PRESUMPTION AND APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOM Martinez v Van Buskirk SD Martinez and Carmen Ong de

Martinez (plaintiffs and appellees) v William Van Buskirk (defendant and appellant)

Facts: The horses of a cochero wounded the plaintiff and her child. The court of first instance of Manila found the
defendant guilty of negligence; thus, this appeal.

Issue/s: Whether the cochero is guilty of negligence

Held: The Cochero is not guilty of negligence. SC reversed the judgment on the principle that acts the performance of
which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have been acquiesced in by society for so long time that they
have ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent Cocheros had been in the
habit of leaving the horses and assisting in unloading the merchandise. Such is the manner described by the defendant
on the day of the accident. NCC 10-12 Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. (n)

Alonzo v. Padua Issue: How should Article 1088 be correctly interpreted and applied? This is Article 1088 of the Civil
Code: Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-
heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do
so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

Fact: The Padua siblings (five brothers and sisters) inherited a parcel of land from their parents. Two of
them, Celestino and Eustaquia, sold their undivided share to the petitioners in 1963 and 1964. The
petitioners, then, enclosed the land they bought and lived there. In 1976, however, Teclo Padua, one of
the coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the petitioners. The trial court dismissed the complaint
citing that though there was no written notice, the co-heirs had actual knowledge of the sale. But the
Intermediate Appellate Court Reversed the decision declaring that Article 1088 requires a written notice
and no written notice has been issued; therefore, the 30 days of redemption has not yet started (citing
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. )
Held: The Court reversed the decision of the respondent court and reinstated the decision of the trial
court. The Court sated The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no
notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended
during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977,
without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

Pastor B. Tenchavez (plaintiff-appellant) v Vicenta F. Escao, et al (defendants-appellees) Related

Provisions NCC 15 Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. NCC 17, par
3 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. Nature of the Case
Direct appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
Facts
Significant dates o February 24, 1948 Vicenta Escao (27) exchanged married vows with Pastor
Tenchavez (32) without the knowledge of her parents (duly registered with the local civil register) o
February 26, 1948 Mamerto Escao received a letter disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor
and one Pacita Noel o June 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged o June 24, 1950 Vicenta
applied for a passport indicating in her application that she was single and that her purpose was to study
and that she was domiciled in Cebu, and finally, that she intended to return after two years o August 22,
1950 she filed a verified complaint for divorce in the State of Nevada the ground of extreme cruelty,
entirely mental in character o October 21, 1950 decree of divorce was rendered final and absolute o
1951 Escaos filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage to Pastor
o September 13, 1954 Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran o August 8, 1958 Vicenta
acquired an American citizenship o July 30, 1955 Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Escaos whom he charged for dissuading their
daughter from him Falsely charged the Escaos which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling
them to recover damages The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, just freedom of
plaintiff from supporting his wife and acquiring properties to the exclusion of wife Thus, this appeal
Issues
Whether or not Vicenta and Pastors marriage is valid
Whether or not their marriage is subsisting and undissolved
Whether or not Vicentas divorce and second marriage is valid

Held
Decision under appeal is hereby modified o Pastor is entitled to a legal separation o Vicenta is sentenced
to pay Pastor for damages and attorneys fees o Pastor is sentenced to pay the Escaos by way of damages
and attorneys fees
Tenchavez falsely charged which caused them unrest and anxiety thus entitling them to recover
damages Ratio
February 24, 1948 marriage is valid o Both parties were above the age of majority o Both consented to
the marriage o Marriage was performed by a Catholic Priest in the presence of competent witnesses o
The very act of Vicenta suing for divorce implies admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and
binding
Their marriage is subsisting and undissolved under the Philippine law; Vicentas divorce and second
marriage is not valid o The Civil Code does not admit absolute divorce o Vicentas marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Moran entitles Techavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the
basis of adultery
Board of Commissioners vs Joselito Dela Rosa

197 SCRA 863 Civil Law Preliminary Title Conflict of Laws Foreign Laws; How Proven Proof of Foreign Laws
Processual Presumption
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born
Filipino citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve-year-old minor arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino
citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the Secretary of Justice issued a
memorandum setting aside all decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases where entry was
allowed among which was that of William Gatchalian.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular
subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known as Processual Presumption. In this
case, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it is the same of that of
Philippine law the said marriage then is declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the citizenship of his
father is a Filipino citizen.

BELLIS vs. BELLIS G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 (RENVOI DOCTRINE)

Facts: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he
had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate
children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine
properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on
the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to
be applied.

Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs and therefore no legitimes.

