Jimenez vs Commission on Ecunemical Mission

Facts: The [petitioners] are sisters and the children of x x x Nicanor Teodoro and Francisca
Ciriaco. They filed their complaint in 1982 alleging that their mother was the owner of the subject
property which was titled in her name under OCT No. 11757. Said property is now covered by
TCT No. 90689 in the name of [respondent] United Church of Christ in the Philippines (or UCCP)
for this was donated to it by the Commission on Ecumenical Mission in that Deed of Donation
dated July 1, 1977. [Petitioners] claim that their parents never sold the lot to the Board of Foreign
Missions nor any one else, and that their purported signatures on the impugned Deed of Sale
have been found to be forgeries by government handwriting experts. Relying on this
[respondents] filed this suit [imputing] the fraudulent act upon [respondents] and thus asked for
the declaration of nullity of the subject deed and of TCT No. 90689 issued in the name of UCCP,
the reconveyance of the subject property in their favor, and for the award of damages.

In their answer, [respondents] denied that there was forgery and insisted that the said spouses
legally conveyed their property under a valid deed of sale. They likewise averred that the action
was already barred by prescription and/or laches for [petitioners] filed this suit after sleeping on
their alleged rights for forty-five (45) years.

At the trial [petitioners] submitted various exhibits as documentary evidences and presented
five (5) witnesses, namely: [petitioners] Susan T. Joven and Nora T. Jimenez, handwriting experts
Arcadio Ramos of the National Bureau of Investigation and Francisco Cruz, Jr., of PC Crime
Laboratory, and [respondent] pastor Policarpio Carungin. On the other hand, [respondents]
proffered as their evidences four (4) documents and the testimonies of [Respondent] Pastor
Policarpio Carungin and that of his wife Felicula.

According to [petitioners], their father and mother died respectively on September 30, 1979 and
April 3, 1943, and they were then only minors when their mother died. In 1975 they learned for
the first time about the subject property from Irene Cruz, their aunt and the caretaker of their
mothers said property. They had no copy of the original title to the property and the only
documents they possessed proving their mothers ownership were the Application for
Registration of Title filed by their mother

With these papers on hand, [petitioners] then filed a petition for reconstitution of original
certificate of title in 1977. This was opposed by UCCP arguing that it owned the property by
virtue of a valid deed of sale signed by their parents. [Petitioners] also discovered that a petition
for reconstitution of transfer of certificate of title involving the same property had been filed way
back in 1975 by the UCCP, and in fact, in 1979 this petition of UCCP was granted and TCT No.
90689 was issued in its name. Entertaining doubts as to the truthfulness of the deed of sale,
[petitioners] secured a copy of it and showed it to their father who denied having signed the
deed. Consequently they asked for signature verification of the said deed of sale by the NBI and
the PC. In its Questioned Document Report No. 241-780 the NBI made the finding that the
sample and questioned signatures of Francisca were not written by the same person, while no
definite opinion was given as to Nicanors signatures because of the insufficiency in numbers of
his sample signatures. The PC Crime Laboratory examination came to the conclusion that the
signatures of both Francisca and Nicanor were written by persons other than the said spouses.

On the other hand, the evidence of [respondents] shows that the Board of Foreign Missions
(now the Commission on Ecumenical Mission) bought the subject property from the Teodoro
spouses in 1936. A church building was constructed on it that same year by the Presbyterian
Protestant Church which was then under the ecclesiastical auspices of the Board of Foreign
Missions. From then on, the church has remained on the property and has been regularly used
for religious worship by its members. Sometime in 1947, several protestant church bodies,
including the Presbyterian Church, were merged into a one incorporated unionthe UCCP.

the court aquo rendered its first decision of the case dismissing the complaint of [petitioners] on
the grounds of prescription and laches, and as such it did not anymore see it fit [to] resolve the
other issues of the case.

Dissatisfied [petitioners] challenged the ruling by filing an appeal with this Court docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 21704. On October 31, 1991, this Court rendered its decision reversing the lower
courts judgment holding that the case had not been barred by laches or prescription

The CA reversed the RTC, which had placed unquestioning faith and reliance on the findings of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Crime
Laboratory Service.

The appellate court doubted the findings of the NBI and the PC handwriting experts, because
the documents from which the sample signatures were taken were either mere photocopies, or
dated years away from the questioned Deed of Sale of 1936. 7 The police findings were not
conclusive upon the courts, which could totally disregard them and make their own separate
finding for themselves. After examining and analyzing the subject signatures, the CA concluded:
We x x x found no substantial indicia or reason to suspect their authenticity. Contrary to the
findings of the NBI and the PC, x x x we find resemblances but no stark and distinguishing
difference. The slight dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for these are natural, expected and
inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and the same person. x x x.8

The CA relied on the validity of the Deed of Sale, because it was notarized. Moreover,
Francisca Ciriaco, during her lifetime, never protested the building of the church in 1936. Her
nonchalant attitude towards the intrusion on the subject property was likewise displayed by
her husband and her sister who was the administrator/caretaker of her properties.
Hence, this recourse.9

Held: We clarify. As a rule, this Court accords great weight and respect, sometimes even finality,
to findings of fact of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the CA. However, where the factual
findings of the courts a quo are contrary to each other, this Court may intervene to resolve the
conflict

The reliance of appellate tribunals on the factual findings of the trial court is based on the
postulate that the latter had firsthand opportunity to hear the witnesses and to observe their
conduct and demeanor during the proceedings. However, when such findings are not anchored
on their credibility and their testimonies, but on the assessment of documents that are available
to appellate magistrates and subject to their scrutiny, reliance on trial courts finds no application.
In the present case, the CA had the same opportunity as the RTC in examining and analyzing the
questioned signatures.

