Consti2 Reviewer Part 1

2014 Semester 2
10. Privacy
The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone." The right of privacy has
grown to defend the freedom of individuals to autonomy, to decide on whether or
not to implement certain acts or allow themselves to participate to certain affairs.
This personal autonomy has grown into a freedom secured by law.
According to BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES1, if we extend our judicial gaze
we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly recognized in the Bill of Rights, to
wit;
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill
of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health as may be
provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to
form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws.
The Civil Code provides that;
a. "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.
(Art. 26)
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life,
place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
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G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
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b. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for
damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person (Art.
32), and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. (Art. 723)
The Revised Penal Code makes a crime
a. the violation of secrets by an officer ( Art. 229),

b. the revelation of trade and industrial secrets (Art. 290-292), and
c. trespass to dwelling (Art. 280).
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
a. the Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200),

b. the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (R.A. 1405), and
c. the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. 8293).
The Rules of Court on privileged communication (Sec 24, Rule 130 [C], Revised
Rules on Evidence) likewise recognize the privacy of certain information2.
Some Cases:
Case: Petitioner Ople prays for the invalidation of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to
be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
Rule: We prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by
some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as
the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and security. His
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Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal
case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants;
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any
fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by
him or any information which he may have acquired in attending such patient in a
professional capacity, which information was necessary to enable him to act in capacity,
and which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the confession, be
examined as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional
character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or
priest belongs;
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(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
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communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
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transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded whether it be in the
computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions
for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of
building a huge formidable informatin base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may
be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for
some of our authorities to resist.
Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet,
there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control
programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or
penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system.
The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on
his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that
the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to
strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
disctinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of
a technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support
this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998 BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES
Case: Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs
unhampered performance of its task.
The constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the
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Senates power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution .
Rule: Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process.
The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
privacy is a constitutional right and the right most valued by civilized men, but also from our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that
explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to
determine what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed.
Section 2 guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.
Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy of communication and correspondence and further
cautions that any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
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Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
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may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.

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In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling
state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe, employed the rational basis
relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the
opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote
morality in public administration. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public
figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into
consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public
concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress
but also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to
participate therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely
depend on the information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to
information really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the government. Section 4(b) limits
or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other
data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. IN THE MATTER OF
THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO G.R.
No. 174340 October 17, 2006
Case: Petitioner seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c),
(d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 to wit;
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among
others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening
test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug
test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs
shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo
a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous
drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act be struck down as
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due
process and equal protection guarantees.
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Issue: Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do
these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure,
and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Rule: For Tresting of Students: The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised
in rnonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia), considered the following: (1) schools stand in
loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at
the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes
since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the
sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing
because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that
the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth and 14th Amendments and declared
the random drug-testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls,
et al., the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high
school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show
choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the
drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As
Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their
peers in locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among
non-athletes on the basis of the schools custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said
court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and
teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the
students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court
hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to
engage.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition
for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure,
the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
For Testing of Officers and Employees: Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students,
the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees
of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in
this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to
be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities
in such a way as to cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. And while there has
been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search,
translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable
broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain
paramount rights of the public and defers to the states exercise of police power.
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And whether
a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees
and students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what
was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause
standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
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The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis
of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the companys
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a
degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as
formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly
focused?
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing
a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when
and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in
Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to
random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law
specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But
the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.] In addition, the
IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know
basis; that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA
9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test
results, and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits
set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and,
ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public
officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the
test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times
to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
For Testing of the Accused:- Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the
case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from
the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's
office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The
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operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the
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case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can

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never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged,
they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare
fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug
testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. G.R.
No. 157870 November 3, 2008 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)
11. Privacy of Communication
Section 3.
1. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
2. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. (Art III)
Rule: Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy
to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication
between individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. G.R. No. 93833
September 28, 1995 SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ESTER S.
GARCIA
Rule: Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition
in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996 CECILIA
ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN
III Freedom of Expression

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Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances. (Art III)
Section 18. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and
aspirations. (Art III)
Protected Speech includes all kinds of expression. written, oral, print, or recorded,
as well as symbolic. This guarantee only includes core speech as those that
advance religious, political and social ideal. It excludes commercial speech.
The citizen can articulate his views, for whatever they may be worth, through the
many methods by which ideas are communicated from mind to mind. Thus, he may
speak or write or sing or dance, for all these are forms of expression protected by
the Constitution. So is silence, which "persuades when speaking fails." Symbolisms
can also signify meanings without words, like the open hand of friendship or the
clenched fist of defiance or the red flag of belligerence.
The individual can convey his message in a poem or a novel or a tract or in a public
speech or through a moving picture or a stage play. In such diverse ways may he
be heard. There is of course no guaranty that he will be heeded, for a acceptability
will depend on the quality of his thoughts and of his persona, as well as the mood
and motivation of his audience. But whatever form he employs, he is entitled to the
protection of the Constitution against any attempt to muzzle his thoughts.4 This is
unless the same is contrary to law, public order or public policy, as in seditious
speeches, slanderous or libelous remarks and indecent or immoral expression that
may corrupt the public (especially the youth).
A. Philosophic Basis
Free expression is rooted not only on legal grounds, but in rather more
personal, practical, and socio political premises.
1. Market Place of Ideas. freedom of speech is important because, in a

marketplace of ideas, the better ideas eventually prevail through
competition. It is modeled both on laissez faire in the economic realm and
on scientific experimentation. Under this rationale there is no hierarchy of
speech. The value of different kinds of speech depends solely on the
marketplaces assessment.5
Protecting speech, even speech in error, is necessary to the eventual

ascertainment of the truth, through conflict of ideas in the marketplace, a
view skeptical of our ability to ever know the truth.6
2. Discovery of Political Truth. Guaranteed is the right of every citizen to

express their sentiments and raise their concerns with the government
and the entire political structure. With the long history of corruption and
experience of dictatorship, transparency and public inquisitiveness on
state affairs is deemed necessary.
4
G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992 NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (Cruz J)
5
http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-of-speech/
6
The ''marketplace of ideas'' metaphor is attributable to Justice Holmes' opinion in Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories
8
of Expression, 40 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 519 (1979). The theory has been the dominant one in
Page
scholarly and judicial writings. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. Rev. 964, 967-74 (1978).

2014 Semester 2
3. For Self Government - Citizens are to engage in self-government by using

reason and practical judgment. Accordingly, one rationale of freedom of
speech is that it is indispensable for self-government. People
communicate on political matters so that they can intelligently participate
in the democratic process.
Under this rationale, political speech ranks at the top of the hierarchy,
with other kinds of speech ranked in a derivative manner based on their
relation to political speech.7
4. For individual Perfection - Freedom of expression is necessary to promote

individual self-fulfillment, such as the concept that when speech is freely
chosen by the speaker to persuade others it defines and expresses the
''self,'' promotes his liberty, or the concept of ''self- realization,'' the
belief that free speech enables the individual to develop his powers and
abilities and to make and influence decisions regarding his destiny. 8
This rationale treats freedom of speech as promoting every individuals

self-fulfillment and autonomy.
Under this rationale, non-political speech such as artistic expression is

fully covered; as with the marketplace of ideas rationale, there is no
hierarchy of speech. On the other hand, under this approach one wonders
what is so special about freedom of speech inasmuch as other provisions
of the Constitutionthink substantive due processsimilarly promote self-
fulfillment and autonomy.9
B. Restrictions to Free Speech - Prior Restraint and Subsequent punishment
Like any other manifestations of freedom, reasonable restrictions, may be

imposed on personal and collective freedoms. According to the popular maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use [what is] yours so as not to harm
[what is] of others) and the expression, your freedom ends where my freedom
begins", freedom in society can never be absolute.
Free expression may thus be restricted by prior restraint, and subsequent

punishment. Generally, these promote state survival, and public welfare that
is, social order.
However, prior restraint and subsequent punishment cannot be taken lightly,

freedom of expression being a preferred right.
Prior restraint is generally understood as an imposition in advance of a limit

upon speech or other forms of expression. In determining whether a restriction
is a prior restraint, one of the key factors considered is whether the restraint
prevents the expression of a message. In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared:
A prior restraint by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be

said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills" speech, prior
restraint "freezes" it at least for the time.
As an aspect of freedom of expression, prior restraint should not be confused with

subsequent punishment. In Alexander v. U.S ,petitioners complaint was that the RICO
forfeiture provisions on businesses dealing in expressive materials constituted "prior
9
7
Page
8
Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982).
9

2014 Semester 2
restraint" because they may have an improper "chilling" effect on free expression by
deterring others from engaging in protected speech. 10
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,

expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption
of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The
Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal
presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation." 11
Subsequent punishment is likewise seen as a threat to legitimate expression.

There is logic in the proposition that the liberty of the press will be rendered
a "mockery and a delusion" if, while every man is at liberty to publish what he
pleases, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless
publications. In this regard, the fear of subsequent punishment has the same
effect as that of prior restraint.12
Case: The Trial Court upheld the denial of the issuance of the sought after mayors permit unless
Petitioners were duly satisfied that the subject property where their radio stations were operated
has been classified as commercial in nature
Rule: The fundamental constitutional principle that informs our analysis of both petitions is the
freedom of speech, of expression or the press. Free speech and free press may be identified with
the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and
punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent
liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.
Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right
to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is undeniable political color. They admit that in
2001, Bombo Radyo "was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela
that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty."
Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of Isabela from 2001 until he
was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station manager
at petitioners own DZNC Bombo Radyo. A rival AM radio station in Cauayan City, DWDY, is
owned and operated by the Dy family. Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a 20 February
2004 article printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending "to file
disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNC-AM."
The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are
authorized by law to operate radio stations in Cauayan City, and had been doing so for some
years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities
have taken actions, whatever may be the motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to
freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all.
These actions have ranged from withholding permits to operate to the physical closure of those
stations under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the
weight of government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An
elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics lessons will recognize that free
speech animates these cases.
Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we
can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an act of
prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official
governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy
burden against its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.
10
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES,
11
10
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571, 585 (2001); Under other
circumstances, State action and legislation are deemed to be not unconstitutional, The burden
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of proof rests on he who alleges that the measure is against the Fundamental Law.
12
G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES

2014 Semester 2
Nonetheless, there are added legal complexities to these cases which may not be necessarily
accessible to the layperson. The actions taken by respondents are colored with legal authority,
under the powers of local governments vested in the Local Government Code (LGC), or more
generally, the police powers of the State. We do not doubt that Local Government Units (LGU)
are capacitated to enact ordinances requiring the obtention of licenses or permits by businesses,
a term defined elsewhere in the LGC as "trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a
means of livelihood or with a view to profit."
It emerges then that there exists tension between petitioners right to free expression and
respondents authority by law to regulate local enterprises.
Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well
defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as more
suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with discrimination in the regulation
of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech
are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.
Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it
operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as
content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or
business enterprise within the LGU.
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a
content-based restraint. First, the only rival station of the Petitioner is owned by respondent.
Second, Petitioner is a critic of the respondent. All those circumstances lead us to believe that the
steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately
content-based.
That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough. There is a
long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental
action directed at expression must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental
action directed at most other forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: "Because of
the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. .
. . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of
such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every
legislation." G.R. Nos. 170270 & 179411 April 2, 2009 NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING
NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC., vs. HON. CEASAR
G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE
CITY OF CAUAYAN
Case : Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa

sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae
yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng
mga demonyong ito. x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section
3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter
XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of
the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.5 The same order also set the case for preliminary
investigation.
11
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2014 Semester 2
Petitioner posits that the order of preventive suspension promulgated by respondent [MTRCB]
dated 16 AUGUST 2004 against the television program ANG DATING DAAN x x x is null and
void for violative of freedom of speech and expression
Rule: Petitioner theorizes that the three (3)-month suspension is either prior restraint or
subsequent punishment that, however, includes prior restraint, albeit indirectly.
After a review of the facts, the Court finds that what MTRCB imposed on petitioner is an
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for his offensive and obscene language in
Ang Dating Daan.
To clarify, statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed
unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are
movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people,
including the young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech.
PD 1986 was passed creating the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (now
MTRCB) and which requires prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or
broadcasting a TV program. The Board can classify movies and television programs and can
cancel permits for exhibition of films or television broadcast.lavvphi1.net
It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures
come within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. Each method
though, because of its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children,
tends to present its own problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media,
of all forms of communication, enjoying a lesser degree of protection. Just as settled is the rule
that restrictions, be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction against publication or
threat of cancellation of license / franchise, or subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage
suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of
expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of expression, as
with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is, however, not absolute. It may be
regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of speech not being
protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached when the
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern. In the oft-quoted expression of
Justice Holmes, the constitutional guarantee "obviously was not intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language." From Lucas v. Royo comes this line: "[T]he freedom to
express ones sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor
and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and with
proper regard for the rights of others.
Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.
The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech
or low-value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or
misleading advertisement, insulting or "fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering
national security.
The Court finds that petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
the average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech.
There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California
which established basic guidelines, to wit:
(a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
A cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case
reveal that to an average adult, the utterances "Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang
12
babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang
gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!" may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances.
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They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely a play on words. In the context they were

2014 Semester 2
used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged
statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated "G" or for general viewership,
and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children. G.R. No. 164785
April 29, 2009 ELISEO F. SORIANO, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA
Case: Petitioner seeks reconsideration on the following grounds or issues: (1) the suspension
thus meted out to the program constitutes prior restraint;
Rule: Petitioners threshold posture that the suspension thus imposed constitutes prior restraint
and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of expression is a mere rehash of
the position he articulated in the underlying petitions for certiorari and expounded in his
memorandum. So are the supportive arguments and some of the citations of decisional law,
Philippine and American, holding it together. They have been considered, sufficiently discussed
in some detail, and found to be without merit in our Decision. It would, thus, make little sense to
embark on another lengthy discussion of the same issues and arguments.
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under
the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent
punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the
program on August 10, 2004. To be sure, petitioner has not contested the fact of his having
made statements on the air that were contextually violative of the programs "G" rating. To merit
a "G" rating, the program must be "suitable for all ages," which, in turn, means that the "material
for television [does not], in the judgment of the [MTRCB], x x x contain anything unsuitable for
children and minors, and may be viewed without adult guidance or supervision." As previously
discussed by the Court, the vulgar language petitioner used on prime-time television can in no
way be characterized as suitable for all ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children. More
importantly, petitioner is deemed to have yielded his right to his full enjoyment of his freedom of
speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as television station owners, program
producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast
industry. G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010 ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P.
LAGUARDIA
Case: The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System.
Rule: Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those
that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not
free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in
this country. It follows that both expressions concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of
forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing
free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify
the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The
OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.

[COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of
petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful
exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the
Constitution.
xxxx
13
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the
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petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be

2014 Semester 2
hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right

which cannot be limited.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in
the party-list system, and as advanced by the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a
political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-
qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of
petitioners fundamental rights. G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections
C. Content Based Restrictions
Content Based and Content Neutral Restraint - A content-based restraint is

aimed at the contents or idea of the expression, whereas a content-neutral
restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression
under well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest,
without restraint on the message of the expression. Courts subject content-
based restraint to strict scrutiny.
I - Some tests of validity of content based restrictions
1. Dangerous Tendency13 - By enacting the present statute the State has

determined, through its legislative body, that utterances advocating the
overthrow of organized government by force, violence and unlawful means,
are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive
evil that they may be penalized in the exercise of its police power. That
determination must be given great weight. Every presumption is to be
indulged in favor of the validity of the statute. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 661. And the case is to be considered "in the light of the principle that
the State is primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest of
public safety and welfare;" and that its police "statutes may only be declared
unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or unreasonable attempts to
exercise authority vested in the State in the public interest." Great Northern
Ry. v. Clara City, 246 U.S. 434, 439. The statute being constitutional, it may
constitutionally be applied to every utterance -- not too trivial to be beneath
the notice of the law -- which is of such a character and used with such
intent and purpose as to bring it within the prohibition of the statute; and the
question whether the specific utterance in question was likely to bring about
the substantive evil aimed at by the statute, is not open to consideration. 14
If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated.
It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.15
13
14
focus on content
14
Gitlow v. New York No. 19 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 268 U.S. 652
Page
Argued April 12, 1923

15
Cabansag v. Fernandez 102 Phil. 152, 161 (1957)

2014 Semester 2
2. Clear and Present Danger 16- The question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.17
Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be
patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must
be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing
instrument to be stilled.18
3. Balancing of Interests19 - Briefly stated, the "balancing" test requires a court

to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation. The Court must,
therefore, undertake the delicate and difficult task to weigh the
circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.20
4. Direct Increment - Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio

(395 U.S. 444) states that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.21
5. Grave but Improbable Danger - The Court rule affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner, a leader of the Communist Party in the United States. Dennis had
been convicted of conspiring and organizing for the overthrow and
destruction of the United States government by force and violence under
provisions of the Smith Act. In affirming the conviction, a plurality of the
Court adopted Judge Learned Hand's formulation of the clear and present
danger test: In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the
"evil," discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as necessary to avoid the danger. 22
II - Applications of Tests (content based restrictions)
a. Freedom of Expression and National Security
In principle, freedom of expression may be curtailed in furtherance of

national security. Peace may be preserved by limiting expression;
Art. 138. Inciting a rebellion or insurrection. The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking arms or being in
open hostility against the Government, shall incite others to the execution of any of the
acts specified in article 134 of this Code, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings,
emblems, banners or other representations tending to the same end.
16
focus on content and context
17
Schenck v. U.S. , 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
18
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992 BLO UMPAR ADIONG, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
19
15
focus on weighing between government and private interests

20
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 339 U.S. 382 American Communications Assn. v. Doubs
Page
21
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 JOVITO R. SALONGA, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO
22
341 U.S. 494 Dennis v. United States

2014 Semester 2
Art. 118. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals. The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee, and that of prision mayor
upon any private individual, who, by unlawful or unauthorized acts provokes or gives
occasion for a war involving or liable to involve the Philippine Islands or exposes Filipino
citizens to reprisals on their persons or property. (Revised Penal Code)
And
Art. 142. Inciting to sedition. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without
taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment
of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations,
writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations tending to the same end,
or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write,
publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government (of the United States or the
Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing the
functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which
lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of
the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal
such evil practices.
b. Freedom of Expression and criticism of Official Conduct
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead. (RPC)
Based on this definition, the Supreme Court has held that four elements
constitute the crime of libel, namely
(a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit or

contempt;
(b) malice, either in law or in fact;
(c) publication; and
(d) identifiability of the person defamed.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely
to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to
do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the
author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven. Malice in law is a

presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that
raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as
constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice.
In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the Revised

Penal Code, which also enumerates exceptions thereto:
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
16
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
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public officers in the exercise of their functions. (RPC)

2014 Semester 2
There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory

imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable
motive for making such imputation.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute

a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that
such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the fact. 23
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given
in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and,
moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants
shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not
be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees
with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted. (RPC)
Art. 362. Libelous remarks. Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter
privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the
author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.
(RPC)
Actual Malice - The actual malice standard requires that the plaintiff in a
defamation or libel case prove that the publisher of the statement in question
knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth
or falsity.
In New York Times v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court ruled that
the existing common law of defamation violated the guarantee of free speech
under the First Amendment of the Constitution. It held that the citizen's right
to criticize government officials is of such tremendous importance in a
democratic society that it can only be accommodated through the tolerance
of speech which may eventually be determined to contain falsehoods. The
solution adopted was to do away with the common law presumptions of
falsity and malice and place the onus on the plaintiff to prove that, at the
time the defamatory statements were made, the defendant either knew them
to be false or was reckless as to whether they were or not
Case: As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier
of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the
evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a
"chilling effect" on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
17
23
G.R. No. 141994 January 17, 2005 FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. vs. AGO
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MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE,

(AMEC-BCCM) and ANGELITA F. AGO,

2014 Semester 2
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a
newspaperman who, instead of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted
personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of malicious distortions of half-truths which
tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However, this case is not a
simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who
heads the investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts
but who feels so terribly maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court
inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to
fiscals and defense lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
xxx
This Court has stressed as authoritative doctrine in Elizalde v. Gutierrez (76 SCRA 448
[1977]) that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words find sanctuary
within the shelter of the free press guaranty. In other words, a prosecution for libel should not
be allowed to continue, where after discounting the possibility that the words may not be
really that libelous, there is likely to be a chilling effect, a patently inhibiting factor on the
willingness of newspapermen, especially editors and publishers to courageously perform their
critical role in society. If, instead of merely reading more carefully what a columnist writes in
his daily column, the editors tell their people to lay off certain issues or certain officials, the
effect on a free press would be highly injurious.
Because many questions regarding press freedom are left unanswered by our resolution, I
must call attention to our decisions which caution that "no inroads on press freedom should
be allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on what otherwise should be characterized
as libel." (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 117 [1970]; See also the citations in Elizalde
v. Gutierrez, supra). G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988 MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, vs. THE
HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR
Case: A series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of
a conference without naming or identifying private respondent.
Private respondent reacted to the articles, insisting that he was the "organizer" (of the first
24
National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) ) alluded to in petitioner Borjal's
columns and instituted against him a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the
instant case.
After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of private respondent Wenceslao.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Rule: The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient
that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be
shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication.
Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar. The event had
several organizers and that Respondent was only a part of the organization.
The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his articles
are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which
state
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and,
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To be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies
concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis.

2014 Semester 2
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions.
Respondent court explained that the writings in question did not fall under any of the
exceptions described in the above-quoted article since these were neither "private
communications" nor "fair and true report . . . without any comments or remarks." But this is
incorrect.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.

Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author
has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which
exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications
containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made
without good intention justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and
"fair and true report without any comments or remarks."
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of
The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither
private communications nor fair and true report without any comments or remarks. However
this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the enumeration
under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on privileged
communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. As early as 1918, in United
States v. Caete, this Court ruled that publications which are privileged for reasons of public
policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This constitutional
right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the legislature to give it express recognition in
the statute punishing libels.
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a
valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while
in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man
is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable
imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or
a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based
on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as
it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.
Also, in the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of
the New York Times ruling. At any rate, we have also defined "public figure" in Ayers
Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong as
. . . . a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a

profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and
his character, has become a "public personage." He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously
to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by
appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a
pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public
officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant
prodigy, and no less a personage than the Great Exalted Ruler of the lodge. It includes, in
short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as
a person.
But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he
occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that
he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or
at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a
matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly became less so merely
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because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not
voluntarily choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public
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2014 Semester 2
focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the
conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.
The Court of Appeals concluded that since malice is always presumed in the publication of
defamatory matters in the absence of proof to the contrary, the question of privilege is
immaterial.
We reject this postulate. While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words,
the privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of
proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must
bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true
motive of his conduct.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the
reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel.
In the milieu obtaining, can it be reasonably inferred that in writing and publishing the articles
in question petitioner Borjal acted with malice?
Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner

was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the articles
were written and published without good motives or justifiable ends. On the other hand, we
find petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded
by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and denounce what he
perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen
has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner
Borjal has violated that right in this case nor abused his press freedom.
Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have

been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of
whether they are false or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the
defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication, or that he possesses a
high degree of awareness of their probable falsity. G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999
ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO
Case: Petitioner is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area. Sometime in April 1986, he and
some 37 families from the area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General
Manager regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo. After
the meeting, petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by newspaper
reporters at the NHA compound concerning their complaint. The next day, a news article
appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. This highlighted the allegation that Olmedo,
through connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area and
that he was involved in a number of illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of
fighting cocks) while quoting the Petitioner.
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel against petitioner alleging
that the latter's statements cast aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
The trail court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of libel. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto
Rule: On the main issue whether petitioner is guilty of libel, petitioner contends that what he
said was true and was made with good motives and for justifiable ends.
To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
elements must be proved: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of
malice.
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime,

the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstances which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
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There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required that
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the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a

2014 Semester 2
third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate
in which others hold him in, not the good opinion which he has of himself."
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a
third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.
Finally, malice or ill will must be present.
In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present.
The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be
presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under
Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statements is made against a public
official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not
prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends
In this case, petitioner was able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official.
His allegation that, through connivance with NHA officials, complainant was able to obtain
title to several lots at the Tondo Foreshore Area was based on the letter of NHA Inspector
General Hermogenes Fernandez to petitioner's counsel which mentions the irregular
consolidations of the lot in Tondo to Jaime and Victoria Olmedo,
With regard to the other imputations made by petitioner against complainant, it must be noted
that what petitioner stated was that various charges (for attempted murder against petitioner,
gambling, theft of fighting cocks) had been filed by the residents against their barangay
chairman but these had all been dismissed. Petitioner was able to show that Olmedo's
involvement in the theft of fighting cocks was the subject of an affidavit-complaint, dated
October 19, 1983, Likewise, petitioner presented a resolution, dated March 10, 1988, of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor in TBP-87-03694, stating that charges of malversation and
corrupt practices had been filed against Olmedo and nine (9) other barangay officials but the
same were dismissed
It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner "only tried to prove that the complainant
[barangay chairman] is guilty of the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that
the complainant committed the crimes." For that is not what petitioner said as reported in the
Ang Tinig ng Masa. The fact that charges had been filed against the barangay official, not the
truth of such charges, was the issue.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to
official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statements was made
with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York
Times v. Sullivan, which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decision. This
is the rule of "actual malice." In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the
charges made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official
misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not
only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from
performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and
assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice
Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people.".R. No. 118971September 15, 1999 RODOLFO R. VASQUEZ, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
Case: An Article was published in the Peoples Journal about a Swiss national who shoots the
pets of his neighbors in BF Homes, which happen to enter his property. Mentioned also was
the desire of the neighbors to have the latter deported., The subject of this article, Francis
Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing in this country with his Filipina wife and
their children. Claiming that the report was false and defamatory, and that the petitioners
acted irresponsibly in failing to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil
case for damages against herein petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr.,
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its publisher, and reporter Cristina Lee.

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2014 Semester 2
The petitioners claim that Lee, as the reporter assigned to cover news events in the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation, acquired a copy of the complaint letter of the
homeowners from a trusted source in the CIDs Intelligence Division. They claimed to "have
reasonable grounds to believe in the truth and veracity of the information derived (from their)
sources. They claimed to "have reasonable grounds to believe in the truth and veracity of the
information derived (from their) sources.
It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The headline,
which categorically stated that the subject of the article engaged in the practice of shooting
pets, was untrue Moreover, it is immediately apparent from a comparison between the above
letter and the news item in question that while the letter is a mere request for verification of
Thoenens status, Lee wrote that residents of BF Homes had "asked the Bureau of
Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors pets." No complaints had in
fact been lodged against him by any of the BF Homeowners, nor had any pending
deportation proceedings been initiated against him in the Bureau of Immigration.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners saying that
there is no malice on the part of the defendants in publishing the news item done in the
exercise of their profession as journalists reporting to the people on matters of public interest.
The news report was based on an official communication filed with the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation.
On appeal, the court a quo reversed the trial court
Rule: The constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of speech and the press against
liability for damages does not extend to the petitioners in this case
Libel is not protected speech. For there to be libel, malice or ill will must be present. As a
general rule, malice is presumed.. However, the article is not a privileged communication for
it is neither "private communication" nor a fair and true report without any comments or
remarks.
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by the spurious Atty. Angara is
privileged communication, it lost its character as such when the matter was published in the
newspaper and circulated among the general population. A written letter containing libelous
matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated in public, which
was what the petitioners did in this case.
Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor
is the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions,
for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet
life. G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005 PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLES
JOURNAL), ZACARIAS NUGUID, JR. and CRISTINA LEE vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
Case: Published in REMATE were articles by Tulfo which imputed against ATTY. CARLOS
"DING" SO acts of corruption as an employee of the Bureau of Customs and depicted as an
extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth..
The RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the judgment of the trial court
In essence, Tulfo argues before the SC that the subject articles fall under "qualifiedly
privileged communication" under Borjal and that the presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the
RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove malice in fact.
Rule: This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the first being that Borjal
stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel, and was not a criminal case.
Second, the ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the complainant,
which shall be differentiated from the present case in discussing the second assignment of
error of Tulfo. Third, the subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case,
the subject is a public official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal
were "fair commentaries on matters of public interest."
There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of the
22
Bureau of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) at the time of the printing of the allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot
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be refuted that the goings-on at the Bureau of Customs, a government agency, are matters of

2014 Semester 2
public interest. It is now a matter of establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are protected as
qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which he
would be liable.
In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalists Code of Ethics and
exercised his journalistic freedom responsibly.
In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of Customs as being
involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal gain. He went
even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying "ikaw na
yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw sa miyembro nito." He accused Atty. So of stealing
from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel suit
against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, "Nagalit itong
tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-expose ang kagaguhan niya sa
[Bureau of Customs]."
Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even
falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any
scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care,
the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact
as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they
courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done "consistent
with good faith and reasonable care." This was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote
the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist
abdicating his responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists
may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but this
margin does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in
the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total abandonment of
responsibility.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous
statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate
margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York
Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not
be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the
libelous statement
Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of
Customs and relied only on this source for his columns, but did no further research on his
story. The records of the case are bereft of any showing that Atty. So was indeed the villain
Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfos articles related no specific details or acts committed to prove
Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public official. These columns were unsubstantiated attacks on
Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a
public official. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public
officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties, or against public
officials in relation to matters of public interest involving them, such defamatory utterances do
not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech.
Tulfos articles cannot even be considered as qualified privileged communication under the
second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC which exempts from the presumption of malice "a
fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any statement,
report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public
officers in the exercise of their functions." This particular provision has several elements
which must be present in order for the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice.
The provision can be dissected as follows:
In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged,
the following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which
are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in said
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proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;
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(b) That it is made in good faith; and

