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Syllabi/Synopsis

THIRDDIVISION

[G.R.No.131429.August4,1999]

OSCAR BERMUDEZ, ARTURO A. LLOBRERA and CLAUDIO L. DAYAON,

petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES, BUDGET
SECRETARYSALVADORENRIQUEZ,JR.,JUSTICESECRETARYTEOFISTO
GUINGONA,JR.,andATTY.CONRADOQUIAOIT,respondents.

DECISION
VITUG,J.:

The validity and legality of the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit to the post of Provincial
ProsecutorofTarlacbythenPresidentFidelV.Ramosisassailedinthispetitionforreviewoncertiorariona
purequestionoflawwhichpraysforthereversaloftheOrder,[1]dated20October1997,oftheRegionalTrial
Court (Branch 63) of Tarlac, Tarlac, dismissing the petition for prohibition and/or injunction and mandamus,
withaprayerfortheissuanceofawritofinjunction/temporaryrestrainingorder,institutedbyhereinpetitioners.
The occurrence of a vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the main
contestantsinthiscase,petitionerOscarBermudezandrespondentConradoQuiaoit,totakecontrastingviews
on the proper interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez, the First
AssistantProvincialProsecutorofTarlacandOfficerInChargeoftheOfficeoftheProvincialProsecutor,wasa
recommendee[2] of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor.
Quiaoit,ontheotherhand,wouldappeartohavehadthesupportofthenRepresentativeJoseYapoftheSecond
Legislative District of Tarlac.[3] On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was appointed by
PresidentRamostothecovetedoffice.Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21
July1997,tookhisoathofofficebeforeExecutiveJudgeAngelParazooftheRegionalTrialCourt(Branch65)
ofTarlac,Tarlac.On23July1997,QuiaoitassumedofficeandimmediatelyinformedthePresident,aswellas
theSecretaryofJusticeandtheCivilServiceCommission,ofthatassumption.Bermudezrefusedtovacatethe
Office of Provincial Prosecutor claiming that the original copy of Quiaoits appointment had not yet been
releasedbytheSecretaryofJustice.[4]Quiaoit,nonetheless,performedthefunctionsanddutiesoftheOfficeof
Provincial Prosecutor by issuing office orders and memoranda, signing resolutions on preliminary
investigations,andfilingseveralinformationsbeforethecourts.Quiaoithadsincebeenregularlyreceivingthe
salary,RATAandotheremolumentsoftheoffice.
On17September1997,BermudezandQuiaoitweresummonedtoManilabyJusticeSecretaryGuingona.
ThethreemetattheDepartmentofJusticeand,followingtheconference,Bermudezwasorderedtowinduphis
casesuntil15October1997andtoturnoverthecontestedofficetoQuiaoitthenextday.
In his First Indorsement, dated 22 September 1997, for the Chief State prosecutor, Assistant Chief State
ProsecutorNiloMarianotransmittedtheoriginalcopyofQuiaoitsappointmenttotheRegionalStateProsecutor
CarlosdeLeon,RegionIII,atSanFernando,Pampanga.Inturn,inhisSecondIndorsement,dated02October
1997, Regional State Prosecutor de Leon forwarded to Quiaoit said original copy of his appointment.On the
basisofthetransmittalletterofRegionalStateProsecutordeLeon,Quiaoit,asdirected,againsoassumedoffice
on 16 October 1997. On even date, Bermudez was detailed at the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor,
RegionIII,inSanFernando,Pampanga.

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In the meantime, on 10 October 1997, Bermudez together with his copetitioners Arturo Llobrera and
ClaudioDayaon,theSecondAssistantProvincialProsecutorandtheFourthAssistantProvincialProsecutorof
Tarlac,respectively, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a petition forprohibitionand/orinjunction,
andmandamus,withaprayerfortheissuanceofawritofinjunction/temporaryrestrainingorder,againstherein
respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the
recommendationoftheSecretaryofJusticeprescribedundertheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1987. After
hearing,thetrialcourtconsideredthepetitionsubmittedforresolutionand,induetime,issueditsnowassailed
order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to have the order reconsidered met with a
denial.
Hence,theinstantrecourse.
The core issue for consideration is whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit. This question
would,inturn,pivotontheproperunderstandingoftheprovisionoftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1987
(BookIV,TitleIII,ChapterII,Section9)totheeffectthat

AllprovincialandcityprosecutorsandtheirassistantsshallbeappointedbythePresidentuponthe
recommendationoftheSecretary.

