James Monroe and the Three-To-Five Clause of

the Northwest Ordinance

By Jorge M. Robert

In recent years, early American historians have re-examined the pervasive influence of
American expansionism on the life of the American republic, and the harshly criticized
Turner's frontier thesis of a century ago (1).

The expansion of the English colonies in North America was a continuous process which
began as early as the time of the first settlers' arrival in the New World. The constant
influx of immigration and the never ceasing westward migration brought up the need
for more territory which in turn would admit always more population, and so on.
Paraphrasing the Turnerian dictum, the existence of an area of open land, and the
advance of American settlement causing its continuous recession, explain American
development(2).

The 1780's was a decade of fruitful institutional creation for the United States. During
those crucial years the young confederation laid down the foundations of its political
system and set in place institutional mechanisms which regulated and controlled the
future expansion of the American nation.

More than a century ago, Jay Amos Barrett, a Nebraskan historian, wrote a monograph
on the legislative evolution of the Northwest Ordinance (hereafter NWO). One of the
many intriguing issues discussed in Barrett's monograph is James Monroe's influence
and role in designing a policy of fewer and larger states for the Northwest Territory
which was finally enacted in the Northwest Ordinance as the three-to-five clause (3).

Barrett said that in 1785 Monroe toured the West as an observer and went back to
Congress convinced from what he saw that the existing policy for the Western territory
embodied in the ordinance of 1784, was impolitic due to smallness of the states
projected. In effect, the first successful attempt to regulate the territory North-West of
the Ohio river was the so-called Ordinance of 1784 attributed mainly to Jefferson but
never actually applied. Therefore, Monroe motioned in Congress for a reduction in the
number of states to be created out of the Northwest Territory (hereafter NWT).

Barrett also asserted that Monroe's proposal was finally approved in the July 7, 1786
Congressional resolution(4). The image created by Barrett's monograph was that of
Monroe visiting the land, the Old Northwest, inspecting its physiographical features, and

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obtaining thus a clear vision of what should be the most convenient size and quantity of
new states to be created in the NWT. This interpretation which has had a lasting
influence, was soon adopted with minimal variations by the subsequent scholars of the
subject (5).

This essay shall attempt to show that during the years 1785 and 1786 Monroe's role on
the changes proposed -larger and fewer states for the NWT-, finally adopted in the
NWO as the three-to-five clause, was rather minor. That his trip to the West had little if
anything to do with the revision of the ordinance. That Monroe's participation in the
legislative action leading to the July 7, 1786 resolution was rather obscure. And, that
the reduction in the number of states to be created out of the NWT, and, consequently,
the size of the future Western states was the result of a very complex set of
circumstances not depending on the clear vision of any particular individual.

First, Monroe's trips to the West will be examined to determine to what extent he
became acquainted with the NWT. Secondly, attention will be given to Monroe's
legislative accomplishments. And, finally, some of the factors and circumstances
connected with the "new" policy of fewer and larger states for the Old Northwest will be
explored.

I. MONROE'S "ROUTS WESTWARD"

Monroe took his seat as delegate to the Continental Congress on December 13, 1783,
serving for three years until October of 1786. He reached Annapolis, the seat of
Congress, when the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and the acceptance of the
Virginia cession were pending. In April 23 1784 an ordinance for the government of the
Western territory passed, and two months later Spain closed the lower portion of the

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Mississippi river to American navigation. Monroe made at this time two trips to the
West, one in 1784, and one in 1785.

Tour of the Lakes (1784)

On the 22th of July 1784, Monroe undertook his first tour to the West. Jefferson
planned to accompany Monroe, but he then had to depart for France. Monroe's original
plans were to enter the West via Pittsburgh, but he was offered to accompany the
Indian commissioners bound for Fort Schuyler in New York. Thus, the trip commenced
in Albany. The plan was to pass through the lakes, visit the posts, and come down to
the Ohio and thence Virginia (6). Harry Ammon, Monroe's biographer, said that "the
tour was a logical outgrowth of Jefferson's general interest in the West and Monroe's
own involvement in land speculation. Both realized that firsthand knowledge of the
region was necessary to frame sound measures for its future development. "(7)

Monroe sailed from New York with the Indian commissioners in a sloop bound for
Albany. In Fort Schuyler, he was an observer at the conferences between the
commissioners and the Indians. Fron there he continued his journey with a party bound
for Detroit by way of Canada. They embarked in a "batteaux" at Oswego, and reached
Fort Niagara. Accompanied by an Indian guard he continued on the American side of
the lake to Fort Erie, but, because of Indian disturbances, Monroe went back to Fort
Niagara, where he embarked in a British sloop bound for Montreal. From Montreal he
went to Lake Champlain, and then to New York by way of Albany. On October 19, 1784,
he was back in Trenton where Congress was to meet late in October after its move from
Annapolis.

Monroe's itinerary was then New York-Albany-Fort Schuyler-Oswego-Fort Niagara-Fort

Erie-Fort Niagara-Montreal-Lake Champlain-New York-Trenton. In a 7-20-84 letter to
Jefferson, Monroe said that the purpose of the trip was to acquire a better knowledge of
the posts which should be occupied, the cause of the delay of the evacuation, the
temper of the Indians toward the Americans, as well as the temper of the soil, waters
and in general a view of the country (8). This 1784 trip seems to be justified by
Monroe's stand and proposed policy concerning the recovery of the posts. However, it is
clear that he did not get even close to the NWT (9).

Tour of the Ohio (1785)

Monroe's second tour took place in 1785. Ammon said that Monroe departed for a well-
earned vacation in August 1785, combining personal as well as public interests. In
Kentucky, he checked on his land holdings, and he also planned to attend the federal

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court at Williamsburg (10). Monroe accompanied, unofficially and for his own
convenience the commissioners sent to the Ohio by Congress to make a treaty with the
Swanees, Delawares, and Wyandots. Their negotiations crystallized in the treaty of Fort
Finney signed on January 31, 1786. He intended "to see the country lying between Lake
Erie and the Ohio." (11).

Monroe left New York in August 25th and was back in the city in December 12th. They
traveled by way of Pittsburgh and then down the Ohio to Limestone where Monroe
parted from his companions to go on to Kentucky to have his lands surveyed, returning
to Richmond by way of Lexington and the Wilderness Trace. Monroe's itinerary went
like this, New York-Lancaster-Carlisle-Pittsburgh-down the Ohio-Limestone-Lexington-
Wilderness Trace-Richmond-New York (12).

In his letter to Jefferson of January 19, 1786, Monroe said that "the danger from the
Indians made it imprudent for me to pass the river, and the delay at Fort Pitt, and upon
the Ohio, the water being low, consumed so much of the time allotted for this
excursion, that I was forced to leave the commissioners at Limestone and take my
course directly through the Kentucky settlements and the Wilderness to Richmond, so
that I was neither gratified with the view of the treaty, or to such a degree with that of
the country as I had proposed." (13) Monroe's observations resulting from this trip
might have covered the country on his way to Pittsburgh, the Ohio river from that point
to Limestone, and the Kentucky country through Lexington and the Wilderness road,
but not the NWT itself.

Traditional Account

The traditional account explaining the enlargement of the states projected in the
ordinance of 1784 has been based mainly on the knowledge acquired by Monroe in his
trips to the West and his 1786 legislative proposal. The often cited evidence is a
passage of his 1-19-86 letter to Jefferson, where he said: "A great part of the territory
is miserably poor, especially that near lakes Michigan & Erie & that upon the Mississippi
& the Illinois consists of extensive plains which have not had from appearances & will
not have a single bush on them, for ages. The districts therefore within which these fall
will perhaps never contain a sufficient number of Inhabitants to entitle them to
membership in the confederacy." (14)

On this evidence, historians have found that Monroe was the main influence in bringing
about a fundamental change to territorial policy for the Northwest: fewer and larger
states and, consequently, the elimination of the boundaries enacted it 1784. In the
January 19, 1786 letter to Jefferson, Monroe also said that the ordinance of 1784 had

4
made the northwestern states strong instead of subservient to the purposes of the
Atlantic states. Moreover, Monroe stated that by reducing the number of northwestern
states two purposes would be served, one detrimental to them and one beneficial: first,
to weaken their power, and, second, to help them to attained the population
requirement of the ordinance sooner, because part of the territory was poor, and other
parts were extensive plains without bushes (15).

The two regions or areas which Monroe said would never have enough inhabitants to
qualify for statehood were, first, "that near lakes Michigan & Erie," and second, the area
located "upon the Mississippi & the Illinois" rivers. Pattison, in his masterly work on the
American Rectangular System says that in his letter to Jefferson, Monroe "doubtless
had in mind the extensive swamps and marshes of the former area [that near lakes
Michigan and Erie]. As to the latter [that upon the Mississippi and Illinois rivers], he
was referring to prairies." Pattison says that this last opinion of Monroe was
"pardonable, because widespread belief about the fertility of the prairie." (16).

Thus, the two areas of Monroe's concern were the swamps and marshes, and the
prairies. The swamps and marshes were known as the Black Swamp on the lake Erie
shoreline which extended around the mouth of the Maumee and to the north, isolating
Detroit from central Ohio, and surrounding Toledo (17). The second was the prairie
region extended from Illinois to about the 98th meridian with small patches in western
Ohio and northern Indiana (18). Monroe's argument was that these areas were poor
and would slow down settlement in the projected states which would in turn never
reach the population requirement of the ordinance.

It seems proper to consider what districts were affected by these poor areas. At lake
Erie, the Ordinance of 1784 projected one state which Jefferson had christened in the
original version of the ordinance, Metropotamia. Thus, the swamps fell within this
projected state. On the Illinois and Mississippi, the prairies affected two states,
Assenisipia and Illinoia (19).