2014 Semester 2
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They
provide no details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and simple
baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking,
as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo
goes even further to attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace
to his religion and the legal profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of
Art. 354 of the RPC is present in Tulfos articles, it cannot thus be argued that they are
qualified privileged communications under the RPC.
Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms "fair" and "true," Tulfos articles do
not meet the standard. "Fair" is defined as "having the qualities of impartiality and
honesty. "True" is defined as "conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine;
honest." Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements, as he did not do research before making
his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are
not "fair and true reports," but merely wild accusations.
Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified
privileged communication, this would still not protect Tulfo.
In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo argues
that the presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the RPC is no longer present, placing
upon the prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be
liable, there should have been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the
subject articles.
The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and reiterated in
Flor v. People, which should be to determine whether the defamatory statement was made
with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with
reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not, as proven by the prosecution.
There was the finding that Tulfo failed to verify the information on which he based his
writings, and that the defense presented no evidence to show that the accusations against
Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So,
personally, there was no malice attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the "reckless
disregard" test, and Tulfo has failed to meet that test.
The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be
considered as further evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo, wherein publication
after the commencement of an action was taken as further evidence of a malicious design to
injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to
continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty.
So, no matter the cost, and is proof of malice. G.R. No. 161032 September 16, 2008 Erwin
Tulfo vs. People of the Philippines
c. Freedom of Expression and the right to privacy
Case: A proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the
Movie Television Review and Classification Board as well as the other government agencies
consulted. General Fidel Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It
would be essentially a re-enactment of the events that made possible the EDSA revolution; it
is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-
drama" style, creating four (4) fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing
actual documentary footage as background.
Private respondent Enrile replied that "[he] would not and will not approve of the use,
appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of
his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation" and further advised petitioners that 'in the production, airing,
showing, distribution or exhibition of said or similar film, no reference whatsoever (whether
24
written, verbal or visual) should not be made to [him] or any member of his family, much less
to any matter purely personal to them.
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2014 Semester 2
Enrile filed a Complaint seeking to enjoin petitioners from producing the movie and alleged
that petitioners' production of the mini-series without private respondent's consent and over
his objection, constitutes an obvious violation of his right of privacy.
Rule: The constitutional and legal issues raised by the present Petitions are sharply drawn.
Petitioners' claim that in producing and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their
freedom of speech and of expression protected under our Constitution. Private respondent,
upon the other hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the production and filming of
the projected mini-series would constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is
entitled to enjoy.
Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the clear and present danger test" be applied in
respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be
reached: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four
Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion
upon private respondent's "right of privacy."
The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-bloody change of
government that took place at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and the train
of events which led up to that denouement. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. Indeed, it is, petitioners' argue, of international interest. The subject
thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this country and as such, must be
regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for speech
and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The subject matter, as set out in
the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual
life and certainly not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.
The Four Day Revolution" is not principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan
Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to refer to the role played by Juan
Ponce Enrile in the precipitating and the constituent events of the change of government in
February 1986.
At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that
petitioners propose to film were taking place, private respondent was what Profs. Prosser and
Keeton have referred to as a "public figure:" A public figure has been defined as a person
who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a 'public personage.'
Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a
principal actor in the culminating events of the change of government in February 1986
To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in portraying the participation of
private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to those events which are directly and reasonably
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's
privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried
out even without a license from private respondent. G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 AYER
PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. And McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, vs.
HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Rule: Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor
is the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions,
for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet
life.
As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure. We
are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an
individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional
privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of
public interest.
Three reasons were advanced by Justice Powell for making a distinction between private
individuals on one hand and public officers and public figures in the other.
25
First, public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
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2014 Semester 2
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals
are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is
correspondingly greater.
Second, an individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain
necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer
public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. Those classed as public figures stand in
a similar position. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive
power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.
In either event, they invite attention and comment.
Third, this would impose an additional difficulty on trial court judges to decide which
publications address issues of "general interest" and which do not. Even if the foregoing
generalities do not obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act
on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed
themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No
such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted
public office or assumed an "influential role in ordering society." (Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S., at 164) He has relinquished no part of his interest in the protection of his
own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for
redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.
Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public
figures; they are also more deserving of recovery. G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005
PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. (PEOPLES JOURNAL), ZACARIAS NUGUID, JR. and
CRISTINA LEE vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
d. Freedom of Expression and the administration of justice (contempt)
(SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION BRION, J.) In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments
and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies not only to
participants in the pending case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and
witnesses, but also to the public in general, which necessarily includes the media. Although
the Rules of Court does not contain a specific provision imposing the sub judice rule, it
supports the observance of the restriction by punishing its violation as indirect contempt
under Section 3(d) of Rule 71:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x a person

guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice[.]
Persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule often invoke
as defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for contempt constitutes a
form of impermissible subsequent punishment.
We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution is not absolute. A very literal construction of the provision, as
espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, may lead to the disregard of other
equally compelling constitutional rights and principles. In Vicente v. Majaducon, this Court
declared that "[the freedom of speech] needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests such as the
maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice."
Courts, both within and outside this jurisdiction, have long grappled with the dilemma of
balancing the publics right to free speech and the governments duty to administer fair and
impartial justice. While the sub judice rule may be considered as a curtailment of the right to
free speech, it is "necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice and the right of an
accused to a fair trial." Both these latter concerns are equally paramount and cannot lightly
26
be disregarded.
Before proceeding with this line of thought, however, let me clarify that the sub judice rule is
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not imposed on all forms of speech. In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two

2014 Semester 2
classes of publicized speech made during the pendency of the proceedings can be
considered as contemptuous: first, comments on the merits of the case, and second,
intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the courts with respect to the
case. Publicized speech should be understood to be limited to those aired or printed in the
various forms of media such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and internet, and
excludes discussions, in public or in private, between and among ordinary citizens. The
Constitution simply gives the citizens the right to speech, not the right to unrestricted
publicized speech.
Comments on the merits of the case may refer to the credibility of witnesses, the character
of the accused, the soundness of the alibis offered, the relevance of the evidence presented,
and generally any other comment bearing on the guilt or innocence of the accused. The
danger posed by this class of speech is the undue influence it may directly exert on the court
in the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly through the public opinion it may generate
against the accused and the adverse impact this public opinion may have during the trial.
The significance of the sub judice rule is highlighted in criminal cases, as the possibility of
undue influence prejudices the accuseds right to a fair trial. "The principal purpose of the
sub judice rule is to preserve the impartiality of the judicial system by protecting it from
undue influence."Public opinion has no place in a criminal trial. We ruled that
it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries,

in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.
The right to a fair trial is an adjunct of the accuseds right to due process which
"guarantees [him] a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a
trial x x x where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or
influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded."
In foreign jurisdictions, the courts do not hesitate to exercise their power to punish for
contempt where necessary to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications that
tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts.
If the media publish prejudicial material, they can appear to urge, or may in fact be urging, a
particular finding: the media can "wage a campaign" against one of the parties to
proceedings. If the jury decides in accordance with an outcome promoted by the media, it
will appear as if the jurors were swayed by the media. By the same token, if the jurys
decision does not accord with media opinion, it may appear as if they were deliberately
reacting against it. Either way, it may appear that the jurys decision was not impartial and
based on the evidence presented in court, even if it was.
The accused must be assured of a fair trial notwithstanding the prejudicial publicity;he has a
constitutional right to have his cause tried fairly by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by
publication or public clamor. "The sub judice doctrine protects against the appearance of
1
decisions having been influenced by published material."
As may be observed from the cited material, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts to
insulate members of the jury from being influenced by prejudicial publicity. But the fact that
the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an argument against our observance
of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no different from members of the jury, they are
not immune from the pervasive effects of media. "It might be farcical to build around them an
impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion." As I
said in another case, in a slightly different context, even those who are determined, in their
conscious minds, to avoid bias may be affected.
Also, it is not necessary that the publicity actually influenced the courts disposition of the
case; "the actual impact of prejudicial publicity is not relevant to liability for sub judice
contempt." In several cases, the Court has noted the enormous effect of media in stirring
public sentience x x x Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that
media can bring to bear on [witnesses and judges] directly and through the shaping of public
opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying
degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the
27
testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise
be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
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2014 Semester 2
Comment on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case becomes subject to a
contempt proceeding when it is intemperate, is contumacious, and unduly impairs upon the
dignity of the court. A comment that impairs of the dignity of the court "excites in the mind of
the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes their
1
minds to obey them[.]" If the speech tends to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of the court and its members, and lowers or degrades the
administration of justice, then the speech constitutes contempt. "Unwarranted attacks on the
dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot
be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and
1
confidence therein." Without the sub judice rule and the contempt power, the courts will be
powerless to protect their integrity and independence that are essential in the orderly and
effective dispensation and administration of justice.
This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism against the court. As the third
branch of the government, the courts remain accountable to the people. The peoples
freedom to criticize the government includes the right to criticize the courts, their
proceedings and decisions. This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to our
democratic society and ensures that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial arbitrariness or
idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the publics confidence in the administration of justice is
maintained. The criticism must, however, be fair, made in good faith, and "not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety." And to enhance the open court principle and allow the
people to make fair and reasoned criticism of the courts, the sub judice rule excludes from
its coverage fair and accurate reports (without comment) of what have actually taken place
in open court.
In sum, the court, in a pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment or influence
in its all-important duty of deciding the case. Any publication pending a suit, reflecting upon
the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or
tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of speech because of the sub judice rule is
necessary and justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the rights of the accused
and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice.
If we do not apply at all the sub judice rule to the present case, the reason is obvious to
those who have followed the case in the media both parties are in pari delicto as both
have apparently gone to the media to campaign for the merits of their respective causes.
Thus, the egregious action of one has been cancelled by a similar action by the other. It is in
this sense that this Supplemental Opinion is independent of the merits of the case. Their
common action, however, cannot have their prejudicial effects on both; whatever the results
may be, doubts will linger about the real merits of the case due to the inordinate media
campaign that transpired.
Lest we be misunderstood, our application of the sub judice rule to this case cannot serve as
a precedent for similar future violations. Precisely, this Supplemental Opinion is a signal to
all that this Court has not forgotten, and is in fact keenly aware of, the limits of what can be
publicly ventilated on the merits of a case while sub judice, and on the comments on the
conduct of the courts with respect to the case. This Court will not standby idly and helplessly
as its integrity as an institution and its processes are shamelessly brought to disrepute. G.R.
No. 176389 December 14, 2010 ANTONIO LEJANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rule: Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic freedom invoked by
the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this
Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because
respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of
young aspiring attorneys that respondents own non-observance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored
nor glossed over by this Court.
Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause
28
Resolution, has interfered with respondents constitutionally mandated right to free speech
and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents assertion is
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2014 Semester 2
and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors dissenting
view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it
was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had
charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the
manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by which respondents, who are not
parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the
Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly
enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of
the UP Law facultys Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice
Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as
an established fact, but a truth" when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an
ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such allegations." It was also
pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to
the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement
that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court.
The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It
reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas
who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court
of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the
Courts alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic
values of decency and respect.
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents freedom of

expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free
and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only
goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become
harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust
criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on
being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner,
free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine
the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its
reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough,
the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that
would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors
and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"
29
e. Symbolic Expression (Flag Burring Case)

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2014 Semester 2
Flag burring cannot be simply content neutral, due to the high respect
afforded to our symbol of nationhood. The flag is not an image but a symbol
of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of
national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the
Constitution guarantee and protect.25
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), was an important decision by the US
Supreme Court and changed the perspective as to prohibitions on
desecrating the American flag. It held that the defendant Gregory Lee
Johnson's act of flag burning was protected speech under the First
Amendment
Case: During the 1984 Republican National Convention, respondent Johnson participated
in a political demonstration to protest the policies of the Reagan administration and some
Dallas-based corporations. After a march through the city streets, Johnson burned an
American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with
injury, although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. Johnson
was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute, and a
state court of appeals affirmed.
Rule: Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive
conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. The State conceded that the
conduct was expressive. Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with
the Republican National Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct
was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent. Texas v. Johnson (No. 88-155) 491
U.S. 397 (1989),
Our Constitution however states that
The flag of the Philippines shall be red, white, and blue, with a sun and three stars, as
consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law. (Sec 1, Art XVI)
As such, the Philippines, a different stance is taken as enshrined in

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8491 "Flag and Heraldic Code of the Philippines."
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8491 "Flag and Heraldic Code of the Philippines."
SECTION 2. Declaration of policy. - Reverence and respect shall at all times be accorded the flag, the anthem, and
other national symbols which embody the national ideals and traditions and which express the principles of
sovereignty and national solidarity. The heraldic items and devices shall seek to manifest the national virtues and
to inculcate in the minds and hearts of our people a just pride in their native land, fitting respect and affection for
the national flag and anthem, and the proper use of the national motto, coat-of-arms and other heraldic items and
devices.
xxx
SECTION 14. A flag worn out through wear and tear, shall not be thrown away. It shall be solemnly burned to avoid
misuse or desecration. The flag shall be replaced immediately when it begins to show signs of wear and tear.
xxx
SECTION 34. It shall be prohibited:
a) To mutilate, deface, defile, trample on or cast contempt or commit any act or omission casting dishonor or
ridicule upon the flag or over its surface;
b) To dip the flag to any person or object by way of compliment or salute;
c) To use the flag:
1) As a drapery, festoon, tablecloth;

2) As covering for ceilings, walls, statues or other objects;
30
Page
25
Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil. 2 (1959) and Balbuna, et al. vs.
Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150 (1960)

2014 Semester 2
3) As a pennant in the hood, side, back and top of motor vehicles;

4) As a staff or whip;
5) For unveiling monuments or statues; and
6) As trademarks, or for industrial, commercial or agricultural labels or designs.
d) To display the flag:
1) Under any painting or picture;

2) Horizontally face-up. It shall always be hoisted aloft and be allowed to fall freely;
3) Below any platform; or
4) In discotheques, cockpits, night and day clubs, casinos, gambling joints and places of vice or where frivolity
prevails.
e) To wear the flag in whole or in part as a costume or uniform;
f) To add any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawings, advertisement, or imprint of any nature on the flag;
g) To print, paint or attach representation of the flag on handkerchiefs, napkins, cushions, and other articles of
merchandise;
h) To display in public any foreign flag, except in embassies and other diplomatic establishments, and in offices of
international organizations;
i) To use, display or be part of any advertisement or infomercial; and
j) To display the flag in front of buildings or offices occupied by aliens.
xxx
SECTION 48. Failure or refusal to observe the provisions of this Act; and any violation of the corresponding rules
and regulations issued by the Office of the President, shall after proper notice and hearing, shall be penalized by
public censure which shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the Commission on Higher Education, upon the
recommendation of the Institute and after proper notice and hearing, shall cause the cancellation of the recognition
or permit of any private educational institution which fails or refuses to observe the provisions of this Act for the
second time.
SECTION 49. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Commission on Higher Education
shall ensure that the National Anthem, as adopted by law, shall be committed to memory by all students of both
public and private educational institutions, and performed during the flag ceremony conducted in accordance with
the rules and regulations issued by the Office of the President. In addition, they shall make available the vocal,
piano or band scores of the National Anthem, as adopted by law, to all private and public schools, as well as the
general public.
SECTION 50. Any person or juridical entity which violates any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000), or by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, or both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion
of the court: Provided, That for any second and additional offenses, both fine and imprisonment shall always be
imposed: Provided, further, That in case the violation is committed by a juridical person, its President or Chief
Executive Officer thereof shall be liable.
Approved: February 12, 1998
f. Freedom of Expression Assembly and Petition
Are the actions of the striking public school teachers content neutral?
Case: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by
then Secretary Isidro D. Cario of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),
The herein Petitioner participated in the mass action/illegal strike in Sept. 19-21, 1990 and
subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990 issued by this Office,
31
which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty,
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gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without

