Why China's Rise Will Be Peaceful: Hierarchy and Stability in the East Asian Region

Author(s): David C. Kang

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 551-554
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 Policyresearchworkingpaper2509. Washington
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DC: David C. Kang
WhyChina'sRise WillBe PeacefuhHierarchy
and Stabilityin theEast Asian Region
Will China'sexpectedemergence as thepredominant state
in East Asia resultin hierarchy or balancing?'At least
threemajorbodiesofliterature predictthata risingChina
will be destabilizing.Realpolitikpessimistssee China's
rise as inherently so. JohnMearsheimer writesthat if
Chinathreatened to dominatetheentireregion, "Itwould
be a farmoredangerous place than it is now ... Engage-
mentpoliciesand thelikewould not dull China'sappe-
titeforpower."2Powertransition theorists alsoseerapidly
risingpower as a likelycause of conflict. RobertPowell
writesthat,"Arapidly of
shiftingdistribution powercom-
binedwiththe states'inabilityto committo an agree-
ment can lead to war."3Finally,thosewho focuson
signalingemphasizethatan authoritarian statehas more
in makingcrediblestatements about itsinten-
difficulty
tionsthana democratic state.4
However,China has alreadybeengrowingrapidlyfor
almostthreedecades,and thereis littleevidencethatthe
regionis devolvingintobalancing,or thatChina'sriseis
causingunduealarm.5Surely, giventheanticipatory nature
ofthepessimistic arguments-that states for
prepare future
contingencies today-China'sgrowth should alreadyhave
prompted a reaction from East Asian states. Stability is
also not theresultof theUnitedStatesactingas an off-
shorebalancer, attenuatingregionalconflicts andcounter-
balancing Chinese power,uniformly welcomed by East
Asian states.6Only Taiwan,and perhapsJapan,clearly
relyon a U.S. securityumbrella to balanceChinesepower.
In decidinghowcloselyto alignwitheitherChinaor the
U.S, statescanchooseto aligntightly withtheU.S., tightly
withChina, or a positionsomewhere betweenthe two.
Whileno stateis completely alliedwithChina,manystates
areat leastaccommodating itsrise(fig.1). Statessuchas
Vietnam, Thailand,thePhilippines, andevenSouthKorea
could alignmuchmorestrongly withtheUnitedStates,
buttheyhavechosennotto do so. Indeed,thecaseofEast
Asia beliesthenotionthatsome statesare "too smallto
balance."Witha potential offshore balancerin theUnited
States,evensmallstateshavea choiceaboutwhetheror
notto tryto balancerisingpower.IfTaiwan,withonly22
millionpeopleand closegeographic proximity to China,
can seekto balancebecauseof a U.S. umbrella,thenall
theotherstatesin EastAsiacouldas well.Ifmyargument
isright,thedirectionofstates'
alignments willmovetowards
ChinaandawayfromtheUnitedStates,eventhoughthey
may remainhesitantto clearlychoose one side or the
other.

David C. Kangisassociate
professor at
ofgovernment
Dartmouth (david.
College c.kang@dartmouth.edu).

September 2005 I Vol. 3/No.3 551

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Symposium I TenYearsfrom
Now

Figure1
Currentand predictedalignmentbetweenthe UnitedStatesand China of selectedEast Asian states
North
Korea Vietnam Malaysia Philippines SouthKorea Japan,
Taiwan

I I I I I
withChina
Alignment withthe
Alignment
UnitedStates

Predicted
direction
ofalignment

China'sexpectedemergence as themostpowerful state (or "unbalanced")power,it is notjust security

and eco-
in East Asia has been accompaniedwithmorestability nomicrelations,but also the intentionsand preferences
thanpessimists believedpossiblebecauseChinais increas- ofbothdominantand secondary statesthatmakeChina's
inglybecomingthe regionalhierarch.7 It has provided emergence as the largestregionalstatestableand non-
credibleinformation aboutitscapabilities and intentions This coincideswithrecentformalworkon
threatening.
to itsneighbors; EastAsianstatesbelieveChina'sclaims, international
conflict
thathasidentifiedasymmetric infor-
andhencedo notfear-and insteadseektobenefit from- mationas one of the main causal mechanisms thatcan
itsrise.This sharedunderstanding aboutChina'sprefer- Signalsmustshow that the stateis
lead to conflict.12
encesandlimited thesecurity
aimsshort-circuits dilemma.8 moderateand willingto reciprocate cooperation.13 To
One needonlyimaginetheconsequences ofJapanattempt- theextentthatChinacommunicates to itsneigh-
restraint
ing to undertake sucha roleto realizehow important is bors,and its neighborsbelieveChina, thenthe system
thissocialunderstanding about China'spositionin East willbe stableevenin thecontextof itsrisingpower.
Asia.
Furthermore, theUnitedStatesmaynot be thekeyto
in EastAsia. If theUnitedStateswithdraws SignalingChina'sintentions. Viewed in materialterms,
stability sig-
China'sriseposesbothpotentialcostsand benefits. The
nificantlyfrom the region,East Asia will not becomeas
costsare obvious:the richer and more powerful China
dangerousor unstableas the balance-of-power perspec-
tive expects,because othernationswill accommodate becomes,the moreit can bullyotherstates.And were
China'scentralpositionin EastAsia,ratherthanbalance China to provokea warsomewhere in EastAsia,itwould
effect theentireregionandquitepossibly theUnitedStates.
againstit.9
However,thebenefits fromChina'srisearejust as obvi-
ous: as botha consumer and a producer, theChinesemar-
Themicrofoundations ofhierarchy. A hierarchic system is ket is increasingly seen to hold the future for many
one thatinvolvesa dominantpowerthatdoes not fold companies worldwide, andmanycountries-including the
secondary statesunder its in
wing empire, and yet also United States-are to
attempting gain access to it.14In
doesnotcauseotherstatesto balanceagainstit.Although addition,good relations withChina also hold thepossi-
muchoftheliterature emphasizes thepotentialcostsasso- bilityforregionalstabilityand a spilloverof increased
ciatedwitha risingpower,just as important to consider economicand diplomaticcooperation.
arethepotentialbenefitstosecondary states.A risingpower Of all theAsianstates,Japanis themostlikelyto have
may demand concessions or from
territory secondary states, the capabilityto challenge China'sregional leadership, and
but it may also offer benefitsfrom a growingeconomy the ultimate directionofJapan-China relations isstill
evolv-
and lowerdefensespendingifrelations betweenthetwo ing. However,Japanhas not soughtregionalleadership
areamicable.10Balancinga risingpowerputsthebalancer and appearsunlikelyto do so in thefuture.15Although
in a betterpositionto avoid potentialcostsif thereis Japanand Chinastillhaveunsettled historical animosities
conflict.However,balancing will also be more likely to and territorial
disputes,their economic ties have beenrap-
limitthe benefits of cooperation with the risingpower, idlyincreasing, and the two countries cooperate a range
on
and mayraisecoststhroughadded defense expenditures of issues.
and creatingconflict wheretherewas noneto beginwith. Leadersof East AsianstatesbelieveChina becauseits
Thus a secondarystate'sdecisionwilldepend part in on signalsaboutitsintentions havebecomemoremoderate
thetradeoffbetween thecostsandbenefits therisingpower even as itspower has increased. Chinahastoneddownits
potentiallyprovides. rhetoric, resolvedterritorialdisputeswithits neighbors,
are
However,while materialfactors important ele- and joined(andproposed) international andregional insti-
mentsof hierarchy, sharedexpectations about state pref- tutions. Most China
significantly, has in
put writing that
erencesare just as important." In a of
system unequal it has no intentionof using force in Southeast Asia.16 East

