Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Department of Justice
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
Cynthia L. Crosby
Deputy Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Greer, Anne J.
Kelly, Edward F.
Kendall Clark, Molly
Userteam: Docket
Cite as: E-D-H-, AXXX XXX 523 (BIA Aug. 29, 2017)
In re: E -H
APPEAL
The respondent appeals from the Immigration Judge's March 13, 2017, decision denying his
claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.
Sections 208(b)(l)(A), 241(b)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
1158(b)(l)(A), 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. 1208.13, 1208.16-.18. The Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") opposes the appeal. We will remand the record for further
proceedings and issuance of a new decision.
We previously remanded the record for the Immigration Judge to reassess the findings in her
February 2, 2016, decision that the respondent's proposed particular social group, "indigent
Mexicans without familial support and with chronic and perceptible mental illness involving
psychosis," lacked the requisite particularity to be cognizable under the Act.1 In addition, we
remanded for the Immigration Judge to reassess whether the respondent had established a
likelihood of being harmed on account of his membership in the proposed particular social group.
We found the Immigration Judge's analogy to Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1161 (9th
Cir. 2013), which held that injustices arising from an inadequate health care system do not rise to
the level of persecution, to be misplaced because the respondent fears harm upon return based on
severe physical mistreatment or involuntary institutionalization due to his mental illness, not as
part of a group of individuals who lack resources to purchase medication.
1 We affirmed the Immigration Judge's finding that the proposed group of "Mexican men who are
presumed to be gang members because of visible gang tattoos" was not cognizable under the Act,
and the respondent has not further contested that issue (U at 19, March 13, 2017).
Cite as: E-D-H-, AXXX XXX 523 (BIA Aug. 29, 2017)
523
After accepting new evidence and hearing additional testimony on remand, the Immigration
Judge issued her decision on March 13, 2017, finding that the respondent's proposed particular
social group was sufficiently particular, but that it lacked social distinction, and therefore was not
cognizable under the Act (IJ at 21-27, March 13, 2017). The Immigration Judge denied the
respondent's claims for asylum and withholding of removal for this reason, and did not address
whether the respondent had established a well-founded fear or a likelihood of future persecution
We agree with the respondent that, on this record, including the record submitted on
remand, the proposed particular social group of "indigent Mexicans without familial support and
with chrome and perceptible mental illness involving psychosis" meets the requirements
of immutability, particularity, and social distinction to be cogniz.able under the Act. Matter of
W- G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 221(BIA 2014)(to be cogniz.able, a particular social group must be
1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, 2) defined with
particularity, and 3) socially distinct within the society in question); accord, Matter of M-E-V-G-,
26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014). Chronic psychosis is an immutable characteristic, and when
symptoms are manifest, individuals can be identifiable in this category. Thus, in our view, the
Immigration Judge erred in denying the respondent's applications for asylum and withholding of
removal for lack of a cognizable particular social group. (IJ at 27-28, March 13, 2017). We also
find that the respondent has established his membership in this particular social group.
We will remand the record, however, for the Immigration Judge to make findings of fact and
legal conclusions regarding whether the respondent has shown that the people who he fears will
harm him would be motivated to do so based on his membership in the particular social group.
See Matter of N-M-, 25 l&N Dec. 526, 532 (BIA 2011) (noting the significance of determining
whether the alleged persecutor is motivated by the protected trait). We recognize the Immigration
Judge's reasoning that the respondent has not demonstrated an inability to obtain medication or
outpatient treatment for his diagnosed schizophrenia(IJ at 33, March 13, 2017). While we do not
dispute that antipsychotic medication and mental health treatment exist in Mexico, we nonetheless
find clear error in the Immigration Judge's predictive findings of fact in this regard. Given the
respondent's diagnosis of schizophrenia and his regimen of medications, as well as the lack of
available resources upon return, particularly his family and treating doctors, we find it unlikely
that the respondent will be in a position to maintain his medication regimen, and likely that he will
decompensate and display symptoms of his illness.
The Immigration Judge should consider, however, whether the inability of law enforcement
and/or health care professionals in Mexico to appropriately respond to and treat the respondent's
schizophrenia is evidence of an intent to persecute or torture him for purposes of establishing his
eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, as well as protection under Article 3 of the
Convention Against Torture(IJ at 34, addressing this issue only in the context of the Convention).
See Matter ofN-M-, 27 I&N Dec. at 526(persecution requires intent on the part of the persecutor);
see also Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2008) (to establish a likelihood of
torture for purposes of the Convention Against Torture, the applicant must demonstrate that severe
pain or suffering was specifically intended).
Cite as: E-D-H-, AXXX XXX 523 (BIA Aug. 29, 2017)
523
ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion
and for entry of a new decision.
Cite as: E-D-H-, AXXX XXX 523 (BIA Aug. 29, 2017)
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IMMIGRATION COURT
1623 EAST J STREET, SUITE 3
TACOMA, WA 98421
OTHER:
COUR
IMMIGRATION COURT
>
FF
CC: GWENDOLYN FRANKS, ICE ASST. CHIEF COUNSEL
1623 E J STREET SUITE i2
TACOMA, WA, 98421
D H ,E In Removal Proceedings
Respondent
On February 16, 2016, the court ordered Respondent removed to Mexico and denied his
applications for asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against
Torture. See Decision of the Immigration Judge (Dec. 17, 2015) [hereinafter "U Decision"].
Respondent, through counsel, timely appealed the court's decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals ("Board"). The case is back before the court on remand from the Board for further
analysis of the respondent's eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal based on his
membership in the particular social group of "indigent Mexican without familial support and
with chronic and perceptible mental illness involving psychosis." Decision of the Board (Aug. 4,
1
2016) [hereinafter "BIA Decision"]. Specifically, the Board instructed the court "to detennine
whether the defining characteristics of [Respondent's] proposed group, including the behavior
manifestations of psychosis, have commonly accepted meaning within the society in question,
membership." Id. at 3. The Board, however, did not disturb the court's prior decision denying
Respondent's application for asylum and withholding of removal based on his membership in the
particular social group of "Mexican men who are presumed to be gang members because of
visible gang tattoos." Id at 2. Thus, the court hereby incorporates, in its entirety, its written
decision from February 16, 2016 to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the written decision
herein.
