Public Lands

Nancy T. Lorzano v. Ju An Tabayag, Jr., GR No 189647, February 6, 2012

Facts:

The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan Tabayag who
died on June 2, 1992. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Iriga City. Right after the
burial of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she be
allowed to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject property
until after her eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioners siblings acceded to
the said request.

After the petitioners eldest son finished college, her siblings asked her to return to them
the possession of the subject property so that they could partition it among themselves.
However, the petitioner refused to relinquish her possession of the subject property
claiming that she purchased the subject property from their father as evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale of Real Property4 executed by the latter on May 25, 1992.

Tabayag Jr. Argument: The respondent claimed that their father did not execute the said
deed of sale. He pointed out that the signature of their father appearing in the said deed of
sale was a forgery as the same is markedly different from the real signature of Tabayag.

Same: Forged Signature in the Deed of Sale: The respondent alleged that the petitioner
purposely forged the signature of Tabayag in the said deed of sale to deprive him and their
other siblings of their share in the subject property.

Lorzano Contention: The petitioner maintained she is the owner of the subject parcel of
land having purchased the same from Tabayag as evidenced by the May 25, 1992 deed of
sale. Further, the petitioner asserted that the respondent failed to establish that the
signature of Tabayag appearing on the said deed of sale was a forgery considering that it
was not submitted for examination by a handwriting expert.

RTC Ruling: Ruled in Favor of Tabayag Jr.: a cursory comparison between the signature
of Tabayag appearing on the said deed of sale and his signatures appearing on other
documents would clearly yield a conclusion that the former was indeed a forgery.

CA Ruling: Affirmed the Decision of RTC: The CA held that the testimony of a
handwriting expert in this case is not indispensable as the similarity and dissimilarity
between the questioned signature of Tabayag as compared to other signatures of the latter
in other documents could be determined by a visual comparison.

Lorzanos Argument: the petitioner points out that the subject property, being acquired
by her through a grant of free patent from the government, originally belonged to the
public domain. As such, the lower courts could not order the reconveyance of the subject
property to the heirs of Tabayag as the latter are not the original owners thereof. If at all,
the subject property could only be ordered reverted to the public domain.
Same: Indefeasibility of the Title: The petitioner asserts that the amended complaint for
annulment of document, reconveyance and damages that was filed by the respondent with
the RTC is a collateral attack on her title over the subject property. She avers that, when the
said amended complaint was filed, more than a year had already lapsed since OCT No. 1786
over the subject property was issued under her name. Thus, the petitioner maintains that
her title over the subject property is already indefeasible and, hence, could not be attacked
collaterally.

Issue:

Is the opinion of a handwriting expert necessary in the examination of forged documents?

Considering that the subject property was registered under the petitioners name pursuant
to a free patent, can an action for reconveyance prosper since only the Government could
assail her title thereto in an action for reversion?

Ruling:

First Issue

No, the opinion of a handwriting expert is not indispensable in the examination of forged
documents.

While, it is true that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon
the court, the experts function being to place before the court data upon which the court
can form its own opinion. Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of
forged documents because of the technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But
resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the
comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the
testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent
examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to
its authenticity.

Second Issue

Yes, action for reconveyance is proper on the case.

True, once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title [is] issued, the
land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property.
Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible a year after
the issuance of the latter. However, this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles
secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of
a patent under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens System is not a
mode of acquiring ownership.

Rule: Discussion for an Action for Reversion: A fraudulently acquired free patent may
only be assailed by the government in an action for reversion. A free patent that was
fraudulently acquired, and the certificate of title issued pursuant to the same, may only be
assailed by the government in an action for reversion pursuant to Section 101 of the Public
Land Act.

Same: Same: Reason why Government may bring Action: the reason for the rule that
only the government, through the OSG, upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands,
may bring an action assailing a certificate of title issued pursuant to a fraudulently acquired
free patent: Since it was the Director of Lands who processed and approved the
applications of the appellants and who ordered the issuance of the corresponding free
patents in their favor in his capacity as administrator of the disposable lands of the public
domain, the action for annulment should have been initiated by him, or at least with his
prior authority and consent.

Exception: Action for Reconveyance: An action for reconveyance is proper in this case.
However, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. A recognized exception is that
situation where plaintiff claimant seeks direct reconveyance from defendant public land
unlawfully and in breach of trust titled by him, on the principle of enforcement of a
constructive trust.

