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth

classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent
physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate
themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a
congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West
Point.[158]

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-

victim was injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation
ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the
mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight
to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over
which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on
each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the
barrel.[162]

In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune,

North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper
jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.[163] The victims were
shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through
the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University

chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship
program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical
abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a
heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which
active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the
ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station
circle of physical abuse.[167]

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing

by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in
Alabama.[168]The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump
into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit;
(2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto
walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and
yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing
chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and
yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2
a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and
(7) running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as
they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.[169]
In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester
Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi
Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which included various
forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.[171]

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim

suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation
rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical
hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.[173]

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought

initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-
06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series
of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates,
was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.[175] In these
rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two evenings, he received
approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing,
the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the
four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]

The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by
fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his
or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity
among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship
and common cause.[182]

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

 The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in
the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so
prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It
was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing
conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom.[185]
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts
of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or
criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil
statutes proscribing hazing.[187]Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe
situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in
case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing
that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony. [190] In a Class 4
felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and
not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly
weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in
serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily injury. [194] A
person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two
(2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant
to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial
risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a
Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to
exceed seven years.[197]

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. [198] An
individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state
jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180 days. [199] Under
Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-
degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law
provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may
be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin,
a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another. [203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
10 years, or both.[204]

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies,
as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma
Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for
wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until
1994.[206]

The existence of animus interficendi or intent to

kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does
not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is
proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty
mind whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise they are
still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with
the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did
not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes.
We shall no longer disturb this finding.

As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court
and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny
Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of
homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will
while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had been
stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a
hand in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very
clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is
unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and
should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime
of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

 The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to
determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context
in which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to
reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as
to what to expect during the next three days and we were told
the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were also
told about the fraternity song, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to
ride a van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan
City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our
arms and then the driver of the van and other members of the
Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka,
Asuncion Patay ka and the people outside pound the van,
rock the van, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice
these remarks uttered upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their
voices, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and
through, what were the voices or utterances that you heard?

Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during
the rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?

xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being
inflicted, was there any utterances by anybody?

Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it
was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them
enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?

Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether matigas
pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you
quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances

simultaneously, I could not really pin point who uttered those
words, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this
Bicol Express?

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the
utterances that you remember?

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh,
he would say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito ay
pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that would in turn sort of
justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead
of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after on
was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that this guy, his
father stole the parking space of my father, sir. So, thats why
he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having
your family have his brother killed, what was your response?

Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making
it up sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that incident.
However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on
uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify
him and to give me harder blows, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny
Villas father stole the parking space allotted for his father,
do you recall who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?

Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different
people who heard from time to time, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against
Lenny Villas father was made?

Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and
when Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered those
statements, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he
stand up and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it,
sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned
also that accusations made by Dizon you or your family had
his brother killed, can you inform this Honorable Court
what exactly were the accusations that were charged against
you while inflicting blows upon you in particular?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew
that his family who had his brother killed, and he said that his
brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story that
he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he
continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident
was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of
the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was
drinking beer, and he said and I quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano
ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang
nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness Thats all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a
physician came around as promised to you earlier?

Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you
stated that there was a briefing that was conducted immediately
before your initiation as regards to what to expect during the
initiation, did I hear you right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to
expect during the initiation?

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we

would be mocked at, sir.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc.,
and the likes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical
contact?

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to
school. All the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs,
sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves,
it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face
would be slapped, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises
on your body but that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that
would create bruises to your body?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or
paddle, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation
procedures is psychological in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical
initiation, meaning body contact, is that correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation,
correct?
Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to
terrify you, scare you, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation
intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into
perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?

Witness Sometimes sir, yes.

Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said
or he was supposed to have said according to you that your
family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was
an NPA, do you remember saying that?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon
that you did not believe him because that is not true, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the
purpose as I have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring
you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is
correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was
saying those things was because he wanted to inflict injury.

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?

Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was
hitting me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same
forms of initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that
earlier, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked
you said something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?
 Witness No, sir.

Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the
masters would run on your thighs, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating
masters not only on you but also on the other neophytes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation
was administered by one master, was also administered by
one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another
master on the other neophyte, this is correct?

Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the
CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused
were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of
the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation
rites.[214]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of
substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for
those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the
CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa,
thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon
who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet
Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on
Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father.
With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the
existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.

As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the

entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and
understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were
briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them.
They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard
fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka,
Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin,
or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused
Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny
Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the
Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all
part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological
pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted
the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all
in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes
admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of

hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing
Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.

xxxxxxxxx

So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but
the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already
described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the
readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire
to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organizationor playing and
putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking
him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is
that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building these are
the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations,
sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public hearing
 testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead
to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa.
Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation.
This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon
and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the
veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only
confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not true and that [Dizon]
was just making it up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances
of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were
not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
fraternity initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of

homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence
of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate
the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the
fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious

intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable
doubt

The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor
General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable
for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to
266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be
coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a
person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions.
Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and
intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself,
make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of

physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically
liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a
bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of
discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment.
In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries,
this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility
[w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the
means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will,
hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that
as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious
group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual
or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head
against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a
kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by expelling through those
means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the
death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial
courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and
instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.

Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting
physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a
felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to
Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be
judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.[227] What persons do
is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed,
the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted
may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.

Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that
there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and
that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to traditional
initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies
Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms
and legs.
In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again
subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened
on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.

During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes.
The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and
shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological
pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical
blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or round; to serve
food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they
needed.

These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days before the
rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His
father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone
for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to
undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of
facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the
Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what
to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that
traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve
beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness
Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that after a week, you can already
play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he
knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden paddle
would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)
 Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first
day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing
clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking,
paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely,
and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in
the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the
acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second
night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were
officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling,
which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon
was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly
the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries,
which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care
of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious
intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of
traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is
uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must
therefore be taken into consideration.

The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries
was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the
initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following
discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished
under the Revised Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death,

the charge would be murder or homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated

homicide or serious physical injuries.
 SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does
so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new

offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either

composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement
of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land
that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person
can become a member without being held criminally liable.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a
mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage

hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more
charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling

difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific
crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if
one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of
hazing.
 To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter
the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider
having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even
committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That
is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o
pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga
kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the

distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of
the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a
novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into the
intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to

initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits
that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or
a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent,
but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being

criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and
fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention
is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical
pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters
intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of
the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain
can easily escape responsibility and say, We did not have the intention to kill.
 This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention
to kill or maim.

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the
prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate
offenses.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that

initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if
it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x

x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the

prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove
intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if

that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should
be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of
whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator
Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection
to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as
necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two
persons with or without consent.

To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of

sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President,
that sodomy be modified by the phrase without consent for purposes of this section.

SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy

with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done
without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from
hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person
joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or
without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.

This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices
that attend initiation which may have been announced with or without physical
infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is
announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and
therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment.
What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.

The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from
himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the
individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the

distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society
sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some
individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the
private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways
that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that
the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction
of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that
does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted
the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator
said, Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that
reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we would
not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill,
because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain
or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
 act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates
the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?

(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)

Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent,

Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea
of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special
law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code.
That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the
core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did
not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing,
founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a
cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct
or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have
consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice
of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.

Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice

(now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the
people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing,
[an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it
may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows
recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not
clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio
pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala
in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of
hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

The accused fraternity members guilty of

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that
the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The
Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without

malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results
by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by
the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done
without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and
the danger is not openly visible. [244]

The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an

act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do
so constitutes negligence.[246]
 As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with
recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree
of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of
causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid
damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is
required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or
diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to
the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of
care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure

secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victims heart
could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite
blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of the blood supply
from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and
capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of
multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick,
and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained
by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like. [257] Repeated blows
to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the
circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The
officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other
organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale
due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was
concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim
suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs,
resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital
organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of
the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the
testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed,
kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and
thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped
on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez
testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal
officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is
as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross
examinations of defense counsels that the injuries that you have
enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously
marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by themselves
would not cause the death of the victim. The question I am going
to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these
injuries marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?

Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it
is not fair for us to isolate such injuries here because we are
talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car
would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in
human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not
in part.[267]

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members
were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount

to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must
be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause
them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal
officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered,
criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and
contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.

It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon
and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites.
Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened
initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication
of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation.
We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys
initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative
consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during
hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the

misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There
must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the
fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as
tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared
being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a
choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances,
they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands
to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.

Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and
Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity
members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable
by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting
the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing
laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove,
beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the

applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

The accused liable to pay damages

The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts
of 50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the
amount of 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death
of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the
CAs award of indemnity in the amount of 50,000.

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages,

including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as
the claim is supported by tangible documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award
actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are
bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during
trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim
for actual damages.[277]

The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered
on account of the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of
the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding

petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and
penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly
and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on
all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision
until satisfaction.[280]Costs de oficio.
 The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is
hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano,
are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the Opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992

ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, from the decision* of the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, in Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on appeal to the respondent
appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR No. 04889.

The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts of the offense charged, have been
clearly illustrated, in the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official counsel for the
public respondent, thus:

Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but a did not
have complete equipment that could make his venture workable. He also had another problem, and
that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, he lacked funds with which to purchase the
necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner, representing Ultra
Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President
of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment
of which Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who fully bared that he had no sufficient
funds to buy the equipment needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS Finance and
Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity) advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that
Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could
accommodate petitioner and provide him credit facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased,
amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey
Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the
warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in
question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)

The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:

 1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT Before or upon delivery of each item of Equipment,
the Lessee shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums specified in Schedule A
to serve as security for the faithful performance of its obligations.

This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon the satisfactory completion of the
entire period of Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of this Article. (Ibid., p.
17)

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS
Finance would lease the garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with
the option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered
to petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested
through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific
Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2)
checks dated July 29, 1983 were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the
subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges subject of the petition, were held momentarily
by Corazon Teng, on the request of Magno as they were not covered with sufficient funds. These
checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos. 006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28,
1983 and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated
September 28, 1983, in the amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43).

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipments. It was then on this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the
one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and
promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited
they were returned for the reason "account closed." (Ibid., p. 43)

After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the accused-petitioner
was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows:

. . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of

violations of B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to imprisonment for one year in
each Criminal Case Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay to complainant
the respective amounts reflected in subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)

Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated decision of the court a quo, this Court is
intrigued about the outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were intended by the parties,
the petitioner on the one hand and the private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty
deposit" equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company. Corazon Teng is one of the
officers of Mancor, the supplier of the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the
high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of the repair service equipment, which
was arranged at the instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the transaction.

By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the
"purchase/lease" value of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that the "cash out"
made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It
would have been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of equipment on or about the
termination of the lease-purchase agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of
the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the purchase price. As the transaction did not
ripen into a purchase, but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned equipment, which
were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to
economic constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the warranty deposit should
not be charged against the petitioner.

To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was
not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt",
to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount
was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by
the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks
he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his
knowledge on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and
immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty
deposit".

It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the
"warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry
and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in
this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized
unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively
called "warranty deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of
a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction
of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the
special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted
with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.

This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or lessee referred to above in the lease
agreement knew that the amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere accommodation-
arrangements with somebody thru Joey Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund
of said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement provision to the contrary. To argue
that after the termination of the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable in full to
Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the "warranty deposit" for his official or personal
use, is to stretch the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.

For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor encourage
users of the system to enrich themselves through manipulations and circumvention of the noble
purpose and objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of jeopardizing honest-to-
goodness transactions with some color of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning
businessmen who are the pillars of society.

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function
of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not
clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be
punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of
Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped
at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious
transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that
moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This
disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external
means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice
Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused,
the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for
value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the
checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer",
whose operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in favor of the accused, however, by the
open admission of the appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the "warranty
deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was convicted, as shown below:

Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that the obligation of the accused to
complainant had been extinguished by the termination of the leasing agreement
by the terms of which the warranty deposit advanced by complainant was refundable
to the accused as lessee and that as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any
liquidation of said amount nor returned the same to the accused, it may he assumed
that the amount was already returned to the complainant. For these allegations, even
if true, do not change the fact, admitted by appellant and established by the
evidence, that the four checks were originally issued on account or for value. And as
We have already observed, in order that there may be a conviction under the from
paragraph of Section 2 of B.P. Blg 22 with respect to the element of said offense
that the check should have been made and issued on account or for value it is
sufficient, all the other elements of the offense being present, that the check must
have been drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.

Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the extinguishment, after the issuance of
the checks, of the obligation in consideration of which the checks were issued, would
have resulted in placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the prohibition in
Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no satisfactory proof that there was such an
extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly points out that appellant had not
adduced any direct evidence to prove that the amount advanced by the complainant
to cover the warranty deposit must already have been returned to her. (Rollo, p. 30)

It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even disregarded the cardinal rule that the
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, the
same court even expected the petitioner-appellant to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty
of the crime charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the warranty deposit has
already been taken back by Mrs. Teng when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the
transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of her side-line. Thus, even if she may
have gotten back the value of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the
petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that "bounced".

That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking into the real nature of the warranty
deposit is evident from the following pronouncement:

And the trail court concluded that there is no question that the accused violated BP
Blg. 22, which is a special statutory law, violations of which are mala prohibita. The
court relied on the rule that in cases ofmala prohibita, the only inquiry is whether or
not the law had been violated, proof of criminal intent not being necessary for the
conviction of the accused, the acts being prohibited for reasons of public policy and
the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal intent being unavailing in
prosecutions for said offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)

The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of the postdated checks by the
petitioner, i.e., whether they were drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the following definitions of the catch-terms
"warranty" and "deposit", for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the more, the
alleged crime could not have been committed by petitioner:

a) Warranty A promise that a proposition of fact is true. A promise that certain

facts are truly as they are represented to be and that they will remain so: . . . (Black's
Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, (1979) p. 1423)

A cross-reference to the following term shows:

Fitness for Particular Purpose:

Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or modified,
an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)

b) Deposit: Money lodged with a person as an earnest or security for the

performance of some contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his undertaking.
It may be deemed to be part payment and to that extent may constitute the
purchaser the actual owner of the estate.

To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to put. To lodge for safe- keeping or
as a pledge to intrust to the care of another.

The act of placing money in the custody of a bank or banker, for safety or
convenience, to be withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under rules and
regulations agreed on. Also, the money so deposited, or the credit which the
depositor receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly accepted and generally
understood among bankers and by the public, includes not only deposits payable on
demand and for which certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may be issued,
payable on demand, or on certain notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning,
petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit
and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez,
to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament
was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding the lease agreement the financing of
which was covered by L.S. Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the accused-petitioner is hereby

ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-23625 November 25, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MARIANO TERRADO, PEDRO TERRADO and CASIMIRO FLORES, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No.L-23626 November 25, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
REMEDIOS GUNDRAN, PEDRO TERRADO, CASIMIRO FLORES, and BRUNO
GUNDRAN, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-23627 November 25, 1983

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellants,

vs.
GERTRUDES OBO, PEDRO TERRADO, CASIMIRO FLORES, and BRUNO
GUNDRAN. defendants-appellees.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

German G. Vilgera for defendants-appellees.

