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The motion was denied by the trial court. Petitioner ANTONIO T. TIONGSON, petitioner, vs.
moved to reconsider the order of denial, but no avail.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PASCUAL
Hence, this instant petition for prohibition for
ARNOBIT, CARLOS UBALDO, RAFAEL LAPENA,
preliminary injunction, alleging that the respondent
MARCELINO FELIXMENA, LUDOVICO ANTONIO
judge has departed from the accepted and usual
GALLIGUEZ, MARIANO MATEO, FORTUNATO
course of judicial proceeding and had acted without or
VILLASISTA, MELCHOR DE GUZMAN, MARCELINA
in excess or in error of his jurisdiction or in gross
SANTIAGO, TRANQUILINO CAYOG, JOSE GUBA,
abuse of discretion.
MARIANO NAZARENO, BIENVENIDO NATIVIDAD,
ISSUE: Whether the venue indicated in the ticket is VICTOR NEMENIO, MARCELINO MOLINA, and
valid and binding between the parties HERMINIGILDO MATEO, respondents.
But where the second action between the same parties Respondents-tenants are therefore clearly entitled to
is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in reinstatement pending decision on the merits of their
the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to appeal by the Court of Appeals to which we have
those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the ordered the case returned for decision on the merits.
determination of which the finding or judgment was
In the interest of avoiding further delay in respondent-
rendered. In fine, the previous judgment is conclusive
tenants' obtaining the reinstatement and possession
in the second case, only as to those matters actually
which the law unqualifiedly grants them pending final
and directly controverted and determined and not as to
decision on the merits on their appeal (which
matters merely involved therein. This is the rule on
reinstatement has already been long delayed and
"conclusiveness of judgment" embodied in subdivision
which will necessarily be further delayed,
(c) of Section 49 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
notwithstanding the Court's directive that the appellate
Court.
court immediately issue such reinstatement order, due
In the case at bar, the cause of action of petitioner is to the mechanics of remanding the records of the case
upon a different claim or demand. The action of to the said court), I vote that such immediate
petitioner was predicated upon the violation by the reinstatement order should be issued directly by this
private respondents of the terms and conditions of the Court. I therefore dissent from the decision insofar as
judgment by compromise rendered by the Agrarian it fails and declines to issue such reinstatement order
Court on April 8, 1968, as amended by its order of May and to grant respondents' urgent petition expressly
22, 1968. As to whether or not private respondents praying for such reinstatement order from this Court.
violated the terms and conditions thereof by defiantly This Court's authority to issue such order cannot be
refusing to use certified fertilizers recommended by an seriously questioned nor can any valid technical or
agriculturist and maliciously failed and refused to use procedural objection be raised against its directly
tractor offered for their use by petitioner resulting in issuing such order in the decision at bar.
substantial damage and prejudice to the latter, are
Concepcion, C.J., Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.,
matters which were not actually and directly
concurs and dissents.
controverted and determined in the previous case.
These are new facts which occurred subsequent to the
first judgment.
Separate Opinions the supply, delivery, installation, and finishing of
parquet tiles for certain floors in the petitioners Makati
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting: City condominium project called The Regency.
Petitioner sent a notice to respondent respondent FGU
I concur in the result reversing the appellate court's
Insurance Corporation (FGU Insurance) demanding
decision and returning the case to it for decision on the
damages pursuant to the surety and performance
merits.
bonds the former had issued for the subcontract. On
April 30, 2002, the petitioner filed a complaint for
But respondents-tenants were clearly wrongfully
breach of contract against both Magsalin and FGU
ordered ejected from their landholding by the agrarian
Insurance. FGU Insurance was duly served with
court, notwithstanding their appeal, since under our
summons. With respect to Magsalin, however, the
decision in Quilantang vs. Court of Appeals (L-34212,
corresponding officers return declared that both she
Dec. 13, 1972) they are entitled under section 36 of
and Karens Trading could not be located at their given
the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844) "to
addresses, and that despite further efforts, their new
continue in the enjoyment and possession of (their)
addresses could not be determined. In August 2002,
landholding except when (their) dispossession has
FGU Insurance filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
The petitioner filed its opposition to the motion. The
final and executory."
motion to dismiss was denied as well as the ensuing
Respondents-tenants are therefore clearly entitled to motion for reconsideration, and FGU Insurance was
reinstatement pending decision on the merits of their obliged to file an answer.
appeal by the Court of Appeals to which we have
In an effort to assist the RTC in acquiring jurisdiction
ordered the case returned for decision on the merits.
over Magsalin, the petitioner filed a motion for leave to
In the interest of avoiding further delay in respondent- serve summons on respondent Magsalin by way of
tenants' obtaining the reinstatement and possession publication. In January 2003, the petitioner filed its
which the law unqualifiedly grants them pending final reply to FGU Insurances answer. FGU Insurance filed a
decision on the merits on their appeal (which motion for leave of court to file a third-party complaint
reinstatement has already been long delayed and and claimed that the three had executed counter-
which will necessarily be further delayed, guaranties over the surety and performance bonds it
notwithstanding the Court's directive that the appellate executed for the subcontract with Magsalin and, hence,
court immediately issue such reinstatement order, due should be held jointly and severally liable.
to the mechanics of remanding the records of the case
The RTC admitted the third-party complaint and denied
to the said court), I vote that such immediate
the motion to serve summons by publication on the
reinstatement order should be issued directly by this
ground that the action against respondent Magsalin
Court. I therefore dissent from the decision insofar as
was in personam. In May 2003, the RTC issued a
it fails and declines to issue such reinstatement order
notice setting the case for hearing on June 20, 2003.
and to grant respondents' urgent petition expressly
FGU Insurance filed a motion to cancel the hearing on
praying for such reinstatement order from this Court.
the ground that the third-party defendants had not yet
This Court's authority to issue such order cannot be
filed their answer. The motion was granted.
seriously questioned nor can any valid technical or
procedural objection be raised against its directly
In June 2003, Baetiong filed his answer to the third-
issuing such order in the decision at bar.
party complaint and denied any personal knowledge
about the surety and performance bonds for the
G.R. No. 170026 June 20, 2012
subcontract with Magsalin. Of the three (3) persons
SHIMIZU PHILIPPINES CONTRACTORS, INC., named as third-party defendants, only Baetiong filed
Petitioner, vs MRS. LETICIA B. MAGSALIN, doing an answer to the third-party complaint; the officers
business under the trade name KARENS TRADING, returns on the summons to the Garcias state that both
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, GODOFREDO could not be located at their given addresses.
