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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.104732June22,1993

ROBERTOA.FLORES,DANIELY.FIGUEROA,ROGELIOT.PALO,DOMINGOA.JADLOC,CARLITOT.CRUZ
andMANUELP.REYES,petitioner,
vs.
HON.FRANKLINM.DRILON,ExecutiveSecretary,andRICHARDJ.GORDON,respondents.

IsaganiM.Jungco,ValerianoS.Peralta,MiguelFamularcano,Jr.andVirgilioE.Aciertoforpetitioners.

BELLOSILLO,J.:

TheconstitutionalityofSec.13,par.(d),ofR.A.7227,1otherwiseknownasthe"BasesConversionandDevelopment
Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for
prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of
publicfundsbywayofsalariesandotheroperationalexpensesattachedtotheoffice...."2Paragraph(d)reads

(d)ChairmanadministratorThePresidentshallappointaprofessionalmanagerasadministrator
oftheSubicAuthoritywithacompensationtobedeterminedbytheBoardsubjecttotheapprovalof
theSecretaryofBudget,whoshallbetheexoficiochairmanoftheBoardandwhoshallserveasthe
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its
operationsfromtheeffectivityofthisAct,themayoroftheCityofOlongaposhallbeappointedasthe
chairmanandchiefexecutiveofficeroftheSubicAuthority(emphasissupplied).

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and
members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the
provisoinpar.(d)ofSec.13hereinabovequotedinitalicsinfringesonthefollowingconstitutionalandstatutory
provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IXB, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be
eligibleforappointmentordesignationinanycapacitytoanypublicofficerorpositionduringhistenure,"3because
theCityMayorofOlongapoCityisanelectiveofficialandthesubjectpostsarepublicoffices(b)Sec.16,Art.VII,ofthe
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,andthosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint",4sinceitwas
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts5 and, (c)
Sec.261,par.(g),oftheOmnibusElectionCode,whichsays:

Sec.261.ProhibitedActs.Thefollowingshallbeguiltyofanelectionoffense:...(g)Appointment
of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. During the
period of fortyfive days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any
head,officialorappointingofficerofagovernmentoffice,agencyorinstrumentality,whethernational
or local, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new
employee, whether provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except
uponpriorauthorityoftheCommission.TheCommissionshallnotgranttheauthoritysoughtunless
itissatisfiedthatthepositiontobefilledisessentialtotheproperfunctioningoftheofficeoragency
concerned,andthatthepositionshallnotbefilledinamannerthatmayinfluencetheelection.Asan
exception to the foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need:
Provided, however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within three
daysfromthedateoftheappointment.Anyappointmentorhiringinviolationofthisprovisionshallbe
null and void. (2) Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase of salary or

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remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee, including those in government

ownedorcontrolledcorporations....

for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive
Secretaryon3April1992waswithintheprohibited45dayperiodpriortothe11May1992Elections.

TheprincipalquestioniswhethertheprovisoinSec.13,par.(d),ofR.A.7227whichstates,"Provided,however,
ThatforthefirstyearofitsoperationsfromtheeffectivityofthisAct,themayoroftheCityofOlongaposhallbe
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional
proscriptionagainstappointmentordesignationofelectiveofficialstoothergovernmentposts.

Infull,Sec.7ofArt.IXBoftheConstitutionprovides:

Noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignationinanycapacitytoanypublicoffice
orpositionduringhistenure.

Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficialshall
holdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyorinstrumentality
thereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries.

The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a
public officer or employee may serve fulltime with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services.Itisanaffirmationthatapublicofficeisafulltimejob.Hence,apublicofficeroremployee,likethehead
ofanexecutivedepartmentdescribedinCivil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,G.R. No. 83896, and Anti
GraftLeagueofthePhilippines,Inc.v.PhilipEllaC.Juico,asSecretaryofAgrarianReform,G.R.No.83815,6". .
. . should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility,whichmayresultinhaphazardnessandinefficiency...."