CONCEPCION, JR., J.: +. wph!1

APPEAL from the orders of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, all dated April 15, 1963,
which dismissed Criminal Case No. 7613 of said court, entitled: "The People of the Philippines,
plaintiff, versus Mariano Terrado, et al., defendants"; Criminal Case No. 7614, entitled: the People of
the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Remedios Gundran, et al., defendants"; and Criminal Case No.
7615, entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gertrudes Obo, et al., defendants", on
the ground that "the crimes committed by the accused are either perjury defined under Section 129
of the Commonwealth Act No. 141 and punished under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, or
offenses relating to 'unlawful occupation and destruction of public forest' defined and punished under
Section 2751 of the Revised Administrative code, as amended by Acts 115 and 171" and had
already prescribed.

The appellant maintains that the facts charged in the informations constitute the crimes of
falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal
Code, and that the criminal actions have not Yet prescribed.

The records of the cases show that in November, 1951 and May, 1952, Gertrudes Obo, Remedios
Gundran, and Mariano Terrado applied for, and were issued free patents for contiguous parcels of
land situated in Barrio Paculago Ragay, Camarines Sur, each containing an area of more than 23
hectares, and more particularly known as Lots 7, 8 and 9 of Plan Psu-1 25902, respectively. As the
said parcels of land were allegedly forest land and, hence, not disposable, Mariano Terrado,
Remedios Gundran, and Gertrudes Obo were charged before the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur on March 13, 1962, in three separate informations for falsification of public
documents, defined and penalized under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as
Criminal Case Nos. 7613, 7614, and 7615, respectively, together with Pedro Terrado, a licensed
private land surveyor; Casimiro Flores, a public land inspector of the Bureau of Lands; and Bruno
Gundran, the District Land Officer of District No. 10 of the Bureau of Lands, for having conspired,
confederated, cooperated together, and helped one another, through false and fraudulent
misrepresentations in wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with full knowledge of their falsity, preparing
or causing to be prepared, documents containing false narration of facts, more particularly, the (1)
applications for free patent; (2) notices of application for free patent; (3) final inspection reports; and
(4) first indorsements of District Land Officer Bruno Gundran, wherein they made it appear to the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that the applicants
possessed all the necessary qualifications and had complied with all the requirements of law to
entitle them to a free patent, when in truth and in fact, as they all fully well knew, all their
manifestations were false and fraudulent and that the said applicants had not complied with any or
all of the requirements of the law to entitle them to a free patent. The informations further alleged
that Casimiro Flores and Bruno Gundran had taken advantage of their respective official positions in
making the untruthful statements. Before the arraignment, the defendants filed separate motions to
quash the informations on the ground that the crimes charged in the informations do not constitute
the offense of falsification of public documents, and that the same had already prescribed. After
proper hearing, the trial court dismissed the informations as aforesaid. Hence, the present recourse.

While the informations sufficiently alleged the commission of falsification of public documents under
Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the offenses alleged to have been committed have already
prescribed since the preparation and submission of false affidavits in support of a petition or claim
respecting lands of the public domain is also punishable as perjury under Sec. 129 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, which reads, as follows: t.hqw

Sec. 129. Any person who present or causes to be presented, or cooperates in the
presentation of, any false application, declaration, or evidence, or makes or causes
to be made or cooperates in the making of a false affidavit in support of any petition,
claim, or objection respecting lands of the public domain, shall be deemed guilty of
perjury and punished as such.

Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P
5,000.00. 1 Prison mayor is an afflictive penalty, 2 and hence, prescribes in 15 years. 3 Perjury, upon
the other hand, is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, 4 or from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months,
which is correctional in nature,5 and prescribes in ten (10) years. 6 However, Public Act No. 3326, as
amended by Act 3585 and Act 3763, provides that "violations penalized by special laws shall, unless
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for
offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after
four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c)
after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years;
and (d) after twelve years for any other offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more,
except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years", so that perjury which is
punishable by imprisonment of from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4)
months prescribes after eight years.
Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly
applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 As it would be more favorable
to the herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act 3326, as amended, in
connection with the prescriptive period of the offenses charged, the same should be applied.
Considering, therefore, that the offenses were alleged to have been committed during the period
from May 15, 1952 to February 2, 1953, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7613; from May 28, 1952
to August 18, 1952, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7614; and from November 16, 1951 to
February 21, 1952, with respect to

Criminal Case No. 7615, and the informations were filed only on March 13, 1962, or more than eight
(8) years after the said offenses were allegedly committed, the lower court correctly ruled that the
crimes in question had already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED. Without costs.

SO ORDERED. 1w ph1.t
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936

RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent.

Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June
11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both
under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below
had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of
prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of
the criminal action filed against him.

In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of
Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States
has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and
such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of
the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to
the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and
regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed.,
222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where
he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.],
423.) The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.

1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the
United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question
whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio
vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the
political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the
Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of
the Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution.
(Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to the great instrument, and
derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is
bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original
 jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional
provision.

2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by
the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but
merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction
as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original
jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers,
and consuls."

In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether the original
jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.

The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads
as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warrantoin the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code
of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other
cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
and habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction
possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the
jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.

The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the United States provides
that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the
Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent
Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of
the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)

3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon
the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more
than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No.
136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as
we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of
ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside.
By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution
until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction
granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in
force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the
jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not
inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to
the power of the National Assembly to amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P.
Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp.
620, 623.)

We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner,
an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

LAUREL, J., concurring:

In my humble opinion, there are three reasons why the jurisdiction of this court over the petitioner in
the instant case is concurrent and not exclusive. The strictly legal reason is set forth in the preceding
illuminating opinion. The other reasons are (a) historical and based on what I consider is the (b)
theory upon which the grant of legislative authority under our Constitution is predicated.

(a) As the provision in our Constitution regarding jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls, has been taken from the Constitution of the United States,
considerable light would be gained by an examination of the history and interpretation thereof in the
United States.

The fifth resolution of the New Jersey plan (Paterson resolutions of June 15, 1787) gave the
Supreme Court of the United States, the only national court under the plan, authority to hear and
determine "by way of appeal, in the dernier resort . . . all cases touching the rights of ambassadors .
. . ." This clause, however, was not approved. On July 18, the Convention of 1787 voted an
extraordinarily broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court extending "to cases arising under laws
passed by the general legislature, and to such other questions as involve the national peace and
harmony." This general proposition was considerably narrowed by Randolph in his draft of May 29
which, however, did not mention anything about ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
But the Committee of Detail, through Rutledge, reported on August 6 as follows: "Article XI, Section
3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend . . . to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls; . . . In . . . cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, . . . this jurisdiction shall be original . . . ."On September 12, the Committee on Style
reported the provision as follows: "Article III, Section 2. The judicial power shall extend . . . to all
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . . In (all) cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls . . . the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction." This provision was approved in the convention with hardly any amendment or debate
and is now found in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the Constitution of the United States. (The
Constitution and the Courts, Article on "Growth of the Constitution", by William M. Meigs, New York,
1924, vol. 1, pp. 228, 229. See also Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, Yale
University Press, 1934, 3 vols.; Warren, The Making of the Constitution, Boston, 1928, pp. 534-537.)
The word "original", however, was early interpreted as not exclusive. Two years after the adoption of
the Federal Constitution, or in 1789, the First Judiciary Act (Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat., c.
20, 687) was approved by the first Congress creating the United States District and Circuit Courts
which were nisi prius courts, or courts of first instance which dealt with different items of litigation.
The district courts are now the only federal courts of first instance, the circuit courts having been
abolished by the Act of March 3, 1911, otherwise known as the Judicial Code. The Judiciary Act of
1787 invested the district courts with jurisdiction, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all
suits against consuls or vice-consuls and the Supreme Court of the United States with original but
not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party. By the passage
of the Act of February 18, 1875 (18 Stat., 470, c. 137), the clause giving the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction was repealed and, since then state courts have had concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal courts over civil or criminal proceedings against a consul or vice-consul. At the present time,
the federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction "of suits or proceedings against ambassadors or
other or other public ministers, or their domestics or domestic servants, as a court of law can have
consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction, of all suits brought by
ambassadors or other public ministers, or in which a consul or vice-consul is a party." (Act of March
8, 1911, 36 Stat., 1156, reenacting sec. 687 of the Act of September 24, 1789; 28 U. S. C. A., sec.
341; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit, 1934, sec. 233.) The district courts now
have original jurisdiction of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls." (Act of March 3, 1911, 36
Stat., 1093; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 41, subsec. 18; Hopkins' Federal Judicial Code, 4th ed., by Babbit,
1934, sec. 24, par. 18.)

The Judiciary Act of 1789 was one of the early and most satisfactory acts passed by the Congress of
the United States. It has remained essentially unchanged for more than 145 years. It was prepared
chiefly by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut (1 Ann. Cong., 18, April 7, 1789) one of the ablest jurists in
the Constitutional Convention, who was later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States (1796-1800). It is interesting to note that 10 of the 18 senators and 8 of the members of the
House of the first Congress had been among the 55 delegates who actually attended the Convention
that adopted the federal Constitution (Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court
[Boston, 1935], p. 99). When, therefore, the first Congress approved the Judiciary Act of 1789
vesting in the Supreme Court original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits in which a consul or a
vice-consul shall be a party, express legislative interpretation as to the meaning of the word "original"
as not being exclusive was definitely made and this interpretation has never been repudiated. As
stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ames vs. Kansas ([1884], 111 U. S., 449; 4 S.
Ct., 437; 28 Law. ed., 482):

In view of the practical construction put on this provision of the Constitution by Congress, at
the very moment of the organization of the government, and of the significant fact that, from
1789 until now, no court of the United States has ever in its actual adjudications determined
to the contrary, we are unable to say that it is not within the power of Congress to grant to
the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has
been vested by the Constitution with original jurisdiction. It rests with the legislative
department of the government to say to what extent such grants shall be made, and it may
safely be assumed that nothing will ever be done to encroach upon the high privileges of
those for whose protection the constitutional provision was intended. At any rate, we are
unwilling to say that the power to make the grant does not exist.

Dicta in some earlier cases seem to hold that the word "original" means "exclusive" and as observed
by Justice Field in United States vs. Louisiana ([1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31 Law. ed., 69),
the question has given rise to some differences of opinion among the earlier members of the
Supreme Court of the United States. (See, for instance, dissenting opinion of Iredell, J., in U.
S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388.) Reliance was had on more or less general
expressions made by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch,
137; 2 Law. ed., 60), where it was said:

"If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has
declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has
declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without
substance." But Chief Justice Marshall who penned the decision in this case in 1803 had occasion
later, in 1821, to explain the meaning and extent of the pronouncements made in the Marbury case.
He said:

In the case of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 172; 2 Law. ed., 60), the
single question before the court, so far as that case can be applied to this, was, whether the
legislature could give this court original jurisdiction in a case in which the Constitution had
clearly not given it, and in which no doubt respecting the construction of the article could
possibly be raised. The court decided, and we think very properly, that the legislature could
not give original jurisdiction in such a case. But, in the reasoning of the court in support of
this decision, some expressions are used which go far beyond it. The counsel for Marbury
had insisted on the unlimited discretion of the legislature in the apportionment of the judicial
power; and it is against this argument that the reasoning of the court is directed. They say
that, if such had been the intention of the article, "it would certainly have been useless to
proceed farther than to define the judicial power, and the tribunals in which it should be
vested." The court says, that such a construction would render the clause, dividing the
jurisdiction of the court into original and appellate, totally useless; that "affirmative words are
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those which are affirmed; and, in this
case (in the case of Marbury vs. Madison), a negative or exclusive sense must be given to
them, or they have no operation at all." "It cannot be presumed," adds the court, "that any
clause in the Constitution is intended to be without effect; and, therefore, such a construction
is inadmissible, unless the words require it." The whole reasoning of the court proceeds upon
the idea that the affirmative words of the clause giving one sort of jurisdiction, must imply a
negative of any other sort of jurisdiction, because otherwise the words would be totally
inoperative, and this reasoning is advanced in a case to which it was strictly applicable. If in
that case original jurisdiction could have been exercised, the clause under consideration
would have been entirely useless. Having such cases only in its view, the court lays down a
principle which is generally correct, in terms much broader than the decision, and not only
much broader than the reasoning with which that decision is supported, but in some
instances contradictory to its principle. The reasoning sustains the negative operation of the
words in that case, because otherwise the clause would have no meaning whatever, and
because such operation was necessary to give effect to the intention of the article. The effort
now made is, to apply the conclusion to which the court was conducted by that reasoning in
the particular case, to one in which the words have their full operation when understood
affirmatively, and in which the negative, or exclusive sense, is to be so used as to defeat
some of the great objects of the article. To this construction the court cannot give its assent.
The general expressions in the case of Marbury vs. Madison must be understood with the
limitations which are given to them in this opinion; limitations which in no degree affect the
decision in that case, or the tenor of its reasoning. (Cohens vs. Virginia [1821], 6 Wheat.,
264, 400; 5 Law. ed., 257.)

What the Supreme Court in the case of Marbury vs. Madison held then was that Congress could not
extend its original jurisdiction beyond the cases expressly mentioned in the Constitution, the rule of
construction being that affirmative words of the Constitution declaring in what cases the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction must be construed negatively as to all other cases. (See Ex
parte Vallandigham [1864], 1 Wall., 243, 252; 17 Law. ed., 589; Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee [1816], 1
Wheat., 305, 330; 4 Law. ed., 97; U. S. vs. Haynes [D. C. Mass., 1887], 29 Fed., 691, 696.) That
was all.

It should be observed that Chief Justice Marshall concurred in the opinion in the case of
Davis vs. Packard (11833], 7 Pet., 276; 8 Law. ed., 684). In this case the jurisdiction of the state
court of New York over a civil suit against a foreign consul was denied solely on the ground that
jurisdiction had been conferred in such a case upon the district courts of the United States
exclusively of the state courts. Such a ground, says Justice Harlan in Bors vs. Preston ([1884], 111
U. S., 252; 4 S. Ct., 407; 28 Law. ed., 419), would probably not have been given had it been
believed that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court deprived Congress of the power
to confer concurrent original jurisdiction in such cases upon subordinate courts of the Union,
concluding that the decision in the case "may be regarded, as an affirmance of the constitutionality
of the Act of 1789, giving original jurisdiction in such cases, also, to District Courts of the United
States." Of the seven justices who concurred in the judgment in the case of Davis, five participated
in the decision of Osborn vs. Bank of the United States ([1824], 9 Wheat., 738; 6 Law. ed., 204), also
penned by Chief Justice Marshall and relied upon as authority together with
Marbury vs. Madison, supra.

The rule enunciated in Bors vs. Preston, supra, is the one followed in the United States. The
question involved in that case was whether the Circuit Court then existing had jurisdiction under the
Constitution and laws of the United States to hear and determine any suit whatever against the
consul of a foreign government. Justice Harlan said:

The Constitution declares that "The judicial power of the United States shall extend . . . to all cases
affecting ambassadors or other public ministers and consuls;" to controversies between citizens of a
state and foreign citizens or subjects; that "In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, . . . the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction;" and that in all other cases
previously mentioned in the same clause "The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both
as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."
The Judiciary Act of 1789 invested the District Courts of the United States with jurisdiction,
exclusively of the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls, except for
offenses of a certain character; this court, with "Original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all suits . . .
in which a consul or vice-consul shall be a party;" and the circuit courts with jurisdiction of civil suits
in which an alien is a party. (l Stat. at L., 76-80.) In this act we have an affirmance, by the first
Congress many of whose members participated in the Convention which adopted the Constitution
and were, therefore, conversant with the purposes of its framers of the principle that the original
jurisdiction of this court of cases in which a consul or vice-consul is a party, is not necessarily
exclusive, and that the subordinate courts of the Union may be invested with jurisdiction of cases
affecting such representatives of foreign governments. On a question of constitutional construction,
this fact is entitled to great weight.

