CITIZENSHIP SECTION 1.
THE FOLLOWING ARE CITIZENS Those born in the Philippine Islands of
OF THE PHILIPPINES:
THOSE WHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
AT THE TIME OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION;
THOSE WHOSE FATHERS OR MOTHERS ARE
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES;
THOSE BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973,OF
FILIPINO MOTHERS, WHO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP UPON REACHING THE AGE OF
MAJORITY;AND
THOSE WHO ARE NATURALIZED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
Q. What is citizenship?
A. Citizenship is personal and more or less permanent
membership in a political community. It denotes
possession within that particular political community of
full civil and political rights subject to special
disqualifications such as minority. Reciprocally, it
imposes the duty of allegiance to the political
community.
Q. What are the modes of acquiring citizenship?
A. Modern law recognizes three distinct modes of
acquiring citizenship:
(1) jus sanguinis acquisition of citizenship on
the basis of blood relationship;
(2) jus soli acquisition of citizenship on the
basis of place of birth;
(3) naturalization the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the privilege of a
native born citizen. Basic Philippine law follows
the rule ofjus sanguinis and provides for
naturalization. 182 Sees. 4-5 ART. IV -
CITIZENSHIP 183
Q. Who are citizens of the Philippines?
A. See supra, Section 1.
Q. Who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the adoption of the 1987 Constitution?
A. Philippine citizens at the time of the adoption of
the 1987 Constitution were those who were citizens
under the 1973 Constitution.
Q. Who were citizens of the Philippines under the
1973 Constitution?
A. Section 1 of the article on Citizenship under the
1973 Constitution was the same as Section 1 under
the new Constitution.
Q. Who were citizens of the Philippines at the time
of adoption of the 1973 Constitution?
A. They were those who were citizens under Article
IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, namely:
Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of the
(1935) Constitution;
foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution, had been elected to
public office in the Philippine Islands;
Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines;
Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
Q. How is the principle of jus sanguinis applied in
the 1987 Constitution?
A. Section 1(2) declares as Filipino citizens "Those
whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines." This is the same rule as that under the
1973 Constitution. This means that if a child is born
under the 1973 or 1987 Constitution and either his
father or mother is a Filipino citizen at the time the
child is born, the child is a Filipino citizen no matter
where he may be born. 184 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec.
10
Q. Emilio Osmena is a holder of an alien registration
certificate. He is also a son of a Filipino father (and a
grandson of President Osmena) and the holder of a
valid subsisting Philippine passport, a continuous
resident of the Philippines and a registered voter
since 1965. It is contended that he is an alien and
therefore disqualified from holding public office.
Decide. A. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino
father the presumption is that he is Filipino and
remains Filipino until proof is shown that he has
renounced or lost Philippine citizenship. There is no
proof that he has been naturalized in a foreign
country, or has expressly renounced Philippine
citizenship, or has sworn allegiance to a foreign
country. Possession of an alien registration
certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance
of acts whereby Philippine citizenship is lost is not
adequate proof of loss of citizenship. Aznar v.
COMELEC and Osmena, 185 SCRA 703 (1990).
Q.What is the citizenship of an illegitimate child of a
Filipina mother?
A. Filipino. This is true whether the child be born
under the 1935 or under the 1973 or 1987
Constitution.
Q. What is the citizenship of an illegitimate child of
a Filipino father and an alien mother?
A. Filipino, if paternity is clear, because of jus
sanguinis, which makes no distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children. This was the
case of Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March
3, 2004.
Q. If a child was born of a Filipina mother and an
alien father before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution, do the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
recognize such child as Filipino?
A. No, unless upon reaching majority the child
elects Philippine citizenship pursuant to the 1935
Constitution. In other words, Section 1(2) of the
1973, which is the same as Section 1(2) of the 1987
Constitution, took effect only with the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973. Hence,
children similarly situated but born prior to January
17, 1973 are governed by Section 1(4) of Article IV
of the 1935 Constitution.
Q. Who may elect Philippine citizenship under the
1935 Constitution?
A. Those born under the 1935 Constitution whose
mothers were Philippine citizens (at the time at
least of their marriage to an alien father) may elect
Philippine citizenship. Sees. 4-5 ART. IV -
CITIZENSHIP 185
Q. When must the election be made?
A. The election must be made within a reasonable
period after reaching majority.
InDy Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice, L-18069, May
26, 1962, the Supreme Court cited with approval
the ruling of the Secretary of Justice to the effect
that three years is a reasonable period within which
to make the election, which period, however, may
be extended under certain circumstances as when
the person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino citizen.
Q. How is election made? A. Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 625, enacted on June 7, 1941,
says that the election must be expressed in a
statement sworn before any officer authorized to
administer oaths and filed with the nearest civil
registry and accompanied by an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Constitution. However,
participating in elections and campaigning for
candidates, and similar acts done prior to June 7,
1941, have been recognized as sufficient to show
one's preference for Philippine citizenship. In re
Florencio Mallare, 59 SCRA 45, 52, September,
1974.
Q. May a child born under the 1973 or the 1987
Constitution of a Filipina mother and an alien father
elect Philippine citizenship?
A.No. If the mother was still a Filipina at the time of
the birth of the child then the child is already
Filipino by birth, and hence need not elect. If the
mother, however, had lost Philippine citizenship by
the time of the birth of the child, the child has no
right of election and may acquire citizenship only by
naturalization. In other words, the provision on
election in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution are
transitory provisions intended to take care of those
who under the 1935 Constitution could have
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
majority but had not yet reached majority at the
time of the effectivity of the 1973 or 1987
Constitution.
Q. Should children born under the 1935
Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien
father, who executed an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took their oath of
allegiance to the government upon reaching the age
of majority, but who failed to immediately file the
documents of election with the nearest civil
registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to
186 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 4-5
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER deportation as
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien
certificates of registration?
A.No. This case involved children who had grown to
adult years and for some reason failed to register
their election but had all along acted as citizens.
Among the things which the Court noted was that
the 1973 Constitution had already corrected the
chauvinistic provision of the 1935 Constitution by
making those born of a Filipina mother a citizen
without need for election. Cabiling Ma v.
Commissioner, G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010.
Q.What is naturalization?
A. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting a
foreigner and clothing him with the privileges of a
natural-born citizen. A person may be naturalized
either by complying with both the substantive and
procedural requirements of a general naturalization
law or he may be naturalized by a special act of the
legislature.
Q. What kind of naturalization laws and procedures
have been used in the Philippines?
A. The following have been used:
General law of naturalization applied
through a judicial process. (Revised
Naturalization Law, C.A. 473, June 17,1939.
This is still in effect.)
Special naturalization law, i.e., an act of the
legislature making a named individual a
citizen of the Philippines. E.g.,the Republic
Act which made Father James Moran, S.J. a
citizen or the Presidential Decree which
made Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz a citizen.
Mass naturalization law. The Philippine Bill
of 1902 made Filipino citizens of "all
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside in them who were
Spanish subjects" on 11 April 1899 "and
then resided in said islands."
 4. General law of naturalization applied
through a combination of administrative
process and presidential legislative process
(Letter of Instruction No. 270, in effect for a
limited period from its promulgation by
President Marcos on April 11,1975.) Sees. 4-
5 ART. IV -CITIZENSHIP 187 5.
Administrative Naturalization Law, R.A.
9139, enacted in 2000.
Q. What kind of requirements must an applicant
for naturalization satisfy under the Revised
Naturalization Law?
A. Both substantive and procedural
requirements.
Q. What are the substantive requirements for
naturalization?
A. Briefly, Section 2 of C A. 473 prescribes
requirements of age, residence, moral character
and political belief, real property or lucrative
occupation, language, and education of
children.
Q. Applicant for citizenship received a favorable
decision after the Fiscal failed to raise any
objection. In the hearing after the two year
probation, however, the Fiscal turned around to
say that the respondent had no lucrative
business, trade, or profession. May such subject
be raised for the first time in the final hearing?
A. Yes. In re petition of Martin Ng to be
admitted a Filipino Citizen, 158 SCRA 492
(1988).
Q. What procedural requirements must be
satisfied?
A. The applicant must go through the following
steps: declaration of intention, filing of petition,
hearing and initial judgment, period of
probation, rehearing and final judgment.
Q. When does the applicant become a Filipino
citizen?
A. Upon taking the oath provided by law after
satisfactorily passing the period of probation.
Q. What kind of requirements must an applicant
for naturalization satisfy under the
Administrative Naturalization Law?
A. Both substantive and procedural
requirements.
Q. What are the substantive Requirements?
A.
The applicant must be born in the
Philippines and residing therein since
birth;
The applicant must not be less than
eighteen (18) years of age, at the time
of filing of his/her petition;
The iapplicant must be of good moral
character and believes in the underlying
principles of the Constitution, 188 THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 10
and must have conducted
himself/herself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his/her
entire period of residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the duly
constituted government as well as with
the community in which he/she is living;
The applicant must have received
his/her primary and secondary
education in any public or private
educational institution duly recognized
by the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, where Philippine
history, government and civics are
taught and prescribed as part of the
school curriculum and where
enrollment is not limited to any race or
nationality: Provided, that should
he/she have minor children of school
age, he/she must have enrolled them in
similar schools;
The applicant must have a known trade,
business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives
income sufficient for his/her support
and if he/she is married and/or has
dependents, also that of his/her family:
Provided, however, That this shall not
apply to applicants who are college
degree holders but are unable to
practice their profession because they
are disqualified to do so by reason of
their citizenship;
The applicant must be able to read,
write and speak Filipino or any of the
dialects of the Philippines; and
The applicant must have mingled with
the Filipinos and evinced desire to learn
and embrace the customs, traditions
and ideals of the Filipino people.
Q. How is the application handled?
A. It is handled through the Special Committee
on Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor
General. Sec. 5 & 6, R.A. 9139.
Q. What is the effect ofthe naturalization ofa
father on legitimate minor children?
A. In general, the minor children become
citizens of the Philippines. (C.A. 473, Sees.
15,16)
Q. What is the effect on the wife of the
naturalized husband?
A. She becomes a Filipino citizen, provided she
shows, in an administrative procedure for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration, that she has none of the
disqualifications Sees. 4-5 ART. IV -CITIZENSHIP
189 found in C.A. 473, Sec. 2.Burca v. Republic,
51 SCRA 248 (June 15,1973).
Q. What is the effect of the naturalization of a
husband under RA. 9139?
A. Applicant's alien lawful wife and minor
children may file a petition for cancellation of
their alien certificates of registration with the
Committee. Sec. 11.
Q. What is the effectof the naturalization of a
wife?
A. Her administrative naturalization will not
benefit her alien husband but her minor
children may file a petition for cancellation of
their alien certificate of registration. Sec. 12.
SEC.2.NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS ARE
THOSEWHO ARE CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
FROM BIRTH WITHOUT HAVING TO PERFORM
ANY ACT TO ACQUIRE OR PERFECT THEIR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.THOSE WHO ELECT
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP IN ACCORDANCE
WITHPARAGRAPH (3),SECTION 1HEREOF SHALL
BE DEEMED NATURAL-BORN CITIZENS.
Q. Is one who is a Filipino citizen by election a
natural-born citizen under Section 1(3)?
A. Yes, because of the second sentence of
Section 2. This is a clarification made by the
1987 Constitution.
Q. Is this a new rule?
A. Although this rule has been made explicit
only under the 1987 Constitution, there is the
view that this was the implicit rule even before
1987, the reason being that a child born of a
Filipina mother already has the inchoate right to
Filipino citizenship from birth. At any rate, the
rule as worded in the 1987 Constitution applies
even to those who made their election prior to
the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on
February 2, 1987.
Q. Jose was born a Chinese and married a
natural born Filipina in 1932. Jose was
eventuaUy naturalized and took his oath of
allegiance in 1955. At that time Jose, Jr. was 9
years old. In 1987 Jose, Jr. was elected to the
House of Representatives.
1. May the citizenship of Jose, Sr., already
deceased, be attacked collaterally in this case?
2. Did the minor Jose, Jr. become a Filipino
citizen with his father?
3. Did he have to elect Philippine citizenship
when he came of age?
4. Is he a natural born citizen?
A.1. No.
2. Yes, under the Naturalization Law.
3. No, because he already was one. It would be
unnatural to expect him to. Election of
Philippine citizenship presupposes that you are
not one. Moreover, jurisprudence recognizes
both formal and informal election. See e.g., In
re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 (1974).
4. Yes. He benefits from the curative nature of
Section 2. He derives his status of being a
natural born citizen not from his father, who
made election unnecessary for him, but from
his mother who was a natural born Filipina. Co
v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives,G.R. No. 92191-92, July
30,1991.
Q. May the law treat natural-born citizens and
naturalized citizens differently?
A. No, except in the instances where the
Constitution itself makes a distinction.
Otherwise there would be a violation of the
equal protection clause. Chen Teck Lao v.
Republic, 55 SCRA 1, 5-6 (1974). SEC. 3.
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR
REACQUIRED IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY
LAW.
Q. What laws govern loss and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship?
A. Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and
Republic Acts No. 965 and 2639, and P.D. 725
on repatriation.
Q. May a certificate of naturalization be
canceled?
A. Yes, if it is shown to have been obtained
fraudulently or illegally, or if the person is
shown to have violated the prohibitions Sees. 4-
5 ART. IV -CITIZENSHIP 191 imposed on him by
C.A. 473, Section 18. But to justify cancellation
of such certificate, the evidence must be "clear,
unequivocal and convincing" and not merely
preponderant. Citizenship acquired through
naturalization is not second-class citizenship.
Republic v. Cokeng, 23 SCRA 559 (1963) and 34
SCRA 668 (1970).
Q. After naturalization proceedings, Cesar Guy
took his oath of allegiance on December
22,1959. The government sought the
cancellation of his certificate of naturalization
on the ground that
(1) during the pendency of his petition for
naturalization he filed a sworn application for a
timber license falsely claiming that he was
Filipino (for which he was subsequently
convicted for perjury), and that
(2) on December 12, 1963 he was convicted of
rape. On May 28, 1974, the lower court ordered
the cancellation of his certificate on the ground
that it had been obtained fraudulently and
illegally. On appeal, Guy contended that both
convictions were after the two-year
probationary period and after the final
judgment on his citizenship and hence could not
be used against him. Decide.
A. 1.
A decision in a naturalization proceeding is
notres judicata as to any of the matters which
could support a judgment canceling the
certificate for illegal or fraudulent procurement.
In fact, the certificate may be canceled for acts
committed after naturalization.
2. Perjury, committed during the pendency of
his petition, is evidence of lack of good moral
character; hence his having been able to obtain
citizenship despite this misconduct rendered his
acquisition thereof fraudulent or illegal. (The
Naturalization Law allows cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization if it is found to have
been obtained "fraudulently or illegally.")
Republic v. Cesar Guy, G.R. No. 41399, July
20,1982.
Q. Petitioner was issued a Portuguese passport
in 1971. He was given naturalization as Filipino
citizen in 1978. In 1980, however, he still
declared his citizenship as Portuguese in
commercial documents and in 1981 he still
obtained a Portuguese passport which expired
in 1986. Has petitioner renounced Philippine
citizenship?
A. Yes, his actions constitute renunciation.
"While normally the question of whether or not
a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court
of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less,
upon insistence of petitioner, had to look into
the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not
petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious." In Willie Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, G.R. No. 83882, January
24,1989. 192 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
Sec. 10
Q. Labo went through a process of
naturalization as Australian and thereafter took
the oath of allegiance renouncing Philippine
citizenship. He claims that his acquisition of
Australian citizenship was invalid and that
therefore he was still Filipino citizen qualified to
run for Philippine office.
A. Whether or not he acquired Australian
citizenship validly is between him and Australia.
The fact is he renounced Philippine citizenship
by taking an oath of allegiance to Australia. And
since he has not taken any of the steps for re-
acquiring Philippine citizenship, he is not one
now and is not qualified to hold an elective
office. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC,G.R. No. 86564,
August 1,1989.