On September 22, 2016, Respondent appeared with counsel to an initial master calendar.
The court reset the hearing to allow Respondent's counsel time to submit additional evidence on
remand. On October 20, 2016, Respondent appeared with counsel at a continued master calendar
hearing. Again, counsel for Respondent requested additional time to submit evidence, but
requested the court proceed with scheduling an individual hearing to take additional testimony.
On February 9, 2017, the court heard additional testimony from Dr. WhitneyDuncan.
Il. Evidence
The court has considered all evidence of record whether or not specifically mentioned.
A. Exhibits
2
Conviction records
3
Borderland Beat, PRI Candidate wounded in Mexico attack, husband dies
(2013)
AP, Gang's Terror Felt Far from Drug War on U.S. Border (2011)
Disability Rights International, No Justice: Torture, Trafficking, and
Segregation in Mexico (2015) (excerpt)
Disability Rights International, The Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities
4
Report by Dr. Robert Kirkland, Ph.D.,
5
c
Franco Mascayano et al, Stigma toward mental illness in Latin America and
the Caribbean: a systematic review, Revista Brasileira de Psiquiatria (2016)
Rebeca Robles-Garcia et al, Mental illness recognition and beliefs about
adequate treatment of a patient with schizophrenia: Association with gender
and perception of aggressiveness-dangerousness in a community sample of
Mexico City, Int. J. Soc. Psychiatry (2012)
B. Testimony
1. Testimiitiy ofRespondent
The respondent is a twenty-six year-old male who is a native and citizen of Mexico. He
first came to the United States with his family when he was twelve years old. He testified they
had a normal life growing up in Mexico. His father used to travel to the United States to work.
He testified that his parents argued at times, but he was young and did not pay close
attention. He testified that his father mistreated him and his family. The mistreatment continued
in the United States. Later, his father asked him to leave the home when he was approximately
6
sixteen years old. He lived with a friend and worked in a restaurant to pay the rent. His mother
Respondent's last trip to Mexico was in 2006 when his mother passed away. He was in
They saw his tattoos and asked if he was Sureno, which Respondent explained is a gang of
people who live in the South Side. He said they tried to jump him. They said they could not be in
that neighborhood. Respondent and his cousin ran away. He testified he got in a fight several
times when he was in Mexico. He has not returned to Mexico since 2006.
He was arrested by the police because his father called the police. He is not sure why. He
was wearing baggy pants. The police told him that his father said he was not paying attention to
him and was stubborn. He was detained for five days. He reentered the United States two months
Respondent explained that he was not part of the Surenos gang when he was in Mexico.
However, he later became a member of the Surenos that same year. He has numerous tattoos:
clown tattoo, Sur, STC, Cry Now Smile Later, and other tattoos on his fingers. He is still a
- member of the Surenos, but he has decided that he no longer wishes to participate. He stopped
associating with the Surenos in 2012. He never told them anything about leaving due to his fear
that he would be harmed. For example, he feared he could have been stabbed or shot. He saw
such things and participated in harming others. He joined because there were other groups that
tried to jump them. He joined the group for support since he did not have any when he was
He first started having symptoms of schizophrenia between 2010 and 2011. He started
hearing voices. The voices wanted him to come with them. They were loud, and it startled him.
7
He heard a male voice in English, which scared him. He compared it to the "Devil's" voice. 1-:{e
was frightened and did not tell anyone. Later, he told his cousin, who suggested that Respondent
estimated he hears it once a month. When he hears the voice, he feels like a different person. He
described feeling like nothing would happen to him if he jumped off a bridge or threw himself in
front of a car. It would be like his "destiny." Other voices call him, but he ignores them.
He was arrested for burglary. He said he was hearing voices at the time. He explained it
was a problem with his father who did not treat him correctly. He felt his father was a coward
and dishonest. He testified the voices forced him to open the door. His father suspected him of
stealing $2,000. He denies the allegation. Respondent did not want to go to court because he ran
the risk of losing. He claims his father had to testify so he made up the theft. He was offered a
plea agreement and considered it a good deal. He was treated, prescribed medicine, and restored
He has not- spoken with his father because he does not want-to.
another gang. He does not think Mexico can treat his schizophrenia. He does not know if he can
get medication. He said something could happen to him, like "going mad."
He fears gangs because he might be in their territory. He might have to stay in his house.
He fears recruitment. He thinks that he will stand out to gang members because he has gang
tattoos.
8
On cross-examination, Respondent explained he was hanging out with a gang in Mexico,
but he was not ''jumped" in. (See also Exh. 7 at 8 (Respondent's declaration)). He was hanging
out with his cousin who was in a gang and his cousin's friends. In the declaration, Respondent
that is how they knew how that Respondent and his cousin were part of Sur 13. Id He testified
that each town belongs to a certain gang and that Santa Catarina is with Sur 13. He was attacked
in Juxtlahuaca because he was running with Sur 13 and they got in the other gang's territory. He
explained that he ran with the gang so they could back him up when he needed support. He had
not been invited to join the gang yet and was not formally a member. This is when his father
called the police. He was running with his cousin and the gang in Mexico. His father was mad
because Respondent was not getting up in the morning and had shaved his head. Id. Respondent
shaved his in Mexico. His father would not have accepted him bringing gang members to the
home.
Respondent does not have family in Mexico. His cousin is now in the United States.
Respondent agreed that he would not necessarily have to return to Oaxaca if Respondent
is removed to Mexico. However, Respondent believes that it is- not that easy to go-to a new place.
He could get disoriented or lost. He wants to stay with his younger sisters in the United States
His siblings went with him to Mexico for the funeral. They have not returned to Mexico after the
visit.