Eight districts or states were planned by the ordinance of 1784 in the NWT. The poor
areas overlapped the territory of three out of the eight states. The Virginia proposed
alternative to the 84 plan was at the beginning of 1786 to establish from two to five
states not indicating boundaries. Later, on July 7, 1786, Grayson motioned for the
division of the NWT by a parallel running through the southern tip of lake Michigan.
Below this line he proposed three states and above it two more. It seems that the
eastern extension of the line left most of the Black Swamp within the northern district,

5
the future state of Michigan. Therefore, in both plans the swamp affected only one
district or state (20).

As to the prairies, they extended east to west, so that, the apportioning of 1784 was
more effective in minimizing its impact within one particular district than the 1786
scheme (21). In sum, Monroe was not justified in saying that the entire division of the
NWT was impolitic due to the location of these two "poor" areas, because they affected
portions of only 3 out of 8 districts. Even if we do not consider Virginia's new scheme,
larger states were going to be more inclusive, so that, the chances of locating the
"poor" areas in different states decreased.

Because there is no evidence to support the statements that, first, Monroe knew the
NWT first hand, and, second, that he, based on that sort of expert knowledge, came up
with a solution to the "problems" of the ordinance of 1784, an inference may be drawn
in the sense that he may have utilized the "unfertile lands" argument as a
physiographical excuse to justify the modification of the plan. Monroe himself explicitly
mentioned first political reasons and secondly as an additional justification to reinforce
his reasoning, the physiographical argument which did not amount to much, but
received primary attention in Barrett's monograph.

In the January 19th letter, Monroe says "[M]y several routs westward with the
knowledge of the country I have thereby obtained, have impressed me fully with a
conviction of the impolicy of our measures respecting it." This is the same letter where
he begins informing Jefferson of the disappointing results of his 1785 tour. His several
routs westward were actually two, and the knowledge of the country cannot embrace
the NWT, unless he is referring only to a hearsay knowledge. During his first trip -1784-
he reached only Fort Erie on the eastern side of the lake, and during the second, he
navigated the Ohio river turning South at Limestone. In other words, he neither
traveled North through the "west side of the river Ohio" nor toured the Old Northwest
which actual extension is about a quarter of a millon square miles. Therefore, he never
indeed saw in the 1780's that country, let alone the "unfertile lands."

Barrett's account of Monroe's vision of the NWT never took place. The assertion
concerning his expert knowledge of the Old Northwest and therefore his authority on
the subject of state making has been always taken for granted. It may have been so
perhaps due to the simplicity of the explanation, and the apparent documentary
support provided by the 1-19-86 letter. What can be more convincing than "go and see
with your own eyes"? That is implied in the traditional account, that Monroe went to see
by himself whether the plan of 1784 was fitted to the geographical reality of the

6
territory. This is nonsense if one considers the extent of the area and the obstacles
created by the "temper of the Indians."

There is a last intriguing point, the one concerning the source of Monroe's second hand
opinion regarding the unfertile lands argument. Where did it come from? It seems clear
enough that his geographical knowledge was just hearsay knowledge. Somebody
familiar with the NWT informed him about those areas, and he used the account
without qualification.

On his way to the Ohio, Monroe stayed in Fort Pitt for some time because the river was
low and the Indians were restless (22). There, at that time, was Thomas Hutchins, the
U.S. Geographer who arrived on September 3 1785. Monroe called on him between
September 22nd and the 30th (23). It is probable that Monroe may have had
conversations concerning the NWT with Hutchins who was well versed on the geography
of the region. In fact, he had published a map of the NWT along with a topographical
description in 1778 (24).

Thus, it is conceivable that Hutchins may have been the source of Monroe's knowledge.
Another probable source may have been George Rogers Clark. Ammon says that
Monroe established a friendship with him since the time Monroe served as councilor in
1782 (25). The conqueror of Kaskaskies and Vincennes was certainly familiar with the
prairies of Illinois and the surroundings of Detroit.

It is interesting to note that none of the contemporaneous statements concerning the

NWT and its future mention the "unfertile lands." (26). Monroe's motivation for using
the argument may be viewed in the context of his relationship with Jefferson who was
his senior political mentor and virtual author of the geographical plan of 1784. He could
not put down the plan without adducing some tangible hurdle.

Kentucky Lands

On his 1785 trip to the West Monroe visited the Kentucky settlements and inspected his
own lands. Samuel McDowell, a Kentucky resident, in a letter to William Fleming of
November 11, 1785 said that they "had had a certain Colonel Monroe with us, a
member of Congress who is gone to Richmond, he is violently opposed to our
separation from Virginia; and that forever, he has left ... arguments against it (in
writing) in this Country, I have seen them, but they appear to me such as have not
great weight, I wish you saw them, I am persuaded you would be of the same opinion,
they are such as, a separation will lessen the [consequence] of Virginia in the scale of
the Continental Union while connected we may hope for the trade of the Miss., but if

7
separate we need not expect it, as all the States will then be against it, or careless
about it . ... you will easily see the tone of that arguments," (27).

In other words, Monroe's argument was that, with the separation of Kentucky, first,
Virginia's power would be diminished, and, second, the claim of the free navigation of
the Mississippi would be abandoned by the Atlantic states. Monroe was an oddity
among the Virginia leaders on the question of the Kentucky separation. Jefferson,
R.H.Lee, Madison, and Washington approved, in general, the independence of the
western counties, but Monroe had a different view. He opposed the separation of
Kentucky believing that Virginia could model its regulations as to accommodate the
government to the convenience of Kentucky, and in that way avoid diminishing its
power within the Union (28).

At first glance, Monroe's arguments seem to be grounded in high policy like his
"reduction" proposal. But on a harder look, it appears that more personal reasons may
have influenced his position. In effect, Monroe's landholdings in Kentucky were
extensive. Besides, his military warrant for 5,333,33 acres that he received in February
1784. The same year, he registered another 20,000 acres in Lincoln County. In
addition, during 1783 he had filed entries for 49,867 acres in Fayette County. Finally,
on Octuber 23, 1785, during his tour, Monroe made an additional single entry in
Fayette County for 42,656 acres (29).

Thus, by the fall of 1785, Monroe had already obtained title to extensive land holdings
in Kentucky which allowed him three years later, as Ammon says, to realize "his long-
cherished dream: the purchase of an estate in Albermarle. He had acquired 800 acres
of land (the present site of the University of Virginia) and a house in Charlottesville
from George Nicholas, a purchase made possible by the willingness of Nicholas, who
was moving west, to accept Kentucky land in lieu of 2,500 [pounds sterling]" (30). As it
looks, Monroe had very powerful reasons to protect his bounty lands in Kentucky from
the vagaries of new western states' politics (31). Moreover, the division of the western
country in states following the guidelines of the ordinance of 1784 would have meant
the partition of the Kentucky district, and, probably, uncertainty to Monroe's land title.

While Monroe's self-interest cannot be considered as an exclusive factor motivating his

conduct, it cannot be ignored either. Undoubtly, it had to influence his view of the
future of the western states. Some confirmation may be found in contemporaneous
opinions. In effect, in 1786, Monroe's political adversary, Rufus King, wondered in
private correspondence "how will this article [treaty with Spain to shut up the
Mississippi for 25 years to American navigation] affect the Sale of the Western

8
Territory? The answer which the delegates of Virginia would give (all of whom are
probably deeply interested in the Ohio Country West of the Allegheny Mountains)
depends in a high degree upon the opening of the Mississippi" (32).

On the other hand, Monroe himself, on May 31, 1786, in a letter to Madison said that
King had married a woman of fortune in New York so that if he secures a market for
fish and turns the commerce of the Western country down this river [Hudson] he
obtains his object." And, in the same letter Monroe also said that "Pettit who is always
here and the influential man from Pennsylvania is a speculator in certificates. He came
forward under the patronage of Reid with impressions entirely eastern and the
opposition given the requisition last year by the delegation of Virginia has given him an
opinion that she [Virginia] wishes to defraud the publick creditors" (33). So, it may be
seen that the self-interest argument was used at that time by both sides, at least, in
private correspondence.

It seems also significant that, on January 6, 1786, the assembly of Virginia passed a
separation law which guaranteed broadly the Virginia's landowners' interests. All private
rights and interests in lands derived from the laws of Virginia would "remain valid and
secure" and determined by Virginia laws. The lands of non-resident proprietors would
not be taxed higher than the lands of residents, nor would a neglect of cultivation or
improvement of Kentucky land belonging to nonresidents subject those persons to
forfeiture or other penalty for six years after admission. It also guaranteed to Virginia
the free navigation of the Ohio (34). At the beginning of 1786, then, Virginia let
Kentucky go to become a separate state with the boundaries of the district. This
evidenced the inadequacy of the plan of 1784 which had split Kentucky land between
two new states.

II. Monroe's Legislative Actions

The traditional account of Monroe's legislative initiatives to amend the 1784 ordinance
indicates that, about three months after he returned from his 1785 trip to the West, he
motioned in March 24, 1786 to amend the ordinance as to the size and number of the
future northwestern states (35).