Q. Frivaldo does not deny that he was
naturalized an American citizen. He, however,
claims that his naturalization was involuntary
since it was the only way he could stay in the
United States and thereby protect himself from
Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he claims that by
participating in the Philippine political process
and filing his certificate of candidacy, he thereby
renounced American citizenship and reacquired
Philippine citizenship. Decide.
A. He is not Filipino. There were many Filipinos
similarly situated in the United States, but they
did not find it necessary to abandon Philippine
citizenship nor pledge allegiance to the United
States. And by participating in the political
process of the Philippines, at best it would have
rendered him stateless. As to reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, if he really wanted to he
could have easily done so through the process
of repatriation. He did not. Frivaldo v. Comelec,
174 SCRA 245 (1989).
Q.How may lost citizenship be reacquired?
A. Either by naturalization or repatriation.
Q.What is repatriation?
A. Repatriation is the recovery of original
citizenship. Thus, if what was lost was
naturalized citizenship, that is what will be
reacquired. If what was lost was natural born
citizenship, that will be reacquired. Bengzon v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001.
Q. Who may be repatriated?
A. Under Republic Act No. 8171 only
women who lost citizenship by
marriage and (2) those who lost
citizenship for political or economic
reasons may be repatriated. Tabasa v.
CA,August 29,2006. Sees. 4-5 ART. IV -
CITIZENSHIP 193
Q. How is repatriation accomplished?
A. The current law on the subject is found in
Republic Act No. 8171. Section 2 says:
Repatriation shall be effected by taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon
cancel the pertinent alien certificate of
registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the
repatriated citizen.
Q. Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation
with the proper civil registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in
effecting repatriation?
A. Yes.Altarejos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163256,
November 10,2004.
Q. Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. On November 5, 1985, however, he
enlisted inthe United States Marine Corps and,
without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a consequence, he lost his
Filipino citizenship. On June 5, 1990, he was
naturalized as an American. On March 17,1994,
he reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He
ran for and was elected as the Representative
of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
11,1998 elections. Was he a natural born
Filipino citizen?
A. As defined in the same Constitution, natural-
born citizens "are those citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship." On the other hand,
naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law. Cruz was not naturalized but repatriated.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes
by those who lost their citizenship due to:
desertion of the armed forces;
service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;
service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time;
marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien; and
political and economic necessity. As
distinguished from the lengthy process
of naturalization, repatriation simply
consists of the taking of an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering said oath in
the Local Civil 194 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: Sees. 4-5 A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Registry of
the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided. Repatriation, as
the word connotes, results in the
recovery of what had been lost. When
what was lost is natural born
citizenship, what is recovered is also
natural born citizenship. Having thus
taken the required oath of allegiance to
the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance
with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino
father. There are only two kinds of
citizenship: natural born and
naturalized. Since Cruz did not undergo
naturalization, he is natural born.
Bengzon v. Cruz,G.R. No. 142840, May
7, 2001.
Q. If a person who has reacquired Philippine
citizenship wants to run for office, what must
he do?
A. Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225
compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but
who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship
to take the oath of allegiance under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and
for those seeking elective public offices
in the Philippines, to additionally
execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before an authorized public
officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candida
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT SECTION
1.THE LEGISLATIVE POWERSHALL BE VESTED IN THE
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES WHICH SHALL CONSIST
OF A SENATE AND A HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,EXCEPT TO THE EXTENTRESERVED TO
THE PEOPLE BY THE PROVISION ON INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM.
Q. What is legislative power?
A. It is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal
them.
Q. Where does the Constitution vest legislative power?
A. Legislative power is vested "in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House
of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum" in
Section 32. The 1987 Constitution has thus restored
bicameralism.
Q. What are the advantages of bicameralism?
A. Bicameralism (1) allows for a body with a national
perspective to check the parochial tendency of
representatives elected by district;
(2) allows for more careful study of legislation;
) makes the legislature less susceptible to control by the
Executive; (4) serves as training ground for national
leaders. Q. What are the advantages of unicameralism?
A. The advantages of unicameralism are simplicity of
organization resultingin economy and efficiency, facility
in pinpointing responsibility for legislation, and
avoidance of duplication. Q. How many kinds of
legislative power are there? A. In republican systems,
there are generally two, original andderivative. Original
legislative power is possessed by the sovereign 210
Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 211
people. Derivative legislative power is that which has
been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative
bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the
people. This is the kind of power that is vested in
Congress. Legislative power may also be classified into
constituent, which is the power to amend or revise the
Constitution, and ordinary, which is the power to pass
ordinary laws. The people, through the amendatory
process, exercise constituent power, and, through
initiative and referendum, ordinary legislative power. Q.
What are the kinds of limits on legislative power? A.
There are two kinds, substantive and procedural.
Substantive limits curtail the contents of a law. For
example, no law may be passed which impairs freedom
of speech. Procedural limits curtail the manner of
passing laws. For example, a bill must generally be
approved by the President before it becomes law. Q. On
what subject matter may Congress legislate? A.
Provided that the substantive and procedural
limitations found in the Constitution are observed, the
Congress may legislate on any subject matter. In other
words, the legislative power of Congress is plenary.
(This is different from the legislative power of the
United States Congress which consists only of the
legislative powers enumerated in the Federal
Constitution.) Q. May Congress pass irrepealable laws?
A. No. The power of present and future legislatures
must remain plenary. When one legislature attempts to
pass an irrepealable law, to that extent it attempts to
limit the power of future legislatures. The power of any
legislature can be limited only by the Constitution. Q.
May Congress delegate its legislative power? A. No.
Legislative power must remain where the people have
lodged it. However, there are two exceptions to this
rule: (1) by immemorial practice legislative power may
be delegated to local governments, Rubi v. Provincial
Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919); (2) the Constitution itself
might in specific instances allow delegation of legislative
power, e.g., Article VI, Sections 23(2) and 28(2). 212 THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A
COMPREHENSIVEREVIEWER Sec. 10 Q. When legislative
power is delegated, what is the scope of the delegated
power? A. The scope is only as far as Congress allows it.
Thus, delegated legislation may not violate a statute.
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority,G.R.
No. 102782, December 11,1991. Q. Is not legislative
power as a matter of practice delegated to
administrative agencies? A. No. What is delegated to
administrative agencies is not legislative or law-making
power but rule-making power or law execution.
Administrative agencies may be allowed either to "fill
up the details" of an already complete statute or to
ascertain the facts necessary to bring a "contingent" law
into actual operation. Q. In order to ensure that the
power delegated by the legislature is not law-making
but merely law execution, what qualities must the
delegating law possess? A. The delegating law must "(a)
be complete in itself it must set forth therein the
policy to be carried out or implemented by the delegate
. . . and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions ... Indeed without a statutory declaration of
policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate
such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate
upon himself the power, not only to make law, but also
and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting
measures inconsistent with the end sought to be
attained by the Act of Congress." Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569 (1965). Q. Must the standard be
formulated in precise declaratory language? A. No. It
can be drawn from the declared policy of the law and
from the totality of the delegating statute. In Osmefia v.
Orbos, 220 SCRA 703, 711-713 (1993), the authority of
the Energy Regulatory Board to fix the domestic prices
of petroleum products was found to be sufficiently
specified "by the general policy of the law to protect
local consumers by stabilizing and Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 213 subsidizing domestic
pump rates," by the authority given to impose
additional amounts "to augment the resources of the
[Oil Price Stabilization] Fund." More liberally still, the
standard may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged law. Chiongbian
v. Orbos,G.R. No. 96754, June 22,1995. Q. A tax law is
passed saying: SEC. 4. Sec. 106 of the same Code, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 106. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Goods or
Properties. - (A) Rate and Base of Tax. - There shall be
levied, assessed and collected on every sale, barter or
exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the gross selling
price or gross value in money of the goods or properties
sold, bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the
seller or transferor: provided, that the President, upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added
tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied. (i) value-added tax
collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%) or (ii) national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (11/2%). Is this an invalid
delegation of legislative power? A. No. It is a valid
delegation of law execution. It is an example of
contingent legislation. Where the effectivity of the law
is made dependent on the verification by the executive
of the existence of certain conditions. The verification is
delegated to the executive. Abakada Guru Party List
Officers v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056,
September 1, 2005. Reconsidered October 18, 2005.
214 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 10 Q. Act No. 2307
says in part: Section 16. The Board shall have power,
after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to
require every public utility as herein defined: (3) To
furnish annually a detailed report of finances and
operations, in such form and containing such matters as
the Board may from time to time prescribe. Is the
delegation valid? A. No. The delegation is so general
that it is no more precise than if it had just said "the
Board may require every public utility to furnish
annually a detailed report." Compahia General de
Tabacos v. Board, 34 Phil. 136 (1916). Q. A law is passed
saying: "If for any cause conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, the
Governor General is authorized to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures fixing the
price of such cereals." Is the delegation valid? A. No.
The law contains no standard that will guide the
Governor General in determining whether the rise is
extraordinary and for determining what the price
should be.United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1
(1922). Q. A law authorized the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources to impose restrictions "on the
use of any fishing net or fishing device for the
protection of fish fry or fish eggs." Pursuant to this a
regulation is passed prohibiting the use of trawls. Is the
regulation valid? A. Yes. The regulation merely supplies
the details for implementing the law which is already
clear and complete in itself and contains a standard to
guide the administrative officer. Araneta v. Gatmaitan,
101 Phil. 328 (1957). Q. The Secretary of Agriculture
passed a regulation penalizing electro fishing. Electro
fishing is not one of the forms of fishing punished in the
Fisheries Act. In fact, a later P.D. added electro-fishing
to the list of punishable forms of fishing, a recognition
that it was not punishable under prior existing law. Can
one be prosecuted under the regulation? A. No. The
regulation was beyond the scope of the Secretary's
authority. People v. Maceren, L-32166, 18 October 1977
(76 SCRA 450). (NOTE: Compare this with theAraneta
case.) Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT215 Q. A Letter of Instruction issued by
the President requiring the use of "early warning
devices" (EWD) and also the implementing regulations
are challenged as undue delegation of legislative power.
Decide. A. As to the claim of undue delegation, it is
enough to say that the standard of "safe transit upon
the roads" is sufficient. Moreover, the Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals, which endorses
the use of EWD, is impressed with the character of a
"generally accepted principle of international law"
which our Constitution makes part of the law of the
land.Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (L-49112, February
2,1979). Q. The collective bargaining agreement
stipulates that in case of any wage adjustment decreed
by law higher than the increase given in the agreement,
the company shall pay the difference. R.A. 6640
decreed a wage increase higher than the CBA increase.
DOLE, however, issued a regulation saying that salary
increase granted pursuant to a CBA will not be
considered in determining compliance with the new
law. Proper? A. No. "Administrative regulations adopted
under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and
should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. The law itself cannot be expanded
by such regulations. An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress." Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene v.
Secretary Drilon, G.R. No. 82849, August 2,1989. Q. The
law authorizing the Medical Board of Examinations to
devise tests for entrance to medical schools is assailed
as undue delegation of legislative power because of lack
of sufficient standards. What are the standards, if any?
A. The standard is sufficiently found in the law's desire
for the "standardization and regulation of medical
education" and in various other parts of the statute
which make the guidelines adequately clear. Tablarin v.
Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (1987). Q. Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of POEA is challenged as unallowable
delegation. POEA bases its authority to issue the
regulation on Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 97
which authorizes it to "promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration." It is
alleged that there is no sufficient standard. Decide. A.
The standard is to be found in the Executive Order
creating the Administration mandating it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices." Eastern Shipping Lines v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 166
SCRA 533 (1988). 216 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 10
Q. May the power to fix wages be delegated to an
executive body? A. Yes, provided there are adequate
standards. Employers Confederation v. National Wages
and Productivity Commission, G.R. No. 9619, September
24,1991. Q. R.A. No. 8180 (Oil Deregulation Law)
enumerated two factors to be considered by the
Department of Energy and the Office of the President in
effecting the full deregulation of the oil industry, viz.:(1)
the time when the price of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining, and (2) the
time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to
the US dollar is stable. E.O. No. 392 considered the
depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in ordering the
early implementation of full oil deregulation. Petitioners
contend that E.O. No. 392 misapplied R.A. No. 8180.
Decide. A. "We therefore hold that the Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the standards set
by R.A No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund." Such
consideration amounts to a rewriting of the standards
set forth in R. A No. 8180. "On the basis of the text of
E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight
given by the Executive department to the depletion of
the OPSF fund. ...In light of this uncertainty, we rule that
the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a
misapplication of R.A No. 8180." Tatad v. Secretary of
the Department of Energy, G.R. Nos. 124360 and
127867, November 5,1997,281 SCRA 330,35354. Q.
What is the rationale of the grant of quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies? A.
"[A]s a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society, it has become necessary to create more and
more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of
its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice."
Philippine International Trading Corporation v. Angeles,
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996, 263 SCRA 421,444-
45 (citing SolidHomes Inc. v Payawal, 177 SCRA 72
[1989]). NOTES: The Supreme Court has continued to
apply the same principles that have been developed in
the past. Thus the standby authority given to the
President to increase the value added tax rate in the Vat
Law, R.A. 9337, was upheld as an example of contingent
legislation where the effectivity of the law is made to
depend on the verification by the executive of the
existence of certain conditions.Abakada Guru Party List
Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 217
Officers v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056,
September 1, 2005. Reconsidered October 18,2005. In
Gerochi v. DENR, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007, the
power delegated to the Energy Regulator Board to fix
and impose a universal charge on electricity end-users
was challenged as an undue delegation of the power to
tax. The Court, however, said that, since the purpose of
the law was not revenue generation but energy
regulation, the power involved was more police power
than the power to tax. Moreover the Court added that
the power to tax could be used for regulation. As to the
validity of the delegation to an executive agency, the
Court was satisfied that the delegating law was
complete in itself and the amount to be charged was
made certain by the parameters set by the law itself.
R.A 9335, the Attrition Act of 1995, authorizes the BIR
and BOC to give awards to those who surpass the BIR
targets and to impose sanctions on those who fall short.
The awards are taken from the excess over target as set
up by a Board. The Rules for implementation are subject
to review by an Oversight Committee of Congress. The
validity of the law was challenged on the ground that
the delegation to the President of the power to set
targets was invalid. However, the law is complete and
has standards for the President to follow. Revenue
targets are based on the original estimated revenue
collection expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC
for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and
stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets
does not rest solely on the President. Rules and
regulations promulgated by administrative agencies
have the force of law. May they have the force of penal
law? Yes, provided that the following conditions concur:
(1) The delegating statute itself must specifically
authorize the promulgation of penal regulations,U.S. v.
Grimmaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); (2) The penalty must
not be left to the administrative agency but must be
provided by the statute itself, U.S. v. Barrios, 11 Phil.
327 (1908); (3) The regulation must be published in the
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation,
People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). Q. Section 32
of R.A. 4670 prescribes a penalty of "imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court." No period is specified.
Valid? A No. "It is not for the courts to fix the term of
imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of 218 THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Sees. 2-5 discretion to fix the length of
service which must be served within specific or
designated limits provided by law, the absence of which
designated limits will constitute such exercise as undue
delegation, if not an outright intrusion or assumption,
of legislative power." People v. Dacuycuy,G.R. No.
45127, May 5,1989. SEC.2.THE SENATE SHALL BE
COMPOSED OF TWENTY-FOUR SENATORS WHO SHALL
BE ELECTED AT LARGE BY THE QUALIFIED VOTERS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW. Q.
What is the composition of the Senate? A. Twenty-four
Senators elected at large. SEC. 3. NoPERSON SHALL BE A
SENATOR UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL- BORN CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES,AND,ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION, IS
AT LEAST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF AGE,ABLE TO READ
AND WRITE,A REGISTERED VOTER,AND A RESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FOR NOT LESS THAN TWO YEARS
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE ELECTION.
Q. What are the qualifications of a Senator? A. Section
3. These may neither be added to nor subtracted from
by Congress. Q. What does "on the day of the election"
mean? A. It means on the day the votes are cast.