He was sentenced to thirteen months for the burglary offense. He received good time
credit. He did not seek any medical attention after the fights he got into in Mexico.
9
c
gang until (s)he is jumped in. He was running with the gang before he joined. In Mexico he
M.A. and Ph.D. in Latin American studies. He has military experience. He wrote a book "Drug
Cartel and Gang Violence in Mexico and Central America," which was published in 2015. He
Dr. Kirkland offered that it is likely respondent would suffer hann that is different than
2006 if he is removed to Mexico now because: 1) violence is worse; 2) there has been
fragmentation of the gangs (in fighting and violence); 3) MS 13 has become more linked with the
Zetas; and 5) respondent's mental health condition. Dr. Kirkland assumes that Respondent's
mental health condition has gotten worse since 2006 and that he may be taken advantage of.
He testified that the government of Mexico is doing the best it can. There are high profile
arrests of cartel leaders, but at the same time only 25% of crimes are investigated and only 2%
- -a.re prosecuted. He thinks the government will try to protect Respondent, but he does not think
Dr. Kirkland testified about police corruption in Mexico. He explained that the local
police are being replaced with state and federal police officers. He described corruption at the
local level. He said respondent's hometown is small. He does not believe that the police officers
in Respondent's home town would go after him if Respondent relocated to a large urban area.
However, he believes that Respondent would probably be caught up in gang violence though.
10
When individuals are deported, their criminal records are made available to the
authorities. He speculates that there are officers who monitor the records and might share
powerful group in Mexico from the Gulf of Mexico to the Mexico-Belize border. Id. at 11. He
claims the Zetas know if someone is removed. He said respondent is a member of Surenos, and
he would most likely join a rival gang in Mexico and be harmed. The gangs might know him
On cross-examination, Dr. Kirkland recently retired from the military. With the military,
he reported on intelligence and security in Latin America. He also taught. He has not visited
Mexico since 2003. He wrote about the role of the Mexican military in drug violence. He agreed
that the United States participates and cooperates in drug enforcement activities with the
Mexican authorities. He has not worked with the Mexican police. He testified that not every
police officer in Mexico is corrupt. There are officers at the federal and state level who are
competent. The Mexican government is taking measures to fight the cartels. There is a push to
move the federal resources to the local level because there is a lot less corruption at the federal
level than the local level. There is screening by the federal government of local officials. Since
2009, the military has been deployed to assist local officials, but there has been criticism of some
violence by the military. The federal government is trying to affect things at the local level.
He understands that the government is given information about who is being removed
and why when someone is removed to Mexico. He has heard about this but does not have
personal experience. He does not know what percentage of people have problems because of
11
He was asked about Z-42, but the witness does not know of him. This man was recently
captured. Dr. Kirkland acknowledges that the Mexican authorities are making arrests and trying
to make efforts to control the situation. He described the situation in Mexico as a "difficult
believes that Respondent would be at risk at the local level where respondent would be.
He thinks the gang violence in Oaxaca has gotten worse, though there is no travel
warning by the United States Department of State for that state. (Exh. 6 at 19). He described
On February 9, 2017, the court granted the motion for telephonic testimony by Dr.
Duncan as an accommodation under Matter ofM-A-M-. The court granted the motion by counsel
Her curriculum vitae is accurate and mostly up-to-date. She has issued other articles. Her
opinion report is in the record. See Exh. 18 5-13. In her report, Dr. Duncan referred to
chronically ill people who have no family support or economic means and who often
permanently reside in mental health institutions with little hope of returning to society in Mexico
as "abandonados" and "cronicos.'' Id at 7. It is her opinion that the terms, "abandonados" and
"cronicos" are commonly known and understood in the context of psychiatric care. Most people
would understand "abandonados" to mean individuals who have been abandoned in a mental
health institution and forgotten by society. The average person would not know the clinical
definition of psychosis, but generally people know what psychosis is and would recognize
someone showing symptoms of psychosis. Most people understand that psychosis involves
hallucinations and recognize that behavior as a symptom of psychosis. She has heard of some
12
abuses in psychiatric hospitals. She worked primarily with out-patient individuals. She has seen
allegations of mistreatment by mental health staff such as throwing food at patients and feeding
Duncan confirmed there is a lack of funding for mental health in Mexico and a lack of training of
mental health professionals. The budget for health care is low. She thinks the low budget reflects
how the Mexican government views mental health, i.e. a low budget for a low priority. There is
discrimination and stigma in allocating funds. She testified there are more funds dedicated for
AIDS treatment because it is deemed a higher priority by the government. She explained that
budget decisions are intentional decision and these decisions are rooted in the stigma toward
mental health. Underfunding is a constant problem for practitioners and there are on-going
The "Hidalgo Moder is an effort to move mental health care from a hospital setting to a
more community based treatment. The focus is more on psychiatric care and a reintegration of
patients into communities. There are also efforts to staff general clinics with psychiatric
professionals, and may less acute-forms -of care available.- She believes there has been little
success with the program because of underfunding. Rather, any success is very uneven and only
a few hospitals have implemented the models. In Oaxaca, they built villas for potential living
space but no patients currently live there. Many similar projects are begun, but never fmished. In
Oaxaca, the patients still live in a dorm-like setting and wear "uniforms." She does not think the
Respondent was originally from Oaxaca. His immediate family is in the United States.