It is also hornbook doctrine that the opinions of handwriting experts, even those from the NBI
and the PC, are not binding upon courts. This principle holds true especially when the question
involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual
comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones.

Handwriting experts are usually helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the
technical procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not mandatory or
indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting. 1 A finding of forgery does
not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct
an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable
conclusion as to its authenticity.

In an earlier case, this Court explained as follows:

x x x. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts.
Although such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the
issue of authenticity of the signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the mere
testimony of the handwriting expert. In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals (citing the case
of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the authenticity of
signatures

x x x is not a highly technical issue in the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum
physics or topology or molecular biology, would constitute matters of a highly technical nature.
The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of a questioned signature is certainly
much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a specialist on a highly technical
issue.

A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity x x x.

Moreover, Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to
make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings admitted or treated as genuine
by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge

the factors involved in examining handwritings were identified and explained in these words:
x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general
characteristics, similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards
spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that
may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the
question of the formers authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even
with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are
other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the
surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his state of mind,
feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the
general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence,
or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a
questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or
dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.
Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The
burden of proof lies in the party alleging forgery. Did petitioners succeed in proving that the
signatures of Francisca Ciriaco and Nicanor Teodoro had been forged?

After comparing the questioned signatures, the CA concluded that they were not forged. We
affirm its finding. Indeed, the best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the
instrument itself showing the alleged forgeries. The fact of forgery can be established by
comparing the allegedly false signature with the authentic or genuine one.
This was exactly what the appellate court did. After comparing the allegedly forged signature
of Francisca on the 1936 Deed of Sale with her authentic or genuine specimen, the CA made its
independent conclusion that there was nothing irregular in the signature on the questioned
document.

People vs Duranan
That on or about the 8th of March 1994, in xxx, Philippines, said accused with lewd designs and
by means of force and intimidation, to wit, by then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously taking advantage of undersigned complainant, AAAs feeblemindedness and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with (sic) the undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant AAA, complainants mother
BBB, and the attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.

Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is considered to
be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is unemployed and simply does
household chores for her family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainants family in the
same apartment in xxx where he rented a room that he shared with several other people.

The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994.[iv][4] AAA was standing by the door
of her grandfathers house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and
dragged her inside the common bathroom.[v][5] Complainant said that accused-appellant kissed
her and then removed her shorts and underwear as he held her hands with his other hand. She
did not cry for help because accused-appellant threatened her that he would get angry if she did.
[vi][6] She claimed that accused-appellant was able to rape her while standing up despite her
resistance.[vii][7] After the incident, complainant was sent out of the bathroom and went directly
home.

The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994,[ix][9] according to
complainant. She said she was cleaning the premises of her family residence when accused-
appellant pulled her from her house and took her to his room. According to complainant,
accused-appellant asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his
brother had left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped her.[x][10] Complainant said
she was forced to submit to accused-appellants lust because of his threats.[xi][11] After the
incident, accused-appellant sent her letters professing love for her and telling her how beautiful
she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters after reading them.

In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked complainant to let him use their
bathroom. However, after being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled
her inside the bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the door
behind them. He only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody coming.

BBB testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-
appellant. BBB noticed that her daughters lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her
daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. BBB went to
Camp Karingal, together with complainant and her other children, CCC and DDD, where they
filed affidavits and two informations. They then took complainant to Camp Crame for
examination.

With respect to the first incident of rape, which allegedly took place in the afternoon of March 7,
1994, it is contended that accused-appellant could not have committed such, because his daily
schedule was such that he was not at home at that time. He said that because of his work, he used
to leave the house at 3 a.m., arrive home at 1 p.m., and leave for work again at 3 p.m. and arrive
home at 6:30 p.m. He also alleged that on March 7, 1994 he left and was with Rico Bariquit
throughout the day. As to the second incident of rape, accused-appellant contends that it was
impossible for him to commit rape in his room because there were at least six other people there
at the time (i.e., morning of March 8, 1994) of the alleged rape. He charged that the complaints
were filed against him because complainants family wanted to evict him and his housemates
from their house.
Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-appellants schedule.[xxiii][23] Bariquit
claimed that he was always with accused-appellant and knew where he was all the time.Both
witnesses said rape could not have been committed in a room where at least five other people
were sleeping.[xxiv][24]

BBB and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig before the two testified in
court.[xxv][25]

Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on April 22, 1998, finding
the accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
[xxvi][26]

First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victims mental
age was not proven. He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential
element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the
complainants mental age to determine if her mental age is under twelve.[xxvii][27] He further
claims that only in cases where the retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived.

The contention has no merit.

Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may be
received in evidence regarding ---

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.

Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen. Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise:

The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the
physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is suffering from, and
what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter.

....

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of
a person, provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner,
habits, and conduct of the person in question. Generally, it is required that the witness details the
factors and reasons upon which he bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is. As the
Supreme Court of Vermont said: A non-expert witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or
insanity of another, when based upon conversations or dealings which he has had with such
person, or upon his appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental condition, with the
witness own knowledge and observation, he having first testified to such conversations, dealings,
appearance or other observed facts, as the basis for his opinion

n the case at bar, BBB testified on the mental condition of her daughter, thus:

Q: How would you described your daughter? (sic)

A: When she was still a child while walking she accidentally bumped her head and then on she
acted quite not normal from then on we noticed changes because she acted like a child.

Q: How old is (sic) AAA when this happened?

A: 3 to 4 years old.

Q: At the age of 25, how would you described? (sic)

A: She still thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we can see that her declaration
are (sic) true or believable.