2014 Semester 2
official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines.
Rule: Can public school teachers strike for economic reasons?>
As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila
Public School Teachers Association v.Laguio Jr., and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon.
Isidro Cario that the mass actions staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to
a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized
stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out
for essentially economic reasons to protest and pressure the Government to correct what,
among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of
the salary standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the non-payment or delay in
payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and the
26
imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours."
In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission, we denied the claim that the teachers were
thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be
exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school
teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within
reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the
service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their
free time recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one not the DECS, the CSC
or even the Supreme Court could have held them liable for their participation in the mass
actions.
With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
invoked by petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the Rolando Gan case that the PBM
ruling that the rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they
occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties was not applicable to defend the
validity of the 1990 mass actions because what were pitted therein against the rights of free
expression and of assembly were inferior property rights while the higher consideration involved
in the case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth which must, at the very least,
be equated with the freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of
grievances. G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999 LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, MERCY DE
LEON, TERESITA EUGENIO, CORAZON GOMEZ, ELENA GUEVARRA, ROSALINA
JINGCO, LOIDA IGNACIO, and EMERITA PIZARRO, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
27
CULTURE AND SPORTS
D. Content Neutral Restrictions
Freedom of Expression and National Security
In principle, freedom of expression may be curtailed by Content Neutral

Restrictionsin furtherance of national security. For instance, correspondence can be
limited in times of war;
Art. 120. Correspondence with hostile country. Any person who in time of war, shall have
correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional, if the correspondence has been prohibited by the Government;
2. By prision mayor, if such correspondence be carried on in ciphers or conventional signs; and
3. By reclusion temporal, if notice or information be given thereby which might be useful to the
enemy. If the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving such notice or information, he shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to death.chanrobles virtual law library (Revised Penal
Code)
32
26
Note the concept of public service and the basis for the salaries of teachers which is by law
Page
and not by negotiations like CBAs for the private sector

27
Compensation of public school teachers are determined by law and not by CBA.

2014 Semester 2
The O'Brien Test
A government regulation is sufficiently justified
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free

expression; and
[4] if the incidental restriction on speech expression and press is no greater

than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367)
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content
neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such
laws."
Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental

interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to
the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to
the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the
restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the
governmental purpose in question. Hence, as sort of double effect here results.
Issue: The specific issue in this petition is whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private,
and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes per Resolution
No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
Rule: The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by
the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.
First the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to
warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
There are various concepts surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as
part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.
All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free
speech the status of a preferred freedom. (Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516, 89 L. Ed. 430 [1945];
Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, 36 SCRA 228 [1970])
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
[1937]; Salonga v. Pao, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions
of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and
to convince or persuade is denied and taken away.
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L.
Ed. 686 [1964]; cited in the concurring opinion of then Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Babst v.
National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316 [1984]) Too many restrictions will deny to people the
robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will
truly be free, clean and honest.
33
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost
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respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful

2014 Semester 2
the equally vital right of suffrage. (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-32717
November 26, 1970)
The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a citizen of
his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy objectives is always
a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on one
hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election
campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on
Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
The variety of opinions expressed by the members of this Court in the recent case of National
Press Club v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1991) and its companion
cases underscores how difficult it is to draw a dividing line between permissible regulation of
election campaign activities and indefensible repression committed in the name of free and
honest elections. In the National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to reiterate the
preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated COMELEC regulation of
campaigns through political advertisements. The gray area is rather wide and we have to go on a
case to case basis.
There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is
fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive
regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate.
For persons who have to resort to judicial action to strike down requirements which they deem
inequitable or oppressive, a court case may prove to be a hollow remedy. The judicial process, by
its very nature, requires time for rebuttal, analysis and reflection. We cannot act instantly on knee-
jerk impulse. By the time we revoke an unallowably restrictive regulation or ruling, time which is of
the essence to a candidate may have lapsed and irredeemable opportunities may have been lost.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and
freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for
maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in
favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to
regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if in the efforts to
maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
There were a variety of opinions expressed in the National Press Club v. Commission on
Elections (207 SCRA 1) case but all of us were unanimous that regulation of election activity has
its limits. We examine the limits of regulation and not the limits of free speech. The carefully
worded opinion of the Court, through Mr. Justice Feliciano, shows that regulation of election
campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in
time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's
opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory
measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective.
Even as the Court sustained the regulation of political advertisements, with some rather strong
dissents, in National Press Club, we find the regulation in the present case of a different category.
The promotion of a substantial Government interest is not clearly shown.
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the

Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466
US 789, 80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by
such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on the Court to say where the
individual's freedom ends and the State's power begins. Choice on that border, now as always
34
delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by
the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedom
Page
secured by the first Amendment . . . That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction

2014 Semester 2
not permitting dubious intrusions and it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which
determines what standard governs the choice . . .
For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be justified by clear public
interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely, but by clear and present danger. The
rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in
other context might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not
suffice. These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion would
restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and place, must have
clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only the greatest abuses,
endangering permanent interests, give occasion for permissible limitation. (Thomas V.
Collins, 323 US 516 -1945).
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much
that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his
private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of
anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on
reporting by newspapers or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long
as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we
sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by
an individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property. G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992 BLO UMPAR ADIONG, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
1. Regulation of Political Campaign Activity
Case: This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the validity of 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits mass media from
selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political
purposes, except to the Commission on Elections.
Rule: Test for Content-Neutral Restrictions
In Adiong v. COMELEC this Court quoted the following from the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City ordinance which prohibited the
posting of campaign signs on public property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional

power of the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. (Id., at 377, 20 L
Ed 2d 672, 88 S Ct 1673. (City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 US 789,
80 L Ed 2d 772, 104 S Ct 2118 [1984])
This test was actually formulated in United States v. O'Brien. It is an appropriate test for
restrictions on speech which, like 11(b), are content-neutral. Unlike content-based
restrictions, they are not imposed because of the content of the speech. For this reason,
content-neutral restrictions are tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as
that involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and
announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have a
compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These
restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore they bear a heavy presumption of
constitutional invalidity. In addition. they will be tested for possible overbreadth and
vagueness.
It is apparent that these doctrines have no application to content-neutral regulations

which, like 11(b), are not concerned with the content of the speech. These regulations
need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard of
review will suffice to test their validity.
Justice Panganiban's dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test and argues that
"media ads do not partake of the 'real substantive evil' that the state has a right to prevent
35
and that justifies the curtailment of the people's cardinal right to choose their means of
expression and of access to information." The clear-and-present-danger test is not,
Page
however, a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a
thoughtful student of constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law

2014 Semester 2
and only later appropriated for free speech cases. For the criminal law is necessarily
concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends and a guilty conspiracy or
attempt begins. Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional
validity of laws which, like 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of
political ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to
such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a
regular hammer is all that is needed.
The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is
that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are
usually imposed because of fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such
reasons underlie content-neutral regulations, like regulations of time, place and manner
of holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Applying the O'Brien test in this case, we find that 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid
exercise of the power of the State to regulate media of communication or information for
the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for political campaigns; that
the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech; that any restriction on freedom
of expression is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of
promoting equality.
The Court is just as profoundly aware as anyone else that discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates in an election are essential to the proper
functioning of the government established by our Constitution. But it is precisely with this
awareness that we think democratic efforts at reform should be seen for what they are:
genuine efforts to enhance the political process rather than infringements on freedom of
expression. The statutory provision involved in this case is part of the reform measures
adopted in 1987 in the aftermath of EDSA. A reform-minded Congress passed bills which
were consolidated into what is now R.A No. 6646 with near unanimity. The House of
Representatives, of which petitioner Pablo P. Garcia was a distinguished member, voted
96 to 1 (Rep. Eduardo Pilapil) in favor, while the Senate approved it 19-0.
In his recent book. The Irony of Free Speech, Owen Fiss speaks of "a truth that is full of
irony and contradiction: that the state can be both an enemy and a friend of speech; that
it can do terrible things to undermine democracy but some wonderful things to enhance it
as well." We hold R.A. No. 6646, 11(b) to be such a democracy-enhancing measure.
For Holmes's marketplace of ideas can prove to be nothing but a romantic illusion if the
electoral process is badly skewed, if not corrupted, by the unbridled use of money for
campaign propaganda. G.R. No. 132231March 31, 1998 EMILIO M. R. OSMEA and
PABLO P. GARCIA, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21,
1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or

any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey
and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
Is this Unconstitutional?
Rule: Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and
any restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be
presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity. And it is respondent's burden to
overthrow such presumption. Any act that restrains speech should be greeted with
furrowed brows, so it has been said.
To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly

shown. Thus:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional

power of the government, if it furthers an important or substantial government
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
36
Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties, when the
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2014 Semester 2
Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of speech
and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such
substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comelec
cannot be justified since there is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to
interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented
proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create
disorder or confuse the voters. G.R. No. 133486 January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
The term "election surveys" is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows:
Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions

of the voters as regards a candidate's popularity, qualifications, platforms
or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including
voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the
campaign period (hereafter referred to as "Survey").
The implement 5.4, Resolution 3636, 24(h), dated March I, 2001, of the COMELEC
enjoins
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period
of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results
of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing
Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up
to the last day of the elections on May 14,2001.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and
present danger to justify such restraint.
Rule: Using the O Brien Test
First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection
of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to
the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey
results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of
the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the
expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists,
radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, 5.4
shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion
to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that
"the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content."
Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the

suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental,
5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction
be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated,
5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon
effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating
called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim
37
can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
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2014 Semester 2
To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on
the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression. G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001 SOCIAL
WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
2. Freedom of Assembly
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of
a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.28
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 880
AN ACT ENSURING THE FREE EXERCISE BY THE PEOPLE OF THEIR RIGHT

PEACEABLY TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 1. Title - This Act shall be known as "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
Section 2. Declaration of policy - The constitutional right of the people peaceably to

assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to the
strength and stability of the State. To this end, the State shall ensure the free exercise of
such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of the
law.
Section 3. Definition of terms - For purposes of this Act:
(a) "Public assembly" means any rally, demonstration, march, parade,

procession or any other form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for
the purpose of presenting a lawful cause; or expressing an opinion to the general
public on any particular issue; or protesting or influencing any state of affairs
whether political, economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress of
grievances.
The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public meetings and

assemblages for religious purposes shall be governed by local ordinances:
Provided, however, That the declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this
Act shall be faithfully observed.
The definition herein contained shall not include picketing and other concerted
action in strike areas by workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute as
defined by the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by the
Batas Pambansa Bilang 227.
(b) "Public place" shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street,
bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza, square, and/or any open space of public
ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c) "Maximum tolerance" means the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public
assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
38
28
G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented
Page
by its National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, vs. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA

2014 Semester 2
(d) "Modification of permit" shall include the change of the place and time of
the public assembly, rerouting of the parade or street march, the volume of loud-
speakers or sound system and similar changes.
Section 4. Permit when required and when not required - A written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made in
a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which case
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required, or in
the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall be
subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or
rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered by
this Act.
Section 5. Application requirements - All applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:
(a) The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the
leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and
duration thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the
probable number of persons participating, the transport and the public address
systems to be used.
(b) The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant
under Section 8 hereof.
(c) The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5)
working days before the scheduled public assembly.
(d) Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in

writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to
immediately be posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -
(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue
or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application
within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which,
the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said
application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the
mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application
within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal
Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate
court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and
record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it
in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately executory.
39
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-
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four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately

2014 Semester 2
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in
rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed.
Section 7. Use of public thoroughfare - Should the proposed public assembly involve
the use, for an appreciable length of time, of any public highway, boulevard, avenue, road
or street, the mayor or any official acting in his behalf may, to prevent grave public
inconvenience, designate the route thereof which is convenient to the participants or
reroute the vehicular traffic to another direction so that there will be no serious or undue
interference with the free flow of commerce and trade.
Section 8. Responsibility of applicant - It shall be the duty and responsibility of the

leaders and organizers of a public assembly to take all reasonable measures and steps to
the end that the intended public assembly shall be conducted peacefully in accordance
with the terms of the permit. These shall include but not be limited to the following:
(a) To inform the participants of their responsibility under the permit;
(b) To police the ranks of the demonstrators in order to prevent non-

demonstrators from disrupting the lawful activities of the public assembly;
(c) To confer with local government officials concerned and law enforcers to
the end that the public assembly may be held peacefully;
(d) To see to it that the public assembly undertaken shall not go beyond the
time stated in the permit; and
(e) To take positive steps that demonstrators do not molest any person or do
any act unduly interfering with the rights of other persons not participating in the
public assembly.
Section 9. Non-interference by law enforcement authorities - Law enforcement

agencies shall not interfere with the holding of a public assembly. However, to adequately
ensure public safety, a law enforcement contingent under the command of a responsible
police officer may be detailed and stationed in a place at least one hundred (100) meter
away from the area of activity ready to maintain peace and order at all times.
Section 10. Police assistance when requested - It shall be imperative for law
enforcement agencies, when their assistance is requested by the leaders or organizers, to
perform their duties always mindful that their responsibility to provide proper protection to
those exercising their right peaceably to assemble and the freedom of expression is
primordial. Towards this end, law enforcement agencies shall observe the following
guidelines:
(a) Members of the law enforcement contingent who deal with the
demonstrators shall be in complete uniform with their nameplates and units to
which they belong displayed prominently on the front and dorsal parts of their
uniform and must observe the policy of "maximum tolerance" as herein defined;
(b) The members of the law enforcement contingent shall not carry any kind of
firearms but may be equipped with baton or riot sticks, shields, crash helmets with
visor, gas masks, boots or ankle high shoes with shin guards;
(c) Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons, or any similar anti-riot device
shall not be used unless the public assembly is attended by actual violence or
serious threats of violence, or deliberate destruction of property.
Section 11. Dispersal of public assembly with permit - No public assembly with a
permit shall be dispersed. However, when an assembly becomes violent, the police may
disperse such public assembly as follows:
(a) At the first sign of impending violence, the ranking officer of the law
40
enforcement contingent shall call the attention of the leaders of the public assembly
and ask the latter to prevent any possible disturbance;
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2014 Semester 2
(b) If actual violence starts to a point where rocks or other harmful objects
from the participants are thrown at the police or at the non-participants, or at any
property causing damage to such property, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall audibly warn the participants that if the disturbance
persists, the public assembly will be dispersed;
(c) If the violence or disturbances prevailing as stated in the preceding

subparagraph should not stop or abate, the ranking officer of the law enforcement
contingent shall audibly issue a warning to the participants of the public assembly,
and after allowing a reasonable period of time to lapse, shall immediately order it to
forthwith disperse;
(d) No arrest of any leader, organizer or participant shall also be made during
the public assembly unless he violates during the assembly a law, statute,
ordinance or any provision of this Act. Such arrest shall be governed by Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
(e) Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or braech of the peace during the
public assembly shall not constitute a ground for dispersal.
Section 12. Dispersal of public assembly without permit - When the public assembly is
held without a permit where a permit is required, the said public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
Section 13. Prohibited acts - The following shall constitute violations of this Act:
(a) The holding of any public assembly as defined in this Act by any leader or
organizer without having first secured that written permit where a permit is
required from the office concerned, or the use of such permit for such purposes in
any place other than those set out in said permit: Provided, however, That no
person can be punished or held criminally liable for participating in or attending an
otherwise peaceful assembly;
(b) Arbitrary and unjustified denial or modification of a permit in violation of the