He does not have a support network in Mexico. He has gang tattoos that are visible. He suffers
13
from schizophrenia. Even when medicated he becomes symptomatic. Dr. Duncan thinks it is
highly unlikely Respondent would be able to access medical care that he requires outside of an
institution. There is only one public mental health facility in Oaxaca. His original village is at
travel to the facility. Most people are accompanied with family members. Sometimes patients are
transported by police after been found on the street. Without a network and resources to pay for
private healthcare treatment, it would be very difficult for someone to get non-institutionalized,
out-patient treatment. In order to have psychiatric care covered through the public health
insurance would require effort to navigate the paperwork. There are some bureaucratic barriers to
obtaining healthcare. Also, some specialized psychotropic medications are not covered by the
Dr. Duncan acknowledged that is possible for Respondent to live in another city, for
example Mexico City that has more than one hospital. However, she thinks deportation as well
as relocation to an unknown city in Mexico could exacerbate his mental health condition. Even
in Mexico City where he would have more options for care, he would still have to get emolled in
the public health insurance and be compliant with this medical care without anyfamilialsupport
network.
On cross-examination, Dr. Duncan testified she has not testified for OHS as an expert.
She is being paid for her testimony by the Vera Institute. Most of her work is in research. She is
not formally or officially employed by immigrant rights advocacy groups. She has broader
expertise in Oaxaca and Latinos in the United States. She referenced the 2010 ORI report her
affidavit. The data referenced in her affidavit is at least six years old, but she also relied on recent
14
c
articles and literature from 2016. She has also returned to Mexico multiple times since her
original fieldwork.
She reached a conclusion about how the respondent would be treated in Mexico but she is
support system or support system of some kind to be successful in Mexico. Dr. Duncan assumes
Respondent will not have any support. She is aware Respondent has multiple U.S. citizen
In her declaration, she referenced interviews with mental health practitioners and patients
conducted in Oaxaca. The research and interviews she conducted provided the basis for her 2012
dissertation. For the most part, the patients she interviewed did not have active psychosis. She
concluded in her dissertation that the Oaxaca system was improving. She explained however that
psychiatric care was only one piece of her dissertation and the area she saw the most
improvement was access to less specialized forms of care, such as staffing psychiatrist at general
clinics. However, she recently published an article that public psychiatric care has not improved.
The closest public mental health facilities to Oaxaca is Puebla and Chiapis. Dr. Duncan
- estimated that about eight out of 46 hospitals have successfully implemented the Hidalgo Model.
Dr. Duncan agreed that there are public hospitals and generally medication is available at
public hospitals. She takes issue with how low the federal budget is for mental health care. She
has not reviewed state or local budgets for mental healthcare. She agreed mental health treatment
is a broad category that includes counseling for anxiety to individuals with active psychosis. Her
dissertation indicates that some services, such as HIV, do include a mental health component.
She agreed she is not a budget expert. She does not think the government properly funds mental
health services. She has compared the guidelines for proper mental health ftmding in Mexico to
15
other countries and deems it low. She agreed that federal funding is limited and governments
have to make decisions on how to allocate. She agreed that just because there are fewer funds
does not mean this is a low priority. For example, the government may be spending more money
to psychosis. She does not think it is it is reasonable to spend money on preventing access to
drugs as a means of preventing drug-related psychosis because there are plenty of mental
illnesses that are unrelated to drug use. Dr. Duncan thinks that many health organizations would
recommend more funding regardless of whether there is civil unrest in the country.
She confinned the people most at risk at those who have never received treatment. She
recognizes that Respondent does have a mental health diagnosis, has received treatment, and
takes medications to meet his needs. She detailed things that could happen to Respondent or
theorized what might happen to him, should he return to Mexico; including the worst possible
scenario.
Dr. Duncan confirmed the term "abandonados" is just the Spanish word for someone who
has been abandoned. This can refer to anyone, including children, but the media has used this
-tenn to refer to people with mental health issues who- languish in mental health institutions -
because their families do not want to care for them. This term refers to the abandoned situation,
not the specific mental health condition. She agreed the term refers to people with mental
illnesses other than psychosis, but it mostly refers to those in mental health institutions. If
respondent was returned to Mexico, he would not be sent to a mental health institution.
Dr. Duncan testified that people with psychosis can function very well if properly treated.
She does not think anyone should manage their care on their own they should have a medical
professional supervising any psychiatric treatment. Dr. Duncan agreed that people with
16
psychosis are not the only ones that can act in socially unacceptable ways; anyone can act in
socially unacceptable ways. It is her experience that people tend to assume a person who acts in
an aberrant or deviant way has a mental problem. She confirmed that her concern is that
On re-direct examination, Dr. Duncan was asked about the stigma of someone acting in
an erratic way. Dr. Duncan testified that public health workers have tried to educate people of the
symptoms of medical health issues. In Mexico, people manifesting symptoms could be referred
to as "crazy" or "loco," which are derogatory terms to describe people. She heard accounts of
mistreatment of people exhibiting symptoms by people around them in public. There is not a
deep understanding of mental illness in the general public. She stated, of course, not everyone
Dr. Duncan was asked about funding of mental health and perceives this as a
discriminatory attitude. If this was brought to the government's attention in the ORI report and
there has been little improvement. Dr. Duncan thinks the continued lack of funding reflects the
On re-cross, Dr. Duncan agreed that since the 2010 DRI report some changes have been
made in Mexico, but not the prevention of all abuses. She also testified that access to institutions
has been limited to some investigators. She is not sure how many hospitals were investigated.
m. Credibility
Respondent submitted his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
under the Convention Against Torture on August 26, 2015. Exh. 3. Therefore, his application is
subject to the credibility provisions of the REAL ID Act. Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42, 43
17
(BIA 2006) (finding all applications filed after May 11, 2005 subject to the REAL ID Act).
Pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005 103(a), the court "may base an adverse credibility
determination on any relevant factor that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances,
F.3d 1079, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir.
2010)). Additionally, inconsistencies that do not speak to the applicant's veracity should not be a
part of the basis of an adverse credibility finding. Id. Under the totality of the circumstances, the
INA 208(b)( l )(B)(iii); see also Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040 (''The above list is not exhaustive
because the trier of fact may also consider 'any other relevant factor."'). The Immigration Judge
may not ''cherry pick solely facts favoring an adverse credibility detennination while ignoring
facts that undermine that result." Id Instead, the Immigration Judge must consult all of the
The court reiterates its prior findings that Respondent and Dr. Robert Kirkland testified
credibly. Additionally, the court finds Dr. Whitney Duncan testified credibly.