SEC.4.THE TERM OF OFFICE OFTHE SENATORS SHALL BE
SIXYEARS AND SHALL COMMENCE,UNLESS OTHERWISE
PROVIDED BY LAW,AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF
JUNE NEXT FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NoSENATOR
SHALL SERVE FOR MORE THAN TWO CONSECUTIVE
TERMS.VOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR
ANY LENGTH OF TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS
AN INTERRUPTION IN THE CONTINUITY OF HIS SERVICE
FOR THE FULL TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. Q.
What is the term of office of a Senator? A. Section 4. Q.
May a Senator serve for more than two terms? A. Yes,
provided that the terms are not consecutive.
SEC.5.(1)THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALLBE
COMPOSED OF NOT MORE THAN TWOHUNDRED AND
FIFTY MEMBERS,UNLESS OTHERWISE Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 219 FIXED BY LAW,WHO
SHALL BE ELECTEDFROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES,CITIES,AND
THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE NUMBEROF THEIR RESPECTIVE INHABITANTS,
AND ON THE BASIS OF A UNIFORM AND PROGRESSIVE
RATIO,AND THOSE WHO, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, SHALL
BE ELECTED THROUGH A PARTY-LIST SYSTEM OF
REGISTERED NATIONAL,REGIONAL,AND SECTORAL
PARTIESOR ORGANIZATIONS. (2) THE PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVESSHALL CONSTITUTE TWENTY PER
CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
INCLUDING THOSE UNDER THE PARTY LIST.FOR THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE RATIFICATION OF
THISCONSTITUTION,ONE-HALF OF THE SEATS
ALLOCATED TO PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE
FILLED, AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BY SELECTION OR
ELECTION FROM THE LABOR, PEASANT, URBAN POOR,
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES, WOMEN,
YOUTH, AND SUCH OTHER SECTORS AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THE RELIGIOUS SECTOR. (3)
EACH LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT SHALL COMPRISE,AS FAR
AS PRACTICABLE, CONTIGUOUS, COMPACT AND
ADJACENT TERRITORY. EACH CITY WITH A POPULATION
OF AT LEAST TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND,OR
EACH PROVINCE, SHALL HAVE AT LEAST ONE
REPRESENTATIVE. (4) WITHIN THREE YEARS FOLLOWING
THE RETURN OF EVERY CENSUS, THE CONGRESS SHALL
MAKE A REAPPORTIONMENT OF LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
BASED ON THE STANDARDS PROVIDED IN THIS
SECTION. Q. What is the total composition of the House
of Representatives? A.Not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise provided by law. Q.How do
representative districts come into existence? A. They
are created by law. The ARMM Regional Assembly may
not create a representative district. Nor may it creates
province because a province automatically gets one
representative district. Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No.
177597, July 16, 2008. The creation of legislative
districts does not need confirmation by plebiscite if it
does not involve the creation of a local government
unit. Bagabuyo v. Comelec,G.R. No. 176970, December
8,2008. Q.How are members of the House classified? A.
(1) district representatives, each representing one
congressional district; 220 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sees. 2-
5 (2) party-list representatives, elected through the
"party-list system." [(3)sectoral representatives,but
these existed only until 1998.] Party-list system Q. How
does the "party-list system" work? A. Under the system,
"registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations" submit a list of candidates arranged in
the order of priority. During congressional elections,
such parties or organizations are voted for at large, and
the number of seats a party or organization will get, out
of the twenty percent allocated for party-list
representatives, will depend on the number of votes
garnered nationwide. The details for the operation of
the party list system will be provided by law. Q.What is
the reason for the introduction of the party list system?
A. It is hoped that the system will democratize political
power by encouraging the growth of a multi-party
system while at the same time giving power to those
who traditionally do not win in elections. Q. What
organizations may participate in the party list system?
A. According to the Supreme Court, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission and the implementing
statute, R A. 7941, was not to allow all associations to
participate indiscriminately in the system but to limit
participation to parties or organizations representing
the "marginalized and underprivileged." For this
purpose, the Court laid down the following guidelines
for the Comelec to apply: 1. The parties or organizations
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
in Section 5 of RA.7941; 2. Political parties who wish to
participate must comply with this policy; 3. The religious
sector may not be represented; 4. The party or
organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of
R.A. 7941; 5. The party or organization must not be an
adjunct of or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by the government; Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 221 6. Its nominees must
likewise comply with the requirements of the law; 7.
The nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of legislation that will
benefit the nation. Ang Bagong Bayani, et al. v.
Comelec,G.R. No. 147589, June 26,2001. Q. Which
parties or organizations are disqualified? A. Section 6
says: The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds: It is a
religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes; It
advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; It
is a foreign party or organization; It is receiving support
from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through
any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes; It violates
or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections; It declares untruthful statements in its
petition; It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year;
or It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%)
of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. Q. Who determines whether a party is
qualified to participate in the party list system? A. The
Comelec. Qualification is a question of fact and
therefore is not subject to review by certiorari. VC
Cadangen, et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177179, June 5,
2009. Q.What are the qualifications of a party-list
nominee? A.As found in Section 9 of R.A. 7941, they
are: SECTION 9. Qualifications ofParty-List Nominees.
No person shall be nominated as party-list
representative 222 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: Sees. 4-5 A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the
Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he
must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue
in office until the expiration of his term. Ang Bagong
Bayani, etal. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147589, June 26,2001.
Q. Congress enacted R.A. 7941 and declared therein a
policy to promote "proportional representation" in the
election of party- list representatives in order to enable
Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them. It, however, deemed it necessary
to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system
in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those
garnering more than this percentage could have
"additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or
coalition can have more than three seats in the House
of Representatives. Are the two percent threshold
requirement and the three-seat limit provided in
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional? A. Veterans
Federation Party, et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 136781,
October 6, 2000 held that the filling of the 20% was not
mandatory but the 2% requirement was. Banat v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009 ruled that the
20% was mandatory and since the 2% requirement was
an obstacle to filling the 20%, the 2% requirement was
declared unconstitutional. Q. How are the party-list
seats distributed among the parties? A. Partido v.
Comelec. G.R. No. 164702, March 15, 2006, reiterated
the formula for the computation of additional seats for
Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 223
party-list winners as originally stated in the landmark
case of Veterans. They are: First, the twenty percent
allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list; Second, the
two percent threshold only those parties garnering a
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the
House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit
each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional
seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes." However, the interpretation of "in proportion to
their total number of votes" made in Veterans would
make it impossible for the party-list seats to be fully
filled because of the requirement that only those who
obtained at least 2% may get addition seats. But the
20% share can never be filled if the 2% threshold is
maintained. Hence, since the 20% share is mandatory,
the 2% threshold was declared unconstitutional in
Banat v. Comelec, G.R. No. 179271, July 8,2009. NOTE:
The Comelec may not issue implementing rules and
regulations (IRRS) that provide a ground for the
substitution of a party-list nominee not written in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act. Lokin, Jr. v. Comelec,G.R. Nos.
179431-32, June 22,2010. Q. May religious leaders be
elected or selected as sectoral representatives? A. Yes.
The prohibition is against representation of religious
sectors but not against religious leaders becoming
representatives. 224 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sees. 2-
5 Q. How are the representative districts apportioned?
A. "Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.'' "Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section." Q. Why are
representative districts apportioned among provinces,
cities, and municipalities "in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio?" A. The underlying
principle behind this rule for apportionment is the
concept of equality of representation which is a basic
principle of republicanism. One man's vote should carry
as much weight as the vote of every other man. Q.
What is the rule on the representation of provinces and
cities? A. Each province, irrespective of population, is
entitled to one representative; each city with a
population of at least 250,000 is entitled to at least one
representative. Q.May the ARMM Regional Assembly
create a legislative district? A. No. New legislative
districts may be created only by law. Section 19, Article
VI of R.A. 9054, insofar as it granted to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and
cities which could in effect result in the creation of
legislative districts is invalid. "Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces
and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province
without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative
district." Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, July 16,
2008. NOTE: When one of the municipalities of a
congressional district is converted into a city large
enough to entitle it to one legislative district, the
incidental effect is Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 225 the splitting of the district into two.
The incidental arising of a new district in this manner
need not be preceded by a census. Moreover, this
incidental effect is deemed implicitly contained in the
title announcing the creation of the new city thus
satisfying the requirement that the content of the bill
be announced in the title. Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA
106 (1994); Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,G.R.
No. 118627, March 7,1995. If, however, as a result of
the increase of the number of legislative districts, either
because of the creation of a new province or of a new
city, an imbalance results in the remaining legislative
districts of the mother province, the Commission on
Elections has no authority to correct the imbalance by
the transfer of municipalities from one district to
another. Correction of the imbalance must await the
enactment of a reapportionment law. Montejo v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702, March 16,
1995. Q. Does the creation of a legislative district need
confirmation by plebiscite? A. The creation of legislative
districts does not need confirmation by plebiscite if it
does not involve the creation of a local government
unit. Bagabuyo v. Comelec,G.R. No. 176970, December
8, 2008. Q. Must a representative district have a
population of 250,000. A. For a city to qualify as a
legislative district it must have a population of at least
250,000. The 250,000 minimum applies only to cities
seeking to become a representative district. On this
basis the Court allowed creation of representative
districts of disproportionate sizesin Aquino III v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010. [The Court
completely ignored the requirement of proportional
representation.] Q. Why was the creation of Malolos
City into a representative district invalidated? A.
Because it did not satisfy the 250,000 population
requirement. The certification made by Regional
Director Miranda of the NSO has no legal basis. Aldaba
v. Comelec,G.R No. 188078, January 25,2010. Affirmed
on reconsideration March 15,2010. 226 THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Sec. 10 Q. What is "gerrymandering?" Is it
allowed? A. "Gerrymandering," which is the formation
of one legislative district out of separate territories for
the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party, is not
allowed. The Constitution says that each district shall
"comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory." Q. If a candidate who received
the highest number of votes is disqualified, does the
candidate who received the second highest number of
votes assume the office? A. No. It is of no moment that
there is only a margin of 768 votes between protestant
and protestee. Whether the margin is ten or ten
thousand, it still remains that protestant did not receive
the mandate of the majority during the elections. Thus,
to proclaim him as the duly elected representative in
the stead of protestee would be anathema to the most
basic precepts of republicanism and democracy as
enshrined within our Constitution. In effect, we would
be advocating a massive disenfranchisement of the
majority of the voters of the sixth district of
Manila.Ocampo v. HRET,G.R. No.158466,June15,2004.
SEC.6. NoPERSON SHALL BE A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND,ON THE DAY OF THE
ELECTION, IS AT LEAST TWENTY- FIVE YEARS OF
AGE,ABLE TO READ AND WRITE, AND, EXCEPT THE
PARTY- LIST REPRESENTATIVES,A REGISTERED VOTER IN
THE DISTRICTIN WHICH HE SHALL BE ELECTED, AND A
RESIDENT THEREOF FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS THAN
ONE YEAR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE DAY OF THE
ELECTION. Q. What are the qualifications of a member
of the House of Representatives? A. Section 6. Note,
however, that a party-list representative need not be "a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election." Note, moreover, that Congress may not
diminish nor increase these qualifications. Q. What is
the meaning of residence as a qualification for
membership in the House of Representatives? A. The
currently accepted meaning of the residence
qualification may be drawn fromRomualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 227 Elections, G.R. No. 119976,
September 18, 1995, and Aquino v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995. What
is required is not just temporary residence but
"domicile" as this has been defined in jurisprudence.
Normally, a person's domicile is his domicile of origin. If
a person never loses his or her domicile, the one year
requirement of Section 6 is not of relevance because he
or she is deemed never to have left the place. If,
however, a person loses his or her domicile either by
voluntary abandonment for a new one or by marriage
to a husband who under the Civil Code dictates the
wife's domicile, one must be domiciled in the new place
for at least one year immediately preceding the election
if one wants to represent the place in Congress.
Similarly, if a person, having once lost his or her
domicile, should decide to re-establish herself or
himself in his former domicile, the one year
requirement would also apply. Q. Records show that
petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur
and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile
of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for
the position of representative of the 3rd District of
Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now
claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
"residence" in Quezon City and has established a new
"domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.
Decide. A. A person's "domicile" once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a
change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus
nan revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change-of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual. It is the contention of petitioner that his
actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since
December 1996 was sufficiently established by the lease
of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and
by the affidavits and certifications under oath of the
residents of that place that they have seen petitioner
and his family residing in then- locality. While this may
be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to
show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of
choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention. 228 THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 4-5 A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER While "residence" simply
requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile"
requires not only such bodily presence in that place but
also a declared and probable intent to make it one's
fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. The
lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997,
does not adequately support a change of domicile. The
lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention
to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one's original domicile. Further, Domino's lack of
intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is
further strengthened by his act of registering as voter in
one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not
conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong
presumption of residence especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his former barangay.Domino v.
Comelec,G.R. No. 134015, July 19,1999. Q. The
Congress passes a law requiring that candidates for the
House must post a bond equivalent to one year's salary
of a Congressman. Is the law valid? A. The sum required
as bond is so big that it amounts to a property
qualification. Property qualifications are contrary to the
social justice provision of the Constitution, Maquera v.
Borra, 15 SCRA 7 (1965). Moreover, this is an attempt to
add to the qualifications found in Section 6. NOTE:
Republic Act No. (RA.) 9165, otherwise known as the
ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002, requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain
offenses, among other personalities. As applied to
candidates for national office, the requirement is
unconstitutional because it adds to the exclusive
qualifications for such offices prescribed by the
Constitution. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3,2008. SEC.7.THE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL
BE ELECTED FOR A TERM OF THREE YEARS WHICH
SHALL BEGIN, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY
LAW,AT NOON ON THE THIRTIETH DAY OF JUNE NEXT
FOLLOWING THEIR ELECTION. NoMEMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALLSERVE FOR MORE
THAN THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS. VOLUNTARY
RENUNCIATION OF THE OFFICE FOR ANY LENGTH OF
TIME SHALL NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN INTERRUPTION
IN THE CONTINUITYOF HIS SERVICE FOR THE FULL TERM
FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED. Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 229 Q. What is the term of a
member of the House? A. Section 7. Q. May a member
of the House serve for more than three terms? A. Yes,
provided the terms are not successive. Q. Section 67,
Article IX, of the Omnibus Election Code, BP Big. 881,
says that any "elective official whether national or local
running for any office other than the one he is holding
in a permanent capacity except for the President and
Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy." Is this still in effect? A. This is no longer in
effect having been repealed by the Fair Election Law.
Farinas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387,
December 10,2003; Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No.
189698, December 1, 2009. Q. What is the difference
between term and tenure? A. Term is the period during
which an official I entitled to hold office. Tenure is the
period during which the official actually holds the office.
Tenure can be shortened, e.g., by death or removal. But
term is changed only by amendment. Dimaporo v.
Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 96859, October 15,1991.
SEC.8.UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW,THE
REGULAR ELECTION OF THE SENATORS AND THE
MEMBERSOF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALLBE HELD ON THE SECOND MONDAY OF MAY.
NOTE: A person holding office in the House must yield
his or her seat to the person declared by the Comelec to
be the winner. The Speaker shall administer the oath on
the winner. Codilla v. de Venecia, G.R. No. 150605,
December 10, 2002. SEC.9.IN CASE OFVACANCY IN THE
SENATE OR IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,A
SPECIAL ELECTION MAYBE CALLED TO FILL SUCH
VACANCY IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW, BUT
THE SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES THUS ELECTED SHALL SERVE ONLY
FOR THE UNEXPIRED TERM. Q. In case there is a vacancy
in the Senate or House of Representatives, is a special
election to fill the vacancy mandatory? A. No. The
matter is left to the discretion of Congress "in the
manner prescribed by law." But if there should be a
special election, the person elected shall serve only for
the unexpired term. 230 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 10
Q. Following confirmation of Senator Guingona as Vice-
President, the Senate called on COMELEC to fill the
vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May
2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were
due to be elected in that election. Comelec issued a
resolution providing that the "Senatorial candidate
garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve
only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto
T. Guingona, Jr." Petitioner challenged the resolution
because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the
position to be filled in the special election as required
under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 ("R.A. No.
