Analysis
April 21, 2010
Summary: Considering persis-
tent U.S.-Turkish differences
over Iran, the participation by
the Turkish Prime Minister in
last week’s Nuclear Security
Summit in Washington was
viewed as good news. Howev-
er, the summit has not bridged
the gap in strategy toward
Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
The Nuclear Security
Summit should be seen as the
start of a series of high-level
international interactions in
which Turkey will have distinc-
tive stakes, and will need to
remain present at the table.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
www.gmfus.org
Turkey and the Nuclear Summit
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser1
Last week, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan joined dozens of other world
leaders in Washington for the Nuclear
Security Summit convened by U.S.
President Barack Obama. The good
news is that Turkey participated in the
summit, and at a high level. Given the
prominent U.S.-Turkish differences
over Iran nuclear policy, and the very
recent return of Turkey’s ambassador to
Washington, this participation was not
a foregone conclusion. Surveying the re-
sults of the summit, and various bilateral
meetings on the margins, it is possible to
discern some implications for the future
of Turkish relations with Euroatlantic
partners—and others—as the interna-
tional community reinvents the nuclear
strategy debate.
First, the Washington summit has not
bridged the fundamental gap between
the Turkish and American approaches
to slowing or halting Iran’s nuclear
program. As I have argued in previous
On Turkey analyses2, this is not a matter
of divergent preferences about out-
comes. Neither side would like to see the
emergence of a nuclear armed Iran, or
the use of force to prevent this. But there
appears to be no consensus between
Ankara and Turkey’s Western partners
on the question of Iran strategy, and the
utility of sanctions, in particular. It may
1
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
2
Ian O. Lesser (2010). “Can Turkey Live with a Nuclear Iran,” On Turkey series, March 2, 2010.
also reflect a fundamental difference in
intelligence judgments about the status
and trajectory of the Iranian nuclear
program. Since a UN Security Council
vote on a sanctions package is perhaps
a few weeks away, Turkey faces a tough
choice: Vote for new sanctions and
risk the collapse of a greatly improved
and economically significant relation-
ship with Tehran; or vote “no” and risk
further turmoil in an already strained
relationship with Washington (and per-
haps irking a few neighbors in the Arab
Middle East who would prefer to see
Iran’s nuclear ambitions contained).
Under these conditions, and given
Ankara’s frequently stated goal of a
nuclear-free neighborhood, a Turkish
vote to abstain remains the most likely
outcome. This would disappoint an
Obama administration that feels it has
invested a good deal in engaging Turkey
over the past year. But it is unlikely to do
any irreparable damage to the bilateral
relationship.
Second, the European dimension mat-
ters. If Turkey does not line up behind
a UN sanctions resolution, the fallout
from this will be felt on both sides of the
Atlantic. In fact, the more significant
consequences may be felt in Ankara’s
relations with Europe, where opponents
of Turkey’s EU candidacy will be quick
Analysis
to point to differences over Iran as a sign of Turkish divergence
on one of the few foreign policy issues where there has been a
concerted European approach. This would signal an important
departure from the pattern of recent years, in which, with the
important exception of Cyprus, Ankara has been essentially in
the European mainstream on most international issues, from
Afghanistan to the Middle East peace process. A visible rift
on Iran policy could pose new challenges for Turkey’s already
troubled EU candidacy. Turks, too, could find an increasingly
“hawkish” European stance on Iran at odds with the country’s
changing worldview. In this sense, Iran may be the most criti-
cal near-term test of the proposition that Turkey’s new regional
activism is compatible with an evolving EU neighborhood
policy.
Third, Turkey’s decision to pursue a more active and indepen-
dent diplomatic approach, in cooperation with Brazil, also says
a good deal about the new Turkish foreign policy. The debate
over the new look in Turkish strategy has focused overwhelm-
ingly on the question of the balance between Turkey’s Western
and Middle Eastern orientations. But Turkey’s new interna-
tional policy vocabulary also has strong echoes of non-align-
ment and references to the global south, along the lines of the
discourse in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. The choice
of Brazil as a partner in alternative diplomacy on the Iran issue
may well have strategic as well as tactical significance. Both
countries hold rotating seats on the UN Security Council, and
both share the perspective, voiced by Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu in Washington, that an Iran sanctions package is
being negotiated among the five permanent members, without
much input from others on the Council. It seems that Turkey,
like Brazil, is beginning to see these and other issues through
the lens of global governance, and not simply regional dynam-
ics. This, too, may say a lot about the evolving Turkish world-
view—and Ankara’s aspirations.
With the experience of Iraq in the 1990s firmly in mind, there
can be little question that Turkey sees costs flowing from new
international sanctions on Iran. The protracted international
containment of a nuclear or “near-nuclear” Iran clearly will
not fit well with Turkey’s commercially-driven neighborhood
policy. If allegations of Syrian transfers of Scud missiles to
Hezbollah in Lebanon turn out to be accurate, the Western
opening to Damascus may also be thrown into reverse. But
Turkey has security as well as political and economic stakes
in these settings. Even against a backdrop of greatly improved
Turkish-Iranian ties, the Turkish leadership—and the Turk-
ish public—will remain sensitive to physical threats to Turkish
territory from proliferation trends around the region. So far,
considerations of Turkey’s own exposure to these trends has
been largely absent from the Turkish debate, which has been
more about politics and trade, than defense per se.
The hard security implications of nuclear and missile develop-
ments on Turkey’s borders may be more difficult to side step
in the months ahead, and this could encourage convergence
in apparently divergent Turkish and Euroatlantic approaches
to Iran. Indeed, other issues and developments may push this
evolution along, including the coming NATO debate over
nuclear weapons and strategy, new approaches to arms control
and missile defense, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
review. The Nuclear Security Summit should be seen as the
start of a series of high-level international interactions in which
Turkey will have distinctive stakes, and will need to remain
present at the table.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was vice president of the
Pacific Council on International Policy and spent over a decade at the
RAND Corporation. From 1994 to 1995, Dr. Lesser was a member of
the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff.
About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) is a nonpartisan
American public policy and grantmaking institution dedicated to pro-
moting greater cooperation and understanding between North America
and Europe. Founded in 1972 through a gift from Germany, as a per-
manent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong
presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in
Washington, DC, GMF has seven offices in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava,
Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and Bucharest.
About the On Turkey Series
GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis
briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-
tuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.
To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at
www.gmfus.org/turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at
http://database.gmfus.org/reaction.