Petitionerscontendthatanappointmentofaprovincialprosecutormandatorilyrequiresapriorrecommendation
of the Secretary of Justice endorsing the intended appointment citing, by analogy, the case of San Juan vs.
CSC[5]wheretheCourtheld:

"xxxTheDBMmayappointonlyfromthelistofqualifiedrecommendeesnominatedbytheGovernor.If
noneisqualified,hemustreturnthelistofnomineestotheGovernorexplainingwhynoonemeetsthelegal
requirementsandaskfornewrecommendeeswhohavethenecessaryeligibilitiesandqualifications.

TheProvincialBudgetOfficer(PBO)isexpectedtosynchronizehisworkwithDBM.[6](Emphasissupplied.)

InsistingontheapplicationofSanJuan,petitionerscallattentiontothetenorofExecutiveOrderNo.112[7]

Section1.Allbudgetofficersofprovinces,citiesandmunicipalitiesshallbeappointedhenceforthbythe
MinisterofBudgetandManagementuponrecommendationofthelocalchiefexecutiveconcernedxxx.

that, they claim, can be likened to the aforequoted provision of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Respondentsarguedifferently.
The legislative intent is, of course, primordial.There is no hardandfast rule in ascertaining whether the
language in a statute should be considered mandatory or directory, and the application of a ruling in one
particular instance may not necessarily be apt in another[8] for each must be determined on the basis of the
specificlawinissueandthepeculiarcircumstancesattendanttoit.Moreoftenthannot,theproblem,inthefinal
analysis,isfirmedupandaddressedonacasetocasebasis.Thenature,structureandaimofthelawitselfis
often resorted to in looking at the legislative intent. Generally, it is said that if no consequential rights or
liabilitiesdependonitandnoinjurycanresultfromignoringit,andthatthepurposeofthelegislaturecanbe
accomplishedinamannerotherthanthatprescribedwhensubstantiallythesameresultscanbeobtained,then
thestatuteshouldberegardedmerelyasdirectory,ratherthanasmandatory,incharacter.[9]
An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the
authoritythereforofanindividualtodischargeandperformthedutiesandfunctionsofanofficeortrust.[10]The
appointmentisdeemedcompleteoncethelastactrequiredoftheappointingauthorityhasbeencompliedwith
anditsacceptancethereafterbytheappointeeinordertorenderiteffective.[11] Appointment necessarily calls
foranexerciseofdiscretiononthepartoftheappointingauthority.[12]InPamantasanngLungsodngMaynila
vs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,[13]reiteratedinFloresvs.Drilon,[14]thisCourthasheld:

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Thepowertoappointis,inessence,discretionary.Theappointingpowerhastherightofchoicewhichhemay
exercisefreelyaccordingtohisjudgment,decidingforhimselfwhoisbestqualifiedamongthosewhohavethe
necessaryqualificationsandeligibilities.Itisaprerogativeoftheappointingpowerxxx[15]