Same: Same: Private Individual may bring an action for Reconveyance: A private
individual may bring an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land even if the title thereof
was issued through a free patent since such action does not aim or purport to re-open the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration, but only to show that the
person who secured the registration of the questioned property is not the real owner
thereof.

Same: Same: Action is one based on Fraud: Institution within 4 years from the
discovery: It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a reconsideration of the
granting of the patent or of the decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is
not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs. Fraudulent statements were
made in the application for the patent and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor
knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors and occupants of the property.
The action is one based on fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four years
from the discovery of the fraud. It is to be noted that as the patent here has already been
issued, the land has the character of registered property in accordance with the provisions
of Section 122 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the party
who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is an action for reconveyance.

On the Case: The respondent, in filing the amended complaint for annulment of
documents, reconveyance and damages, was not seeking a reconsideration of the granting
of the patent or the decree issued in the registration proceedings. What the respondent
sought was the reconveyance of the subject property to the heirs of the late Tabayag on
account of the fraud committed by the petitioner. Thus, the lower courts did not err in
upholding the respondents right to ask for the reconveyance of the subject property. To
hold otherwise would be to make the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud.
Heirs of Sps Teofilo M. Reterta et al. v. Sps Lorenzo Mores, GR No 159941, August 17,
2011
Facts:

On May 2, 2000, the petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and
reconveyance in the RTC averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of
land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, containing an area of 47,708 square meters,
having inherited the land from their father who had died on July 11, 1983; that their late
father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; that
their late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and
continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999
an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby he
had waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit,
Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issued in favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the
then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-64071 had later issued to the respondents.

On August 1, 2000, the respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil Case due to the land being friar land,
and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence the Civil Case.

RTC Ruling: The land subject of this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain,
consequently Act No. 1120 is the law prevailing on the matter which gives to the Director
of Lands the exclusive administration and disposition of Friar Lands. The determination
whether or not fraud had been committed in the procurement of the sales certificate rests
to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is of the opinion that it has
no jurisdiction over the nature of this action.

CA Ruling: Dismissed the Petition.

Issue:

Was the petitioners action for reconveyance within the jurisdiction of the regular court?

Ruling:

Yes, an action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on ones title involves the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over
such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the property did not exceed
20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive
original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the
allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief
thereby sought.

LMB has no Jurisdiction: The authority of LMB under Act No. 1120, being limited to the
administration and disposition of friar lands, did not include the petitioners action for
reconveyance. LMB ceases to have jurisdiction once the friar land is disposed of in favor of
a private person and title duly issues in the latters name.
Petitioners cause of action for Reconveyance: The petitioners cause of action for
reconveyance has support in jurisprudence bearing upon the manner by which to establish
a right in a piece of friar land. According to Arayata v. Joya, in order that a transfer of the
rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands may be legally effective, it is necessary
that a formal certificate of transfer be drawn up and submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of
Public Lands for his approval and registration. The law authorizes no other way of
transferring the rights of a holder of a certificate of sale of friar lands. In other words,
where a person considered as a grantee of a piece of friar land transfers his rights thereon,
such transfer must conform to certain requirements of the law. Under Director of Lands v.
Rizal, the purchaser in the sale of friar lands under Act No. 1120 is already treated by law
as the actual owner of the lot purchased even before the payment of the full payment price
and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, subject to the obligation to pay in
full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government becoming that of a mere lien
holder or mortgagee.

Same: Concept of Action for Reconveyance: An action for reconveyance respects the
incontrovertibility of the decree of registration but seeks the transfer of the property to its
rightful and legal owner on the ground of its having been fraudulently or mistakenly
registered in another persons name. There is no special ground for an action for
reconveyance, for it is enough that the aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property
superior to the claim of the registered owner, and that the property has not yet passed to
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. On this score, it is also worthy to stress that
the title of a piece of a friar land obtained by a grantee from the Government without
conforming with the requirements set by the law may be assailed and nullified.

Republic v. Heirs of Agustin L. Angeles et al, GR No 141296, October 7, 2002

Facts:

On July 30, 1963, the late Agustin L. Angeles filed his Free Patent Application covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2744, Cad. 241, Orion Cadastre, situated in Capunitan,
Orion, Bataan, and with an area of 3,578 square meters.
By virtue of the said free patent application, Free Patent No. 265340 was issued in favor of
the late Agustin L. Angeles on February 24, 1964. On the basis of said free patent, Original
Certificate of Title No. 194 was issued and registered in the name of the late Agustin L.
Angeles.