Barrett said that "after sounding members of Congress on the subject and finding them
favorable, he moved to refer the matter to a grand committee," citing an excerpt from
a letter to Madison of 1212-85 -the day after his return from the western tour-, which
in its entirety says: I find the most enlightened members here fully impress'd with the
expediency of putting an end to the dismemberment of the old States doubtful of the

9
propriety of admitting a single new one into the Confederacy & well inclin'd to a revision
of the compact between the U.S. & Virga. respecting the division of the country beyond
the Ohio.(36)

Monroe arrived in New York back from his trip to the West on December 12 1785, and
the next day he wrote this letter saying that he found some of the members of
Congress in the mood described. By his own account, he did not bring the idea to his
colleagues, on the contrary, he found them already propounding those ideas. In brief,
the mood of some of the delegates was, first, to stop the dismemberment of the old
states, second, to disfavor the admission of new states, and, third, to revise the
proposed division of the NWT. Again, as to the last point he did not bring the idea of
fewer and larger states to Congress, on the contrary, Congress was already elaborating
on it along with the other two issues -dismemberment and admission-. Monroe and his
trip brought if anything only one more advocate "violently" opposed to the
"dismemberment" of Virginia (McDowell's observation).

In fact, Monroe said that it was convenient to confine the number of the western states
as much as possible, but this thinking preceded his trip and was based on a different
motivation. In effect, in August 25, 1785, two hours before his departure "for the
Indian treaty on the Ohio," he wrote to Jefferson that he disliked the idea of Kentucky
separating from Virginia because, if that happened, Virginia would have "less
consequence ... in the Union." He also said that the Atlantic states should keep a
prevailing influence on the new states, because when the Mississippi river be opened to
their commerce they would have but little interest in whatever occurred to the Atlantic
states.

At this time, he was seeing the closure of the Mississippi with some sort of implied
approval, as a factor aiding in keeping the western territory within the Union. He also
said that unless the Atlantic states confine their numbers as much as possible, the new
states would outnumber the original states in Congress. Monroe finally stated that the
matter should be well investigated before any measure was hastily adopted (37).

These letters reveal that, before the 1785 tour, Monroe was inclined to believe that the
number of western states should be reduced for political reasons not geographical ones
(38). They also show that, after the trip, he found in Congress a movement which
among other things proposed to reduce the number of new states to be created in the
NWT, based also on political reasons.

"Dismemberment Agitation" in Congress

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While Monroe was touring the Ohio, initiatives concerning the admission of new states
issue were being discussed in Congress.

It is necessary to go back to October 1785 to understand the reports of March 1786. In

the fall of 1785, the landed states reacted to the attempts of several movements
tending to form new states out of old ones. First, there was the new state of Franklin
comprising the settlements on the Watauga and Holston rivers which at one time
included a portion of southwestern Virginia (Washington county). This separation
movement began in 1784 as a result of the North Carolina cession, and later, after the
repeal of the cession, it remained autonomous in defiance of state authority. The
selfgovernment provisions of the 1784 ordinance legitimized the political aspirations of
these settlers (39).

Secondly, the Kentucky settlements had been "agitating" since the first conventions
began discussing separation from Virginia in 1784. The Danville convention of August 8,
1785 requested from Virginia the separation of the district by sending Muter and Innes
to lobby for its acceptance (40). Thirdly, the Massachusetts' district of Maine began its
own quest for statehood in 1785 (41). Finally, last but not least, the "state of Vermont"
was at this time still pressing its case against New York (42).

The most urgent claims were those of Kentucky and Franklin, because Vermont's case
had a protracted history, and the Maine movement was just in its beginnings. This
"agitation" culminated in the fall of 1785 with a reaction by two the affected states,
Virginia and Massachusetts.

In Virginia, the assembly declared "treason" any attempt to separate its western
districts (43). In October 7 1785, Massachusetts made a motion seconded by Virginia to
appoint a committee to prepare a report for expressing the highest disapprobation of
Congress toward the separatists movements (44). Rhode Island, represented by Howell
and Ellery, made a motion to postpone the consideration of the Massachusetts-Virginia
motion and to amend the Articles of Confederation adding an article to empower nine
states or two thirds of the states to erect into a new state and admit into the Union on
the terms to be specified any part or district of any of the United States by a joint
application of the legislature of the state to which the district belongs and the people of
such district. Three states voted for the consideration of this report: Rhode Island,
Connecticut, and Georgia. Five states were opposed: Massachusetts, New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. South Carolina was divided, and New Hampshire
and North Carolina were represented by just one delegate each (45).

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A new motion by Howell-Ellery proposed to postpone the consideration of the
Massachusetts-Virginia motion until 11-585, but it was lost by the same margin. Five
days later, on 12-85, the delegates from Massachusetts (Gerry-Holten-Icing) and
Virginia (Lee-Grayson [Monroe was still on his tour]) withdrew their 10-7-85 motion
and proposed instead that a grand committee be appointed to report what measures
were proper to prevent the ill consequences of a particular district in any State acting
up and claiming the right of independent government without the consent of the said
state and of the United States. It was ordered that a grand committee meet the
following Friday.

The committee book reveals that on 10-13-85 a grand committee (Massachusetts

represented by Gerry, and Virginia by Grayson) was appointed to consider the motion
proposed on 10-12-85 and also the HowellEllery motion to amend the Articles. Later,
the large states in agreement with the small states left the motions "in suspence" until
anyone of the large ones would bring it forward for approval. The small states were
going to lay the matter before their respective constituents, so that instructions might
be sent for that purpose (46).

On March 10 1786, this grand committee was discharged and the business referred to a
new one consisting of Long, Dane, Johnson, Smith, Hornblower, Bayard, Hindman,
Monroe and Pinckney that reported on 3-24-86. Thus, this grand committee was
appointed as an aftermath of the "dismemberment agitation" and also to regulate the
division of the public domain. Monroe himself in his 1-19-86 letter to Jefferson said that
"the tendency which at present prevails for a dismemberment of the old States not only
increases their [western states] strength but will also add to the diversity of interest."
(47)

The journal of the Continental Congress for 3-24-86 contains two reports, the first one
with a preamble, and no resolution, in the writing of Henry Remsen, Jr. The resolve for
this report is said to be spread on the Journal for 7-7-86. The second report in the
writing of Pierse Long contains a preamble and a resolution. The Journal indicates that
both reports were considered on 3-30-86. No further action is reported on them until
July 7 (48).

At that time Grayson and Lee and Monroe proposed to fix the boundaries for five states
in the NWT, but the motion was lost. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia
voted in favor, and New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania cast
their votes in opposition. Two states, New York and South Carolina were divided. The
Southern states wanted to secure the 2-5 clause with the proposed boundaries which

12
was other way to secure the eventual admission of at least five states (49). A motion
by Pinckey-Symmes tried unsuccessfully to strike out the 2-5 limitation. The resolution
was further amended to limit the recommendation to the state of Virginia changing the
minimum of states from two to three, and dropping the proposed boundaries (50). This
resolution passed with the unanimous vote of the ten states present and the affirmative
but insufficient vote of two more states. The only negative vote was cast by Grayson
who had proposed the rejected boundaries.. This vote of 7-7-86 settled the question of
the number of states to be created in the NWT, at least three but not more than five.
With the passing of this resolution, the NWT was single out from the western country
(51).

Thus, the "dismemberment agitation" in Congress led to the legislative distinction

between the areas north and south of the Ohio river, forcing the abandonment of the
1784 boundaries. Federal jurisdiction eventually would control on the SWT, but land
ownership had already been disposed of by the states keeping those areas as their
backlands. It was clear also that the states to be created out of the SWT were going to
follow Southern politics. The result was not however so obvious in the NWT and the
debate reflected the sectional aspirations to control the region. The Howell-Ellery
motion was made in the context of Kentucky, Franklin, and Maine's "agitation" for the
purpose of shrinking the large states as a means of equalization. Rhode Island expected
to benefit from it (52). They were not land speculators, but their states foresaw the
great benefits to come from a redistribution of the public domain. The equalization
issue was to play also its role in the 1787 constitutional convention debates (53).

Once the October 1785 "agitation" in Congress opened the discussion on

dismemberment of old states and creation of new ones, it became apparent that the
ordinance of 1784 which had encouraged "dismemberment" in the SWT -Kentucky and
Franklin-, could have the same effect in the NWT with the dissemination of small states
(54). The issue evolved from controlling the formation of new states on the backlands
of some states to con trolling their formation on the public domain. Thus, the potential
"dismemberment of the public domain" opened the discussion on the politically sound
bases for expansion of the Union and avoidance of the formation of new states outside
the control of Congress.

Monroe and the Reports of March 24, 1785

The July 7 resolution provided for a reduction in the number of future states to be
created in the NWT, from 8 provided in the Ordinance of 1784 to the 3-5 formula, so, it
meant fewer and larger states to be set up in the NWT. What was Monroe's contribution

13
to this reduction? He was a member of the grand committee which produced two
reports rendered on, among other things, a Monroe's motion. The "other things" were
the 10-12-85 motion by Massachusetts and Virginia, and the Howell's motion on the
amendment to the Articles of Confederation (55).

Monroe's motion to the 3-24-86 reports cannot be found either on the journal or among
the papers of the Continental Congress. In his 5-11-86 letter to Jefferson, Monroe said
that the 100-150 condition of the Virginia cession had been questioned and that a
report was before Congress. He did not assume the authorship of the proposal, he just
said that "it [the condition] 3was question'd" without saying by whom (56). No
reference can be found to support the assertion that Monroe was the chairman of the
grand committee. It seems that he was just the member representing Virginia. Finally,
neither one of the reports was in his writing (57).

In sum, Monroe was not the chairman of a committee but just a member of the grand
committee. His motion to the report cannot be found among the Papers of the
Continental Congress. The reports are not in his handwriting, and, when he mentions
the subject to Jefferson, he does not assume the authorship of the proposal. However,
it is true that the original reports in the PCC No. 30, folios 75 and 79 indicate that both
were given on his motion.