6645"); (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to
indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they
seek election under the special or regular elections as
allegedly required under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa
Big. 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the
Voters Information Sheet the candidates seeking
election under the special or regular senatorial elections
as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of
Republic Act No. 6646 (TLA. No. 6646"). Decide. A. In a
special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a
statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a
vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes
the date at which the special election is to be held and
operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an
election held at the time thus prescribed is not
invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law
with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This
is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call for the
election by some authority and the law thus charges
voters with knowledge of the time and place of the
election. Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334,
January 21,2004. SEC.10.THE SALARIES OF SENATORS
AND MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALLBE DETERMINED BY LAW. NoINCREASE IN SAID
COMPENSATION SHALL TAKE EFFECT UNTIL AFTER THE
EXPIRATION OF THE FULL TERM OF ALLTHE MEMBERS
OF THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APPROVING SUCH INCREASE. Q. Upon the organization
of the first Congress under this Constitution, what will
be the salary of the members? A. Two hundred four
thousand pesos per annum. Article XVIII, Section 17. Q.
The Congress, during the second year of its term,
approves an increase in salary effective during the next
budget year. Can the law be made effective the next
budget year? A. No. The increased salary cannot take
effect until the following term. Sees. 2-5 ART. VI -THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 231 Q. After Congress
passes a law increasing the salary of its members,
special elections are held to fill a vacancy in three
congressional districts. Will the newly elected members
receive the increased salary? A. No because they would
be serving within the term of the members who
approved the increase. Q.What is the reason for the
delayed effect of the increased salary? A. Its purpose is
to place a "legal bar to the legislators' yielding to the
natural temptation to increase their salaries." Philconsa
v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300,307 (1966). Q. While the salary
of the members of the Congress may not be increased
during their tenure, may other "emoluments" not
forming part of the fixed salary be tacked on during the
term? A. The letter of the prohibition seems to allow
such indirect increase of salary because the prohibition
is not as all encompassing as the prohibition found in
the 1935 Constitution (which prohibited 'per diems and
other emoluments or allowances'). What the letter of
the present law prohibits is immediate increase of "said
compensation," that is, salaries. It is submitted,
however, that one may legitimately appeal to the spirit
of the prohibition, expressed in Philconsa v. Mathay,
supra, and read the prohibition as an absolute ban on
any form of direct or indirect increase of salary. Q. May
a member of the Congress receive office and necessary
travel allowances? If so, what is the limit on such
allowances? A. Yes. Since such allowances do not form
part of the salary or compensation, allowances take
effect immediately. Nor is there a legal limit on the
amount that may be appropriated. The only limit is
moral, because, according to Section 20, the books of
Congress are audited by the Commission on Audit
"which shall publish annually an itemized list of
amounts paid and expenses incurred for each
Member." SEC.11.ASENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL, IN ALL OFFENSES
PUNISHABLE BY NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS
IMPRISONMENT,BE PRIVILEGED FROM ARREST WHILE
THE CONGRESS isIN SESSION.NoMEMBER SHALL BE
QUESTIONED NOR BE HELD LIABLE IN ANY OTHER PLACE
FOR ANY SPEECH OR DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OR IN
ANY COMMITTEE THEREOF. 232 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: Sees. 4-5 A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Q. How does the 1987 privilege from arrest
differ from the privilege under the 1935 Constitution?
A. The 1987 privilege differs from the privilege under
the 1935 Constitution, and for that matter from the
privilege under the American Constitution, in that under
the 1935 Constitution the privilege was only from civil
arrest. In no way did the 1935 Constitution protect a
legislator from arrest for a criminal offense. Martinez v.
Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972). Under the new Constitution,
however, as under the 1973 Constitution, a legislator is
privileged from arrest even for a criminal offense
provided that the offense was not punishable by a
penalty of more, than six years imprisonment Q. When
is the privilege available? A. It is available "while the
Congress is in session," whether regular or special and
whether or not the legislator is actually attending a
session. Hence, it is not available while Congress is in
recess. Q. Why has it not been made available during
recess? A. Since the purpose of the privilege is to
protect the legislator against harassment which will
keep him away from legislative sessions, there is no
point in extending the privilege to the period when the
Congress is not in session. Q. Representative Jaloslos,
convicted for rape and detained in prison, asks that he
be allowed to attend the sessions of the House. He
argues on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need
for his constituents to be represented. Decide. A.
Members of Congress are not exempt from detention
for crime. They may be arrested, even when the house
is in session, for crimes punishable by a penalty of more
than six months. This is the case of Jalosjos. There is no
basis whatsoever for treating him differently from other
convicts. People u,Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76.
February 3,2000, Q. What is the parliamentary privilege
of speech? A. "No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Sees. 2-5
ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 233 Q. What is
the scope of the privilege? A. In the first place, the
privilege is a protection only against forums other than
the Congress itself. It does not protect the
assemblyman against the disciplinary authority of the
Congress but it is an absolute protection against suits
for libel. Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960). In
the second place, "speech or debate" includes
utterances made in the performance of official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements
made, votes cast, as well as bills introduced and other
acts done in the performance of official duties. Jimenez
v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966). To come under the
privilege, it is not essential that the Congress be in
session when the utterance is made. What is essential is
that the utterance must constitute "legislative action,"
that is, it must be part of the deliberative and
communicative process by which legislators participate
in committee or congressional proceedings in the
consideration of proposed legislation or of other
matters which the Constitution has placed within the
jurisdiction of the Congress. Gravel v. U.S. 90 LW 5053
(1972). See also Antonino v. Valencia, 57 SCRA 70 (May
27,1974). Q. What is the purpose of the privilege? A.
Like the privilege from arrest, the privilege of speech is
intended to leave the legislator unimpeded in the
performance of his duties and free from fear of
harassment from outside. NOTE: In a Senate privilege
speech Senator Santiago said the following: x x x I am
not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up
to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I
was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in
another environment but not in the Supreme Court of
idiots x x x. Senator Santiago explained that "those
statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a
speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of
her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the
open controversial anomalies in governance with a view
to future remedial legislation. She averred that she
wanted to expose what she believed 'to be an unjust act
234 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sees. 12-13 of the Judicial
Bar Council [JBC],' which, after sending out public
invitations for nomination to the soon to be vacated
position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform
applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme
Court would qualify for nomination." The Court upheld
her defense on the ground of parliamentary immunity
but added that "the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in
question were intemperate and highly improper ii}
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that
she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and
calling the Court a "Supreme Court of idiots." Pobre v.
Defensor Santiago,AC. No. 7399, August 25,2009. Q.
Does the privilege extend to agents of assemblymen?
A.Yes, provided that the "agency" consists precisely in
assisting the legislator in the performance of "legislative
action." Gravel v. U.S., supra. SEC.12.ALL MEMBERS OF
THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL,UPON ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE,MAKE A FULL
DISCLOSURE OF THEIR FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS
INTERESTS.THEY SHALL NOTIFY THE HOUSE CONCERNED
OF A POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT MAY
ARISE FROM THE FILING OF A PROPOSED LEGISLATION
OF WHICH THEY ARE AUTHORS. Q. About what matters
is a member of Congress obliged to make public
disclosure? A. Section 12. SEC.13.NoSENATOR OR
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES MAY
HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICEOR EMPLOYMENT IN
THEGOVERNMENT,OR ANY SUBDIVISION,AGENCY,OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS OR THEIR SUBSIDIARIES,DURING HIS
TERM WITHOUT FORFEITING HIS SEAT. NEITHER SHALL
HE BE APPOINTED TO ANY OFFICEWHICHMAY HAVE
BEEN CREATED OR THE EMOLUMENTS THEREOF
INCREASED DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH HE WAS
ELECTED. Q What are the prohibitions imposed on a
members of the Congress? A. See Section13.
NOTE:Petitioner Liban, a private citizen, alleged that by
remaining Chairman of the National Red Cross Senator
Gordon has Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 235 forfeited his seat in the Senate.
Liban, however, has no standing to challenge Gordon's
occupation of his senatorial seat and the National Red
Cross is not a government owned corporation but a
private corporation performing public function. Liban v.
Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009. SeeNachura
dissent. Q. May a member of Congress resign in order
to accept an appointment in the government before the
expiration of his term? A. Yes. See the first Sentence of
Section 13. Q. But are there offices appointment to
which is prohibited dining his term even if the member
of Congress resigns his seat? A. Yes. He cannot accept
appointment to an office which may have been created
or the emolument of which may have been increased
during his term, and this, even if he had already
resigned when the office was created or the emolument
increased. See the second sentence of Section 13. SEC.
14. No SENATOR OR MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES MAY PERSONALLY APPEAR
ASCOUNSEL BEFORE ANY COURT OF JUSTICE OR
BEFORE THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS, OR QUASI-
JUDICIAL AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES.
NEITHER SHALL HE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BE
INTERESTED FINANCIALLY IN ANY CONTRACT WITH,OR
IN ANY FRANCHISE OR SPECIAL PRIVILEGEGRANTED BY
THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY, OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING ANY
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED
CORPORATION, OR ITS SUBSIDIARY, DURING HIS TERM
OF OFFICE.He SHALL NOT INTERVENE IN ANY MATTER
BEFOREANY OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR HIS
PECUNIARY BENEFIT OR WHERE HE MAY BE CALLED
UPON TO ACT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OFFICE. Q. What are
the prohibitions on a member of Congress relative to
the practice of his profession? A. See Section 14. Q. A
Congressman buys a nominal amount of shares in a
corporation which is party to a suit before the Securities
and Exchange Commission and then appears in
"intervention." Should the intervention be allowed? A.
"A ruling upholding the 'intervention' would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All [a Congressman]
need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body
is to acquire a minimal participation in the 'interest' of a
client and then 236 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16 A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER 'intervene' in the proceedings. That which
the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or
impliedly prohibited." Puyat v. De Guzman, Jr., 113
SCRA 31, 37 (March 25,1982). Q.Does the prohibition
applicable to lawyer-Congressmen apply to the law firm
of which they may be members? A.No. The prohibition
is personal. SEC.15.THE CONGRESS SHALL CONVENE
ONCE EVERY YEAR ON THE FOURTH MONDAY OF JULY
FOR ITS REGULAR SESSION, UNLESS A DIFFERENT DATE
IS FIXED BY LAW, AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE IN
SESSION FOR SUCH NUMBER OF DAYS AS IT MAY
DETERMINE UNTIL THIRTY DAYS BEFORE THE OPENING
OF ITS NEXT REGULAR SESSION, EXCLUSIVE OF
SATURDAYS,SUNDAYS,AND LEGAL HOLIDAYS.THE
PRESIDENT MAY CALL A SPECIAL SESSION AT ANY TIME.
Q. What distinguishes a specialsession from a
regularsession? A. A special session is one called by the
President while the legislature is in recess. Under the
1935 Constitution the distinction between regular and
special session was significant because during a special
session the legislature could consider only the subject
matter designated by the President. It is submitted that
under the present law, which leaves discretion to
Congress as to the number of regular session days, the
distinction is no longer significant for the purpose of
determining what the legislature may consider. SEC. 16.
(1) THE SENATE SHALL ELECT ITS PRESIDENT AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ITS SPEAKER,BY A
MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS RESPECTIVEMEMBERS.
EACH HOUSE SHALL CHOOSE SUCH OTHER OFFICERS
ASIT MAY DEEM NECESSARY. (2) A MAJORITY OF EACH
HOUSE SHALL CONSTITUTE A QUORUM TO DO
BUSINESS, BUT A SMALLER NUMBER. MAY ADJOURN
FROM DAY TO DAY AND MAY COMPEL THE
ATTENDANCE OF ABSENTMEMBERS IN SUCH
MANNER,AND UNDER SUCH PENALTIES,AS SUCH
HOUSE MAY PROVIDE. (3) EACH HOUSE MAY
DETERMINE THE RULES OF ITS PROCEEDINGS, PUNISH
ITS MEMBERS FOR DISORDERLYBEHAVIOR,AND WITH
THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO-THIRDS OF ALL ITS
MEMBERS,SUSPEND OR EXPEL A Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 237
MEMBER.APENALTY OF SUSPENSION,WHEN
IMPOSED,SHALL NOT EXCEED SIXTY DAYS. (4) EACH
HOUSE SHALL KEEP A JOURNAL OF ITS PROCEEDINGS,
AND FROM TIME TO TIME PUBLISH THE
SAME,EXCEPTING SUCH PARTSAS MAY,IN ITS
JUDGMENT,AFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY;AND THE YEAS
AND NAYS ON ANY QUESTIONSHALL,AT THE REQUEST
OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE MEMBERS PRESENT,BE ENTERED
IN THE JOURNAL. EACH HOUSE SHALL ALSO KEEPA
RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS. (5) NEITHER HOUSE
DURING THE SESSIONS OF THE CONGRESS
SHALL,WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE
OTHER,ADJOURN FOR MORE THAN THREE DAYS,NOR
TO ANY OTHER PLACE THANTHAT IN WHICH THE TWO
HOUSES SHALL BE SITTING. Q. Who are the officers of
Congress? A. The Senate President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and "such other officers as
[each House] may deem necessary." Q. On the first
regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senators
Fernan and Tatad contested for the Senate Presidency.
Fernan won by a vote of 20 to 2. With the agreement of
Senator Santiago, Tatad manifested that he was
assuming the position of minority leader explaining that
those who had voted for Fernan comprised the
majority, while those who had voted for him, the losing
nominee, belonged to the minority. However, the seven
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. Later, Fernan formally
recognized Guingona as such. Santiago and Tatad filed
before the Supreme Court a petition for quo warranto,
alleging that Guingona "had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader," a position that rightfully belonged to Tatad. 1)
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition? 2)
Petitioners claim that Art. VI, 16(1) has not been
observed in the selection of the minority leader. Decide.
A. 1) Yes. "It is well within the power and jurisdiction of
the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely
abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions
and prerogatives." Santiago v. Guingona, G.R No.
134577, November 18,1998, p. 18. 238 THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16 A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER 2) This provision is explicit
on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, but silent on the manner of selecting
the other officers in both chambers of Congress. The
method of choosing who will be the other officers must
be prescribed by the Senate itself. The Rules of the
Senate neither provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders nor prescribe the manner of creating
such offices or of choosing the holders thereof. Such
offices exist by tradition and long practice. "But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or
specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is
not within the province of courts to direct Congress
how to do its work." Id. at 23-24 (citing New York Public
Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Steingut, 353 NE2d
558). Q. What is the existence of a quorum based on? A.
On the proportion between those physically present
and the total membership of the body. Q. Is disciplinary
action taken by Congress against a member subject to
judicial review? A. No, because each House is the sole
judge of what disorderly behavior is. Osmena v.
Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960). Q. May the Court
intervene in the implementation of the rules of either
House of Congress? A. On matters affecting only
internal operation of the legislature, the legislature's
formulation and implementation of its rules is beyond
the reach of the courts. When, however, the legislative
rule affects private rights, the courts cannot altogether
be excluded.United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
See also Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 206 (1946). Q.
What is the purpose of the requirement that a Journal
be kept? A. The duty to keep a Journal has a dual
purpose: (1) "to insure publicity to the proceedings of
the legislature, and a correspondent responsibility of
the members to their respective constituents," and (2)
to provide proof of what actually trans Sees. 15-16 ART.
VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 239 pired in the
legislature.1STORY COMMENTARIES 840, quoted with
approval in Field v. Clark,143U.S.649,670(1892). Q.What
matters may Congress keep out of the Journal? A. The
Constitution exempts from publication only such
matters "as may, in [the Congress'] judgment, affect
national security." This new rule is an application of
Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which says: The right of
the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. Q. What is the value of the
Journal as evidence of what actually transpired in
Congress when the Journal conflicts with extraneous
evidence such as the testimony of witnesses or
newspaper reports, etc.? A- The Journal is conclusive
upon the courts.United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729
(1916). Q.What is the enrolled bill doctrine? A. The
signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that such bill
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. Arroyo
v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14,1997,277
SCRA 268. Q. What is the value of the Journal as
evidence of the contents of a law when what the
Journal says conflicts with the "enrolled bill?" A. The
"enrolled bill" is the official copy of approved legislation
and bears the certification of the presiding officer of the
legislative body. The respect due to a coequal
department requires the courts to accept the
certification of the presiding officer of the legislative
body. The respect due to coequal department requires
the courts to accept the certification of the presiding
officer as conclusive assurance that the bill so certified
is authentic. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez,
7 SCRA 347 (1963). 240 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 17
Q. If the presiding officer should repudiate his signature
in the "enrolled bill," will the enrolled bill still prevail
over the Journal? A. The enrolled bill theory is based
mainly on the respect due to a coequal department.
When such coequal department itself repudiates the
enrolled bill, then the journal must be accepted as
conclusive.Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974). Q. If
the enrolled bill conflicts with the Journal on a matter
required by the Constitution to be entered in the
Journal,which should prevail? A. The Supreme Court has
explicitly left this matter an open question in Morales v.
Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969). SEC.17.THE SENATE AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL EACH HAVE AN
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL WHICH SHALL BE THE SOLE
JUDGE OF ALL CONTESTS RELATING TO THE
ELECTION,RETURNS,AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE MEMBERS.EACH ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
SHALL BE COMPOSED OF NINE MEMBERS,THREE OF
WHOM SHALL BE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
TOBE DESIGNATED BY THECHIEF JUSTICE,AND THE
REMAINING SIX SHALL BE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE OR
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,AS THE CASE MAY
BE,WHO SHALL BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONFROM THE POLITICAL
PARTIES AND THE PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS
REGISTERED UNDER THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
REPRESENTED THEREIN.THE SENIOR JUSTICE IN THE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL SHALL BE ITSCHAIRMAN. Q. Who
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of Congress?
A. When there is an election contest, that is, when a
defeated candidate challenges the qualification and
claims the seat of a proclaimed winner, the respective
Electoral Tribunal of each House is the sole judge, and
neither the Supreme Court nor each House of Congress
nor the Commission on Elections can interfere. In the
absence of an election contest, however, the Electoral
Tribunals are without jurisdiction. Thus, the power of
each House to defer the oath-taking of members until
final determination of election contests filed against
them has been retained by each House.Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936). Sees. 15-16
ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 241 Q. When
does a case pass from the Comelec to the electoral
Tribunal? A. Once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs
own jurisdiction begins. Aggabao v. Comelec, G.R. No.
163756, January 26, 2005; Limkaichong v. Comelec,G.R.
Nos. 17883132, April 1, 2009. Q. Who decides whether
a party list representative is qualified? A. The HRET. But
the Comelec can decide whether a party-list
organization is qualified to join the party-list system.
Abayon u. Comelec, G.R. No. 189466, February 11,
2010. Q. Do not the powers of Congress and the
Comelec to entertain pre-proclamation controversies
conflict with the power of the Electoral Tribunals? A
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach
upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no
conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and
the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and
the SET, on the other, are exercised on different
occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President. The
SET is the sole, judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only
be invoked once the winning presidential, vice
presidential or senatorial candidates have been
proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37,
Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine
only the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en
banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation
of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and
senatorial candidates. Banat v. Comelec,G.R No.
177508, August 7, 2009. Q. What is the composition of
each Electoral Tribunal? A. See Section 17. NOTE: The
Constitution gives to the two Houses of Congress the
primary jurisdiction over who should sit in the
Commission on Appointments. This includes
determination of party affiliation and number of party
members for the purpose of determining proportional
representation. Drilon, et al. v. Speaker, G.R. No.
180055, July 31,2009. 242 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16 A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Q. May the Supreme Court intervene in the
creation of the Electoral Tribunal? A. The case of
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991), involved a
blatant attempt of a political party to manipulate the
decision of the Tribunal by manipulating its
membership. On the eve of the promulgation of a
decision of the Tribunal against a member of the Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the LDP expelled
Camasura from the party, and therefore as LDP
representative in the Tribunal, on the ground of
disloyalty. Camasura, the LDP member of the Electoral
Tribunal, had confided to the LDP that he was voting
against the party's candidate. The Supreme Court
invalidated the expulsion of Camasura from the Tribunal
saying that it was a clear impairment of the Tribunal's
prerogative to be the sole judge of election contests. Id.
at 810-812. See dissent of Padilla and Sarmiento saying
that the decision impairs the independence of the
House. The jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to be
sole judge comes only after a valid proclamation of a
winner. Under Article VIII, Section 1, judicial power
includes the authority "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.'' Robles v.
House Electoral Tribunal, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Co v.
House Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991). On this
basis, the Supreme Court has invalidated a final vote
tally made by the Electoral Tribunal without supporting
evidence. Lerias v. House Electoral Tribunal, 202 SCRA
808 (1991); Arroyo v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
118597, July 14,1995. Q. What major difference is there
in the composition of the Electoral Tribunals under the
1935 Constitution and of those under the new
Constitution? A. Under the 1935 Constitution, only the
two major political parties had representation and they
had it equally between them, Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R.
No. 10520, February 28, 1957; under the new
Constitution, all political parties are given proportional
representation. Q. The right of Farinas to sit in the
House of Representatives is challenged on the ground
that his certificate of candidacy was invalid. The
challenger claims that, although Farinas has already
been proclaimed winner and is actually holding office,
the case does Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 243 not come under the Electoral
Tribunal because the jurisdiction of the HRET as defined
under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution is limited
only to the qualifications prescribed under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution. Consequently, he claims
that any issue which does not involve these
constitutional qualifications is beyond the realm of the
HRET. The filing of a certificate of candidacy being a
statutory qualification under the Omnibus Election Code
is outside the pale of the HRET. Decide. A. Article VI,
Section 17 of the Constitution cannot be circumscribed
lexically. The word "qualifications" cannot be read as
qualified by the term "constitutional." Ubi lex non
distinguit noc nos distinguire debemos. Basic is the rule
in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. In an
electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation
of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office
and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that
issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this
ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of
proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between
constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's
mandate. Moreover, whether Farinas validly substituted
for someone else must likewise be addressed to the
sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can
we demonstrate fealty to the Constitutional provision
that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress
shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members." Guerrero v. Comelec,G.R. No. 137004, July
26, 2000. NOTE: This is different from Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) where the Federal
Court said that Congress can pass judgment only on
constitutional qualifications. The Tribunal's power,
however, covers not just qualifications but also
"election" and "returns." Q. May Congress regulate the
actions of the Electoral Tribunals even only in
procedural matters? A. No. The Tribunals are
independent constitutional bodies. Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139. Q. Petitioners, seeking to
disqualify Harry Angping, failed to make the cash
deposit required by the rules of the HRET. When the
petition was dismissed, they claimed grave abuse of
discretion. Decide. A. The petition for quo warranto
attacks the ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold
office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. This
is a serious charge, which, if true, renders Congressman
Angping disqualified from such office. In view of the
delicate nature and importance of this charge, the
observance of the HRET Rules of 244 THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Sec. 17 Procedure must be taken seriously if
they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and
orderly determination of the true will of the electorate.
Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET
or, to be more precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to
know and are expected to properly comply with the
procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal
without being formally ordered to do so. They cannot
righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if
by reason of the non-observance of those requirements
it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative justice
requires the proper observance of technicalities
precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift
dispensation. Therefore, we find that the HRET did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules
strictly and in dismissing the Garcia v. HRET, 6.R. No.
134792. August 12,1999. Q. What is the extent of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the Electoral
Tribunals? A. Judicial review of decisions or final
resolutions of the Electoral Tribunals is possible only in
the exercise of the Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction upon a determination that the tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
constituting denial of due process. Robles v. House
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5,1990;Co
v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 92191-92, July 30,1991; Lerias v. House
Electoral Tribunal,G.R. No. 97105, October 15,1991. Q.
On the eve of the promulgation of a decision against an
LDP member, the LDP expelled Camasura from the
party (and therefore as LDP member of the HET), one of
its representatives in the Electoral Tribunal and the
alleged ground of disloyalty for having shown his
support for Cojuangco. Camasura had previously
confided to LDP that he had voted against the LDP
Congressman. As a consequence the decision could not
be promulgated. Was the removal of Camasura valid? A.
The action taken by LDP was a grave abuse of discretion
which the Supreme Court can correct by virtue of its
power under Article VIII, Section 1 to review "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government."Bondoc v. Pineda,G.R. No. 97710,
September 26, 1991. Q. . The Senator-members of the
Electoral Tribunal are sought to be disqualified on the
ground that they, together with all the other Senators,
are respondents in the contest filed by the opposition.
May the Electoral Tribunal function as such when all of
the Senator-members in it have been disqualified,
either voluntarily or involuntarily? Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -
THE LEGISLATIVEDEPARTMENT 245 A. No. "Where as
here a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any
of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting
the same objections to the substitute's competence, the
proposed mass disqualification if sanctioned and
ordered would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn
of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators." They must therefore discharge their
function. Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,166
SCRA 651 (1988). Q. Petitioner contends that the
protest before the Electoral Tribunal was filed out of
time and therefore should be dismissed. True enough,
the protest was filed within the period prescribed by
the Tribunal rules, but out of time if computed on the
basis of the Election Code for filing cases before the
COMELEC. Decide. A. The applicable rule is not the
Election Code rule, which is for cases filed before the
COMELEC, but the Tribunal rule. In fact, Congress may
not prescribe for the Electoral Tribunal a period for
filing cases before it. The Tribunal is sole judge of
election contests. This power necessarily includes the
rule making power with which Congress may not
interfere. Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No.
84297, December 8,1988. SEC.18.THERE SHALL BE A
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS CONSISTING OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN,
TWELVE SENATORS AND TWELVE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTED BY EACH HOUSE
ON THE BASIS OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATIONFROM THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND
PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS REGISTERED UNDER THE
PARTY-LIST SYSTEM REPRESENTED THEREIN. THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION SHALL NOT VOTE,
EXCEPT IN CASE OF A TIE. THE COMMISSION SHALL ACT
ON ALL APPOINTMENTS SUBMITTED TO IT WITHIN
THIRTY SESSION DAYS OF THE CONGRESS FROM THEIR
SUBMISSION.THE COMMISSION SHALLRULE BY A
MAJORITY VOTE OF ALLITS MEMBERS. Q.What is the
composition of the Commission on Appointments? A. It
is composed of the Senate President as Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House according to
proportional representation of the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The total composition will thus be
twenty five, but the Chairman votes only to break a tie.
246 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16 A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Q. What is the function of
the Commission on Appointments? A. The Commission
on Appointments acts as a legislative check on the
appointing authority of the President. For the effectivity
of the appointment of certain key officials enumerated
in the Constitution, the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is needed. Q. Petitioner was a member of
the Commission on Appointments representing the
Liberal Party. With the organization of the LDP (Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino), some congressional
members belonging to the Liberal Party resigned from
said party to join the LDP. When the Commission on
Appointments was reorganized, petitioner was replaced
by an LDP representative. 1. Does the situation present
a "political question?" 2. Petitioner contends that the
organization of the LDP cannot affect the composition
of the Commission on Appointments because LDP is not
a registered party and has not yet shown the stability of
a party. Decide. A. 1. The question is justiciable. The
issue is one of legality not of wisdom. The
ascertainment of the manner of forming the
Commission on Appointments is distinct from the
discretion of the parties to designate their
representatives. And even if the question were political
in nature, it would still come under the expanded power
of review in Article VIII, Section 1. 2. The Constitution
requires proportional representation of the parties in
both houses of Congress. Nowhere, however, does the
Constitution require that the party must be a registered
party. (Moreover, in the course of the litigation, the
Commission on Elections affirmed the registration of
the LDP as a political party.) The sense of the
Constitution is that the membership in the Commission
on Appointments must always reflect political
alignments in Congress and must therefore adjust to
changes. It is understood that such changes in party
affiliation must be permanent and not merely
temporary alliances.Daza v. Singson,G.R. No. 86344,
December 21,1989. Q. Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA. After the
reorganization of party alignment when many joined
the LDP and with the endorsement of nine other
Congressmen she sought appointment to the
Commission on Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 247 Appointments as a minority
representative. Is she entitled to a seat under the rule
of proportional representation? No. This is a justiciable
question since it involves the legality of the distribution
of seats. Even if KAIBA were to be considered as an
opposition party, its lone member represents only 0.4%
of the House membership and thus not entitled to one
of the twelve seats. Under the total membership of the
House, to be entitled to a seat the party should
comprise 8.4% of the House membership. Nor can the
endorsement of the nine members be counted in
Coseteng's favor because they are not members of her
party. Coseteng v. Mitra, Jr., G.R. No. 86649, July 12,
1990. NOTE: The arithmetic involved in the formation of
the Commission on Appointments has occasioned a
number of controversies and was once again the
subject of controversy in Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales, 214
SCRA 789 (1992). The case involved the Senate
contingent in the Commission. The senatorial elections
of 1992 yielded 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC, 3 Lakas-NUCD,
and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN. On the basis of proportional
representation, therefore, the Commission on
Appointments could contain 7.5 LDP, 2.5 NPC, 1.5 Lakas,
and .5 LP-PDP-LABAN. The Senate, however, put in 8
LDP by rounding out 7.5, 2 NPC by ignoring .5, 1 LAKAS
also by ignoring .5, and 1 LP-PDP by rounding out .5 to
1. Was this constitutional? The Court ruled that
rounding out 7.5 to 8 and .5 to 1 was unconstitutional
because it deprived Lakas and NPC of .5 each. Nor could
the holders of .5 each, while belonging to distinct
parties, form a unity for purposes of obtaining a seat in
the Commission. Thus, under the Court's arithmetic, the
result would be a total of only 11 members. The Court
ruled that a full complement of 12 was not mandatory.
The case of Lorenzo Tanada being given a seat in the
Commission on Appointments in the old Senate in spite
of his being the only member of the Citizens Party was
cited as justification for reconsidering the decision. The
Court did not consider the case of the older Tanada as
precedent because the action of the Senate then was
never challenged in court. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales,
219 SCRA 326 (1993). NOTE: The Constitution gives to
the two Houses of Congress the primary jurisdiction
over who should sit in the Commission on
Appointments. This includes determination of party
affiliation and number of party members for the
purpose of determining proportional representation.
Drilon, et al v. Speaker, G.R. No. 180055, July 31, 2009.
248 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sees. 12-13 SEC. 19. THE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE CONSTITUTED WITHIN
THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALLHAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITH
THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER.
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS SHALL MEET
ONLY WHILE THE CONGRESS IS IN SESSION, AT THE CALL
OF ITS CHAIRMAN OR A MAJORITY OF ALL ITS
MEMBERS, TO DISCHARGE SUCH POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS AS ABE HEREIN CONFERRED UPON IT. Q.
How should the Commission arrive at its decisions? A.
First, the Commission must act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days from
submission. This rule is intended to prevent the
Commission from freezing appointments. Second, the
Commission shall decide by majority vote. Thus, the
dissent of one member should not block action by the
Commission. Finally, the Commission can meet and act
onlywhen Congress is in session. SEC.20.THE RECORDS
AND BOOKSOF ACCOUNTS OF THE CONGRESS SHALL BE
PRESERVED AND BE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW, AND SUCH BOOKS SHALL BE
AUDITED BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH SHALL
PUBLISH ANNUALLY AN ITEMIZED LIST OF AMOUNTS
PAID TO AND EXPENSES INCURRED FOR EACH MEMBER.
SEC.21.THE SENATE OR THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OR ANY OF ITS RESPECTIVE
COMMITTEES MAY CONDUCT INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS DULY
PUBLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE. THE RIGHTS OF
PERSONS APPEARING IN OR AFFECTED BY SUCH
INQUIRIES SHALL BE RESPECTED. NOTE: Legislative
hearings. There are two provisions on legislative
hearing, Sections 21 and 22. Section 21 is about
legislative investigations in aid of legislation. Its scope
and limitation has been the subject of earlier rulings but
Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20,2006,
specified who may and who may not be summoned to
Section 21 hearings. Thus, under this rule, even a
Department Head who is an alter ego of the President
may be summoned. Thus, too, the Chairman and
members of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) are not except from summons in
spite of the exemption given to them by President Cory
Aquino during her executive rule. Sabio v. Gordon,G.R.
Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
249 No. 174318, October 17, 2006. The Court ruled that
anyone, except the President and Justices of the
Supreme Court, may be summoned. Nor may a court
prevent a witness from appearing in such hearing.
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majadueon,
G.R. No. 136760, July 29, 2003. Section 22, for its part,
establishes the rule for the exercise of what is called the
"oversight function" of Congress. Such function is
intended to enable Congress to determine how laws it
has passed are being implemented. In deference to
separation of powers, however, and because
Department Heads are alter egos of the President, they
may not appear without the permission of the
President. This was explicitly mentioned in the
deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention
where some Delegates had doubts about the propriety
or constitutionality of Department Heads appearing in
Congress. Such deference is not found, by the Court's
interpretation, in Section 21. It should be noted,
however, that the exemption from summons applies
only to Department Heads and not to everyone who has
Cabinet rank. Q. Must the rulesfor investigation be
published? A. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height
of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect
after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."
The absence of any amendment to the rules published
some years ago cannot justify the Senate's defiance of
the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs,
without more, that the Senate or its committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance
with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make 250 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees.
15-16 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER any distinction
whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice
or tradition followed by the Senate. Garcillano v. House
of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23,
2008 In De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February
13, 2009 petitioners argue that respondent Committee
is devoid of any jurisdiction because it violated the
same Senate Rules when it issued the warrant of arrest
without the required signatures of the majority of the
members of respondent Committee and because they
were not published as required by the Constitution, and
thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation
involving them relative to the Moscow incident. But
Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
states: "Each House shall determine the rules of its
proceedings." This provision has been traditionally
construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to
the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise
of this power is generally exempt from judicial
supervision and interference, except on a clear showing
of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as
will constitute a denial of due process. But the Senate is
still subject to the imperatives of quorum, voting, and
publication. (The Senates rules had in fact been
published and were followed by the Senate.) Q. What is
the purpose of legislative investigation? A. The power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information which is not infrequently
true recourse must be had to others who do possess
it. Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 45 (1950). Q. How is
the power of legislative investigation enforced? A.
Experience has shown that mere requests for
information are frequently unavailing and that
information that is volunteered is not always accurate
or complete. Hence, the power of investigation
necessarily includes the power to punish a
contumacious witness for contempt. Arnault v.
Nazareno, supra. Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 251 Q. May a court enjoin the
appearance of a witness? A. No. A court has no
authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring
respondent to appear and testify before it. Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee v. Judge Majaducon,G.R. No.
136760, July 29,2003. Q. When may a witness in an
investigation be punished for contempt? A. No person
can be punished for contumacy as a witness unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which the
legislature or any of its committees has jurisdiction to
inquire. The requirement that the investigation be "in
aid of legislation" is an essential element for
establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It is,
however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy
because, unlike in the United States, where legislative
power is shared by the United States Congress and the
state legislatures, the totality of legislative power is
possessed by Congress and its legislative field is well-
nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits
by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded." Moreover, it is not necessary that every
question propounded to a witness must be material to a
proposed legislation. "In other words, the materiality of
the question must be determined by its direct relation
to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect
relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and character of the
action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question."Arnault v. Nazareno,
supra. Q. Upon the instigation of Senator Enrile who
said in a privileged speech that there was need to
determine the existence of violation of law in the
alleged transfer of some properties of "Kokoy"
Romualdezto the Lopa Group of companies, the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee decided, purportedly in aid of
legislation, to investigate the transaction. Meanwhile,
too, the petitioners in this case had been charged
before the Sandiganbayan in connection with the same
transaction. Meanwhile, too, the petitioners in this case
had been charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan
in connection with the same transaction. A. The Court
ruled that the investigation was not in aid of legislation
because "the speech of Senator Enrile contained no 252
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sees. 19-21 suggestion of
contemplated legislation" but merely pointed to the
need to determine whether "the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the
law." To allow the investigation to continue would
violate separation of powers. (The Court did not find it
necessary to discuss the due process allegation.)
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No.
89914, November 20,1991. See dissents. But when bank
officers who had been summoned used the Bengzon
argument in Standard Charter v. Senate, G.R. No.
167173, December 27,2007, the Court said that the
factual milieu in Bengzon did not obtain in the case.
Resolution No. 166 calling for the hearing was explicit
about the subject and nature of the inquiry to be
conducted by the respondent Committee. Q. What does
the Constitution mean when it says that "The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected?" A. This is just another way of saying that
legislative investigations must be "subject to the
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action." And since all governmental action must be
exercised subject to constitutional limitations,
principally found in the Bill of Rights, this limitation
really creates no new constitutional right. Q. For how
long may Congress keep a contumacious witness in
detention? A. In addition to the above express
limitations on the power of Congress is the implicit
limitation that the legislature's power to commit a
witness for contempt terminates when the legislative
body ceases to exist upon its final adjournment. "This
must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to
impose such a penalty is the right which the legislature
has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable
during the existence of the legislative body." Avancena,
C.J. concurring in Lopez v. de los Reyes, 55Phil. 170,186
(1930). Q. May the inherent power of Congress to
punish for contempt be applied,mutatis mutandis,to
local legislative bodies? A. No. The power is recognized
as inherent in Congress as a matter of self-preservation
of one of the three independent and coordinate
branches of government. It is sui generis and may not
be claimed by local legislative bodies.Negros Oriental II
Electric Cooperative v. Sangguniang Panglunsod,G.R.
No. 72492, November 5,1987. Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 253 SEC.22.THE HEADS OF
DEPARTMENTS MAY UPON THEIR OWN
INITIATIVE,WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PRESIDENT,OR
UPON THE REQUEST OF EITHER HOUSE,AS THE RULES
OF EACHHOUSE SHALL PROVIDE, APPEAR BEFORE AND
BE HEARD BY SUCH HOUSE ON ANY MATTER
PERTAINING TO THEIR DEPARTMENTS. WRITTEN
QUESTIONS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SENATE OR THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES AT LEAST THREE DAYS BEFORE THEIR
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE. INTERPELLATIONS SHALL
NOT BE LIMITED TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS, BUT MAY
COVER MATTERS RELATED THERETO. WHEN THE
SECURITY OF THE STATE OR THE PUBLIC INTEREST SO
REQUIRES AND THE PRESIDENT SO STATES IN
WRITING,THE APPEARANCE SHALLBE CONDUCTED IN
EXECUTIVE SESSION. Q. What is the purpose of Section
22? A. The provision formalizes the "oversight function"
of Congress. The special mention of heads of
departments was put in, even under the Administrative
Code before the 1935 Constitution, was intended to
forestall any objection to a department head's
appearance in Congress. Q. Does Section 22 provide for
a "question hour?" A.No. The "question hour" is proper
to a parliamentary system where there is no separation
between the legislative and executive department.
Section 22, unlike in the "question hour" under the
1973 Constitution, has made the appearance of
department heads voluntary. They can appear on their
own initiative, with the consent of the President, or at
the request of Congress. Because of the separation of
powers, however, department secretaries may not
impose their appearance upon either House. SEC. 23.
(1) THE CONGRESS, BY A VOTE OF TWO-THIRDS OF
BOTH HOUSES IN JOINT SESSION ASSEMBLED, VOTING
SEPARATELY, SHALL HAVE THE SOLE POWER TO
DECLARE THE EXISTENCE OF A STATEOF WAR. (2)IN
TIMES OF WAR OR OTHER NATIONAL EMERGENCY, THE
CONGRESS MAY BY LAW AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT,
FOR A LIMITED PERIODAND SUBJECT TO SUCH
RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY PRESCRIBE,TO EXERCISE
POWERS NECESSARY AND PROPER TO CARRY OUT A
DECLARED NATIONAL POLICY.UNLESS SOONER
WITHDRAWN BY RESOLUTION OFTHE CONGRESS,SUCH
POWER SHALL CEASE UPON THE NEXT ADJOURNMENT
THEREOF. 254 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION:
Sees. 15-16 A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Q. What is
the difference, if any, between the war power of
Congress under the 1935 Constitution and the war
power of Congress now? A. The 1935 Constitution,
Article VI, Section 25, gave to Congress "the sole power
to declare war;" the present provision, as also the 1973
provision, gives to Congress "the sole power to declare
the existence of a state of war." The difference between
the two phraseologies is not substantial but merely in
emphasis. The two phrases are interchangeable, even
under the 1935 Constitution; but the second phrase
emphasizes more the fact that the Philippines,
according to Article II, Section 2, renounces aggressive
war as an instrument of national policy. Q. May the
country engage in war in the absence of a declaration of
war? A. While the Constitution gives to the legislature
the power to declare the existenceof a state of war and
to enact all measures to support the war, the actual
power tomakewar is lodged elsewhere, that is, in the
executive power which holds the sword of the nation.
The executive power, when necessary, may make war
even in the absence of a declaration of war. In the
words of the American Supreme Court, war being a
question of actualities, "the President was bound to
meet it in the shape it presented itself, without waiting
for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name
given to it by him or them could change the fact." See
Prize Cases, 2Bl. 635 (U.S. 1863). Q. Under what
conditions may emergency powers be delegated to the
President? A. See Section 23(2). Q. What emergency
powers may be delegated? A. Under the present
provision, Congress may authorize the President "to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy." Note that the nature of the
delegable power is not specified. It is submitted that, on
the basis of this provision, the President may be given
emergency legislative powers if Congress so desires.
This is confirmed by the explanation made on the floor
of the 1971 Convention, which is the source of this
provision, that emergency powers can include the
power to rule by "executive fiat." Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 255 Q. Does a
resolution of Congress withdrawing the emergency
powers need presidential approval? A.No. SEC.24.ALL
APPROPRIATION,REVENUE OR TARIFF BILLS,BILLS
AUTHORIZING INCREASEOF THE PUBLIC DEBT, BILLS OF
LOCAL APPLICATION, AND PRIVATE BILLS SHALL
ORIGINATE EXCLUSIVELY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,BUT THE SENATE MAY PROPOSE
ORCONCUR WITH AMENDMENTS. Q. What is the
meaning of the requirement that money bills must
originate in the House of Representatives? A. The
meaning of origination from the House and the scope of
the Senate's power to introduce amendments were
thoroughly discussed in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994), affirmed on
reconsideration October 30, 1995, involving R.A. 7716,
the Value Added Tax (VAT) law. The Court said that the
exclusivity of the prerogative of the House of
Representatives means simply that the House alone can
initiate the passage of a revenue bill, such that, if the
House does not initiate one, no revenue law will be
passed. But once the House has approved a revenue bill
and passed it on to the Senate, the Senate can
completely overhaul it, by amendment of parts or by
amendment by substitution, and come out with one
completely different from what the House approved. It
does not matter whether the Senate already anticipated
a bill from the House and formulated one to take the
place of whatever the House might send. The Court
rejected the idea that the Senate is bound to retain the
essence of what the other House approved. Textually, it
is the "bill" which must exclusively originate from the
House; but the "law" itself which is the product of the
total bicameral legislative process originates not just
from the House but from both Senate and House. NOTE:
A bill of local application, such as one asking for the
conversion of a municipality into a city, is deemed to
have originated from the House provided that the bill of
the House was filed prior to the filing of the bill in the
Senate even if, in the end, the Sernate approved its own
version. Reiterates the VAT case. Alvarez v.
Guingona,G.R. No. 118303, January 31,1996.
NOTE:Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991),
dealt with the controversy surrounding automatic
appropriation 256 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION:
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 17 for foreign debt
servicing. Petitioners sought to declare the various
Presidential Decrees authorizing automatic
appropriation of amounts to be used for servicing
foreign debts. The principal contention of petitioners
was that (1) appropriation "bills" under Section 24 must
originate in the House of Representatives and (2) there
must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation. Answering the first argument the Court
said that the existing presidential decrees were laws
and not bills still to be enacted into law. As to the
second argument, the Court resolved it by applying the
principles on delegation: The decrees are complete by
themselves and the exact amount due can be arrived at
by arithmetical computation on the basis of existing
records. SEC.25.(1)THE CONGRESS MAY NOT INCREASE
THE APPROPRIATIONS RECOMMENDED BYTHE
PRESIDENT FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
AS SPECIFIED INTHE BUDGET.THE FORM,CONTENT,AND
MANNER OF PREPARATION OF THE BUDGET SHALL BE
PRESCRIBED BY LAW. (2) NOPROVISION OR ENACTMENT
SHALL BE EMBRACEDIN THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS
BILL UNLESS IT RELATES SPECIFICALLY TO SOME
PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION THEREIN.ANY SUCH
PROVISION OR ENACTMENT SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS
OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION TO WHICH IT
RELATES. (3) THE PROCEDURE IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONSFOR THE CONGRESS SHALL STRICTLY
FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS FOR OTHER DEPARTMENTS
ANDAGENCIES. (4) ASPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS BELL
SHALL SPECIFY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS
INTENDED,AND SHALL BE SUPPORTED BY FUNDS
ACTUALLY AVAILABLE AS CERTIFIED BY THE NATIONAL
TREASURER,OR TO BE RAISED BY A CORRESPONDING
REVENUE PROPOSAL THEREIN. (5) NOLAW SHALL BE
PASSED AUTHORIZING ANY TRANSFER OF
APPROPRIATIONS;HOWEVER,THE PRESIDENT,THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,THE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT,AND THE HEADS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS MAY,BY LAW,BE
AUTHORIZED TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM IN THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES
FROM SAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
APPROPRIATIONS. (6) DISCRETIONARY FUNDS
APPROPRIATED FOR PARTICULAR OFFICIALS SHALL BE
DISBURSED ONLY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES TO BE
SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE VOUCHERS AND SUBJECT
TO SUCH GUIDELINES AS MAY BE PRESCRIBEDBY LAW.
Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
257 (7)IF,BY THE END OF ANY FISCAL YEAR,THE
CONGRESS SHALL HAVE FAILED TO PASS THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS BILL FOR THE ENSUING FISCAL
YEAR,THE GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THE
PRECEDING FISCAL YEAR SHALL BEDEEMED REENACTED
ANDSHALL REMAIN IN FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL
THEGENERAL APPROPRIATIONS BILL IS PASSED BYTHE
CONGRES8. Q. How is the general appropriations bill
prepared? A. See Section 24 and Section 25(1). Q. What
is the rule on "riders" in the general appropriations bill?
A. See Section 25(2). Q. The Appropriation Act for FY
1956-57 contained the following provision: "after the
approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency,
no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for
more than two years during any period of five
consecutive years." Is the provision valid? A. No. The
provision violates the rule on "riders." Garcia v. Mata,
65 SCRA 517 (July 30,1975). Q. May Congress treat
appropriations for Congress itself differently from those
for others? A. See Section 25(3). Q. What are the rules
on special appropriations? A. See Section 25(4). Q. To
what extent may Congress allow transfer of funds? A.
See Section 25(5); Q. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 ofP.D.
1177 says: "The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the
executive department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment." Valid? A. No. Commenting on the
constitutional text, the Court said that the provision is
intended "to afford the heads of the diffe 258 THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Sec. 17 rent branches of the government and
those of the Constitutional Commissions considerable
flexibility in the use of public funds and resources" but
that the leeway granted was limited. "The purpose of
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made
only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body." Pointing out that P.D. 1177
empowered the President "to indiscriminately transfer
funds . . . without regard as to whether or not the funds
to be transferred are actually savings in the item from
which the same are to be taken," the Court declared the
law unconstitutional.Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208
(1987). NOTE: The list of those who may be authorized
to transfer funds under this provision is exclusive.