ParticularlyasregardsthefirstparagraphofSec.7,"(t)hebasicideareallyistopreventasituationwherealocal
elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents...."7

In the case before us, the subjectprovisodirects the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of
OlongapoCity,toothergovernmentposts(asChairmanoftheBoardandChiefExecutiveOfficerofSBMA).Since
thisispreciselywhattheconstitutionalproscriptionseekstoprevent,itneedsnostretchingoftheimaginationto
conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IXB, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the
expertiseofanelectiveofficialmaybemostbeneficialtothehigherinterestofthebodypoliticisofnomoment.

ItisarguedthatSec.94oftheLocalGovernmentCode(LGC)permitstheappointmentofalocalelectiveofficial
to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is fallacious.
Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act
can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue
here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke a
practiceotherwiseunconstitutionalasauthorityforitsvalidity.

Inanycase,theviewthatanelectiveofficialmaybeappointedtoanotherpostifallowedbylaworbytheprimary
functionsofhisoffice,ignorestheclearcutdifferenceinthewordingofthetwo(2)paragraphsofSec.7,Art.
IXB, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an appointive
official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringentbynotprovidinganyexceptiontotheruleagainstappointmentordesignationofanelectiveofficialtothe
governmentpost,exceptasareparticularlyrecognizedintheConstitutionitself,e.g.,thePresidentasheadofthe
economicandplanningagency9theVicePresident,whomaybeappointedMemberoftheCabinet 10 and, a member
ofCongresswhomaybedesignatedexofficiomemberoftheJudicialandBarCouncil.11

ThedistinctionbetweenthefirstandsecondparagraphsofSec.7,Art.IXB,wasnotaccidentalwhendrawn,and
notwithoutreason.ItwaspurposelysoughtbythedraftersoftheConstitutionasshownintheirdeliberation,thus

MR.MONSOD.Inotherwords,whatthenCommissionerissaying,Mr.PresidingOfficer,isthatthe
prohibitionismorestrictwithrespecttoelectiveofficials,becauseinthecaseofappointiveofficials,
theremaybealawthatwillallowthemtoholdotherpositions.

MR.FOZ.Yes,Isuggestwemakethatdifference,becauseinthecaseofappointiveofficials,there
willbecertainsituationswherethelawshouldallowthemtoholdsomeotherpositions.12

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The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be
extendedtoelectiveofficialswhoaregovernedbythefirstparagraph.

ItisfurtherarguedthattheSBMApostsaremerelyexofficiotothepositionofMayorofOlongapoCity,hence,an
excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 13 where we stated that the prohibition
againsttheholdingofanyotherofficeoremploymentbythePresident,VicePresident,MembersoftheCabinet,andtheir
deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend
additionaldutiesandfunctionsrequiredbytheprimaryfunctionsoftheofficialsconcerned,whoaretoperformtheminanex
officiocapacityasprovidedbylaw,withoutreceivinganyadditionalcompensationtherefor.

Thisargumentisapparentlybasedonawrongpremise.CongressdidnotcontemplatemakingthesubjectSBMA
posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointiveandnotmerelyadjuncttothepostofMayorofOlongapoCity.Haditbeenthelegislativeintenttomake
the subject positions exofficio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex
officio"wouldhavebeenused.14

EvenintheSenatedeliberations,theSenatorswerefullyawarethatsubjectprovisomaycontraveneSec.7,first
par.,Art.IXB,buttheyneverthelesspassedthebillanddecidedtohavethecontroversyresolvedbythecourts.
Indeed,theSenatorswouldnothavebeenconcernedwiththeeffectsofSec.7,firstpar.,hadtheyconsideredthe
SBMApostsasexofficio.

Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene
Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee just said "the Mayor shall be the Chairman" then that
should foreclose the issue. It is a legislative choice." 15 The Senator took a view that the constitutional proscription
againstappointmentofelectiveofficialsmayhavebeensidesteppedifCongressattachedtheSBMApoststotheMayorof
Olongapo City instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post. Without passing upon this view of Senator
Saguisag,itsufficestostatethatCongressintendedthepoststobeappointive,thusnibblinginthebudtheargumentthat
theyareexofficio.

TheanalogywiththepositionofChairmanoftheMetroManilaAuthoritymadebyrespondentscannotbeapplied
toupholdtheconstitutionalityofthechallengedprovisosinceitisnotputinissueinthepresentcase.Inthesame
vein,theargumentthatifnoelectiveofficialmaybeappointedordesignatedtoanotherpostthenSec.8,Art.IX
B,oftheConstitutionallowinghimtoreceivedoublecompensation 16wouldbeuseless,isnonsequitursinceSec.8
doesnotaffecttheconstitutionalityofthesubjectproviso.Inanycase,theVicePresidentforexample,anelectiveofficial
who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3, Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet
positionifspecificallyauthorizedbylaw.