Q: You mean to say that she could be intelligent.

A: Yes, ma'am. She finished her elementary and I can say she is quite intelligent.

Q: So she can somewhat understand what is happening around us?

A: Yes, she can understand things around as along as she would be provided some basis and
some reference inorder (sic) to establish time, places and incident (sic).

Q: At your house do you still assigned (sic) household chores(?)

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Could she relied (sic) upon madam witness?

A: Yes maam.[xxix][29]

To rebut this, accused-appellant points to the mothers statement that complainant is quite
intelligent. The statement that complainant is quite intelligent must be read in the context of BBBs
previous statement that complainant thinks like a child but from her narration or statement we
can see that her declaration are (sic) true or believable.

Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which describes complainant as coherent and
contends that this is an evaluation of the mental state of complainant. This contention is totally
without basis. The medicolegal report categorically states that the purpose of the medical
examination is limited to determining whether the complainant had been sexually abused.[xxxiii]
[33] In other words, the purpose of the examination was to determine her physical, not her
mental, state.

Second. On the alternative, accused-appellant argues that indeed, complainant could not be a
competent witness if she is a retardate. Under Rule 130, 20, any person who can perceive and
make known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case, although complainant is
a retardate, she was nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-appellant had done to her
and to answer the questions of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel.

Q: Do you know what day is today?

A: Wednesday.

Q: How about yesterday, what date was that?

A: Tuesday.
Q: Do you know what date is today?

COURT:

She knows that today is Wednesday but she doesnt know the exact date.[xxxiv][34]

....

Q: You also testified before that you were rape (sic) by Kalbo twice, is that correct?

A: Yes, Maam.

Q: When was the second time?

A: The second time at their house that was Tuesday.

Q: Is that the next day? After the incident in the bathroom?

A: Yes, Maam.

....

Q: So you said that you were laid down by Kalbo on the floor and then Kalbo kissed you, where
did Kalbo kiss you?

A: From (sic) my lips.

Q: After that what did Kalbo do if any?

A: Proceeded to removed (sic) my panty and inserted his organ to mine.[xxxv][35]

At all events, any objection to the competency of complainant to testify should have been raised
by the defense at the outset. It cannot be raised for the first time in this appeal. It has been held:

A party may waive his objections to the competency of a witness and permit him to testify.... [I]f,
after such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having
knowledge of the incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the
ground of want of mental capacity or for some other reason. If the objection could have been
taken during the trial, a new trial will be refused and the objection will not be available on writ of
error.

Third. Accused-appellant contends that the absence of injury sustained by complainant negates
the presence of any force and intimidation. This contention is likewise without merit. The
presence or absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape. What is essential is proof that
sexual intercourse with a woman was accomplished without her consent. In this case, the absence
of consent is shown by the fact that complainant is a mental retardate vulnerable to intimidation
by accused-appellant.

In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is proven by the testimony of her mother, [xl]
[40] the trial courts observations during the trial of her demeanor, behavior, and her intelligence,
[xli][41] while the fact of sexual intercourse is proven by the medico-legal certificate.[xlii][42] In
addition, the prosecution proved the presence of force and intimidation, and the court
appreciated such.[xliii][43] The intimidation, in this case, is constituted by the threats that
accused-appellant made to the complainant,[xliv][44] not to mention the force employed by
accused-appellant in placing his arm on the complainants neck[xlv][45] and holding her hands
while undressing her.

People vs Lee

Facts: the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot one JOSEPH MARQUEZ y
LAGANDI, with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries,
which ultimately caused the victims death.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. At the trial, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: (a) Herminia Marquez, the mother of the victim; (b) Dr. Darwin Corpuz, a
resident doctor at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital; (c) PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, a police
officer who examined the crime scene; and (d) Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, a medico-legal officer of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
The prosecution established the following facts: At 9:00 in the evening of September 29, 1996,
Herminia Marquez, 46 years of age and her son, Joseph, 26 years of age, were in the living room
of their house located at No. 173 General Evangelista St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
living room was brightly lit by a circular fluorescent lamp in the ceiling. Outside their house was
an alley leading to General Evangelista Street. The alley was bright and bustling with people and
activity. There were women sewing garments on one side and on the other was a store catering to
customers. In their living room, mother and son were watching a basketball game on television.
Herminia was seated on an armchair and the television set was to her left. Across her, Joseph sat
on a sofa against the wall and window of their house and the television was to his right.
Herminia looked away from the game and casually glanced at her son. To her complete surprise,
she saw a hand holding a gun coming out of the open window behind Joseph. She looked up and
saw accused-appellant Noel Lee peering through the window and holding the gun aimed at
Joseph. Before she could warn him, Joseph turned his body towards the window, and
simultaneously, appellant fired his gun hitting Josephs head. Joseph slumped on the sofa.
Herminia stood up but could not move as accused-appellant fired a second shot at Joseph and
three (3) shots moretwo hit the sofa and one hit the cement floor. When no more shots were
fired, Herminia ran to the window and saw accused-appellant, in a blue sando, flee towards the
direction of his house.

Police investigators arrived at the hospital and inquired about the shooting incident. Herminia
told them that her son was shot by Noel Lee. From the hospital, Herminia went to the St. Martin
Funeral Homes where Josephs body was brought. Thereafter, she proceeded to the Caloocan
City Police Headquarters where she gave her sworn statement about the shooting
Cause of death is intracranial hemorrhage as a result of gunshot wounds. Head.

