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February 2008

One of the most interesting features of the Lula years has been a pessimistic
view of the international system combined with a belief that there is scope for
an activist and assertive foreign policy.

Lulas Brazil:
A Rising Power, but Going Where?
Andrew Hurrell

s the world enters a period of increas- Condoleezza Rice put it: In the twenty-first cen-
ing challenges to us hegemony, attention tury, emerging nations like India, China, Brazil,
shifts naturally to rising powers, emerg- Egypt, Indonesia, and South Africa are increasingly
ing nations, threshold states, and regional powers. shaping the course of history. . . . But there are
Such states obviously will be central to the dynam- other reasons to focus on Brazilian foreign policy.
ics of the balance of power in the twenty-first For many on the left (especially in Europe), for
century, as well as to the possible emergence of many inside Brazil, and for many in the developing
new concert-style groupings of major powers. But world, the assertive foreign policy of the govern-
these states will also be crucial to the development ment of President Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (Lula)
of international institutions and global governance. is seen as a progressive force in global affairs.
Indeed, the current detachment fromor outright Lula and the Workers Party government may
opposition toexisting international organizations well have been tainted at home by corruption and
on the part of many of these nations represents one an association with old-style Brazilian machine
of the most important weaknesses in the global politics. They may have followed an orthodox
institutional order. domestic macroeconomic policy and made little
Think of the major emerging economies dis- progress on structural reforms in areas such as
tancing themselves from the World Bank and Inter- taxation, land redistribution, or tackling violent
national Monetary Fund, or the opposition (led by crime. Nonetheless, Brazils foreign policy (along
Brazil and India) to developed countries prefer- with its conditional cash-transfer program to
ences in the World Trade Organization (wto), or reduce poverty) is widely regarded as a great suc-
the effective breakdown of the global aid regime in cess story, as well as a potential bellwether for the
the face of the emergence of new aid donors such global strategies of other emerging powers.
as China and India. These countries are substan-
tively critical to the management of major global A nationalist worldview
challenges such as climate change and nuclear The Lula government that came to power in
proliferation. And they are procedurally critical if January 2002 sought to differentiate its own more
international institutions are to reestablish legiti- assertively nationalist foreign policy from that of
macy and a degree of representativeness. its predecessor, which it portrayed as insufficiently
Ranking just after China and India, Brazil fig- resolute in the defense of Brazilian interests and
ures prominently in almost all lists of emerging too closely tied to the acceptance of the liberalizing
states and regional powers. As us Secretary of State and globalizing agenda of the 1990s. The incoming
administration brought with it a view of foreign
policy that stressed both the instability of the inter-
Andrew Hurrell is director of the Center for International national environment and the growing concentra-
Studies at Oxford University and a faculty fellow of Nuffield tion of political and military power, wealth, and
College, Oxford. He is the author of On Global Order: Power,
Values, and the Constitution of International Society ideological sway on the part of the United States
(Oxford University Press, 2007). and its developed-country allies.
52 CURRENT HISTORY February 2008