552 on Politics
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Asian statesincreasingly see theireconomicand diplo- 8 Glaser1992.
maticfutures tiedto China.Thus statessuchas Vietnam, 9 I define"EastAsia"as comprising thestatesroughly
thePhilippines,andevenSouthKoreaarereorienting their fromJapanthrough theAssociation of Southeast
foreign to
policies adjust to it. AsianNations(ASEAN).
Why would China reassureotherEast Asian states? 10 Powell2002, 16.
Because its continuedeconomicgrowthand domestic 11 Powell(2002) writesthat"Although some
is predicated
stability on deepintegrationwith,and open- structural theoriesseemto suggestthatone can
ness to, the regionaland international economy.This explainat leasttheoutlineofstatebehavior
grandstrategy is oftencalled "peacefulrise.""17
China withoutreference to states'goalsor preferences...
recognizes thatit needscontinuedeconomicgrowthand in orderto specify a gametheoretic model,the
is dependenton continuedopen international economic actor'spreferences and benefits mustbe defined"
relations.Indeed,the ChineseCommunistParty'smain (p. 17).
claimto legitimacy is itseconomicrecord.Furthermore, 12 Kydd2005; Fearon1995, 381; Martin1993. Infor-
China realizesexplicitlythat it would gain verylittle mationis asymmetric or incomplete whendifferent
fromconflicts withits neighbors, but has muchto gain actorsknowor believemoreabouttheirownprefer-
fromwarmerties.18 encesand vitalinterests thando otherstates.This
can lead to conflict iftwosideshavedifferent assess-
mentsof theother'swillingness to fightoveran
Conclusion. Althoughmaterialfactorsare importantin issue.The othermainmechanism is the"commit-
predicting whether or not China's rise will be destabiliz- ment problem," which arises when twostatescannot
ing,I have focusedon theoften overlooked factor of infor- trust each otherto uphold theirsideofa bargain.
mationand assessments about preferences. Focusingon See Powell2004.
howChinasignalsitsintentions to neighbors leadsme to 13 Kydd1997.
concludethatEastAsia willadjustto China'srise,rather 14 Hoge 2004.
thanbalanceagainstit. 15 Heginbotham and Samuels2003.
If China is ascendingthehierarchy in EastAsia,then 16 In November2002 China signedtheDeclarationon
twootherpredictions follow.First,theUnitedStatesmay theConductofPartiesin theSouthChina Sea, a
notbe thekeyto stabilityin EastAsia.IftheUnitedStates memorandum thatprohibits theuse offorceto
withdraws fromtheregion,EastAsiawillnot
significantly settlerivalclaimsovertheoil-richSpratlyIslands.
becomeas dangerous orunstable as balance-of-power theo- Declarationon theConductofPartiesin theSouth
ristsexpect,because othernationswill accommodate China Sea, signedat theEighthASEAN Summitin
China'scentralpositionin EastAsia,ratherthanbalance PhnomPenh,November2002 (http://www.aseansec.
againstit. Second,if East Asian nationsdo not balance org).Foran assessment ofthedetailsoftheagree-
China as realistsexpect,a U.S. attemptto constructa see
ment, Ang 2004.
balancingcoalitionagainstChina usingEastAsianstates 17 Goldstein(forthcoming).
will be highlyproblematic.East Asian stateswill be 18 Shambaugh2004-5; Womack2003-4.
extremely reluctant
to choose sides, and ifforced to choose,
manywillnotchoosetheUnitedStates.
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Symposium I TenYearsfrom
Now

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Klausenis associate
Jytte politicsat
ofcomparative
professor
BrandeisUniversity @brandeis.edu).
(klausen

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