36. People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), G.R. Nos.
185729-32, discharge is requested;
June 26, 2013, 699 SCRA 713
- Respondent Mercado, was the President of JAM Liner and the other
respondents were Department of Finance officials formerly assigned at
its One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Drawback Center.
- Sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify against the criminal
syndicate that allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop
Shop, Mercado applied with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for
immunity as state witness under its witness protection program.
- On June 5, 2000 the DOJ granted immunity to Mercado. Still, since the
investigation of the case fell within the authority of the Ombudsman, the
latter charged him and the other respondents before the
Sandiganbayans Fourth Division with violations of Section 3(j) of
Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 and two counts of falsification under Article
171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Cases 27511-
14.
- The first information alleged that respondent DOF officials approved and
issued in 1996 Tax Credit Certificate 7711 for 7,350,444.00 in favor of
JAM Liner for domestic capital equipment although it did not qualify for
such tax credit. The second Information alleged that they further illegally
issued in 1996 Tax Credit Certificate 7708 for 4,410,265.50 in favor of
the same company covering its purchase of six Mitsubishi buses.
- Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the
Ombudsman, citing the DOJs grant of immunity to him.
- On September 4, 2003 the Ombudsman executed an Immunity
Agreement with Mercado. In consideration of the immunity, Mercado
would produce all relevant documents in his possession and testify
against the accused in all the cases, criminal or otherwise, that may be
filed against them.
- On April 30, 2008 the Sandiganbayan denied the Ombudsmans motion.
Ombudsmans motion failed to establish the conditions required under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to recognize the immunity from criminal prosecution that the
Ombudsman granted respondent Mercado and, as a result, in declining to
discharge him from the information as a state witness.
Ruling: Yes.
The question before the Sandiganbayan was whether or not Mercado met
the following requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 for the discharge of an
accused to be a state witness:
(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
(b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
(d) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed,
Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman as well as in the
Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state
witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose
mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before
the courts. The latter do not as a rule have a vision of the true strength of the
prosecutions evidence until after the trial is over. Consequently, courts
should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a motion
to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear cases
of failure to meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119.
The records, particularly Mercados consolidated affidavit, show that his
testimony if true could be indispensable in establishing the circumstances
that led to the preparation and issuance of fraudulent tax credit certificates.
Indeed, nobody appears to be in a better position to testify on this than he, as
president of JAM Liner, Inc., the company to which those certificates were
issued.
What is more, the criminal informations in these cases charge respondents
with having conspired in approving and issuing the fraudulent tax credit
certificates. One rule of wisdom is that where a crime is contrived in secret,
the discharge of one of the conspirators is essential so he can testify against
the others. Who else outside the conspiracy can testify about the goings-on
that took place among the accused involved in the conspiracy to defraud the
government in this case
No one can underestimate Mercados testimony since he alone can provide a
detailed picture of the fraudulent scheme that went into the approval and
issuance of the tax credit certificates. The documents can show the
irregularities but not the detailed events that led to their issuance. As
correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Mercados testimony can fill in the
gaps in the evidence. The immunity granted to Mercado does not blot out the
fact that he committed the offense. While he is liable, the State saw a higher
social value in eliciting information from him rather than in engaging in his
prosecution.
37. Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)
- March 15, 1985, Vitaliano Saco was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, he was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris.
- His widow sued for damages under EO 797 and Memorandum Circular
No. 2 of the POEA.
- The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the SSS and should have been filed
against the State Insurance Fund.
- The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the
position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The
award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for
burial expenses.
- The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor
General to move for dismissal on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
- The petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself
as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
Whether the promulgation of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the
principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially
legislative.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The
model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number
of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not
unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise
of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order
itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,
mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and
equitable employment practices."

Ruling: No.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise
of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which,
as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract
substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion

as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not
what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative
of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient
38. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997)
- The petitioner questions the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes.
- The deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase and
the (b) full deregulation phase through EO No. 372.
- The petitioner claims that Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to
guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide
any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the
world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate
of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec 5(b) of R.A. 8180 violates the one title one
subject requirement of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of power.
3. Whether or not R.A. No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition
Rulings:
1. No. The Court does not concur with this contention. The Court has
adopted a liberal construction of the one title one subject rule. The
Court hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane
to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway
prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make
them rely less on imported petroleum.[i][20] We shall, however,
return to the validity of this provision when we examine its blocking
effect on new entrants to the oil market.
The Court consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index
or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject.
2. Sec 15 of R.A. 8180 can hurdle both the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly
provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full
deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the
Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
deregulation. The discretion given to the President is to advance the
date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15
lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. He is
to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
Adopting the ruling from Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, the
Court states that: There are two accepted tests to determine
whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first
test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard
test, there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a
total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative.
3. Section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated by the
aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: The State shall
regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires.
No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or
more persons or companies, consisting in the exclusive right or
power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture a
particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a
particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or
only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On
the other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or
understanding between two or more persons, in the form of a
contract, trust, pool, holding company, or other form of association,
for the purpose of unduly restricting competition, monopolizing trade
and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production,
distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade
without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to
the means while monopoly refers to the end.

39. Sema v. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA 700 (2008)
- The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of
the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because
Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.
Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district
comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
- A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and
vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and
barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created
Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which
comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the
exception of Cotabato City.
- For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that
the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201).
But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained;
however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be
called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting
a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a
legislative district (or part of any).
- Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative
district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was
contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district
and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably
because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact
he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a
province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in
effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
- COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that
regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not
affected and so is its representation.
Issue: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM
can create validly LGUs.
Ruling: Yes. RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in
the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its
plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and
the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence,
ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at
least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one
representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative
district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City
did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable.
On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S.
Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be
legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in
Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and
provinces.
40. Abakada Guro, et al v. Hon. Cesar Purisima, 562 SCRA 251 (2008) revenue targets to the President.
- Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and 3. Whether or not the doctrine of separation of powers has been
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize violated in the creation of a congressional oversight committee.
the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Rulings:
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
1. No. The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that
- The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of the law is
- It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least
the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the
six months of service, regardless of employment status.
BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law should
- Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging
logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation.
- They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct
the law transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC primary function of generating revenues for the national government
through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and
Both the BIR and the BOC principally perform the special function of
incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably, such substantial
- Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and
and incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
the BOC under R.A. 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid
protection.
basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not
apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.
- In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to The Court referred to the ruling of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers Union, which states that the guaranty of equal protection of
fix revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on
the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and
upon all citizens of the State.
BOC officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue
collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not,
however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of
knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars.
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
- Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of constitutionality.
the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in
The Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification
the implementation and enforcement of the law.
or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
Issues: and is not palpably arbitrary.
1. Whether or not the scope of the system of rewards and incentives
2. Yes. R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide
limitation to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates
the President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.
agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4
2. Whether or not there was an unduly delegation of power to fix
 of the said Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as
sufficient standards: public interest, justice and equity, public
convenience and welfare and simplicity, economy and welfare.33
In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.

To determine the validity of delegation of legislative power, it needs

the following: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient
standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays
down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates
authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.

3. No. The court declined jurisdiction on this case. The Joint

Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May
22, 2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus
officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of its alleged
encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

Based from the ruling under Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,