Reflecting a deep-rooted strand of nationalist needs to form coalitions with other developing
thought in Brazil (on both right and left), this states in order to reduce its external vulnerability
approach to foreign affairs regards the global and increase its bargaining power, and to work,
economy as containing more constraints and however modestly, toward a more balanced world
snares than opportunities. It views globaliza- order. Brazil should seek to increase, if only by a
tion as a force working to reinforce the power of margin, the degree of multipolarity in the world,
the developed world while creating new sources as the foreign minister, Celso Amorim, put it.
of instability (especially in relation to recurrent Building up technological capacity also mat-
financial crises) and promoting politically dan- ters, as can be seen in Brazils determination to
gerous and morally unacceptable inequality (both continue protecting its industrial base. Because
within and across countries). the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas is
Political power, according to this view, was seen as a threat in this regard, the Lula adminis-
used throughout the postcold war period to tration has downplayed and significantly diluted
incorporate developing economies into the the negotiations. Likewise, the government has
globalized system. Developed nations and the placed renewed emphasis on the long-term goal
international institutions that they control have of developing the countrys nuclear technological
exploited developing countries external finan- capacity (seeking to preserve industrial secrets
cial vulnerability, created new forms of coercion while maintaining good relations with the global
and conditionalities, and imposed new economic inspection regime).
norms that have generally reflected and reinforced
their own political power and the interests of the The multilateral route
core economies. The cornerstones of Brazilian foreign policy
Even before the presidency of George W. have followed from this general outlook. The Lula
Bush, many in Brazil and in particular many years have witnessed efforts to increase Brazils
who later were associated with the Lula gov- presence in international institutionsincluding
ernment suspected that the liberal norms of the a (so far unsuccessful) campaign for permanent
1990s concerning human rights, democracy, and membership in the un Security Council, and a
free markets had been used in selective ways to (successful) drive to join the core group of states
reflect narrow national interests. Since the ter- negotiating in the World Trade Organizations
rorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many have Doha Round of talks. Brazil has sought to expand
suspected Washington of exploiting new security relations with other major developing countries
threats to mobilize support at home and abroad especially India, China, and South Africawhile
for the projection and expansion of us power. launching a more activist policy toward Africa and,
Within this harsh and conflict-oriented view to a lesser extent, the Middle East.
of the international system, Brazil is seen as The Lula administration has also intensified
vulnerableon one hand because of its internal relations within South America. It has attempted
inequalities, social cleavages, and incomplete to deepen and broaden Mercosur, the common
development and, on the other, because of its market that, in addition to Brazil, includes Argen-
continued external weaknesses and its absence tina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and now Venezuela. Lulas
from international decision-making structures. apparent aim is to shift Mercosurs focus from
Yet the country is not without options. Indeed, purely economic relations toward the develop-
one of the most interesting features of the Lula ment of a political bloc. And Brazil has launched
years has been a pessimistic view of the interna- the Union of South American nations, a fledgling
tional system combined with a belief that there is intergovernmental organization that will unite
scope for an activist and assertive foreign policy. Mercosur with the regions other major free-trade
Foreign policy discussions repeatedly invoke the bloc, the Andean Community, as part of a continu-
idea that Brazil is not small or insignificant and ing process of South American integration.
that it has room to maneuver in a world where, Brazilian officials have sought to portray for-
despite all the challenges, unipolarity is more eign policy as the external face of the Lula govern-
apparent than real. ments domestic social commitment. As Lula put
Facing hegemonic structures of power, Brazil it: Alongside the theme of security, the interna-
needs to reassert its national autonomy, accord- tional agenda should also privilege those issues
ing to the currently prevalent line of thinking. It which aim at the eradication of asymmetries and
Lulas Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where? 53

injustices, such as the struggle against social and of thought, and some critics have interpreted the
cultural exclusion, the genuine opening of the Lula foreign policy in terms of nostalgia for the
markets of the rich countries, the construction of idea of Brasil-potncia (Brazil as a power).
a new financial architecture, and the imperative of The third-worldism (terceiro-mundismo) of the
combating hunger, disease, and poverty. Lula years also feeds into another debate with deep
In keeping with both its perceived identity and historical roots that reflects the complex origins of
its power-related interests, Brazil continues to for- Brazils international identity. On one hand, Brazil
swear a hard-power strategy in favor of a heavy was formed as part of the process of European colo-
emphasis on multilateralism. The Lula adminis- nial settlement, a process that involved subjugation
tration is attempting to exploit what one observer of indigenous peoples. Brazils elites have seen them-
has called Brazils diplomatic gnp : its capacity selves as part of the West in cultural and religious
for effective coalition-building and insider activ- terms and the country harbors a strong tradition of
ism within international institutions, as well as liberalism, including Western ideas about interna-
its ability to frame its own interests in terms of tional law and society. On the other hand, Brazilian
arguments for greater justice. Thus, mobilizing society has been shaped by the legacies of colonial-
claims for greater representational fairness (as ism and poverty, the imperatives of economic devel-
with membership in the Security Council) and opment, and longstanding connections to Africa,
distributional justice (as with the promotion of the Middle East, and Asiaconnections created
a global hunger fund) most powerfully by
has been a central the slave trade but
tool of Brazils recent Brazil has been viewed in Washington also by other waves of
foreign policy. immigration.
Notwithstanding as a potentially moderating force in the This duality has
this concentration on region, especially in relation to Chvez remained an impor-
soft power, however, in Venezuela and Morales in Bolivia. tant element of Brazil-
it is worth noting that ian discussions about
the past five years have where the country
seen the first glimmering of a more focused discus- fits in. The cold war years witnessed a persistent
sion of links between foreign policy and military and often highly politically charged debate as to
strategy. This has few concrete implications for cur- whether Brazil was part of the West in its battle
rent policy, but it represents a new development that against communism and the Soviet Union or a
could have a significant impact in the future, espe- member of the third world in its struggle for devel-
cially if security relations in the region deteriorate. opment and a greater role in international affairs.

A return to history? Embracing the third world

Where does Lulas foreign policy fit within In general terms, the developmentalist line won
the broader historical picture? How much does out. Brazil came to place great emphasis on the pur-
it represent a sharp discontinuity with the past? suit of national autonomy, the politicization of inter-
In fact, assertions that Brazil is destined to play a national economic relations, and complaints against
more influential role in world affairs have a long the freezing of the international power structure
history inside the country. The intensity of these by the powers that be. By the end of the 1960s the
predictions has varied across time. At times ideas close alignment with the United States that followed
about national greatness have been little more than a coup in 1964 had given way to a broader and more
vague aspirationshardly tied to practical political pragmatic approach. Relations with Washington var-
action or concrete foreign policies and commonly ied between cool and distant, and Brazil sought to
engendering a good deal of cynicism. At other diversify its foreign and economic relations, expand-
times they have assumed a much more direct role ing ties with Western Europe, Japan, the socialist
in the shaping of foreign policy, as in the 1970s countries, and, increasingly, the third world.
when high growth rates seemed to establish Brazil Thus, Brazil played a prominent role in such
as an upwardly mobile middle power, if not one third world forums as the Group of 77 (a United
moving ineluctably toward eventual great power Nations coalition of developing countries) and
status. In this respect, the claim that Brazil should was heavily engaged in debates during the 1970s
be seen as a major player speaks to a long tradition regarding a New International Economic Order.
54 CURRENT HISTORY February 2008

Brazils embrace of the third world was not as cold war period. For example, the country moved
thoroughgoing as Indiasand it certainly did not during the 1990s toward increased acceptance of
include calls for global revolution, as Chinas did international norms controlling missile technology,
before 1978but it did figure prominently in the arms exports, and nuclear proliferation.
countrys sense of itself and its place in the world. Similarly, in relation to the environment, Brazil
The developmentalist-nationalist stance was moved sharply away from its defensiveness of the
closely tied to economic policy. Brazils economic 1980s toward an acknowledgement of the legiti-
policies for much of the post-1945 period relied on macy of international concerns about environ-
a strategy of import substitution, subsidies to stra- mental matters. Brazil came to accept the activities
tegic sectors, large-scale direct investment in state- of nongovernmental organizations, which before
owned enterprises, technological nationalism, and had often been denounced as subversive, and it
a deeply rooted belief in the imperative of contin- engaged more positively in international negotia-
ued growth even at the cost of high inflation. The tions, especially in the process leading to the 1992
project of national economic development came Earth Summit in Rio. A parallel move could be
to be institutionally embedded within and around seen in relation to international human rights.
the Brazilian state and was backed by a wide array It is true, as well, that Brazilian foreign policy
of powerful interest groups and a relatively high during the 1990s frequently demonstrated national
degree of elite consensus. reticence, as captured by Cardosos view that to
It also gave rise to a set of unspoken assump- provoke friction with the United States is to lose,
tions whose influence continues to be apparent in or by a comment in his memoirs that Brazils capac-
Brazilian foreign policy: the importance of defend- ity to influence the region politically remained lim-
ing economic and political sovereignty; the imper- ited. Thus, while action to help maintain democracy
ative of developing a more prominent international in Paraguay was viable, thoughts of involvement in
role for the nation; and the suspicion that the Colombia were resisted as something Brazil was not
United States is more likely to be a hindrance than yet able to contemplate.
a help in securing the countrys upward progress. Nevertheless, Cardosos own view of the inter-
This pattern of foreign policy was not signifi- national system and of Brazilian development was
cantly affected by the return to civilian rule in never that of a straightforward neoliberal. And
1985. It began to change, however, by the early over the course of the decade his foreign policy
1990s, as the established economic model came shifted in a more critical and nationalist direction.
under increasing strain, as Brazil along with other Even if his approach had achieved its important
countries in the region moved toward economic initial purpose of reestablishing Brazils interna-
liberalization, and as the end of the cold war tional political and economic credibility, by the late
seemed to force acceptance of the reality of both a 1990s the Cardoso foreign policy of autonomy via
unipolar world and economic globalization. participation had come to face increasingly seri-
ous challenges. The relative optimism with which
The cardoso legacy policy makers had viewed the postcold war inter-
How far Brazil actually abandoned its for- national environment was giving way to a greater
eign policy traditions and embraced neoliberal emphasis on Brazils international economic vul-
globalizationespecially under the government of nerability and the difficulty of translating into
Fernando Henrique Cardoso from 1994 to 2002is concrete results the countrys adaptation to global
a subject bitterly contested inside the country. (One liberal norms.
important trend in recent years has been a politi- There are important differences between Car-
cization of foreign policy, both within the foreign doso and Lula, but they cannot be simplified in
ministry and in Brazilian politics more generally.) terms of a contrast between pro-Western liber-
It is certainly true that the central preoccupation alizer and progressive third-worldist. Cardoso
of the Cardoso administration was with economic believed the changing structures of global capi-
stabilization and economic reform rather than talism meant that there was little alternative but
foreign policy. It is also the case that the Cardoso to adapt to globalization and that the potential
government tended to stress the need for Brazil to political opportunities for successful foreign policy
accommodate itself to us power and to liberal glo- activism were limited. But he combined this prag-
balization. Brazil showed a greater willingness to matic view of the world with a significant degree of
accept many of the dominant norms of the post optimism that structural reform at home was both
Lulas Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where? 55