In this case of Bors, Justice Harlan adopted the view entertained by Chief Justice Taney in the
earlier case of Gittings vs. Crawford (C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1, 10). In that case of Gittings, it
was held that neither public policy nor convenience would justify the Supreme Court in implying that
Congress is prohibited from giving original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls to the inferior
judicial tribunals of the United States. Chief Justice Taney said:

If the arrangement and classification of the subjects of jurisdiction into appellate and original,
as respects the Supreme Court, do not exclude that tribunal from appellate power in the
cases where original jurisdiction is granted, can it be right, from the same clause, to imply
words of exclusion as respects other courts whose jurisdiction is not there limited or
prescribed, but left for the future regulation of Congress? The true rule in this case is, I think,
 the rule which is constantly applied to ordinary acts of legislation, in which the grant of
jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that
jurisdiction is to be exclusive. In the clause in question, there is nothing but mere affirmative
words of grant, and none that import a design to exclude the subordinate jurisdiction of other
courts of the United States on the same subject-matter. (See also U.S. vs. Ravara [1793], 2
Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; United States vs. Louisiana [1887], 123 U. S., 36; 8 S. Ct., 17; 31
Law. ed., 69; Ex parte Baiz [1890],135 U. S., 403; 10 S. Ct., 854; 34 Law. ed., 222, denying
writ of prohibition Hollander vs. Baiz [D. C. N. Y., 1890]; 41 Fed., 732; Iasigi vs. Van de Carr
[1897], 166 U.S., 391; 17 S. Ct., 595; 41 Law. ed., 1045; Graham vs. Strucken [C. C. N. Y.,
1857]; 4 Blatchf., 58; Lorway vs. Lousada [D. C. Mass., 1866]; Fed. Cas., No. 8517; St.
Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay [C. C. N. Y., 1855]; 3 Blatchf., 259; State of Texas vs. Lewis [C.
C. Tex., 1882], 14 Fed., 65; State of Alabama vs. Wolffe (C. C. Ala., 1883], 18 Fed., 836,
837; Pooley vs. Luco [D. C. Cal., 1896], 76 Fed., 146.)

It is interesting to note that in the case of St. Luke's Hospital vs. Barclay, supra, the jurisdiction of
circuit courts exclusive of state courts over aliens, no exception being made as to those who were
consuls, was maintained. (See1 U. S. Stat. at L., c. 20, sec. 11, pp. 78, 79.)

From the history of, and the judicial interpretation placed on, clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the
Constitution of the United States it seems clear that the word "original" in reference to the jurisdiction
of Supreme Court of the United States over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, was never intended to be exclusive as to prevent the Congress from vesting concurrent
jurisdiction over cases affecting consuls and vice-consuls in other federal courts.

It should be observed that the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 placed cases affecting the official
representatives of foreign powers under the jurisdiction of Federal Supreme Court to prevent the
public peace from being jeopardized. Since improper treatment of foreign ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls may be a casus belli, it was thought that the federal government, which is
responsible for their treatment under international law, should itself be provided with the means to
meet the demands imposed by international duty. (Tucker, The Constitution of the United States
[1899], vol. II, 760, 772; vide, The Federalist, No. LXXXI, Ashley's Reprint [1917], 415.) Bearing in
mind in the distinction which international law establishes between ambassadors and other public
ministers, on the one hand, and consuls and other commercial representatives, on the other,
Congress saw it fit to provide in one case a rule different from the other, although as far as consuls
and vice-consuls are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, as already observed,
though original is not exclusive. But in the United States, there are two judicial systems, independent
one from the other, while in the Philippines there is but one judicial system. So that the reason in the
United States for excluding certain courts the state courts from taking cognizance of cases
against foreign representatives stationed in the United States does not obtain in the Philippines
where the court of the lowest grade is as much a part of an integrated system as the highest court.

Let us now turn our own laws as they affect the case of the petitioner. Undoubtedly Philippine courts
are not federal courts and they are not governed by the Judiciary Acts of the United States. We have
a judicial system of our own, standing outside the sphere of the American federal system and
possessing powers and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of our own Constitution and
laws.

The jurisdiction of our courts over consuls is defined and determined by our Constitution and laws
which include applicable treaties and accepted rules of the laws of nations. There are no treaties
between the United States and Uruguay exempting consuls of either country from the operation of
local criminal laws. Under the generally accepted principles of international law, declared by our
Constitution as part of the law of the nation (Art. II sec. 3, cl. 2), consuls and vice-consuls and other
commercial representatives of foreign nations do not possess the status and can not claim the
privilege and immunities accorded to ambassadors and ministers. (Wheaton, International Law, sec.
249; Kent, Commentaries, 44; Story on the Constitution, sec. 1660; Mathews, The American
Constitutional System [1932], 204, 205; Gittings vs. Crawford, C. C. Md., 1838; Taney's Dec., 1;
Wilcox vs. Luco, 118 Cal., 639; 45 Pac., 676; 2 C. J., 9 R. C. L., 161.) The only provisions touching
the subject to which we may refer are those found in the Constitution of the Philippines. Let us trace
the history of these provisions.

The report of the committee on the Judicial Power, submitted on September 29, 1934, did not
contain any provisions regarding cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.
The draft of the sub-committee of seven of the Sponsorship Committee, submitted on October 20,
1934, however, contains the following provision:

Article X, Section 2. The Supreme Court shall have such original jurisdiction as may be
possessed and exercised by the present Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution, which jurisdiction shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other foreign ministers and consuls . . . ." The Special Committee on the
Judiciary, composed principally of Delegates Vicente J. Francisco and Norberto Romualdez,
included in its report the provisions which now appear in sections 2 and 3 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Section 2 provides:

The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribed, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original
jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other ministers and consuls . . . . And the
second sentence of section 3 provides:

The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall include all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls.

The provision in our Constitution in so far as it confers upon our Supreme Court "original jurisdiction
over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls" is literally the same as that
contained in clause 2, section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution.

In the course of the deliberation of the Constitutional Convention, some doubt was expressed
regarding the character of the grant of "original jurisdiction" to our Supreme Court. An examination of
the records of the proceedings of the Constitutional convention show that the framers of our
Constitution were familiar with the history of, and the judicial construction placed on, the same
provision of the United States Constitution. In order to end what would have been a protracted
discussion on the subject, a member of the Special Committee on the Judiciary gave the following
information to the members of the Convention:

. . . Sr. Presidente, a fin de poder terminar con el Articulo 2, el Comite esta dispuesto a hacer
constar que la interpretacion que debe dard a la ultima parte de dicho articulo es la misma
interpretacion que siempre se ha dado a semejante disposicion en la Constitucion de los Estados
Unidos. (January 16,1935.) Without further discussion, the provision was then and there approved.

It thus appears that the provision in question has been given a well-settled meaning in the United
States the country of its origin. It has there received definite and hitherto unaltered legislative and
judicial interpretation. And the same meaning was ascribed to it when incorporated in our own
Constitution. To paraphrase Justice Gray of the Supreme Court of the United States, we are justified
in interpreting the provision of the Constitution in the light of the principles and history with which its
framers were familiar. (United States vs. Wong Kin Ark [1897], 169 U. S., 649; 18 S. Ct., 456; 42
Law. ed., 890, cited with approval in Kepner vs. United States, a case of Philippine origin [1904]; 195
U. S., 100; 49 Law. ed., 114.)

(b) What has been said hereinabove is not unnecessary attachment to history or idolatrous
adherence to precedents. In referring to the history of this provision of our Constitution it is realized
that historical discussion while valuable is not necessarily decisive. Rationally, however, the
philosophical reason for the conclusion announced is not far to seek if certain principles of
constitutional government are borne in mind. The constitution is both a grant of, and a limitation
upon, governmental powers. In the absence of clear and unequivocal restraint of legislative
authority, the power is retained by the people and is exercisable by their representatives in their
legislature. The rule is that the legislature possess plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. A prohibition to exercise legislative power is the exception. (Denio, C. J., in
People vs. Draper, 15 N.Y., 532, 543.) These prohibitions or restrictions are found either in the
language used, or in the purpose held in view as well as the circumstances which led to the adoption
of the particular provision as part of the fundamental law. (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1; 73
S. W., 811; 108 Am. St. Rep., 929.)

Subject to certain limitations, the Filipino people, through their delegates, have committed legislative
power in a most general way to the National Assembly has plenary legislative power in all matters of
legislation except as limited by the constitution. When, therefore, the constitution vests in the
Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, without specifying the exclusive character of the grant, the National Assembly is not
deprived of its authority to make that jurisdiction concurrent. It has been said that popular
government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind. It is unquestionable that
the mass of powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people, and that these
representatives are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which, by clear intendment, have that
effect. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, p.139, ante.) What the Constitution prohibits is merely the
deprivation of the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls and while it must be admitted that original jurisdiction if made
concurrent no longer remains exclusive, it is also true that jurisdiction does not cease to be original
merely because it is concurrent.

It is also quite true that concurrent original jurisdiction in this class of cases would mean the sharing
of the Supreme Court with the most inferior courts of cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls such that the Supreme Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the
lowest courts in our judicial hierarchy, the justice of the peace of the courts, in a petty case for the
instance, the violation of a municipal ordinance affecting the parties just mentioned. However, no
serious objection to these result can be seen other that the misinterpreted unwillingness to share this
jurisdiction with a court pertaining to the lowest category in our judicial organization. Upon the other
hand, the fundamental reasoning would apply with equal force if the highest court of the land is
made to take recognizance exclusively of a case involving the violation of the municipal ordinance
simply because of the character of the parties affected. After alluding to the fact that the position of
consul of a foreign government is sometimes filled by a citizen of the United States (and this also
true in the Philippines) Chief Justice Taney, in Gittings vs. Crawford, supra, observed:

It could hardly have been the intention of the statesmen who framed our constitution to
require that one of our citizens who had a petty claim of even less than five dollars against
another citizen, who had been clothed by some foreign government with the consular office,
should be compelled to go into the Supreme Court to have a jury summoned in order to
enable him to recover it; nor could it have been intended, that the time of that court, with all
its high duties to perform, should be taken up with the trial of every petty offense that might
 be committed by a consul by any part of the United States; that consul, too, being often one
of our own citizens.

Probably, the most serious objection to the interpretation herein advocated is, that considering the
actual distribution of jurisdiction between the different courts in our jurisdiction, there may be cases
where the Supreme Court may not actually exercise either original whether exclusive or
concurrent or appellate jurisdiction, notwithstanding the grant of original jurisdiction in this class of
cases to the Supreme Court. If, for instance, a criminal case is brought either in a justice of the
peace court or in a Court of First Instance against a foreign consul and no question of law is
involved, it is evident that in case of conviction, the proceedings will terminate in the Court Appeals
and will not reach the Supreme Court. In this case, the Supreme Court will be deprived of all
jurisdiction in a case affecting a consul notwithstanding the grant thereto in the Constitution of
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting consuls. This is a situation, however, created not by the
Constitution but by existing legislation, and the remedy is in the hands of the National Assembly. The
Constitution cannot deal with every casus omissus, and in the nature of things, must only deal with
fundamental principles, leaving the detail of administration and execution to the other branches of
the government. It rests with the National Assembly to determine the inferior courts which shall
exercise concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, considering the nature of the offense and irrespective of the
amount of controversy. The National Assembly may as in the United States (Cooley, Constitutional
Law, 4th ed. [1931], sec. 4, p. 156), provide for appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases affecting
foreign diplomatic and consular representatives.

Before the approval of the Constitution, jurisdiction over consuls was exercisable by our courts. This
is more so now that the Independence Law and Constitution framed and adopted pursuant thereto
are in force. The fact that the National Assembly has not enacted any law determining what courts of
the of the Philippines shall exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court is of no moment.
This can not mean and should not be interpreted to mean that the original jurisdiction vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution is not concurrent with other national courts of inferior category.

The respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila having jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the criminal case brought against the petitioner, the writ of prohibition should be
denied.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 97765. September 24, 1992.]

KHOSROW MINUCHER, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR W.

SCALZO, JR., Respondents.

De Leon, De Leon, Casanova Associates for Petitioner.

Luna, Sison, & Manas for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; DISMISSAL OF ACTION BASED ON ERRONEOUS
ASSUMPTION, A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. While the trial court correctly denied the motion to
dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the
basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is
clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. Private
respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present
documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his
position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in
support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim
in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the
issue of diplomatic immunity. The public respondent then should have sustained the trial courts denial of
the motion to dismiss. Verily, such should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should
not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and
whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the
private respondents claim is arbitrary.

2. ID.; ACTIONS; MOTION TO DISMISS; GROUNDS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE DEFENDANT IS A
DIPLOMAT. It may at once be stated that even if the private respondent enjoys diplomatic immunity, a
dismissal of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, but rather for
lack of a cause of action because even if he committed the imputed act and could have been otherwise
made liable therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against him in connection therewith and would
prevent recovery of damages arising therefrom.

3. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON, HOW ACQUIRED; CASE AT BAR. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is acquired either by his voluntary appearance or by the service of summons upon
him. While in the instant case, private respondents counsel filed, on 26 October 1988, a motion to quash
summons because being outside the Philippines and being a non-resident alien, he is beyond the processes
of the court, which was properly denied by the trial court, he had in effect already waived any defect in the
service of the summons by earlier asking, on two (2) occasions, for an extension of time to file an answer,
and by ultimately filing an Answer with Counterclaim. There is no question that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the private Respondent.

4. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; CASE SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED WHERE THERE IS SUFFICIENT
ALLEGATION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT; CASE AT BAR. And now to the core issue the
alleged diplomatic immunity of the private Respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of
authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such a claim, in view of the fact that it
took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel
filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file the
Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were studying the
case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the U.S.
Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, the complaint
for damages filed by the petitioner still cannot be peremptorily dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient
allegations which indicate that the private respondent committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity
and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. As described in the complaint, he committed
criminal acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the Special Appearance to Quash Summons earlier alluded
to, on the other hand, private respondent maintains that the claim for damages arose "from an alleged tort."
Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can be no question that private respondent
was sued in his personal capacity for acts committed outside his official functions and duties. In the decision
acquitting the petitioner in the criminal case involving the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of
which is attached to his complaint for damages and which must be deemed as an integral part thereof, the
trial court gave full credit to petitioners theory that he was a victim of a frame-up instigated by the
private Respondent. Thus, there is a prima facie showing in the complaint that indeed private respondent
could be held personally liable for the acts committed beyond his official functions or duties.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

May a complaint for damages be dismissed on the sole basis of a statement contained in a Diplomatic Note,
belatedly issued after an answer to the said complaint had already been filed, that the defendant was a
member of the diplomatic staff of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the Philippines at the time the
cause of action accrued?

This is the issue in the instant petition.