The two reports of 3-24-86 were different, but complementary. The first recommended
to Virginia and Massachusetts to revise their cessions of western territory to allow the
Congress to modify the condition regarding the extent of the new states within a 2-5
limitation. The second, in turn eliminated the boundaries proposed by the plan of 1784
and the provision that considered the articles of that ordinance as compacts between
the original thirteen states and the new ones unalterable after the sale of lands but by
the joint consent of the parties (58). So, it freed the future sales of NWT from the
provision of the ordinance that allowed Congress to amend it.

The preamble to the first report indicated that the division of 1784 was inconvenient
because, first, some states would not enjoy the advantages of navigation (navigation);
second, some states were inconveniently divided by rivers, lakes, and mountains, thus
the division was not conformable to natural boundaries (natural boundaries); and, third,
many of the states would probably contain a large proportion of barren and
unimprovable lands (unfertile lands).

In his 1-19-86 letter, Monroe only mentions the unfertile lands argument, omitting any
reference to the navigation and natural boundaries rationales. The preamble to the first
report mentions first that according to the plan many of the states in the western

14
country "must probably contain a large proportion of barren and unimprovable lands,"
and then, it refers specifically to "the tract of Country Northwest of the River Ohio"
saying that there the "barren and fertile lands [are] intermixed in no regular form."
Thus, it diminished the importance of the argument as to the NWT because there the
good and bad lands were intermixed. It was evident, however, that the boundaries of
1784 had been laid down disregarding the natural boundaries formed by "rivers, lakes,
and mountains", and, this obvious problem affected the areas both South, and North of
the Ohio.

The unfertile lands argument may have been introduced by Monroe, but there is no
evidence that it carried much weight in the framing of the 7-7-86 resolution. The
preamble to the final resolution summed up the reasons indicating that "in fixing the
limits and dimensions of the new states, due attention ought to be paid to natural
boundaries and a variety of circumstances which will be pointed out by a more perfect
knowledge of the country." (59)

As to navigation, Grayson, seconded by King, proposed on May 12 that the navigable

waters leading to the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the
same be declared to be common highways, and forever free without any tax, impost, or
duty. This motion may have been drawn with the occlusion of the Mississippi in mind, to
insure that the Atlantic states would have unrestricted access to the western regions. In
the future, the policy of free navigation and commerce could not be ignored by the
western states (60). Grayson even considered this resolution as an alteration of the
land disposal ordinance of 1785 (61).

The second report of March 24 was written assuming that the recommendation had
been approved and the condition modified, and for the purpose of modifying the
ordinance of 1784 to reflect those changes. It provided for the repeal of the boundaries
and the compact clause.

The Population Threshold Requirement and the Admission to the Confederacy

What was the real issue under debate on 7-7-86? It turned from being one that
confronted the small states against the large ones in October 1785, to a sectional
confrontation between the eastern and middle states against the southern ones in July
1786. This is in part explained by the crisis on the Spanish treaty negotiations, but,
mainly, by the growing realization that the balance of power of the Confederation itself
was at stake in the development of the West (62).

15
In October 1785, Virginia and Massachusetts were together in claiming their right not to
be dismembered, and they remained so in the 3-24-86 report. But, in the 7-7-86
debate, Massachusetts is dropped from the resolution even though its cession had been
made agreeable to the 10-10-80 resolution which established the 100-150 condition in
the first place. As Monroe said, the 7-7-86 debate "opened the eyes" of the Eastern
delegates and it made them increased the number of inhabitants of the new states
required for admission.

The population requirement in the Ordinance of 1784 was the population of the state
with the least numerous inhabitants. The 1786 proposal meant to make larger states
with more chances to include the threshold number of inhabitants required for
admission. This idea, however, requires some elaboration because without talking about
density of population, the preceding statement seems to be incomplete. In effect, the
assumption was that the density was going to be more or less stable and uniform over
the NWT based on the fact that an 3agricultural society without great concentrations of
population was prevalent at that time. And also, on the assumption that with more
territory the population could grow larger and vice versa (64).

Thus, the South was proposing an amendment to the ordinance to facilitate the
eventual admission of new states which supposedly were going to follow southern
politics (65). It helped not so much to the admission of more states because actually it
reduced the total number to be admitted, but it helped southern politics in the sense of
allowing the effective admission of new states because they would reach the threshold
faster.

It seems then that the direction of policy after the confrontation of October 1785 was,
first, to separate the SWT leaving the new states movements subject to negotiation
with their parent states. The dismemberment movements in Kentucky and Franklin
highlighted the need to distinguished between the ceded and the unceded areas.
Secondly, it made the ordinance of 1784 more realistic in favor of admission by
reducing the number of states.

The vote of October 1785 was a large-small states vote because the "dismemberment"
affected the large and landed states, but the vote of July 1786 was a sectional vote
because it affected only the public domain which belonged also to the small states.
Finally, a compromise was reached on the 3-5 limit. In addition, as Monroe said, it
"open'd the eyes of a part of the Union ... to view the subject in a different light." The
"subject" was the political control of the admission process and, eventually, of the
Union itself (66).

16
The 7-7-86 vote may also be seem as a compromise with the northern states which
were not enthusiastic about the expansion to the West even though some elements
were pushing in that direction (67). It should also be remembered that the holders of
securities who were to be paid with the proceeds of the sale of western lands were
concentrated in the eastern states. This worked as an incentive to an orderly and
controlled disposition of the public lands in the NWT even with large states (68).

The South did favor admissions. If it could not be eight states, three states was not bad
and five would be better (Grayson tried unsuccessfully to fix the boundaries for five
states). But the compromise was only partial because the population quantity was still
open. When the eastern states added the so called 1/13th requirement, Monroe became
upset and told Jefferson that their purpose was to keep the new northwestern states
out of the confederacy defeating the condition of the Virginia cession. Monroe's implied
reasoning was that the 1/13th requirement meant the postponement of admissions sine
die. Jefferson, in his 7-9-86 letter answering Monroe's of 5-11-86, compared states of
30,000 sq.ml. to states of 160,000 sq.ml. Jefferson called the former "happier states of
a moderate size," and the latter too large for a regular society to exist. It should
however be kept in mind that when Jefferson talked of states of 160,000 sq.ml., he was
thinking in the entire western country divided in three states, not just in the NWT (69).

The 1/13th requirement which was introduced in the 9-19-86 report on territorial
government must have been put forward earlier in July when the original 5-10-86
report was modified, because Monroe mentioned the requirement in his 7-16-86 letter
to Jefferson. This new threshold meant a minimum of about 200,000 inhabitants
required for admission (70).

The eastern states were opposed to the proliferation of new states for a number of
reasons: western states supposedly would favored the south and would probable follow
southern politics; the Atlantic states should control the western states and not the other
way around; the population was moving toward the Southwest and the eastern states
were losing population; the new western states might throw their political weight to
remove the seat of government to Georgetown; and vacant land in New York and
Massachusetts was depreciating in value due to availability of federal lands (71).

So, the answer of the eastern states to the southern proposal of forming eventually five
states in the NWT was to increase the population requirement to slow down the
reaching of the threshold. Nathan Dane revealed this connection in his motion of
October 4, 1786 defeated on a clear sectional vote (72).

17
Finally, let's take a comparative look at the different proposals on size and number. It
was known at that time that the areas of the NWT was approximately a quarter of a
million square miles (73). The area of each state proposed in 1784 was going to be
about 29,000 sq.ml. on average (74). The resolution of July 7 provided for states of a
maximum size of 83,000 sq.ml. and a minimum of 50,000 sq.ml. on average. The
conditions of the Virginia cession (resolution of 10-10-80)would have produced states of
a minimum of 10,000 sq.ml. and a maximum of 22,500 sq.ml. (75). Thus, under the
Virginia cession there was to be a maximum of 25 states and a minimum of 11. The
number of states projected for the NWT decreased then from 25 11, to 8, to 3-5. The
respective areas increased from 10,000 22,500, to 29,000, to 50,000-83,000 (76).

III. New Scheme for the "Territory Northwest of the River Ohio"

To understand the complexity of forces shaping the new policy of fewer and larger
states for the NWT, consideration should also be given to some additional factors which
evolved in between 1784 and 1786. They were the land ordinance of 1785; the 1786
,reports of a plan of temporary government to replace the ordinance of 1784; and, the
Washington's and Eastern Nationalists' influence in favor of progressive seating and
compact settlements (77).

Land Ordinance of 1785

This ordinance changed the conception on which the report of 1784 was based. On April
30, 1784, Jefferson reported a land ordinance which was to be the companion of the
ordinance for the government of the western territory passed on April 23, 1784. This
plan was amended and eventually became the land ordinance of 1785 (78). A
comparison between the two plans reveals that they were based on different
assumptions. The 1784 land disposal report was consistent with the division of the NWT
under the 1784 territorial ordinance, but the changes introduced in 1785 were based on
a different conception which conditioned the design of new states introduced by the
ordinance of 1784 (79).

In effect, the 1784 project of land ordinance provided that it was applicable to the
western territory once it was ceded by the states, purchased from the Indians, and laid
off in states. The "laying off in states" provided in this report was going to precede the
survey and disposal of land. This idea is developed in the report by making the
surveying to take place within the borders of each one of the states projected by
Jefferson. Pattison put it technically in this way" "Jefferson's state boundaries ... were
in effect an interlocking series of principal meridians and base lines ... These

18
boundaries, under the law, were to be laid out prior to the initiation of land subdivision,
and the lines defining hundreds were to be spaced out from the corners of the states,
just as township lines would later be spaced out from the intersections of principal
meridians and base lines." (80).