PetitionersalsoassailthelegislativeencroachmentontheappointingauthorityofthePresident.Section13,par.
(d),itselfvestsinthePresidentthepowertoappointtheChairmanoftheBoardandtheChiefExecutiveOfficerof
SBMA,althoughhereallyhasnochoiceunderthelawbuttoappointtheMayorofOlongapoCity.

Asmaybedefined,an"appointment"is"[t]hedesignationofaperson,bythepersonorpersonshavingauthority
therefor,todischargethedutiesofsomeofficeortrust,"17or"[t]heselectionordesignationofaperson,bytheperson
or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same. 18 In his
treatise,PhilippinePolitical
Law, 19 Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority vested with the
power,ofanindividualwhoistoexercisethefunctionsofagivenoffice."

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
AccordingtoWoodbury,J.,20"thechoiceofapersontofillanofficeconstitutestheessenceofhisappointment," 21and
Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of
discretion."22InPamantasanngLungsodngMaynilav.IntermediateAppellateCourt23weheld:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified
among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the
appointingpower....

Indeed,thepowerofchoiceistheheartofthepowertoappoint.Appointmentinvolvesanexerciseofdiscretionof
whom to appoint it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the
choiceoftheappointeeisafundamentalcomponentoftheappointingpower.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the
sametimelimitthechoiceofthePresidenttoonlyonecandidate.Oncethepowerofappointmentisconferredon
the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of

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prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing
authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribedbyCongresscanonlybemetbyoneindividual,suchenactmenteffectivelyeliminatesthediscretionof
theappointingpowertochooseandconstitutesanirregularrestrictiononthepowerofappointment.24

Inthecaseatbar,whileCongresswilledthatthesubjectpostsbefilledwithapresidentialappointeeforthefirst
yearofitsoperationsfromtheeffectivityofR.A.7227,theprovisoneverthelesslimitstheappointingauthorityto
onlyoneeligible,i.e.,theincumbentMayorofOlongapoCity.Sinceonlyonecanqualifyforthepostsinquestion,
the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of
appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of
appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authoritytoprescribequalificationswhereonlyone,andnoother,canqualify.Accordingly,whiletheconferment
oftheappointingpoweronthePresidentisaperfectlyvalidlegislativeact,theprovisolimitinghischoicetooneis
certainlyanencroachmentonhisprerogative.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his
incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionallyattached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The deliberation in the Constitutional
Commissionisenlightening:

MR. DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word "term" with
TENURE.

MR. FOZ. The effect of the proposed amendment is to make possible for one to resign from his
position.

MR.DAVIDE.Yes,weshouldallowthatprerogative.

MR.FOZ.Resignfromhispositiontoacceptanexecutiveposition.

MR.DAVIDE.Besides,itmayturnoutinagivencasethatbecauseof,say,incapacity,hemayleave
theservice,butifheisprohibitedfrombeingappointedwithinthetermforwhichhewaselected,we
maybedeprivingthegovernmentoftheneededexpertiseofanindividual.25

Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to another
publicoffice.

Where,asinthecaseofrespondentGordon,anincumbentelectiveofficialwas,notwithstandinghisineligibility,
appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
ineligibilityimposedbytheConstitution.Onthecontrary,sinceanincumbentelectiveofficialisnoteligibletothe
appointiveposition,hisappointmentordesignationtheretocannotbevalidinviewofhisdisqualificationorlackof
eligibility.ThisprovisionshouldnotbeconfusedwithSec.13,Art.VI,oftheConstitutionwhere"(n)oSenatoror
MemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesmayholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernment...during
histermwithoutforfeitinghisseat...."Thedifferencebetweenthetwoprovisionsissignificantinthesensethat
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another
government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be
appointed,thusrunningtheriskoflosingtheelectivepostaswellasnotbeingappointedtotheotherpost.Itis
therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different
where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a
provisionisheldtoincapacitatetheincumbentofanofficefromacceptingorholdingasecondoffice(Stateexrel.
VanAntwerpvHogan,283Ala.445,218So2d258McWilliamsvNeal,130Ga733,61SE721)andtorender
his election or appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262.
Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the
constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another
office,eithergenerallyorofacertainkind,theprohibitionhasbeenheldtoincapacitatetheincumbentofthefirstofficeto
holdthesecondsothatanyattempttoholdthesecondisvoid(Ala.Stateexrel.VanAntwerpv.Hogan,218So2d258,
283Ala445)."27