possible and necessary and that democracy had early activism of the Lula years was too personalist
become an overriding value. and too voluntarist to have much of an institutional
The Lula government, by contrast, has been impact, and there has been a yawning gap between
rather modest in its domestic policy ambitions, the rhetoric of leadership and the concrete political,
stressing economic orthodoxy and large-scale tar- military, and economic resources made available to
geted social programs. But it has combined this sustain substantive achievements.
domestic accommodation with a high degree of Lulas foreign policy overestimates the willing-
optimism as to what can be achieved abroad. ness of the region to fall into line behind Brazilian
pretensions to a global role as the regions leader. In
Regional destiny? fact, there have been across Latin America numer-
How is Lulas foreign policy working out? ous instances of resistance to Brazils rolein oppo-
Let us look first at South America. The Latin- sition, for example, to its campaign for un Security
Americanization of Brazils foreign policy in fact Council membership and to Brazilian candidates in
goes back to the late 1970s. By the end of the international organizations. Brazils foreign policy
1990s it was already common to talk of Mercosur has also underestimated the readiness of many in
as part of Brazils destiny (as opposed to the Free the region to find an accommodation with Washing-
Trade Area of the Americas, which was seen as an ton (a readiness likely to become more noticeable
option). Nevertheless, it is clear that the Lula gov- in a post-Bush world). And perhaps most difficult,
ernment has worked hard to develop a more promi- Brazils pretensions to regional leadership have
nent role in Latin America. Especially during the encountered Venezuelas Hugo Chvezboth as a
first Lula administration, the body language (if you leader with his own ideas about hemispheric inte-
will) of assertive regional gration and as a symptom
leadership was highly of deep-rooted discontent
visible, however much it Brazil has sought to expand relations within Latin America.
was couched in the rhet- If the measure of suc-
oric of non-hegemonic with other major developing countries cess for Brazils regional
leadership. especially India, China, and South Africa. strategy is the creation of
The Lula government a regional bloc with a sig-
has committed consider- nificant degree of inter-
able rhetorical energy and high-level political effort nal cohesion and a capacity to increase the regions
in particular to relaunching Mercosur; to restor- power in the world, then there can be little doubt
ing with neighboring states economic ties that had that the strategy has failed. It is crucial, however,
frayed during the Argentinian economic crisis at the to note the structural factors both shaping Brazils
start of the millennium; to seeking new areas for regional policy and constraining its actions.
cooperation, such as with anti-poverty initiatives; Compared to 20 years ago, Brazil is now much
and to indicating in a variety of ways a greater will- more firmly enmeshed in the region, and it has
ingness to bear costs and make some concessions in to live with the spillovers and externalities that
order to help sustain the regionalist project. go with ever greater social, economic, and energy
Brasilia has also been prepared to assume a more interdependence. In this respect Brazil is living
assertive political role in the regionin the sense with the consequences of a sustained period of
of an expansion of party-to-party relations and successful regional integration. Not only have eco-
greater involvement in politically contested areas, nomic, infrastructural, and energy ties increased,
such as Brazils leadership of the un peace mission but the protracted violence and the narco-economy
to Haiti (where it has 1,200 troops on the ground) of the Andean region have had profound effects on
and its recent expressions of willingness to medi- patterns of violence in Brazils cities.
ate in Colombia. Equally important, the political complexion of
Yet it is in relation to the region that the limits of the region has changed dramatically in ways that
Brazils foreign policy appear in sharpest light. Mer- make it very difficult for Brazil to steer regional
cosur itself is now far more divided than at any time developments or to project its own model. The
in its history. Its already weak institutional struc- chavismo emanating from Venezuela may not
tures have not been strengthened, and it is difficult establish itself as a stable counter-narrative to
to believe that Venezuelas 2005 accession will do political and economic liberalism, but it is more
anything other than weaken them still further. The than a purely local or transitory phenomenon, and
56 CURRENT HISTORY February 2008