At the time of his death, Joseph was employed as driver by the Santos Enterprises Freight
Services earning P250.00 a day.4 He left behind two children by his live-in partner who are now
under his mothers care and support. Herminia spent approximately P90,000.00 for the funeral
and burial expenses of her deceased son. The expenses were supported by receipts 5 and admitted
by the defense.6

Herminia filed a complaint for murder against accused-appellant. Appellant is a well-known

figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases pending against him in Caloocan
City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and attempted murder in 1989.
For his defense, accused-appellant presented two witnesses: (a) Orlando Bermudez, a neighbor;
and (b) himself. He denies the killing of Joseph Marquez. He claims that from 8:00 to 10:00 in the
evening of September 29, 1996, he was in his house

Accused-appellant had known the victim since childhood and their houses are only two blocks
apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days
before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to
steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victims bad reputation, appellant
presented a letter handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo
of Caloocan City, and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter,
Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked on
shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not
just steal but kill her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit.

The assigned errors principally involve the issue of the credibility of Herminia Marquez, the lone
prosecution eyewitness. Accused-appellant claims that the trial court should not have accepted
Herminias testimony because it is biased, incredible and inconsistent.

Q: Tell us what was that all about.

A: Mayroon po akong napansin na kamay na nakatutok sa anak ko.
Nakita ko po si Noel Lee na nakatayo sa may bintana.
Q: What do you mean by the word kamay?
A: Hawak hawak po niya iyong baril, nakatutok po sa anak ko.
Q: What did you do with what you saw?
A: Nakita ko pong gumanoon siya, sumilip na ganoon, sabay putok ng
baril. Tumingin po siya sa may bintana, ganoon po, sabay putok ng
baril.
COURT: You said he turned the head. Who turned the head? Sino ang
gumanyan sa sinabi mo?
A: (Witness demonstrating that the victim peeped through the window).
Q: And then?
A: At the same time the firing of the gun [sic] and I saw my son
slumped.
ATTY. OPENA TO THE WITNESS:
Q: And after your son was slumped, what did you do?
A: I went to my son and carried him to take him to the hospital.
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Five shots.
Q: That was prior to helping your son?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And how many times was your son hit?
ATTY. VARGAS:
Q: Objection, your honor. It was already answered. Because according to
her it was five shots.
COURT: It does not follow that the victim was hit. So, the witness may
answer.
WITNESS: Twice, Two shots hit my son, two shots on the sofa and one
shot on the cement.
COURT: How about the other one?
A: Boon po sa semento.
ATTY. OPENA TO WITNESS:
Q: And who fired these shots?
A: Noel Lee.
Herminias testimony is positive, clear and straightforward. She did not waver in her narration of
the shooting incident, neither did she waffle in recounting her sons death. She was subjected by
defense counsel to rigorous cross and re-cross examinations and yet she stuck to her testimony
given in the direct examination. She readily gave specific details of the crime scene, e.g., the
physical arrangement of the sofa and the television set, the height of the sofa, the wall and the
window, because the crime happened right in her own living room. She explained that she was
unable to warn Joseph because she was shocked by the sight of accused-appellant aiming a gun
at her son. The tragic events unfolded so fast and by the time she took hold of herself, her son had
been shot dead.
A sons death in his mothers house and in her presence is a painful and agonizing experience
that is not easy for a mother to forget, even with the passing of time. Herminias testimony shows
that she was living with a conscience that haunted and blamed her own self for failing to protect
her son or, at least, save him from death.
Nonetheless, accused-appellant points out inconsistencies in the eyewitness testimony. In her
affidavit of September 30, 1996 given before PO2 Rodelio Ortiz, Herminia declared that while she
and Joseph were watching television, she saw a hand holding a gun pointed at her son. The hand
and the gun came out of a hole in the window, i.e., butas ng bintana. On cross-examination,
Herminia stated that she saw a hand holding a gun in the open window, i.e., bukas na
bintana. According to accused-appellant, this inconsistency is a serious flaw which cannot be
repaired by her statement on the witness stand.

Herminia corrected her affidavit by saying in open court that she saw the hand and the gun
coming out of the open window, not from a hole in the window. In her direct testimony,
Herminia presented a photograph of her living room just the way it looked from her side on the
night of the shooting.17 The sofa on which Joseph was seated is against the wall, with the window
a few inches above the wall. The window is made of transparent glass with six (6) vertical glass
panes pushing outwards. The entire window is enclosed by iron grills with big spaces in between
the grills. The living room is well-lit and the area outside the house is also lit by a fluorescent
lamp.
Between Herminias testimony in open court and her sworn statement, any inconsistency
therein does not necessarily discredit the witness. 18 Affidavits are generally considered inferior to
open court declarations because affidavits are taken ex-parte and are almost always incomplete
and inaccurate.19 Oftentimes, they are executed when the affiants mental faculties are not in such
a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident that transpired. 20 They
are usually not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who suggests words to the affiant,
or worse, uses his own language in taking the affiants statements.

Herminias declarations are based on her actual account of the commission of the crime. She had
no ill motive to accuse appellant of killing her son, or at least, testify falsely against appellant.
Accused-appellant himself admitted that he and Herminia have been neighbors for years and
have known each other for a long time. Appellant is engaged in the business of buying and
selling scrap plastic and Herminia used to work for him as an agent. 24She would not have
pointed to appellant if not for the fact that it was him whom she saw shoot her son.