A. Asylum
18
The court restates its finding that Respondent's conviction for burglary in the first degree
was not a particularly serious crime and he is eligible to apply for asylum and withholding of
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
INA 10 l (a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, an asylum applicant may demonstrate "refugee"
status in either of two ways: demonstrating past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution. See id; 8 C.F.R. 1208.B(b); see also Deloso v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 858, 863-64
On appeal, the respondent did not challenge the court's prior findings that Respondent
had not demonstrated past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of
his race and political opinion. BIA Decision at 2. Accordingly, the Board held those claims have
been waived. Id at 2 n.4. Also, as previously mentioned, the Board upheld the court's denial of
Respondent's claim for asylum and withholding of removal based on his membership in the
particular social group of "Mexican men who are presumed to be gang members because of
visible gang tattoos." Id at 2. Thus, the court will only address Respondent's claim he has a
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership in the particular social
group of "indigent Mexican without familial support and with chronic and perceptible mental
1. Future Persecution
19
In the absence of past persecution, an applicant may be eligible for asylum based on a
well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. 1208.13(b). A well-founded fear must be
subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Rusak v. Holder, 734 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir.
founded fear test is satisfied by an applicant's credible testimony that he genuinely fears harm.
See Ahmed, 504 F.3d at 1191; Sae/ v. Ashcroft, 3 86 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 2004). Because of
Respondent's mental health condition, the court will accept Respondent's subjective fear as
genuine. Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 l&N Dec. 609, 611 (BIA 2015). Thus, the court finds
removed to Mexico.
The objective prong may be satisfied "by adducing credible, direct, and specific evidence
in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear of persecution." Ladha v. INS, 215
F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Duarte de Guiniac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Abebe v. Mukasey, 554
F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en bane) (per curiam). The applicant's fear may be well
founded even if there is only a sligh -though discernible, chance of persecution based on a
protected ground. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987). "[E]ven a ten percent
chance of persecution may establish a well-founded fear." Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888
(9th Cir. 2001); see also Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2009). In determining
will affect the applicant's specific situation. Marcos v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (9th
Cir. 2005).
20
Respondent fears he will be subjected to numerous abuses, including severe physical
mistreatment_ in the future by members of the public, government officials or law enforcement
officers, or staff at one of Mexico's mental health facilities on account of his membership in the
For the following reasons, the court again finds Respondent's proposed social group of
"indigent Mexicans without familial support and with chronic and perceptible mental illness
involving psychosis" does not qualify as a cognizable particular social group. A particular social
group must be (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2)
defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question. See Reyes v.
Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1135-37 (9th Cir. 2016) (according Chevron deference to the Board's
definitions of particularity and social distinction); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA
2014); Matter ofW-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). An immutable characteristic is "one that
the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
individual to-change." Matter ofAcosta, 19 I&N Dec.211, 233-34 (BIA l985). The part_iculty
factor requires that the group not "be amorphous, overbroad, diffused, or subjective," and it
"must be defined by characteristics that provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls
within the group." M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 239; see also Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d
1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2013) (en bane). A proposed social group is "socially distinct," if the
society, in which the group exists, would perceive them as a group. M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at
21
On further review of the record, the court now agrees with Respondent and finds his
proposed group is defined by the requisite immutable characteristics and particularity; however,
the court further finds Respondent's particular social group lacks the third element of social
reference to immutable characteristics. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA
1985) (explaining that an imm utable characteristic is "one that the members of the group either
cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual
psychotropic medications can alleviate the symptoms of mental illness, an individual with a
mental health condition, such as schizophrenia, cannot change their diagnosis and will struggle
to manage the effects of their mental illness all their lives.See Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887,
896-97 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding the group of "individuals with bipolar disorder who exhibit
erratic behavior" possessed immutable characteristics because mental illness was incurable
despite being controllable with medication). Thus, the court finds that Respondent's mental
health condition is an immutable characteristic beyond his ability to change. See Tchoukhrova v.
Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1181, 1188-90-(9th Cir. 2-005) vacated on other grounds by Gonzales v.
Tchoukhrova, 549 U.S. 801 (2006) (finding that "Russian children with disabilities that are
serious and long-lasting or permanent in nature and parents who care for them" qualified as a
particular social group because long.;.lasting or near permanent disabilities were immutable
Second, the court agrees that Respondent's proposed social group is sufficiently precise
described "in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in
22
question, as a discrete class of persons." Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1091. Respondent's
proposed social group is formed by stringing together several adjectives that gradually narrow
the scope of the Mexican population to a particular subsect of people. First, Respondent limits
finds Mexican society recognizes as the poor, unfortunate persons who exist outside of the
typical social structure of the close-knit family unit. Exh. 18 at 7 (Dr. Duncan's Report); Exh. 18
at 22-31 (discussing the stigma by family members toward fellow family members with mental
illness and reliance on familial support). Second, Respondent further restricts the boundaries of
his proposed social group by limiting the group of "Mexicans without familial support" to only
those members who also have mental illnesses that are chronic, perceptible, and involve
psychosis. Contrary to DHS's argument, the court finds Respondent's proposed social group
meets the particularity requirement because it is defined by several clear, specific benchmarks
that determine who falls in the group. See M-E-V-G-, 26 l&N Dec. at 239. In fact, the court finds
the most particular limiting characteristic of Respondent's proposed social group is its
requirement that its members have a mental illness involving psychosis, which often causes them
- to exhibit outwardly visible.. and recognizable. symptoms, such as acting on auditory -or visual
hallucinations. The court agrees with Dr. Duncan that even Mexicans with little to no formal
education have a general understanding that a person with psychosis may experience auditory or
visual hallucinations. Exh. 18 at 7. The court notes its doubts that the additional nonphysical
attributes of being indigent and having a chronic mental illness may be too amorphous and
subjective to meet that particularity requirement. However, in the end, the court finds
Respondent's proposed social group is narrowly defined by precise limiting characteristics when
23
Yet, the court finds the same degree of specificity in Respondent's proposed social group
makes it difficult for Mexican society to view this particular subsect of people as belonging to a
distinct group. See Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1090 (explaining that the diversity of a
same group). A proposed social group is considered "socially distinct," if the society, in which
the group exists, would perceive them as a group. M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 240 ; see also W-G
R- 26 I&N at 216. Again, the applicant bears the burden of presenting some "society-specific"
evidence to demonstrate that the society in question "perceives, considers, or recognizes persons
sharing the particular characteristic to be a distinct or separate group within society." Pirir-Boc v.
Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014); M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 241. In addition to
society's perspective, the Immigration Judge should also consider the persecutor's perspective
relevant insofar as it reflects the views of the greater society and/or "play[s] a role in causing
members of society to view a particular group as distinct." M-E-V-G-, 26 l&N Dec. at 223, 242;
Pirir-Boc, 750 F.3d at 1083 n. 6. Respondent argues that his particular social group is socially
distinct because the media, health practitioners, and the general public refer to "indigent
Mexicans without familial support and with chronic and -perceptible mental i llness involving
First, the court finds the record evidence does not show the term "abandonados" is widely
used by Mexican society to refer to individuals like Respondent or that Mexican society uses the
term "abandonados" as a commonly accepted definition for indigent individuals with a chronic
perceptible mental illness involving psychosis. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 239;
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 l&N Dec. at 214. Rather, the evidence shows that the term "abandonados"
is typically used only by individuals in the mental health field, such as practitioners, institution
24
staff, and advocacy NGOs, like Disability Rights International, who coined the term
"abandonados" to draw attention to the plight of mentally ill individuals who languish in mental
health institutions because their families do not want to or cannot afford to care for them. See
"cronicos" are commonly known and understood in the context of psychiatric care. Outside the
context of mental health care, there is nothing in the record showing that Mexican society has by
and large adopted either " abandonado" or "cronico" to refer to "indigent Mexicans without
familial support and with chronic and perceptible mental illness involving psychosis.',.
Instead, the evidence shows that due to a "deeply rooted mix of cultural and
socioeconomic factors" the general Mexican population broadly views individuals with mental
illness as "loco" or "crazy" without regard to the various types of mental illness the persons
have. Exh. 7 at 573-577 (CNN, Stigma Haunts Mentally RI Latinos (Nov. 15, 2010); see also id
at 539-572 ("No Soy loco at p. 7). And this notion of painting the mentally ill with a broad brush
is exacting what the term "abandonados" does. As Dr. Duncan admitted in court, the term
"abandonados" broadly refers to mentally ill patients in institutions, not just those with chronic,
- perceptible mental illnesses -involving psychosis. Although there is evidence Latinos make some
distinctions among the mentally ill, such as between those who exhibit violent, aggressive
behavior and those who do not as well as between those who require medication and those who
do not, there is no evidence that Mexican society would differentiate between a bipolar
person with psychosis. Id ("No Soy loco at p. 7). Yet, a bipolar individual exhibiting perceptible
symptoms of mental illness would not fall within the tightly defined parameters of Respondent's
proposed social group. Respondent also argues that use of the term by the media in news articles
25
shows Mexican society has adopted the term. The court disagrees. A closer look at the record
reveals that all of the articles mentioning the term come from American news sources and every
time an article used the term "abandonados" it was referring to the Disability Rights International
Second, despite Respondent and Dr. Duncan's assertions that these terms specifically
refer to individuals in Respondent's proposed group, the court finds these terms broadly refer
patients in mental health institutions. Exh. 16 at 17-18, 21. The record evidence makes clear that
mental health institution staff and use the term "abandonados" to refer to individuals who
pennanently reside in a mental health institution. However, Respondent's proposed social group
is not limited to individuals who reside in mental health institutions in any way. Rather,
Respondent's proposed social group refers to all "indigent Mexicans without familial support
and with chronic and perceptible mental illness involving psychosis" whether they are housed at
an in-patient facility, out-patient facility, or never received mental health treatment. Thus, the
court finds Respondent's argument puts the cart before the horse by assuming that Respondent
The court acknowledges that a colloquial term in a country's lexicon used to refer to
certain group of people is strong evidence that the society in question views those people as
socially distinct. See Maner ofA-R-C-G-, 26 l&N Dec. 388, 393 (BIA 2014) (looking to whether
certain attributes in a proposed social group have commonly accepted definitions); see also
Temu, 740 F.3d at 890 (finding Tanzanian society's label of "mwenda wazimu," which means
"demon possessed" evidence of social visibility). However, the key to social distinction is that
when two people use the same term, they are referring to the same people. That is just not the
26
case here. As Dr. Duncan admitted in court the tenn "abandonados" is just the Spanish word for
someone or something that has been abandoned. While mental health professionals use the word
to describe the long-term institionalized population, the same term could be used to refer to a
the mental health field have imbued the term with a secondary meaning to describe people who
have been abandoned in a mental health institution, this secondary meaning must be commonly
Accordingly, because the court finds Respondent has failed to demonstrate his proposed
social group of "indigent Mexicans without familial support and with chronic and perceptible
mental illness involving psychosis" is socially distinct, the court denies Respondent's claim for
B. Withholding of Removal
demonstrates it is "more likely than not" that his "life or freedom would be threatened" on
account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. INA 24l(b)(3); 8--C.F.R. 1208.16; see also Zhang. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d
713, 718 (9th Cir. 2004). One of the protected grounds must be "a reason" for the claimed
persecution, which is "a less demanding standard than 'one central reason'" for asylum. See
Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017). A showing of past persecution
There is no statutory deadline for bringing an application for withholding of removal. El-Himri
v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2004). "The clear probability standard for withholding
of removal is more stringent than the well-founded fear standard governing asylum," and the
27
applicant must present "objective evidence" establishing the likelihood of persecution. Zehatye v.