It appears, however, that the late Agustin L. Angeles, prior to his death, was able to transfer
and convey in favor of his sister, Emilia L. Angeles (now deceased) the 1/2 northern
portion of Lot No. 2744, by means of a Deed of Absolute Sale that was postdated January 5,
1970, when Agustin L. Angeles was already dead.

The postdating of the Deed of Absolute Sale to January 5, 1970, was obviously done to
evade the prohibition of any alienation or encumbrance of the free patent within a period
of 5 years. Then again, the late Emilia L. Angeles was able to transfer and convey, by way of
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 27, 1973, the same 1/2 northern portion in favor of
her daughter, Luz Gancayco Alvarez.
On November 19, 1976, the Samahang Nayon members and Barangay members of
Capuntan, Orion, Bataan, represented by Elvira E. Manabat filed a Protest before the then
Bureau of Lands.

DENR Findings: the later Agustin L. Angeles or his predecessors-in-interest, have never
occupied nor cultivated Lot No. 2744 prior to and after the issuance of the Free Patent in
his name, the same having been in the actual and continuous occupation by the members of
the Samahang Nayon since the prewar days; Lot No. 2744 is not an agricultural land but a
residential land bordering the shoreline of Manila Bay; and that the late Agustin L. Angeles
conveyed the 1/2 northern portion of Lot No. 2744 during the prohibitory period of 5 years
or prior to his death in favor of the late Emilia L. Angeles.

RTC Ruling: The States cause of action had prescribed, because the Complaint had been
filed beyond the prescriptive period of four years from the issuance of the OCT. The RTC
further ruled that Respondent Alvarez was an innocent purchaser for value; her title, being
already indefeasible, could therefore no longer be revoked or cancelled.

Issue:

Does prescription runs against the State?

Ruling:

No, it is an elementary rule that prescription does not run against the State and its
subdivisions. When the government is the real party in interest, and it is proceeding mainly
to assert its own right to recover its own property, there can as a rule be no defense
grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included in patents or
certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section
101 of the Public Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred
by prescription.

Indefeasibility of a Title does not bar the Investigation of the State: While it is true that
a title issued on the basis of a free patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured,
however, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by the State as to how such
title has been acquired, if the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether or not
fraud has been committed in securing the title. One who succeeds in fraudulently acquiring
title to public land should not be allowed to benefit from it.

Esconde Case: Reconveyance based of Fraud 4 years Prescription: The court a quo
relied on Esconde v. Barlongay, which held that an action for reconveyance based on fraud
must be filed within four years from the discovery of its cause. Such discovery shall be
deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the OCT.

The Court holds that Esconde is inapplicable to the present appeal. That case involved an
action for reconveyance, a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land
that has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another. The purpose of
reconveyance is to compel a person, under whose name the property was wrongfully
registered, to transfer or reconvey it to the rightful owner. Note that in Esconde, the
Complaint for Reconveyance was filed by a private individual. Furthermore, the property
therein had long been the subject of ordinary land registration and did not involve public
land.

Reversion by the State: The instant case involves a reversion sought by the State through
the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioners Complaint for Reversion primarily seeks the
cancellation of the illegally obtained free patent and certificate of title, as well as the
consequent reversion of the subject land which was originally public in character. In a
reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not go back to the State.
Clearly then, the facts and the issues in Esconde differ from those obtaining in the present
case.

Melchor Caro v. Susana Sucaldito, GR No 157536, May 16, 2005

Facts:

Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessors Lot No. 160 from Ruperto
Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953. The said lot was situated
in Iloilo City, consisting more or less of 17.9849 hectares.

Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting
of 70,124 square meters, and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of
Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale3 dated January
31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.

On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands
covering the said area of the property which he bought from his father. The application
was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional
Director rendered a Decision canceling the said application.

Melchor Caro Contention: Respondent claims preferential rights over the land as he
acquired it through sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had likewise bought the land
from Ruperto Cepellano in 1953.

Protestant De la Cruz Claims: Protestant De la Cruz testified that the land in controversy
was bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that he thereafter occupied, possessed
and improved the land by planting coconut trees; and that in 1968 he was forcibly driven
out by Gregorio Caro from the land in question.