The lone eyewitness account of the killing finds support in the medico-legal report. Dr.
Rosalie Cosidon found that the deceased sustained two gunshot woundsone to the right of the
forehead, and the other, to the left side of the back of the victims head. 27 Two slugs were
recovered from the victims head. Judging from the location and number of wounds sustained,
Dr. Cosidon theorized that the assailant could have been more than two feet away from the
victim.28Both gunshot wounds were serious and fatal.29
Accused-appellant makes capital of Josephs bad reputation in their community. He alleges
that the victims drug habit led him to commit other crimes and he may have been shot by any of
the persons from whom he had stolen. 30 As proof of Josephs bad character, appellant presented
Herminias letter to Mayor Malonzo seeking his assistance for Josephs rehabilitation from drugs.
On rebuttal, Herminia admitted that she wrote such letter to Mayor Malonzo but denied
anything about her sons thievery.

Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
1. (a)In Criminal Cases:

1. (1)The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged.
2. (2)Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
3. (3)The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.

xxx xxx x x x.
Character is defined to be the possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived from
the common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his reputation. 32 Good moral
character includes all the elements essential to make up such a character; among these are
common honesty and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that
measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives, or that is up to
the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches to a man of good behavior and
upright conduct.33
The rule is that the character or reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in
determining a controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily, if the
issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the character or reputation of the
parties, the trial would be apt to have the aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual
inquiry into the merits of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not the
man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause. 34 There are exceptions to this rule however
and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph 1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove
his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this strengthens the presumption
of innocence, and where good character and reputation are established, an inference arises that
the accused did not commit the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person
of good character and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged against
him.35 Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of
the accused except only in rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged. This is intended to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who
might otherwise be convicted not because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad
character.36 The offering of character evidence on his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and
the prosecution cannot comment on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence. 37 Once
the defendant raises the issue of his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer
evidence of the defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would
have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.3

Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of
the accused.39 And this evidence must be pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged, meaning, that the character evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the
act charged,40 e.g., on a charge of rape, character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for
peacefulness or violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and
integrity.41 Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the said Rule refers to the character of the offended
party.42Character evidence, whether good or bad, of the offended party may be proved if it tends
to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
Such evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an assault or
homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.

In homicide cases, a pertinent character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as
evidence of the deceaseds aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the
accused.54 The pugnacious, quarrelsome or trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his
calmness, gentleness and peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether
the deceased or the accused was the aggressor. 55 When the evidence tends to prove self-defense,
the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to show that it produced a
reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that
a prompt defensive action was necessary.56
In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the
probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim was
the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the
deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant.
In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character
he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation.

x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or
improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), 58 such is not necessary in the crime of
murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of such character
may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of
imminent danger in the mind of the accused I and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive
action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule
does not apply to cases of murder.

CSC vs Belagan - When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his
reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the
occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose, 1 or at the time of the trial and
prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. 2This is because a
person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself.

Facts: The instant case stemmed from two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by
Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the Mother and Child Learning Center, and Ligaya
Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar Elementary School, against respondent Dr.
Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), all
from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with sexual indignities and harassment, while
Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances.

Magdalenas sworn complaint alleges that sometime in March 1994, she filed an application with
the DECS Office in Baguio City for a permit to operate a pre-school. One of the requisites for the
issuance of the permit was the inspection of the school premises by the DECS Division Office.
Since the officer assigned to conduct the inspection was not present, respondent volunteered his
services. Sometime in June 1994, respondent and complainant visited the school. In the course of
the inspection, while both were descending the stairs of the second floor, respondent suddenly
placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her check. Dumbfounded, she muttered, Sir, is
this part of the inspection? Pati ba naman kayo sa DECS wala ng values? Respondent merely
sheepishly smiled. At that time, there were no other people in the area.

Fearful that her application might be jeopardized and that her husband might harm
respondent, Magdalena just kept quiet.

Several days later, Magdalena went to the DECS Division Office and asked respondent, Sir,
kumusta yung application ko? His reply was Mag-date muna tayo She declined, explaining that
she is married. She then left and reported the matter to DECS Assistant Superintendent Peter
Ngabit.

Magdalena never returned to the DECS Division Office to follow up her application. However,
she was forced to reveal the incidents to her husband when he asked why the permit has not yet
been released. Thereupon, they went to the office of the respondent. He merely denied having a
personal relationship with Magdalena

Thereafter, respondent forwarded to the DECS Regional Director his recommendation to

approve Magdalenas application for a permit to operate a pre-school.

Sometime in September 1994, Magdalena read from a local newspaper that certain female
employees of the DECS in Baguio City were charging a high-ranking DECS official with sexual
harassment. Upon inquiry, she learned that the official being complained of was respondent. She
then wrote a letter-complaint for sexual indignities and harassment to former DECS Secretary
Ricardo Gloria.

Respondent was placed under suspension.

On the part of Ligaya Annawi, she alleged in her complaint that on four separate occasions,
respondent touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind
and pulled her close to him, his organ pressing the lower part of her back.

Ligaya also charged respondent with: (1) delaying the payment of the teachers salaries; (2)
failing to release the pay differentials of substitute teachers; (3) willfully refusing to release the
teachers uniforms, proportionate allowances and productivity pay; and (4) failing to constitute
the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and regulations.

The DECS conducted a joint investigation of the complaints of Magdalena and Ligaya. In his
defense, respondent denied their charge of sexual harassment. However, he presented evidence
to disprove Ligayas imputation of dereliction of duty.

DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision 4 finding respondent guilty of four (4) counts of sexual
indignities or harassments committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of sexual advances
or indignities against Magdalena. He was ordered dismissed from the service.

Eespondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never been
charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was
charged with several offenses before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baguio City,

the Civil Service Commission (CSC), on September 23, 1996, promulgated Resolution No.
9662136affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by Magdalena but
dismissing the complaint of Ligaya.
The CSC ruled that respondents transgression against Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct.

Respondent seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never been
charged of any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service.