it reflects the widely perceived failures of economic after all, not been much to quarrel about. us foreign
liberalism, the narrowness of many accounts of policy has obviously been focused elsewhere. And
electoral democracy, and a powerful resurgence of the integrating impulses of the 1990s had already
economic nationalism. faded by the end of that decade, as is evident in the
Brazil has thus become ever more entangled in absence within the United States of either the for-
an unstable and crisis-prone area without its being eign policy will or the domestic political support to
clear that the country has the economic or military negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
resources to play a leadership role. The regional Much is made of the unique position of the
story of the past five years is in some ways better United States, the degree to which (unlike all
understood in terms of damage limitation under other modern great powers) it faces no geopo-
difficult conditions than in terms of the projection litical challenge from within its region, and how
of regional leadership. it has been able to prevent, or more accurately
to contain, the influence of extra-regional pow-
Relations with washington ers. But the other important regional aspect of
There is a common but mistaken view that rela- us power is that countrys ability to avoid deep
tions between Brazil and the United States have his- entanglements and mostly to escape from low-
torically been harmonious. It is true that there have er-level conflicts within its backyard that could
been periods of close relations, such as the years fol- ensnare and divert it. Washington has been able to
lowing Brazils entry into the Second World War and take the region for granted and, for long periods,
following the coup in 1964. Still, for much of the to avoid having a regional policy at allas has
cold war era the relation- arguably been the case
ship was not especially since 2001.
close; on the contrary, it Lulas foreign policy overestimates And there has been
was characterized by real space for some shared
the willingness of the region to fall
clashes of interest (espe- interests with Brazil.
cially over economic and into line behind Brazilian pretensions New issues such as biofu-
trade issues), by deep to a global role as the regions leader. els have provided a basis
divergences in the two for cooperation. After
countries views of the the brief and absurd por-
international system, and by a recurrent sense of trayal of Lula in some neoconservative quarters as
mutual frustration. More recent policy making in part of a South American axis of evil, Brazil has
Brazil has aimed at prudent coexistence with the been viewed in Washington as a potentially mod-
United States, possible collaboration, and minimal erating force in the region, especially in relation to
collision, but it has shied away from any kind of Chvez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia.
special relationship. Many Brazilians share the tra- While Brazils economy has not been growing as
ditional nationalist perception that Washington is a fast as Chinas or Indias, foreign investment has
potential obstacle to Brazils progress. been rising fast and economic stability has been
There is also strong and widespread opposition maintained. Brazilian diplomats, though formally
to us policy in Colombia, which is seen as danger- rejecting any role as bridge-builders, have some-
ously militarizing conflicts in the Andean region. times stressed the countrys moderating influence
us policy has also revived in some quarters the old and fire-fighting role.
fear that the United States poses a threat to the Still, limits to an active or close relationship
sovereignty of the Amazon. (The other element of with Washington remain. Brazil has to maintain
this fear is that viewing tropical forests as part of a very delicate balancing act that would be upset,
the common heritage of humanity will lead to calls both within the region and inside Brazil, by any
for the international administration of the region.) attempt to act as a provider of regional order on
And, of course, the unilateralism and intervention- behalf of the United States. Serious differences
ism of the Bush years have fueled anti-American- persist over the two countries preferred models of
ism even in a country in which such sentiments regional economic integration: Brazil rejects the us
have traditionally been weak (compared to, say, notion of integration along the lines of the North
Mexico or Argentina). American Free Trade Agreement.
On the other hand, recent relations with Wash- There has been considerable frustration in
ington have actually been rather cordial. There has, Washington, as well, over Brazils determination
Lulas Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where? 57