Issue: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate
children.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being
the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
(d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Concept of renvoi.
Renvoi means referring back. Senator Salonga asked the following question on renvoi: When the conflicts rule of the
forum refers a matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the corresponding conflicts rule of the foreign law,
or is the reference to the purely internal rules of the foreign system a case in renvoi? Justice Desiderio Jurado likewise
gave an example of an application of the principle of renvoi as follows: Example: A and B, both Filipino citizens, are
married.
They have five (5) legitimate children. They are all living in California. A executed a will instituting B as his sole heir,
thereby depriving the children of their shares in the estate. This cannot be done by A because it is violative of the order
of succession, for the legitimate children are the first in the order of succession. And since the legitimate children are
deprived and totally omitted in the will, it also goes into the intrinsic validity of the will as there is preterition. (Art. 854,
New Civil Code). It is also violative of the rule that governs the amount of successional rights of the legitimate children,
since the law provides that their legitime is 1/2 of the estate, B, getting only a share equal to that of a legitimate child.
(Art. 892, New Civil Code). In all these circumstances, the national law of A governs, that even if American law says
that A can give all his estate to anyone, still his national law would govern.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM v.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, THIRD DIVISION, (Peralta, J.)
DOCTRINE: Foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum.
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst
made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262
for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law?
RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Normas son altogether. In international law, the party
who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support.
While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of
them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that
is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of
the Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith,
such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied
of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)

[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008]
FACTS:

Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered
into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992,
respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers
affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
 On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, a
suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional
Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as
well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.

Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent
and BMSI and RUST, denominated as Special Sales Representative Agreement, the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on
grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory
counterclaim.

Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause,
that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of
foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens
and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?

RULING:

On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and
where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case
even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of
sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party
plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant)
was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from
hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair
to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law stipulation will
become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits
proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial
court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the courts desistance.

Estrellita Juliano-Llave vs Republic of the Philippines

646 SCRA 637 Civil Law Family Code Article 35 Nullity of Marriage Bigamy
Annulment of Marriage Collusion Participation of the Solicitor General
Who may file an annulment case
In May 1993, Mamintal A.J. Tamano (a former senator) married Estrellita Juliano-Llave under a civil ceremony. In June
1993, both got married again to each other but this time under Muslim rites. Unfortunately, in less than a year, Tamano
died.
In November 1994, mother and son Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano and Adib Ahmad Tamano filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Tamano for being bigamous. It appears that Zorayda and
Tamano were already married in 1958 under civil rites and Muslim rites.
In her defense, Estrellita averred that Tamano was already divorced when he married Estrellita in 1993. This was
evidenced by Tamanos declared status of divorced at the time of their marriage in 1993.
After a long and tedious process, the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano was finally declared void for being
bigamous by the RTC and later the Court of Appeals.
Estrellita now questions the said ruling on the ground that:
a. Zorayda and Adib have no legal standing to question the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano because they
were not parties to the marriage contract; that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an action to file the declaration of nullity of marriage is
only limited to the husband or the wife;
b. The proceedings in the RTC and the CA are void because under Article 48 of the Family Code as well as A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, the Solicitor General or the public prosecutor are required to appear or participate in the proceedings in
order to determine collusion between the parties this was not the case here, according to Estrellita;
c. The Muslim Code or PD 1083 was enacted in 1977 and that the marriage between Zorayda and Tamano happened
in 1958; that Muslim Code provides for Muslim Divorce; that under said law, if Muslim divorce need not be registered.
ISSUE: Whether or not Estrellitas arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. Zorayda and Adib have the legal personality to question the marriage between Estrellita and Tamano. A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and
does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
2. The participation of the Sol-Gen or the public prosecutor can be dispensed with. First of, the public prosecutor was
actually ordered by the RTC at the onset of the case to make a report on whether or not there was a collusion between
the parties. And as the records of the case would show, the prosecutor did submit a report finding no collusion. Second,
the rationale behind the requirement for the Sol-Gen or public prosecutor to participate is to make sure that theres no
collusion between the parties. In this case, the lack of collusion between the parties (between Estrellita and Zorayda) is
apparent because of the vehement opposition of Estrellita to the petition filed by Zorayda.
3. The Muslim Code did not automatically cover all Muslim marriages already existing at the time of its enactment.
Further, the Muslim Code finds no application to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim rites. Further still,
the Muslim Code did not provide for retroactive application. It cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already
bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Tamano and Zorayda.
Thus, the law applicable on the marriage between Tamano and Zorayda is the Civil Code and nowhere in the Civil
Code is divorce allowed. The declaration of Tamano that he was divorced is therefore without effect as to the validity
of his earlier marriage with Zorayda. Hence, the ruling of the RTC and the CA is correct the marriage between Tamano
and Estrellita in 1993 is void for being bigamous.