The land ordinance of 1785 eliminated all this. "The term prior survey may suggest to
the reader the policy of surveying state boundaries before proceeding with subdivision
and settlement. This policy, laid down in the ordinance of 1784, and further developed
in the land ordinance intended to accompany it, was ignored in the Land Ordinance of
1785," which "was directed toward the survey and disposal of lands in one specific
area, extending from the Ohio River to Lake Erie, immediately west of Pennsylvania."
(81). This altered the picture in the NWT and relegated Jefferson's boundaries to a
future determination. Besides, the land ordinance of 1785 was to apply only in the
NWT. Thus, when the land report of 1784 was substantially amended in 1785, the
Jefferson's ordinance and with it its boundaries was left without its original land disposal
support.

1786 Reports of a Plan of Temporary Government

These reports designed a system of government preliminary tc the formation of states

which was absent in the ordinance of 1784. At the same time that a revision of the
number and size of the future northwestern states was under discussion, a committee
was appointed on March 27, 1786 to report on forms of temporary government for the
Western territory. Its members were Monroe, Johnson, King, Kean, and Pinckney. Many
historians affirm or at least imply that this was the committee which reported on the
number and size of the states in July 1786, but that is not the case. To be sure, the
ordinance of 1784 contained a provision on the location and boundaries of the future
states, but left opened the organization of preliminary governments. Then, during 1784
and 1785, it became clear the need to include a plan for temporary government. At the
same time, the dismemberment "agitation" led eventually to the revision of the number
and size of the states. This, as we have already seen, found congressional expression in
the 7-7-86 resolution. The elaboration of these two issues, temporary government and
"number and size", followed different courses of action. Thus, the two 1786 reports on
temporary government included no regulation on the "number and size" issue. Finally,
in 1787, the NWO consolidated all the issues in one ordinance.

The two reports of 1786 were the one issued on May 10 and amended on July 13 by the
socalled Monroe committee, and the one issued on September 19 by a committee
consisting of Johnson, Pinckney, Smith, Dane, and Henry. The May 10 report was

19
significant in relation to the "number and size" issue not only because in its preamble
announced the need to reduce the number of prospective states but also because it
provided for a type of government adequate for areas not yet populated. In effect, the
NWT at that time was inhabited by the Indians, the French settlers of Illinois, and the
inhabitants of Detroit. These were small groups scattered over the vast NWT. Thus, it
made no sense to appoint authorities for several empty districts. Moreover, as Eblen
pointed out, the Congress's financial resources could not have provided for authorities
for more than one district (82).

On May 10, 1786, the Monroe committee presented a report prompted by a motion by
Nathan Dane. It was said to be in the writing of Remsen with a preamble and resolve in
the writing of Monroe (83). The preamble indicated that Congress had to take measures
to comply with two objectives: first, promote settlement, and, second, secure to the
settlers and absentee purchasers the rights of property and personal safety. As to
settlement, the plan was addressed to future residents and absentee landowners
(future population). As to property, it would be more secure in districts under
congressional control.

The preamble said that, it was the duty of Congress, previous to sell the territory, to
adopt and publish a plan of temporary government for the state or states to be created
thereon and to establish a period at which such government shall expire and admission
on an equal footing may take place. These goals meant an ordered and supervised
process of settlement to fill the void left in the 1784 ordinance. In addition, it said that
was proper to define first the bounds of the states within which the temporary
government would apply. But, it was improper to make divisions until the condition
from the Virginia cession (100-150 clause) were modified.

The temporary government of the 5-10-86 report was designed under the assumption
that there was going to be fewer and larger states as revealed by the preamble, and
also that the "number and size" issue had not been yet settled. The July 13 report is an
slightly modified vesion of the 5-10 plan and the main novelty of the September 19 new
version was the 1/13th requirement advanced by the Eastern states as a counterpoise
to the new "number and size" arrangement of July 7 (84).

Washington's and Eastern Nationalists' Influence

An additional factor was Washington's opinion in support of progressive seating and

compact settlement. To consider his influence may seem to resurrect the great-man
approach which this essay disregards when applied to Monroe. However, to do so
seems justified, because, first, his own contemporaries recognized the considerable

20
weight of his influence (85), secondly, he actually had an effective and extensive
experience in western matters (86), and, finally, he had been proposing these
measures for some time starting with his September 7, 1783 letter to Duane. Most of
Washington recommendations were included in the congressional report of October 15,
1783.

Washington's ideas about the NWT in this regard were progressive seating, and
compact settlement. The former meant the gradual settlement of the NWT beginning
from the area bounded by lake Erie, the western boundary of Pennsylvania and the
Ohio river, and from there advancing Westward avoiding in that way that a more
remote state be admitted before a closer one. Compact settlement meant the initial
creation of just one state with more or less the borders of Ohio. This was opposed to
"the decies," as the proliferation of states in the ordinance of 1784 was called by
Washington (87).

The practice of creating a large district at the beginning and, then, as the population
increase to subdivide the district in smaller jurisdictions was typical of Virginia's
experience (88). Propounding this idea of leaving the territory opened to future
demarcation, Madison in The Federalist No. 14 said that "the arrangements that may be
necessary for those angles and fractions of our territory which lie on our northwestern
frontier must be left to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more
equal to the task.

As to the eastern nationalists' influence, some New Englanders were trying to settle the
Ohio country since the end of the war. The officers ' petition of 1783, issued with
Washington's support, proposed an state equivalent to Ohio which did not match the
boundaries of the 1784 ordinance. These officers were mainly from New England.
Samuel J. Parsons accompanied the commissioners to Fort Finney in 1785, and
Benjamin Tupper, surveyor of the seven ranges, reported to. Rufus Putnam in January
1786 on the quality of the Ohio lands. From there, they went in March 1786 to found
the Ohio Co. in Boston. The influence of this group on the elaboration of the new policy
was carried out not only by Washington himself, but also by Manasseh Cutler and his
contacts with the Massachussetts' congressional delegation (89).

Conclusion

State-making in the NWT received during 1784-1786 its preliminary definitions. The
size and boundaries of the new states to be carved out of the NWT was pretty much set

21
in the summer of 1786, establishing a precedent for the future institutional expansion
of the Confederation.

The traditional view of Monroe's influence in shaping statemaking policy for the NWT
seems the result of a simplistic adherence to the great-man approach. Barrett's
selected facts fitted well the image of a responsible statesman who being concerned
with high policy visited the region to make sure that the legislation to be promulgated
would be successful and compatible with the needs of its future inhabitants. This was
an inspiring image of the future president's statesmanship, but it does not muster the
reality test. It was based on unwarranted assumptions, half truths, and a desire to
introduce order and rationality in a very complex and often confused political reality.

It seems appropriate to conclude this essay pointing out to further developments of two
aspects of the story: Monroe's western tours, and the Black swamp. The first is that
Monroe, as president, thirty one years later, had the chance to "complete" his 1780's
tours. In effect, in 1817, he finally and effectively saw the country lying between Lake
Erie and the Ohio. The tour was a sort of political good-will campaign that took him
through the original states and Vermont. From there he sailed lake Erie to visit Detroit,
and, on his way back to Washington he crossed the new state of Ohio passing through
Delaware, Columbus, Worthington, Circleville, Chillicothe, and Zanesville. At
Worthington, Monroe addressed the citizens stating that "he had a strong desire to
ascertain and know by actual view, the situation of the northern border of Ohio". This
belated remark which ironically seems to confirm some of the observations made in this
essay, was however made in the context of Ohio's aspirations concerning its northern
boundary (90).

The second event concerns Monroe's comments on the region "near lakes Michigan &
Erie." A new slander of that area took place in 1815. Monroe, as Madison's Secretary of
State, requested from Edward Tiffin, surveyor general of the U.S., the survey of
2,000,000 acres in the territory of Michigan to satisfy bounties promised by Congress to
the officers and soldiers who fought in the War of 1812. The Tiffin's report was as bad
as Monroe's 1-19-86 opinion in his letter to Jefferson, and it briefly slowed down the
settlement of the region, but, eventually, it proved to be no major obstacle to
Michigan's statehood (91).

End Notes

(1) Bernard Bailyn. Voyagers to the West. N.Y.: Knopf, 1986. Drew R. McCoy. The
Elusive Republic. Chapel Hill: Univ.N.C.Pr., 1980. David H. Fischer. Albion's Seed. N.Y.:

22
Oxford, 1989. Daniel J. Boorstin. The Americans: The National Experience. N.Y.:
Random, 1965. Patricia N. Limerick. The Legacy of Conquest. N.Y.: Norton, 1987.
Michael Lienesch. New Order of the Ages. Princeton Univ.P., 1988. Donald K. Pickens.
"The Turner Theses and Republicanism" PHR(1992): 319. Andrew Cayton & Peter S.
Onuf. The Midwest and the Nation. Bloomington: Ind.Univ.P., 1990. William Cronon.
"Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier." WHQ (Ap. 87):157. Richard Jensen. "On
Modernizing F.J.Turner." 11 WHQ (1980): 307-22.

(2) Rush Welter. "The Frontier West as Image of American Society." 46 MVHR (1960):
593-614. Paul W. Conner. Poor Richard's Politicks. N.Y.: Oxford, 1965. Henry N. Smith.
Virgin Land. Cambridge: Harvard Univ.P., 1950. A.L.Rowse. "Tudor Expansion." 14
WMQ (1965): 309-316. For Turner's central theme I follow Bestor for whom, the theme
was not really the frontier, but something larger: the westward movement, the West
which it created, and the influence of both on American life. See, Arthur E. Bestor, Jr.,
"PatentOffice Models of the Good Society." 58 AHR (AP. 1953): 505-526. William
Cronon. "BecominC West," in Under the Open Sky. N.Y.: Norton, 1992.