in trade talks to press for deeper agricultural lib- Council demonstrates that Brazilian talk of strate-
eralization in the United States and the European gic partnerships with India and China is radically
Union while resisting further trade and investment out of line with Brazils actual status in the foreign
openings in Brazil. And on the issue of climate policies of those countries. Some observers have
change, Brazil has firmly maintained its position also noted that Brazils efforts to gather support for
that the internationally accepted formula of com- its Security Council membership and its broader
mon but differentiated responsibilities means that attempts at southern solidarity have at times led
the United States and the developed world have a the country to compromise on its commitment to
duty to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas human rights.
emissions (including accepting binding targets) And yet, although there has indeed been a gap
and to provide funds and technology to help devel- between some of the rhetoric and the concrete
oping countries reduce their emissions. achievements in South-South diplomacy, the critics
Above all, the us-Brazilian relationship features arguments underestimate the way in which Brazil-
none of the sorts of concrete political, security, or ian foreign policy has contributed to perceptions
economic interests that have underpinned the stra- that global power is more diffuse than had appeared
tegic realignment that has taken place in the case to be the case even five years ago. Brazils weight as
of us-Indian relations. Brazil is not closely linked a player in international trade, for example, is lim-
to major American geopolitical interests, as India is ited, but its activism and assertiveness have worked
with China, Pakistan, and the issue of nuclear pro- to convince many that Brazil has to be part of any
liferation. The economic relationship with Brazil stable global trade regime for reasons of political
is nothing like Americas with India. Nor is there a legitimacy as much as narrow economic logic. In
large Brazilian diaspora in the United States push- relation to climate change, Brazil has helped to shift
ing for improved ties. the focus of negotiations back toward recognition of
global warming as a shared and common problem,
Southern strategy and has advanced the notion that the responsibili-
If Brazils aspirations for regional leadership and ties and burdens of the developed and developing
its relations with the United States have so far pro- world need to be differentiated.
duced limited gains, the same might be said of the In general, Lulas Southern strategy forms a clear
Lula administrations vaunted South-South diplo- contrast to the nearly total disappearance of third
macy. Critics of Brazils attempted solidarity with world self-identification on the part of China, as
emerging economies say the policy has generated well as, in Indian foreign policy, the displacement
more rhetoric than concrete achievement. of nonalignment and the relative downgrading of
In 2003, Brazil, along with India and South multilateralism. In part, Brazils approach reflects
Africa, formed within the World Trade Organi- its relative power position. Brazil is a threshold
zation a coalition of developing countriesthe state that seeks entry into the ranks of the power-
Group of 20that decided to block the Doha ful, but for whom coalitions with other developing
round of trade talks until their demands were met. countries continue to make political sense.
For many orthodox economists, the G-20 coalition But Brazils foreign policy under Lula has also
shackles Brazils true interests as a major agricul- reflected a powerful set of ideas about nationalism,
tural exporter with powerful stakes in trade liberal- development, and globalization that resonate both
ization. Although South-South trade has increased, in the country and across Latin America. As Brazil
the core of Brazils external economic relations seeks to carve out a regional and global position
remains with the developed world. for itself as an emerging power, its foreign policy
The critics of South-South diplomacy, both in is likely to continue to be marked by tensions
Brazil and elsewhere, argue that economic engage- among the different facets of the nations strategy
ment with the developed world should be given far and identityas a leader of the South, as a poten-
higher priorityespecially since China appears to tial bridge between North and South, and as a ris-
be emerging more as a competitor to Brazil than ing power that uses the rhetoric of South-South
an ally. According to this view, Chinas failure to solidarity and claims for global justice for its own
support Brazils bid for a seat on the un Security instrumental purposes.