On 3 August 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint for damages
against private respondent Arthur Scalzo, Jr. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-45691 and was
raffled off to Branch 19 of said court. 1 Petitioner alleges therein that he was the Labor Attache of the
Embassy of Iran in the Philippines "prior to the Ayatollah Khomeini regime." On 13 May 1986, private
respondent, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by a certain Jose
Iigo, an informer belonging to the military intelligence community, with whom petitioner had several
business transactions involving Iranian products like carpets, caviar and others. Iigo had previously sought
petitioners assistance in connection with charges of illegal recruitment. According to Iigo, private
respondent was purportedly interested in buying Iranian products, namely caviar and carpets. On this same
occasion, petitioner complained to the private respondent about the problems the former was then
encountering with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife and fellow Iranian, Abbas
Torabian. Offering his help, private respondent gave the petitioner a calling card showing that the former is
an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Department of Justice, of the United States of
America assigned to the American Embassy in Manila with official contacts with a certain Col. Dumlao; head
of the Anti-Narcotics Command, Philippine Constabulary. Private respondent also expressed his intent to
purchase two (2) kilos of caviar worth P10,000.00 and informed the petitioner that he might have
prospective buyers for these goods; he further promised to arrange for the renewal of the aforesaid visas for
a $2,000.00 fee. On 19 May 1986, private respondent invited petitioner to dinner at Marios Restaurant in
Makati, Metro Manila; the petitioner accepted. During the said dinner held the very next day, both discussed
politics and business. Specifically, private respondent told petitioner that he wanted to purchase an
additional two hundred (200) grams of caviar and inquired about his commission for selling petitioners
carpets; petitioner promised a 10% commission based on profits. chanrobles. com.ph : vi rtua l law lib rary

In the evening of 26 May 1986, private respondent came to petitioners residence and asked to be entrusted
with a pair of Persian silk carpets with a floor Price of $24,000.00 each, for which he had a buyer. The
following day, private respondent returned to petitioners residence, took the carpets and gave the latter
$24,000.00; after about an hour, private respondent returned, claimed that he had already made
arrangements with his contacts at the American Embassy concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.00. He
was given this amount. It turned out, however, that private respondent had prepared an elaborate plan to
frame-up the petitioner and Abbas Torabian for alleged heroin trafficking; both were falsely arrested by
private respondent and some American and Filipino police officers, and were taken to Camp Crame in their
underwear. Private respondent and his companions took petitioners three (3) suitcases containing various
documents, his wallet containing money and the keys to his house and car, as well as the $24,000.00 which
private respondent had earlier delivered to him. Petitioner and Torabian were handcuffed together for three
(3) days and were not given food and water; they were asked to confess to the possession of heroin or else
they would be jailed or even executed by Iranian terrorists. Consequently, the two were charged for the
violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig. They were, however, acquitted by the said court on 8 January 1988. Private respondent testified for
the prosecution in the said case.
Petitioner further alleges in his complaint that private respondent falsely testified against him in the criminal
case. The former also avers that charges of unlawful arrest, robbery and estafa or swindling have already
been filed against the private Respondent.

He therefore prays for actual and compensatory damages of not less than P480,000,00 ($24,000.00)
representing the fair market value of the Persian silk carpet and $2,000.00 representing the refund of the
amount he had given for the visas; moral damages in the amount of P5 million; exemplary damages in the
sum of P100,000.00 and attorneys fees of at least P200,000.00 to answer for litigation expenses incurred
for his defense in the criminal case and for the prosecution of the civil case. chanrob les law l ibra ry

On 14 September 1988, private respondents counsel, the law firm LUNA, SISON AND MANAS, filed a
Special Appearance and Motion alleging therein that since the private respondent is an agent of the Drug
Enforcement Administration of the United States of America, and the acts and omissions complained of were
performed by him in the performance of official functions, the case is now under study by the Departments
of State and Justice in Washington, D.C. for the purpose of determining what defenses would be
appropriate; said counsel also prayed that the period to answer be extended to 13 October 1988. 2 This
prayer was granted in the 16 September 1988 order of the court.

On 12 October 1988, private respondents aforesaid counsel filed another Special Appearance and Motion
seeking a further extension of the period to answer to 28 October 1988 because the law firm had not yet
received the decision of the Departments of State and Justice. 3

On 27 October 1988, private respondents counsel filed a Special Appearance to Quash Summons 4 alleging
therein that: "The action being a personal action for damages arising from an alleged tort, the defendant
being outside the Philippines and not being a resident of the Philippines, Defendant is beyond the processes
of this court," and praying that the summons issued be quashed. The trial court denied the motion in its
Order of 13 December 1988. 5 Unsatisfied with the said order, private respondent filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was docketed as C.A.-G R. SP No 17023. In its Decision
promulgated on 6 October 1989, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. 6 Respondent
thus sought a review of the said decision by filing a petition with this Court which was docketed as G.R. No.
91173. Said petition was however, dismissed by this Court in the Resolution of 20 December 1989 for non-
compliance with paragraph 2 of Circular No. 1-88; moreover, respondent failed to show that the Court of
Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. 7

On 9 March 1990, private respondent filed with the trial court his Answer in Civil Case No. 88-46591 8
wherein he denies the material allegations in the complaint, sets forth the following Affirmative Defenses: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

"The Complaint fails to state a cause of action: in having plaintiff and Abbas Torabian arrested on May 27,
1986 and detained at Camp Crame; a quantity of heroin, seized from plaintiff by Philippine police authorities
and in seizing the money used in the drug transaction, defendant acted in the discharge of his official duties
or otherwise in the performance of his official functions as agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration,
U.S. Department of Justice." 9

and interposes a counterclaim for P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys fees and the expenses of litigation.
libra ry : red
cha nrob les law

On 13 June 1990, private respondent filed with the trial court the Defendants Pre-Trial Brief, 10 the
pertinent portions of which read: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

x x x

"DEFENSES

1. Plaintiffs complaint is false and malicious;

2. In having a quantity of heroin and the money used in the drug transaction between him and plaintiff
seized from plaintiff by P.C. NARCOM, plaintiff (sic) was acting in the discharge of his official functions as
special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice and was then a member
of the U.S. diplomatic mission in the Philippines.

DEFENDANTS EVIDENCE
Defendant will present: cha nro b1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry

1. His testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories because defendant lives and works outside the
Philippines and is not a resident of the Philippines.

2. Documentary evidence, consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on
his position and duties as DEA special agent in May 1980 in Manila; these will be identified by defendant and
possibly by another DEA official." 11

On 14 June 1990, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the case on the ground that as per the
copy of Diplomatic Note No. 414 issued by the Embassy of the United States of America, 13 dated 29 May
1990 and certified to be a true and faithful copy of the original by one Donald K. Woodward, Vice-Consul of
the United States of America on 11 June 1990, 14 the Embassy advised the Department of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of the Philippines that: jgc:chanrob les.com. ph

". . . Arthur W. Scalzo, was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from
his arrival in the Philippines on October 14, 1985 until his departure on August 10, 1988. . . .

. . . in May 1986, with the cooperation of Philippine law enforcement officials and in the exercise of his
functions as a member of the mission, Mr. Scalzo investigated Mr. Khosrow Minucher, the plaintiff in the
aforementioned case for allegedly trafficking in a prohibited drug. It is this investigation which has given rise
to the plaintiffs complaint. The Embassy takes note of the provisions of Article 39(2) of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which provides that Mr. Scalzo retains immunity from civil suit for acts
performed in the exercise of his functions, as is the case here, even though he has departed (sic) the
country." chanrobles vi rtua l lawlib ra ry

Petitioner opposed the motion.

On 25 June 1990, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for being "devoid of merit." 15

Private respondent then filed with the public respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed
therein as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 22505, to nullify the aforesaid Order of 25 June 1990.

On 31 October 1990, public respondent promulgated a Decision 16 ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No.
88-45691 due to the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant because the latter
possessed diplomatic immunity.

Petitioners motion to reconsider the decision was denied in the public respondents Resolution of 8 March
1991 because: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"When therefore Mr. Scalzo testified in the Criminal Case against Khosrow Minucher it was in connection
with his official functions as an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States and
member (sic) of the American Mission charged with cooperating with the Philippine law enforcement agency.
He therefore, enjoys immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving State under Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations." 17

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner declares that the public
respondent erred: j gc:cha nrob les.com. ph

"I. . . . IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY SCALZO.

II. . . . IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT SCALZO IS A DIPLOMAT IMMUNE FROM CIVIL SUIT
CONFORMABLY WITH THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

III. . . . IN NOT FINDING THAT SCALZOS PARTICIPATION IN THE BUY-BUST OPERATION IS OUTSIDE OF
HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, HENCE, THAT HE IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS." 18

After private respondent filed his Comment to the petition and the petitioner submitted his Reply thereto,
this Court gave due course to the same and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently did.
We find merit in the petition.

While the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its
discretion in dismissing Civil Case No 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply
because of the Diplomatic Note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic immunity, thereby
divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person. It may at once be stated that even if the private
respondent enjoys diplomatic immunity, a dismissal of the case cannot be ordered on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over his person, but rather for lack of a cause of action because even if he committed the
imputed act and could have been otherwise made liable therefor, his immunity would bar any suit against
him in connection therewith and would prevent recovery of damages arising therefrom. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is acquired either by his voluntary appearance or by the service of summons upon
him. While in the instant case, private respondents counsel filed, on 26 October 1988, a motion to quash
summons because being outside the Philippines and being a non-resident alien, he is beyond the processes
of the court, which was properly denied by the trial court, he had in effect already waived any defect in the
service of the summons by earlier asking, on two (2) occasions, for an extension of time to file an answer,
and by ultimately filing an Answer with Counterclaim. There is no question that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the private Respondent. cralawna d

And now to the core issue the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private Respondent. Setting aside for
the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such a claim, in
view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days
from the time his counsel filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first
extension of time to file the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of
America were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure the
Diplomatic Note from the U.S. Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such
note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by the petitioner still cannot be peremptorily dismissed.
Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that the private respondent committed the
imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. As described
in the complaint, he committed criminal acts for which he is also civilly liable. In the Special Appearance to
Quash Summons earlier alluded to, on the other hand, private respondent maintains that the claim for
damages arose "from an alleged tort." Whether such claim arises from criminal acts or from tort, there can
be no question that private respondent was sued in his personal capacity for acts committed outside his
official functions and duties. In the decision acquitting the petitioner in the criminal case involving the
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, copy of which is attached to his complaint for damages and which
must be deemed as an integral part thereof, the trial court gave full credit to petitioners theory that he was
a victim of a frame-up instigated by the private Respondent. Thus, there is a prima facie showing in the
complaint that indeed private respondent could be held personally liable for the acts committed beyond his
official functions or duties.

In Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 19 after citing pertinent authorities, 20 this Court ruled: chan robles lawlib rary : rednad

"The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will
not apply and may not be involved where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity
as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public
official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction (Dumlao v.
Court of Appeals, Et Al., 114 SCRA 247 [1982])." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Even Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It reads: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

"1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall
also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of: chan rob1es v irt ual 1aw li bra ry

x x x

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State outside his official functions. (Emphasis supplied).

There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done in his official
capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. In short, insofar
as the records are concerned, private respondent did not come forward with evidence to prove that indeed,
he had acted in his official capacity. It does not appear that an actual hearing on the motion to dismiss was
conducted and that private respondent offered evidence in support thereof. Thus, it is apropos to quote what
this Court stated in United States of America v. Guinto: 21

"But even as we are certain that the individual petitioners in G.R. No. 80018 were acting in the discharge of
their official functions, we hesitate to make the same conclusion in G.R. No. 80258. The contradictory
factual allegations in this case deserve in our view a closer study of what actually happened to the plaintiffs.
The record is too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had
actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Lacking this information, this Court
cannot directly decide this case. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess
and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of the evidence that has yet to be presented at
the trial. Only after it shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting at the time of the
incident in question will this Court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is
applicable."
cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June
1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his
investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila.
Having thus reserved his right to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the
alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied
upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity.

The public respondent then should have sustained the trial courts denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily,
such should have been the most proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by
the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet
been proved. The undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondents claim is
arbitrary.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of public respondent of 31 October 1990 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 22505 is
SET ASIDE and the Order of 25 June 1990 of Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case
No. 88-45691 denying private respondents Motion to Dismiss is hereby REINSTATED.

Costs against private Respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

ELLIOTT, J.:

The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court,
where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain
provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and
(4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.

The information alleges:

That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull was
then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard, which
vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said accused H. N.
Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of December, 1908,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port
and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and
seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there
fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means for trying and securing
said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be
tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in
stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the
accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of
some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon
the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.

All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.

Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
 The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage
from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be
provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from
the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.

By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1 thereof
the following:

The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for
securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or
unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that

Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully
fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay
a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United
States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals
are disembarked.

1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court was
sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a
vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.

Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is
nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the organization of the
courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts
over certain offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within
any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep.,
614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which
such ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission
thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have
been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian
vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the
laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission
which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of
the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she
was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law
(Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The
ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the
proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which
determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to
anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed
while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of
departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed
during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within
American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and
the person of the offender.

The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the objection
to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the
nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial
waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power
without permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are
considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from
local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within comparatively recent times.
In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the
effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from
the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory
was also supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as
1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144),
Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port
may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within
whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva
Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of
war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding
founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256;
Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)

Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local official
exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by
their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon
the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and
finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port.
But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily
granted to them, According to the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are
justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign
ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-
628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit
Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a right,
although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231;
British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory
have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says
that

It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels

that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p.
263.)

The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a
foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by
act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such
jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean
Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said
that

When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient
and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the
government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one country
visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern
the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise
provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.)

Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the treaty of
commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827,
which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to sit as
judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews of the
vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the
interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb
the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception
applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The
order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or
general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed
upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn
from the cognizance of the local authorities.

In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the
vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the
United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary steps to have
the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard
against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and
Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of
such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for
the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault
and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there
was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic
channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to
Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
 I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection with
the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty
of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained in
the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction
is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature
growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the party may be
held amenable under the local criminal law.

This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their
right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and
crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or
crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is
made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel,
involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such
magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under such
circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is
not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local
judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden
to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and
if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party accused,
to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the offense by the
municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)

The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses committed on
board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance
of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of the language
requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs the order or traquillity of the country.
The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between the
captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into whose
port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the
court of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in
this case.

It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the animals
were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to the
jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be to
construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of
the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable
construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into
which the animals are bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the
mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be
different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it
does not.

It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act
was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed knowingly. As said in
Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea,
when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or
intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in
Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not
show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This
point, I think, was fully answered by the respondent's counsel that the words 'willfully' and
'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design
done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done."
To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the
present case.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his defense rests
upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the
decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the animals." It was
conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.

In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary
to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and
concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must
be in such form as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the
court to pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is
good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)

The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to "provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in
this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means
for securing said animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed."

The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not charge him
with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes"
and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was prepared in English, and
that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente,"
according to the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant,
particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the
evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."

2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment thereto
seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands.
The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation of live stock between
foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with
its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People
(Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)

But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by
constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The importance of
the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those relations, and
consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the
Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and treaties, and it
has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus
acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of Congress
to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express
terms that Congress should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3,
par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated
into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern
the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary
powers required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual
procedure. Congress has provided such governments for territories which were within the Union,
and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial, and to
prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with which the local government
should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which
had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local
legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National
Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress
has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the
government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature
and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of
the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no
longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370,
385.)

The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory,
although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to
create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own force.
(Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the power of
Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its
power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De
Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S.,
197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)

This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United States, and
legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular
possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The Constitution and all
laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect
within all the organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the
United States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly
provided that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1,
Act of 1902.)