Indeed,itmayrightlybesaidthattherightofchoiceistheheartofthepowertoappoint.[16]Intheexerciseof
thepowerofappointment,discretionisanintegralpartthereof.
When the Constitution[17] or the law[18] clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate
officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to
appoint.ItshouldbeherepertinenttostatethatthePresidentistheheadofgovernmentwhoseauthorityincludes
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Control means the authority of an
empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the
performanceofhisduties,aswellastosubstitutethejudgmentofthelatter,[19]asandwhentheformerdeemsit
tobeappropriate.Expressedinanotherway,thePresidenthasthepowertoassumedirectlythefunctionsofan
executive department, bureau and office.[20] It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can
interfereintheexerciseofdiscretionofofficialsunderhimoraltogetherignoretheirrecommendations.[21]
ItistheconsideredviewoftheCourt,giventheabovedisquisition,thatthephraseuponrecommendationof
theSecretary,foundinSection9,ChapterII,TitleIII,BookIV,oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode,shouldbe
interpreted,asitisnormallysounderstood,tobeamereadvise,exhortationorindorsement,whichisessentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made.[22] The
recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature.[23] The President, being the head of the
Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or
officesevenintheexerciseofdiscretionaryauthority,andinsoopting,hecannotbesaidashavingactedbeyond
thescopeofhisauthority.
ThedoctrineinSanJuan,relieduponbypetitioners,istangential.Whilethetenorofthelegalprovisionin
ExecutiveOrderNo.112hassomesimilaritywiththeprovisioninthe1987AdministrativeCodeinquestion,it
is to be pointed out, however, that San Juan,[24] in construing the law, has distinctively given stress to the
constitutionalmandateonlocalautonomythus:

TheissuebeforetheCourtisnotlimitedtothevalidityoftheappointmentofoneProvincialBudgetOfficer.The
tugofwarbetweentheSecretaryofBudgetandManagementandtheGovernorofthepremierprovinceofRizal
overaseeminglyinnocuouspositioninvolvestheapplicationofamostimportantconstitutionalpolicyand
principle,thatoflocalautonomy.Wehavetoobeytheclearmandateonlocalautonomy.Wherealawiscapable
oftwointerpretations,oneinfavorofcentralizedpowerinMalacaangandtheotherbeneficialtolocal
autonomy,thescalesmustbeweighedinfavorofautonomy.

xxxxxxxxx

WhentheCivilServiceCommissioninterpretedtherecommendingpoweroftheProvincialGovernoraspurely
directory,itwentagainsttheletterandspiritoftheconstitutionalprovisionsonlocalautonomy.IftheDBM
Secretaryjealouslyhoardstheentiretyofbudgetarypowersandignorestherightoflocalgovernmentsto
developselfrelianceandresolutenessinthehandlingoftheirownfunds,thegoalofmeaningfullocalautonomy
isfrustratedandsetback.[25]

The Court there has explained that the President merely exercises general supervision over local
governmentunitsandlocalofficials[26]hence,intheappointmentofaProvincialBudgetOfficer,theexecutive
department,throughtheSecretaryofBudgetandManagement,indeedhadtosharethequestionedpowerwith
thelocalgovernment.
Intheinstantcase,therecommendationoftheSecretaryofJusticeandtheappointmentofthePresidentare
actsoftheExecutiveDepartmentitself,andthereisnosharingofpowertospeakof,thelatterbeingdeemedfor
allintentsandpurposesasbeingmerelyanextensionofthepersonalityofthePresident.

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WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Melo,(Chairman),Panganiban,Purisima,andGonzagaReyes,JJ.,concur.

[1]PerJudgeArsenioP.Adriano.

[2]AnnexD,Petition,Rollo,p.40.

[3]MemorandumofAppealforPetitionersAppellants,pp.1415.

[4]PriortothereleasedoftheoriginalcopyofQuiaoitsappointment,thenJusticeSecretaryGuingonawrotealetteraddressedtothen
PresidentRamoswhichreads:
DearMr.President:
This has reference to the appointment of Atty. Conrado T. Quiaoit as Prosecutor III (Provincial Prosecutor) of the Provincial
ProsecutionOfficeofTarlac,RegionIII.
It has been the practice in the appointment of prosecutors for the Office of the President to consult this Department on the most
qualified candidate for the position on the basis of performance, length of service and rank.When the position of the Provincial
ProsecutorofTarlacbecamevacant,wehaveexpresslyrecommendedProsecutorOscarV.Bermudeztothepositionbeingthemost
qualifiedcandidatebasedontheforegoingcriteria.WearegreatlyconcernedanddisturbedthereforewhenthatOfficehasappointed
Atty.Quiaoit,withoutourcommentorrecommendation.
WewouldlikealsotoconveytotheOfficeofthePresidenttheadversesentimentsfromtheOfficeoftheProvincialProsecution
OfficeofTarlacgeneratedbytheappointmentofAtty.Quiaoitinapositionpaperacopyofwhichisenclosedherewith.(Rollo,p.
13.)
[5]196SCRA69.