it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se,
meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in
fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
41. Camid v. Office of the President, 448 SCRA 711 (2005) community has claimed and exercised corporate functions with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or
- The municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur, is a town that is not objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.
supposed to exist yet is actually insisted by some as alive and thriving.
What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous
The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by
exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the
the Supreme Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that
acquiescence thereto by instrumentalities of the state. Camids plaint should
Andong thrives on and, hence, its legal personality should be given
judicial affirmation. have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done,
- The factual antecedents derive from the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would
have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations.
General in 1965. Then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several
Petitioners seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of
Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao.
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant
- President Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing
prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced.
his powers under Sec.68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Then VP
Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition
alleging that the EOs were null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed The question as to whether a municipality previously annulled by the
Supreme Court may attain recognition in the absence of any
by RA 2370, and said orders constituting an undue delegation of
curative/reimplementing statute has never been decided before. The effect of
legislative power.
Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong
- After due deliberation, the SC ruled that the challenged EOs were null
warrants explanation.
and void since Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code did not meet the
well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the
executive branch. EO 107 which established Andong was declared null and void ab initio in
1965 by the Supreme Court in Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569
- Among the EOs annulled was EO 107 which created the Municipality of
(1965), along with 33 other EOs. The phrase ab initio means from the
Andong.
beginning. Pelaez was never reversed by the SC but was rather expressly
- Petitioner represents himself as a current resident of Andong and alleged
that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, Municipality of
complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the Malabang v. Benito, and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya. No subsequent
ruling declared Pelaez as overturned/inoperative. No subsequent legislation
municipality and its constituents, despite the fact that no person has
has been passed since 1965 creating the Municipality of Andong. Given
been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the local government
these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not
offices of Andong since 1968.
exist as a duly constituted municipality.
- Camid imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of DILG in not
classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not
including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to
create municipalities yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular
existing regular municipality. He argues that Pelaez has already been
municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. With the
modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and
promulgation of the LGC in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the
jurisprudence, particularly citing Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon.
municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled
Mendez wherein the court affirmed the unique status of the Municipality
of San Andres as a de facto municipal corporation. Camid also cites Sec. 442(b) of the LGC deemed curative whatever legal defects to title
Sec. 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the these municipalities had labored under.
There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as
recognition of the impugned municipality.
San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most prominent is the fact that the EO
creating Andong was expressly annulled by the SC in 1965. Court decisions
Issue: Whether the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong
continues despite the petitioners allegation that Andong has thrived into a cannot lose their efficacy due to sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.
full-blown municipality
Sec. 442(d) of the LGC does not serve to affirm/reconstitute the judicially
dissolved municipalities which had been previously created by presidential
Ruling: Yes.
issuances/EOs. The provision only affirms the legal personalities of those
Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the
municipalities which may have been created using the same infirm legal
basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the
other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved remain inexistent unless
recreated through specific legislative enactments.

The legal effect of the nullification of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert

the constituent barrios of the voided town back to their original municipalities.

If there is only a strong impulse for the reconstitution of the municipality

nullified in Pelaez, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial
confirmation of void title. The time has come for the light to seep in and for
the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality.
42. Vivas v. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. request and ordered the general examination to proceed as previously
No. 191424, August 7, 2013, 703 SCRA 290 (2013) scheduled.
- In January 2006, Vivas acquired the Rural Bank of Faire, Inc. (RBFI). - A complaint was filed before DOJ for Estafa Through Falsification of
Commercial Documents against certain officials and employees of ECBI.
Upon acquisition, Vivas initiated an internal audit of RBFI. The audit
- Eventually, the Monetary Board issued a resolution as follows:
highlighted the dismal operation of RBFI.
1. To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the
- On 8 Dec. 2006, BSP issued a Certificate of Authority extending the
Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership;
corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP also approved
the change of its name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Inc. (ECBI) and
- R.A. 7653, the New Central Bank Act, required the general 2. To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as
Receiver of the bank.
examination of certain banks including ECBI. The following are the
- Vivas filed a petition for prohibition before SC, ascribing grave abuse of
serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general
discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking
examination:
business and for placing it under receivership.
1. Negative capital of P14.674M and Capital Adequacy ratio of
Negative 18.42%;
2. Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity composite Issue: Whether or not ECBI was entitled to due and prior hearing before its
being placed under receivership.
rating of 2 with a Management component rating of 1; and
3. Serious supervisory concerns on activities deemed unsafe or
Ruling: Yes.
unsound.
- Because of these findings, BSP cancelled the rediscounting line of the
ECBI. Moreover, BSP directed the bank to: In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-
1. Infuse fresh capital of P22.643M Valenzuela, the Court reiterated the doctrine of close now, hear later,
stating that it was justified as a measure for the protection of the public
2. Book the amount of P28.563M representing unbooked valuation
interest. Thus:
reserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before
October 31, 2008; and
3. Take appropriate action necessary to address the The close now, hear later doctrine has already been justified as a measure
violations/exceptions noted in the examination. for the protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of
the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and
- Vivas claimed that the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) took
determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and
the above courses of action due to the joint influence exerted by a certain
mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to
hostile shareholder and a former BSP examiner.
deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the
- Vivas moved for reconsideration of such resolution for being arbitrary
and violative of due process. losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all
- BSP on the contrary, said that there are several instances that the BSP deserve the protection of the government.
invited ECBI to discuss pertinent matters but Vivas kept on postponing
In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote that
the meeting.
x x x due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or
- The Monetary Board of BSP posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow
an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just
the BSP examiners from examining and inspecting its books and
records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653. In its letter, imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the
13 dated May 8, 2009, the BSP informed ECBI that it was already due order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may
be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking
for another annual examination and that the pendency of its appeal
community.
before the MB would not prevent the BSP from conducting another one
as mandated by Section 28 of R.A. No. 7653.
- In view of ECBI's refusal to comply with the required examination, MB The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate
issued a resolution imposing penalty on ECB. In a Letter-Reply of ECBI, unwarranted dissipation of the banks assets and as a valid exercise of police
power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general
it asked for another deferment of the examination due to the pendency of
public. Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against
certain unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and
financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest
because Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBIs
the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the
national economy.
43. Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994) constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in
- Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, An Act Converting the the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequence
municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as of the proposed law and its operation.
the City of Mandaluyong.
2. Yes.
- Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of
this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became RA The present composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress
7675, President Ramis signed it into law. itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
- Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The
3. No.
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the
conversion. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted no. particular candidate or party. It should be noted that Rep. Zamora, the author
By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was deemed ratified in effect. of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
- Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By
46 thereof, is unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the one dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamoras constituency has in fact
subject one bill rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as
two principal subjects, namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a favorable to him.
highly urbanized city; and 2. the division of the congressional district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
- Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representative beyond that provided in the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not
made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements.

Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the number of the members of the House of
Representative may increase.
3. Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.

Ruling:
1. No.
The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population
of not less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the one city
one representative as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the
Constitution.

The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a

subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural ang logical consequence of its conversion into
a highly urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all provisions are germane to that
general subject. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
44. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32
(2010) Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
- Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus
grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial,
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It
also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
2. Yes.
- A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant
Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
- Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified
the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission
into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to
moral fabric of society.
privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws,
as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
- In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel. other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
Issues:
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
1. WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
determination of liability or culpability.
Constitution;
2. WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
and legal grounds. governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
Rulings:
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
1. Yes.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
45.A. Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)

- Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in

2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill to
have two legislative districts in CdO instead.
- The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative districts were
created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and
he went immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC
from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo
was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite
which he averred was required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

Ruling: No.
A plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or
barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No.
9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oros territory,
population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What
happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two
legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by
the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council
members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. By having two
legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro
now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the
citys population. This easily means better access to their congressman
since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000.

45.B. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al, 570 SCRA
410 (2008)
- This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs Board (G.R. No.
158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 161658)
- In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices,
and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain
offenses.
- In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a
candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
- According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of
five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a
senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory
drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Issues:
1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Ruling:
[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declared Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It also PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Court thus permanently enjoined all the concerned agencies from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.]
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator; NO,
Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for
candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution.
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates
for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid
down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or
weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the
Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional.
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-
drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted
upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set
up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is
really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
 2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 are NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f) thereof is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and tertiary schools
Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton and Board of
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et
al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and applied the following principles: (1)
schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and
are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and
schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have
the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just,
and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of Education, supra, the Court is of
the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of public and private
offices
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and
as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion
of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness
requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge.
Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand students for that
matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing
what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary
procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even
practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of
the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within
the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the
office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized
by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the
search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA
9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain
provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would
unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject
of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The
goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and
who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the
employees concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained
in the companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory
test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the
results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall
be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
need to know basis; that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told,
therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing
leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and

employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed
by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them
with utmost responsibility and efficiency.

As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the prosecutors office

with a crime with an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6
years and 1 day

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from
the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to
the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees,
the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before
the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with 6 years
and 1 day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing
can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
46. ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party List v. Commission on
Elections, 646 SCRA 93 (2011) 1. Yes.