Asincumbentelectiveofficial,respondentGordonisineligibleforappointmenttothepositionofChairmanofthe
BoardandChiefExecutiveofSBMAhence,hisappointmenttheretopursuanttoalegislativeactthatcontravenes
theConstitutioncannotbesustained.HehoweverremainsMayorofOlongapoCity,andhisactsasSBMAofficial
arenotnecessarilynullandvoidhemaybeconsideredadefactoofficer,"onewhoseacts,thoughnotthoseofa
lawfulofficer,thelaw,uponprinciplesofpolicyandjustice,willholdvalidsofarastheyinvolvetheinterestofthe
publicandthirdpersons,wherethedutiesoftheofficewereexercised....undercolorofaknownelectionor
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appointment,voidbecausetheofficerwasnoteligible,orbecausetherewasawantofpowerintheelectingor
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or
defectbeingunknowntothepublic....[or]undercolorofanelection,orappointment,byorpursuanttoapublic
unconstitutionallaw,beforethesameisadjudgedtobesuch(Statevs.Carroll,38Conn.,499Wilcoxvs.Smith,5
Wendell[N.Y.],23121Am.Dec.,213Sheehan'sCase,122Mass,445,23Am.Rep.,323)."28

Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments
whichmayhavebeenreceivedbyrespondentGordonpursuanttohisappointmentmayberetainedbyhim.

TheillegalityofhisappointmenttotheSBMApostsbeingnowevident,othermattersaffectingthelegalityofthe
questioned proviso as well as the appointment of said respondent made pursuant thereto need no longer be
discussed.

Inthusconcludingaswedo,wecanonlysharethelamentofSen.SoteroLaurelwhichheexpressedinthefloor
deliberationsofS.B.1648,precursorofR.A.7227,whenhearticulated

....(much)aswewouldliketohavethepresentMayorofOlongapoCityastheChiefExecutiveof
this Authority that we are creating (much) as I, myself, would like to because I know the capacity,
integrity,industryanddedicationofMayorGordon(much)aswewouldliketogivehimthisterrific,
burdensomeandheavyresponsibility,wecannotdoitbecauseoftheconstitutionalprohibitionwhich
isveryclear.Itsays:"Noelectiveofficialshallbeappointedordesignatedtoanotherpositioninany
capacity."29

For,indeed,"aConstitutionmustbefirmandimmovable,likeamountainamidstthestrifeofstormsorarockin
theoceanamidsttheragingofthewaves." 30 One of the characteristics of the Constitution is permanence, i.e., "its
capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate needs but only by passing fancies, temporary
passions or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or personalities . . . . Such a Constitution is not likely to be
easilytamperedwithtosuitpoliticalexpediency,personalambitionsorilladvisedagitationforchange."31

Ergo,undertheConstitution,MayorGordonhasachoice.Wehavenochoice.

WHEREFORE,theprovisoinpar.(d),Sec.13,ofR.A.7227,whichstates:"...Provided,however,Thatforthe
firstyearofitsoperationsfromtheeffectivityofthisAct,theMayoroftheCityofOlongaposhallbeappointedas
the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional consequently, the
appointmentpursuanttheretooftheMayorofOlongapoCity,respondentRichardJ.Gordon,isINVALID,hence
NULLandVOID.

However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such
ChairmanandChiefExecutiveOfficermayberetainedbyhim,andallactsotherwiselegitimatedonebyhimin
theexerciseofhisauthorityasofficerdefactoofSBMAareherebyUPHELD.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, GrioAquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo and Quiason,
JJ.,concur.

Padilla,J.,isonleave.