provisions of this Act by the mayor or any other official acting in his behalf.
(c) The unjustified and arbitrary refusal to accept or acknowledge receipt of

the application for a permit by the mayor or any official acting in his behalf;
(d) Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or otherwise denying the exercise of the

right to peaceful assembly;
(e) The unnecessary firing of firearms by a member of any law enforcement

agency or any person to disperse the public assembly;
(f) Acts in violation of Section 10 hereof;
(g) Acts described hereunder if committed within one hundred (100) meters
from the area of activity of the public assembly or on the occasion thereof;
1. the carrying of a deadly or offensive weapon or device such as

firearm, pillbox, bomb, and the like;
2. the carrying of a bladed weapon and the like;
3 the malicious burning of any object in the streets or thoroughfares;
4. the carrying of firearms by members of the law enforcement unit;
5. the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public

assembly by the use of a motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.
Section 14. Penalties - Any person found guilty and convicted of any of the prohibited
acts defined in the immediately preceding Section shall be punished as follows:
41
(a) violation of subparagraph (a) shall be punished by imprisonment of one

month and one day to six months;
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2014 Semester 2
(b) violations of subparagraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and item 4, subparagraph
(g) shall be punished by imprisonment of six months and one day to six years;
(c) violation of item 1, subparagraph (g) shall be punished by imprisonment of

six months and one day to six years without prejudice to prosecution under
Presidential Decree No. 1866;
(d) violations of item 2, item 3, or item 5 of subparagraph (g) shall be punished

by imprisonment of one day to thirty days.
Section 15. Freedom parks - Every city and municipality in the country shall within six
months after the effectivity of this Act establish or designate at least one suitable "freedom
29
park" or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall be centrally
located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit.
In the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, the respective mayors shall establish
the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity of this Act.
Section 16. Constitutionality - Should any provision of this Act be declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the validity or constitutionality of the other provisions shall not be affected
thereby.
Section 17. Repealing clause - All laws, decrees, letters of instructions, resolutions,
orders, ordinances or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
Section 18. Effectivity - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, October 22, 1985.
A.M. 98-7-02-SC dated July 7, 1998
Re: Guidelines on the Conduct of Demonstrations, Pickets, Rallies

and Other Similar Gatherings in the Vicinity of the Supreme Court and All Other
Courts
En Banc.
Considering the inherent and regulatory power of the courts to control their
proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of justice and the
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and
complementing further the Per Curiam Resolution of the Court in the case of Nestle
Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, et al., dated September 30, 1987, the
Court resolves to adopt formally the following policy and procedural guidelines,
regarding the conduct of demonstrations, pickets, rallies and other similar gatherings
in the vicinity of the grounds and adjacent areas of the Supreme Court and all other
courts:
1. Courts are the defenders of the people's rights, especially their freedom of
expression and assembly. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the
other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values.
These freedoms, however, are not absolute. The right of a citizen to use the streets
for communication of views on national questions must be balanced with the need of
our courts for an atmosphere that will enable them to dispense justice free from bias
and unnecessary pressure. The courts would not exist and survive to protect the
people's most revered rights if they were unable to preserve the integrity of judicial
proceedings and the dignity of the institution from all forms of distracting, degrading
and prejudicial influences that threaten the fair and orderly administration of justice.
2. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and all other similar persons are enjoined from
holding any activity on the sidewalks and streets adjacent to, in front of, or within a
radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court
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2014 Semester 2
Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court
sala. Such activities unquestionably interrupt and hamper the working condition in
the salas, offices and chambers of the courts.
3. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers must keep all public
thoroughfares free and unimpeded to allow the smooth flow of vehicular and
pedestrian traffic. At no time should ingress to and egress from the premises of the
courts and the offices of the courts and the offices of the justices, judges, and court
officials and employees be obstructed.
4. Demonstrators, picketers, rallyists and their sympathizers are prohibited from

camping out on the streets, sidewalks or pavement adjacent to, in front of, or within a
radius of two hundred (200) meters from, the outer boundary of the Supreme Court
Building, any Hall of Justice, and any other building that houses at least one (1) court
sala. No provisional shelters and kitchens, pickets' quarters, and other similar
makeshift structures shall be established in said areas.
5. Lawyers of parties with cases pending in courts have a duty to properly apprise
their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice when
engaged in demonstrations, pickets, rallies and similar activities. As officers of the
court, they must help to preserve the dignity of the courts and to insulate the courts
from all forms of influence that may adversely affect judicial impartiality and violate a
party's right to due process.
6. Any violation of this resolution shall be treated as contempt of court. Members of

the Bar violating this resolution may, in addition, be subject to the administrative
sanctions of fine, imprisonment, suspension from the practice of law or disbarment as
circumstances may warrant.
The Clerk of Court is directed to forthwith cause publication of these Guidelines in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation. The Guidelines shall take effect upon the
expiration of fifteen (15) days after such publication.
The Clerk of Court is further directed to furnish all lower courts, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the PNP, and all agencies of local governments in charge of issuing
permits to hold demonstrations, rallies, pickets and similar activities, around the
vicinity of courts of justice with copies of this Resolution.
Very truly yours,
[Sgd.] LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court
Facts: The first petitioners, Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838, allege that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was
violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of them in toto and others only
Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop
violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the Calibrated
Preemptive Response" (CPR) policy then recently announced..
Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of
the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time
and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in
support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or
influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government.
Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies to assemblies against
43
the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it

cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
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2014 Semester 2
Petitioners Jess del Prado, et al., in turn, argue that B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it
is a curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for redress of grievances
because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes public
assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their dispersal.
Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
Rule: The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
constitute the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other
rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.
It is very clear, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since
they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to
public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient
standard the clear and present danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to
"imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the
same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the
same power independently under Republic Act No. 71602 is thus not necessary to
resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum
through the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful
assembly and petition at any time: G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006 BAYAN
vs.EDUARDO ERMITA,
Case: On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo
Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a
permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30
p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral
organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on
given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge,
which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.
The Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Jose "Lito" Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue
other than the one applied for by the IBP
Rule: The Court finds for petitioners. Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
44
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

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2014 Semester 2
e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in
an appropriate court of law.
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(f) A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the

applicant shall, be immediately executory.
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as
is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the
danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did
not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing
of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the
applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereof.
It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in
determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still
the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public
place is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. G.R. No. 175241
February 24, 2010 INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its
National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, vs. HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA
3. Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike in the Public Sector
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. (Art III)
Section 2. The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. (ART
IX, B)
Section 3. The State guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work,
and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.(ART XIII)
Facts: A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en masse walkout
waged/held in front of the GSIS main office in Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all.
Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were
GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS ("KMG" or the "Union"), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-
file employees. Contingents from other government agencies joined causes with the
GSIS group. The mass action's target appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia
45
and his management style. While the Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit,
the absence of the participating GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved
leave.
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2014 Semester 2
On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they
should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally.
The CA enjoined Petitioner from implementing the issued formal charges and from
issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the appellate court in
granting the petition for prohibition absent an instance of grave abuse of authority on their
part.
Rule: We resolve to GRANT the petition.
Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized in
Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of
the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable
limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
considerations of national security . . . .
It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that employees
in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms
of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service.
The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike,
To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services remained at the
usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four (4) days of massive
walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things. And to place the erring
employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability would be to trivialize the
civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of professionalism exacted of civil
servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. G.R. No. 170132 December 6, 2006 GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS
Facts: On 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees,
marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation
Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for. Mario Molina and Albert
Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;
Some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management
and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing
Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for
Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;
Respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No.
021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited
Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some
employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.
Rule: On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question of
whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316. Stated
differently, whether or not respondents' actions on May 27, 2005 amounted to a
"prohibited concerted activity or mass action." Pertinently, the said provision states:
Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase ''prohibited concerted

activity or mass action'' shall be understood to refer to any collective activity
undertaken by government employees, by themselves or through their
employees organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession, economic or
otherwise, from their respective agencies or the government. It shall include
mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature. (underscoring
supplied)
As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to regulate the
46
political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity or mass action
proscribed must be coupled with the "intent of effecting work stoppage or service
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disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession." Wearing similarly

2014 Semester 2
colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing with them
recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the guards and PGM
Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work stoppage or service
disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force concession.
Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-
1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such prohibition. Not all collective
activity or mass undertaking of government employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we
would be totally depriving our brothers and sisters in the government service of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person in the land
to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their rights and
interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It would be
unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only
but can never be taken away. G.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010 GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. DINNAH VILLAVIZA
4. Movie Censorship
Case: The dispute between the parties has been narrowed down. The motion picture in
question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only." There is the further issue then,
also one of first impression, as to the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in view of the
objections raised. Thus the relevance of this constitutional command: "Arts and letters shall
be under the patronage of the State.
Rule There is some difficulty in determining what is obscene. There is persuasiveness to the
approach followed in Roth: "The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be
judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons.
Regina v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3 QB 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later
decisions have rejected it and substituted this test: whether to the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
30
appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated
passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material legitimately
treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms
of speech and press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards
adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity.
This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not there was a
grave abuse of discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is
evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa
Patalim was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its
perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive. This Court
concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough
votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does
not lie. This conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its Answer to the
amended petition: "The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater
operators and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the
scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots
concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the
theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted the women kissing and caressing as
lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence
attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative
in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes." Further: "Respondents further
stated in its answer that petitioner company has an option to have the film reclassified to For-
General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare down the
violence in the film." Petitioners, however, refused the "For Adults Only" classification and
instead, as noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari.
All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is
concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion
pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there
is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein
47
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Having or encouraging an excessive interest in sexual matters. Characterized by an
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2014 Semester 2
shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the
concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. it cannot be
denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring
for the welfare of the young. G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985 JOSE ANTONIO U.
GONZALEZ vs. CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK
Case: Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner
submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR
tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series
as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.": Petitioner alleged that the
respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them.
Rule: Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates
the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals,
or public welfare.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking"
either religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence will show that
the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of
other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not
presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent,
contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of religion
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that
gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our
constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it
against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to
preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of
freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion
The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right
can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a
clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified,
and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger
The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent
appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the
subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and
imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. G.R. No. 119673 July
26, 1996 IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOVING PICTURES AND TELEVISION and HONORABLE
HENRIETTA S. MENDOZA
In the concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban in the above case, he

maintains that;
48
In Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak and Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) vs. Dans, Jr.,
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this Court early on acknowledged the uniquely pervasive presence of broadcast and
electronic media in the lives of everyone, and the easy accessibility of television and

2014 Semester 2
radio to just about anyone, especially children. Everyone is susceptible to their influence,
even "the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or
television set." And these audiences have less opportunity to cogitate, analyze and
reject the utterances, compared to readers of printed material
He continues by saying that it is precisely because the State as parens

patriae is "called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the welfare of
the young" that the State's power of review and prohibition via the
MTRCB must be retained. High-minded idealism in the staunch defense of
the much-vaunted freedoms cannot but be admired.
5. Radio Broadcast
Case: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio
Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere
allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. The petitioner also
raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents'
general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift
towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared
towards public affairs.
Rule: Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among

qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency
without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression
clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat
lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in
the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores
and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to
children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or
viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the
poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there
are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their
humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of
broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or
through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated
handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to
violently overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to
signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be
informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited
to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since they are the most
convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also
deserve special protection.
The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative

democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already
stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
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public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
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Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be

2014 Semester 2
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned
with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of
the individual be exalted. G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985 EASTERN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION (DYRE) vs. THE HON. JOSE P. DANS
g. Freedom of Information
Case: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464)
Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule
on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In

accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the
Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal
branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of
the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing
before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in
executive session.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29,
2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464,
and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to
appear at the meeting [regarding the North Rail project] will not be able to attend the
same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials
have not secured the required consent from the President."
Rule: In Chavez v. PCGG, (360 Phil. 133 (1998).) the Court held that this jurisdiction
recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national
security matters." The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a
recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (433 Phil. 506 (2002).), the Court ruled
that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged
information under the separation of powers," by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It
also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national
security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before
the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive
privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that
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certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as

privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:
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There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged

information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A
frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-
making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature,
it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of
inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each
member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the
fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in
dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral
argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice. G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA
Case: In Chavez v. PCGG, this Court held that there is a "governmental privilege against
public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
security matters." In Chavez v. PEA, there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is
fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed
by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation
of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than
others. G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008 NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE
Rule: Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in
favor of thepresidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal
system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,
affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Even Senate v. Ermita, the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this
concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege
was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), and Chavez v. PEA. The Court articulated in these cases
that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the
public, " that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters"; and that
"the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information
51
under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings." . G.R. No. 180643
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September 4, 2008 NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE

2014 Semester 2
Read
Hilado vs. Reyes 496 SCRA 262

Bantay RA 7491 vs. COMELEC 523 SCRA 1
Annotation 299 SCRA 782
CPEG vs. COMELEC 631 SCRA 41
E. Cybercrime
Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday the Twenty-fifth day of July two thousand eleven.
[ Republic Act No. 10175 ]
AN ACT DEFINING CYBERCRIME, PROVIDING FOR THE PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION,

SUPPRESSION AND THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the vital role of information and communications
industries such as content production, telecommunications, broadcasting electronic commerce, and data
processing, in the nations overall social and economic development. The State also recognizes the
importance of providing an environment conducive to the development, acceleration, and rational
application and exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT) to attain free, easy, and
intelligible access to exchange and/or delivery of information; and the need to protect and safeguard the
integrity of computer, computer and communications systems, networks, and databases, and the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and data stored therein, from all forms of misuse,
abuse, and illegal access by making punishable under the law such conduct or conducts. In this light, the
State shall adopt sufficient powers to effectively prevent and combat such offenses by facilitating their
detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing
arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms are hereby defined as
follows:
(a) Access refers to the instruction, communication with, storing data in, retrieving data from, or otherwise
making use of any resources of a computer system or communication network.
(b) Alteration refers to the modification or change, in form or substance, of an existing computer data or
program.
(c) Communication refers to the transmission of information through ICT media, including voice, video and
other forms of data.
(d) Computer refers to an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other data processing or
communications device, or grouping of such devices, capable of performing logical, arithmetic, routing, or
storage functions and which includes any storage facility or equipment or communications facility or
equipment directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device. It covers any type of computer
device including devices with data processing capabilities like mobile phones, smart phones, computer
networks and other devices connected to the internet.
(e) Computer data refers to any representation of facts, information, or concepts in a form suitable for
processing in a computer system including a program suitable to cause a computer system to perform a
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function and includes electronic documents and/or electronic data messages whether stored in local
computer systems or online.
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2014 Semester 2
(g) Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of
which, pursuant to a program, performs automated processing of data. It covers any type of device with
data processing capabilities including, but not limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device
consisting of hardware and software may include input, output and storage components which may stand
alone or be connected in a network or other similar devices. It also includes computer data storage
devices or media.
(h) Without right refers to either: (i) conduct undertaken without or in excess of authority; or (ii) conduct
not covered by established legal defenses, excuses, court orders, justifications, or relevant principles
under the law.
(i) Cyber refers to a computer or a computer network, the electronic medium in which online
communication takes place.
(j) Critical infrastructure refers to the computer systems, and/or networks, whether physical or virtual,
and/or the computer programs, computer data and/or traffic data so vital to this country that the incapacity
or destruction of or interference with such system and assets would have a debilitating impact on security,
national or economic security, national public health and safety, or any combination of those matters.
(k) Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training,
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and
organization and users assets.
(l) Database refers to a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, or instructions which
are being prepared, processed or stored or have been prepared, processed or stored in a formalized
manner and which are intended for use in a computer system.
(m) Interception refers to listening to, recording, monitoring or surveillance of the content of
communications, including procuring of the content of data, either directly, through access and use of a
computer system or indirectly, through the use of electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the
same time that the communication is occurring.
(n) Service provider refers to:
(1) Any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate by means of
a computer system; and
(2) Any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service or
users of such service.
(o) Subscribers information refers to any information contained in the form of computer data or any other
form that is held by a service provider, relating to subscribers of its services other than traffic or content
data and by which identity can be established:
(1) The type of communication service used, the technical provisions taken thereto and the period of
service;
(2) The subscribers identity, postal or geographic address, telephone and other access numbers, any
assigned network address, billing and payment information, available on the basis of the service
agreement or arrangement; and
(3) Any other available information on the site of the installation of communication equipment, available
on the basis of the service agreement or arrangement.
(p) Traffic data or non-content data refers to any computer data other than the content of the
communication including, but not limited to, the communications origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration, or type of underlying service.
CHAPTER II
PUNISHABLE ACTS
SEC. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable
under this Act:
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(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems:
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(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.