(3) Jay Amos Barrett. Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787 with an Account of the Earlier
Plans for the Government of the Northwest Territory. N.Y.: Putnam, 1891.

(4) Barrett, ibidem, 34. For the text of the Ordinance of 1784, see, Julian P. Boyd, ed.
Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Princeton Univ.P., 613-615 (hereafter "Papers"). For the
resolution of 7-786, see Journal of the Continental Congress, L.C. ed. (Ju1.1786), 390-
394 (hereafter "JCC").

(5) George H. Alden. "The Evolution of the American System of Forming and Admitting
New States into the Union," 18 Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social
Sciences (1901): 469-479, 477; Alpheus H. Snow. The Administration of Dependencies.
N.Y.: Putnam, 1902, 430; Edmund C. Burnett, Letters of Members of the Continental
Congress. Wash.D.C.: Carnegie Institution, 1921, vol. 8, xxv, Preface; Clarence Carter
ed., Territorial Papers of the United States, NWT, 48 n. 29. Francis S. Philbrick. The
Rise of the West, 1754-1830. N.Y.: Harper, 1965, 128; Daniel J. Boorstin. The
Americans: The National Experience. N.Y.: Random, 1965, 244; Jack E. Eblen. The First
and Second United States Empires. Univ.Pittsburgh P., 1968, 28; Merril D. Peterson.
Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation. N.Y.: Oxford, 1970, 283; Harry Ammon. James
Monroe: The Quest for National Identity. N.Y.: McGraw, 1971, 53; Robert F. Berkhofer
Jr., "Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial
System," 29 WMQ (1972): 231262; H.James Henderson. Party Politics in the
Continental Congress. N.Y.: McGraw, 1974, 409; Joseph L. Davis. Sectionalism in

23
American Politics, 1774-1787. Madison: Univ.Wis.P., 1977, 120. Peter S. Onuf. The
Origins of the Federal Republic. Philadelphia: Univ.Penn.P., 1983, 154; Onuf, Statehood
and Union. Bloomington: Ind.Univ.P., 1987, 52. William A. Williams. The Contours of
American History. N.Y.: Norton, 1988, 132. Reginald Horsman, The Northwest
Ordinance and the Shaping of an Expanding Republic, Wisconsin Magazine of History
(Autumn, 1989): 21-32. Dexter Perkins, in his contribution of Monroe's biography to
the Dictionary of American Biography, N.Y.: Scribner's, says that the "youthful delegate
[Monroe] was not a dominating influence, ..., in the great legislation of 1784 and 1785
for the organization of the West." For a work preceding Barrett's Evolution, see, John M.
Merriam, "The Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787,. American Antiquarian
Soc. (Ap. 1888): 303-342.

(6) Monroe to Jefferson, 8-9-84, in The Writings of James Monroe, ed. by Stanislaus
Murray Hamilton, N.Y.: AMS P., 1969 (1989), I, 38 (hereafter "Writings").

(7) Harry Ammon, James Monroe. N.Y.: McGraw, 1971, 45.

(8) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-20-84 and 11-1-84, Writings, I, 3538 and 40-46.

(9) To avoid confusions on the NWT concept, see, Hildegard B. Johnson, Order Upon
the Land, N.Y.: Oxford, 1976, 7-8. For the location of Ft. Niagara and Ft. Erie, see,
Scribner's Atla of American History, 2d ed., N.Y., 1984, maps Nos. 25 & 73.

(10) Writings, 113, n. 1. Justin Winsor. The Westward Movement, N.Y.: Franklin, 1968
(1897), 272. Ammon, ibidem, 53. Gerry to Jefferson, 9-12-85, LMCC # 227 at 216.

(11) 7 Statutes at Large 26. Long to Langdon, 3-29-86, LMC # 361 at 335. Monroe to
Jefferson, 8-25-85, Writings, 107/8.

(12) To understand the geography of this trip, see, Scribner's Atlas, maps Nos. 55 &
103.

(13) Monroe to Jefferson, 1-19-86, Writings, 112-120, 113.

(14) Ibidem, 117.

(15) Ibidem, 112-120, 118. This rationale will be referred to hereafter as the "unfertile
lands" argument.

24
(16) William D. Pattison, Beginnings of the American Rectangular Land Survey System,
1784-1800, Columbus: Ohio Hist.Soc., 1957, 1970, 32.

(17) Ray A. Billington, Westward Expansion, Macmillan, 1967, 277, 280-81, 305. Harlan
Hatcher, Lake Erie, N.Y.: Bobbs Merrill, 1945, 190. Frank Angelo. Yesterday's Detroit,
Miami: Seemann, 1974. Bruce Catton, A Bicentennial History, N.Y.: Norton, 1976, 72.

(18) Ralph H. Brown, Historical Geography of the U.S., N.Y.: Harcourt Brace, 1948,
204, 209, 284. Billington, Expansion, 305. Philbrick, Rise, 128.

(19) Papers, 591, 593. Pattison, Beginnings, 18, 27, 34.

(20) JCC, 7-7-86, 390-91. There was to be much cohtroversy between Ohio and
Michigan concerning this boundary.

(21) See supra note 19. Brown, Historical Geography, 206211. Johnson, Order, 16.

(22) See supra note 12. Winsor, Westward, 262.

(23) Hutchins to the President of Congress, 11-24-85, in Papers of the Continental

Congress (microfilm edition) M247, r. 74, i. 60, pg. 193-197 (herein after PCC).

(24) Pattison, Beginnings, 17, n. 3.

(25) Ammon, Monroe, 39. Monroe to Clark, 10-19-83, in Draper Coll. microfilm ed.,
Serv. J, r. 13, # 85-91.

(26) Manasseh Cutler. An Explanation of the Map of Federal Lands. Ann Arbor: Univ.
Microfilms, 1966, 12, 15 [It is true that this is a promotional pamphlet which would try
to avoid any unfavorable feature]; N.H. delegates, 5-29-85, in E.C.Burnett ed., Letters
of Members of the Continental Congress, 8-130/131 (hereinafter LMCC); William
Thomas Hutchinson, The Bounty Lands of the American Revolution in Ohio. New York:
Arno, 1979 (1927), 76 (on Tupper's and Putnam's opinions); Louis Guillaume Otto,
Question of the Mississippi (1786), in Albert Bushnell Hart ed. American History told by
Contemporaries, N.Y.:Macmillan, 1900, III150/154.

(27) Draper Coll. MS 2U-139. See also, Monroe's own 1783 contrary opinion in a letter
to Clark, 10-19-83, Draper Mss. 52 J 85 [...you may rest assured that the objects of
this part of the state, an object which will govern in all our councils, will be to effect a

25
separation an erect an independent state westward, as it will enable us to economize
our efforts here & give us greater strength in the federal councils].

(28) Monroe to Jefferson, 8-25-85, Writings, 107; Lowell H. Harrison, Kentucky's Road
to Statehood, Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky, 1992, 41. Jefferson believed that, by
letting Kentucky go, Virginia would be able to keep Southwest Virginia. Jefferson to
Madison, 2-20-84, Robert A. Rutland ed. The Papers of Madison, Charlottesville: Univ.
Pr. of Va., VII-425 (herein after Papers of Madison). Thomas P. Abernethy. Western
Lands and the American Revolution. N.Y.: Russell, 1964 (1937), 308.

(29) Ammon, supra, 38, and n. 26. Willard R. Jillson, Old Kentucky Entries and Deeds,
Louisville: Standard, 1926, 51, 130, 350, 434, 515. Samuel M. Wilson, Revolutionary
Soldiers and Sailors, Greenville: Southern Historical Pr., 1994 (1913), 52. Daniel M.
Friedenberg. Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Land. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1992, 220;
Monroe to Clark, 10-1983, Draper Mss. 52 J 85 [sale of land from Major Crittenden to
Monroe].

(30) Ammon, Monroe, 74. Monroe to Madison, 10-26-88, Writings, 194-95 [In this
letter Monroe said that he acquired 300 acres not 800 as indicated by Ammon].
Treasury warrants were purchased at 40 pounds sterling per hundred acres. Harrison,
Statehood, 11. Edgar Woods, Albemarle County in Virginia, Bridgewater, Va.: Carrier,
1964, 279-80, 289-90.

(31) Merrill Jensen, The New Nation, N.Y.: Random House, 1950, 354.

(32) LMCC: 8-381/382, # 413. Henderson, Party Politics, 393.

(33) LMCC: 8-375/377, # 408. Monroe to Henry, 8-12-86, Writings, 150. Davis,
Sectionalism, 122.

(34) Papers of Madison, 12-22-85, 450-453. Some of the terms of the act had been
anticipated by Madison who was being consulted by Caleb Wallace. See, Madison to
RHLee, 7-7-85, Papers of Madison, 314.

(35) JCC, 28132/135.

(36) Monroe to Madison, 12-19-85, Writings, 108.

(37) Monroe to Jefferson, 8-25-85. Samuel Cole Williams, History of the Lost State of
Franklin, 1974 (1924), 86, n. 8. See also, supra, footnote 27.

26
(38) Philbrick, Rise, 128. The boundaries of the Ordinance of 1784 should not be taken
too seriously anyhow. See, Jefferson's thinking in September 1785 as revealed in his
letters to RH Lee (712-85) and Hartley (9-5-85), Papers, 287, 483.

(39) Williams, Franklin, 86-87. Campbell to Madison, 10-2885, Papers of Madison, 381-
385. Johnson to Sherman, 4-20-85, LMCC # 110 at 100, 102. LMCC 5-16-85, 120, n.2.
RHLee to Madison, 5-30-85, LMCC # 142 at 131. Spaight to Caswell, 6-585, LMCC #
146 at 134.