[6]Atp.79.

[7] Entitled, Placing All Budget Officers of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities under the Administrative Control and Technical
SupervisionoftheMinistryofBudgetandManagement
[8]SutherlandStatutoryConstruction,Vol.3,5thed.,p.8.

[9]RubenAgpalo,StatutoryConstruction,2nded.,p.238,citingMillervs.LakewoodHousingCo.,180NE700,81ALR1239.

[10]SeeIsaganiA.Cruz,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,1993edition,p.187PhilippineLawDictionaryByF.B.Moreno,ThirdEdition,
p.67BlacksLawDictionary,6thedition,p.99,citingInreNicholsonsEstate,104Colo.561,93P.2d880,884citingBoardof
EducationofBoyleCountyvs.McChesney,235Ky.692,32S.W.2d26,27.
[11]SeeAparrivs.CourtofAppeals,127SCRA231.

[12]InthewordsofJusticeMalcolman(a)ppointmenttoofficeisintrinsicallyanexecutiveactinvolvingtheexerciseofdiscretion.
(Concepcionvs.Paredes,42Phil.599.)
[13]140SCRA22.

[14]223SCRA568.

[15]Atp.579.

[16]Ibid.,p.579.

[17] Sec.16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersandconsulsorofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelor
navalcaptain,andotherofficerswhoseappointmentsarevestedinhiminthisConstitution.Heshallalsoappointallotherofficersof
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to

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appoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vesttheappointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orinthe
headsofdepartments,agencies,commissions,orboards.
ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,but
suchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentofthe
Congress.(Phil.Constitution,ArticleVII.)
[18] SEC.9.Provincial/City Prosecution Offices.The Provincial and City Fiscals Office established in each of the provinces and
citiespursuanttolaw,isretainedandrenamedProvincial/CityProsecutionOffice.ItshallbeheadedbyaProvincialProsecutoror
CityProsecutor,asthecasemaybe,assistedbysuchnumberofAssistantProvincial/CityProsecutorsasfixedand/orauthorizedby
law.ThepositiontitlesofProvincialandCityFiscalandofAssistantProvincialandCityFiscalareherebyabolished.
Allprovincial/cityprosecutionofficesshallcontinuetodischargetheirfunctionsunderexistinglaw.
AllprovincialandcityprosecutorsandtheirassistantsshallbeappointedbythePresidentupontherecommendationoftheSecretary.
(AdministrativeCodeof1987,BookIV,TitleIII,Chapter2.)
[19] Mondanovs.Silvosa,etal.,97Phil.143Echechevs.CA,198SCRA577citingOliverosTorrevs.Bayot,58SCRA272and
AngAngcovs.Castillo,118Phil.1468.
[20]Pelaezvs.AuditorGeneral,15SCRA569.

[21]LacsonMagallanesCo.,Inc.vs.Pano,21SCRA895.

[22]Cuyegkengvs.Cruz,108Phil.1147.

[23]SeeBlacksLawDictionary,6thedition,p.1272.

[24]SanJuanvs.CSC,196SCRA69.

[25]Atpp.7578.

[26]Section4,ArticleXoftheConstitutionprovides:ThePresidentofthePhilippinesshallexercisegeneralsupervisionoverlocal
governments.Provinceswithrespecttocomponentcitiesandmunicipalities,andcitiesandmunicipalitieswithrespecttocomponent
barangaysshallensurethattheactsoftheircomponentunitsarewithinthescopeoftheirprescribedpowersandfunctions.

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