2014 Semester 2
(2) Illegal Interception. The interception made by technical means without right of any non-
public transmission of computer data to, from, or within a computer system including
electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data.
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration
of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the
introduction or transmission of viruses.
(4) System Interference. The intentional alteration or reckless hindering or interference with the
functioning of a computer or computer network by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting,
deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data or program, electronic document, or
electronic data message, without right or authority, including the introduction or transmission of
viruses.
(5) Misuse of Devices.
(i) The use, production, sale, procurement, importation, distribution, or otherwise making
available, without right, of:
(aa) A device, including a computer program, designed or adapted primarily for the
purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act; or
(bb) A computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of
a computer system is capable of being accessed with intent that it be used for the
purpose of committing any of the offenses under this Act.
(ii) The possession of an item referred to in paragraphs 5(i)(aa) or (bb) above with intent to
use said devices for the purpose of committing any of the offenses under this section.
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain name
is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the
appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration:
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in
case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
(b) Computer-related Offenses:
(1) Computer-related Forgery.
(i) The input, alteration, or deletion of any computer data without right resulting in inauthentic
data with the intent that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic,
regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible; or
(ii) The act of knowingly using computer data which is the product of computer-related forgery as
defined herein, for the purpose of perpetuating a fraudulent or dishonest design.
(2) Computer-related Fraud. The unauthorized input, alteration, or deletion of computer data or
program or interference in the functioning of a computer system, causing damage thereby with
fraudulent intent: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be
one (1) degree lower.
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession,
alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether natural or juridical,
without right: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one
(1) degree lower.
(c) Content-related Offenses:

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(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of
any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for
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2014 Semester 2
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No.
9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a computer system: Provided,
That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act
No. 9775.
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic

communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for
the recipient to reject. receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the
same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of
the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the message.
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be
devised in the future.
SEC. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
SEC. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, if
committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered
by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree
higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case may
be.
SEC. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any
liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws.
CHAPTER III
PENALTIES
SEC. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a)
and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two
hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the damage
incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment
of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion
temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount
commensurate to the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
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(PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

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2014 Semester 2
punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act
of 2009: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for
in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished
with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not
exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with
imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least
One hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.
SEC. 9. Corporate Liability. When any of the punishable acts herein defined are knowingly committed
on behalf of or for the benefit of a juridical person, by a natural person acting either individually or as part
of an organ of the juridical person, who has a leading position within, based on: (a) a power of
representation of the juridical person provided the act committed falls within the scope of such authority;
(b) an authority to take decisions on behalf of the juridical person: Provided, That the act committed falls
within the scope of such authority; or (c) an authority to exercise control within the juridical person, the
juridical person shall be held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7
up to a maximum of Ten million pesos (PhP10,000,000.00).
If the commission of any of the punishable acts herein defined was made possible due to the lack of
supervision or control by a natural person referred to and described in the preceding paragraph, for the
benefit of that juridical person by a natural person acting under its authority, the juridical person shall be
held liable for a fine equivalent to at least double the fines imposable in Section 7 up to a maximum of
Five million pesos (PhP5,000,000.00).
The liability imposed on the juridical person shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural
person who has committed the offense.
CHAPTER IV
ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
SEC. 10. Law Enforcement Authorities. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of the provisions
of this Act. The NBI and the PNP shall organize a cybercrime unit or center manned by special
investigators to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.
SEC. 11. Duties of Law Enforcement Authorities. To ensure that the technical nature of cybercrime
and its prevention is given focus and considering the procedures involved for international cooperation,
law enforcement authorities specifically the computer or technology crime divisions or units responsible
for the investigation of cybercrimes are required to submit timely and regular reports including pre-
operation, post-operation and investigation results and such other documents as may be required to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for review and monitoring.
SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be
authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with
specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type
of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the collection or
recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written application and
the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove
has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed: (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to
the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
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SEC. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber information
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2014 Semester 2
period of six (6) months from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six
(6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That
once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case,
the mere furnishing to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor
shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the order and its
compliance.
SEC. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing a court warrant,
shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or submit subscribers
information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from
receipt of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and
the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.
SEC. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and seizure warrant is
properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has knowledge about the
functioning of the computer system and the measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein
to provide, as is reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure
and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the examination of the
computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty
(30) days from date of approval by the court.
SEC. 16. Custody of Computer Data. All computer data, including content and traffic data, examined
under a proper warrant shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed therein,
be deposited with the court in a sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the law
enforcement authority executing it stating the dates and times covered by the examination, and the law
enforcement authority who may access the deposit, among other relevant data. The law enforcement
authority shall also certify that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made,
or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the package deposited with the court. The
package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or then
contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with
due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications
have been recorded.
SEC. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided in Sections 13 and
15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and
completely destroy the computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
SEC. 18. Exclusionary Rule. Any evidence procured without a valid warrant or beyond the authority of
the same shall be inadmissible for any proceeding before any court or tribunal.
SEC. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found
to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to
such computer data.
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SEC. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the
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orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829

2014 Semester 2
with imprisonment of prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
authorities.
CHAPTER V
JURISDICTION
SEC. 21. Jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the
provisions of this Act. including any violation committed by a Filipino national regardless of the place of
commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was committed within the Philippines or
committed with the use of any computer system wholly or partly situated in the country, or when by such
commission any damage is caused to a natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was
committed, was in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges to handle
cybercrime cases.
CHAPTER VI
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Sec. 22. General Principles Relating to International Cooperation All relevant international instruments
on international cooperation in criminal matters, arrangements agreed on the basis of uniform or
reciprocal legislation, and domestic laws, to the widest extent possible for the purposes of investigations
or proceedings concerning criminal offenses related to computer systems and data, or for the collection of
evidence in electronic form of a criminal, offense shall be given full force and effect.
CHAPTER VII
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES
SEC 23. Department of Justice (DOJ). There is hereby created an Office of Cybercrime within the DOJ
designated as the central authority in all matters related to international mutual assistance and
extradition.
SEC. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby created, within thirty (30)
days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for
policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.
SEC. 25. Composition. The CICC shall be headed by the Executive Director of the Information and
Communications Technology Office under the Department of Science and Technology (ICTO-DOST) as
Chairperson with the Director of the NBI as Vice Chairperson; the Chief of the PNP; Head of the DOJ
Office of Cybercrime; and one (1) representative from the private sector and academe, as members. The
CICC shall be manned by a secretariat of selected existing personnel and representatives from the
different participating agencies.
SEC. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance for the suppression of
real-time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency response team (CERT);
(b) To coordinate the preparation of appropriate and effective measures to prevent and suppress
cybercrime activities as provided for in this Act;
(c) To monitor cybercrime cases being bandied by participating law enforcement and prosecution
agencies;
(d) To facilitate international cooperation on intelligence, investigations, training and capacity building
related to cybercrime prevention, suppression and prosecution;
(e) To coordinate the support and participation of the business sector, local government units and
nongovernment organizations in cybercrime prevention programs and other
related projects;
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(f) To recommend the enactment of appropriate laws, issuances, measures and policies;
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(g) To call upon any government agency to render assistance in the accomplishment of the CICCs

2014 Semester 2
mandated tasks and functions; and
(h) To perform all other matters related to cybercrime prevention and suppression, including capacity
building and such other functions and duties as may be necessary for the proper implementation of this
Act.
CHAPTER VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 27. Appropriations. The amount of Fifty million pesos (PhP50,000,000.00) shall be appropriated
annually for the implementation of this Act.
SEC. 28. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The ICTO-DOST, the DOJ and the Department of the
Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall jointly formulate the necessary rules and regulations within
ninety (90) days from approval of this Act, for its effective implementation.
SEC. 29. Separability Clause If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the other provisions not
affected shall remain in full force and effect.
SEC. 30. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees or rules inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. Section 33(a) of Republic Act No. 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act is hereby
modified accordingly.
SEC. 31. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of its publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: SEP 12 2012
(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines
The SC ruled that the controversial provision on online libel is constitutional, but is
subject to one condition: only the original author, not those who receive or react to
the post, can be penalized
Meanwhile, 3 provisions were voted down as categorically UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic

communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and

reliable way for the recipient to reject. receipt of further commercial electronic
messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include

misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients
59
to read the message.
Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data

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2014 Semester 2
SEC. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due cause,
shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration,
or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities in the
collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be
committed: (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data
SEC. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima
facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict
or block access to such computer data.
The SC decided that granting power to the Department of Justice to restrict

computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence was not in
keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found in
Section 19 of the cybercrime prevention law.
Case: Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and
Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175,
otherwise known as the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for violating the fundamental rights
protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing
the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government,
the Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUES/GROUNDS: Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners
constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of
communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of
legislative authority and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure
;
Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any
violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners right against Double Jeopardy;
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP with due cause to
engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge,
violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block
or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law,
contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the
judiciary, and violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom
of expression; and
Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the
penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years,
infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press.
60
Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at
service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction.
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Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom

2014 Semester 2
of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be
removed from access, work together as a chilling effect upon protected speech.
No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is therefore
cognizable by the SCs judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and
pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
PRAYER:
- Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
- Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
- Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of
RA 10175; and
- Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises

31
Rule In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1 ) that calls for the application of the
strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is
essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a
universally condemned conduct.
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the work of ethical hackers, professionals who
employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither damage the target systems nor
steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the target systems security and report back to the owners the
vulnerabilities they found in it and give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical hackers are
the equivalent of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping records
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the
extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is referred to as the "get
out of jail free card." Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such
permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
32
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3 ) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent
effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms. But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply
punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that
belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such
act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer
systems and private documents.
33
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection clause in that, not
being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use
aliases or take the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device. For example, supposing
there exists a well known billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law would punish for
cyber-squatting both the person who registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-name
31
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and
systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right.
32
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or
deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right,
including the introduction or transmission of viruses.
33
Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of a domain name over the internet in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if such a domain
name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with the
61
appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration:

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant, in
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case of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

2014 Semester 2
and another who registers the name because it happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that,
considering the substantial distinction between the two, the law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or
use it as a pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the name that the law condemns. The
law is reasonable in penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy
reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is
baseless.
34
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The usual identifying information regarding a person includes his name, his citizenship, his residence
address, his contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his spouse if any, his occupation,
and similar data. The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right,
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related
identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that journalists would be
hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in the news to secure information
about him that could be published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that the law seeks to
prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of identity information must be intended for an illegitimate
purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating information made public by the user himself cannot be
regarded as a form of theft.
35
The subject of Section 4(c)(1) lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activityis not novel.
Article 201 of the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows." The Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography." The law defines prostitution as any act, transaction, scheme, or design
involving the use of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct in exchange for
money, profit, or any other consideration
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even
unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech
which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms
of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate
forms of expression.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It
suffers from overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on
it, or "Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor
places on the office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand is a thief!," he could certainly be
charged with libel. If Roger, seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be libel since he did
not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that be
libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the statement on the poster. He still is not its author.
Besides, it is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and
Share) are essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their
response to the original posting. Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering the inherent
impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal
charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who should go to jail for the outbreak of the
challenged posting?
34
Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration or deletion of identifying information belonging to another, whether
natural or juridical, without right: Provided, That if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty
62
imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

35
Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly,
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of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer
system, for favor or consideration.

2014 Semester 2
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous
statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes
hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to
disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this cyberspace
communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that
will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users
will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all
liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of
facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts,
comments, and other messages. Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or
abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a posting on the internet by liking
it? Netizens are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful
conduct. When a case is filed, how will the court ascertain whether or not one netizens comment aided
and abetted a cybercrime while another comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the original posting but creates an altogether new
defamatory story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children," then that should be considered an
original posting published on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law clearly punish
authors of defamatory publications. Make no mistake, libel destroys reputations that society values.
Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy relationships and, under certain circumstances, will
generate enmity and tension between social or economic groups, races, or religions, exacerbating
existing tension in their relationships.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises apprehension on the
part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since
the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is
more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated.
In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in
other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited
Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. G.R. No.
203335 February 11, 2014 JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P.
MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE,
THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
F. Academic Freedom
1. Goals of the state in education
Quality education for all levels

Affordable and accessible education
Education that is relevant to the needs of the people and society
Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. Section 5, Article XIV
1. Acedeic Freedom of SCHOOLS
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all 0institutions of

higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint.
63
According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the

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independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may

2014 Semester 2
teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be
admitted to study.36
Who may be admitted to study
Rule: The Loyola School of Theology, is a seminary for the priesthood; and petitioner is
admittedly and obviously disqualified and is not studying, for the priesthood, she being a
laywoman and therefore not eligible for admission; It only remains to be added that the futility that
marked the persistence of petitioner a woman. to continue her studies in the Loyola School of
Theology is the result solely of a legal appraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to
be construed as in any way reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the
part of respondent due acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained
in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well
as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere.
There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. It could be
that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other
institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the
legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in this decision. G.R. No. L-40779 November
28, 1975 EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, vs. THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY, herein represented by FR. ANTONIO B. LAMBINO
Case: Reynaldo Borja y Torres, who is assisted in this complaint (for damages) by his parents,
was enrolled in defendant's institution as second year high school (student) day session, in the
school year 1979-80; At the end of the school year he failed in 3 academic disciplines
Mathematics, Pilipino and Practical Arts. His failure in the last subject was reconsidered, to make
hi(m) pass, under such circumstances as the parties will prove in the trial; That he took the 1980
summer classes at the National University in the two subjects he failed and obtained passing
grades thereat; That attempts on the part of the father-parent of the plaintiff to enroll him for the
school year 1980-1981 failed because the defendant refused and still refuses to admit him.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable in damages for its refusal to admit the complainant
as a regular third year high school student
Rule: The dropping of the private respondent from the petitioner's roll of students was not done
precipitately. Private respondent's grades were of his own making. He failed in Practical Arts
because he did not submit a required project. His teacher saw fit to fail him for his non-
compliance. At the end of the last grading period, the Committee on Admission deliberated on the
school standing of students who incurred failures in three academic subjects and among them
was the private respondent. With regard to the latter, the Committee resolved that he be made to
transfer to another school in line with the petitioner's policy. This recommendation was adopted
by petitioner. We fail to see any irregularity involved herein. In the absence of substantial
evidence showing arbitrariness or malice on the part of the petitioner, We will not disturb its
decision. In his concurring opinion in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, et al., the late
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee supplied the rationale underlying Our attitude towards academic
decisions or policies, to wit:
Only . . . when there is marked arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment
of the school faculty and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant
for enrollment . The courts simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute
themselves as Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher learning and to
substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted Admission Committees of such
educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be swamped with
petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every year, and next the thousands
who flunked and were dropped would also be petitioning the courts for a judicial review of their
grades. (G.R. No.L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277, 289).
While such opinion relates to schools of higher learning, by analogy the same could also apply in
this case. G.R. No. 84401 May 15, 1991 SAN SEBASTIAN COLLEGE, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND REYNALDO BORJA y TORRES
Case: Respondents are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La
Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of
their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other
student members of Domino Lux Fraternity
64
Page
36
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS,