Regional Directors Findings: The records disclosed that the land which was actually sold
to Gregorio Caro by Ruperto Gepellano is Assessors Lot No. 160. The description and
physical identity of Lot No. 160 is basically different and distinct from Lot No. 4512, the
land in question. Ruperto Cepellano in his affidavit testified that what he sold to Gregorio
Caro is a land distinct and different from the land in question.

Same: Ruling: Applicant respondent Melchor Caro is cancelled. Protestant Deogracias de la

Cruz if qualified, is given 120 days from the finality of this decision to file an appropriate
public land application otherwise he shall lose his preferential right thereto.
Sucaldito Free Patent Application: On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer
of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a Free Patent covering the said lot, and was issued
Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued OCT No F-
27162 in her favor.

Caros Contention against Sucaldito: On February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint
against Sucaldito for "Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of
Ownership and/or Possession with Damages" before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an
amended complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and had been in
possession of the same "since 1953 and/or even prior thereto in the concept of owner,
adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He further alleged that the said lot had
been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and
that the corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor.

Same: Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in
favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the
subject lot. Hence, as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was obliged to return the same
to him as the lawful owner.

RTC Ruling: Dismissed the petition and ruled in favor of Sucaldito.

Same: Ratio: Caro had no personality to file the action for the annulment of the free patent
issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the Solicitor General. It held
that "an applicant for a free patent who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an
action in court to recover the land, for the court may not usurp the authority of the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through
administrative proceedings under the Public Land Act," or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a rival-applicant for a free
patent over the same land was through administrative channels, not judicial, because even
if the oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former does not thereby
become the owner of the land in dispute.

CA Ruling: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Does Caro have the personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property?

Ruling:

No, the petitioner has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the subject property.

Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this
case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a
free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-interest with personality to file an
action for reconveyance.
To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that
would result in the reversion of the land to the government. The petitioner has no
personality to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.

Concept of Person in interest: Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,31 every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one
"who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal
standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest
means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as
distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

Concept of Reconveyance: The Court notes that the petitioners complaint before the RTC
prays for the annulment of the free patent issued in the respondents favor. Considering
that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to "return" the subject property to him,
it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that "the essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is
respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right." Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by
a private individual, the property does not go back to the State.

Concept of Reversion: Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian doctrine.
Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government,
its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

Edgardo Dolar v. Brgy Lublub et al, GR No 152663, November 18, 2005

Facts:

Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6
hectares (Lot No. 1). Said property forms part of Lots No. 4181 and 4183 of the Dumangas
Cadastre.

On September 16, 1981, petitioner and Jaranilla donated Lot No. 1 to respondent Barangay
Lublub, subject to the following conditions:

That the area donated shall be for the purpose of constructing building and/or
establishing public plaza, sports complex, public market, health centers and the like
for the use of the Barangay of Lublub which area shall be hereinafter be known as
DON VENANCIO DOLAR PLAZA and shall be so designated in a proper landmark;
That the construction and development of the area above-described shall be
initiated and completed within 5 years from the execution of this Deed of Donation
and should the same be not made or completed then this Deed of Donation shall
have no force and effect whatsoever and the ownership of the above-described
property will revert back to the DONORS including all or any unfinished
improvement the DONEE might have placed or constructed; and
 That should the use of the area be converted to uses other than herein stipulated,
then this DEED OF DONATION shall be deemed revoked and the ownership shall
revert back to the DONORS.

Sometime in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed5 donating to Brgy. Lublub
represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla
had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the
same conditions expressly set forth in the first.

Petitioner: Dolars Claim: On May 6, 1998, petitioner filed against Brgy Lublub a
complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages involving the
donated property. Petitioner claimed that the donation in question had ceased to be
effective, the donee barangay having failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.

Same: Same: Failure of Brgy Lublub to fulfill the conditions of the Donation: Brgy
Lublub failed to build or establish within the period therein stipulated, a public plaza,
sports complex and like structures for the use of Barangay Lublub and neither had it
designated in a proper landmark that the area donated is known as the Don Venancio
Dolar Plaza.

Defense: Brgy Lublubs Counterclaim: Within 5 years from the execution of the deed of
donation several structures/buildings were constructed thereon for the use and benefit of
Brgy Lublub. PLDT building, Dumangas Water District, PNP Mobile Force Office and Branch
68 of the RTC of Iloilo was established for the benefit and use of the residents.