Respondent claimed that the numerous cases filed against Magdalena cast doubt on her
character, integrity, and credibility.

In its Resolution No. 972423 10 dated April 11, 1997, the CSC denied respondents motion for
reconsideration, holding that:
The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor significance in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of having committed the offense.
This is so because even a prostitute or a woman of ill repute may become a victim of said offense.
As such, the fact that complainant Magdalena Gapuz is shown to have had cases before the
regular courts for various offenses and was condemned by her community for wrongful behavior
does not discount the possibility that she was in fact telling the truth when she cried about the
lecherous advances made to her by the respondent. x x x

Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. As stated earlier, it
reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalenas complaint.

The Appellate Court held that Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being
questionable. Given her aggressiveness and propensity for trouble, she is not one whom any
male would attempt to steal a kiss. In fact, her record immediately raises an alarm in any one
who may cross her path. 11 In absolving respondent from the charges, the Appellate Court
considered his unblemished service record for 37 years.

In his comment, respondent maintains that Magdalenas derogatory record undermines the
verity of her charge and that the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing it.

Issue: whether complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible. This is a question of fact
which, as a general rule, is not subject to this Courts review.

Held: Here, the Court of Appeals and the CSC are poles apart in their appreciation of
Magdalenas derogatory record. While the former considered it of vital and paramount
importance in determining the truth of her charge, the latter dismissed it as of minor
significance. This contrariety propels us to the elusive area of character and reputation evidence.
Generally, the character of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy.15 One statutory exception is that relied upon by respondent, i.e., Section 51 (a) 3,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which we quote here:
SEC. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in
any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

It will be readily observed that the above provision pertains only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. And even assuming that this technical rule of evidence can be applied
here, still, we cannot sustain respondents posture.

Not every good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved under this
provision. Only those which would establish the probability or improbability of the offense
charged. This means that the character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics
involved in the type of offense charged. 16 Thus, on a charge of rapecharacter for chastity, on a
charge of assaultcharacter for peaceableness or violence, and on a charge of embezzlement
character for honesty.17 In one rape case, where it was established that the alleged victim was
morally loose and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the conviction of the accused
doubtful.
In the present administrative case for sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence
that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he presented are charges for grave oral
defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against
her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence are inadmissible under the above provision because they
do not establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

Obviously, in invoking the above provision, what respondent was trying to establish is
Magdalenas lack of credibility and not the probability or the improbability of the charge. In this
regard, a different provision applies.

Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in the testimony given. It
refers to a persons integrity, and to the fact that he is worthy of belief. 19 A witness may be
discredited by evidence attacking his general reputation for truth, 20 honesty21 or
integrity.22 Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on Evidence reads:
SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse partys witness.A witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for
truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it
may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been
convicted of an offense

Although she is the offended party, Magdalena, by testifying in her own behalf, opened herself to
character or reputation attack pursuant to the principle that a party who becomes a witness in
his own behalf places himself in the same position as any other witness, and may be
impeached by an attack on his character or reputation.23
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the character
or reputation of a complaining witness in a sexual charge is a proper subject of inquiry. This
leads us to the ultimate questionis Magdalenas derogatory record sufficient to discredit her
credibility?
A careful review of the record yields a negative answer.
First, most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City relate to acts
committed in the 80s, particularly, 1985 and 1986. With respect to the complaints filed with the
Chairmen of Barangay Gabriela Silang and Barangay Hillside, the acts complained of took place
in 1978 to 1979. In the instant administrative case, the offense was committed in 1994. Surely,
those cases and complaints are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in according much weight to such evidence. Settled is the
principle that evidence of ones character or reputation must be confined to a time not too
remote from the time in question. 24 In other words, what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit.

Hence, to say that Magdalenas credibility is diminished by proofs of tarnished reputation

existing almost a decade ago is unreasonable. It is unfair to presume that a person who has
wandered from the path of moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly,
every person is capable to change or reform.
Second, respondent failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted in any of the criminal cases
specified by respondent. The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is
not permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or
prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his
credibility.26 This view has usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or
theories: (a) that a mere unproven charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his
credibility, (b) that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused
of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness
may not be impeached or discredited by evidence of particular acts of misconduct. 27 Significantly,
the same Section 11, Rule 132 of our Revised Rules on Evidence provides that a witness may not
be impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts. Such evidence is rejected because of the
confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be involved, and because the witness may
not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.

But more than anything else, what convinces us to sustain the Resolution of the CSC is the fact
that it is supported by substantial evidence. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is
replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school,
the specific part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient
boarders during summer. Magdalena would not have normally thought about these details if she
were not telling the truth.

Q When did the alleged kissing occur? Was it during the first time
that you went up with him or the second time?
A No, sir, on the second time, sir.
Q Second time?
A Yes, sir. We were going down, sir.
Q And you were going down?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall what portion of the stairs where you were during the
alleged kissing?
A Sir, on the topmost of the stairs.
Q Before you went down?
A Yes, sir. At the topmost because there is a base floor going up to the
stairs and it has 16 steps.
Q So, it was not on the 16th step but still on the topmost?
A Yes sir.
Q Part of the floor of the building?
A Yes, sir. Topmost, sir?
ASEC R. CAPINPIN:
Q Will you kindly tell us your relative position at that time?
A Sir, on the second time that we went up and I mentioned about
these transients that I had then and he wanted to stay in the place in
one of the rooms and then I declined and I was still showing the
rooms simultaneously. On the last, the biggest room that I had, he
said, No. Never mind, I am not going to see that anymore. So he
waited for me there and upon reaching the place, as I was to step
down on the first step going down, he placed his arm and held me
tightly and planted the kiss on my cheek, sir.

Q It says here that she would relate the incident to you. Did she relate
any incident?
A Yes, she did sir.
Q What was that incident all about?
A She was saying that when Mr. Belagan went to visit her school, he
stole a kiss from her and that she was saying that when she asked
Supt. Belagan for her papers, she was asked for a date before the
 Indorsement. After that, she left.

With Magdalenas positive testimony and that of Ngabit, how can we disregard the findings of
the DECS and the CSC? Surely, we cannot debunk it simply because of the Court of Appeals
outdated characterization of Magdalena as a woman of bad reputation. There are a number of
cases where the triers of fact believe the testimony of a witness of bad character 31 and refuse to
believe one of good character.

As a matter of fact, even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of
belief, when he testified in a straightforward and convincing manne

At this juncture, it bears stressing that more than anybody else, it is the DECS investigating
officials who are in a better position to determine whether Magdalena is telling the truth
considering that they were able to hear and observe her deportment and manner of testifying. 34
In reversing the CSCs Resolutions, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is ample evidence
to show that Magdalena had a motive in accusing respondent, i.e., to pressure him to issue a
permit. This is unconvincing. The record shows that respondent had already issued the permit
when Magdalena filed her letter-complaint. Indeed, she had no more reason to charge
respondent administratively, except of course to vindicate her honor.

We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service. Respondent
has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made a steady ascent from
an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division Superintendent. In devoting the best
years of his life to the education department, he received numerous awards. 41 This is the first time
he is being administratively charged

People vs Diopita

Facts: At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of 16 April 1995 complaining witness Dominga Pikit-
pikit, 24 years old, was walking towards Emiville Subdivision, Diversion Road, Sasa, Davao City,
on her way home from work. Suddenly, a man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her
neck and warned her not to shout or else she would die.[2] The man then dragged her through
the banana plantation towards the cornfields where the plants were a meter high and far apart.[3]
When Dominga shouted for help, the man pushed her to the ground and punched her on the
stomach saying, "Leche ka, why are you shouting? What do you want me to do, make you
unconscious?"[4]

Dominga Pikit-pikit got a good look at the man, who turned out to be accused-appellant Rafael
Diopita y Guzman, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings - ladies
watch, bracelet, ring with russian diamonds, wedding ring and P1,000.00 cash. With the full
moon shining on his face, the victim clearly saw Diopita place the items on the right pocket of his
shorts

Thereafter, accused-appellant Diopita announced his desire to have carnal knowledge of

Dominga. Forthwith, he pulled up her t-shirt and unfastened her brassiere.He also loosened her
belt, unzipped her pants and struggled to pull it down, nearly ripping her zipper. Annoyed at the
tightness of her pants, Diopita hit her and ordered her to help him pull them down. [6] Dominga,
fearing for her life and thinking of Diopitas punches, obeyed. She pulled her pants to her
hips. Then accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down further and got irritated in fact when he
was told that she was wearing a girdle and panty. In frustration, he punched her repeatedly and
kept on muttering, "Why is this very tight? What kind of panty is this?" Finally, he succeeded in
pulling the girdle and panty down.[7]
 Accused-appellant Diopita then took off his shorts. He kissed the victim, lasciviously
caressed her breasts, bit her nipples, and fornicated with her. As he was sexually assaulting her,
Dominga made desperate struggles and frantic calls for help but her efforts proved futile until he
finally satiated his lust. He then warned Dominga not to tell anyone and that should he hear that
she told anybody about the incident he would shoot her to death. Then he dressed up and left,
walking casually to the opposite direction of the subdivision before disappearing in the darkness

Exhausted, Dominga slowly stood up, put on her clothes and walked away in the direction
of her house. Finding it locked, she asked help from her neighbors who called the
police. Thereafter, Dominga was brought to Precinct No. 4 of Sasa, Davao City, where SPO1
Stephen Batacan entered her complaint in the police blotter. Later, she was examined by Dr.
Floranne Lam-Vergara at the Davao Medical Center who found her "positive for
spermatocytes."[9]
PO3 Steve dela Cruz, who was on duty at the Intelligence and Investigation Section, made a
follow-up on the case. He went to the victims house and interviewed her between the hours of
1:00 oclock and 3:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, 17 April 1995. Dominga gave a
description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts
Since the victim earlier disclosed that the suspect headed north after committing the crime, he
proceeded to that direction where he came upon four (4) houses about fifteen (15) to fifty (50)
meters away from the scene of the crime. A back-up team was called and they rounded up all the
residents therein. Afterwards, four (4) men who fitted the description of the suspect were invited
to the police station for questioning. They were Placido Laput, William Silvano, Vicente Silvano
and accused-appellant Rafael Diopita y Guzman.

the police invited Dominga to identify the suspect at the police station. Thereat, Dominga saw
the four (4) men in a police line-up and readily pointed at accused-appellant.

The defense denied the charge and invoked alibi. Accused-appellant claimed that between
8:30 to 12:00 oclock in the evening of 16 April 1995 he was with his wife Flora, son Ryan and
fellow Jehovahs Witnesses Roger Custorio and Ruben Suarez at the house of Eulalio Nisnisan for
an informal Bible session upon the invitation of Juan Nisnisan. [14] Accused-appellant also claimed
that during those hours, he never left the place. Flora, Roger, Ruben, Eulalio and Juan
corroborated his alibi and testified on his good moral character as a ministerial servant of their
faith.
On 18 June 1997, the trial court formally rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of
the crime charged (robbery with rape)
In a long line of cases, it has been held that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by the victim. Pikit-Pikit testified that she was able to see the face of
her attacker because the moon was shining brightly that evening. This Court takes judicial notice
of the fact that in the month of April 1995 the full moon came out on April 15, 1995, a day before
the date of the crime.
We affirm his conviction; the guilt of accused-appellant has been established by the evidence
beyond reasonable doubt.
First. Complaining witness Dominga Pikit-pikit positively and categorically identified
accused-appellant as her assailant, first during the police line-up where she singled him out from
among the four (4) suspects and, later during the trial where she pointed at accused-appellant as
the one who robbed and sexually molested her -
 Q: Where did you go?
A: To the Police Station, there were four persons who lined up for identification.
Q: And then?
A: First, when I arrived, I peeped behind the place where there were four persons lining
up. After that I went to the place where they were receiving visitors and I saw the four
persons who were there already and lined up.
Q: And then?
A: After that the police told me to identify the person who molested me, and I pointed to that
person there (witness pointing to the accused whom she previously identified). [15]
From the circumstances of this case, it cannot be denied that complaining witness Dominga
Pikit-pikit had a good look at the face and physical features of accused-appellant during the
commission of the crime. While the robbery was in progress, the moonlight sufficiently illumined
his face and clothes, thus making it possible for private complainant to identify him. [16] During
the rape, private complainant was as close to accused-appellant as was physically possible, for a
man and a woman cannot be more physically close to each other than during a sexual act.
[17]
Victims of criminal violence naturally strive to know the identity of their assailants and
observe the manner the crime was perpetrated, creating a lasting impression which may not be
erased easily in their memory.[18] There is therefore no reason to doubt the accuracy of private
complainants visual perception of accused-appellant as the criminal. Nor is there any reason to
doubt her honesty of intention for there is no showing that she implicated accused-appellant due
to an evil or corrupt motive.
We do not subscribe to accused-appellants contentions that the complaining witness
hesitated to point at him during the police line-up, and that she was just forced by the police to
choose him from among the four (4) suspects. The identification was made with such certainty by
the complaining witness that even accused-appellant had to comment on it -
Atty. Galicia: What made you say she was hesitant to point at you? x x x x
Rafael Diopita: Because during that time, sir, when we confronted each other in the police
station, she was looking at me when there were four of us there. So, I asked why x x x x[19]
The foregoing testimony belied the allegation of hesitancy on the part of Dominga Pikit-pikit
to pinpoint accused-appellant during the line-up. His very own words project his guilt as
well. Only the guilty experiences neurotic fear in the face of imminent discovery of his
malefaction. His paranoia colors his interpretation of the events during the line-up.
Second. In light of this positive and direct evidence of accused-appellants culpability, the trial
court correctly discarded his defense of alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail
over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the very person who committed the
crime. Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish
by clear and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of
the offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time
it was committed.[21] This, accused-appellant miserably failed to do.
Accused-appellant admitted that at the time in question he was with his wife, son and fellow
members of the Jehovahs Witnesses at the house of one Eulalio Nisnisan supposedly attending
Bible studies, which is merely fifteen (15) to fifty (50) meters away from the crime
scene. Considering the short and insignificant distance, it was not impossible for accused-
appellant to surreptitiously slip away from the house of Nisnisan, commit the crime and then
return without arousing the suspicion of his companions who were then busy with their Bible
session.
 Third. Perhaps aware of the crushing impact of complainants positive identification of
accused-appellant, the defense attacked the supposed inconsistencies and discrepancies in her
testimony in a vain attempt to make it completely unreliable, claiming that: (a) the victim
declared that the culprit wore short pants with a zipper, and he had no short pants with zipper;
(b) the yellow slipper retrieved by the police did not belong to him as his slippers were colored
blue, with his initials inscribed thereon; and, (c) the description given by complainant in the
police blotter did not fit the physical appearance of accused-appellant.
We are not persuaded. Suffice it to say that these are mere trifles which do not detract from
complainants straightforward and consistent identification of accused-appellant as the one who
robbed and raped her. Trivial inconsistencies do not shake the pedestal upon which the
complainants credibility rests. On the contrary, they are taken as badges of truth rather than as
indicia of falsehood for they manifest spontaneity and erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.[23] Furthermore, entries in police blotters should not be given undue significance or
probative value for they are normally incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial
suggestion or want of suggestion or inquiry.[
Fourth. We now deal with the more substantial arguments raised by accused-appellant in his
brief. He tenaciously maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime
charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does the position
of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a
righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.
We are not impressed. The fact that accused-appellant is endowed with
such "sterling" qualities hardly justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime
charged.Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no
guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious alone who
succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply
because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal
of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged
its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in
the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of
accused-appellant is unavailing.
Accused-appellant likewise bewails and assigns as reversible error the failure of the trial
court to give credence to the testimonies of the defense witnesses. He argues that these are
Jehovahs Witnesses, and as such, they are God-fearing people who would never lie as to his
whereabouts at the time in question. This argument is as puerile as the first. We quote once more,
and with approval, the pertinent portion of the trial courts ruling on this point -

x x x x it is so easy for witnesses to get confused as to dates and time. The precision with which
the witnesses for the defense, who are his co-members in the Jehovahs Witnesses, quoted the
respective hours when the participants in the Bible sharing session supposedly arrived is, at best,
self-serving and deserves scant consideration because of the facility with which it may be
concocted and fabricated (underscoring supplied).

The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently
performed by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not
reflected in the records.[25] Hence, the court a quo's appraisal on the matter is entitled to the
highest respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that would affect the result of the case. [26] There is no compelling reason in the present case to
depart from this rule.
In sum, we find that all the elements of robbery with rape are present in this case.