2014 Semester 2
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap
and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux
Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity," a rival fraternity
They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion by DLSU.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily
disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be
reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded
Issues: 1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating
disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their
misdeed.
Rule: It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary
cases decided by institutions of higher learning.
R.A. No. 7722 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to
affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that
education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting
academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual
growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible
and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the
enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware
that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future,
which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to
academic freedom.
Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which

includes determination of who to admit for study.
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a
necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the
freedom "what to teach." Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982
that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject to the established academic
and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can
very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission
to its school. G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007 DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC.,
EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA
QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
WILFREDO D. REYES
Who may teach
Case: The petitioners executed individual Teachers Contracts for each of the trimesters that they
were engaged to teach, with the following common stipulation:
65
POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in

the College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for the duration of the last term that the TEACHER
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is given a teaching load based on the assignment duly approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO

2014 Semester 2
For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth
in its Guidelines on the Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla. Under the new screening
guidelines, teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience,
capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. The performance
standards under the new screening guidelines were also used to determine the present faculty
members entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based
on the performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation, 13th month pay,
and for discriminatory practices. On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a
memorandum from AMACC, through Human Resources Supervisor informing them that with the
expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer be renewed.
The NLRC dismissed the complaint. Elevated,, the CA dismissed the petitioners complaint for
illegal dismissal.
Rule: It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since
quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable
and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside. Schools cannot be required to adopt
standards which barely satisfy criteria set for government recognition.
The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and
conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor
Code. Academic freedom, too, is not the only legal basis for AMACCs issuance of screening
guidelines. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management prerogative
the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the freedom to
prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding
transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of
workers. Thus, AMACC has every right to determine for itself that it shall use fixed-term
employment contracts as its medium for hiring its teachers. It also acted within the terms of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools when it recognized the petitioners to be merely on
probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters. G.R. No. 183572 April 13, 2010
YOLANDA M. MERCADO, CHARITO S. DE LEON, DIANA R. LACHICA, MARGARITO M.
ALBA, JR., and FELIX A. TONOG, vs. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE-PARAAQUE CITY, INC.
2. FACULTY MEMBERS have academic freedom in the folliwng;
a. Full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the
adequate performance of their other academic duties
b. Freedom in the classroom in discussing their subjects, but they should be careful
not to introduce into their teaching controversial matters which has no relation to
their subjects
c. When faculty members speak or write in their capacity as citizens, then they are
free from institutional censorship or discipline.
3. STUDENTS and Academic Freedom
They have the right to enjoy in school the guarantees of the bill of rights
4. LIMITATIONS of Academic Freedom
a. Dominant police power of the state

b. Social interest of the community
5. Academic freedom and Civil Service
Case: three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty
members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:
1. Complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service filed by Jose Rene A. Cepe and Narciso P. Ragay. It was alleged that
66
respondent approved the release of salary differentials despite the absence of the
required Plantilla and Salary Adjustment Form and valid appointments.
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2014 Semester 2
2. Complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documents filed by

Jocelyn Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos. The complaint averred that respondent
maliciously allowed the antedating and falsification of the reclassification differential
payroll, to the prejudice of instructors and professors who have pending request for
adjustment of their academic ranks.
Issues: Is the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction
constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and
officials?
Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate
academic freedom?
Rule:. 1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service.
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the
governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was
appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision
of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC
2. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged violations of civil service
laws and rules.
Following that doctrine, this Court has recognized that institutions of higher learning has the
freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims and objectives, free from
outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires. They have the
independence to determine who to accept to study in their school and they cannot be
compelled by mandamus to enroll a student.
That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the
matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the
administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is
facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are classified as grave
offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the
unbridled authority to perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a school
official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil
service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic
freedom. G.R. No. 168766 May 22, 2008 THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, vs. HENRY
A. SOJOR
6. BUDGETARY PRIORITY
The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching
will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment. ARTICLE XIV, Section 5 (5)
Education must be assigned the highest budgetary priority. However,

Congress is free to determine what should be given budgetary priority in
order to enable to respond to the imperative of national interest and for the
attainment of other state objectives and policies
Case: This is a case whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. Allegedly, , P86 Billion is appropriated for
debt service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the
1990 budget. Is the said appropriation for debt services is inconsistent with the Constitution,
hence, viod
Rule: While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is
mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate
remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow
that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the
67
imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
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2014 Semester 2
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to
upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers
has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the
highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear compliance with
the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only
by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous
debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only
a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very
survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount
for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds
that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional. G.R. No. 94571 April
22, 1991 GUINGONA, JR.. vs. CARAGUE
IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights. (Art III)
Clauses in Section 5;
A. Non- Establishment clause
1. Non establishment No law shall be made respecting an

establishment of religion
2. Free exercise No law shall be made prohibiting the free exercise

thereof.
US Jurisprudence:
Rule: In discussing the reach of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment the Court said:
"Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different
kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. The Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion
whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or not. This is not to
say, of course, that laws officially prescribing a particular form of religious worship do not
involve coercion of such individuals. When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?
If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, withdraws from legislative
power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise [374 U.S. 203, 223] of
religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the
coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The
distinction between the two clauses is apparent - a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is
predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF ABINGTON TOWNSHIP, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. v. SCHEMPP ET
68
AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. No. 142. Argued February 27-28, 1963. Decided June 17,
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1963. *

2014 Semester 2
The non-establishment clause prohibits the following;
1. Excessive state entanglement with religious institutions

2. State endorsement or approval of religion
The right to religious profession and worship; to believe, and to act on ones belief
Case: In their Letter dated November 19, 2001 addressed to Executive Judge Valerio M. Salazar,
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said
city request that they be allowed to enjoy the following privileges:
1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee breaks during the
month of Ramadan;
2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during
the entire calendar year.
With respect to the matter of allowing the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office
hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month of Ramadan, such n is well
taken. The same has statutory basis in Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No.
322, The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the
Muslim employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to allow
them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day. No law mentions "Friday, the Muslim Prayer Day" as one
of the recognized holidays.
The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5, Article III of the
Constitution:
This provision contains two aspects: (1) the non-establishment clause; and (2) the free exercise
clause. The subject requests are based on the latter and in interpreting this clause (the free
exercise clause) embodied in the Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine
that:
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on ones beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two concepts in this wise:
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter. He may
indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all;
embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being that appeals to his
reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul in fact, cherish any religious conviction
as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile
and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be
required to prove his beliefs. He may not be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all,
is a matter of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a right to his
beliefs and he may not be called to account because he cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on Ones Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect the public, his
freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be,
religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a
proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious
freedom will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this
is true even if such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for
the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional provision on religious freedom terminated
69
disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its essence
is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
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2014 Semester 2
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or those belonging to
other religious denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the
exercise of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable
requirements of the law, including civil service laws. A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC December 14, 2005
RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY (RE:
OFFICE HOURS)
Case: Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled / excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church for reasons of; disobedience inciting dissension, for threatening to forcibly
occupy the Parish Church
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages

with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao
City,. They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus
violating their right to due process of law.
Rule: The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to
hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.
We rule that the courts do not.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a

religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws
and canons, of said institution / organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over
church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for
the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and abandonment of faith
or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding
from the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts. G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005
DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA, NICANOR GALANIDA, RENERIO CANTA,
JERRY CANTA, CORDENCIO CONSIGNA, SUSANO ALCALA, LEONARDO DIZON,
SALVADOR GELSANO and BENITO LAUGO, vs. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ, REV.
FR. RUSTOM FLORANO and DELFIN BORDAS
Case: In question is the allegation of immorality against the Respondent court employee.
Respondent testified that when she entered the judiciary she was already a widow, her husband
having died She admitted that she has been living with her partnerr. without the benefit of
marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known
as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together,
she executed a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness, Same marital arrangement is recognized
allegedly as a binding tie before "JEHOVAH" God and before all persons to be held to and
honored in full accord with the principles of God's Word.
Escritor's partner, Quilapio, executed a similar pledge on the same day.. At the time Escritor
executed her pledge, her husband was still alive but living with another woman. Quilapio was
likewise married at that time, but had been separated in fact from his wife. During her testimony,
Not represented by counsel, respondent, in layman's terms, invokes the religious beliefs and
practices and moral standards of her religion, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in asserting that her
conjugal arrangement with a man not her legal husband does not constitute disgraceful and
immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable. While not articulated by
respondent, she invokes religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross
and immoral conduct." To resolve this issue, it is necessary to determine the sub-issue of
whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from the
prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.
Rule: In resolving claims involving religious freedom (1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation,
70
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the religion
clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondents plea of exemption based on the Free
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2014 Semester 2
Exercise Clause (from the law with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling
state interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.
The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the respondent's claim of religious
freedom to the "compelling state interest" test from a benevolent neutrality stance - i.e.
entertaining the possibility that respondent's claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out
an exception from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be
unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state interest.
Thus, the case is remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), so it can:
(a) examine the sincerity and centrality of respondents claimed religious belief and practice;
(b) present evidence on the states "compelling interest" to override respondents religious belief
and practice; and
(c) show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondents religious freedom. A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 ALEJANDRO ESTRADA,
vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR
Rule: Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in
the hierarchy of rights "the most inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of
Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the states interest is important, because our
Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in specific
terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to religious
freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right
by itself.
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held administratively liable as the arrangement she
had was "illegal per se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very
nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,"
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent
Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld
must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect
the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed. A.M. No. P-02-1651
June 22, 2006 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant,
vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR
Facts : Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the
following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae
ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di
ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae
yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. x x x
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order preventively
71
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section
3(d) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter
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2014 Semester 2
XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of
the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
Rule: The Court is at a loss to understand how petitioners utterances in question can come
within the pale of Sec. 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution on religious freedom.
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out
with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them
the character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person
cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his
words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution, not by any
religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his
statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the
foul language used in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his
statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or
refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate that
petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner
could have chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road. G.R.
No. 164785 April 29, 2009 ELISEO F. SORIANO, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA
Rule: The Honorable Court should have rendered its decision in light of the surrounding
circumstances why and what prompted herein petitioner to utter those words. Clearly, he was
provoked because of the malicious and blatant splicing by the INC ministers of his recorded
voice. Verily, Petitioner submits that the choice of words he used has been harsh but strongly
maintains that the same was consistent with his constitutional right of freedom of speech and
religion.
Contrary to petitioners impression, the Court has, in fact, considered the factual antecedents of
and his motive in making his utterances, and has found those circumstances wanting as
defense for violating the programs "G" rating
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent [MTRCB]. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by
the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which
the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e. serious detriment to the more overriding interest of
public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion
can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as
religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea
and in our shore, the bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable
religious differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife
considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling and
claw to these beliefs. x x x For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should
not stand still G.R. No. 164785 March 15, 2010 ELISEO F. SORIANO, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA
P. LAGUARDIA
1. Operation Of Sectarian Schools
Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and

mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation
in all educational institutions. The control and administration of educational
institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines. (Section 4, par 2, ARTICLE
IV)
2. Religious Instruction In Public Schools
Religion may be taught in public schools subject to the following requisites
a. Express written option of the student and guardians

b. Taught within regular school hours
72
c. Instructors are designated and approved by the proper religious authorities

d. Without additional cost to the government
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2014 Semester 2
3. At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be

allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools
within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious
authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost
37
to the Government.
Art. 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For
this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible:
(1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction
38
shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian xxx
3. Tax Exemption
Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually,
directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall
39
be exempt from taxation. Section 29, Par 2, Article VI
Case: The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of
Nueva Segovia, possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the municipality of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, all four sides of which face on public streets. On the south
side is a part of the churchyard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for a vegetable
garden, containing an area off 1,624 square meters, in which there is a stable and a
well for the use of the convent. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the
church. On the north is an old cemetery with two of its walls still standing, and a portion
where formerly stood a tower, the base of which still be seen, containing a total area of
8,955 square meters.
As required by the defendants, on July 3, 1925 the plaintiff paid, under protest, the land
tax on the lot adjoining the convent and the lot which formerly was the cemetery with
the portion where the tower stood.
The plaintiff filed this action for the recovery of the sum paid by to the defendants by
way of land tax, alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal. The lower court
absolved the defendants from the complaint in regard to the lot adjoining convent and
declared that the tax collected on the lot, which formerly was the cemetery and on the
portion where the lower stood, was illegal. Both parties appealed from this judgment.
Rule: The exemption in favor of the convent in the payment of the land tax (sec. 344 [c]
Administrative Code) refers to the home of the parties who presides over the church
and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. In therefore must,
in the sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the
adjacent ground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. Except in large cities
where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the use
of larger tracts of land for buildings, a vegetable garden belongs to a house and, in the
case of a convent, it use is limited to the necessities of the priest, which comes under
the exemption.
In regard to the lot which formerly was the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such,
neither is it used for commercial purposes and, according to the evidence, is now being
used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities, which
constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within the
exemption.
The judgment appealed from is reversed in all it parts and it is held that both lots are
exempt from land tax and the defendants are ordered to refund to plaintiff whatever
was paid as such tax, without any special pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. L-
27588 December 31, 1927 THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA,
as representative of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, vs. THE PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF ILOCOS NORTE, ET AL.
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37
Section 3. ARTICLE XIV
Page
38
New Civil Code
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Section 29, Par 2, Article VI

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Rule: The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary
tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it
lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to
others, such those selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to religious
groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with the latter's sale of
religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, "it
is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another
thing to exact a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101
Phil. 386 (1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on
those engaged in the sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be
imposed on the sale of bibles by the American Bible Society without restraining the free
exercise of its right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a
privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or
exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of
properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or
subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the
proceeds derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which
are given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to
increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case, the
resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make it
difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might make the right
to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument,
to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden
on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as
amended by 7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the
expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to
accounting in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is
not liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it
also sells some copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be
decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
4. Public Aid to Religion
Section 29. No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium. (Par 2, Art VI)
Requisites for government aid to be allowable;
1. Must be for a secular purpose