GARCIA, CONCORDIA GARCIA, and REYNALDO Incidentally, the petitioner claims, and Baetiong does
BAETIONG, not dispute, that it was not served with a copy of
Baetiongs answer.
BRION, J.:
The petitioner argues that FGU Insurance, which is the
FACTS plaintiff in the third-party complaint, had failed to
exert efforts to serve summons on the Garcias. It
A breach of contract was claimed by petitioner against suggests that a motion to serve summons by
Leticia Magsalin, doing business as Karens Trading, for publication should have been filed for this purpose. The
petitioner also asserts that the RTC should have The December 16, 2003 dismissal order clearly violates
scheduled a hearing to determine the status of the this rule for its failure to disclose how and why the
summons to the third-party defendants. petitioner failed to prosecute its complaint. Thus,
neither the petitioner nor the reviewing court is able to
The Trial Court rendered order in favour of the know the particular facts that had prompted the
respondents stating the dismissal was due to the prejudicial dismissal. Had the petitioner perhaps failed
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute. The RTC denied the to appear at a scheduled trial date? Had it failed to
petitioners motion for reconsideration, prompting the take appropriate actions for the active prosecution of
latter to elevate its case to the CA via a Rule 41 its complaint for an unreasonable length of time? Had
petition for review. it failed to comply with the rules or any order of the
trial court? The December 16, 2003 dismissal order
CA ruled that the dismissal raised by FGU Insurance
does not say.
base on ground of lack of jurisdiction is a pure
question of law as it did not dispute the proceedings 2. The appeal was properly filed under Rule 41 of
before the issuance of the December 16, 2003 the Rules of Court
dismissal order. The CA agreed with FGU Insurance
and dismissed the appeal, and denied as well the In dismissing the appeal, the CA relied on the premise
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The petitioner that since the facts presented in the petitioners appeal
thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari. were admitted and not disputed, the appeal must
thereby raise a pure question of law proscribed in an
ordinary appeal. This premise was effectively the legal
principle articulated in the case of Joaquin v.
ISSUE: 1) Whether dismissal order is void
Navarro,cited by the CA in its April 8, 2005 resolution.
Respondent FGU Insurance thus contends that the
2) Whether the appeal was properly filed under Rule
proper remedy to assail the dismissal of Civil Case No.
41 of the Rules of Court
02-488 was an appeal filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
HELD: of Court.
2. Petitioner did not lose his legal capacity and Following the pre-trial conference, the petitioners filed
such did not constitute sufficient ground to dismiss the a Motion to Dismiss the case for the respondents
civil case failure to include his children as indispensable parties.
The respondent filed an Opposition, arguing that his
The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal children are not indispensable parties because the
from administration are on appeal only means that his issue in the case can be resolved without their
legal standing could be restored. Thus, the civil case participation in the proceedings.
was correctly dismissed without prejudice. If his
conviction is reversed and his appointment restored by RTC denied the motion to dismiss. After the denial of
the probate court, the case may continue without their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners
being barred by res judicata. The lower courts Decision elevated their case to the CA through a Petition for
showed that it was careful in its action. Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They
charged the RTC with grave abuse of discretion
On the other hand, Obando has yet to show that he amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not dismissing the
has regained administration of the Figueras estates. case after the respondent failed to include
Noteworthy also is the fact that his removal from office indispensable parties.
was predicated not only on his conviction for a crime,
but also on his failure to render an accounting of the The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioners moved
rentals of a property leased to the Community of for reconsideration but to no avail.
Learners.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents children are
G.R. No. 182585 November 27, 2009 indispensable parties
JOSEPHINE MARMO,*NESTOR ESGUERRA, DANILO DEL HELD: The respondents children are not indispensable
PILAR and MARISA DEL PILAR, Petitioners versus parties.
MOISES O. ANACAY, Respondent.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines
BRION, J.: indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without
whom there can be no final determination of an action
FACTS: and who, for this reason, must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants. Jurisprudence further holds
Respondent Moises O. Anacay filed a case for
that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an
Annulment of Sale, Recovery of Title with Damages
interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but
against the petitioners. Josephine, petitioner, was
also if his interest is such that a final decree cannot be
actually authorized by the petitioner to sell the subject
made without affecting this interest or without placing
property. She sold the property to petitioner Danilo for
the controversy in a situation where the final
P520,000.00, payable in monthly instalments.
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity
However, Danilo defaulted in his installment payments.
and good conscience. He is a person whose absence
disallows the court from making an effective,
The respondent subsequently discovered that TCT No.
complete, or equitable determination of the
815595 had been cancelled and TCT No. T-972424 was
controversy between or among the contending parties.
issued in petitioner Josephines name by virtue of a
falsified Deed of Absolute Sale. Petitioner Josephine
subsequently transferred her title to petitioner Danilo;
TCT No. T-972424 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
991035 was issued in petitioner Danilos name.