Same: Same: The deed of donation was executed in September 16, 1981. Even if the donee
failed to comply with the conditions of the deed within 5 years or until 1986, plaintiff
should have sought revocation of the donation within 4 years from 1986 or until 1990 only.

Same: Same: The deed of donation having been executed in 1981 yet, the donee took
possession of the same in concept of an owner, with just title, adverse, open, peaceful and
continuously up to the present. Hence, even if the donation is void or conditions were not
complied with, the property is now owned by the donee, as it can be considered that it has
been acquired by prescription.

Same: Complaint for cancellation of Title: Brgy Lublub filed a motion to dismiss against
the petition of the Sps Dolar for quieting of Title and filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Title, Reconveyance/Issuance of Title, Declaration of Nullity of Notice of Delinquency in the
Payment of Real Property Tax.

Petitioner: Herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss against the complaint for
cancellation of title filed by the Brgy on the grounds of forum shopping.

RTC Ruling: petitioners action was already barred by extinctive prescription under Article
764,11 in relation to Articles 73312 and 1144 (1)13 of the Civil Code, granted the
Barangays motion to dismiss and denied petitioners similar motion.

Issue:
Can the deed of donation be automatically reversed as stipulated?

Was the quieting of title prescribed?

Did the barangay acquire the property in question by acquisitive prescription?

Ruling:

First Issue

Yes, however, judicial declaration rescinding a contract is necessary to determine whether

the rescission is proper.

Judicial Intervention to determine whether or not the rescission was proper: The
rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for automatic revocation, judicial
intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a
contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper.

Rules on Contract under the NCC when stipulations are not contrary to law: When a
deed of donation . . . expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the
property donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply,
and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the parties
to a contract to establish such stipulations . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public
policy, we are of the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing
for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that
purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of
the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.

Second Issue

The Court can grant that the prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous
donations, as here, are governed by the general rules on prescription,26 which, in context,
is Article 1144 of the Civil Code providing that actions upon a written contract shall be
brought within ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. Ten years from September
1986 the date when petitioners right to revoke accrued - would be September 1996.
Here, however, what partakes as petitioners suit to revoke was filed only in May 1998.

In all, petitioners right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed,
regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article
1144 of the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent
barangay had disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his
right to revoke, claiming it had already complied with the construction and development
conditions of the donation. From the records, it would appear that respondent barangays
boast of compliance is not an empty one. As we see it, the establishment on the donated
area of telephone service, a water service, a police mobile force, and a courtroom, all for the
benefits of the barangay residents, substantially satisfies the terms and conditions of the
subject donation.

Third Issue

Admittedly, standing alone, adverse, continuous and long possession of a piece of real
property cannot defeat the title of a registered owner. But, then, this postulate presupposes
a Torrens title lawfully acquired and issued. As may be recalled, however, respondent
barangay instituted Civil Case No. 00-140, supra, for Cancellation of Title,
Reconveyance/Issuance of Title precisely because of the dubious manner by which
petitioner allegedly acquired his TCT No. T-129837 over a lot he admits donating.

Maria Alvarez Vda. De Delgado v. CA, GR No 125728, August 28, 2001

Facts:
During his lifetime, Carlos Delgado was the absolute owner of a parcel of land with an area
of 692,549 sq. m. On October 5, 1936, said Carlos Delgado granted and conveyed, by way of
donation or gift with quitclaim, all his rights, title, interest, claim and demand over a
portion of said land consisting of 165,000 square meters in favor of the Commonwealth of
the Philippines or its successors. Acceptance was made by then President Manuel L.
Quezon in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army.

Condition of the Donation: the parcel of land above described shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to be used as military reservation for
training cadres or for such other uses of the Philippine Army as the Commander-in-Chief or
Chief of Staff thereof may determine, provided that when the Commonwealth of the
Philippines no longer needs this parcel of land for any military purposes, then said land
shall automatically revert to the donor or its heirs or assigns.

Improvements by the Donee and Registration under Torrens System: The donee
promptly occupied the donated land and constructed buildings thereon for military
purposes, such as a military training campsite. The Donee thereafter caused the
registration of the same under the Torrens System.

OCT in favor of Commonwealth and Annotations Infavor of Delgado: On February 6,

1939, the CFI of Samar decreed that on the basis of more than forty years of quiet, peaceful
and continuous possession by the donors and their donee the aforesaid parcels of land as
well as the improvements thereon, were to be registered in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines as absolute owner thereof. The OCT contained an
annotation of the express condition attached to the land donated by Carlos Delgado.