2. Its primary effect must not inhibit or advance any religion
3. No excessive entanglement with recipient institutions
In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 20140, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which
appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps
with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department
Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate
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40
Quoted from G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981 ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO
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MARILAO OSMEA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, , vs. Hon. NUMERIANO
G. ESTENZO

2014 Semester 2
the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the
Catholic Church.
The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design
of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No
religious purpose was intended.
Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church,
sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps.
It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a
religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's
prohibition suit was dismissed.
In that case, the Court declared that
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of
Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage
stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase
"advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It
does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for
the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however,
the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5,
1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in
issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist
to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered
of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" It is
significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a
Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It
is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if
any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in
its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if
the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere
incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
A. Free exercise clause
1. Flag Salute
Case: The petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in
Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge
as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) dated July
21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of
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worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or

anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State.
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2014 Semester 2
transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control..
Issue: Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be
expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8
Held: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to
his Creator.
The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is
the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public
interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such a threat to public
safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified. (Teehankee)
The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsory flag
ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their
countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of the
flag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their
respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Since
they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the
flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes". What
the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public
schools where they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form of
government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine history and culture but also
receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect
for human rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and
moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula.
Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through their
on hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will
hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.
Also, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are
enrolled violates their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to make such education accessible to
all (Sec. 1, Art. XIV) EBRALINAG v. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS OF
CEBUG.R. No. 95770 March 1, 1993
2. Freedom to Propagate Religious Doctrines
Case: In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines and translating the
same into several Philippine dialects. The City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without providing itself
with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of the City Ordinances,
and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees,
Predicated on this constitutional mandate, plaintiff-appellant contends that the Ordinances

are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for
religious censorship and restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession,
to wit: the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the people of the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, are constitutional and valid;
Rule: The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraints of
such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds
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that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right
to prevent". (Taada and Fernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 4th ed., p.
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2014 Semester 2
297). In the case at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature:
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this
cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila
Ordinance cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs. G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957 AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY, vs. CITY
OF MANILA
Case: The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985, the officers
of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached
Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of
P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department
of Social Welfare and Development.
As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed

against petitioner for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law,
before the Municipal Trial Court. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or
public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction
of a chapel.
Rule: The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect.
On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such
religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus,
the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions
to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be
so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom.
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in
order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its
citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before
permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his
authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to
regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace,
comfort, or convenience.
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion
that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. It has been said that a law
advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with
the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on
the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of
solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or
delay the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even though the
collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited
previous restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
exercise. To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation
by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN CENTENO, vs.HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-
PORNILLOS
Rule: According to Cruz, where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions
that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State. As
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great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in the
Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is error to
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2014 Semester 2
impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to
prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such practices are
pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not merely for the purpose of evading the
reasonable requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional provision on religious freedom

terminated disabilities, it did not create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma.
Accordingly, while one has lull freedom to believe in Satan, he may not offer the object of his
piety a human sacrifice, as this would be murder. Those who literally interpret the Biblical
command to "go forth and multiply" are nevertheless not allowed to contract plural marriages
in violation of the laws against bigamy. A person cannot refuse to pay taxes on the ground
that it would be against his religious tenets to recognize any authority except that of God
alone. An atheist cannot express in his disbelief in act of derision that wound the feelings of
the faithful. The police power can validly asserted against the Indian practice of the suttee,
born of deep religious conviction, that calls on the widow to immolate herself at the funeral
pile of her husband. G.R. No. 119673\ July 26, 1996 IGLESIA NI CRISTO, (INC.), vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
3. Exemption from Union Shop
Case: Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia
ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. As such
employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had with the
Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no
action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon,
the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from
the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.
Rule: Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the
Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations.
Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence
regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one
subscribes to. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should
join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to
which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and
the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350
introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the
following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350
merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement
the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with
any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed
from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining
union.It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision
on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and
the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious
beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do
so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither
may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does
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not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. G.R. No. L-25246
September 12, 1974 BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION
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4. Disqualification from Government Office
Case: The novel question raised in this certiorari proceeding concerns the eligibility of an
ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private respondent, Father Margarito R.
Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.
Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner,
himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code
provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics,
soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or
national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper,
respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He
ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The
matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner.
Rule: The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment a quo is reversed and set aside.
Respondent Gonzaga is hereby ordered immediately to vacate the mayoralty of the
municipality of Albuquerque, Bohol, there being a failure to elect.
(BARREDO, J., concurring:.) I just cannot imagine how a duly ordained minister of God
whose sacred life mission is supposed to be to serve God and to advance and defend the
interests of His church above all other interests can properly act as a government official
committed to enforce state policies which may conflict with the fundamental tenets of that
church.
)MAKASIAR, J., concurring) No doubt Section 2175 was designed to preserve the
indestructible wall of separation between Church and State the basic pillar of our democratic
regime. The no-religious test clause of the Constitution only implements and supplements
one's freedom to entertain views of his relations to his Creator and to preach, propagate and
evangelize his religious belief. But such no-religious test does not guarantee him the right to
run for or be appointed to a public office and thereafter to use such public office to compel the
citizenry to conform to his religious belief, thereby to gain for his Church dominance over the
State.
A priest or minister, once elected or appointed to a municipal office, necessarily enjoys the
salary pertaining to the office. This would be a direct violation of the prohibition under Section
18(2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which was contained in paragraph 3 of Section
23 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Not only public funds will be appropriated for his
salary but the priest or minister thus elected or appointed as a municipal officer employee will
also directly or indirectly enjoy the use or benefit of any property of the municipality. The only
exception where such appropriation of public money or property can be validly made in favor
of such priest or minister is when he is assigned to the Armed Forces or to any penal
institution or government orphanage or leprosarium.
What will necessarily follow would be the Church fielding its own candidates for municipal
offices all over the country even without registering as a political party. Such support by the
Church, although not registered as a political party, remains a circumvention of the absolute
prohibition specified in Section 8 of Article XII of the 1973 Constitution. And when the majority
of the winning candidates for elective offices in tile towns all over the country are supported
by the Church, these officials will naturally be beholden to the Church and will utilize
covertly or overtly their office to further the interests of the Church. When the Church
achieves such political dominance, then the Church will have the power to persuade the
electorate or citizenry to amend the Constitution to eliminate all the provisions on separation
of Church and State, the establishment of state religion and the utilization of public funds or
property by the Church or by any of its priests or ministers and the prohibition against the
registration of a religious sect as a political party.G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978
FORTUNATO R. PAMIL, vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON
V. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be
provided by law. (Art III)
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Guaranteed by Section 6, Art III are the Curtailment

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2014 Semester 2
abode and within the limits of law

Travel within the country and abroad By the lawful order of the court
By administrative officers in the
interest of national security
(passport), public safety, public
health (quarantine), as may be
provided by law
1. Travel within the country and abroad
Rule: Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its function conformably to the
mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of the highlights
of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of
the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of 'the ban on international
travel. There should be fidelity to such a pronouncement. It is the experience of the undersigned
in his lectures abroad the last few years, in the United States as well as in Malaysia, Singapore
and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional rights under the present emergency regime
had elicited the commendation of members of the bench, the bar, and the academe in foreign
lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law
Association, President Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with
law and that the Constitution had been applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the
executive branch, therefore, the Travel Processing Center should ever be on its guard, lest the
impression be created that such declarations amount, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, to no more
than munificent bequests in a pauper's will. Petitioner, to my mind, is justified, the more so in the
light of the Answer of Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative response to his
prayer in his Manifestation and Reply 'that under the circumstances mentioned in the Petition,
Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents
have issued his Certificate of Eligibility to Travel, as mentioned in the Answer. G.R. No. L-53622
April 25, 1980 JOVITO R. SALONGA, vs. CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO, TRAVEL
PROCESSING CENTER, and GENERAL FABIAN VER
Case: After having been exiled to Hawaii, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation
of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and
the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar
the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue
travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance
the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:, the right of Mr. Marcos and his
family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual
rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The
Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof,
all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal,
military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all
the people of the blessings of democracy.,
Rule: It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
80
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally
distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel.
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2014 Semester 2
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state,
the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international
law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.]
However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived"
thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the
framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no
other? Are these numerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? It would not be
accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the
President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it.
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially
ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in
the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing
implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as
President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things,
and adhere to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the
Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic
principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people
have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good
against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual
power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as
steward of the people. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
IMELDA R. MARCOS, vs. RAUL MANGLAPUS
Facts: On September 28, 1989, former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Yet, Pres. Aquino
maintains that In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of society,
the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to our country until such
time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise
decide.
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners of the September 15,
1989 Decision.
Rule: The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not
changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the
destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis
for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is
Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that the
matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."
Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power
is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
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Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the
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return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and

2014 Semester 2
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a clear
showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this
decision, the Court will not enjoin the implementation of this decision G.R. No. 88211 October
27, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, vs. HONORABLE RAUL
MANGLAPUS
Case: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in
Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for
his provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines
filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order
against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of
the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the
allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public
safety or public health,
Rule: The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty
of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may
be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution,
Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the
1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center,
No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in
criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial
officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the
effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at
all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to
travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of
a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution.
Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in
People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof
by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued.
Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to
leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an
accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the
Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the
Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and
proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes. G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991 RICARDO C. SILVERIO, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS
Case: This petition seeks to dismiss for a case against him violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended now pending before respondent Sandiganbayan Further, he prays for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondent Sandiganbayan from further enforcing and or implementing its order which bans
petitioner from leaving the country except upon prior approval by said court..
82
Petitioner filed a motion reiterating his application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction with urgent motion for hearing thereon citing the urgency of lifting the travel
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restriction on him in view of the various problems involving the investments of San Miguel

2014 Semester 2
Corporation (SMC) abroad which must be immediately attended to by petitioner as duly elected
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of SMC. Petitioner asserts that quite often, it becomes
necessary for him to attend meetings and conferences abroad where attendance must be
confirmed promptly. Considering that he must first secure the permission of respondent
Sandiganbayan before he can travel abroad and abide by the conditions imposed by said court
upon the grant of such permission, petitioner contends that it becomes impossible for him to
immediately attend to the aforecited tasks.
Issue: Whether the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner should be vacated to enable
petitioner to go abroad without prior permission of and other restrictions imposed by the
respondent Sandiganbayan
Rule: The travel ban should be lifted, considering all the circumstances now prevailing.
The rule laid down by this Court is that a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
released on bail does not have an unrestricted right to travel, the reason being that a person's
right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding
the system of justice. But, significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation
indicated that it is not interposing any objection to petitioner's prayer that he be allowed to travel
abroad based on the following considerations:
. . . (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to supend its own rules, including the second
paragraph, Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the past that
the petitioner has always returned to the Philippines after the expiration of the period of his
allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now Chairman of the Board of San Miguel Corporation,
may be constrained to leave the country for business purposes, more often than he had done in
the past, . . . .
It however recommended that the period of travel should be reduced to three (3) months instead
of six (6) months as requested by petitioner and that the latter should be required to post an
additional cash bond equivalent to the present cash bond posted by him.
Moreover, prescinding from our initial declaration that the issuance of warrant of arrest against
petitioner by respondent court is invalid, it now becomes necessary that there be strong and
compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on petitioner's right to travel abroad.
Admittedly, all of petitioner's previous requests to travel abroad has been granted and that, as
confirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has always returned to the
Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him. The necessity of further denying
petitioner's right to travel abroad, with attendant restrictions, appears less than clear. The risk of
flights is further diminished in view of petitioner's recent reinstatement as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, though he has now more justification to travel so as
to oversee the entire operations of that company. In this regard, it has to be conceded that this
assumption of such vital post has come at a time when the current economic crisis has adversely
affected the international operations of many companies, including San Miguel. The need to
travel abroad frequently on the part of petitioner, to formulate and implement the necessary
corporate strategies and decisions, could not be forestalled. These considerations affecting the
petitioner's duties to a publicly held company, militate against imposing further restrictions on
petitioner's right to travel abroad. G.R. No. 134307 December 21, 1998 EDUARDO M.
COJUANGCO, JR., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Means of Travel, Use of Toll Ways
Case: Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles in toll ways unduly
deprive them of their right to travel.
We are not persuaded.
Rule: A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to
certain destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public interest
and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to ordinary
roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle in traversing a toll way. The right
to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll
way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled vehicles. Petitioners are not
83
denied the right to move from Point A to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access
the toll way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which petitioners wish to travel
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pertains to the manner of using the toll way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.

2014 Semester 2
Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available to them. Their complaint is that
these routes are not the safest and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies
as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel. The right to travel does not
entitle a person to the best form of transport or to the most convenient route to his destination.
The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of (i.e., potholes, manholes,
construction barriers, etc.), are not suffered by them alone.
Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a drivers license from the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) and the fact that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to use all
kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are mistaken. There exists no absolute right to
drive. On the contrary, this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is allowed to
drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests administered by the LTO. A drivers license issued
by the LTO merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not a license to drive or
operate any form of transportation on any type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the
other hand merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not preclude the
government from prescribing which roads are accessible to certain vehicles. G.R. No. 158793
June 8, 2006 JAMES MIRASOL, RICHARD SANTIAGO, and LUZON MOTORCYCLISTS
FEDERATION, INC., vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
2. Choose and Change ones place of abode
Rule: The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are
not absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall
not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law.
The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will make
himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer look at
the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode; he is
merely required to inform the court in case he does so. G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
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xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws.

The Civil Code provides that;

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;

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The Revised Penal Code makes a crime

a. the violation of secrets by an officer ( Art. 229),

Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like

a. the Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200),

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SET 3 ATTY EDGAR PASCUA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

SET 3 ATTY EDGAR PASCUA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

SET 3 ATTY EDGAR PASCUA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

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11. Privacy of Communication

III Freedom of Expression

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1. Market Place of Ideas. freedom of speech is important because, in a

Protecting speech, even speech in error, is necessary to the eventual

2. Discovery of Political Truth. Guaranteed is the right of every citizen to

SET 3 ATTY EDGAR PASCUA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

3. For Self Government - Citizens are to engage in self-government by using

4. For individual Perfection - Freedom of expression is necessary to promote

This rationale treats freedom of speech as promoting every individuals

Under this rationale, non-political speech such as artistic expression is

B. Restrictions to Free Speech - Prior Restraint and Subsequent punishment

Like any other manifestations of freedom, reasonable restrictions, may be

Free expression may thus be restricted by prior restraint, and subsequent

However, prior restraint and subsequent punishment cannot be taken lightly,

Prior restraint is generally understood as an imposition in advance of a limit

A prior restraint by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be

As an aspect of freedom of expression, prior restraint should not be confused with

SET 3 ATTY EDGAR PASCUA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2

Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,

Subsequent punishment is likewise seen as a threat to legitimate expression.

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Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa

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Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of speech.

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Rule: Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied.

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hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right

C. Content Based Restrictions

Content Based and Content Neutral Restraint - A content-based restraint is

I - Some tests of validity of content based restrictions

1. Dangerous Tendency13 - By enacting the present statute the State has

Argued April 12, 1923

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3. Balancing of Interests19 - Briefly stated, the "balancing" test requires a court

4. Direct Increment - Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio

II - Applications of Tests (content based restrictions)

a. Freedom of Expression and National Security

In principle, freedom of expression may be curtailed in furtherance of

focus on weighing between government and private interests

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b. Freedom of Expression and criticism of Official Conduct

(a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor, discredit or

Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven. Malice in law is a