#Footnotes

1AnActAcceleratingtheConversionofMilitaryReservationsintoOtherProductiveUses,Creating
theBasesConversionandDevelopmentAuthorityforthisPurpose,ProvidingFundsThereforandfor
OtherPurposes,"approved13March1992,totakeeffectuponitspublicationinanewspaperof
generalcirculation.

2See"ActiontoDeclareUnconstitutionalProvisionsofR.A.7227withProhibitionandApplicationfor
aWritofPreliminaryInjunction,"dated7April1992,p.6Rollop.7.

3Sec.7,Art.IXB,provides:"Noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignationin
anycapacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.

"Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noappointiveofficial
shallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentintheGovernmentoranysubdivision,agencyor
instrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheirsubsidiaries."

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4Sec.16,Art.VII,provides:"ThePresidentshallnominateand,withtheconsentoftheCommission
onAppointments,appointtheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublic
ministersandconsuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,and
otherofficerswhoseappointmentsarenotvestedinhiminthisConstitution.Heshallalsoappointall
otherofficersoftheGovernmentwhoseappointmentsarenototherwiseprovidedforbylaw,and
thosewhomhemaybeauthorizedbylawtoappoint.TheCongressmay,bylaw,vestthe
appointmentofotherofficerslowerinrankinthePresidentalone,inthecourts,orintheheadsof
departments,agencies,commission,orboards.

"ThePresidentshallhavethepowertomakeappointmentsduringtherecessoftheCongress,
whethervoluntaryorcompulsory,butsuchappointmentsshallbeeffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalby
theCommissiononAppointmentsoruntilthenextadjournmentoftheCongress."

5Petitionersallegethattheprovisoconstitutesa"limitationtothepowerofappointmentofthe
Presidentandthereforeviolatestheseparationofpowers"andthat"Congresscannotcreatethe
positionandatthesametimespecifythepersontofillupsuchposition"(Petition,pp.45Rollo,pp.
56).

6G.R.Nos.83896and83815wereconsolidatedanddecidedjointlyon22February1991,194
SCRA317,339.

7RecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.1,p.546.

8Sec.94.AppointmentofElectiveandAppointiveLocalOfficialsCandidatesWhoLostinan
Election.(a)Noelectiveorappointivelocalofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignation
inanycapacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure.

"Unlessotherwiseallowedbylaworbytheprimaryfunctionsofhisposition,noelectiveorappointive
localofficialshallholdanyotherofficeoremploymentinthegovernmentoranysubdivision,agency
orinstrumentalitythereof,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsortheir
subsidiaries.

"(b)Exceptforlosingcandidatesinbarangayelections,nocandidatewholostinanyelectionshall,
withinone(1)yearaftersuchelection,beappointedtoanyofficeinthegovernmentorany
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationsorinanyoftheirsubsidiaries."

9Sec.9,Art.XII,oftheConstitution.

10Sec.3,secondpar.,Art.VII,oftheConstitution.

11Sec.8,par.(1),Art.VIII,oftheConstitution.Thisparticularprovisionwasapprovedinanticipation
ofaunicamerallegislature.However,asitturnout,weadoptedinsteadabicameralformof
governmentsothattheseatallocatedtotherepresentativeofCongresshastobesplitbetweena
memberoftheSenateandamemberoftheHouseofRepresentative.Eachbeingentitledtoone
halfvoteinthedeliberationsintheJudicialandBarCouncil.

12RecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.5,p.156.

Section4oftheProposedResolutionNo.468,theprecursorofthefirstparagraphofSec.7,read:
"Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw,noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignation
inatemporaryoractingcapacitytoanypublicofficeorpositionduringhisterm"(Recordofthe
ConstitutionalCommission,Vol.1,p.524).

Thefollowingwerereactionsonthefloor:

FR.BERNAS.Onpage3,Section4,line5,theprovisionbeginswiththephrase"Unlessotherwise
providedbylaw"whichdoesnotexistinthe1973Constitution.Thiswasinsertedina1981
amendment.Weknowthereasonwhythiswasputhere.Itpracticallyrenderstheprovisionuseless
becausethewholematterbecomesdiscretionarywiththelegislature.Itisoneofthoseinstancein
the1973Constitution,asamendedandconstantlyreamended,wheretheythrewinthephrase
"Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw"preciselytogivethePresidentafreehandinhisdecreemaking
power.