Gonzales, 453 FJd 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006). There is no discretionary element; if the
applicant establishes eligibility, withholding of removal must be granted. See INA 24l(b)(3).
membership in a legally cognizable particular social group. Thus, the Court finds Respondent
has not met his burden of showing it is more likely than not his membership in a valid particular
social group would be "a reason" for the claimed persecution in the future. Accordingly, the
Because the Board did not reach the court's prior findings on Respondent's claim for
protection under the Convention against Torture, the court rests on its prior analysis.
1208.16, 1208.17, 1208.18; see also Matter ofG-K-, 26 l&N Dec. 88, 93 (BIA 2013). An
applicant for protection under the Convention Against Torture has the burden of proving that it is
more likely than not that he or she will be tortured if removed to the proposed country. Al-Saher
v. INS; 268 F-.3dH43, 1147 (9th Cir. 200l) (quoting--8 CF.R 20816(c)(2)); see also-Matter-of
M-B-A-, 23 l&N Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2002). "Torture" is defined as:
8 C.F.R. 1208.18(a){l). "Torture is an extreme fonn of cruel and inhuman treatment [that] does
not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do not
28
amount to torture" and "does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
208.18(a)(l); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). "Acquiescence" requires
that the official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and
thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity." 8 C.F.R.
208.18(a)(7); see also Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1059 (9th Cir. 2006).
The Court must consider all evidence relevant to the likelihood of future torture to
determine if the applicant has met his or her burden of proof, including but not limited to: "past
torture inflicted upon the applicant;" "evidence that the applicant could relocate" to another part
of the country where it is unlikely he will be tortured; "gross, flagrant, or mass violations of
human rights" in the applicant's cowitry of removal; and "other relevant information regarding
conditions" in the applicant's country. 8 C.F.R. 1208.16(c)(3); see also Maldonado v. Lynch,
786 F.3d 1155, 1162-64 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining the burden of proof with the 8 C.F.R.
protection). Country conditions "can play a decisive role in granting relief under the [Convention
Against Torture]." Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
negative credibility finding did not preclude Convention Against Torture relief when country
human rights violations alone is insufficient to show that a particular applicant would be in
danger of torture if returned to that country. See Matter of S-V-, 22 I&N Dec. 1306, 1313 (BIA
29
2000), disagreed with on other grounds by Zheng, 332 F.3d 1186 (holding that human rights
Respondent fears that he will more likely than not be tortured if he is removed to Mexico.
application that he fears (1) that he will be "beaten up or killed by gang members" because they
will think that he is a member of a different gang on account of his gang-related tattoos and (2)
that he will be "abuse[d]" because of his schizophrenia. Id at 6. Respondent did not specifically
testify about his fear of torture in Mexico beyond his general fear of harm in Mexico from gangs
or due to his mental health condition. For ease, the court addresses Respondent's application as
two separate claims, but the court finds that Respondent has not established that the aggregate
risk of harm he faces demonstrates that he will more likely than not be tortured. See Cole v.
Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 775 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an applicant for relief under the
Convention Against Torture ''must establish that, taking into account all possible sources of
torture, he is more likely than not to be tortured, by or with the consent or acquiescence of the
government").
l. Harmbygangs
Respondent fears that he will more likely than not be tortured by opposing gang members
because he will stand out due to his gang-related tattoos. (See Exh. 4 at 6). Specifically,
Respondent argues that he will more likely than not be tortured in Mexico "by government actors
or with the government's acquiescence because of the combination of his former membership in
a U.S. prison gang, his visible gang tattoos, his indigenous ethnicity, his status as a criminal
deportee from the United States, and his perceptible mental illness, which leads to disruptive
behavior." (Exh. 9 at 2). For Respondent to succeed with his application for relief, he must show
30
that each step in a hypothetical chain ofevents is itselfmore likely than not to occur. Matter ofJ
First, the court finds that Respondent has not been tortured in the past in Mexico by gang
and associated with his cousin, a gang member, when Respondent was last in Mexico in 2006,
the only harm Respondent suffered was involvement in gang fights. There is no evidence that
Respondent was particularly targeted at any point or that the fights inflicted "severe pain or
suffering" that could rise to the level of torture. As discussed above, the court finds that
Respondent did not suffer past persecution, a lower fonn of hann than torture. Thus,
Respondent's claim for reliefis entirely premised on his risk of future torture ifhe is removed to
Mexico.
The court acknowledges that Respondent has presented a large amount of evidence that
recent deportees from the United States, particularly individuals who have lived in the United
States for significant lengths of ti.me are at an above average risk ofbeing targeted by cartels or
gangs in Mexico. See, e.g., Exh. 7 at 188-213. Additionally, Respondent presented evidence that
individuals with visible gang tattoso are often viewed with suspicion and thatindividuals with
mental health conditions often have trouble with gangs/cartels, either because they are seen as
easy targets or because they are unable to properly internalize and follow the gang's rules. See,
e.g., id at 19, 20-22. Respondent thus is at a risk of hann due to his residence in the United
However, the court finds that Respondent has not shown that this risk rises to the level of
more likely than not being subjected to torture by gangs operating with the consent or
31
officials. Mexico struggles with a high level of cartel-led violence and official corruption. See,
e.g., id at 214-17; Exh. 8 at 11. Nevertheless, the Mexican government is actively taking action
to fight back against the cartels, and key cartel leaders have been arrested or killed in recent
working to combat the cartels and cartel violence. See Exh. 7 at 15 (referring to local law
enforcements efforts against the Zetas); Exh. 8 at 10-11 (discussing President Nieto' s and
President Calderon's use of the Mexican security forces to combat the cartels). While progress
may be slow, the court finds that the country conditions materials do not establish that the
government of Mexico, at the national or local levels, would remain willfully blind or otherwise
acquiesce to the torture of its citizens at the hands of its own police.
Additionally, the court finds that Respondent can effectively avoid the risk of hann he
fears by either returning to his hometown or by relocating within Mexico. The court understands
that the Zetas cartel is the dominant cartel in the state of Oaxaca and that Respondent fears harm
from MS-13 members affiliated with the Zetas. See e.g., id at 13. However, Respondent did not
,
have any trouble in his hometown of Santa Catarina when he returned to Mexico in 2006 despite
his gang-tattoos -and affiliation with his cousin who was in the gang. Instead; Respondent only
had trouble with other gangs when he left his town and went to a nearby city, Santiago
Juxtlahuaca. (See Exh. 7 at 8 (Respondent's declaration)). Although the z.etas may dominate
Respondent's home state of Oaxaca, there is no evidence that the gang activity in Respondent's
town specifically has changed since he was last in Mexico. If, however, Respondent fears harm
in his hometown, he also could relocate within Mexico. All parts of Mexico do not suffer from
the same level of commonplace cartel activity and violence; eleven Mexican states, including the
federal district, do not have any United States Department of State travel warnings for
32
individuals travelling to the country, indicating they are relatively safe portions of the country
compared with other states. (See Exh. 6 at 15-22). Respondent argues that it would be
unreasonable to expect him to relocate to avoid harm because he is unfamiliar with Mexico and
that he can only access treatment or medication for schizophrenia in one portion of the country.
Respondent indicated in his 1-589 application that he worked in restaurants and at a warehouse in
the United States, positions that are available in many areas of Mexico. (Exh. 4 at 5).
Respondent also presented a large amount of evidence regarding the conditions and
treatment of individuals with mental health conditions in mental health institutions in Mexico.
(See generally Exh. 7 at 228-376, 400-538). The court th.us understands that Respondent is afraid
of being tortured at a Mexican mental health institution. Again, for Respondent to succeed with
his application for relief, he must show .that each step in a hypothetical chain of events is itself
more likely than not to occur. Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. at 917-18. The court finds that
Fi the court finds that Respondent has provided only mere speculation that-he-will be
unable to control his schizophrenia through medication or other less intrusive or invasive means
in Mexico. Although Respondent was previously institutionalized for approximately two months,
Respondent had not yet been diagnosed with schizophrenia at that point and was not aware of his
condition. (See Exh. 7 at 9). Now, however, Respondent is aware of his condition and the need to
take medication and seek treatment. There is no evidence that Respondent cannot seek and
33
Respondent is not more likely than not to be tortured in a Mexican mental health institution.
Torture is defined as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
requirement has been construed so as to require a showing that the government actor has the
specific intent to torture, aka a specific intent to "inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering." Matter of J-E-, 23 I&N Dec. at 298 (citing 8 C.F.R. 208.18(a)(5)). The Ninth
Circuit addressed the issue of intent in Villegas v. Mukasey, a case presenting substantially
similar factual circumstances as the respondent's. 523 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2008). In Villegas, the
applicant claimed that he would be subjected to torture in the form of living in inhumane
conditions should he be forced to return to Mexico and placed in a mental health facility due to
his bipolar disorder. Villegas, 523 F.3d at 989. The Ninth Circuit noted that while the evidence
indicated that Mexican patients at mental health facilities were "housed in terrible squalor," there
was simply no evidence ''that Mexican officials (or private actors to whom officials have
acquiesced) created these conditions for the specific purpose of inflicting suffering upon the
patients." Id. The court accordingly dismissed the applicant's claim under the Convention
Against Torture. Id
In this case, the court finds that Respondent has not presented any evidence that
illustrates that Mexican officials intend to cause patients any suffering that rises to the level of
torture. Although there are reports of all-too-often substandard and unsanitary conditions at
Mexican mental health institutions where restraints and other controversial treatments may be
used, Respondent has not provided any evidence that these conditions or tools are used with the
intent to torture patients. In fact, the health care providers at Mexico's mental health institutions
34
. .
cite many reasons for the use of restraints, including the prevention of f alls and the control of
self-injurious, disruptive, or otherwise difficult behavior, and explain that such tactics are used
because of a shortage of staff members to provide alternative care. (See Exh. 7 at 314).
D. Voluntary Departure
To be eligible for post-conclusion voluntary departure, the respondent must (1) have been
physically present in the United States for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the
date the NTA was served; (2) be a person of good moral character for at _least five years
immediately preceding the respondent's application for voluntary departure; (3) not be
237(a)(4), as an alien deportable for security grounds; and (4) have the means to depart the
United States and the intention to do so. INA 240B(b)( l )(A)-(D); 8 C.F.R. 1240.26(c); see
also INA IOl(t) (laying out the requirements for a find of "good moral character").
Additionally, voluntary departure is a privilege, and the respondent must show that he is entitled
. to-.a favorable exercise of discretion by the immigration judge, even if the respondent otherwise
meets the statutory requirements. See Matter of Arguelles-Campos, 22 I&N 811, 816-17 (BIA
voluntary departure, the court must weigh the relevant adverse and positive factors, including the
alien's prior immigration history; criminal history, if any; length of his residence in the United
States; and extent of his family, business, and societal ties in the United States. Matter of
35
. '
The court finds that the respondent meets the minimum statutory requirements for the
relief of post-conclusion voluntary departure. However, the court denies the respondent's request
as a matter of discretion. The most significant positive equity in favor the respondent is his
residence in the United States to commit a wide range of criminal offenses, including multiple
(See Exh. 3 at 3-4). The respondent was granted cancellation of removal in 2012, but he
continued to engage in criminal activity, demonstrating a lack of respect for this country's
immigration laws and the benefit afforded him in the past. Id The respondent did not submit any
evidence of significant ties to the United States, such as a long-term employment, property
ownership, or a spouse or children who live in the United States. Although Respondent indicated
in his 1-589 application that his father and four of his siblings live in the United States,
V. Orders
36