Hence, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces may not
be given such authority. Likewise, individual members
of Congress may not be given such authority and must
seek approval from the Speaker or the Senate President
if these latter have been authorized by law. Philippine
Constitutional Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA
506,544 (1994). Q. What is the rule on discretionary
funds? A. See Section25(6). Q. On what budget does the
government operate when Congress fails to approve a
general appropriation bill? A. See Section25(7).
SEC.26.(1)EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL
EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH SHALL BE
EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF. (2)NOBILL PASSED
BY EITHER HOUSE SHALL BECOMEA LAW UNLESS IT HAS
PASSEDTHREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS,AND
PRINTED COPIES THEREOF IN ITS FINAL FORMHAVE
BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO ITS MEMBERS THREE DAYS
BEFORE ITS PASSAGE,EXCEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT
CERTIFIES TO THE NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE
ENACTMENT TO MEET A PUBLIC CALAMITY OR
EMERGENCY.UPON THE LAST READING OF A BILL,NO
AMENDMENT THERETOSHALL BE ALLOWED,AND THE
VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY
THEREAFTER,AND THEYEASAND NAYSENTERED IN THE
JOURNAL. Q. What is the nature and purpose of the rule
on title and subject of bills? A. The requirement that
"Every bill embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof' is mandatory and not
directory and compliance with it is essential to the
validity Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 259 of legislation. An early decision
explained the purpose of this limitation on legislative
power thus: The object sought to be accomplished and
the mischief proposed to be remedied by this provision
are well known. Legislative assemblies, for the dispatch
of business, often pass bills by their titles only without
requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes
covers legislation which, if its real character had been
disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To
prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of
the purposes this provision was intended to accomplish.
Before the adoption of this provision the title of a
statute was often no indication of its subject or
contents. An evil this constitutional requirement was
intended to correct was the blending in one and the
same statute of such things as were diverse in their
nature, and were connected only to combine in favor of
the statute all the advocates of each, thus often
securing the passage of several measures no one of
which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr.
Cooley thus sums up in his review of the authorities
defining the objects of this provision: 'It may therefore
be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision
was: First, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling
legislation, second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which
the titles gave no information, and which might
therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly appraise
the people, through such publication of legislative
proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
legislation that are being considered, in order that they
may have opportunity of being heard thereon by
petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.' Central
Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883, 891 (1920). Q. How must
the rule be interpreted, liberally or strictly? A. Liberally.
The rule "should be given a practical rather than
technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions of the statute
are germane to that general subject." Sumulong v.
Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291 (1941). Q. A
bill is passed entitled "An Act Amending Certain
Sections of Republic Act Numbered One Thousand One
Hundred Ninety-Nine, otherwise known as the
Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines." The bill
contained a provision authorizing the Secretary of
Justice to mediate tenancy disputes through a tenancy
mediation division. Valid? 260 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 17
A. Yes.Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962). Q.
The title of R.A. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means of
Increasing the Highway Special Fund." It is contended
that, since the purpose of the bill is to increase the
highway fund, the provision in Section 5 which creates
an exemption and thus does not contribute to an
increase is alien to the subject of the law and is
therefore unconstitutional. Decide. A. The purpose of
the constitutional provision requiring unity of content
and expression of the content in the title is to prevent
duplicity of subject and surprise upon the legislators
and the public. Clearly, the provision for exemption
comes under the general subject expressed in the title.
Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 SCRA
710, 716-7 (L-31137, May 29,1981). Q. A bill is passed
entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton
in the Province of Lanao del Norte." The proposed
municipality, however, included some barrios outside
Lanao del Norte. Valid? A. A divided Supreme Court
declared the law invalid for insufficiency of title. Lidasan
v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496 (1967). Q. P.D. No. 1987 is
entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board." Section 10 thereof imposes a 30% tax on gross
receipts on video transactions. Is this a "rider?" A. The
requirement that eveiy bill must only have one subject
expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is
comprehensive enough to include subjects related to
the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
Such is the case here. Taxation is sufficiently related to
the regulation of the video industry. Tio v. Videogram
Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208 (1987). NOTE: The title
"An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation,
Defining Its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for the Regulation of the Industry and for
Other Purposes Connected Therewith" was found to be
sufficiently broad to cover the removal of the franking
privileges of the judiciary. Philippine Judges Association
v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993). [But the provision on the
franking privileges of the judiciary was declared
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.]
Similarly, the title "An Act Converting the Municipality
of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" was deemed to include the resulting
conversion of such city into a congressional district in
compliance with Article VI, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution. Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106,110111
(1994). Also Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 118702, March 16,1995. Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 261 NOTE: RA 9369 is
challenged misleading because it speaks of poll
automation but contains substantial provisions dealing
with the manual canvassing of election returns. But the
constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall
be expressed in the title thereof has always been given
a practical rather than a technical construction. The
requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough to include subjects related to the general
purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. RA 9369 is
an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending Republic
Act No. 8436, Entitled 'An Act Authorizing the
Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election
System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections
and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral
Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility,
Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Big. 881, as Amended,
Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws,
Providing Funds Therefore and For Other Purposes."*
This is wide-covering enough. Banat v. Comelec, G.R.
No. 177508, August 7,2009. Q.How many times must a
bill be brought before Congress before it becomes a
law? A. See Section26(2). SEC.27.(1) EVERY BILL PASSED
BY THE CONGRESS SHALL, BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW,
BE PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT.IF HE APPROVES THE
SAME,HE SHALL SIGN IT;OTHERWISE,HE SHALL VETO IT
ANDRETURN THE SAME WITHHIS OBJECTIONS TO THE
HOUSE WHERE IT ORIGINATED, WHICH SHALL ENTER
THE OBJECTIONS AT LARGE IN ITS JOURNAL AND
PROCEED TO RECONSIDER IT. IF, AFTER SUCH
RECONSIDERATION, TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF SUCH HOUSE SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE
BILL,IT SHALL BE SENT,TOGETHER WITH THE
OBJECTIONS,TO THE OTHER HOUSE BY WHICH IT SHALL
LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED,AND IF APPROVED BY
TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT HOUSE, IT
SHALL BECOME A LAW.IN ALL SUCH CASES, THE VOTES
OF EACH HOUSE SHALL BE DETERMINED BY
YEASORNAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE MEMBERS
VOTING FOR OR AGAINST SHALL BE ENTERED IN
ITSJOURNAL.THE PRESIDENT SHALL COMMUNICATE HIS
VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE HOUSE WHERE IT
ORIGINATED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF
RECEIPT THEREOF;OTHERWISE,IT SHALL BECOMEA LAW
AS IF HE HAD SIGNED IT. (2)THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE
THE POWER TO VETO ANY PARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS
IN AN APPROPRIATION, REVENUE,OR TARIFF BILL, BUT
THE VETO SHALL NQT AFFECT THEITEM OR ITEMS TO
WHICH HE DOES NOT OBJECT. 262 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16 A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Q. What steps are needed before a bill finally
becomes a law? A. Two steps are required before a bill
finally becomes a law. First, it must be approved by
Congress. The legislative action required of Congress is
a positive act; there is no enactment of law by
legislative inaction.Miller v. Mardo, 2 SCRA 398,908-9
(1961). Second, it must be approved by the President.
Approval by the President may be by positive act or by
inaction. "The President shall communicate his veto of
any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it." Q. When does the
Constitution require that the yeas andnays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote?
A.(1) upon the last and third readings of a bill [Art. VI,
26(2)]; (2) at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present [Art. VI, 16(4)]; and (3) in repassing a bill over
the veto of the President [Art. VI, 27(1)].Arroyo v. De
Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14,1997, 277 SCRA
268. Q. If the version approved by the Senate is
different from that approved by the House of
Representatives, how are the differences reconciled? A.
In a bicameral system bills are independently processed
by both Houses of Congress. It is not unusual that the
final version approved by one House differs from what
has been approved by the other. The "conference
committee," consisting of members nominated from
both Houses, is an extra-constitutional creation of
Congress whose function is to propose to Congress
ways of reconciling conflicting provisions found in the
Senate version and in the House version of a bill. Q.
What is the extent of the powers of a conference
committee? A. InTolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235
SCRA at 666-672, [affirmed on reconsideration October
30, 1995], the Court held. Following US practice, that
amendments germane to the purpose of the bill could
be introduced even if thesewere not in either original
bill. Moreover, the Court said: "Nor is there anything
unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the
conference committee met in executive sessions. Often
the only way to reach agreement on conflicting
provisions is to meet behind closed doors, Sees. 15-16
ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 263 with only
the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is
likely to be made." Q.If a bill is vetoed by the President,
may it still become a law? A. Yes. "If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by
which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House
shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal." Q. May the President approve some part or
parts of a bill and veto the rest? A. As a general rule, if
the President disapproves a bill approved by Congress,
he should veto the entire bill. He is not allowed to veto
separate items of a bill. It is only in the case of
appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills that he is
authorized to exercise item-veto. Q.What is the effect
of an invalid veto? A. It is without effect, i.e., it is as if
the President did not act on the bill at all. Hence, the bill
becomes a law by executive inaction. Bolinao
Electronics v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 (1964). Q. Section
42 of H.B. 17839 which became R.A. 6110 imposed a
caterer's tax on various operators of restaurants.
President Marcos, however, vetoed the portion of
Section 42 which imposed a 20% caterers tax on
restaurants operated by hotels, motels, and rest
houses. It is contended that the veto was invalid since
item veto refers to a veto of an entire section and not
portions of a section. Decide. A. The veto was valid. "An
Htem' in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire
section imposing a particular kind of tax, but rather to
the subject of the tax and the tax rate. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals,G.R. No.
47421, May 14,1990. Q. The General Appropriations Act
of 1989 contained the following provision: Section 55.
Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of
Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or
Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation
recommended by the President . . . which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be 264 THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Sec. 17 restored or increased by the use of
appropriations authorized for other purposes by
augmentation. An item of appropriation for any
purpose recommended by the President in the Budget
shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress
if no corresponding appropriation for the specific
purpose is provided in this act. The General
appropriations Act for 1990 contained the following
provision: Sec. 16. Use of Savings. . . . Provided, that
no item of appropriation recommended by the
President in the Budget... which has been disapproved
or reduced by Congress shall be restored or increased
by the use of appropriations authorized for other
purposes in this Act by augmentation. An item of
appropriation for any purpose shall be deemed to have
been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this
Act. Exercising the power of "item veto" the President
vetoed the similar provisions for the reason that they
violate "Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If
allowed, this Section would nullify" the "constitutional
and statutory authority" of the President to augment
items from savings. The President added that "this
provision is inconsistent with Section 12 and other
similar provisions of this General Appropriations Act."
The Solicitor General further argues that the matter is a
political question and that at any rate Section 55 is a
"rider." The petitioners on the contrary argue that (1)
the provision in issue is not an "item" subject to
separate veto but a "provision" which she cannot veto
without vetoing the entire bill; (2) power of "item veto"
does not include the power to veto a condition without
vetoing the entire provision; (3) the power of
augmentation has to be provided by Congress and may
therefore be restricted by Congress. Decide. A. 1. This is
a justiciable question. In involves interpretation of the
Constitution. 2; The power to augment lies dormant
until authorized by law. And since the grant of the
power of augmentation is not an act of appropriation, it
has no. place in an appropriation act. But since there is
already a separate law authorizing augmentation, the
new provision to that extent restricts the authority of
other departments already granted. [Implicit in this
argument is that therefore, if the power of
augmentation isto be taken back or restricted, it should
be in a separate law.] 3. A condition in an appropriation
bill may not vetoed without vetoing the item to which it
is attached. Bolinao Electronics v.Valencia, 11 SCRA 486
(1964). Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 265 4. "Provision" and "item" in
budgetary legislation are different. An "item" is "an
indivisible some of money dedicated to a stated
purpose" and not "some general provision of law which
happens to be put into an appropriation bill." Neither
Section 55 nor Section 16 fits the definition of an
"Item." In fact the disapproved items do not appear on
the face of the bill. 5. Neither is it, however, an
allowable "provision" because it does not relate to any
particular appropriation in the bill. It refers to items
which do not appear on the bill. TQ that extent
therefore it is a rider. 6. Neither is it a condition in the
budgetary sense because it does riot refer to any
specific item. It is more in the nature of a general
provision which should be contained in a separate law.
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.,G.R. No. 87636, November
19,1990. Q. What is the doctrine of "inappropriate
provisions?" A. Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452
(1990), marks the Court's acceptance of what eventually
would be referred to as the "doctrine of inappropriate
provisions." What the doctrine says is that a provision
that is constitutionally inappropriate for an
appropriation bill may be singled out for veto even if it
is not an appropriation or revenue "item." In essence
what this means is that the President may veto "riders"
in an appropriation bill. Q. What is the meaning of
"executive impoundment?" A- Another way of
exercising executive veto is through what is called
"impoundment." Impoundment simply means refusal of
the President to spend funds already allocated by
Congress for a specific purpose. There is no provision in
the Constitution on the subject. Impoundment came up
also in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez.
To the amount appropriated by Congress for the
compensation and separation benefits of members of
CAFGU was attached a provision that "it shall be used
for the compensation of CAFGlFs including the payment
of their separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year
subsistence allowance for the 11,000 members who will
be deactivated in 1994." 235 SCRA at 544. The President
did not veto the provision but said instead in his veto
message that the implementation of the provision
would be subject to his prior approval taking into
consideration the peace and order situation in the
affected localities. 266 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sec. 17
Those who challenged the veto contended that the
provision already effectively required the deactivation
of the CAFGLTs and that the President had no choice
but to implement the law. The President on the other
hand justified his impoundment of the provision on the
basis of his Commander-in-Chief powers and on the
dangerous argument that the duty to implement the
law includes the duty to desist from implementing it
when implementation would prejudice public interest.
As Justice Roberto Concepcion pointed out in an earlier
case, "after all we still live under a rule of law."
Gonzalez v. Hechanova, G.R. No. 21897 (October
26,1963). The Supreme Court, however, has heretofore
refrained from passing judgment on the
constitutionality of "impoundment" The Court,
however, found in the doctrine on "inappropriate
provision" a way out of having to decide whether
impoundment was legal. It said that a provision for the
disband- ment of the CAFGU should be in a separate
bill. Q. May the publication of laws prior to their
effectivity be dispensed with? A. No. Publication in
every case is indispensable. Total omission of
publication would be a denial of due process in that the
people would not know what laws to obey. Tanada v.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986). SEC. 28. (1) THE RULE OF
TAXATION SHALL BE UNIFORM AND EQUITABLE. THE
CONGRESS SHALL EVOLVEA PROGRESSIVE SYSTEMOF
TAXATION. (2) THE CONGRESS MAY,BY LAW,AUTHORIZE
THE PRESIDENT TO FIX WITHIN SPECIFIEDLIMITS,AND
SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS AS
ITMAY IMPOSE, TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND EXPORT
QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFAGEDUES,AND OTHER
DUTIES OR IMPOSTS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF THE
GOVERNMENT. (3) CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS,CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES OR
CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NON-
PROFIT CEMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS,AND
IMPROVEMENTS ACTUALLY,DIRECTLY,AND EXCLUSIVELY
USEDFOR RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE,OR EDUCATIONAL
PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM TAXATION. (4) NO
LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED
WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL
THE MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. Sees. 15-16 ART. VI -
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 267 Q. What is the
purpose of the power to tax? A. The obvious, primary,
and specific purpose of the power to tax is to raise
revenue. However, from the earliest days of the history
of the power of taxation, the power to tax has been
recognized as an instrument of national economic and
social policy. It has, for instance, been used as an
instrument for the extermination of undesirable
activities and enterprises. In the celebrated words of
Justice Marshall, the power to tax involves the power to
destroy. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 431
(U.S. 1819). The power to tax has also been used as a
tool for regulation. For the purpose of regulating
property, the State can choose to exercise its police
power or its power to tax. "It is beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it
regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the
activities taxed . . . The principle applies even though
the revenue obtained is obviously negligible, ... or the
revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary . . United
States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42,44 (1950). Another aspect
of the power to tax is what the United States Supreme
Court has characterized as "the power to keep alive."