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MR.FOZ.Aspresentlywordednow,theprovisionwouldallowthelegislaturetoreallyprovide
otherwise,meaning,toallowanelectiveofficialtobeappointedtoanexecutiveoffice.(Ibid.,Vol.1,p.
539.)
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MR.COLAYCO....ThewayIunderstandthisisthatwearegivingthelegislaturethepowerto
authorizetheappointmentordesignationinatemporaryoractingcapacityofanelectiveofficialto
anypublicofficeorpositionduringhisterm,AmIright?

MR.FOZ.Ifalawispassedregardingthismatter,thensuchlawmayreversethisprovisionas
worded,butwehavesaidearlierthatwewillentertainsuggestionsfromthefloor.

MR.COLAYCO.Personally,Ifindthepolicyestablishedinthisprovisionmeritorious.Tomakeitafirm
policy,Isuggestthatwedeletetheprefatoryphrase"Unlessotherwiseprovidedbylaw.

MR.FOZ.WeagreewiththeCommissioner(Ibid.,Vol.1,p.549).

Asrevised,knownlaterasSec.4ofResolutionNo.10,andapprovedonthirdreading,thesubject
sectionread:"Noelectiveofficialshallbeeligibleforappointmentordesignationinanycapacityto
anypublicofficeorpositionduringhistenure"(Ibid.,Vol.II,p.788).

13Supra,p.335.

14....When,intheexigenciesofgovernment,itisnecessarytocreateanddefinenewduties,the
legislativedepartmenthasthediscretiontodeterminewhetheradditionalofficesshallbecreated,or
thesedutiesshallbeattachedtoandbecomeexofficiodutiesofexistingoffices.Thepowerextends
totheconsolidationofofficesresultinginabolishingoneandattachingitspowersanddutiestothe
other.Itmattersnotthatthenamecommissionorboardisgiventothebodycreated...."(Tayloev.
Davis,212Ala282,102So.433,40ALR1052,1057).

15TranscriptsofSessionProceedings,Senate,6February1992,p.57.

16Sec.8,Art.IXB,provides:"Noelectiveorappointivepublicofficeroremployeeshallreceive
additional,double,orindirectcompensation,unlessspecificallyauthorizedbylaw,noracceptwithout
theconsentoftheCongress,anypresent,emolument,office,ortitleofanykindfromanyforeign
government.

"Pensionsorgratuitiesshallnotbeconsideredasadditional,double,orindirectcompensation."

17Black'sLawDictionary,4thed.,p.128citingInreNicholson'sEstate,104Colo,561,93P.2d880,
884.

18Ibid.,citingStatev.Braman,173Wis.596,181N.W.729,730.

191987ed.,p.180.

20FloydR.Mechem,ATreatiseontheLawofPublicOfficesandOfficers(1890),p.48,citingIn
Johnstonv.Wilson,2N.H.205,9Am.Dec.50.

21Mechem,ibid.,citingMarburyv.Madison,ICranch(U.S.)137Craigv.Norfolk,IMod.122.

22Concepcionv.Paredes,No.17539,23December192142Phil.599,603,citingKeimvs.U.S.
(1900),177U.S.,290.

23G.R.No.65439,13November1985140SCRA22,35.

24WhileitisinarguablethatCongresshasplenaryauthoritytoprescribequalificationstoapublic
office,it"maynothoweverprescribequalificationssuchthatthePresidentisentirelystrippedof
discretion,thusconvertingappointmenttoamereministerialact"(Gonzales,NeptaliA.,
AdministrativeLaw,LawonPublicOfficersandElectionLaw,1966ed.,p.173,citingManalangv.
Quitoriano,No.L6898,30April195494Phil.903).

25RecordoftheConstitutionalCommission,vol.1,p.591.

2663AmJur2d678679.

2767CJS295.

28LinoLunav.RodriguezandDelosAngeles,No.12647,26November1917,37Phil,186,192
(emphasissupplied).

29TranscriptsofSessionProceedings,Senate,29January1992,pp.8990.
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30Vanhornev.Dorrance,1L.ed.391,citedinCruz,IsaganiA.,ConstitutionalLaw,1987ed.,p.7.

31Cruz,IsaganiA.,ConstitutionalLaw,supra.

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