In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as a result
of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in
conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the United States
on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor,
pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government
of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect
person and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and
on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was
signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the
destruction of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of
the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty
of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United
States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and
the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was
governed under the military authority of the President as commander in chief. Long before Congress
took any action, the President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal
justification, like the purely military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The
military power of the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military
or civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901

The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers the exercise
of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed
and the rights determined.

President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as conditions would
permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment
of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the
authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military power of the
President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the
military government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should
be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the
raising of revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of
public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil
service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military
governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of
legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of individual rights. The
Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or
for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the
people of the Philippine Island, and the measures adopted should be made to conforms to their
customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific
restrictions upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person
shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment
for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."

To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner
amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and
judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise provided by
Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner, as the
President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for
maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority, which had been exercised
previously by the military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created by
virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to
administer the affairs of the Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1,
1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with
the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the
President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and approved the
action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had been
imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions were included in the law, Congress
thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the
protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions.
The action of the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the
treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1,
1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by
law the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the
enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the
authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a
legislature consisting of two houses the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly. The
government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United States.

This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is
derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States,
acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from
different parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines
looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it
assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the
President and Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act is from
the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United
States.

Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete governmental
organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the functions commonly
assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most governments. In
neither Federal nor State governments is this separation such as is implied in the abstract statement
of the doctrine. For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers,
and the President to some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto
power enables him to exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the
executive department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but
as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement
of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges.

In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general constitutional
doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject
to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national Constitution, and the
States under the national and state constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions,
must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official
acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State
judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government
of laws and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly
government.

Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is apparent that
the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature. The Federal
Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the
Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been granted
to the central government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The
validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a
grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the
Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative
authority of the Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is
valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its enactment
forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.

The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms subject to
specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to
exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific authority is
conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that
Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply
as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not as
implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty.
Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)

The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the Government of
the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of
the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The
situation was unusual. The new government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To
relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to
grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood
prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was
therefore provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be
reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the
Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine Islands until
annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)

In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the Legislature has
been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the
United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the Government of
the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue
of its power to govern the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce
with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to
which its power in this respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties
which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and
navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the
Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to
the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the
authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted
before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after
the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil
government instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory.
(Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act
has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must
be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and
the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce
between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended
by Act No. 275, is valid.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can not be
left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court
from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the
port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully
sustained by the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December,
1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese
ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.

That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which
ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in
front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that
fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were
dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said
ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and
risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said
ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any
 provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to
maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation.

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship coming
into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such
cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in
case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to
stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this
case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced
seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that
since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the
transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year.
The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience
the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more
secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable,
either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three
hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them
individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds
of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if he is
untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the animals
upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.

The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-922 November 8, 1902

TRINIDAD H. PARDO DE TAVERA, complainant-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, defendant-appellant.

Vicente Garcia Valdez, appellant.

Felipe G. Calderon, for appellee.

LADD, J.:

Both the private prosecutor and the defendant have appealed from the judgment of the court below,
finding the defendant guilty of the offense of injurias graves under article 457 and 458 of the Penal
Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment and costs.

(1) No brief has been filed by the defendant, nor did he appear, either personally or by counsel, on
the day fixed for the argument, and under the rules of this court the motion that his appeal be
dismissed for lack of prosecution might be granted, but we have nevertheless deemed it proper to
consider the whole case upon the merits. The evidence shows that the defendant was in September,
1901, the editor of "Miau," a periodical published and circulated in Manila, and that an article
containing the alleged injurious matter was published in the issue of that periodical of September 15,
1901. The article is couched throughout in grossly abusive language, and in terms not capable of
being misunderstood; charges the private prosecutor, who had been then recently appointed a
member of the United States Philippine Commission, with having displayed cowardice at the time of
the murder of his mother and sister and with having subsequently entered into intimate political
relations with the assassin. The article contains other statements and imputations of a derogatory
character, but we base our opinion upon that portion to which reference has been made. Injurias
graves are classified by article 457 of the Penal Code under four heads, as follows: "(1) The
imputation of a crime of the class not subject to prosecution de oficio. (2) That of a vice or moral
shortcoming, the consequences of which might seriously injure the reputation, credit, or interests of
the person offended. (3) Injurias which by reason of their nature, occasion, or circumstances are
commonly regarded as insulting. (4) Those which may be reasonably classified as grave in view of
the condition, dignity, and personal circumstances of the injured party and the offender." The
statements in question do not involve the imputation of a crime, and, possibly, not of a vice or moral
shortcoming in the strict sense, but they are obviously of a character calculated to bring the person
attacked into public obloquy and contempt, and specially so in the present case in view of the
position of the private prosecutor as a high official of the Government, and they are therefore clearly
comprehended under Nos. 3 and 4 or the article cited. The defendant's offer to prove the truth of the
statements was properly rejected. (Penal Code, art. 460.) The conviction must be sustained.

2. The question raised by the appeal of the private prosecutor relates solely to the propriety of the
punishment imposed by the court below. Article 458 of the Penal Code provides that "injurias graves,
put into writing and made public [which is the present case] shall be punished with the penalty
of destierro in its medium to its maximum degree, and a fine of from 625 to 6,250 pesetas." Act No.
277 of the United States Philippine Commission "defining the law of libel." etc., and reforming the
preexisting Spanish law on the subject of calumnia and injurias affixes to the offense of publishing a
libel as defined in the act the punishment of "a fine not exceeding $2,000 or imprisonment for not
exceeding one year, or both." Section 13 of the same act provides as follows: "All laws and parts of
laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby
repealed: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall operate as a repeal of existing laws in so far
as they are applicable to pending actions or existing causes of action, but as to such causes of
action or pending actions existing laws shall remain in full force and effect." This act went into effect
October 24, 1901, subsequent to the publication of the article in question, and during the pendency
of the prosecution. By article 22 of the Penal Code "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so
far as they favor the person guilty of a crime of misdemeanor," etc. The court below in fixing the
punishment proceeded upon the theory that by the operation of this general rule the penalty
prescribed in the Penal Code for the offense in question was necessarily modified and could not be
inflicted in its full extension. In so doing we think the court overlooked or improperly construed the
proviso in the section of Act No. 277, above cited, by virtue of which the previously existing law on
the subject covered by the act is left intact in all its parts as respects pending actions or existing
causes of action. The language is general and embraces, we think, all actions, whether civil,
criminal, or of a mixed character. In this view of the case we have no occasion to consider the
question argued by counsel for the private prosecutor as to whether the provisions of Act No. 277
respecting the penalty are more favorable to the accused than those of the former law or otherwise.
The punishment must be determined exclusively by the provisions of the former law.

It is urged by counsel that the official position of the private prosecutor should be considered as an
aggravating circumstance under Penal Code, article 10, No. 20. We are inclined to think that in the
view we have taken of the case this circumstance is qualificative rather than generic. (Penal Code,
art. 78.)
law phi 1.net

The result, then, is that the penalty prescribed by article 458, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code should
be applied in its medium grade, and in view of all the circumstances of the case we fix the penalty as
four years of destierro and a fine of 4,000 pesetas, with subsidiary liability to one day's banishment
for every 12 pesetas not paid, and the costs of both instances. The judgment of the court below
will be modified in accordance with this opinion, and the record will be returned to that court for the
execution of the sentence as thus modified. So ordered.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

The appellants in their own behalf.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW. Under the Spanish
criminal procedure, appeals from justices courts were allowed only to Courts of First Instance. By section 43
of General Orders No. 58, this procedure has been so amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme
Court in such cases when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. This amendment of the
procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the purpose stated that
is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was
predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such has uniformly been the interpretation of section 43 by
this court.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having played the game of chance
called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they
were again tried and convicted upon the same charge. An appeal was allowed to this court because the
validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the trial of the cause in the court below.

Two questions are raised by this appeal: (1) Is Ordinance No. 35 valid, and (2) is this court required under
the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants?

The first question is answered in the affirmative by this court in the case of the United States v. Joson (26
Phil. Rep., 1). The cases are on all fours, and a further discussion of this branch of the case is unnecessary.

With reference to the second question, it is said that by reason of the defendants having in the lower court
questioned the legality of Ordinance No. 35, for the violation of which they have been convicted, this case
has been brought to us in all its details of law and fact, including the evidence taken at the trial, on which
the Court of First Instance founded its judgment touching the guilt and condemning the defendants. While,
on the other hand, it is contended that the questions of fact, which we are [not] authorized to examine, are
those which are essential to be examined for the purpose of determining the legality of Ordinance No. 35
and the penalties provided for therein, and no other.

At the outset it may be well to briefly outline the criminal procedure in force in this jurisdiction prior to the
promulgation on the 23d day of April, 1900, of General Orders No. 58.

The royal order dated December 17, 1886, directing the execution of the royal decree of September 4,
1884, wherein it was ordered that the Penal Code in force in the Peninsula, as amended in accordance with
the recommendations of the code committee, be published and applied in the Philippine Islands, as well as
the Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure which accompanied it. These two laws, having been published in
the Official Gazette of Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887, became effective four months thereafter.

According to the provisions of Rule 1 of the above-mentioned provisional law, the justices of the peace, or
gobernadorcillos, had original jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in Book 3 of the Penal Code.

Rule 2 provided that "when the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo receives notice that there has
been committed any one of the offenses provided for in Book 3 of the Penal Code which can be prosecuted
by the Government, he shall issue summons for an oral trial to the complainant, if any, to the alleged
culprit, and to the witnesses who may be able to testify as to the facts, fixing the day and hour for holding
the trial. If this (the trial) takes place at the residence of the promotor fiscal, he shall also be summoned."
Rule 3 provided that the same procedure should be followed in those cases which can only be prosecuted at
the instance of a private party, except that the promotor fiscal was not cited.

Neither the Provisional Law, the criminal procedural laws of the Peninsula, nor the autos acordados
prescribed any special form for the complaint to be presented to the justice of the peace or the
gobernadorcillo. As to this point, it seems that the Compilation of the Laws of Criminal Procedure of 1879
was applicable. Articles 405, 406, and 412 read: "ART. 405. The complaint made in writing must be signed
by the complainant, and if he cannot do so, by some other person at his request. The authority or official
who receives it shall rubricate and seal every page in the presence of the person who presents it, which also
he may do himself or through another person at his request.

"ART. 406. When the complaint is oral, it shall be reduced to writing by the authority or official who receives
it, wherein, in the form of a declaration, shall be set forth such information as the complainant may have
regarding the act complained of and the circumstances thereof, and both shall sign it at the bottom. If the
complainant cannot sign his name, some other person shall do so at his request." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

"ART. 412. Criminal cases that are not instituted by the Government must begin with a complaint." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

The oral trial referred to in Rule 2 was held within three days next following the date when the justice of the
peace or the gobernadorcillo received information that the offense had been committed (Rule 4), the
procedure being that provided for in Rule 9, which reads: "The trial shall be public, beginning with the
reading of the complaint, if any there be, followed by the examination of the witnesses summoned and the
introduction of such other evidence as the complainant, accuser, and public prosecutor, if he take part, may
request and the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo may regard as pertinent. Immediately thereafter
the accused shall be given a hearing, the witnesses who appear in his defense shall be examined, and such
other evidence as the justice or the gobernadorcillo may declare to be admissible shall be adduced. The
parties shall forthwith make such pleas as they think expedient in support of their respective contentions,
the first to speak being the public prosecutor, if he take part, then the private complainant, and finally the
accused.

"The representative of the public prosecutor shall attend the trial for misdemeanors, whenever he is cited
thereto, in accordance with Rule 2."cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

A record of the trial was made, wherein the whole procedure was clearly and succinctly set forth, and signed
by all the parties participating in the trial. (Rule 11.)

After trial and rendition of judgment, either of the parties could appeal to the Court of First Instance within
the first day next following that on which notice of the rendition of judgment was served. The appeal
suspended the judgment. After the appeal had been allowed, the justice of the peace or the gobernadorcillo
remitted to the Court of First Instance the original record and cited the parties to appear within the period of
five days before the appellate court. This time could be extended, if the circumstances of the case required.
(Rule 14.) If the appellant appealed, a day was fixed for the trial; but if he did not appear, the appeal was
dismissed. (Rule 15.) Rule 16 provides the procedure for the trial in the second instance. This rule reads:
"The hearing at the trial shall be public, and all the proceedings in the case shall be read therein; then the
parties or their attorneys may speak in their turn, and thereafter the judgment shall be pronounced and
communicated to them.

"A record of the trial shall be drawn up in the same manner as fixed by Rule 11." cralaw vi rtua1aw l ibra ry

Rule 17 reads: "In this second instance no evidence may be admitted other than that which, offered in the
first instance, was not taken for reasons independent of the will of the parties who had offered it." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
Rule 19 provides: "The judgment of the Court of First Instance will be executory, and there will be no
recourse from the same except that of responsibility before the audiencia del territorio." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

The provisions of General Orders No. 58 pertinent to the question under consideration, are as follows: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph

"SEC. 43. From all final judgments of the Courts of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all
cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts an appeal may be taken to the Supreme
Court as hereinafter prescribed. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgments of justices of the peace in
criminal cases to the courts of the next superior grade, and the decisions of the latter thereon shall be final
and conclusive except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute, wherein appeal may be
made to the Supreme Court." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

"SEC. 54. All cases appealed from a justices court shall be tried in all respects anew in the court to which
the same are appealed; but on the hearing of such appeals it shall not be necessary, unless the appeal shall
involve the constitutionality or legality of a statute, that a written record of the proceedings be kept; but
shall be sufficient if the appellate court keeps a docket of the proceedings in the form prescribed in the next
preceding section." cra law virtua1aw li bra ry

Section 43 has been amended by section 34 of Act No. 1627 so as to read as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"From all final judgments of the Court of First Instance or courts of similar jurisdiction, and in all cases in
which the law now provides for appeals from said courts, an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court as
hereinafter prescribed. The convicted party may appeal from any final judgment of a justice of the peace in
a criminal cause to the Court of First Instance by filing a notice of appeal with such justice within fifteen
days after the entry of judgment. Upon such notice being so filed, the justice shall forward to the Court of
First Instance all original papers and a transcript of all docket entries in the cause, and the provincial fiscal
shall thereupon take charge of the cause in behalf of the prosecution. The judgment of the Court of First
Instance in such appeals shall be final and conclusive, except in cases involving the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality of a municipal or township ordinance." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

In view of the fact that this court took the view, prior to the passage of Act No. 1627, that the military
governor and the framers of General Orders No. 58 intended by the use of the word "statute" found in
section 43 (supra) to include "ordinances," the amendment of this section by section 34 of that Act does not
affect the issue in the instant case. The original section provided that "an appeal may be made to the
Supreme Court in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute," and the section, as amended,
authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court in the same class of cases.