(40) Harrison, Statehood, 35. John A. Caruso, The Appalachian Frontier, Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1959, 316317.

(41) Ronald F. Banks. Maine Becomes a State, Portland: N.Y. Publis.Co1, 1973, 3-25.
Grayson to Short, 6-15-85, I14CC # 153 at 141. Dane to Phillips, 1-20-86, LMCC # 317
at 289, n. 8. Van Beck Hall. Politics Without Parties. Massachusetts, 1780-1791.
U.Pitts.Pr., 1972, 40-42, 173-175.

(42) RHLee to Jefferson, 10-29-85, LMCC 8-242; Virginia delegates to Patrick Henry,
11-7-85, LMCC 8-249; Grayson to Madison, 11-8-85, LMCC 8-251; Luther Martin,
Genuine Information, Farrand, Records, App. A, CLVIII, 223.

(43) The Virginia act is explained by Williams as a reaction to the threatened separation
of Washington county (S.W. Va.), which aspired to join the new state of Franklin, more
than to the separation of Kentucky. Williams, Franklin, 54. See, Papers, 1-2286,
Madison to Jefferson, at 201. George H. Alden. The State of Franklin, 8 AHR (1903):
282. Norman K. Risjord. Chesapeake Politics 1781-1800. N.Y.: COl.U.Pr., 1978, 237, n.
26 (616). James William Hagy. Arthur Campbell and the Origins of Kentucky: A
Reassessment. 55 The Filson Club History Quarterly (1981): 373. Jay said in a letter to
Adams (10-14-85) that "the rage for separation and new states is mischievous, it will,
unless checked, scatter our resources and in every view enfeeble the Union." Cited in
Winsor, Westward, 262.

(44) The motion disapproved the disposition which appears in several districts of the
U.S., to be separated from the states which have exercised constitutional jurisdiction
over them, and be erected into independent governments without the consent of the
said states and of the U.S.- It also stressed the intention of Congress to support any
state when opposing such unconstitutional attempts to destroy the fundamental
principles of the Union. JCC, 29:810. Grayson to Madison, 8-2185, LMCC #203 at 193,
195.

27
(45) The rationale for the Massachusetts vote was given by Dane in a letter to Samuel
Phillips saying that with the exception of Canada or any other British colony, no other
states could be admitted, because it would be in the power of nine states to balance the
Union at pleasure by dividing old states and making new ones. January 20, 1786, Dane
Manuscripts, cited in Onuf, Origins, 165, n. 78. Dane to Choate, 1-31-86, LMCC # 320
at 293. This motion was a forerunner of Art. 4, clause 3, Sec. 1 of the Fed. Const. See
also Williamson's motion of 6-19-83, Papers of Madison, 7, 164. To appreciate the
significance of these issues, see, debates in the Federal Convention on August 29 and
30, 1787.

(46) Virginia delegates to the Governor [P.Henry], LMCC 8:249; RHLee to Jefferson,
10-29-85, LMCC # 264 at 243. See also, Onuf, Origins, 163.

(47) See, supra, footnote # 15. On the "diversity of interest" as an obstacle to

republican government, see, Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interest,
Lawrence U.Pr. of Kansas, 1990, 82, and also Madison to Jefferson, 3-1886, The
Writings of Madison, 230. Jefferson himself, the great champion of western rights
preferred to have the commercial reform passed before the admission of the western
states; in Jefferson to Monroe, 6-17-85, Writings, IV, 49.

(48) JCC (July 86): 390-94.

(49) The Virginia motion on boundaries should be understood as a proposal to secure

the maximum of five states. This vote reveals that the Southern states supported the
creation of more states in the NWT than the Eastern states which at this point were
increasing the minimum population required for admission.

(50) The elimination of Massachusetts from the language of the resolution has been
attributed to the fact that her 4-19-8G cession did not specifically referred to the 100-
150 clause, however, her cession was made under the provisions of the 1010-80
resolution which brought that condition in the first place. It seems that the elimination
of Massachusetts may have been prompted by the Eastern states' realization that the
size of the future northwestern states was intrinsically related to the population
threshold requirement (See infra footnote # 71). The issue since October 85 had
changed from affecting the unceded lands (SWT plus Maine and Vermont) to regarding
only the ceded lands (NWT). The southern states seem to have dropped the boundaries
which secured five states for an increase in the minimum from two to three states. In
1787, the NWO would include both, the boundaries and the 3-5 clause.

28
(51) Madison, in The Federalist # 14, in discussing what to do with "angles and
fractions" laying in the "northwestern frontier" of the Union, proposed to leave the issue
"to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more equal to the task."
Onuf, origins, 162 [He clearly develops the distinction between the institutional
treatment of ceded and unceded lands].

(52) Madison in 1783 said that "from several circumstances there was reason to believe
that Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, if not Maryland also,
retained latent views of confining Virginia to the Allegheny mountains." JCC 25:973 and
Madison's notes. On Rhode Island's policy, see Staples, Rhode Island in the Continental
Congress, 457-459. Ellery and Howell to Governor Greene, 10-9-83, "It has been
earnestly contended that they [Virginia] should relinquish all their claims over the
Allegheny mountains. In alleviation of the public disappointment by failing in this point,
it may be observed that the lands appropriated by Virginia to her line, at all events,
must have been taken out of these western claims. The lands already ceded to the
United States are estimated to amount to upwards of 500,000 square miles. Allowing
the state of Rhode Island to strike one-fiftieth, our share would amount to ten thousand
square miles, a territory of ten times the extent of the whole state."(Emphasis added);
and 517. Howell to Deputy Governor Bowen, 5-31-84. Howell was optimistic that
"Congress will be able to open a land office for the sale of one or two states by next
Christmas." Ibid., 524, Howell to Governor Greene, 2-9-85. Congress waits impatiently
for the outcome of the Indian negotiations, since there is a great demand for land.
Spaight to Blount, 3-27-85, LMCC #85 at 75. Madison's observations, 5-1-82, LMCC 6-
340, 341. Howell to Greene, 7-30-82, LMCC 6-399, 402.

(53) Debates in the Convention for 6-28-87 (Madison), and 69-87 (Brearly). Rosemarie
Zagarri, The Politics of Size, Ithaca: Cornell U.Pr., 1987, 68. A.C. McLaughlin, The
Confederation and the Constitution, 1905, 216. Jefferson to Madison, 2-20-84, Papers
of Madison, 7-424 (RHLee was talking of separating the Northern Neck from Virginia
and make it part of Maryland to interest the small states int he Union). Williamson to
Martin, 11-18-82, LMCC 6-544, No. 689.

(54) See, supra, footnote # 41. Campbell to Madison, 10-2885, Papers, 8:383. Onuf,
Origins, 156, 161.

(55) JCC 28132.

(56) Monroe to Jefferson, 5-11-86, Writings, 126. A Monroe scholar, in a comparable

situation, believes that the absence of an allusion in a letter sent to Jefferson a week
after the submission of a report, provides no evidence of the report's authorship.

29
Charles E. Dickson, James Monroe's Defense of Kentucky's Interests in the
Confederation Congress: An Example of Early North/South Party Alignment, Register of
the Kentucky Historical Society (1976): 261,280, 264. As to the absence of Monroe's
motion from the JCC and the PCC, it is interesting to observe that motion was already
missing from the previous edition of the Journals. See, Snow, Dependencies, 430 [The
LC edition of the JCC by John C. Fitzpatrick was published in 1933/34, and Snow's
Dependencies in 1902].

(57) JCC, 3-24-86, 133, n. 1, and 135, n. 1.

(58) The ordinance of 1784 was to apply to lands ceded by the states, purchased from
the Indians, and offered for sale by the Congress. This guarantee given to the future
property owners referred to the population threshold requirement set at the population
of the least numerous of the thirteen states as well as to governmental provisions
securing orderly settlements.

(59) JCC, 5-3-86: 230. With respect to this motion by Dane, it is intriguing that the
document shows below the indorsement an sketch which resembles part of the 1784
boundaries of the ordinance intersected by a river. See, PCC, No. 30, folio 83. The
unfertile lands argument cannot be said to be "apparent" as the term is used int he
Secretary of Congress' letter to the Governor of Virginia, 711-86, Territorial Papers
(NWT), 19. For a discussion of "natural boundaries," see, Campbell to Madison, 10-28-
85, Papers of Madison, 382. JCC (3-24-1786), 394.

(60) It was eventually incorporated in art. IV of the NWO. See also, Madison to
Jefferson, 1-9-85, Papers, 232 [opening the rivers as an answer to separatism].

(61) Grayson to Madison, 5-5-86, LMCC: 8-372/374, # 407.

(62) Peter Onuf, Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and the Western Lands, 34
WMQ (1977): 372; Grayson in Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788, Elliot, Debates,
340/343; Arthur P. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier. 1783-1795. Gloucester:
P.Smith, 1962, 75. For the transition among the following groupings: landed-landless
states, the small-large states, and the eastern-southern states, see, Madison to
Pendleton, 4-23-82, in Hutchinson, Bounty Lands, 39 n.l.

(63) See, Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-85, LMCC 8:403, No. 443.

(64) See, comparison between agriculture and manufacturing related to density in C.E.
Carter ed. Documents Relating to the Mississippi Land Co., 1763-1769, 16 AHR(1911):

30
311-319, 316. McCoy, Elusive Republic, 83-85. For maps depicting densities in 1790,
1800, and 1810, and for early Americans' assumptions about the relationship between
state size and population, see, Zagarri, Politics of Size, 6-7.