Section 2 (5), Article IX-Cof the Constitution grants the COMELEC the
- On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a
authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the
petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and
authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The said
accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-Liston the ground that petitioner is
authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. In the
a front for a religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a
party-list group under Section 6 (1)of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET, in accordance
otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. with Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, that has jurisdiction over
contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list
- On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC, Second Division issued a Resolution
organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that
dismissing the petition. The dismissal on procedural grounds was
sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the
grounded on the lack of proper verification of the petition.According to
party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of
the COMELEC, Second Division, the Verification with Certification Re:
Forum Shopping and Special Power of Attorney was not duly notarized Representatives. Thus, the jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relates to
in accordance with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, as amended. the qualifications of a party-list nominee or representative, while the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over petitions for cancellation of registration
Sections 1 and 6, Rule II require that the person appearing before a
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition. In sum,
notary public must be known to the notary public or identified by the
the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of
notary public through competent evidence of identity.
the registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged
- In this case, the "Acknowledgment" at the end of the verification did not
contain the name of private respondent who supposedly appeared violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941.
before the notary public, and he was not identified by any competent
2. Yes.
evidence of identity as required by the rules on notarial practice. The
COMELEC, Second Division also dismissed the petition based on
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of
substantial grounds, as it found that ABC is not a religious sect, and is,
therefore, not disqualified from registration. discretion when it singled out this case and directed that it be set for hearing
- However, the COMELEC en banc found that the petitions verification when other cases of the same nature were summarily and motu proprio
dismissed by the COMELEC, citing the cases of BANAT v. CIBAC
page substantially complied with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
Foundation and BANAT v. 1-Care and APEC. However, in both cases, the
and that the records of the case showed that the Resolution of the
proceedings were summary because the
Second Division was issued without any hearing, contrary to RA No.
registration/qualification/cancellation of the party lists had already been
7941, which deprived Mauricio of the opportunity to submit evidence in
support of his petition. decided in another case.
- In filing this petition, Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no
longer had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of
registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was already
proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10,
2010. Further, petitioner submits that Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which
states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint
of any interested party remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing,
the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition, is applicable only to a non-winning party-list group.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Comelec has jurisdiction to hear the case on ABC
party lists cancellation of registration
2. Whether or not a cancellation case should be summary

Ruling:
47. BANAT v. Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA 210 (2009); 592
SCRA 294 (2009)
- On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because
"the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."
- BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling
in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
- On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the
COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the
Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the
Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.
Issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a
ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
to qualify for one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political
parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
Ruling: WHEREFORE we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE
the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We
declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of
additional party-list seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law
which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains
a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued
operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available
party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our
allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes
garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast
for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available
seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved
under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining
available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed
all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally,
we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-
list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral
seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the
sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as
either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and
R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list
elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
In view of the inclusion of major political parties (according to Puno, J.)
The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v.
COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the
participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the
formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I
regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with
respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of
party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence
There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our
traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-
list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed
to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by
some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political
parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162
parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top
50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number
of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining
155 parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only
obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties
or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of
the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat
their members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the
total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties
garnered more than 2%.
In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at
the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is
through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this
systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how
the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by
the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to
dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to
participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate
the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the
democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard
of the party-list system.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major
political parties into the party-list system.
In view of 2% being unconstitutional (according to Nachura, J.)
However, I wish to add a few words to support the proposition that the
inflexible 2% threshold vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a
seat in the House of Representatives in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 is
unconstitutional. This minimum vote requirement fixed at 2% of the total
number of votes cast for the party list system presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI, of the
Philippine Constitution. As such, it effectively defeats the declared
constitutional policy, as well as the legislative objective expressed in the
enabling law, to allow the peoples broadest representation in Congress,the
raison detre for the adoption of the party-list system.
Today, a little over eight (8) years after this Courts decision in Veterans
Federation Party, we see that in the 14th Congress, 55 seats are allocated to
party-list representatives, using the Veterans formula. But that figure (of 55)
can never be realized, because the 2% threshold vote requirement makes it
mathematically impossible to have more than 50 seats. After all, the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system can never exceed 100%.
Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a
threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement
was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his
separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with
him that a minimum vote requirement is needed --
1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system
as a fallback position;
2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and
whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections;
3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;
4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn
their seats within the system;
5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of
the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some
degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional
gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;
6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups
and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system;
and
7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.9
However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in
the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional
legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed
2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to
the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with
the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being
fully operative.

It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party,

that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it
merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But
when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise
purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition
that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally
impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as
an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the
wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to
ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of
statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that
renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.
49. Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954)

- Respondent was born in Caoayan, Ilocos Sur; came to Manila to pursue

his studies; went to United States for the same purpose; returned to the
Philippines; and engaged in the newspaper work in Manila, and Iloilo.
When he ran for the office of Provincial Governor of Ilocos Sur, he was
proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the governor. A
petition for quo warranto was filed by the petitioner on the ground of
respondents ineligibility for the said office because of alleged lack of
residence. The petitioner relies on the fact that the respondent
registered as voter in Pasay City in 1946 and 1947.

Issue: Whether or not respondents acts, activities, and utterances constitute

abandonment or loss of his residence of origin.