It is urged that as the civil-law term "appeal" is used in section 43 (supra), we must apply the same rule of
construction that the courts in England and the United States have ,almost uniformly applied to the same
term and thus derive an unqualified review of both the law and the facts. This doubtless would be a correct
position in some jurisdictions in the American Union, as there the technical civil-law meaning of the term
"appeal" is followed. The reason for so doing is set forth in the case of Nashville Ry. & Light Co. v. Bunn
(168 Fed. Rep., 862), wherein the court said: jgc:chan robles .com.p h

"The distinction between a writ of error, which brings up the record in an action of law for a review of
questions of law only, and an appeal, which involves a rehearing upon both the facts and the law, is vital.
These remedies have their origin and functions in the inherent difference between courts of law and courts
of equity, differences which are recognized in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of
Congress. The writ of error is a common law writ, and searches the record for errors of law in the final
judgment of a common-law court. If error is found, the judgment awards a venire facias de novo. The
appeal is a procedure which comes to us from the civil law along with the fundamentals which go to make
up the jurisprudence of a court of equity. Its office is to remove the entire cause, and it subjects the
transcript to a scrutiny of fact and law and is in substance a new trial." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Under the system of procedure which obtains in the Philippine Islands, both legal and equitable relief is
dispensed in the same tribunal. We have no courts of law and courts of equity as they are known and
distinguished in England and the United States. All cases (law and equity) are presented and tried in the
same manner, including their final disposition in the Supreme Court. Therefore, the word "appeal," as used
in section 43 (supra), does not necessarily imply the removal of the cause from one tribunal to another in its
entirety, subjecting the facts, as well as the law, to a review or a retrial, but it is to be interpreted by the
ordinary rules of construction.
The intention of the framers of General Orders No. 58 i8 the law. In order to ascertain that intention the
provisions of the order must be construed in the light of existing law and the circumstances at the time of its
promulgation.

At the time General Orders No. 58 went into effect, criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance
came to the audiencia in their entirety, subjecting both the law and the facts to a review or retrial. But the
audiencia, or Philippine Supreme Court, could not review the judgment of a Court of First Instance in any
case tried on appeal from courts of justices of the peace wherein the latter courts had jurisdiction. Such
judgments were final and conclusive. The aggrieved party could go no further with the case. The only
recourse he had was that mentioned in Rule 19 (supra). The penalties for violations of the provisions of
Book 3 of the Penal Code over which justices of the peace then had jurisdiction were generally arreto or
arresto menor and small fines. This was the law in force at the time section 43 (supra) was framed and
these were the conditions confronting the framers of that section at that time. What changes did the section
make?

Section 43 authorizes appeals to the Supreme Court from all final judgments of Courts of First Instance "and
in all cases in which the law now provides for appeals from said courts." This part of the section is limited to
judgments rendered in criminal cases originating in Courts of First Instance. This is necessarily true because
the latter part of the section makes the decisions of the "courts of next superior grade (which were Courts of
First Instance) rendered in cases appealed from justices courts final and conclusive, except in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute." The result is that the former procedure was amended
by section 43 so as to also authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in the cases mentioned in the latter part
thereof when the validity or constitutionality of a statute was drawn in question. To this extent only was the
former procedural law changed in so far as, the question at issue is concerned. Among the reasons which
induced the lawmakers to make this change was the fact that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace was
"extended to all offenses which the Penal Code designates as punishable by arresto mayor in all of its
grades." (Sec. 108.)

If we had found the ordinance attacked in the case at bar to be illegal and unconstitutional, the judgment
appealed from would necessarily have to be set aside and defendants would have no interest in presenting
to us the evidence taken at the trial. But we have maintained the legality of that ordinance, and in so doing
have we exhausted our powers and reached the limit of our inquiry? Section 43 does not expressly so limit
our power. Neither does it expressly authorize us to review the testimony touching the guilt or innocence of
the defendants.

The distinction between the illegality of a penalty imposed by a municipal corporation and the correctness of
that imposed by a justice of the peace under a municipal ordinance, and between the illegality of the
ordinance and that of the proceedings or actions taken under it, is plain and broad. An ordinance may, from
the standpoint of the regularity of all the proceedings leading up to and inclusive of its enactment, be
absolutely faultless and yet the ultimate act done or enacted may be inherently or intrinsically illegal or
unconstitutional. On the other hand, the latter may be perfectly unassailable and yet the ordinance be illegal
or unconstitutional by reason of some fact or circumstance connected with its passage. It may, for instance,
have been presented in a wrong manner, at a wrong time, or not voted for as directed by law. It is to facts
of this class or character that section 43 refers when it says "the latter thereon shall be final and conclusive
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Such appears to be the meaning and intention manifested from the provisions of the latter part of section
43, already quoted, especially when they are considered in the light of the former practice above indicated.
Under that practice no appeals whatever were allowed to the Supreme Court from judgments of Courts of
First Instance in cases originating in justices courts. We must assume that the framers of section 43 had
knowledge of this practice and its effects. The framers desired to amend this practice to the extent only of
providing a way by which statutory questions, which might arise in these cases, could be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. This object could be very imperfectly obtained, if, when the court assumed jurisdiction of
such a case, it would not only determine the statutory questions, but also inquire into and determine every
other question raised during the progress of the trial. In effect, this would entirely destroy the former
practice, because it would render it possible to bring every case here in its entirety. All that would be
necessary would be to raise some statutory question, whether material to the decision of the case or not,
and the right of appeal and reexamination of the whole case would be assured. Clearly, no such result was
intended, nor is it manifest from the language employed in section 43. But it is urged that our ruling in this
matter "involves the legal absurdity of disjoining a single case and turning over one fragment to one court
and another parcel to another court." (Elliott on Appellate Procedure, sec. 17.) In this section the author is
speaking of appellate jurisdiction where the distinction between law and equity is rigidly maintained. He
says: "Where a court of equity retains jurisdiction for one purpose, it will retain it for all purposes." The
same author recognizes a difference in the two systems of appellate jurisdiction that is, the one where
the distinction between law and equity is maintained and, the other, where the two are blended. (Section
24.) In this last section the author says: "In some respects an appeal under the code system may be less
comprehensive in its scope than an appeal under the old system," citing Judge Curtis, wherein he said that
"it is evident that an appeal under the code system does not necessarily bring up the entire case." In view of
the fact that the code system prevails in the Philippine Islands, blending legal and equitable rights and
providing for one remedial system, our holding in the instant case is not in conflict with Elliot on Appellate
Procedure.

It is also urged that the rule announced in the case of Loeb v. . Columbia Township Trustees (179 U. S.,
472), and followed in the late case of Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. v. Boise City (230 U. S.,
84), is directly opposed to our holding in the case under consideration. These two cases went to the
Supreme Court of the United States on writs of error directly from the circuit courts in accordance with the
provisions of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891. This section provides "that appeals or writs of
error may be taken from the district courts, or from the existing circuit courts, direct to the Supreme Court
in the following cases: . . ." Here Congress maintains the distinction between "appeals" and "writs of error."
In each case above cited the Supreme Court of the United States held that it not only had jurisdiction to
review the constitutional questions, but also every other question properly arising. The court then proceeded
to review all legal questions in those cases and not questions of fact, for the reason that the cases were
before the court on writs of error. Even granting that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under the Act
above mentioned to review both questions of law and fact in cases appealed to that court, such holding
would not be antagonistic to our views in the instant case for the reason that our power to review the facts
touching the guilt or innocence of the defendants must be found in section 43 of General Orders No. 58. Our
view is, as above indicated, that the framers of that section did not intend to confer upon this court that
power. And all must admit that the military governor at the time he promulgated General Orders No. 58 had
the power to limit or restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to statutory questions in cases of the
character of the one under consideration.

Our ruling in the case at bar is fully supported by the adjudicated cases of this Supreme Court.

In the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney (4 Phil. Rep., 531), the court said: "Upon the facts stated in the
complaint the plaintiff is entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but upon such appeal the only
question to be considered will be that of the validity or invalidity of the ordinance. We cannot review the
evidence nor pass upon any other question of law which may appear in the record." cralaw virtua 1 aw libra ry

In United States v. Trinidad (7 Phil. Rep., 325), the defendant was convicted in the municipal court of the
city of Manila for violating a municipal ordinance. He appealed to the Court of First Instance, where he was
again convicted. An appeal was allowed to the Supreme Court on the ground that the constitutionality or
validity of the ordinance was drawn in question. On appeal the appellant insisted, among other things, that
the trial court erred in deciding the case without first consulting with the two assessors. This court held the
ordinance valid and, after quoting with approval the language used in the case of Trinidad v. Sweeney
(supra), said: "In cases where the appeal involves the constitutionality or validity of a statute, the
disagreement of the assessors with the judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not authorize
this court to review the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to the question of the validity of the
Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

In the case of The United States v. Espiritusanto (23 Phil. Rep., 610), we examined the facts touching the
due enactment of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was held valid, but the facts touching the
guilt or innocence of the appellant were not gone into.

In United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), the court used this language at page 12: "While we have
discussed at length each of the assignments of error made by the appellants, nevertheless, the only
question, in fact, presented by the appeal under the law, in the first instance, is whether or not the
ordinance under which the defendants were sentenced is legal. Having concluded that said ordinance is legal
and within the express powers of the Municipal Board to enact, the appeal must be dismissed, with costs in
this instance against the appellants in equal parts."cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry

In United States v. Abendan (24 Phil. Rep., 165), the court, after quoting the testimony of a sanitary
inspector and after holding the ordinance valid, said: "The evidence in the case, which is undisputed, is
sufficient, in our judgment, to warrant the order complained of. It does not appear therefrom, the defendant
himself having introduced substantially no proof in the case, that he was treated differently from other
persons in that locality, or that he was required to do a thing that the others had not been required to do, or
that he had in any way been discriminated against in the application of this ordinance to the facts of his
case, or that its application was oppressive or unreasonable in this particular instance.

"The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Considering this language, together with that used in the opinion wherein the court said, "The sole question
raised on this appeal is that presented by the claim of the appellant that the ordinance in question is
unreasonable and oppressive," it is clear that the court did not intend to hold that it had authority to
examine into the question of the guilt or innocence of the Appellant.

In United States v. Co Chee (R. G. No. 8269, not reported) the appellants were convicted of a violation of
Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having drawn in question the validity of that ordinance, an
appeal was allowed to this court. In disposing of this case the court said: "Precisely this question was
presented in the case of the United States v. Ten Yu (24 Phil. Rep., 1), just decided by this court, in which
we held that said Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila was valid and constitutional. That case is on all
fours with the present one, and the judgment of conviction of the Court of First Instance is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellants, on the authority of that case." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

No attempt was made to examine or pass upon the testimony touching the guilt or innocence of the
appellants.

In United States v. Tiu Un (R. G., No. 7804); United States v. Gaw Kee (R. G., No. 7816); United States v.
Lim Cui (R. G., No. 7815); United States v. See Kea (R. G., No. 7828); United States v. Go Tin (R. G., No.
7481); United States v. Sia Kim (R. G., No. 7716); United States v. Lim Baey (R. G., No. 7915); United
States v. Li Tia (R. G., No. 7826); and United States v. Tam Bak (R. G., No. 7814), not reported, the
appellants were convicted for a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 152 of the city of Manila and, having
drawn in question the validity of that ordinance, appeals were allowed to this court. This court, upon the
authority of the United States v. Ten Yu (supra), dismissed the appeals and directed the records to be
returned to the court below for execution of the sentences.

Other cases might be cited, but we think the above are sufficient to show that we have followed in the
instant case the uniform holding of this court for more than ten years. In fact, the court has not, since its
organization, held in any case that it has the power to review the facts touching the guilt of an accused
person in cases of the character of the one under consideration.

Some discussion has arisen in regard to the language we should use in the final disposition of cases wherein
the statute or ordinance has been upheld. Sometimes we say, "The judgment is affirmed," and at other
times we have said "the appeal is dismissed," etc. The result is the same and it is of little importance which
expression we use. But, as the case comes to us on appeal for the purpose of testing the legality of the
statute or ordinance upon which the judgment rests and as the judgment cannot be executed without the
sanction of this court, it is perfectly legal to "affirm" or "reverse" the judgment as the case may be.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendants. So
ordered.
SECOND DIVISION

JOEY P. MARQUEZ, G.R. Nos. 187912-14

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH

DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF Promulgated:
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,
Respondents. January 31, 2011
X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Through this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction,[1]petitioner Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) assails the 1] February 11, 2009
Resolution[2] of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB-5th Division) in Criminal
Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905; and its 2] May 20, 2009 Resolution [3] denying
his motion for reconsideration.

In the assailed issuances, the SB-5th Division denied Marquezs Motion to

Refer Prosecutions Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
 From the records, it appears that as a result of the Report on the Audit of
Selected Transactions and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Paraaque for the years
1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special Audit Team of the Commission on
Audit (COA), several anomalies were discovered involving Marquez, then City
Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee of Paraaque City; and
Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services Office of said city.

It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding,
Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several thousand rounds of bullets
of different calibers that were grossly overpriced from VMY Trading, a company
not registered as an arms and ammunitions dealer with either the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI).

Finding the transactions anomalous, the COA Special Audit Team issued
Notices of Disallowances for the overpriced ammunitions. Marquez and Caunan
sought reconsideration of the findings of the team, but their plea was
denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the COA but their appeal was denied.

At the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), in answer to the charges filed against
them, Marquez and Caunan filed their Joint Counter Affidavit[4] with the Evaluation
and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of said office. In the said affidavit, the two
insisted on the propriety of the transactions and raised the pendency of their appeal
with the COA.

Having found probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, the OMB, through the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP),filed three (3) informations[5] against Marquez and Caunan. The
cases were raffled to the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB-4th Division).

Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the forged

signatures, Marquez sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase
requests and authorization requests to the NBI and the reinvestigation of the cases
against him.[6] These were denied by the OSP.
 Before the SB-4th Division, to prove its case, the prosecution presented five
(5) witnesses, namely: 1] COA State Auditor IV Fatima Valera Bermudez; 2] Elenita
Pracale, Chief, Business Permit and Licensing Office, Paraaque City; 3] Benjamin
Cruz; 4] P/Insp. Rolando C. Columna, Legal Officer, PNP Firearms and Explosive
Division; and 5] Emerito L. Lejano, President, Guns Empire. Documentary evidence
consisting of disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests
were also adduced.

On January 13, 2006, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence
consisting of Exhibits A to FFFF, and their sub-markings. All of the evidence offered
were admitted by the anti-graft court on March 22, 2006.

After the prosecution rested, Caunan testified and partly presented evidence
for her defense.

Marquez, on the other hand, in his Omnibus Motion dated April 1, 2008,
moved, among others, for the inhibition of Associate Justice Gregory Ong (Justice
Ong) and Associate Justice Jose Hernandez (Justice Hernandez) and for the referral
of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization to the
NBI. Associate Justice Hernandez and Associate Justice Ong inhibited themselves
but the request of Marquez that the questioned documents be referred to the NBI was
not acted upon.

On May 20, 2008, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez recused themselves
from further participating in the cases. The cases were then raffled to the SB-
5th Division.

Thereafter, on July 4, 2008, Marquez filed the subject Motion to Refer

Prosecutions Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation. In his motion, he again insisted that his purported
signatures on the vouchers were forged.

By way of Comment/Opposition to the motion, the prosecution argued that its

documentary exhibits had already been formally offered in January 2006 and had
been duly admitted by the anti-graft court. The prosecution added that, when
confronted with the questioned transactions during the COA audit investigation,
Marquez never raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he insisted on the propriety of
the transactions. He did not claim forgery either when he filed his Joint Counter-
Affidavit with the OMB. Also, in his verified Motion for Reconsideration dated May
29, 2003 and Supplemental Motion dated July 1, 2003 filed with the COA, no
allegation of forgery was made.

The prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of

[7]
Court and posited that since Marquez alleged in his pleadings that he had relied on
the competence of his subordinates, there could be no palpable mistake, thus, he was
estopped from alleging that his signatures on the subject documents were forged.
The prosecution accused Marquez of filing the motion merely to delay the
proceedings.[8]

In his Reply, Marquez insisted that he never admitted that his signatures on
the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests were his
and that his motion was not intended to delay the proceedings.