Subsequently, said OCT was later cancelled and replaced with TCT. It appears, however,
that said TCT did not contain an annotation of the condition originally found in the Deed of
Donation.

Transition from Commonwealth to Republic: Upon declaration of independence on July

4, 1946, the Commonwealth of the Philippines passed out of existence. It was replaced by
the existing Republic of the Philippines. The subject land and turned portions of it over to
the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), later renamed Bureau of Air
Transportation Office (ATO). Said government agency has since utilized the land in
question, or portions of it as a domestic national airport, with some portions rented to the
Philippine Airlines, and some to the provincial government for a capitol site and a hospital
site, and for some other uses which clearly are not military in nature.

Petition for Reconveyance: A petition for reconveyance was filed on December 25, 1970,
alleging as ground therefor the violation of the express condition imposed by the donor. It
was also during this time that Jose Delgado, brother and lone heir of the donor, Carlos,
obtained a court order dated March 15, 1971, directing the insertion of the automatic
reversion clause as an annotation in the TCT.

Defense Contention: Republic of the Philippines contends that the heirs have no cause of
action and even denied knowledge of such donation, having no record thereof in its
possession. The action for reconveyance is already barred by laches, waiver and/or
prescription.

RTC Ruling: Ruled in favor of petitioner ordering the Republic to transfer ownership in
favor of petitioners.

CA Ruling: Reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Did the action for reconveyance already barred by prescription?

Ruling:

Yes, the action for reconveyance has already barred by prescription. Extinctive prescription
has set in in favor of the Republic, and it cannot now be sued based on the same causes of
action.

10 years Prescription under the NCC: Applying Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code on
prescription of actions based on a written contract, the petitioners herein should have
instituted the action for reconveyance within 10 years from the time the condition in the
Deed of Donation was violated. The earliest date the petitioners knew of the said violation
of said condition was on July 4, 1946, when the Republic, as successor of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, took over the properties and diverted the property to
uses other than that imposed by the donor. As found by the Court of Appeals, the cause of
action of the petitioners has clearly prescribed, having instituted the action for
reconveyance only on December 29, 1970, or 24 years after the condition was violated.
Said action was dismissed by the trial court on September 26, 1983 for failure of
petitioners to prosecute the case. The institution of a new action for reconveyance made on
September 28, 1989, does not alter respondent court's conclusion but in fact bolsters it, for
by then, a total of 43 long years were allowed by petitioners to lapse before instituting the
case at bar.
Excess Portion: With regard to the alleged excess of 33,607 square meters mistakenly
included in the OCT, we also find in order the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the action
for its reconveyance has likewise prescribed.

Article 1456 of the Civil code states, "If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the person from whom the property comes."

Registration of property by one person in his name, whether by mistake or fraud, the real
owner being another person, impresses upon the title so acquired the character of a
constructive trust for the real owner, which would justify an action for reconveyance.
However, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance of registered land based on
an implied trust prescribes in ten years and it is from the date of issuance of such title that
the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted.

The said excess portion of petitioners' land was mistakenly registered in the name of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines on September 9, 1939, still petitioners were admittedly
aware of this fact. The issuance of the OCT on said date stating the total area included
should have apprised them, even constructively, that a portion of their land was mistakenly
claimed by the donee, respondent Republic's predecessor-in-interest. Petitioners should
have taken appropriate legal action seasonably, within the ten years prescriptive period.
Since petitioners filed their action belatedly, we find that they have also lost any right to the
aforesaid portion of land consisting of 33,607 square meters.

Rule on Automatic Reversion in a contract: The rules governing onerous donations are
applicable to donations with a resolutory condition. Although automatic reversion
immediately happens upon a violation of the condition and therefore no judicial action is
necessary for such purpose, still judicial intervention must be sought by the aggrieved
party if only for the purpose of determining the propriety of the rescission made.

Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Sps Gregorio J. Lumocso, GR No 158121, December

12, 2007
Facts:

Petitioners claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195, a one-hectare portion of Lot No.
6196-A and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso, Cristita Lumocso Vda de Daan and Jacinto
Lumocso, are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots.

On August 6, 1997, petitioners filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of

Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought
to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding OCT No. P-22556 issued in the
name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195.