(65) Otto to Vergennes, 9-10-86, in Albert B. Hart ed., American History told by
Contemporaries, Macmillan, 1900, 111150. See also, Joseph L. Davis, Political Change
in Revolutionary America: A Sectional Interpretation," in James K. Martin, The Human
Dimension of Nation Making, Madison: State Historical Soc. of Wis., 1976, passim.
Onuf, Origins, 154, 169. Dave to King, 7-16-87, LMCC: 8-621/22.

(66) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-86, LMCC: 8-403, # 443. See also, Williamson-Bland
motion of 6-19-83, Papers of Madison, 7164. Whitaker, Frontier, 76. See, Davis,
interpretation of the "opened the eyes" phrase, in Davis, Sectionalism, 117. Grayson to
Washington, 5-8-85, LMCC: 118. Snow, Dependencies, 427 ["As the power to admit
new "States" was based on Article XI of the Articles of Confederation, a new "State"
could be admitted by vote of any nine States of the Confederation. As soon as more
than three new States were added, the original States would have been at the mercy of
any coalition between these three and a minority of themselves, and as soon as more
than five new States were admitted, even nine of the old States voting together could
not have prevented the admission of as many new States as the remainder might have
seen fit. The original states were slow to adopt a plan which seemed certain to throw
the power into the hands of the Western states."

(67) Tupper and Parsons toured some areas of the NWT as surveyors and Indian
commissioners and went to form the Ohio Co., see, Dumas Malone ed., Dictionary of
American Biography, and Winsor, Westward Movement, 280. Michael Allen, The
Federalists and the West, 61 Western Pa.H.Mg. (1978): 315-332 [Allen develops the
distinction among Federalists between the hard line constrictionists and the "reluctant
expansionists A good illustration of Allen's distinction is Putnam to Ames, Jan. 1790, in
Bushnell Hart ed., American History, III-106. It seems that a rejection of western
expansionism had more ideological than sectional background. The main example is
Washington who presided over the federal period. See also, Grayson to Washington, 4-
15-85, LMCC: 8:95/97.

(68) Monroe to Madison, 5-8-85, Writings, I-78. JCC, 25-915 (226-83). LMCC: 8-130
["(N.H. delegates) think it beyond a doubt that many of the creditors of the U.S. in the
middle and southern parts of the Union have fixed their attention to this as a fund from
which they shall soon be able to pay themselves"]. An additional incentive was the
revenue resulting from the sale of western lands which might be used to pay the federal

31
debt without resorting to commercial taxes. Davis, Sectionalism, 116. Dane to Wales,
1-31-86, LMCC # 321 at 296. Hall, Politics, 40-42.

(69) Jefferson to Monroe, 7-9-86, Papers, 111-115. This letter has been used and
abused to prove Jefferson's "democratic" views. For the political and institutional
context of state size, see generally, Zagarri, Politics of Size, supra.

(70) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-86, Writings, 140.

(71) Jefferson, LMCC: 8-91, n. 12. Monroe to Madison, 9-386, Writings, 162-163, and
Monroe to Henry, 8-12-86, Writings, 150. For the federalist ideology in general, see,
Linda K. Kerber, Federalists in Dissent, Ithaca: Cornell U.Pr., 1983 (1970). Allen,
Federalists, 315-332.

(72) JCC, 10-4-86 at 738. It is interesting that Dane's motion talked about the number
of "free inhabitants" necessary for admission raising thus implicitly the slavery issue to
the fore. He later on attached the slavery clause to the NWO.

(73) See, Jefferson's comments to Hogendorf on the western territory, 4-11-84,

Papers, 220, n. 2. Washington computed 500,000 sq.ml. for the entire western
territory. As to Jefferson's geography, see, John K. Wright, Human Nature in
Geography, Cambridge: Harvard U.Pr., 1966, 219.

(74) It is true that not all the states were planned to have the same extension.
Berkhofer, Origins, 245. See also, Arthur Bestor, Jr., Constitutionalism and the
Settlement of the West: The Attainment of Consensus, 1754-1784, in John Porter
Bloom, ed. The American Territorial System, Athens, 1973, 29.

(75) See, Bestor, ibidem. The 3-24-86 report in its preamble assumes that the 1784
districts were drawn in compliance with the 100-150 clause.

(76) For a New Hampshire delegate, the area of an state should be about 20 millon
acres = 31,250 sq.ml. See LMCC 2-2785, 8-46, # 52. This was the minimum size
established by the financing committee report of 1778, LMCC (Spt. 1778): 931 [20 to
40 million acres = 31,250/62,500 sq.mils.]

(77) This enumeration is not exhaustive. In utilizing the word "factor" I have in mind
the elemental idea of connection which I take from Monroe himself. He said in his letter
to Henry, 8-12-86, Writings, 149, that "clearly I am of opinion it [the Mississippi

32
question] will be held connected with other objects -& perhaps with that upon which the
convention will sit at Annapolis."

(78) See, text of the report of 1784 in Papers, 140-148; and the land ordinance of 1785
in C. Carter ed., Territorial Papers, 1218. Philbrick, Rise, 127.

(79) Onuf, Origins, 166. Monroe to Jefferson, 4-12-85, Writings, 71. Grayson to
Washington, 5-8-85, LMCC: 8-118.

(80) Pattison, Beginnings, 53.

(81) Pattison, ibidem, 88, 104; JCC: 18-915/16. Winsor, Westward, 261, 271.

(82) Eblen, Empires, 27. Richard P. McCormick, "The 'Ordinance' of 1784?" 50

WMQ(1993): 112, 119. Onuf, Origins, 166. The distinction between settled and
unsettled areas was crucial to an effective expansion of the Confederation.

(83) JCC: 5-10-86, 255, n. 1. PCC No. 30, folio 85. A review of the original report in the
PCC indicates that the only portion in the writing of Monroe is just the "introduction"
which says that "the committee to whom a motion of Mr. Dane was referred for
considering & reporting the form of a temporary government for the western territory
beg leave to report."

(84) Monroe to Jefferson, 7-16-86, LMCC 8:403, 404.

(85) Washington to James Duane, 9-7-83, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of George

Washington, 27-133/140; and Congress report of 11-15-83. Pattison, Beginnings, 29.
William T. Hutchinson, The Bounty Lands of the American Revolution in Ohio, N.Y.:
Arno, 1979, 67. Also, in November 1785, Hamilton petitioned Washington to use his
influence with Congress in favor of Baron Steuben, LMCC: 8-260, n. 2 (261). On
Washington's influence in passing the land ordinance of 1785, see, LMCC: 8-vii,
introduction by Burnett. On Washington's influence in acceptance of the Constitution
see John C. Ranney, The Bases of American Federalism, 3 WMQ(1946): 1-35, 28. Henry
Lee to Washington, 10-17-86, LMCC: 8-486, # 523 ["Unbounded influence" to
conciliate the Shay's rebellion], and 8:343 # 374 (4-21-86).

Philbrick, Rise, 121, n. 66.

(86) As to Washington first hand knowledge of the West, see, Charles H. Ambler,
George Washington and the West, N.Y.: Russell, 1936, passim.

33
(87) For Washington ideas of progressive seating and compact settlement, see his
letters to Arthur Lee, 3-15-85, in Writings of Washington, 106; Jacob Read, 11-3-84,
485-490, 487; Hugh Williamson, 3-15-85, ibidem, 107-108; RHLee, 3-15-85, ibidem,
108109 [Lee showed this letter to Grayson, Payson Jackson Treat, The National Land
System, 1910, 29, n. 30], 6-22-85, and 8-22-85, ibidem, 173-175, 230-232; William
Grayson, 4-25-85 and 8-22-85, ibidem, 136-138, 232-234. See also, RHLee to
Washington, 4-18-85, LMCC: # 107 at 97/98. Winsor, Westward Movement, 261.
Washington used the expression "the decies" in his letter to RHLee, 3-15-85, Writings,
108-109. The partitions of Kentucky and Tennessee in eastern and western portions
was seen with suspicion and disapproval.

(88) Carl Evans Boyd, "The County of Illinois" 4 AHR (1899): 623-35. Abernethy,
Western Lands, 309. John Jay to John Lowell, 510-85, cited in Richard B. Morris, The
Forging of the Union 17811789, N.Y.: Harper, 1987, 21. As to the comparison of states
to counties, see, Williamson at the Federal Convention on 6-9-87, Governour Morris on
7-7-87, and Madison on 6-28-87.

(89) Hutchinson, Bounty Lands, 77. Onuf, Origins, 169. Jensen, New Nation, 355.

(90) Hatchet, Lake Erie, 177. R. Carlyle Buley, The Old Northwest Pioneer Period 1815-
1840, Bloomington: Ind.U.Pr., 1951, 51. Samuel Putnam Waldo. A Narrative of a Tour
of Observation made during the Summer of 1817, Hartford, Conn., 1817, 205-206.
Cass to Secr. of War, 11-27-17, Territ.Papers of U.S. (hereafter TPUS), X-711, 712. On
the Northern border of Ohio, see, Spafford to Meigs, 6-9-16, TPUS, X-650; Meigs to the
President, 8-16-16, ibidem, X-663; Meigs to Tiffin, 8-22-16, ibidem, X-664; Cass to
Tiffin, 11-1-17, ibidem, X-709.

(91) Buley, ibidem, 52. F. Clever Bald, Michigan in Four Centuries, N.Y.: Harper, 1954,
145146. Willis F. Dunbar, Michigan: A History of the Wolverine State, Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1965, 241-242. John A. Caruso, The Great Lakes Frontier, Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1961, 352 [Caruso seems to incurred in the same fallacy criticized in this
essay when he says that the surveyors of 1815 may have been influenced by Monroe's
comment in his 1-19-86 letter to Jefferson].

34