In its Rejoinder, the prosecution reiterated its earlier arguments and added that
Caunan testified and identified the signatures of Marquez in the subject vouchers. It
further noted that Marquez moved to refer the documents to the NBI only two and a
half (2 ) years after the formal offer of said documents.

In the subject February 11, 2009 Resolution, the anti-graft court denied the motion
of Marquez. Citing Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,[9] it was of the view
that while resort to the expert opinion of handwriting experts would be helpful in the
examination of alleged forged documents, the same was neither mandatory nor
indispensable, since the court can determine forgery from its own independent
examination.
 The motion for reconsideration of Marquez was likewise denied.
Aggrieved, Marquez interposed this petition for certiorari raising this lone

ISSUE

THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN -

TH
5 DIVISION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN
IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTIONS RESPECTIVELY DATED
FEBRUARY 11, 2009 AND MAY 20, 2009 DENYING THE
PETITIONERS MOTION TO REFER PROSECUTIONS
EVIDENCE FOR EXAMINATION BY THE QUESTIONED
DOCUMENTS SECTION OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION WHICH DENIAL IS IN VIOLATION OF HIS
RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND HIS TWIN
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF LAW.

Those availing of the remedy of certiorari must clearly show that the trial
court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. By grave abuse of discretion, it means such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there
must be capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.[10]

Such circumstance exists in this case.

One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the
Constitution is due process, which includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable
opportunity to present ones defense. Under Section 14, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, it is provided that:
 (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis supplied)

In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings

requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an
opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.

While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by
necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed reasonable
freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this
guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused reasonable opportunity to
submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction
is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due process.

In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his
signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were
forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence[11] and the burden of proof lies on
the party alleging forgery.[12]
 Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that
his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his burden, he
must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his
allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the signatures he is
questioning by no less than the countrys premier investigative force the NBI. If he
is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial
evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other
examination result because the signatures are on the original documents which are
in the control of either the prosecution or the graft court.

At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court. It
will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with Section 22 of Rule
132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present his own
defense. How the prosecution, or even the court, perceives his defense to be is
irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he
should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice. The court should not
control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in
violation of the rules.

Contrary to the assertion of the prosecution, this move of Marquez is not a

mere afterthought to delay the prosecution of the case. From the records, it appears
that as early as November 24, 2003, even before arraignment, upon his alleged
discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez already sought referral of
the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI
and reinvestigation of the cases against him.[13] At that stage, his plea was already
denied by the OSP.

Apparently, he did not abandon his quest. In his Omnibus Motion dated April
1, 2008 filed with the SB-4th Division, Marquez did not only move for the inhibition
of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, but also moved for the referral of the
disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization to the NBI. Since the
latter was not acted upon, he filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecutions Evidence
for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation reiterating his plea, this time with the SB-5th Division.
 If this case has been delayed, it is because of the denial of the simple request
of Marquez. If it was granted in the first instance, the trial of the case would have
proceeded smoothly and would have been over by now. If the Court were to deny
this petition and Marquez would be convicted for having failed to prove forgery, he
could not be prevented from crying that he was prevented from presenting evidence
in his defense.

The fact that Marquez did not raise this issue with the COA is immaterial and
irrelevant. His failure or omission to do so may affect the appreciation and weight
of his defense, but it should not bar him from insisting on it during his turn to adduce
evidence.

In denying said motion, the SB-5th Division offered no valid explanation other
than the fact that, being the trial court, it may validly determine forgery from its own
independent examination of the documentary evidence. While it is true that the
appreciation of whether the signatures of Marquez are genuine or not is subject to
the discretion of the graft court, this discretion, by the very nature of things, may
rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing. Evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before
the court.[14] Only after evidence is offered and admitted that the court can appreciate
and evaluate it. The prosecution had already offered its evidence on the matter. The
court should not deny the same right to the defense.

The fact that the documentary exhibits were already formally offered and duly
admitted by the anti-graft court cannot preclude an examination of the signatures
thereon by the defense. With proper handling by court personnel, this can easily be
accomplished by the NBI expert examiners.

In the conduct of its proceedings, a court is given discretion in maintaining

the delicate balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy
trial on the one hand, and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society
of criminals on the other. Indeed, both the State and the accused are entitled to due
process. However, the exercise of such discretion must be exercised judiciously,
bearing in mind the circumstances of each case, and the interests of substantial
justice.

Thus, for having denied Marquez the opportunity to be heard and to produce
evidence of his choice in his defense, the SB-5th Division committed grave abuse of
discretion warranting intervention from the Court. The anti-graft court should allow
him to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned Documents Section
of the NBI for examination at the soonest time possible and for the latter to
immediately conduct such examination and to submit the results to the court within
a reasonable time.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11,

th
2009 and May 20, 2009 Resolutions of the 5 Division of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to allow the
petitioner Joey P. Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned
Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for examination as soon
as possible and, after submission of the results to the court and proper proceedings,
to act on the case with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third
Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense
of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish
with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights
and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost,
against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in

interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it
behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective
wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties
more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web
of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple
shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between
the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to
preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes
to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a
stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly
because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the
"reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,
enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or

raids on the public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered
by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests
and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring
supplied).

Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it

shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3,
par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for
Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the
Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses
under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits
and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and
opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the charges and the
vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of
warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the
ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which
it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the
Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c)
Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative
act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong
predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch
of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that
the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the
legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and
has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature
are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with
caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of
its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions
of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law
will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain
of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental
law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging
the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters
which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit inits description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden,
and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination

or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the NationalGovernment or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one
charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the
proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the

Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO
ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL
POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,

MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,

converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion
of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none -
that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions
clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions,
according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without
defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident
that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[8] The intention of
the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of

combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May

1991

REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say

THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF.Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one
and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the
same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be
included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a
series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
 SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the
public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to
the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts
falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or

series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1
(d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As commonly
understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him
follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such
overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways,
but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define
the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is
utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as
against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly
applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such activities.[11] With
more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision
or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An
act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible
to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague
and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction
suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person
making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a
statute drawn with narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation,
while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary.The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must
be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder
Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than
real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute
to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision
of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will
take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and
validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law
is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the
law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of
which he even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and
sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law
itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction
that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being
vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and
elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair
warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted"
benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith;
and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the
discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the
different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed,
and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges
three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or
without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in

the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep.
Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions
penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the
term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was
understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection
thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder
Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt
or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall
not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption
of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in
demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal.[29] The use of the"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect
and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual
going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of
a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of
constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9

October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the
information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but
the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is malversation, bribery,
falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the
crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the
robber in the information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was
charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved
two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be
taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in
the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality
of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is
just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations
and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million,
but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved
beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder(underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution
to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers
from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which
would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need
to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused
in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by
pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to
at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern
of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the
very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern
arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined
in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion
is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of
a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged,
(as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the
accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law
without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder
Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused
charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the
law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond
reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and
it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can
avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes
charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
 ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the
crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can
be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern"
is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder
xxxx
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a
means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction
for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed
and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on
evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application

thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as
a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really
so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially
if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens
rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would
not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient
to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:

SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in
Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder,
the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme
or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt
or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the
acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must
be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal

Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens
rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply
as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We
agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit,
but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."[35]

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be

deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like
an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim
or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the
victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very
survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that
their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37]and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080,
on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect thislong dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that
RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary
effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more
and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially
designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked,
will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our
nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately
eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public
office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger
for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the
law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO, G.R. No. 192935

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH

COMMISSION OF 2010,
Respondent.
x-----------------------x
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, G.R. No. 193036
REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR.,
REP. SIMEON A. Present:
DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., CORONA, C.J.,
Petitioners, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SERENO, JJ.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND Promulgated:
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, December 7, 2010
Respondents.

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
 DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel[1]

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that
the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by
which these powers are distributed among the several departments. [2] The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform
and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must
defer.[3] Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the
tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of
situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and
the people who run it.[4]

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases[5] both of which
essentially assail the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated
July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition
instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution[6] as it usurps the
constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor.[7]
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic
May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his
staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability
to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need
for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth
Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines

solemnly enshrines the principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates
that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times
be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this

principle and notorious violation of this mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political,
economic, and social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold
misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector of
society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and
undermined the peoples trust and confidence in the Government and its
institutions;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith
and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the
last elections kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge
that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating

and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President
the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created

the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward
this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude
that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed
by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that
the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will
act as an independent collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1,
involving third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:

a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which
it will investigate;

b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases
of large scale corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require
any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other
papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents
from the Senate and the House of Representatives records of investigations
conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being investigated
by the Commission;

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts,
including the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator,
information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose,
administer oaths or affirmations as the case may be;

f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state

witness to ensure that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who
qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be
admitted for that purpose;

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate
prosecutorial authorities, by means of a special or interim report and
recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and employees and
their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the
course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to
believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;

h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the

Department of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may require in the
discharge of its functions and duties;

i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other

personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;

j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary

to effectively and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to
ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings and hearings,
including the presentation of evidence;

k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in

connection with the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any
government official or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon
subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the Commission
 refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for
inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action.
Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide
the necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers,
execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively,
efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its
mission on or before December 31, 2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment
of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as
defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances of
graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so
extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.

SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared

unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth

Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President
with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it
has been described as an independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within
the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes
a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.[8]

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is
not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative
penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have
been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies to establish
the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international
humanitarian law in a countrys past.[9] They are usually established by states
emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as
mechanisms for transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following
characteristics: (1) they examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of
abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are
temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing
conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized
or empowered by the State.[10] Commissions members are usually empowered to
conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to
discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They
may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional
reforms.[11]
 Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The
Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are examples of a retributory or
vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against
humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds
of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience
for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more
emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of
the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer [12] puts
it:

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the

Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: To
those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would
like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have committed
in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation
without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give
consent to their occurring over and over again.

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners
asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that
they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the
following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates

the power of the Congress to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the

Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office
of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
 include the power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent

statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department
of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively

targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as
it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010

violates the consistent and general international practice of four decades
wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate
human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the
generally accepted principles of international law which the Philippines
is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles
enshrined in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in

futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching pad for
trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to
mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether
vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other
major causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not

constitutionally challenged is of no moment because neither laches nor
estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and
validity of an executive issuance or even a statute.[13]

In their Consolidated Comment,[14] the respondents, through the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:
 1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create
a public office because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), [15] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416[16] (as amended by P.D.
No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,[17] and settled jurisprudence that authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate

funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds
already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the

functions of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ),because it is a fact-finding body and not
a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection

clause because it was validly created for laudable purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive
orders and presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the
PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President
Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance
Efficiency (PCAPE)by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on
Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.[18]
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are
the principal issues to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing

to file their respective petitions and question Executive Order No. 1;
 2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the
principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress
to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of
the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal

protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive

Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise
of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review
is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,
or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[19]

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put
at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their
petition for failure to demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It
argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not
claiming to be the subject of the commissions investigations, petitioners will not
sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.[20]

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the
petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition
primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for
Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their
power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held
in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[21]

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the

power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of
Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative,

powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which,
to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.[22]

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing
to question the creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations. [23] It
emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the
commission are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress.
Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will not entail
congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over
contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained,
or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of
a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and
to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case
of David v. Arroyo[24] explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of

justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by
the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Succinctly put, the
plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public

suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the
category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In
other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen
or taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and

taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme
Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public
right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right,
if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public
offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public
grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain
an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to
his injury cannot be denied.
 However, to prevent just about any person from seeking
judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental
agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court
laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,
later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that
for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that
he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not
sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the
public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our

jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such
as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse
Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v.
Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest.[25]

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,[26] the Court held
that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial
review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,[27] ordinary citizens and taxpayers
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although
they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance [28] laid
down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco[29] are non-existent in this case. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench
and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of all.[30] Undoubtedly, the
Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first
effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance
of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in
the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its
constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth
Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the
President.[31]Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law.
According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed[32] since there is no
provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to
create a truth commission.[33] He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot
serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid
provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize, transfer, consolidate, merge, and
abolish.[34] Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the
Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is
inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution
and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.[35]

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation

of a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the executive
branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to
reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit
the President to create a public office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to
the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is
limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President
Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency.[36] Such continuing authority of the President to
reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President
overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the
creation by the President of a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing
to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long
been recognized.[37]According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the other two
branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding
committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions
and in the exercise of its administrative functions.[38] This power, as the OSG
explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under
Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the
Constitution.[39]

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct
fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced
by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and
office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.[40] The power of the President
to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other
powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates,[41] his power for rule making,
adjudication and licensing purposes[42] and in order to be informed on matters which
he is entitled to know.[43]

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,[44] where it was held
that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the
executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and
by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices
under existing statutes.
 Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the
power to create offices. For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to,
among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the
government.[45]

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC
fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the
Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by
the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office
of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.Clearly, the provision
refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a
body or an office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to
be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned
in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the
President under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently,
the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the
enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon.
Executive Secretary,[46]

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President

to reorganize any department or agency in the executive branch
does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source
of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject
to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
 the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of
other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that
reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation
of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a
bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the
Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents
power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of
control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is
inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress,

empowering the President to create a public office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the
above provision finds statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772.[48] The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize
the national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has
been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.[49]

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for
the President to create a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and
inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authority
to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the
power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes
of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form

of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of the
national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and

resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No.
1772, became functus oficioupon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly
provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the
Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted

was the last whereas clause of P.D.
1416 says it was enacted to prepare
the transition from presidential to
parliamentary. Now, in a
parliamentary form of
government, the legislative and
executive powers are fused,
correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was

issued. Now would you agree with
me that P.D. 1416 should not be
considered effective anymore upon
the promulgation, adoption,
ratification of the 1987
Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416,

Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to

reorganize the entire National
 Government is deemed repealed, at
least, upon the adoption of the
1987 Constitution, correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.[50]

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of
P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds
justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the

three principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos
v. Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the

presidential system of government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual
distribution among three distinct branches of government with
provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive

power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of
state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself
withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It
also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
 execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's
foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987

Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers
of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered
as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of
the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive
power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the

government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution.[53] One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v.
Camposano,[54] the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298,
creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of
medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating

Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally
granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that
all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or
that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
 It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies
to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be
revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created in the past
like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission
and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure,
the Court is not inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because
the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress
to appropriate funds for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there
will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no need
to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because,
in the words of the Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for
the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
commission.[55] Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the
funding.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed is well recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.[56] As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the authority to
directly assume the functions of the executive department.[57]

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate
reports of graft and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As
previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-
judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which
the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.[58] In simpler terms,
judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that
it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the
legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate
was delineated by the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.[59] Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine,

explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject
to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose
of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts
inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by
the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same:
"(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the
taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial
or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a
certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle.
The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and
duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised:
x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And
"adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial
or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy x x."
 In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the
exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass
on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn.
x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial

function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function
of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving
at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law.[60] Even respondents themselves admit
that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.[61]

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or
the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the
overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation.[62] The actual
prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the
charges against them,[63] is certainly not a function given to the commission. The
phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section 2(g), highlights this
fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.[64]

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus,
in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,[65] it was written:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987

Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared
with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the
PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit
 trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on
charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the
passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman
retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and
the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local
elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by

any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such
cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates

the conduct of a preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of
probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power
to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President
in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans
primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2),
Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means
exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the
PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide
Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings
would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the
DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the
recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties
but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative
power of the President, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this

constitutional safeguard. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members
of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous administration as
its sole object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility.[66] Thus, in order to
be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President
Arroyo.[67]

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of
graft and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the
administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations
where the same magnitude of controversies and anomalies[68] were reported to have
been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification formulated
by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first,
there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for
investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their
public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not
germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.[69] In order to
attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the commission should
deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with
the strong arm of the law with equal force.[70]

Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous

administration as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17
thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption
solely during the said administration.[71] Assuming arguendo that the commission
would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous administration, the
petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for
the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous
administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on
substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks
to correct.[72] To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it
recited the following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of

large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which
have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is,
therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and
to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the
evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the Government and in
their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the

object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with
administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely
bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous
administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a

separate class for investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of
possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of
 public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to
ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily
established in the regime that immediately precede the current
administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their

predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues that are
pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence
and good housekeeping by a nascent administration like the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the
late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to
pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former
President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and
the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada
under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent
citizens committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances
surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his predecessor, former
President Fidel V. Ramos.[73] [Emphases supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality
or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.[74]

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.[75] It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.[76] The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.[77] In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.[78]

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those
of the legislature.[79] Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is
taken. [80]

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and
[81]
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.[82]

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must

include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. [83] The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that
the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal
degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those
covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an
individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class
is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application
of the law to him.[84]

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so

constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances
and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall
into a certain classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union[85] and reiterated in a long line of cases,[86]
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty
of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the
state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things
which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the
same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as
to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows

classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that
it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not
be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck
down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration[87] only. The intent
to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it
has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to

investigating and finding out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration,
and which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and
secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created

the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth
on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption
of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from
the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be
served without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall

have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily
tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported
cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third
level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
[Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
 Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo
administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial
enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration
only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be
taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations
which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are
not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice
Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.[88]

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to

limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The
OSG ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.[89] The
reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.[90]

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that

the earlier reports involving the earlier administrations were already inquired into is
beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC
expected to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given
the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex
non cogit ad impossibilia).[91]

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically
recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a centurys worth of graft
cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary
classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not
exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often
quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,[92]
 Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority with
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope
is limited. The Court, however, is of the considered view that although its focus is
restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not
in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights determined and all public authority administered.[93] Laws that do
not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.[94] While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation
of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read
together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier
administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm the
petitioners lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan
hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,[95] it was written: A rather limited number of
such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those
include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political
party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise
of first amendment rights.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of

constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the
class.[96] Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or
so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but
must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are
indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the
influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the
class.[97]
 The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the
validity of a law under the equal protection clause.[98] Legislation is not
unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the
evils within its reach.[99] It has been written that a regulation challenged under the
equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it
happens to be incomplete.[100] In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can
be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the step by step
process.[101] With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the
risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through
inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.[102]

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the

previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention
any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative
commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination.[103]

To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the

OSG clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale
graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.[104] The OSG
points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the

judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of
cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior
administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of
a supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the
discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts
of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee
that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission
will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to
include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears
of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the
prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration.[105]

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata
v. Sandiganbayan,[106] that the PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos.
1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision, however, was
devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the
principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of Judicial
Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is
expected to be the protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been
addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to
once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being
a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the

1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial

review which is the power to declare a treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of
the application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have
been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the
two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been
accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source
of enlightenment, to wit: And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not
in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. [107]

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its
own will upon a co-equal body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional
violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble
intentions, all geared towards the betterment of the nation and its people. But then
again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the
means. No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if
the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.[108] The Court cannot just
turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and
its enshrined principles.

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the
mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to sap its strength
nor greed for power debase its rectitude.[109]
 Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as
nobly envisioned by the present administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive
issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass
the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the
branches of the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in
knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its
attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be
within constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws and not of men.[110]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is

hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist
from carrying out the provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

See separate opinion (concurring)

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

See dissenting opinion Please see dissenting opinion

 ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

I certify that Justice Velasco left his concurring vote See concurring & dissenting opinion
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion See separate opinion (concurring)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion see my separate concurring opinion

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate dissenting opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice
See separate opinion (concurring)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 105907 May 24, 1993

FELICIANO V. AGBANLOG, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

Michael P. Moralde for petitioner.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 7
of P.D. No. 1606 as amended, of the decision of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated on
June 28, 1992, which found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Malversation of Public
Funds, penalized under paragraph 4, Article 217, of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to
suffer, in the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances "the indeterminate penalty of,
from ELEVEN (11) years and one (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS,
FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties of the law; to pay a fine in the amount of P21,940.70; to suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and to pay the costs."

The Sandiganbayan made the following findings of facts :

Feliciano Agbanlog y Vinluan was the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer of Aglipay, Quirino, for the period: March 24, 1986 to May 31, 1988. When
audited by COA Auditing Examiner Marcelina P. Reyes of the Provincial Auditor's
Office of Cobarroguis, Quirino, on August 4, 1986 for the aforesaid period of his
incumbency as Acting Municipal Treasurer, Feliciano Agbanlog was found short in
his cash and accounts in the sum of P21,940.70.

The shortage was broken down in the following manner :

a. Disallowed cash item

of Mr. Feliciano V. Agbanlog
May 31, 1986 worded as cash
advance to defray various expenses
which was not approved
by the Municipal Mayor P12,504.49

b. Disallowed voucher No.

101-86-04-71 dated April 18, 1986
due to under delivery of printed forms P2,900.00
 c. Disallowed voucher No.
101-86-05-144 dated
May 31, 1986 due to
under delivery of printed
forms P3,260.00

d. Unaccounted collection P3,276.21

Total P21,940.70

A written demand to explain the shortage and to pay the amount thereof was neither
answered nor acted upon by the accountable officer. Consequently, a Report was
made by Examining Auditors Marcelina P. Reyes, Asuncion G. Tamondong and
Margarita B. Eugenio to the Provincial Auditor of Quirino, manifesting their findings
and recommending the institution of administrative and/or criminal charges against
Acting Municipal Treasurer Feliciano Agbanlog.

At the outset, the Auditors found the accused Agbanlog short in the amount of
P32,950.34, broken down in this manner:

Accountability:
Balance shown by your
cash book on May 31, 1986
certified correct by you
and verified by us P85,186.40

Credits to Accountability:
Cash and valid cash items
produced by you
and counted on us P52,236.06

Shortage P32,950.34

Upon the finding that P11,009.64 of this amount was chargeable to the account of
former Municipal Treasurer Carlos Pastor, predecessor of Municipal Treasurer
Ruperto Pallaya, the said amount of P11,009.64 was deducted from the
accountability of Feliciano Agbanlog. The Acting Municipal Treasurer was
nevertheless made accountable for the shortage of P21,940.70, the amount for
which he is not charged.

As regards the disbursement voucher billed as a cash advance for various expenses
in the amount of P12,504.49, Exhibit "E", this voucher was disallowed by the auditors
because there was no appropriation for this disbursement. It is indicated in the
voucher that the giving out of this money was in the nature of a cash advance. The
purpose for which the cash advance was given out was, however, not clearly
indicated. The particulars of payment merely states "to cash advance to defray
various expenditures". Only the signature of the accused Feliciano Agbanlog may be
found in the voucher. This indicates that the amount of P12,504.49 was given out to
and received by the accused, Feliciano V. Agbanlog, from Roberto E. Pallaya.
Vouchers of this nature, in order to be valid, must bear the signature of the
incumbent Municipal Mayor of Aglipay, Quirino. The signature of the then Mayor, the
 Hon. Deogracias L. Prego, Sr., does not appear in the voucher. No invoice or receipt
was presented to support the disbursement.

Thus, considering the fact that the accused, Feliciano V. Agbanlog received the
proceeds of the voucher, this disbursement has, indeed, become the accountability
of the accused, whose duty it was to liquidate the same. The accused did not so
liquidate. Accused's allegation that the amount of money involved was given to him
to the Municipal Mayor has not been backed up by sufficient evidence. If this amount
of money were for the Mayor's account, the Mayor should have been made to sign
the voucher, or else, there should have been accomplished some sort of evidence
payment for the Mayor.

Disbursement Voucher No. 101-8604-71, dated April 18, 1986, Exhibit "F", in the
amount of P3,500.00, was partially disallowed because printed forms for which the
voucher was made out was not actually delivered but yet paid for. The accused was
able to present proof of delivery only of accounting forms valued at P600.00.
Consequently, the accused was credited with the amount of P600.00. The remaining
balance of P2,900.00 was nevertheless disallowed.

Disbursement Voucher No. 101-8605-144, dated May 31, 1986, Exhibit "G" in the
amount of P4,110.00 was likewise partially disallowed. The accused was able to
show proof of a legitimate disbursement in the amount of P850.00. Consequently,
the accused was credited with this amount and only the sum of P3,260.00 was
disallowed.

As regards the shortage in the amount of P3,276.21, representing the accused

unaccounted collections, per Collector's Daily Statement of Collections for the period:
April to May, 1986, Exhibits "H" to "M", We find evidence showing that this amount,
while turned over to the accused Feliciano Agbanlog in his capacity as Acting
Municipal Treasurer by Collectors Jane G. Domingo, Marilyn Villarta, Danilo de
Guzman, Guadalupe M. Quimpayag and Rolando Domingo, has not been accounted
for, the accused claiming that cash collections of the aforesaid collectors were never
remitted to him. There is ample proof, therefore, of the fact that the accused received
these cash collections. His signatures on various documents, Exhibits "H" to "M", "H-
1", "I-1", "J-1", "K-1", "L-1" and "M-1", virtually indicate that the accused had actually
received the amounts indicated in these exhibits. We cannot believe that the accused
would sign these documents if he did not receive the amount of money
corresponding thereto. The accused's allegation, made as an afterthought, that the
collectors who were supposed to turnover their collections to him did not actually
turnover their collections cannot be believed. The contention that the collectors had
instead made out vales or cash advances covering the amount of their collections, is
not supported by proof. The vale slips or cash advance papers allegedly given to the
accused in lieu of cash could not be produced by the accused.

The accused was supposed to return these vale slips to the collectors only after they
made good the borrowed amount. This lapse in evidence does not speak well of the
defense herein put up by the accused. (Rollo, pp. 30-34)

Petitioner admits the shortage of the accountable funds charged by the prosecution but claims that
the prosecution failed to show that the shortage accrued during his short stint as acting treasurer.
According to him, the audit of his funds should have been made immediately upon his assumption
as Officer-in-charge of the Office of the Treasurer in the last week of March, 1986, instead of in
August, 1986. He further claims that while there was a turn-over of the funds on June 2, 1986 when
Municipal Treasurer Ruperto Pallaya reported back for work, there was no turnover of the funds
when he temporarily took charge of the Office of the Treasurer. (Rollo, pp. 5-6)

Re : Shortage of P12,504.49

Petitioner admits that he was the one who prepared the voucher, (Exh. "E"), and who received the
amount of P12,504.49 mentioned therein. He does not deny the authenticity of his signatures
appearing thereon. No other person, other than petitioner, was involved in the preparation of the said
voucher and the receipt of the amount of P12,504.49. He only claims that the money was given to
the Municipal Mayor, who allegedly refused to sign the voucher.

Petitioner, having worked as a bookkeeper in the Treasurer's Office of Cobarroguis, Quirino, since
1979 and as Assistant Municipal Treasurer since 1982, should know that vouchers must be signed
by the claimants. If he acknowledged receipt of the money knowing that the claimant was the
Municipal Mayor, he became a party to the fraud and assumed responsibility for the consequences
of his acts. The defense did not call the Municipal Mayor to testify that he was the real claimant and
that he received the money from the petitioner.

Re : Shortage of P2,900.00

Petitioner admits that he was the one who prepared the voucher dated April 18, 1986 for the
payment of various forms in the amount of P3,500.00 (Exh. "F"). He was the one who acknowledged
receipt of the supplies mentioned in the voucher and who received the amount of P3,500.00 in
payment thereof. He even certified to the necessity and legality of the expense.

When audited, petitioner was able to show the delivery of forms valued at only P600.00. The burden
was on petitioner to explain satisfactorily the discrepancy between the voucher and the receipt of the
delivery.

Re : Shortage of P3,260.00

Out of the amount of P4,100.00 disbursed under the voucher marked as Exhibit "G", petitioner
admits having been able to support payment of only P850.00; hence the amount of P3,260.00 was
disallowed.

Re :Shortage of P3,276.21

As to the shortage in the amount of P3,276.21 representing the unaccounted collections of petitioner
for the month of April and May 1986, petitioner claims that the said amount was never turned over to
him. If this was true, he should not have signed the documents marked Exhibits "H" to "M", "A-1", "Y-
7", "5-1", "K-1", "L-1" and "M-1", all acknowledging receipt of the cash collections of the various
collectors.

In all the foregoing cases of shortage, petitioner admits having prepared and collected the amounts
stated in the vouchers (Exhs. "E", "F", "G") and having signed the collectors' daily statement of
collection, which evidence his receipt of the amounts stated therein (Exhs. "H" to "M"). With such
admissions, how can petitioner now attribute the shortage of his accountable funds to his
predecessor?
It is also difficult to comprehend how an earlier audit of petitioner's accountability or an audit made
upon assumption of office of the Municipal Treasurer could possible explain the shortages unearthed
by the government auditor and assist him in his defense.

The elements of malversation of public funds or property punishable under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code are :

a) That the offender is a public officer;.

b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;.

c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable;.

d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence

permitted another person to take them. (II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, p. 391 [1981 ed.])

The prosecution has established (a) that appellant received in his possession public funds; (b) that
he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession when audited; and (c) that he
could not give a satisfactory explanation or reasonable excuse for the disappearance of said funds.
(Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, 197 SCRA 94 [1991]) The prosecution is not required to present direct
evidence of the misappropriation, which may be impossible to do. (Villanueva v. Sandiganbayan,
200 SCRA 722 [1991]).

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is a prima facie evidence that he has put
such funds or property to personal use. (Art. 217, last paragraph, Revised Penal Code as amended
by R.A. 1060).

Petitioner questions as oppressive and unconstitutional the penalty imposed on him that of eleven
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen years, five months and eleven days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

He argues that considering the value of the peso in 1932 when the Revised Penal Code was
enacted and the value of peso today, the penalty for malversation of P21,000.00 should only be an
imprisonment of one or two years. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)

Assuming arguendo that inflation has in effect made more severe the penalty for malversing
P21,000.00, the remedy cannot come from this Court but from the Congress. The Court can
intervene and strike down a penalty as cruel, degrading or inhuman only when it has become so
flagrantly oppressive and so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the
moral senses. (People v. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299 [1968]; People v. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647 [1953];
U.S. v. Borromeo, 23 Phil. 279 [1912]) Considering that malversation of public funds by a public
officer is a betrayal of the public trust, We are not prepared to say that the penalty imposed on
petitioner is so disproportionate to the crime committed as to shock the moral sense.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.