This is the foundation for the imposition of tariffs
designed for the encouragement and protection of
locally produced goods against competition from
imports. "The enactment and enforcement of a number
of customs revenue laws drawn with a motive of
maintaining a system of protection, since the revenue
law of 1789, are matters of history . . . whatever we
may think of thewisdom of a protection policy."
Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,412
(1928). Q. What is the general limit on the power to
tax? A. The power to tax exists for the general welfare.
Hence implicit in the power is the limitation that it
should be exercised only for a public purpose. In the
words of Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall, 655, 664
(U.S. 1875), "To lay, with one hand, the power of the
government on the property of the citizen, and with the
other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid
private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is
none the less a robbery because it is done under the
forms of law and is called taxation." 268 THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Sec. 17 "The power to tax 'is an attribute of
sovereignty.' In fact, it is the strongest of all the powers
of government. But for all its plenitude, the power to
tax is not unconfined as there are restrictions. Adversely
affecting as it does property rights, both due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution may
properly be invoked to invalidate in appropriate cases a
revenue measure. If it were otherwise, there would be
truth to the 1903 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that
'the power to tax involves the power to destroy.' The
web of unreality spun from Marshall's famous dictum
was brushed away by one stroke of Mr. Justice Holmes'
pen, thus: The power to tax is not the power to destroy
while this Court sits.' 'So it is in the Philippines.' Sison,
Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 655 (1984); Obillos, Jr. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 139 SCRA 439
(1985). "In the same vein, the due process clause may
be invoked where a taxing statute isso arbitrary that it
finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious
example is where it cam be shown to amount to
confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of
power (Sison v. Ancheta, supra)." Reyes v. Almanzor,
196 SCRA 322 (1989). Q.What are the specific limits on
the power to tax? A. See Section 28. Q.When is taxation
"uniform and equitable?" A. The concept of uniformity
of taxation is derived from Article I, Section 8, of the
United States Constitution which prescribes that "all
duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the Unites States." It will thus be seen that
whereas the American provision whence the Philippine
rule derived has reference to "duties, imposts, and
excises," that is, to indirect taxes, the Philippine
requirement of uniformity applies to taxation in
general. Philippine jurisprudence, however, from its
earliest days has interpreted "uniformity" in the
Philippine Constitution in the same way as "uniformity"
in the American Constitution. In the words of Churchill
v. Conception, 34 Phil. 969, 976-7 (1916), "uniformity"
in the Constitution does "not signify an intrinsic, but
simply a geographical uniformity . . . A tax is uniform,
within the Constitutional requirement, when it operates
with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject of it is found." Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 269 Moreover, the
requirement of "uniformity" has been interpreted by
Philippine jurisprudence as equivalent to the
requirement of valid classification under the equal
protection clause. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. City
ofButuan, 24 SCRA 789, 795-96 (1968). The word
"equitable" seems to add nothing except by way of
emphasis. NOTE: The obvious primary and specific
purpose of the power to tax is to raise revenue.
However, it may also be used to regulate. But Philippine
jurisprudence frowns on the notion of the power to tax
as the power to destroy because taxation must not be
oppressive. See e.g., Obillos, Jr. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 139 SCRA 436, 439 (1985). Indeed the
notion of equitable taxation excludes oppressiveness.
As Tan v. del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA 324, 332 (1994),
says, "Of course, where a tax measure becomes so
unconscionable and unjust as to amount to confiscation
of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down,
for, despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot
override constitutional prescriptions." Regarding
uniformity of taxation, Tan v. del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324
(1994), put it thus: it means that 1) the standards that
are used therefore are substantial and not arbitrary, (2)
the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative
purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to
both present and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all those belonging
to the same class. Q. Respondents presented an
exhaustive study on the tax rates levied on the jewelry
industry by different Asian countries in order to
convince the court that, relative to its neighbors, the tax
rates imposed on jewelry in the Philippines was
oppressive and confiscatory. Decide. A. The Court
"cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates of
other countries should be used as a yardstick in
determining what may be the proper subjects of
taxation in our own country. It should be pointed out
that the aforementioned taxes and duties, the State,
acting through the legislative and executive branches, is
exercising its sovereign prerogative. It is inherent in the
power to tax that the State be free to select the
subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held
that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no
constitutional limitation.'" Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Santos,G.R. No. 119252, 270 THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16 A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER August 18,1997,277 SCRA
617,631-32 (citing Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148 [1955];
Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 [1984];
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 [1988]; Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, 249 SCRA 628 [1995]). Q. What is
a "progressive system of taxation?" A. A tax system is
progressive when the rate increases as the tax base
increases. The explicit mention of progressive taxation
in the Constitution reflects the wish of the Commission
that the legislature should use the power of taxation as
an instrument for a more equitable distribution of
wealth. Q. May the power to tax be delegated? A. Yes,
under the conditions laid down in Section 28(2). This
delegation of the taxation power by the legislative to
the executive is authorized by the Constitution itself. At
the same time, the Constitution also grants the
delegating authority (Congress) the right to impose
restrictions and limitations on the taxation power
delegated to the President. The restrictions and
limitations imposed by Congress take on the mantle of a
constitutional command, which the executive branch is
obliged to observe. Southern Cross v. Philippine
Cement, G.R. No. 158540, July 8,2004. Q. May tax
exemptions be created by statute? A. Yes, under the
condition laid down in Section 28(4). Q. Are there
constitutionally created tax exemptions? A. Yes, in
Section 28(3), and Article XIV, Section 4(3 & 4). Q. What
kind of tax exemption is created in Section 28(3)? A. The
exemption is only for taxes assessed as property taxes,
as contradistinguished from excise taxes. Lladoc v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292, 295
(1965). Q. Compare the exemption for "lands, buildings,
and improvements" under the 1935 Constitution with
that under the new Constitution. A. "Under the 1935
Constitution: 'Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, build Sees.
15-16 ART. VI -THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 271 ings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.' The present Constitution has added:
'charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit
cemeteries' and required that for the exemption
of'lands, buildings, and improvements,' they should not
only be 'exclusively' but also 'actually' and 'directly used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes . . .
There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct
use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for
religious or charitable [or educational] purposes to be
exempt from taxation... Province of Abra v. Hernando
and Roman Catholic Bishop, 107 SCRA 104, 108-9 (L-
49336, August 31,1981). Q. The Young Men's Christian
Association of the Philippines, Inc. ("YMCA")
established as "a welfare, educational and charitable
non-profit corporation" derived income from rentals
of its real property. Claiming tax exemption, it argues
that: 1) Article VI, 8(3) exempts "charitable
institutions" from payment not only of property taxes
but also of income tax from any source; 2) Article XIV,
4(3) applies because YMCA is "a non-stock, non-profit
educational institution whose revenues and assets are
used actually, directly and exclusively for educational
purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties
and income." Decide. A. 1) This provision covers
property taxes only. YMCA is "exempt from the
payment of property tax, but not income tax on the
rentals from its property." 2) YMCA is not an
educational institution within the purview of Article XIV.
Neither did it submit proof of the amount of the income
that was actually, directly and exclusively used for
educational purposes. Commission of Internal Revenue
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124043, October 14,1998,
pp. 17-18,20. Q. Because the beneficial use of a piece of
property was donated to SYSTEMS PLUS COMPUTER
COLLEGE, tax exemption was sought. Proper? A, No.
There is no showing that the same are "actually, directly
and exclusively" used either for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes. Hence, tax exemption cannot be
claimed. Systems Plus Computer College v. Caloocan
City,G.R. No. 146382, August 7, 2003 Q. The former
camp John Hay was declared a special economic zone.
On that basis it claimed tax exemption. Proper? 272 THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: Sees. 15-16 A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER A. While the grant of
economic incentives may be essential to the creation
and success of SEZs, free trade zones and the like, the
grant of tax exemption to the John Hay SEZ cannot be
sustained. The tax exemption under R.A. No. 7227 are
exclusive only to the Subic SEZ, hence, the extension of
the same by the President to the John Hay SEZ finds no
support therein. John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition
v. Lim, G.R. No. 119775, October 24,2003. Q. The Lung
Center alleges that a minimum of 60% of its hospital
beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that
the major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve
charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a
charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real
property taxes. A. We hold that the petitioner is a
charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an
enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the
elements which should be considered include the
statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes,
its constitution and by-laws, the methods of
administration, the nature of the actual work
performed, the character of the services rendered, the
indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and
occupation of the properties. However, those portions
of its real property that are leased to private entities are
not exempt from real property taxes as these are not
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104,
June 29, 2004. NOTE: In Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) v.
Fertiphil Corp, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, the
Court had occasion to review the validity of LOI1465, a
martial rule product, which imposed a ten peso capital
contribution for the sale of each bag of fertilizer "until
adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable." PPI was a
private corporation. Clearly, therefore, the imposition
was for private benefit and not for a public purpose and
therefore invalid. The Court also found that, even if
seen as an exercise of police power, the imposition
would still be invalid for not being for a public purpose.
SEC.29.(1) NoMONEY SHALL BE PAID OUT OF THE
TREASURY EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN
APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW. (2) NO PUBLIC MONEY
OR PROPERTY SHALL BE APPROPRIATED, APPLIED, PAID,
OR EMPLOYED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE USE,
BENEFIT, OR SUPPORT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH,
DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM
OF RELIGION, OR OF ANY PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER,
OR OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHER OR DIGNITARY AS
SUCH, EXCEPT WHEN SUCH
PRIEST,PREACHER,MINISTER,OR DIGNITARY IS
ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED FORCES, OR TO ANY PENAL
INSTITUTION,OR GOVERNMENT ORPHANAGE OR
LEPROSARIUM. Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 273 (3)ALL MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY
TAX LEVIED FORA SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED
AS A SPECIAL FUND AND PAID OUT FOR SUCH PURPOSE
ONLY.IF THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH A SPECIAL FUND
WAS CREATED HAS BEEN FULFILLED OR
ABANDONED,THE BALANCE,IF ANY,SHALL BE
TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE
GOVERNMENT. Q. Who has control of the expenditure
of public funds? A. Congress. "No money shall be paid
out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." Q. It is argued that the
automatic reappropriation law for servicing foreign
debts is invalid because it does not appropriate a fixed
amount and is therefore an undue delegation of
legislative power. Decide. A The amount is fixed by the
parameters of the law itself which requires the simple
act of looking into the books of the Treasure. Guingona,
Jr. v. Carague,G.R. No. 9457, April 22,1991. Q.What are
the limits on this power of Congress? A. The specific
limits are those found in Section 29(2). Aside from the
explicit limitations, there is also the all important
implicit limitation that public money can be
appropriated only for a public purpose. This limitation
arises from the relation between the power to spend
and the power to tax. "The right of the legislature to
appropriate public funds is correlative with its right to
tax, and, under the constitutional provisions against
taxation except for public purposes... no appropriation
of state funds can be made for other than a public
purpose." 81 CJS p. 1147. Q. The sum of 85,000 pesos is
appropriated by Congress for a feeder road running
through a private subdivision and over property owned
by a private individual. Subsequently, the feeder road is
donated to the government. Is the appropriation valid?
A No, because it is not for a public purpose. The
subsequent donation of the road did not validate the
law because the validity of a statute depends upon the
powers of Congress at the time of its approval, and not
upon events occurring or acts performed subsequently.
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331-346
(1960). Q. Are not "pork barrel" provisions in the annual
budget a violation of separation of powers in that it
allows members of Congress to perform the executive
function of spending money appropriated? 274 THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEWER Sec. 17 A. The controversy over the
Countrywide Development Fund of 1994, which is the
deodorized appellation of the traditional "pork barrel,"
was resolved by the Court in a manner which might be
described as tongue-in-cheek. The General
Appropriation Act set aside an amount to be used for
"infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers
and other priority projects and activities, and credit
facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and
identified by officials concerned." The "officials
concerned" were all Representatives, Senators and the
Vice-President who were each allocated an amount. The
law was challenged on the ground that the authority
given to the enumerated officials to propose and
identify projects and activities was an encroachment
into legislative power. In upholding the validity of the
law, the Court said that Congress itself had specified the
uses of the fund and that the power given to the
enumerated officials was merely recommendatory to
the President who could approve or disapprove the
recommendation. The Court praised the scheme as
"imaginative" and "innovative!" Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, 521-523 (1994).
NOTE: The origin of the name may be traced to a
degrading ritual to which slaves were subjected. At a
fixed day and hour, a barrel stuffed with pork would be
rolled out and a multitude of black slaves, herded
together in a strategic corner of the ranch or plantation,
would cast their famished bodies into the porcine feast
to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the
generosity of their well- fed master. Bernas, "From Pork
Barrel to Bronze Caskets," Today, January 30,1994.
NOTE:Oil Price Stabilization Fund. -InOsmefia v. Orbos,
220 SCRA 703 (1993), part of the controversy was
whether the money that went into the Oil Price
Stabilization Fund [OPSF] was tax money levied for a
special purpose. As set up by law, it was a "trust fund"
which derived funding from four sources: (1) from
increase in the tax collection from ad valorem taxes on
oil products; (2) from any increase in the tax collection
as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of
government corporations; (3) from additional amounts
imposed by the Board of Energy on petroleum products;
(4) from peso savings resulting from the fluctuation of
the peso against currencies used for the importation of
crude oil and petroleum products. The question
centered on whether the additional amounts imposed
by the Board of Energy was a tax. The Court answered:
"What is here involved is not so much the power of
taxation as police power. Although the provision
authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could
be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot
be overlooked that the overriding consideration is [not
to raise revenue but] to enable the delegate to act with
expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law [to
protect consumers from constant fluctuation of oil
prices] which are embraced by the police power of the
State." Sees. 15-16 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT 275 SEC. 30. NoLAW SHALL BE PASSED
INCREASING THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE
SUPREME COURT AS PROVIDED IN THIS CONSTITUTION
WITHOUT ITS ADVICE AND CONCURRENCE. Q. My
Congress increase the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court? A. Yes, but only with the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court itself. The purpose
of this new rule is to prevent the overburdening of the
Supreme Court. Q. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all
administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Valid? A. No, it expands the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its
advice and consent. Consequently, "and in line with the
regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rule of Civil
Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provision of Rule 43."
Fabian v. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742, September
16,1998. SEC. 31. NoLAW GRANTING A TITLEOF
ROYALTY OR NOBILITY SHALL BE ENACTED. Q. What is
the reason for prohibiting the State from granting titles
of royalty or nobility? A. The Federalist (No. 84),
speaking of the importance of the prohibition against
titles of nobility in the Federal Constitution, says: "This
may truly be denominated the cornerstone of
republican government; for so long as they are excluded
there can never be serious danger that the government
will be any other than that of the people." This
provision was in the Bill of Rights of both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. SEC.32.THE CONGRESS SHALL,AS
EARLY AS POSSIBLE,PROVIDE FOR A SYSTEM OF
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM,AND THE EXCEPTIONS
THEREFROM,WHEREBY THE PEOPLE CAN DIRECTLY
PROPOSE AND ENACT 276 THE 1987 PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER Sees.
12-13 LAWS OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR
LAWOR PART THEREOF PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OR
LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY AFTER THE REGISTRATION OF
A PETITION THEREFOR SIGNED BY AT LEAST TENPER
CENTUMOF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS,OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST
BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEASTTHREEPER CENTUMOF
THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. Q. Does Congress
have the exclusive right to pass national legislation? A.
No. Section 32 has introduced the concept of "initiative
and referendum" whereby the people themselves can
legislate. The enabling law is R.A. 6735, the Initiative
and Referendum Law. The first case to come under this
implementing law involved local "initiative and
referendum." Garcia v. Commission on Elections, 237
SCRA 279 (1994), upheld the validity of the procedure
prescribed by the Local Government Code for local
initiative and referendum. ARTICLE VII THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT SECTION 1. THE EXECUTIVE POWER
SHALL BE VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES. SEC 2. NoPERSON MAY BE ELECTED
PRESIDENT UNLESS HE IS A NATURAL-BORN CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES,A REGISTERED VOTER,ABLE TO READ
AND WRITE, AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OF AGE ON THE
DAY OF THE