Ruling: No.

The Court ruled out that mere absence from ones residence or origin
domicile to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is
not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures to
improve his lot. When election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace
to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but
for professional or business reason, he may not be absent himself from the
place of his activities; so there he registers as voter. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence
of origin, he has not forsaken him. Thus, registration of a voter in another
place has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of
such residence.
49. Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R.No. 193314, June 25, down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
2013, 699 SCRA 507 somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
- While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del Norte, Petitioner,
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that
Romeo Jalosjos sought the transfer of his voter's registration record to
Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of
Precint 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Zamboanga Sibugay.
- Dan Erasmo filed a petition with the MCTC which rendered judgement
excluding Jalosjos from the list of voters in question on the ground that
he did not abandon his domicile in Tampilasan and is still the incumbent Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be
taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City
mayor.
to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
- Jalosjos appealed the decision to the RTC but the MCTC ruling was
citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
affirmed.
domicile by operation of law and by choice.
- Through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, Jalosjos elevated the case to the CA. His
application was granted and his name was reinstated in the voter's list When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change
pending resolution of the petition.
his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
- Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
May 2010 national elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a petition
with the COMELEC to deny or cancel said COC. His petition was denied Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
by the COMELEC for insufficiency in form and substance. Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
- Pending Erasmo's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
banc, Jalosjos won the elections and was proclaimed representative.
Zamboanga Sibugay.
- Meanwhile, CA rendered in his favor judgement on the pending petition.
Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA's decision before the
Supreme Court. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga
Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
- Thereafter, COMELEC en banc granted Erasmo's motion anf declared
domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the
Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as representative for not satisfying
settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
the residency requirement because of his incumbency as mayor of
Tampilisan.
The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers house. But this
circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to
repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil,
community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
Zamboanga Sibugay.
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the
Ruling: Yes. house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What
matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of
Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year
before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of
residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same
intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga
Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local
such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a
registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid
Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative

bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review
powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant
considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for
Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that
province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to
breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC.

50. Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013,
712 SCRA 54
- Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a total of
147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked 50th. The
COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially
proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners
involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats.
The petitioner questioned the formula used by the COMELEC and filed
the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
- The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on
Elections is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were not
made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner,
around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of
the Commission on Elections erroneous interpretation. 7,112,792 (Total
number of disregarded votes according to petitioner ARARO)
- On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En
Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers is the following:
- Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20 =Number of seats
available to party-list representatives .80
Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010
elections is 57 as shown below:
229__x .20 =57 .80
The National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10-009 applies the
formula used in Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC18 to arrive at the winning party-list
groups and their guaranteed seats, where:
Number of votes of party-list
______________________________=
Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
Total number of votes for party-list candidates
- the Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor
General took the position that invalid or stray votes should not be
counted in determining the divisor. The Commission on Elections
argues that this will contradict Citizens Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) v. COMELEC22 and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.23 It asserts
that:
- Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters
who did not even vote for any qualified party-list candidate, as these
voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the party-list
system."
Issues:
1. Whether the case is already moot and academic
2. Whether petitioners have legal standing
3. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of
discretion in its interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v.
COMELEC25 to determine the party-list groups that would be
proclaimed in the 2010 elections
Rulings:
1. Yes.
This case is moot and academic but the Court discussed the issues raised by
the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review32 and for
the guidance of the bench, bar, and public.33
2. No.
The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to
meet the 2% threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments
will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise
the argument in this Court.
3. Yes.
The Court agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on
determined to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not
be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list
group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of
the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted
on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified
candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the
ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and
whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on
Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the
divisor.
Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for
the party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the
percentage of representation:
[if !supportLists]1. [endif](b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and

interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:
Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list
candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list
The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list
system including votes cast for party-list groups whose names are in the
ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot
but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on
Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the
divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or
invalid.

FALLO:
1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming
the qualified party-list groups is denied for being moot and academic;
2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and
interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED
 51. Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
204486, April 2, 2013, 694 SCRA 486
- Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the
Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list elections for various
reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for
marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
- Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No.
The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang
Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the
cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two
aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:
Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-
defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-
defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always
been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since
theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major
political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they
do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list
elections will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who
lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the party-list system
provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a
political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case,
Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent
of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987
Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the
marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT
RESERVED for the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies. The common denominator
however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts
but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then
the system itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running
for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be

understood to include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It
should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among others,
in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are
not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized.