G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC.

,
petitioner ,
vs
. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENTAND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FORESTDEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS
DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondents

FACTS: On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreement with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, represented by then Secretary Jose Feliciano,
wherein it was issued an exclusive license to cut, collect and remove timber except prohibited
species within a specified portion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located
in the municipality of Maddela, province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965until June 30,
1990.However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development
(Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging
operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a
memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena. Subsequently,
petitioners timber license agreement was cancelled. He sent a letter addressed to then
President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in
support thereof its contributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given the
opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations, but no favorable
action was taken on his letter; Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half of the area
formerly covered by petitioners TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty
Corporation under a new TLA which was set to expire on July 31,2009, while the other half was
allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license.
The latter entities were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos. Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent a
letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2,
1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR], seeking: (1) the
reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during the
Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks
Development and Realty Corporation without public bidding and in violation of forestry laws,
rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order allowing petitioner to take possession of
all logs found in the concession area. However, petitioner's request was denied. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that the timber license
agreement issued to private respondent be declared null and void. The MNR however denied
this motion. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the
President. The Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filed with the Court a petition
for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction,

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek the nullification of the Bureau orders
cancelling his timber license agreement and the granting of TLA to private respondent, which
were issued way back in 1983 and1984, respectively.
HELD:NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for certiorari within a reasonable period of
time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverse legal consequences of laches. Laches is
defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule is that unreasonable delay on the part of a
plaintiff in seeking to enforce an alleged right may, depending upon the circumstances, be
destructive of the right itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who sleep
upon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions
in 1983 and 1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not
deprived of the opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the
time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a
more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and
against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government
agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests
of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public
policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion
possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve
and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of
utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein.
They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the
due process of law clause.

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA

(Davide, Jr., 1996)

A search warrant has a lifetime of 10 days. It could be served at any time within 10 days. If its
object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following
day or days until completed, provided it is within the 10 day period.

FACTS: On 1 April 1990, Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID),acting on information
that a huge pile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of Mustang
Lumber, conducted a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard. The team saw a truck loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber coming out of the lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce
the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its
cargo and impounded them at DENR compound. On 3 April 1990, RTC Valenzuela issued a
search warrant. On same day, the team seized from the lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings
and slabs, narra lumber, and various species of lumber and shorts. On 4 April 1990, team
returned to lumberyard and placed under administrative seizure (owner retains physical
possession of seized articles, only an inventory is taken) the remaining lumber because Mustang
Lumber failed to produce required documents upon demand. Upon recommendation of SAID
Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran suspended Mustang Lumbers permit and confiscated in favor
of the govt the seized articles. Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles,
and questioned the validity of the April 1 and 4 seizure. RTC held that the warrantless seizure
on April 1 is valid as it comes within the exceptions where warrantless seizure is justified
(search of a moving vehicle), and April 4seizure was also valid pursuant to the search warrant
issued on April 3. CA affirmed. Mustang lumber filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: a) WON the search and seizure on April 4 was valid.

HELD: Yes. The search and seizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were all valid. valid. (1) April 1
search was conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully conducted without a search
warrant. (2*) The search on April 4 was a continuation of the search on April 3 done under and
by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Osorio. Under ROC Rule
126Sec 9, a search warrant ahs a lifetime of 10 days.
The foregoing disquisitions should not, in any manner, be construed as an affirmance of the
respondent Judge's conclusion that lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, as amended, and thus possession thereof without the required legal documents is not
a crime. On the contrary, the SC rules that such possession is penalized in the said section
because lumber is included in the term timber. The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition
of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) PD 705.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CELESTINA NAGUIAT

(GR.NO. 134209, Jan. 24, 2006)
Facts:
This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by Celestina Nuguiat located
at Botolan, Zambales. Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is theowner of the said parcels of
land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the
same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga, and Fausto Monje and their predecessor
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than 30 years. The Republic filed an
opposition to the application on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the lands in question since June12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the monuments of title and tax
payment receipts of applicant do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide
acquisition of the lands applied for, and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

Issue:

Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain and the applicants registration of title will prosper.

Held:

Applicants registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because
the said land is a public forest lands. Forest lands unless declassified and released by positive
act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable and agricultural lands of
the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation. Forests, in the context of both
Public Land act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of
woodland or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees and under brush.Here, respondent
never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official
proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. For unclassified
land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

Provent Tree Farm, INC (PTFI) vs Batario

G.R. No. 92285 March 28, 1994

FACTS:
Petitioner PTFI is a Philippine corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It grows
Gubas trees in its plantations which it supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for
production of matches. In consonance with the state policy to encourage qualified persons to
engage in industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the Revised Forestry Code confers on
entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban against importation of wood
and "wood-derivated" products. On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. International
Corporation (AJIC) imported 4containers of matches from Indonesia and 2 or more containers
of matches from Singapore. On 25 April 1989, upon request of PTFI, Secretary Factoran of the
DENR issued a certification that "there are enough available softwood supply in the Philippines
for the match industry at reasonable price." In light of this, PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a
complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a TRO against respondents Commissioner
of Customs and AJIC to enjoin the latter from importing matches and "wood-derivated"
products, and the Collector of Customs from allowing andre leasing the importations. The case
was raffled to respondent Judge Demetrio M. Batario. Lower court ruled in favor of
respondents, stating that it had "no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal
importations.

"ISSUE:
W/N The Commissioner of Customs under Sec. 1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code andnot the
regular court, has "exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an importation, and other
incidental matters relating to such.

YES.RATIO: The enforcement of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of Customs, and direct recourse of
petitioner to the Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the
ban is devoid of any legal basis. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably
be based on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an
usurpation of the prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Customs. Also, PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs
contesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

PEOPLE V. QUE

FACTS:

Provincial task force officers found Que transporting lumber loaded in his truck along Marcos
Highway. Que was asked of the documents required in transporting lumber but was not able to
provide these documents. Que was found guilty in violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705, as amended
by E.O. No. 277 and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Sec. 68 of P.D.
705 provides penalty for the illegal cutting as well as possession of forest products including
lumber. Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that DENR, the regulating body, did not provide
any guidelines nor list of documents required in the transportation of lumber. His goods were
also seized illegally without provided a search warrant.

ISSUE: WON E.O. No. 277 contains the necessary rules and regulations for the transport of
lumber.

HELD: YES. The phrase existing forest laws and regulations refers to the law in effect at the
time of the enactment of E.O. 277. Petitioners interpretation that no existing forest laws and
regulations puts the statute under fire. Statutory Construction should not kill but give life to the
law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of the
possession of timber or other forest products. DENR has a pre-existing order, Administrative
Order No. 59 of 1993 specify the documents required for the transport of timber and other
forest products. It is clear, therefore that the accused was well aware of the documents needed
for the legal transport of lumber